Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in CD Juarez

University of California Institute for Mexico and the United States
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez: 1928–1936

Author(s): Nicole Mottier
Source: Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos , Vol. 25, No. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 19-46
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the University of California
Institute for Mexico and the United States and the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México
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Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez: 1928–1936

Nicole Mottier*
The University of Chicago
This article examines the two drug gangs in Ciudad Juárez that were significantly
connected to local and state politics between 1928 and 1936. It sheds light on
the border drug trade and the gangs themselves, shows how the gangs influ-
enced local and state politics, and it illustrates how politics played an important
role in shaping the gangs. In doing so, it clarifies the drug and political histories
of Ciudad Juárez and the state of Chihuahua during the 1920s and 1930s.
Este artículo examina las dos bandas de narcotráfico en Ciudad Juárez que es-
tuvieron significativamente relacionadas con la política local y estatal entre 1928
y 1936. Da luz acerca del narcotráfico fronterizo y las bandas mismas, muestra
cómo esas bandas influyeron en la política local y estatal, y señala que la política
desempeñó un papel importante en la formación de las mismas. Al hacer esto,
clarifica la historia de la política y del narcotráfico de Ciudad Juárez y del estado
de Chihuahua durante las décadas de 1920 y 1930.
Key words: Ciudad Juárez, corruption, drugs, crime, organized crime, gambling,
Quevedo, governors, politics, 1920s, 1930s, border.
Palabras clave: Ciudad Juárez, corrupción, drogas, crimen, crimen organizado,

apuestas, Quevedo, gobernadores, política, 1920, 1930, frontera.
* I would like to thank Alan Knight, Emilio Kourí, Isaac Campos-Costero, Bob Chessey, the
anonymous reviewers and the editorial committee at MS/EM for their support and help-
ful comments. I am thankful for grants from the following institutions which made the re-
search and writing phases of this article possible: the British Council Overseas Research
Student Award, University College at Oxford, the Oxford Centre for Latin American Stud-
ies, the Oxford Centre for Mexican Studies, the University of Chicago Unendowed Fel-
lowship and the University of Chicago Mellon Fellowship for Latin American History.
Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos Vol. 25, Issue 1, Winter 2009, pages 19–46. ISSN 0742-9797
electronic ISSN 1533-8320. ©2009 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the Uni-
versity of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprint
info.asp. DOI: 10.1525/msem.2009.25.1.19
19

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20 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos
Before the Juárez Cartel, there were the Fernández and Quevedo drug
gangs. From 1928 through 1934, Enrique Fernández and a woman
known as La Nacha led the first organized crime gang to significantly af-
fect local and state politics. The second gang, which began in 1930, was
allegedly led by José and Jesus Quevedo, involved their brothers Lorenzo,
Guillermo, and Mauro Quevedo, and functioned under the protection of
Rodrigo Quevedo while he was governor of Chihuahua. After the Queve-
dos won a two-year bloody turf war over the gambling and narcotics busi-
nesses with their rival gang, asassinating Fernández in the process, they
merged the two drug gangs and then dominated gambling, the narcotics
trade and local and state politics through 1936.
Several analyses, most notably Mark Wasserman’s Persistent Oli-
garchs, have examined the importance of the alcohol and gambling en-
terprises to the economy and politics of both Juárez and Chihuahua state
during the 1920s and 1930s. Various historians of Chihuahua have in-
cluded the reports of Enrique Fernández and the Quevedos being in-
volved with the Juárez narcotic trade. But none of the studies about Ciu-
dad Juárez have adequately described and analyzed the Fernández and
the Quevedos’ involvement in the drug gangs or discussed the trade’s
significance in local and state politics. In order to thoroughly understand
Chihuahuan local and state politics, the Juárez drug trade and its leaders
must be analyzed along with the gambling business, local and state fac-
tionalism, local and state economies, and national political processes.
Several scholars have written on the history of drugs and politics in Mex-
ico. Amont them, Luis Astorga has shown many connections between
narcotics and politics around all of Mexico during the entire twentieth
century thanks to his broad geographic and temporal scopes.
This article builds on the existing scholarship by detailing and ex-
plicating the Juárez drug trade and its connections to politics. In doing
so, it is the first to track and examine how drug gangs affected politics,
and how politics affected drug gangs, in one place over time in Mexico
from a historical perspective. In examining the first two gangs that were
significantly connected to local and state politics, it sheds light on the
border drug trade and the gangs themselves, and shows how politics
played an important role in shaping these gangs. It details and analyzes
the alleged connections of the Quevedo family to the 1930s Juárez drug
trade. It also clarifies the political history of Ciudad Juárez and Chihuahua
state during the 1920s and 1930s by showing the links between the nar-
cotics business and politics.1
1. See: Luis Astorga, Mitología del ‘narcotraficante’; en México, Mexico City, 1995;
Luis Astorga, El siglo de las drogas, Mexico City, 1996; Luis Astorga, Drogas sin fronteras,
Mexico City, 2003; Edward Langston, The Impact of Prohibition on the Mexican-United

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Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez 21
After contextualizing the drug trade, the article provides a brief

sketch of the two Ciudad Juárez gangs, making distinctions between the
Fernández and Quevedo gangs when necessary. It then turns to the con-
nections between drug gangs and politics at the local and state levels.2
The Context
By 1928, Chihuahua had seen almost two decades of destruction and dis-
ruption brought by war and economic depression. Militarily, the state
had seen constant uprisings, first during the Revolution, and then
throughout the 1920s.3 Politically, the state legislature did not meet from
States Border:The El Paso-Ciudad Juárez Case, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Texas Tech Uni-
versity, 1974; Wilbert Timmons, El Paso:A Borderlands History, El Paso, 1990; Mark Wasser-
man, Persistent Oligarchs:Elites and Politics in Chihuahua, Mexico, Durham, 1993; Robin
Robinson, Monte Carlo of the Southwest: A Reinterpretation of U.S. Prohibition’s Impact
on Ciudad Juárez, unpublished MA. thesis, University of Texas at Arlington, 1997; Robin
Robinson Vice and Tourism on the U.S.-Mexico Border: A Comparison of Three Com-
munities in the Era of U.S. Prohibition, unpublished Ph.D thesis, Arizona State, 2002. Ax-
ayácatl Gutiérrez, Consumo y tráfico de opio en Mexico, 1920–1949, unpublished li-
cenciatura thesis, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México DF, 1996.
2. Organized crime and political corruption are difficult to analyze. Their secretive
natures leave relatively sparse documentation. I was lucky to have at my disposal several
different types of primary sources that discussed Enrique Fernández’s and Jesús, José and
Rodrigo Quevedo’s importance in the Juárez drug trade and the trade’s connections to lo-
cal and state politics. These sources were located in the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN)
in Mexico City, the Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Salud, Sección Jurídica in Mex-
ico City (AHSS, SJ), the Biblioteca Regional Arturo Tolentino Archivo del Municipio de Ciu-
dad Juárez, the University of Texas at El Paso Special Collections (UTEPSC), and the Net-
tie Lee Benson Library in the University of Texas at Austin (UTABL). They included reports
by Juan Requena, a Mexican public health official who had been sent to investigate the
drug trade in Ciudad Juárez; a list compiled by a Mr. McMurray, the Head of Narcotics in
El Paso, which described many of the members of the Fernández gang; a second list de-
scribing members of the Quevedo gang written by Dr. Francisco Urrutia, a Mexican pub-
lic health official who had been posted at Ciudad Juárez; a letter sent from José López, an
American businessman, to Ambassador Josephus Daniels about the Juárez drug gangs; a
report written by Marshall Hail, a local journalist; local and national newspapers, consul
reports on both sides of the border, several reports from Ambassador Daniels to the U.S.
Secretary of State; Mexican presidential papers at the AGN; complaints against Chihuahuan
governors at the AGN; municipal government documents from Ciudad Juárez; and com-
plaints against Rodrigo Quevedo from the Centro de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución
Mexicana, Lázaro Cárdenas, in Jiquilpan, Michoacán (CEHRMLCJ).
Even when a historian is fortunate enough to have found a variety of documents, ana-
lyzing the connection between drugs and politics remains difficult because the historian can
never trust any piece of evidence to provide a completely truthful account. However, given
the quantity and quality of evidence, the frequency that similar comments about the same
people cropped up in different sources, and the relatively lengthy time span the evidence
covers, I found the sources to be compelling and felt that the story deserved to be told.
3. Wasserman, Oligarchs, 33–34

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1913 to 1920, and none of Chihuahua’s governors were able to complete

their terms between 1920 and 1929. At no time during the 1920s would
any faction become strong enough to control state politics; that would
not happen until Rodrigo Quevedo became governor in 1932.4 This po-
litical instability was due in large part to Chihuahua’s economic diffi-
culties. The ruin of the Revolution combined with the effects of the U.S.
Great Depression meant that the state’s agriculture, mining, industry and
commerce could not fully recover until the mid-1930s.5 However, state
politicians could look to one city to fill its coffers, at least partially, and
that city was Ciudad Juárez.
Because Juárez is a border town, making it handy for arms smug-
gling, and because it was the final stop on the Mexican Central Railroad
line, making it easy to move goods and people, the city had seen fre-
quent revolutionary disruptions. Between 1910 and 1917, there were
forty-nine municipal presidents and the stream of people from all over
the country who were fleeing the war constantly drained the city’s mea-
ger resources. The Revolution also left the city with few economic
prospects; the area’s mining industry had been ruined, and it could not
serve as an entrepôt for cattle because the state’s industry had been de-
stroyed. But the United States Prohibition had given Ciudad Juárez a mar-
ket for alcohol and gambling.6 El Paso’s nightlife was moved to Ciudad
Juárez and gave local businessmen a reason to establish more tourism
enterprises in the city.7 By 1926, two-thirds of all Juárez’s businesses and
services catered to tourism and the majority of Juárez’s 42,000 strong
labor force worked in bars, casinos, nightclubs, hotels and the like.8
The American Prohibition changed Ciudad Juárez. It made it bigger 9
and more economically profitable10, and therefore, transformed it into
4. Ibid., 14, 46,

5. Ibid., 32.
6. Ibid., 131.
7. In the face of considerable local opposition, it was voted by the state legislature
that 15 April 1918 would be the final day for legal drinking in Texas, a year and a half be-
fore the eighteenth constitutional reform (the Volstead Act) outlawed liquor production,
sale and consumption nation-wide. Alcohol was finally permitted when President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt abrogated the act in February 1933.
8. Martínez, Boom Town, p59, 62; J. McConville, A History of Population in the El
Paso, Ciudad Juárez Area, unpublished MA.Thesis, New Mexico, 1966, 91.
9. The deluge of tourists in the 1920s and early 1930s made previous tourist flows
seem like a trickle. From July 1918 to July 1919, only 14,130 tourists crossed into Mexico.
In the next twelve months, 418, 735 tourists entered, and of them 83, 536, or twenty per
cent of total tourists into Mexico, visited Juárez, mainly for the alcohol that had been for-
bidden in the United States. Langston, Impact, p. 90.
10. By 1924, tourists were spending between US$2,000,000 and US$3,000,000 a year
in Juárez “Early Closing Must Receive Fair Trial to Prove its Value”, included in White to
Secretary of State, March 1924, UTABL, Internal Affairs 1910–29, Roll 148.

