Distinguish the blanket provision of Sec.
7 par 1 Art IX-B and the more specific where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who in good faith has had
provision of Sec. 13 Article VII. (CLU vs Exec Sec)
EO 284 is invalidated here. “…may, in addition to his primary position, hold not
more than two positions in the govt and govt corp.”
What is ex officio capacity? What does “primary” function mean? (CLU)
2 types of public interest in relation to executive privileged (Akbayan vs Aquino)
Elements of Presidential Communications Privilege (Neri vs Senate)
2 conditions to claim or invike executive privilege (Neri vs Senate)
Distinguish Pres Comm Privilege and Deliberative Process Privilege (Neri vs
Senate)
Types of exec privilege (Neri vs Senate)
NAC vs COA
Representatives of ex officio members are receiving honoraria pursuant to NAC
Admin Order No 2. Is this constitutional? NO legal basis, they cannot rise above
the authority that granted them such office. The ex officio members are not
allowed to receive honoraria, emoluments, per diems, etc. COnsequently, their
representatives are not also allowed to receive such because they are covered by
the Art VII sec 13.
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a new
appointment but by mere designation from the ex officio members who were
themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation. An
appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an individual who is to
exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a designation merely
connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already
in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment.[15]
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon the
person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the position.
Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the
salary of the position. The legal basis of an employees right to claim the salary
attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the
position,[16] and not a mere designation.
possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is
legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in appropriate action
recover the salary, fees and other compensation attached to the office.
A de facto officer derives his appointment from one having colorable authority
to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid
on its face. (He is) one who is in possession of an office and is discharging its
duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an
appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent be not a
mere volunteer.[21]
The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because they were
not appointed but were merely designated to act as such. Furthermore, they
are not entitled to something their own principals are prohibited from
receiving. Neither can they claim good faith, given the express prohibition of
the Constitution and the finality of our decision in Civil Liberties Union prior to
their receipt of such allowances.
BITONIO vs COA
He is Director IV of Bureau of Labor Relations in DOLE. Acting Secretary of
DOLE designated him to be the DOLE Representative to the BoD of PEZA. He is
receiving per diem every attendance in the meeting of the Board. This is
pursuant to Sec 11 of RA 7916. After auditing, COA disallowed per diems of
Bitonio in accordance with CLU vs Exec Sec and Article VII Sec 13.
whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the
petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as
representative of the Secretary of Labor.
YES. It must be noted that the petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings
is solely by virtue of his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. As
the petitioner himself admitted, there was no separate or special appointment
for such position.[11] Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from receiving
compensation for his additional office or employment, such prohibition
likewise applies to the petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the
Secretary of Labor. He cannot have a better right than his principal.
PUBLIC INTEREST VS ELMA (2006)
We dwell on Article IX-B Sec. 7 - General Rule. She is appointed as PCGG
Chairman and subsequently appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel.
This is unconstitutional. Under Art IX-B Sec 7. The general rule contained in
Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold more
than one office only if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position. In the case of Quimson v. Ozaeta,[12] this Court ruled that, [t]here is
no legal objection to a government official occupying two government offices
and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility. The
crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices
was laid out in People v. Green[13] - whether one office is subordinate to the
other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.
[I]ncompatibility between two offices, is an inconsistency in the functions of the
two; x x x Where one office is not subordinate to the other, nor the relations of
the one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that
incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the
vacation of the other. The force of the word, in its application to this matter is,
that from the nature and relations to each other, of the two places, they ought
not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and antagonism which
would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge
the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. x x x The offices must
subordinate, one [over] the other, and they must, per se, have the right to
interfere, one with the other, before they are incompatible at common law. x x x
As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his own
actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG
Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be raised. This
is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition against
holding incompatible offices.
Another point of clarification raised by the Solicitor General refers to the persons
affected by the constitutional prohibition. The persons cited in the constitutional
provision are the Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. These
terms must be given their common and general acceptation as referring to the
heads of the executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries. Public officials given the rank equivalent to a Secretary,
Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary are not covered by the prohibition, nor is
the Solicitor General affected thereby. (Underscoring supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the
CPLC, as neither of them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary,
even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.
Appointment to the position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary
functions of the CPLC, and vice versa. The primary functions of the PCGG
Chairman involve the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and associates, the investigation of graft
and corruption cases assigned to him by the President, and the adoption of
measures to prevent the occurrence of corruption.[19] On the other hand, the
primary functions of the CPLC encompass a different matter, that is, the review
and/or drafting of legal orders referred to him by the President.
FUNA vs AGRA
Appointed Agra as Acting Sec. Of Justice. Then appointed him also as Acting Sol
Gen in a concurrent capacity. Here, puro acting capacities ang involved.
Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with
his position of Acting Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition
against dual or multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their deputies
and assistants?
The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in
violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution.
In CLU vs Exec Sec:
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold
other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such
is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is
meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive
public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose
a stricter prohibition on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple offices or
employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of
Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended
to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the
constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive
and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President
being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article
VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2)
and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. (Bold emphasis
supplied.)
to hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in
possession and administration of the office, which implies nothing less than
the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.
Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, supra, the Constitution makes no
reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as
to apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary,
for it is without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to
prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials,
specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and
their deputies and assistants.
The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an
"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon
the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex
officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority other
than that conferred by the office." An ex officio member of a board is one who
is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment.
Clearly, the primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related
or necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice. Considering
that the nature and duties of the two offices are such as to render it improper,
from considerations of public policy, for one person to retain both,48 an
incompatibility between the offices exists, further warranting the declaration of
Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his
designation as the Acting Solicitor General, to be void for being in violation of the
express provisions of the Constitution.
In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as
a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later designation,
were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally
appointed and qualified for the office. 54 This clarification is necessary in order to
protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible
authority emanates from the State.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no
appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
You can be elected or appointed. Prohibited to hold any other public office ang
elective official either through appointment or designation. While prohibited
to hold any other public office ang appointive official unless otherwise
provided by law or by primary functions of his position. No prohibition as to
private office.
Art XIII Section 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative function.
Only limited to quasi-judicial or administrative function