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a key player in state politics. Until President Lázaro Cárdenas outlawed

gambling in 1934, the casinos in Ciudad Juárez were the most substan-
tial part of the local and state treasuries, thereby providing a fair degree
of autonomy from the federal government. Equally as important, it was
one of the crucial factors in determining which faction won local and
state politics. Whoever obtained a license to operate casinos from the
state government provided substantial and legitimate funding to the treas-
ury. From the treasury, the money was then channeled into public works
projects and salaries.11
The battle between Fernández and the Quevedos for control of gam-
bling concessions brought competing Chihuahuan political factions and
different levels of government into conflict. The faction that backed the
victor controlled state government for the following two years. Thus,
the rivalry for the position of Tivoli concessionaire between the Fer-
nández and Quevedo drug gangs, and, at the state level, between Luís
León and Andrés Ortiz, was a battle for supremacy in Juarense and Chi-
huahuan politics.12
The increase in the number of casinos, saloons and bars in Ciudad
Juárez meant an increase in the number of people involved with the drug
trade. The lack of jobs for a population that had escaped to the El Paso/
Ciudad Juárez area during the Revolution promoted growth in the infor-
mal sector, including trafficking. Drug regulation on both sides of the bor-
11. Between September 1930 and September 1931, for example, gambling licenses
provided approximately fifty per cent of state income. (See “Más de un millon recibió el
gobierno de Ortiz”, El Correo de Chihuahua, 11 September 1931, AGN, Gobernación,
Andréz Ortiz Gobernador del Estado de Chihuahua, 1925–1931.) Manuel Llantada and Fer-
nández received a ten year concession in 1931 for which they had to pay 60,000 pesos
monthly which was then divided equally between the federal, state, and municipal treas-
uries, and from there, went into salaries, administrative costs, road building and various
civic improvements. (See: “Resumption of Gambling in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico”Blocker to
Secretary of State, 12 January 1931, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Reel 46; Langston, Impact,
159. ) Although a detailed account of these civic improvements is unavailable, given the
repetition in U.S. consul reports from 1921–1933 of funds earmarked for drainage and ir-
rigation, maintaining highways, improving sewage systems, building schools, and main-
taining the Juárez-El Paso bridges, it is likely that the improvements were along those lines.
But revenue from monthly license fees was rarely secure. The lifespan of any Juárez
casino was short and usually ended after bankruptcy or one of the sporadic federal inter-
ventions, and while the casino was open, much of the funds set aside for public works
were instead pocketed. (Much of the tax from Juárez casinos earmarked for the Juárez–
Ciudad Chihuahua highway, an estimated total of 720,000 pesos by September 1931 might
have gone instead to Ortiz. See: “Resume of Gambling and Bridge Controversy at Ciudad
Juárez”, Blocker to SS, 25 September 1931, Internal Affairs, Reel 46.) Furthermore, the po-
sition of concessionaire was rarely secure. It depended upon which faction was in state
power and therefore could be revoked or rewarded before it expired.
12. Langston, Impact, 160–173; Wasserman, Oligarchs, 44, 57–58, 133 ; Robinson,
MonteCarlo, 57–59; Robinson, Vice and Tourism, 47–50.

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der during the 1910s and 1920s also played a role. The U.S. federal gov-
ernment banned opium imports in 1906 and regulated the national us-
age and traffic of narcotics under the Harrison Narcotic Act in 1914, which
made it illegal for those who were not doctors to purchase opiates and
morphine. At the local level, the El Paso City Council outlawed the sale
of narcotics and marijuana in 1915. Mexico banned the cultivation and
sale of marijuana in 1920 and of poppies and opium in 1926. President
Calles added that the import of opiates, heroin or its derivatives would
be subject to the discretion of the Department of Public Health.13 Far from
quelling demand, these laws created a black market, making trafficking
more profitable. Instead of eradicating the recreational drug trade, the
regulations only forced it underground in both El Paso and Juárez.
Already by 1923, the Juárez narcotic trade had become organized
and powerful enough to co-opt and persuade certain officials to permit
its development.14 But it would not be until the end of the decade when
the drug trade would join the alcohol and gambling businesses to con-
tour the shape that local and state politics took.
The Gangs
By 1936, the drug trade encompassed Juárez, El Paso, three Chihuahuan
cities: Parral, Casas Grandes, and Ciudad Chihuahua, and Mexico City.15
The gangs sold opium and morphine, and the source of their narcotics
shifted during the first third of the twentieth century. During the Revo-
lution, opium was cultivated and harvested in Europe, then shipped
through the Panama Canal and stopped in Nicaragua before arriving at
Mexican ports. After the emergence of drug import laws in Mexico, traf-
fickers began planting small poppy fields in Sonora, Sinaloa, Nayarit, Chi-
huahua and Durango.16 But perhaps not enough was harvested, for the
first assistant to the U.S. Secretary of State wrote during the mid ‘teens
crude opium was still imported into Mexico.17 During the 1920s and
13. Ibid., p. 28.

14. Due to space constraints, I cannot go into the history of the 1920s drug trade
and gangs in Juárez. See Langston, Impact, 268–278, Astorga, Fronteras, 77–81.
15. “Traffic in Narcotics in the Ciudad Juarez Consular District” Consul Shaw to Sec-
retary of State, 1 February, 1936, Records of the U.S. Department of State Relating to the In-
ternal Affairs of Mexico, 1930–39, 812/59, (abbreviated as Internal Affairs, 1930–39) Roll 34;
“List of Persons Connected with the Narcotic Trade and Places Where Narcotics Are Sold in
Ciudad Juárez”, Josephus Daniels to Secretary of State, 24 September, 1936, Internal Affairs
1930–39, roll 34; López to Daniels, 5 March, 1934, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
16. Gabriela Recio, “Drugs and Alcohol: US Prohibition and the Origins of the Drug
Trade in Mexico, 1910–1930”, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 34, 2002, p 35–6.
17. Astorga, Fronteras, p 21, 102. For converting poppy to opium, see Astorga, Fron-
teras, 103.

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1930s, poppies were grown and converted into morphine and opium
in India or Burma, then shipped to the Green Gang in Shanghai, China,
then shipped to Los Angeles and then Juárez.18 Although it is difficult to
tell whether the gangs dealt very extensively in marijuana compared to
opium and morphine, it is very likely that many of the gangs’annual trans-
actions involved thousands of small sales of marijuana. However, because
officials and diplomats spent the most time and money tracking big deals
that amounted to several thousand pesos and involved daily smuggling
into El Paso, they could not trace the marijuana trade in Ciudad Juárez
as well as they traced the morphine and opium trade.19
It seems that the gangs were divided into four loose tiers based on
degrees of responsibility, authority, power and income.20 It was difficult
to incarcerate the leaders because they had the money and power to
manipulate politics, police and the press. With regards to the Fernández
gang, the leaders were Fernández and La Nacha.21 Fernández had been
the co-manager of the Mint Café, one of Juárez’s top nightclubs during
the 1920s.22 He was also a criminal entrepreneur. Before he became the
leader of the drug gang, he had been caught rum-running in 1923, and
between 1923 and 1928 was involved in a counterfeit ring.23 According
to the Mexican Consul in El Paso, by 1930 Fernández was known as the
“king of morphine” who financed much of the gang’s operations.24 He
was also a philanthropist who had made his fortune in the narcotic and
gambling enterprises and appeared to be well-regarded in the commu-
nity. Although he probably spent much of his money on himself (since
his youth, Fernández had “loved fine clothes and spending money”) he
18. Conversation with Chaowarit “M” Chaowsangrat, 7 May 2004, Latin American
Centre, Oxford University.
19. For the history of marijuana in Mexico from colonial times through the early twen-
tieth century, see Isaac Campos-Costero, Marijuana, Madness, and Modernity in Global
Mexico, 1545–1920. (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 2006).
20. For further details and analysis of the gangs and of their connections to politics,
see Nicole Mottier, Organised Crime, Political Corruption and Drug Gangs in Ciudad
Juárez, Mexico, 1928–1937 (Unpublished M.Phil Thesis, Oxford University, 2004).
21. For more information on the life and times of La Nacha, see: Bob Chessey, La
Nacha: Border Tales of Dope and Depravity, forthcoming manuscript.
22. Clipping from unnamed newspaper: “Blame Killing of Fernández on Officials”,
15 June 1934, UTEPSC, MS 145 John J. Middagh Papers Box 12, Folder 147 Enrique
Fernández.
23. Marshall Hail, “Enrique Fernández”, UTEPSC, MS145, John J Middagh Papers, Box
12, Folder 147, Enrique Fernández. (abbreviated as Hail, “Fernández”.)
24. Eduardo Hernández Chazaro, Secretario Particular del C. Presidente de la
República de México to Gobernado del Estado Chihuahua, 12 August 1930, AGN, Ortiz
Rubio, caja 39, ex 230; Blocker to Secretary of State, 25 September 1931, Internal Affairs
1930–39, roll 46; Luis Medina Barron to President Ortiz Rubio 20 August 1930, AGN, Ortiz
Rubio, Box 39, Ex 230.

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used profits from drugs and gambling to benefit the city. He allegedly
channeled resources into rural schools near Juárez.25 The Ortiz Rubio
School alone cost him approximately 16,000 pesos.26 He was said to play
Santa Clause every Christmas for children from impoverished families.27
Several undertakers stated that he had paid for the funerals of many
Juarenses whose families could not afford proper burials. When it was
his time to be buried, it was reported that thousands of people gathered
to show their last respects.28
La Nacha was said to have joined the gang after her first husband,
who was heavily involved in the Juárez narcotic trade, was shot in a Juárez
brothel.29 Fernández convinced La Nacha that it would be in her best in-
terest to join his gang. Starting at the bottom, she sold drugs to addicts
and went to prison for Fernández’s crimes. On one such occasion, Sep-
tember 19, 1929, La Nacha was charged with committing a crime against
public health, only to be freed a couple of weeks and 300 pesos later.30
Fernández sometimes paid her bail, which demonstrated her importance
to the gang and further cemented her obligation to it.31 By 1933, it was
reported that she was one of the largest dealers in Juárez.32
The leaders of the Quevedo gang were said to be the two Quevedo
brothers who were directly involved in the gang’s operations, José and
Jesús. It was also said that their other brother, Rodrigo Quevedo was in-
directly involved while he was governor of Chihuahua.33 The Quevedo
25. Hail, “Fernández”, MS 145; Article, “Sangriento drama en Madero”, UTEPSC, MS

145 J. J. Middagh Papers Box 12, Folder 147 Enrique Fernández.
26. “El Sr.Enrique Fernández y su actuación en beneficio de la colectividad”, MS 145
J. J. Middagh Papers Box 12, Folder 147 Enrique Fernández.
27. Hail, “Fernández”, MS 145.
28. “Thousands at Depot When Fernández’s Body Arries”, 18 January 1934. UTEPSC,
MS 145 J. J. Middagh Papers Box 12, Folder 147 Enrique Fernández.
29. “Capturaron en Ciudad Juárez A. González”, El Continental, 13 September 1929;
Hail, “Fernández”,”Alleged Drug Queen of Drug Trade Held in Juárez”, El Paso Herald, 13
August 1930; Detectivos, 22 January 1934.
30. Hail, “Fernánadez”; Report, Ignacia Jasso de González by Secretario Encargado
del Juzgado Ignacio Castro 1 October, 1929, Archivo Muncipal de la Ciudad Juárez (AMCJ),
Box 629–1929, Rama de Justicia October 1929 #1018; Comandante de Policía to C. Juez
de lo Civil, 29 September 1929, AMCJ, Box 629–1929, Asuntos Varios 1929.
31. Hail, “Fernández”.
32. Westover to Bureau of Narcotics, 15 June 1933, Internal Affairs, 1930–39, Roll 34.
33. José, Jesús and Rodrigo Quevedo’s involvement was reported in many sources.
See for example: Francisco Urrutia to Ambassador Daniels, “List of Persons Connected with
the Narcotic Trade and Places Where Narcotics Are Sold in Ciudad Juárez” 24 September
1936, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34; José López to Ambassador Daniels, 5 March 1934,
Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34; Grupos Libertarios to Cárdenas, 11 June 1936, Centro de
Estudios Historicos de la Revolución Mexicana, Lázaro Cárdenas, Jiquilpan, Fondo Múgica
Vol 61, Doc.10; Report on Rodrigo Quevedo, 22 January 1936, Centro de Estudios Histori-
cos de la Revolución Mexicana, Lázaro Cárdenas, Jiquilpan, Fondo Múgica Vol 61, Doc. 4.

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brothers were first and foremost politicians whose political and eco-
nomic power arose because of the Revolution.34 The leader of the fam-
ily, Rodrigo, fought in the Revolution, ultimately siding with the Con-
stitutionalists. During the 1920s he defended the regime against several
rebellions and served as chief of military operations in Morelos, Guana-
juato, Puebla and La Laguna. His brothers, Jesús and José, both had held
several local political positions. During the 1920s and ‘30s, Jesús was
presidente municipal of Casas Grandes (1920); a member of the state
legislature (1922–24); tax collector of Ciudad Juárez (1924–25); city
councilor of Ciudad Juárez (1930); and mayor of Ciudad Juárez in 1930
and 1932–33. José was presidente municipal of Casas Grandes in 1911;
tax collector of Casas Grandes, Villa Ahumada and Ciudad Juárez; and
presidente municipal of Ciudad Juárez in 1936–37. The Quevedos were
able to build their fortunes thanks to their political power. During the
1920s and ‘30s they acquired land from the Terrazas latifundio and used
that in turn to help reconstruct the Chihuahuan cattle industry, which
had been badly damaged during the Revolution. The family owned the
Ciudad Juárez power company. They also owned the municipal slaugh-
terhouse and allegedly skimmed off eighty per cent of the profits meant
for the city government. In his first year as governor, Rodrigo Quevedo
acquired two million pesos and property, livestock and other businesses35
As we will see, José, Jesús and Rodrigo Quevedo’s supremacy in the Juárez
drug trade also directly derived from their formal political power.
Unlike Fernánadez, the Quevedos did not enjoy continuous popu-
larity while they were formally politically powerful. On the contrary, they
were widely criticized for their corruption and, by the time Rodrigo left
the governor’s seat, were hated by much of Chihuahua. The community
probably recognized several differences between Fernández and the
Quevedos. Fernández’s assistance to the city and to individuals was en-
tirely voluntary. Unlike the Quevedos, he was not a politician, so he was
not held accountable to campaign promises for municipal improvements.
Nor was he a representative of a state whose officials may have been
perceived by citizens as illegitimate and unwilling to provide basic needs
and services to the community. In addition, Fernández may have culti-
vated more personal ties than the politicians, which created a favorable
impression in the eyes of those whom he personally helped.
The second tier of the gangs was probably comprised of those who
were in charge of dealing with big shipments and distributing them on
a large scale. By 1931, according to one observer, narcotics were sold
34. There were eleven Quevedo brothers in total. This article focuses only on three
of them: Jesús, José and Rodrigo Quevedo.
35. Wasserman, Oligarchs, 43, 100–102.

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“by the ton”. (Regardless of whether this was true, it does indicate that
large amounts were trafficked by the gang relative to the amounts of pre-
vious years).36 After switching sides to become part of the Quevedo gang,
La Nacha became a second-tier member, acting as their representative
in distributing and shipping the narcotics.37 Her second husband was
identified as a major supplier in both gangs.38 Several second-tier mem-
bers held or had held positions of authority in Juárez, which provided
connections and protection for the gang. In both gangs, some of the
members were local officials.39
Not surprisingly, the leaders and the second tier members of the gang
were also difficult to arrest. Interim Police Chief Urbano Zea, who was
appointed by a temporary and moralistic junta municipal in August
1930, complained that this was mainly because “securing evidence
against them is difficult”because “they remain far in the background and
take few risks.”40 If they were caught, upper-echelon members rarely
served their entire sentences: Juan Requena (a public health official who
had been sent by the federal government to investigate the city’s drug
trade,) explained that “there are individuals on the list that have two,
three, and five accusations in Ciudad Juárez, but in some way they have
always made a mockery of justice.”41
The third tier was likely comprised of members who had some skills
and connections, but did not enjoy the same level of responsibility and
local immunity that their upper-echelon counterparts did. The owners
of opium dens were one such group within this tier. Most of these were
owned by Chinese men, and combined a fumadero, where the customer
smoked opium through a chandoo, and a picadero, where the patron
36. A. Wagner to US Treasury Department, 7 October, 1931, UTABL, Internal Affairs

1930–39, roll 33
37. Hail, “Fernández”, José López to Ambassador Daniels, 5 March 1934, Internal Af-
fairs 1930–39, roll 34.
38. “Sangriento Drama en Madero”, 14 January, 1934. UTEPSC, MS 145, J. J. Middagh
Papers, Box 12, Folder 147 Enrique Fernández; McMurray list included in Requena to Salu-
bridad Pública 20 July 1931, AHSS, SJ Box 28, Ex 6.
39. I cross-checked each member of the gangs that I came across in both the lists
that McMurray and Urrutia wrote, newspaper clippings and police records with the men
who were named as municipal officials in Armando Chávez’s Sesenta años de gobierno
municipal. McMurray List and report written by Juan Requena both included in Requena
to Salubridad Pública, 20 July 1931, AHSS,SJ, Box 28, Ex 6.; Francisco Urrutia to Ambas-
sador Daniels, “List of Persons Connected with the Narcotic Trade and Places Where Nar-
cotics Are Sold in Ciudad Juárez” 24 September 1936, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34;
Armando Chávez M. Sesenta años de gobierno municipal, jefes politicos del Distrito
Bravos y presidentes del Municipio de Juárez 1897–1960. Mexico, 1959.
40. “Juarez Police Open Drive on Dope Ring, Eight Are Arrested”, El Paso Herald,
14 August, 1930.
41. Juan Requena to Salubridad Pública, 20 July 1931, AHSS,SJ, Box 28, Ex 6 1931.