ANNULS AND VOIDS the designation of Hon. Alberto C. Agra as the Acting
Secretary of Justice in a concurrent capacity with his position as the Acting ESTRADA VS DESIERTO
Solicitor General for being unconstitutional and violative of Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution

Compare it with legislative - Art VI Sec. 13 - there is a prohibition to hold any other
office during his term without forfeiting his seat in the Congress. Then there is no
prohibition as to holding a private office. Unlike in Executive Dept, they are not
allowed to hold private and public office. This is the same with ConCom
Press statement that he will leave the palace to let the healing process begin.
Arroyo discharged her duties as President. Estrada challenged the presidency
of Arroyo ky nagleave lng man daw xa. That was not a permanent vacation or
he resigned from office. Court said that he has resigned. 2 elements of
resignation:

1. There must be an intent to resign

Prohibition for elective officials
2. The intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment

Art VI sec 13 - No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to
any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he
be appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments
thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from
his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by
THEY MAY NOT HOLD WITHOUT FORFEITING. THEY CAN HOLD BUT THEY CAN
the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
FORFEIT. NO PROHIBITION AS TO PRIVATE UNLIKE THE EXECUTIVE WHICH IS
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
STRICTER WHICH MAKES NO DISTINCTION AS TO PRIVATE AND PUBLIC OFFICES.

(FOR EXECUTIVE - They shall not, unless otherwise provided in this constitution,
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
hold any other office or employment during said tenure) (FOR LEGISLATIVE - No
Senator or Member of HOR may hold any other office or employment in the
Government)
A. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not
Art IX A Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the
tenure, hold any other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the presidency even at that time. (angara diary)
practice of any profession or in the active management or control of any business
B. Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a
which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be
graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any
franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, C. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.
or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries.

BORJA vs COMELEC
Private and public office are not allowed same with Executive Dept. Strict
prohibition as well.