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injected morphine or heroin.42 Those in charge of the dens attempted

to place them inconspicuously in their homes or in the backrooms of
their businesses.43 Though there were many fumaderos on Colón Street,
the most “shameless” of all was located behind the federal sanitary del-
egation offices.44 Those employed in medicine also participated. Several
of the known members of the gangs were doctors who could legally traf-
fic by prescribing medicine to their patients; others were the owners of
drug stores—also places to buy and sell drugs. It was reported that Mauro
Quevedo owned a drug store which accepted large narcotic shipments
from Mexico City or Torreón on Tuesday, Thursday, or Saturday, the days
when the drugstore kept longer hours.45 Finally there were the pistoleros,
who killed rival gang members, and the Juárez madams, who were de-
scribed to be “among the boldest traffickers in drugs”.46
The majority of gang members were in the fourth tier. They took
risks most frequently, and so were the most exposed and the most fre-
quently caught. After arresting eight men in Juárez in August 1930,
Chief of Police Zea shed light on how men and women became part
of this tier: “Certain men in Juárez hire addicts and felons to carry on
the actual mechanical functions of the ring.”47 It is likely that some of
those “who had been put in jail as vagrant and vicious sellers of drugs”
and whom the Quevedos took “into their employ” were also part of
this tier.48 Also likely is that some of the people noted on a list of the
members of the Fernández gang which had been compiled by the head
of narcotics in El Paso were members of this tier.49 Furthermore, it is
probable that some of the one hundred city employees, truck drivers,
carpenters, street cleaners, waterworks operators and electricians
who had been fired during an earlier reformist municipal administra-
42. Gutiérrez, Opio 86.

43. “Fue aprehendido por vendedor de drogas”, El Excelsior, 3 August 1930, 5.
44. Luis Astorga, Siglo, 47; Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch no. 4178, Josephus Daniels
to Secretary of State, 8 December 1936, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
45. Francisco Urrutia to Ambassador Josephus Daniels, “List of Persons Connected
with the Narcotic Trade and Places Where Narcotics Are Sold in Ciudad Juárez” 24 Sep-
tember 1936, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
46. “Luchas de gangsters provocan una intensa tragedia a balazos en la Avenida F.I.
Madero”Excelsior, 14 January 1934; Urrutia report to Ambassador Josephus Daniels which
was enclosed by Ambassador Daniels in his letter to the American Embassy in Mexico City,
8 December 1936, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
47. “Juárez Police Open Drive on Dope Ring, Eight are Arrested”El Paso Herald, 14
August 1930.
48. José López to Ambassador Josephus Daniels, 5 March, 1934. UTABL, Internal Af-
fairs 1930–39, roll 34.
49. McMurray list included in Requena to Salubridad Pública 20 July 1931, AHSS, SJ
Box 28, Ex 6.

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tion probably joined this tier in the Quevedo gang after Jesús Quevedo
won them over by reinstating their employment early during his mu-
nicipal presidency.50
The main activity of members in this tier was short-term and short-
distance smuggling and selling. Members in both gangs smuggled drugs
across the border, where transaction sometimes occurred in the Con-
cordia Cemetery in El Paso after dusk.51 Though sellers approached
people in the open, most deals occurred in the sellers’ homes, and in
casinos, bars and brothels along both sides of the border.52
Drugs, Gambling, and Politics

The governor of Chihuahua collected enough evidence in 1927 to con-
vict Fernández and his brothers Antonio and Simón with trafficking drugs
on a large scale and send them to the Islas Marías penitentiary.53 But Fer-
nández was not incarcerated because he contacted an important politi-
cian who pulled a few strings and immediately returned him to Juárez.54
It is likely that the obliging politician was Luís León, who allegedly had
a friendship with Fernández, had held several political positions rang-
ing from the director of the Sonoran State Agricultural Department to
the Federal Ministry of Industry and Commerce, and was serving on the
National Committee of the PNR.55 Fernández would become an impor-
tant figure in the Luis León faction in northern Chihuahua, and supported
León when he and Andrés Ortiz disagreed irreconcilably over agrarian
matters during Ortiz’s gubernatorial term in 1930.
Once he controlled the Juárez narcotic trade in the late 1920s, it did
not take long for Fernández to gain enough informal political power to
get his men elected to the municipal government. The internal election
to name the candidate of the PNR, held at the Juárez Jockey Club on Sep-
tember 8, 1929, was fixed by his gang from the start. The commander
of the Juárez garrison was in charge of placing the soldiers as close to
the polls as permissible to ensure vigilance. He was thought to be in-
50. “New Regime Has Control in Juárez”, El Paso Herald, 15 August 1930, p1, 5.
51. Langston, Impact, 270.
52. “Representative of Mexican Government in Ciudad Juárez Investigating Narcotic
Traffic.” Blocker to SS, 23 April 1931, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 33.
53. “Fernández si es que no debe delito alguno, por qué lo ha perseguido la justi-
cia?” 20 December 1934, UTEPSC, MS 145 J. J. Middagh Papers, Box 12, Folder 147 En-
rique Fernández; José López to Ambassador Josephus Daniels, 5 March 1934, Internal Af-
fairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
54. Marshall Hail, “Enrique Fernández”, UTEPSC, MS 145 J. J. Middagh Papers Box
12, Folder 147 Enrique Fernández.
55. Requena to SP, 20 July 1931, AHSS,SJ, Box28, Ex 6, 1931; Roderic Camp, Mexi-
can Political Biographies, 1935–1993, 3rd ed., Austin, 1995, 390–91.

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volved in narcotics and was “no stranger to Enrique Fernández”.56 After

the polls closed a member of the Fernández gang was one of two men
chosen to represent the PNR in formally announcing which candidate
the official party in Chihuahua would back. Predictably, Gustavo Flores,
the candidate whom Fernández supported and who was noted as being
one of the “principal traffickers” in the Fernández gang, won the elec-
tion for the municipal presidency, and just as predictably, did not seem
to win honestly.57 The local press reported that he was an unpopular
candidate who had been placed by Fernández and Luis León, and an
agent of the Mexican Public Health Department wrote that Flores com-
mitted several “outrages”, including freeing prisoners, forming them into
“flying columns”and then letting them loose to take over voting booths
and to harass supporters of the opposing party.58
Under Gustavo Flores, Fernández and his gang continued to enjoy
immunity and political influence. Members of the Fernández gang re-
ceived favors from Flores, which probably aided their contributions to
the gang.59 “When Gustavo Flores rose to power,” one journalist re-
marked, “the ‘business’ of Fernández prospered notably. The racketeers
were not persecuted because they were in power . . . they even placed
judges and mayors for the benefit of their maniobras and works.”60 In
addition to Flores himself, several men in his municipal administration
were involved heavily in narcotics between 1925 and 1938. One of the
substitute councilors was charged with smuggling in 1938 while he was
municipal president.61 The police chief was a friend of Fernández’s, his
56. “Memorandum al Sr. Presidente de Ciudad Juárez” 7August 1930 Ulises Irigoyen
to President Ortiz Rubio, AGN, Ortiz Rubio, Box 39, Ex 230 (1930); “Corona Protests Elec-
tion, Wants Acting Mayor Named After Jan. 1”, El Paso Herald, 18 November 1929.
57. McMurray List included in Requena to Salubridad Pública, 20 July 1931, AHSS,SJ,
Box 28, Ex 6 “Se discutira un Dictamina”, El Continental, 12 September 1929; “Corona
Protests Election, Wants Acting Mayor Named After Jan. 1”, EPH, 18 November 1929; “Fer-
nández se es que no debe delito alguno, por qué lo ha perseguido la justicia?” 20 Decem-
ber, 1934, UTEPSC, MS 145 John J. Middagh Papers, Box 12, Folder 147.
58. “Fernández se es que no debe delito alguno, por qué lo ha perseguido la justi-
cia?” 20 December, 1934, UTEPSC, MS 145 John J. Middagh Papers, Box 12, Folder 147;
“Memorandum para el C. Gobernador del Estado, sobre las condiciones que prevalecen
en Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua.” Rosales to Barrón, 18 August 1930. AGN, Ortiz Rubio, Box
39, Ex 230 (1930).
59. Flores to whom it may concern, 23 January 1930, AMCJ, Ramo de gobernación,
correspondencia particular, Meses de enero, febrero, marzo y abril 1930, #1101, Year Box
1930, number 660 1101,1102.
cia?” 20 December, 1934, UTEPSC, MS145 J. J. Middagh papers, Box 12, Folder 147 En-
rique Fernández.
61. File note regarding José Borunda in Ciudad Juárez, 12 January 1938, Internal Af-
fairs 1930–39, Roll 34.

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occasional bodyguard, and, on at least one occasion, waited for a mor-

phine shipment at the Juárez train station with Gustavo Flores.62 Jesús
Quevedo, the councilor of Salubridad y Beneficia, would become one
of the leaders of the Quevedo gang. Another councilor would later par-
ticipate in the Quevedo gang. The Jefe de las Comisiones de Seguridad
was a third- or fourth-tier member in the Fernández gang. Dr. Daniel
Quiroz, a doctor on the town council and a future municipal president,
would also join the Quevedo gang.63 They were thus willing to abuse
their office, either by exploiting their power or by willfully neglecting
their public duties, something that even concerned President Ortiz Ru-
bio. He stated in a telegram to Governor Almada in July 1930: “. . . the
municipal administration of Ciudad Juárez is in the hands of persons who
do little honor to their positions [by virtue of being persons of ] bad an-
tecedents, vice-ridden and underhanded— they traffic in drugs.”64
As gang members and their cronies achieved power in Juárez, Fer-
nández reached the peak of his political influence: he was said to be “all
powerful along the frontier”. According to several sources, he used his
connections and money to direct state politics when he backed the cam-
paign of Andrés Ortiz and got him elected to the governorship of Chi-
huahua. During the spring and summer of 1930, Ortiz was on good terms
with Luis León and thus enjoyed the Chihuahuan agrarians’ support. It
seems that Ortiz knew that Fernández was “recognized as a promoter
of candidates and magnificent in his donations”, so it was arranged for
Fernández to go to Ciudad Chihuahua several times to meet the candi-
date. On one occasion, Fernández was said to have given him a total of
25,000 pesos.65 It was reported that he also sent 10,000 pesos to buy
several deputies on August 9, 1930 so that the State Legislature would
declare Ortiz the victor, which it did three days later.66 In his letter to
Ambassador Josephus Daniels, businessman José López wrote that the
1930 gubernatorial election illustrated that Fernández and his drug gang
62. Luis Medina Barron, report, 18 July 1930, AGN, Ortiz Rubio, Box 39, Ex 230;
“Thousands at Depot When Fernández’s Body Arrives” 18 January 1934, UTEPSC, MS 145
John J. Middagh Papers, Box 12, Folder 147.
63. Armando B. Chávez M., Jefes políticos del Districto Bravos y presidentes de
municipio de Juárez 1897–1960, Mexico, 1959, 271; McMurray List included in Requena
to Salubridad Pública, 20 July 1931, AHSS,SJ, Box 28, Ex 6; Francisco Urrutia to Ambas-
sador Josephus Daniels, “List of Persons Connected with the Narcotic Trade and Places
Where Narcotics Are Sold in Ciudad Juárez” 24 September 1936, Internal Affairs 1930–
39, Roll 34;
64. Ortiz Rubio to Almada, 24 July 1930, AGN, Ortiz Rubio, caja 39, expediente 230
1930.
65. López to Daniels, 5 March 1934, UTABL, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
66. Eduardo Hernández to Governor Almada, 12 August 1930, AGN, Ortiz Rubio,
caja 39, expediente 230 .

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controlled “even public affairs, as the highest officials and the lowliest
employees shared in the abundant and inexhaustible funds of the splen-
did magnate of the Juárez gang. [This occurred for ] every political cam-
paign whether it was for the re-election of the municipal councils of
Juárez, Guadalupe, San Ignacio, . . . or in the elections of deputies and
senators by the state of Chihuauha, and still more for elections for Gov-
ernor of the state of Chihuahua . . .”67
The Flores administration was ousted on August 1, 1930 and replaced
by five Juarense businessmen who governed Juárez as a junta munici-
pal. 68 Their intent to clean up the Juárez drug trade shed more light on
the Flores administration and the extent of Fernández’s informal politi-
cal power. A few days after they took charge, over one hundred people,
many of whom had been hired under the Flores administration, either
were fired or resigned from their jobs. Many were involved with narcotics.
One of those fired was the director of the jail who had been charged with
possession only a few months earlier.69 The Agente del Ministerio Público
remarked that his desk “was overflowing” with indictments. In the two
weeks that it held office the zealous junta reported more morphine
crimes than had been reported in the previous two years.70
But the reform was temporary. Jesus Quevedo, appointed munici-
pal president by the governor in mid-August, began his political rise and
used his newfound power to start building his rival drug gang by re-
hiring those who the junta fired. He also protected people involved in
narcotics by deliberately overlooking their activities. One of the federal
sanitary agents sent by the federal government to get information about
the Juárez drug scene complained that “none of the persecutory meth-
ods are effective because the very same municipal authorities tolerate
and protect the traffickers”.71 The municipal police were no exception.
One of Quevedo’s first orders was to replace the moralist police chief who
the junta municipal had appointed with one of the Quevedo allies.72
Only four days into Quevedo’s administration, Consul Luis Barrón com-
plained that “everything has returned to its original state . . . the drug
67. López to Daniels, 5 March 1934, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
68. “Governor Escobar Appoints Advisory Board to Rule Juárez City Government.”
2 August 1930, El Paso Herald; Blocker to Secretary of State, “Political Conditions in the
Ciudad Juárez Consular District”, 1 August 1930, Internal Affairs 1930–39, roll 8.
69. “Indice del Legajo de Gobernación” 14 August 1930, AMCJ, box no. 654, Book,
Augusto 1930.
70. Almeida to Escobar, 15 August 1930, AGN, Ortiz Rubio, caja 39, expediente 230
(1930).
71. Rosales to Barrón, 18 August 1930, included in Barrón to Ortiz Rubio, 20 August
1930, AGN, Ortiz Rubio, Caja 39, expediente 230 (1930).
72. “New Regime Has Control in Juárez”, 15 August 1930, El Paso Herald, Pineda;
“Ciudad Juárez está en calma”, El Excelsior, 20 August 1930.

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dealers are dealing almost publicly and the councilors and their friends
enjoy this situation”.73
Although Jesús Quevedo used his position to start building his own
drug gang, Fernández did not take any action against him. He may have
felt that he still had the upper hand, which, in fact, seemed to be the
case. Through part of 1931, Fernández’s gang was the more powerful
of the two, not to mention that Fernández had more money. Rodrigo
Quevedo was alleged to have sought Fernández for a loan of over
130,000 pesos to help his political career. In exchange, Fernández re-
ceived a great deal of immunity; “any official”, wrote José López, “who
received assistance and money from Fernández for his election, assumed
an obligation to aid him later in his activities, assure his impunity, cover
up his contraband business, and tolerate everything that the contraband
chief might do”.74 Furthermore during the summer of 1931, Fernández
had “at his service, six politicos who cared for him day and night”.75 Per-
haps these included the Quevedo brothers.
In addition, the Quevedos and Fernández were on the same politi-
cal side. At the time of Ortiz’s election in July 1930, the Luis León fac-
tion dominated state politics, and both Fernández and the Quevedos
were all allies of Ortiz, León and Calles and they had won the good graces
of Governor Almada, one of the leading figures of the León faction in
the state.76
The Quevedos and Fernández were also in the gambling business
together. In January 1931 Fernández joined Manuel Llantada, an ex-
governor of Nayarit who was an ally of the Quevedos (though never a
member of their drug gang), in managing the Tivoli casino. At this time
it was easy for Fernández to get a concession for the Tivoli; after all, Or-
tiz had to show his appreciation for Fernández’s help in getting him
elected. And in light of the financial help he had given Rodrigo Quevedo,
it made sense that Fernández and Llantada would share management of
the casino.
Within a few months of being awarded possession of the gambling
concession along with Llantada, Fernández found himself in a very dif-
ficult situation, one which would mark the beginning of his downfall.
In March 1931, Govenor Ortiz and Luis León disagreed over agrarian mat-
ters, causing Ortiz to travel frequently to Mexico City in hopes of sal-
73. Barrón to Hernández, 19 August 1930, AGN, Ortiz Rubio, caja 39, expediente
230 (1930).
75. Requena to C. Jefe del Depto de Salubridad Pública, 20 July 1931, AHSS, SJ, caja
28, expediente 6 1931.
76. “Political Conditions in the Ciudad Juárez Consular District”, Blocker to SS, 15
August 1930, UTABL, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 8.

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vaging his political position. José López reported that heavy expenses
caused Ortiz to seek support from Fernández who, this time, brusquely
refused his request for 35,000 pesos.77 Given that Fernández had been
one of the unofficial leaders of the leonistas in northern Chihuahua, he
probably decided to side with León. But Fernández calculated badly. In
early September, Ortiz feigned ignorance of Fernández’s dominance of
the Juárez drug scene and rescinded Fernández’s share of the Tivoli con-
cession after publicly “discovering”that he was the “narcotic king of Ciu-
dad Juárez”. Manuel Llantada then received the entire concession and
paid Fernández 50,000 pesos, a meager reimbursement for all of the
Tivoli’s expensive gambling equipment.78 Around the same time, an ed-
itorial campaign criticizing Ortiz’s encouragement of gambling appeared
in the El Paso Times. Whether or not Fernández was actually behind it,
Ortiz blamed him.79 In meetings, Ortiz began to speak “contemptuously”
of Fernández and it was rumored in 1931 that he wanted to have him
assassinated.80 Although Ortiz’s overt hostility toward Fernández was
probably personal, his actions fit his pattern of ousting all the loyal Leon-
istas from the state government.
Once Fernández was out of the Tivoli management, Ortiz (who had
been the third partner all along81) and Llantada were left as the only part-
ners. The Quevedos, for their part, had sided with Ortiz, and it was be-
lieved that they used their alliance with him as an opportunity to gain
the upper hand on Fernández. Jesus Quevedo and Ortiz seemed to have
conspired to burn down the Mint Café, which Fernández had continued
to co-manage, on September 13.82 Like his business, his leadership of
the drug trade, and his involvement in Juárez gambling, his immunity
and informal political power would be destroyed in a short while.
Ortiz would not last either. The Quevedos were not content to share
power with him, political or otherwise. Desiring to establish their po-
litical dynasty, Rodrigo Quevedo managed to get President Ortiz Rubio
and Jefe Máximo Calles to force Governor Ortiz’s resignation on No-
77. López to Daniels, 5 March 1934, UTABL, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
78. “Resume of Gambling Bridge Controversy at Ciudad Juárez, Mexico”, Blocker
to SS, 25 September 1931, UTABL, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 46.
79. Blocker to Secretary of State, 20 August 1931, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 46.
“Further Details Regarding the Gambling Situation in Juárez”Blocker to SS, 20 August 1931,
Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 46. “Resume of Gambling and Bridge Controversy at Ciudad
Juárez, Mexico” Blocker to SS, 25 September 1931, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 46;
Langston, Impact, 164.
80. Fernández to Puentes, 1 August 1931, AGN, Gobernación, Andrés Ortiz Gober-
nador del Estado de Chihuahua (1925) 2.384. (6)/21 (1931).
81. Wasserman, Oligarchs, 58.
82. “Incendario”, Diputado Arriola and five others, AGN, Gobernación, Andrés Ortiz
Gobernador de Estado de Chihuahua, (1925) 2.384 (6)/21 (1931).