Art IX B Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or Appying by analogy the succession of VP in the case of Vice Mayor.
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Sec. 4 Article VII daw is applicable by analogy to VIce Mayor. SC says it is wrong. It
is only applicable to VP. Article X on Public Officials did not even mention this
prohibition. It is not applicable because 3-year term lng man na. Then Sec 4
provided a four year limit for disqualification for reelection.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency
and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible for election as
President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the
event of the latters death, permanent disability, removal or resignation. While he
may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so is entirely dependent on the
good graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to
also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as
Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it
becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than four years may
rightly be considered as service for a full term.
This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he
is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and
employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions,
succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of
them.[16] It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event
of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the
mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a
matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be
counted in the application of any term limit.
OPLE VS TORRES
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy.
we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered
by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative
head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. 23
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending state policies — the primacy of national security,
the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice
of policies, etc.
Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.D. No. 308 is not a law
because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates
no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government
agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated
identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one
can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID,
a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given
this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no
duty cannot stand.
KMU VS DIRECTOR GENERAL
Buklod vs Zamora
Distinguish deactivation and abolition
Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656[28] provides for the circumstances which
may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service
employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a
significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and
another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where
incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of
offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices
perform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and (e) where
the removal violates the order of separation
Ganzon vs CA
The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the
1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend
to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or
remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of
the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the
constitutional language?
NO. It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change
in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the
legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by
existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It
is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies
nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress
and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The
Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to
deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly
self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local
government code,27 a local tax law,28 income distribution legislation,29 and a
national representation law,30 and measures31 designed to realize autonomy at
the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution
places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive.
"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the
latter."36"Supervision" on the other hand means "overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.37 As
we held,38 however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing",
although it is a lesser power than "altering".
The rpesident can exercis disciplinary powers which is compatible with his power
of general supervision as allowed by law. In this case, we have Local Government
Code to grant the President to discipline local government officials. It can be
delegated because of qualified political agency. Supervision entails investigation
and discplining local government officials. The rpsident cannot exercise power of
control because of local autonomy.
Joson vs Torres
There are 2 types of disciplining authority to elective officials
Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials
is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating
Authority. This is explicit from A.O. No. 23, to wit:
"Sec. 2. Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly verified, against
elective local officials mentioned in the preceding Section shall be acted upon by
the President. The President, who may act through the Executive Secretary, shall
hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining Authority."
Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government is hereby designated as the Investigating Authority. He may
constitute an Investigating Committee in the Department of the Interior and Local
Government for the purpose.
The Disciplining Authority may, however, in the interest of the service, constitute
a Special Investigating Committee in lieu of the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government."[46]
Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of the
Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive Secretary. The
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority, who
may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the
DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG
Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating
Committee.
The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see
that the subordinate officers perform their duties."[48] If the subordinate officers
fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.[49] The President's power
of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are
faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law.[50] Supervision
is not incompatible with discipline.[51] And the power to discipline and ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President
to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion
the good of the public service so requires
DILG has invesitgating authority only but the discplining authority remains in the
President alone.
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the
Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government
officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG
or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining
Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson's
claim. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated is
the power to investigate, not the power to discipline
PIMENTAL VS AGUIRRE
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect
exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the
President, however, only the power of general supervisionover LGUs,
consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues that
the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of
Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its
share in the national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand
that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by
the peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's
power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal
autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify measures
that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least
25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not
violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on
their revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature
pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."
SC RULED THAT THE PRESIDENT IS EXERCISING SUPERVISION POWERS.
Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their
own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national
taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate
their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the
preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the
constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed
on local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources
or not. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the
harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials,[24] who in
any case are partners in the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national
government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local
programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly,
the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning
agency of the government,[25] primarily responsible for formulating and
implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic
policies, plans and programs[26] for the entire country. However, under the
Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and
programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies,
various private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do
so unilaterally.
Is EO a valid exercise of President’s power of supervision? YES