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vember 2, 1931. An interim governor replaced him for two weeks while
the PNR scrambled to find someone to take over for the rest of Ortiz’s
term.83
Meanwhile Fernández had been working toward a favorable out-
come in the November 1931 election for municipal president. He per-
sonally financed all of his candidate’s campaign expenditures, who was
apparently not involved with narcotics. But Jesús Quevedo, who enjoyed
more support from the PNR and who had been courting the Juárez un-
derworld continuously, easily won the November election.
Fernández enjoyed a final surge of power before his influence in the
drug trade, gambling business and politics was extinguished. Colonel
Roberto Fierro was appointed governor with the initial approval of the
Quevedos on the assumption that he would follow their orders. But dur-
ing Fierro’s eight-month administration, he favored Fernández over the
Quevedos: Fernández received tax exemptions in exchange for his con-
tinuing financial assistance to the state.84 On March 3, 1932, Fierro gave
Fernández complete control over Juárez gambling, and Fernández in turn
advanced the state treasury 100,000 pesos for workers who had not been
paid in February.85
Fierro would not last as governor, for in addition to favoring Fer-
nández, he had ousted several quevedistas from state political positions.
By this time, Rodrigo Quevedo, who had won the gubernatorial elec-
tion, was determined to put an ally in the gubernatorial seat until he be-
came governor. The local quevedista deputies, led by José Borunda E.,
accused Fierro of appropriating funds, deposed him on 4 July 1932, and
elected a quevedista to the position.86
Once Rodrigo Quevedo became governor, and once Jesús and José
Quevedo seized the city hall in Juárez in the summer of 1932 and “de-
clared war on Fernández”, Fernández found he had nowhere to turn.87
83. Luis Aboites, “De Almeida a Quevedo: Lucha Política en Chihuahua, 1927–
1932,”in Ricardo León García, (ed.) Actas del Segundo Congreso de Historia Regional
comparada 1990, Ciudad Juárez, 1991.
cia?” 20 December 1934, UTEPSC, MS 145 J. J. Middagh Papers Box 12, Folder 147 En-
rique Fernández.
85. “Political Conditions in the Ciudad Juárez Consular District for the Month of
March 1932”, 31 March 1931, Farnsworth to SS, UTABL,Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 8;
Langston, Impact, 167.
86. Styles to Secretary of State, 5 July 1932, UTABL, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 8.
Pedro Antillon, Crónicas Chihuahenses: de la conquista al Cardenismo, Mexico, 1992,
254–258. In Gobernadores del Estado de Chihuahua, ex-governor Francisco Almada, also
a historian of Chihuahua, claims that Fierro’s deposal was “unjust, for he had not taken a
penny . . .” Almada, Gobernadores, 579.
87. Astorga, “Organized Crime”, 69.

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In August 1932 he appealed in person to President Ortiz Rubio for as-

sistance, but to no avail. Not only did Fernández return to Juárez empty-
handed, but police sent by Jesús Quevedo, now mayor of Juárez, arrested
and charged him with violating state gaming laws: he was operating the
Gold Palace Casino despite that Manuel Llantada had been granted ex-
clusive rights on gambling in Júarez.88 Though he was released thirty
minutes later, this was the first time he was arrested. Weeks later, he was
forced to return the concession to the state, and it was bestowed on Llan-
tada.89 Fernández faded from politics and retreated to another one of his
businesses, a shoe store named La Mexicana, where he continued being
active in the Juárez drug trade from the backroom for his remaining two
years.90
About the same time, the Quevedo drug gang was reported to have
begun aggressively challenging the Fernández gang’s supremacy in the
Juárez narcotic trade. It was described that
the police of that town took drugs away from Fernández’s smugglers, and once
those drugs had been confiscated, the Chief of Police himself, instead of having
them turned over to the Health Officer in Juárez, delivered them to José Quevedo
by express order from Jesús, the mayor. [. . .] the Quevedo’s gang was growing
constantly and the Fernández gang was declining.91
In late 1933 Governor Quevedo sent members of the state police

force to Juárez, ostensibly to clean up the drug trade there, but more
likely to get rid of Fernández’s gang and his hold on gambling.92 Several
articles in the local papers described how three large men wearing som-
breros and leather jackets and riding in a red Ford, attacked, killed, and
buried members of Fernández’s gang in La Piedrera, a lonely boulder-
strewn desert wasteland four miles south of Juárez. The first to be found
at La Piedrera was Luis Kuan, a Chinese Tong leader who was Fernán-
dez’s chief link to Mexico City.93 During 1933 and 1934, there were be-
tween thirty and forty murders, and some of the deceased were men-
tioned in the McMurray list or associated with persons on it.94 Meanwhile
the authorities, many of whom by this time had been co-opted by the
88. Blocker to Secretary of State, 11 August 1932, UTABL, Internal Affairs 1930–39,
Roll 46; Langston, Impact, 171–2.
89. Langston, Impact, 171–2.
90. Hail, “Fernández”, MS 145.
91. José López to Ambassador Josephus Daniels, 5 March, 1934, Internal Affairs 1930–
39, roll 34.
92. Hail, “Fernández”, MS145. Langston includes some details about Enrique Fer-
nández’s demise in Langston, Impact, 173–176.
93. Hail, Fernández.
94. McMurray list included in Requena to Salubridad Pública 20 July 1931, AHSS, SJ
Box 28, Ex 6; Number of murders: Wasserman, Oligarchs, 102.

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Quevedos, “seemed permanently neutral” and tolerated the actions of

the three men.95
Attempting to maintain his gang’s supremacy in the Juárez under-
world, Fernández tried to “scatter money by the handful and pull
strings”. But his attempts were in vain because “everything failed before
the influence and power of the Quevedo brothers”. It was reported that
the Quevedos learned that Fernández intended to expose them as the
greatest exploiters of the border drug traffick, so they told several of their
men, including the state police chief from Chihuahua City, to spy on Fer-
nández.96 Once they learned that Fernández had traveled to Mexico City
to collect the evidence necessary to make formal accusations against
them, it is likely that they concluded that Fernández would have to be
killed quickly if they were to achieve complete control over the Juárez
drug trade and gambling enterprise.97
An attempt on Fernández’s life occurred on December 4, 1933.98
He was walking home from his shoe store along 16 September Street
with his son when several gunshots wounded him.99 Both he and his
son reported that the shots came from a red car, which Fernández sus-
pected was the same used by the men who were murdering members
of his gang.100 When Marshall Hail, a journalist and an acquaintance of
Fernández’s, spoke to the men at the Hotel Koper (where the red Ford
was parked in full view) they admitted they were special police officers
“sent from the state capital to clean up narcotics gangs”, but they de-
nied any connection with the attack or with the gang.101
The incident convinced Fernández that he had to campaign against
the Quevedos and, as he put it, “appeal personally to the president of
Mexico for protection”.102 One of Fernández’s friends told a local news-
paper that Fernández told him he was worried that the Quevedos
95. “Ciudad Juárez”, Detectives, 15 January 1934, UTEPSC, MS 145, J. J. Middagh Pa-
pers, Box 12, Folder 147 Enrique Fernández.
96. López to Ambassador Josephus Daniels, 5 March, 1934, Internal Affairs 1930–
39, roll 34.
97. Report on Governor of Chihuahua, General Rodrigo Quevedo, 22 January 1936,
Centro de Estudios Historicos de la Revolución Mexicana, Lázaro Cárdenas, Jiquilpan, Fondo
Múgica Vol 61,Doc. 4.
98. Ibid., “Merchant Names Three Men He Says Tried to Take his Life” 5 December,
1933, UTEPSC, MS145, J. J. Middagh Papers, Box 12, Folder 147 Enrique Fernández.; “En-
rique Fernández asegura que sabe quién lo hirió anoche”, 5 December, 1933, El Continental.
99. Langston, Impact, 173; Hail, “Fernández”, MS145.
100. “Ciudad Juárez”, Detectives, UTEPSC, MS 145 J. J. Middagh Papers, Box 12, Folder
147 Enrique Fernández.; “Enrique Fernández asegura que sabe quién lo hirió anoche”, 5
December, 1933, El Continental.
101. Hail, “Fernández”, MS145.
102. Blocker to Secretary of State, 18 January 1934, Internal Affairs 1930–39; Janu-
ary 14, and 15, 1934, El Paso Times; Fernández quoted in “Gunmen in Mexico City to

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“wanted to kill me in Chihuahua because I was going to reveal the se-

crets of the international rum-running, drug smuggling, and gambling
rackets in Juárez”.103 Marshall Hail explained in his report that “Fer-
nández hoped to convince powerful politicians that he himself was not
the gang leader of the north, but that certain of his enemies carried
on the operation for which he was given credit . . . it was an audacious
plan. If successful, [Fernández] would be left without a rival on the
border.”104
Fernández left for Mexico City in January 1934 disguised as a rail-
way worker but did not get far without the Quevedos’spy network notic-
ing.105 One of the personal aides of Governor Quevedo and one of the
members of the Quevedo gang both boarded the same train Fernández
was riding in Chihuahua City. After realizing that Fernández suspected
them, they got off in Guanajuato, were joined by “a bully”, and caught
a later train. Meanwhile, several Juárez police officers, and José and
Guillermo Quevedo had arrived at the Cosmos Hotel in Mexico City—
said to be one of the Quevedo gang’s centers there.106 Aware of being
shadowed, Fernández hired a friend who had been an inspector of po-
lice in Chihuahua to protect him.107 But this did not help. On the after-
noon of January 13, 1934, both men were shot on the corner of Teatro
Nacional and Avenida Madero. Fernández died that evening in the Red
Cross Hospital.108 The documents that Fernández supposedly had in his
coat pocket that he hoped would incriminate the Quevedos disappeared,
and it was later discovered that court and police records about Juárez
criminality, which probably concerned the Quevedos and members of
their gang, had vanished as well.109 A month later, an ex-police officer
from Juárez named José Barragán Sánchez admitted accepting 5,000 pe-
sos to kill Fernández, but did not disclose the identity of those who had
Avenge Shootings of Enrique Fernández”, 31 January 1934, MS 145 J. J. Middagh Papers

Box 12, Folder 147 Enrique Fernández.
103. “Asserts Slain Merchant Fled from Border Because of Plot on Life”, MS 145 John J.
Middagh Papers, Box 12, Folder 147.
104. Hair, “Fernández”, MS 145.
105. Edward Langston included a few details about Fernández’s final days in Langston,
Impact, 174–75.
107. “Fernández vino a hacer sensacional declaraciones”, Excelsior, 15 January 1934,
4; “José Barragan Sánchez Mató al Hampon Enrique Fernández Por Questiones Personales”,
La Semana, 16 January 1934.; Sangriento drama en Madero” 14 January, 1934, MS 145
John J. Middagh Papers, Box 12, Folder 147.
108. “Sangriento drama en Madero”, 14 January, 1934, UTEPSC, MS 145, J. J. Mid-
dagh Papers, Box 12, Folder 147 Enrique Fernández.
109. “Barragan Sánchez confiesa que recibió mil pesos para matar a Fernández”, El
Continental, 2 February, 1934, 1.

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hired him.110 The Quevedos were accused of being behind the opera-
tion; in his testimony Gil Sánchez reported that he saw one of the men
Rodrigo Quevdo sent to clean up the trade and Barragán together in a
car parked outside the hotel where Fernández was staying.111 Accord-
ing to the U.S. vice consul in Chihuahua City “the consensus of local opin-
ion is that there is no doubt that Messrs. Quevedo, with the tacit sup-
port of their brother and governor, are engaged in liquor and drug
smuggling and were responsible for the murder of Fernández.”112 The
Quevedos vehemently denied all the allegations.113
Writing soon after Fernández’s death, businessman José López ex-
plained to Ambassador Daniels that the Quevedos “are now the masters
of the field [of narcotics] and, certainly since the death of Fernández,
the most powerful dealers along the whole northern boundary of the
country.”114 Little changed in the next two years, for in January 1936,
one of the Quevedo brothers in Juárez, probably José, was recorded as
being “the largest exporter of illicit narcotic drugs operating in that sec-
tion of Mexico”115
Securing political control had proven crucial to the Quevedos be-
ing able to dominate the Juárez drug trade. When José was elected mu-
nicipal president, the Quevedos exercised electoral fraud, which in turn
enabled them to fix each Juárez municipal administration probably
through all the typical methods of multiple voting, buying votes, count-
ing improperly, intimidations and harassment. It appears that they
arranged for the municipal administrations to include men involved in
narcotics, who, if they were not part of the gang, would at least look the
other way. While serving as municipal president in 1932, Jesús Quevedo
named a member of the Quevedo gang as councilor of the police.116 The
councilor who oversaw education had been charged with smuggling only
months before his appointment.117 Dr. Daniel Quiroz Reyes, a member
of the Quevedo gang, was the city health officer and the Quevedos’cho-
110. “Barragan Sánchez confiesa que recibó cinco mil pesos por matar a Fernández”,
El Continental, 2 February 1934.
111. “El Gobernador Quevedo fue mencionado en el crimen que se achaca al hampa
de Ciudad Juárez”, La Prensa ,19 January, 1934, 1.
112. Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch no. 4178, Ambassador Josephus Daniels to Secre-
tary of State, 8 December, 1936, UTABL, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
114. López to Daniels, 5 March, 1934. UTABL, Internal Affairs 1930–39, roll 34.
115. J.J. Biggins, Treasury Department District Supervisor to H. J. Anslinger, Com-
missioner of Narcotics, 8 January 1936, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
116. Francisco Urrutia to Ambassador Daniels, “List of Persons Connected with the
Narcotic Trade and Places Where Narcotics Are Sold in Ciudad Juárez”24 September 1936,
Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
117. Document file note by Clark, 28 April 1932, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 33.

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sen candidate to succeed Jesús.118 During Dr. Quiroz’s administration

(1934–1936), one gang member who left the Fernández gang to be part
of the Quevedo gang was put in charge of the police.119 The next mu-
nicipal president was José Quevedo, who held office between 1936 and
1937. He filled the council with an unprecedented number of officials
involved in narcotics. José was also on the Consejo de Distrito Electoral
para Supremos Poderes del Estado. His brother Jesús was also on that
Consejo, as well as on the Consejo de Distrito Electoral para elección
de Supremos Poderes Federales. Another member of the Quevedo gang
was in charge of Salubridad y Beneficia, and belonged to the Electoral
Municipal Council. Dr. Quiroz Reyes was the head of the Board of Health,
a member of the Consejo para Supremos Poderes Federales, and a lead-
ing voice on the Consejo para Supremos Poderes del Estado. A mem-
ber of the Fernández gang was the Presidente de la Sección Municipal
de Zaragoza and another was one of the men on the Consejo para
Supremos Poderes Federales. A third member of the Fernández gang was
on the Consejo Electoral Municipal. Finally, one of the major traffick-
ers in the Fernández gang was on the Consejo Municipal para elecciones
de Supremos Poderes del Estado.120
The Quevedos also found a way around anti-drug legislation. Cir-
cumventing laws became easier when the councilors in charge of po-
lice were members of the gang, as in Jesús Quevedo’s and Quiroz’s ad-
ministrations. By having several médicos in the Quevedo gang and in
local administrations—note that Dr. Quiróz participated in every mu-
nicipal administration—the gang continued to acquire a steady stream
of narcotics.121
But the Quevedos in Juárez had not achieved their power alone; their
excellent connections to Ciudad Chihuahua were crucial. Rodrigo
Quevedo became governor in October 1932.122 It was alleged that Gov-
118. Chávez, M., Jefes, 293–94, 300–01; Francisco Urrutia to Ambassador Daniels,
“List of Persons Connected with the Narcotic Trade and Places Where Narcotics Are Sold
in Ciudad Juárez” 24 September 1936, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
119. Chávez M., Jefes, 307; McMuray list included in Requena to Salubridad Pública
20 July 1931, AHSS,SJ Box 28, Ex 6; Francisco Urrutia to Ambassador Daniels, “List of Per-
sons Connected with the Narcotic Trade and Places Where Narcotics Are Sold in Ciudad
Juárez” 24 September 1936, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
120. Chávez M., Jefes, 313–15. McMuray list included in Requena to Salubridad
Pública 20 July 1931, AHSS,SJ Box 28, Ex 6; Francisco Urrutia to Ambassador Daniels, “List
of Persons Connected with the Narcotic Trade and Places Where Narcotics Are Sold in
Ciudad Juárez” 24 September 1936, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34.
121. Francisco Urrutia to Ambassador Daniels, “List of Persons Connected with the
Narcotic Trade and Places Where Narcotics Are Sold in Ciudad Juárez”24 September 1936,
Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 34
122. Wasserman, Oligarchs, p 56–7.

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ernor Quevedo and other state officials protected his family’s drug gang
in addition to their liquor and gambling enterprises.123 Rodrigo’s subor-
dinates in the state government were said to have begun taking money
from the Quevedos in March of 1934 in return for protecting them. This
proved useful when rumors of the Quevedos’involvement in Fernández’s
murder circulated in Juárez, Ciudad Chihuahua and Mexico City because
the officials “prevented full light from being shed on the case of [the as-
sassin,] Barragán Sánchez. . . .” In addition, the Quevedos were able to
censor both state and local newspapers so that the “newspapers ceased
their campaign against vices and the narcotics traffic of Ciudad Juárez,
for that is what suits the interest of the Quevedos, and they prevent it
being known who are the important dealers in this dirty business . . .”124
Despite their efforts, allegations of their involvement could not be
kept quiet. The May 9, 1936 edition of La Prensa ran a letter naming Ro-
drigo as the protector of José Quevedo’s “illicit trafficking in opiates”.125
During the last part of Rodrigo Quevedo’s governorship, public allega-
tions charged him with drug trafficking.126 Lázaro Cárdenas had been
made aware of the accusations regarding Rodrigo’s involvement in the
Juárez drug trade during his presidency. The Grupos Libertarios del Es-
tado de Chihuahua, an anti-quevedista group, supplied him with a list
of several complaints against Rodrigo Quevedo, among them that he “per-
mitted drug trafficking through family networks”.127
By the mid-1930s, the Quevedos had become very unpopular with
most sectors of society. Governor Rodrigo Quevedo was unpopular with
labor; he opposed the Chihuahuan chapter of the CTM while he was gov-
ernor.128 He was also unpopular with the campesinos. Though he doled
out resources for existing ejidos, he had never advocated the ejidal model,
especially after Calles’s condemnation of the ejido in 1930.129 Given that
123. Louis Mazzeo, American Vice Consul to Secretary of State, 31 January 1934, In-
ternal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 8;Grupos Libertarios to President Lázaro Cárdenas, 11 June 1936,
CEHRMLC, Jiquilpan, fondo Mújica, Vol. 61, doc. 10; Astorga, “Organized Crime”, 69,
124. López to Daniels, 5 March 1934, Internal Affairs 1930–39, roll 34.
125. Astorga, “Organized Crime”, 69.
126. “Political Conditions in Chihuahua During the Month of May 1935”, Blohm to
Secretary of State, 31 May 1935, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 8.
127. Granted the writers had an angle: they wanted to make sure that quevedista
influence would stop, and they did not want Talamantes as the next governor because
they thought that he was a puppet of Quevedo’s. However, it is significant that they com-
plained about Rodrigo Quevedo’s connection to narcotics among their other complaints.
Grupos Libertarios to Cárdenas, 11 June 1936, Centro de Estudios Historicos de la Revo-
lución Mexicana, Lázaro Cárdenas, Jiquilpan, fondo Mújica, Vol. 61, doc. 10.
128. Wasserman, Oligarchs, 59; Luis Aboites, Breve Historia de Chihuahua, (Mex-
ico, 1994) 154.