Can president interfere on fiscal matters? YES provided these requisites are
present:
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local
fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government;
(2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of
the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding
the current one.
Pwede makainterfere provided that the ff elements are present. It is only advisory
and not mandatory.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to
recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all
concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and
teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal
sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such
advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard
to Section 1.
BITO-ONON VS FERNANDEZ
Onon argues that even if the DILG has supervisory authority over the LIGA, the act
of the DILG in issuing Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 or the supplemental rules
and guidelines for the conduct of the 1997 LIGA elections had the effect of
modifying, altering and nullifying the rules prescribed by the National Liga
Board. Onon posits that the issuance of said guidelines allowing an appeal of the
decision of the BES to the regular courts rather than to the National Liga Board is
no longer an exercise of supervision but an exercise of control.[8]
On many occasions in the past, this court has had the opportunity to distinguish
the power of supervision from the power of control. In Taule vs. Santos,[17] we
held that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking
whether a local government or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. He cannot interfere with local governments
provided that the same or its officers act within the scope of their
authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over
such body.[18] Officers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they
are not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done
by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done to conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe
his own manner for the doing of the act
the Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government
organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by law or
by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government
officials.
Having in mind the foregoing principles, we rule that Memorandum Circular No.
97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the
decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post proclamation electoral
protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner and
the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of
the decision of the BES with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect
amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated by the National Liga
Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES
shall be subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the
GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of supervision but is an
exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have over the
LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and
other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely
monitoring compliance by local government units of such issuances.[27] To
monitor means to watch, observe or check and is compatible with the power
of supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to
checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof
perform their duties as per statutory enactments.[28] Besides, any doubt as to
the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be
resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
NATIONAL LIGA VS PAREDES
There was a complaint filed by a certain brgy captain. In election as liga
chairman, there are certain irregularities. While the case is still pending, DILG
filed
That the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), pursuant to
its delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the Interim
Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that
the new set of National Liga Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed
office; …
THis was questioned because it was beyond the power of DILG.
The resolution of the issues of whether the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to
DILG supervision, and whether the questioned caretakership order of the
respondent judge and the challenged issuances and acts of the DILG constitute
control in derogation of the Constitution, necessitates a brief overview of
the barangay, as the lowest LGU, and the Liga, as a vehicle of governance and
coordination.
Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga
barangay, which is not a local government unit?
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department
of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization,
being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by
authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government
officials. The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an
organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the
representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating
and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and
securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.[91]
The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident,
whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an
aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented therein by their
respective punong barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court this present
officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they original petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of
enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal subject appointments and disbursements made therefor.
councilors, city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus,
the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the enactment
of ordinances and formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher
Is the appointment invalid? NO
than the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for
the bottom-to-top approach of development.

Did the Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction? NO
In the case at bar, even before the respondent Judge designated the DILG
as interim caretaker of the Liga, on 28 July 1997, it issued Memorandum Circular
No. 97-176, directing local government officials not to recognize David as the
National Liga President and his pronouncements relating to the affairs of
the Liga. Not only was the action premature, it even smacked of superciliousness
and injudiciousness. The DILG is the topmost government agency which maintains Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of
coordination with, and exercises supervision over local government units and its officers of the government to be appointed by the President:
multi-level leagues. As such, it should be forthright, circumspect and supportive in
its dealings with the Ligas especially the Liga ng mga Barangay. The indispensable
role played by the latter in the development of the barangays and the promotion First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
of the welfare of the inhabitants thereof deserve no less than the full support and ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
respect of the other agencies of government. As the Court held in the case of San naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Juan v. Civil Service Commission,[92] our national officials should not only comply Constitution;
with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate
the spirit of liberty upon which these provisions are based.[93]

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
When the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to
manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the
management from the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the
DILG. Even a cursory glance at the DILGs prayer for appointment as interim Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
caretaker of the Liga to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such
time that the new set of National Liga officers shall have been duly elected and
assumed office reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take control over Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
the Liga. Even if said caretakership was contemplated to last for a limited time, or vest in the President alone.
only until a new set of officers assume office, the fact remains that it was a
conferment of control in derogation of the Constitution.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first

MANALO VS SISTOZA
On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of Interior
and Local Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C. Aquino
group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The
appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category,
need not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the
case of Tarrosa vs. Singson[11], Congress cannot by law expand the power of
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation
of appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first
sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

Consequently, unconstitutional are Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975

This is one of the provisions
The Chief of the PNP shall be appointed by the President from among the senior
officers down to the rank of the chief superintendent, subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments:
which empower the Commission on Appointments to confirm the
appointments of public officials whose appointments are not required by the
Constitution to be confirmed. But the unconstitutionality of the aforesaid
sections notwithstanding, the rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled
that when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute
and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity
and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its
voided sections.[12]