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Governor Quevedo was more concerned with amassing properties than

incorporating peasants into the nation, it is not surprising that agrarian
reform slowed. There were agrarian protests throughout his adminis-
tration, the largest occurring in July 1935 when hundreds of ejidatarios
demonstrated against him and accused him of “oppressing workers, [and
practicing] great favoritism to capitalism”.130 According to a U.S. consular
report, when Rodrigo Quevedo’s gubernatorial term ended, there was
“jubilation, [and] immense rejoicing, because at last members of the sin-
ister Quevedo clan will cease to oppress and exploit the state.”131
The Quevedos were probably not regarded well by President Cár-
denas. During his administration, the political tide turned. From the be-
ginning of his presidency, Cárdenas was more pro-agrarian and pro-labor
than Calles. Governor Quevedo, like Calles and like the rest of the Que-
vedos, was a conservative landed capitalist; thus he opposed radical agrar-
ian reform and distrusted labor unions. Nevertheless, he was prudent
enough to go through the motions of complying with cardenismo, and
for that reason he finished his term.132 Quevedo did not fight the estab-
lishment the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration of Ciudad Juárez, for
example.133 But Cárdenas probably knew that Quevedo made several
trips across the border while he was governor to see Calles during the
“purification” (that is, purge of callismo) of the party during 1935 and
1936.134
The change of federal authority from Calles (during the maximato)
to Cárdenas also affected expectations for public morality. Unlike Calles,
who was a “principal stockholder” in one of the largest casinos in Mex-
ico City and in the Aguascalientes resort in Baja California during the
maximato, Cárdenas seemed to have been relatively honest in his per-
sonal life and professional affairs.135 The virtues which Cárdenas was
known to have cultivated in himself, among them sobriety, responsibil-
ity and diligence, he tried to promote in Mexican society, especially
among workers and campesinos. During the radical phase of his ad-
ministration, one of the ways he did this was through “socialist” educa-
tion, but he also attacked gambling directly. He did not content himself
130. Ibid., 59.

131. US report quoted. Ibid., 60.
132. Ibid., 59.
133. Antillon, Crónicas, 355; Luis Aboites, Breve Historia de Chihuahua, Mexico
DF,1994, 153.
134. Grupos Libertarios to President Lázaro Cárdenas, 11 June 1936, CEHRMLC, Vol.
61, doc. 10.
135. “Political Situation in the Ciudad Juárez Consular District”Blocker to SS, 19 De-
cember 1934, UTABL, Internal Affairs 1930–39, Roll 46. Alan Knight, “Cardenismo, Jug-
gernaut or Jalopy?”, Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 26, 1994, 80.

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with simply mandating the reforms that, though well-intentioned, had

proven ultimately unsuccessful during the maximato. He banned gam-
bling early in December 1934. But his reform was unsuccessful at the
local level.136 José Quevedo still managed Juárez gambling until Rodrigo
Quevedo left office. Thus, games were still played, although presumably
more discreetly. But profits were already precarious before Cárdenas out-
lawed gambling. The legalization of beer sales in El Paso in April 1933
and the end of Prohibition in early 1934 put much of Juárez tourism out
of business.137
The Quevedos would never again wield as much formal political
power as they did during part of the 1930s. This was due in part to the
changed national tide: no more faithful callistas, (even those who, like the
Quevedos, had not openly challenged Cárdenas) remained in significant
positions of political power. It was also due to local circumstances: their
unpopularity, their failure to make good on campaign promises, and the
new governor, Gustavo Talamantes. Although he took control of gambling
and was supposedly behind the murder and jailing of several agrarian lead-
ers he presented himself as an active cardenista by declaring his hatred
for Calles and by incorporating peasants and workers into the PRM.138
However, the Quevedos still retained some formal political strength.
Governor Talamantes only managed to oust José Quevedo from the mu-
nicipal presidency on April 1 with the help of federal troops; and for the
first two weeks that Talamantes’s man was formally recognized as mu-
nicipal president, the council led by Quevedo still functioned.139 In ad-
dition, the PRM conceded the quevedistas (including Guillermo and
Lorenzo) several deputy seats in the senate in May 1937.140 Furthermore,
some of the Quevedos surfaced sporadically in politics and the military
in subsequent decades; and through the 1970s they held a substantial
amount of cattle and land.141
Less than a year after Rodrigo Quevedo left office, the family lost

138. Wasserman, Oligarchs, p 61, 63, 141. Under him, the Chihuahuan agrarian re-
form reached its zenith. See:Noe Palomares, Propietarios Norteamericanos y Reforma
Agraria en Chihuahua 1917–1942, Ciudad Juárez, 1991, 15. While he was Governor, Ta-
lamantes was the Secretary of Agrarian Action of the National Executive Committee of the
PNR, and also the President of the Agrarian Commission of the State of Chihuahua. Roderic
Camp, Mexican Political Biographies 1935–1975, Arizona, 1976, 312.
139. Chávez M., Jefes, 318–19.
140. Wasserman, Oligarchs, 61. By the time José Quevedo relinquished power he
was ill, so he registered at the Hospital Militar in Mexico City and later died there. See:
Chávez, M. Jefes, 320.
141. Chávez M., Jefes, p 318–19; Charles Hershberger, “The Death of Borunda, Al-
calde of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahuan Politics During the 1930s”, Arizona and the West, The

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the power they had acquired in the drug trade and gambling. Gustavo
Talamantes took over Juárez gambling and in El Universal, the head of
the Department of Health referred to Juárez as “possibly the most dan-
gerous center where traffickers operate”, and noted that they “are cor-
rupted by newcomer Allende El Bravo’s gangsterism and defend their
trafficking with gunfire.”142
Conclusion
There were important differences between the ways Fernández and the
Quevedo brothers became politically powerful. For the Quevedos, it was
not until they dominated local and state politics, achieved enough
power to buy off state officials, censored the local press, and either co-
opted or killed Fernández gang members that they secured outright dom-
inance of the drug scene. The Quevedos used their already existent po-
litical influence to gain control of the Juárez drug trade and gambling,
and in turn, used the resultant revenue and connections to maintain their
control over Juárez gambling and continue advancing their control over
both politics and the drug trade between 1930 and 1936. As for Enrique
Fernández, only after becoming the uncontested force in the Juárez drug
trade did he influence politics and acquire control over gambling, if only
for a brief time. Unlike the Quevedos, Fernández never held a political
office. But he did become informally politically powerful because he had
been so successful in his dealings in drugs.
This article shed new light on the history of the drug trade in Ciu-
dad Juárez by sketching the structure of the gangs and recounting their
battle for leadership of the trade. Furthermore, in detailing and analyz-
ing the continuities and changes in the connection between the drug
gangs and local and state politics, it showed how politics affected the
drug gangs and at the same time clarified the political histories of Ciu-
dad Juárez and the state of Chihuahua. It thus added a new facet onto
the argument Mark Wasserman has made about how winning factions
were determined in Juarense and Chihuahuan politics during the 1920s
and ‘30s. He credits gambling revenues as the “crucial”deciding factor.143
University of Arizona Press, Vol. 8, Nu. 3, 212. The PNR conceded the quevedistas (in-
cluding brothers Guillermo and Lorenzo Quevedo) several seats as deputies in the senate
in May 1937. Guillermo Quevedo served out his term as federal deputy, and was re-elected
to serve the 1943–46 and 1955–58 terms. After the end of his governorship, Rodrigo was
a Senator from 1958–1964. He was also Commander of the 25th Military Zone in Puebla
between 1936 and 1938, and of the 1st Military Zone in the Federal District between 1941
and 1945. Camp, Biographies, 568.
142. Quoted in Astorga, “Organized Crime”, 69.

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But, as has been shown, studying the narcotic trade in addition to the
gambling industry is necessary in order to understand Juarense and Chi-
huahuan politics. Given how lucrative the narcotic trade was, it is likely
that both Enrique Fernández and the Quevedo brothers used part of the
profits they reaped from it in addition to the wealth they received from
owning the gambling concession in order to advance their political agen-
das at the local and state levels. In addition, the lucrative drug trade prob-
ably contributed along with gambling revenue to the considerable de-
gree of autonomy Chihuahua enjoyed from the federal government. Thus,
in the midst of continual political instability and economic depression,
the funds generated by both the gambling and narcotics enterprises pro-
vided important sources of power, opportunity and patronage.
More research remains to be done on the Juárez drug trade. What
more can we learn about the members of the gangs? How would the
trade connect with local and state politics for the rest of the twentieth
century? And the connections between politics and drug trades around
Mexico also need to be examined further for, local particularities aside,
it is unlikely that Ciudad Juárez’s story is unique.

85.233.220.25 on Fri, 17 May 2019 22:58:07 UTC

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University of California Institute for Mexico and the United States

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez: 1928–1936

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Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez: 1928–1936

Palabras clave: Ciudad Juárez, corrupción, drogas, crimen, crimen organizado,

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20 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

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Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez 21

After contextualizing the drug trade, the article provides a brief

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22 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

1913 to 1920, and none of Chihuahua’s governors were able to complete

4. Ibid., 14, 46,

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Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez 23

a key player in state politics. Until President Lázaro Cárdenas outlawed

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24 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

13. Ibid., p. 28.

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Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez 25

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26 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

25. Hail, “Fernández”, MS 145; Article, “Sangriento drama en Madero”, UTEPSC, MS

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Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez 27

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28 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

36. A. Wagner to US Treasury Department, 7 October, 1931, UTABL, Internal Affairs

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Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez 29

injected morphine or heroin.42 Those in charge of the dens attempted

42. Gutiérrez, Opio 86.

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30 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

Drugs, Gambling, and Politics

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Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez 31

volved in narcotics and was “no stranger to Enrique Fernández”.56 After

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32 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

occasional bodyguard, and, on at least one occasion, waited for a mor-

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Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez 33

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34 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

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Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez 35

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36 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

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Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez 37

In August 1932 he appealed in person to President Ortiz Rubio for as-

In late 1933 Governor Quevedo sent members of the state police

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38 Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos

Quevedos, “seemed permanently neutral” and tolerated the actions of

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Mottier, Drug Gangs and Politics in Ciudad Juárez 39

“wanted to kill me in Chihuahua because I was going to reveal the se-

Avenge Shootings of Enrique Fernández”, 31 January 1934, MS 145 J. J. Middagh Papers

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