Without their names submitted to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation, the said police officers took their oath of office and assumed their
respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and Management,
under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for
their salaries and other emoluments.
It is petitioners submission that the Philippine National Police is akin to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and therefore, the appointments of police
officers whose rank is equal to that of colonel or naval captain require
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
This contention is equally untenable. The Philippine National Police is separate
and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
RA 6975 - No element of the police force shall be military nor shall any position
thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Thereunder, the police force is different from and independent of the armed
forces and the ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine
National Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the
herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first category of
presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
In view of the foregoing disquisition and conclusion, the respondent former
Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III of the Department of Budget and Management,
did not act with grave abuse of discretion in authorizing and effecting
disbursements for the salaries and other emoluments of the respondent police
officers whose appointments are valid.
MATIBAG VS BENIPAYO
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII
of the Constitution provides as follows:
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall
be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for
any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.
More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad
interim appointment is permanent in character. In Summers vs.
Ozaeta,[25] decided on October 25, 1948, we held that:
x x x an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4),
Section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, which provides that the President shall
have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. It is an appointment
permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad
interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its
provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course distinguishable from
an acting appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent
appointment is issued. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad
interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect
immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de
jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments,[26] this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad
interim appointment as follows:
A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential
prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when
Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the President
nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments
may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad
interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus
qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His title to such office is
complete. In the language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective
until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
Petitioner cites Blacks Law Dictionary which defines the term ad interim to
mean in the meantime or for the time being. Hence, petitioner argues that
an ad interim appointment is undoubtedly temporary in character. This
argument is not new and was answered by this Court in Pamantasan ng
Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[27]
where we explained that:
x x x From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner should
experience difficulty in understanding the situation. Private respondent had
been extended several ad interim appointments which petitioner mistakenly
understands as appointments temporary in nature. Perhaps, it is the literal
translation of the word ad interim which creates such belief. The term is
defined by Black to mean in the meantime or for the time being. Thus, an
officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to discharge the duties
of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its regular
incumbent (Blacks Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is
not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. In
referring to Dr. Estebans appointments, the term is not descriptive of the
nature of the appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to denote the
manner in which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President
of the Pamantasan in the meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is
originally vested by the University Charter with the power of appointment, is
unable to act.x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the term ad interim appointment, as used in letters of appointment
signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the
President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The
term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a
definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again
occasion to explain the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more
recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals,[28] where the Court stated:
We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive
of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the
appointment is temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the
manner in which the appointment was made. In the instant case, the
appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr.
was issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status
of private respondents appointment as Executive Assistant II was recognized
and attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No.
12. Petitioners submission that private respondents ad interim appointment is
synonymous with a temporary appointment which could be validly terminated
at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent but
their terms are only until the Board disapproves them.
MATIBAG VS BENIPAYO
Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can be withdrawn or
revoked by the President at her pleasure, and can even be disapproved or simply
by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. For this reason, petitioner claims
that an ad interim appointment is temporary in character and consequently
prohibited by the last sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
We find petitioners argument without merit.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or failure
of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A
by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the
merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of
Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to
give or withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the
Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad
interim appointment of a by-passed appointee.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee SORIANO VS LISTA
has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until PCG is not part of AFP or Phil Navy. List in Article VII Sec 16 is exclusive. It refers
the next adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII to military alone. Since PCG is under DOTC, the promotions and appointments
of the Constitution provides as follows: of the officers do not require confirmation by CA.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall
be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress. (Emphasis supplied) Acting appoinments to secretaries of various exec depts. While congress is in
recess and CA is not operational, PGMA issued ad interim appointments to
them.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next

adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the

The petition questions the constitutionality of President Arroyos appointment
President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for
of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.
Appointments while Congress is in session.

Thus, the term ad interim appointment, as used in letters of appointment signed

SC says this is constitutional.
by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment
that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time.
The Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Constitution. Although
its membership is confined to members of Congress, said Commission is
independent of Congress. The powers of the Commission do not come from
Distinction of Ad Interim Appointments & Appointment in an Acting or Temporary
Congress, but emanate directly from the Constitution. Hence, it is not an agent
Capacity
of Congress. In fact, the functions of the Commissioner are purely executive in
nature.

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as

provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity
The Constitutionality of President Arroyos Issuance
can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power.[31] A
temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter of Appointments to Respondents as Acting Secretaries
how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions,
including the COMELEC.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo should not have appointed
respondents as acting secretaries because in case of a vacancy in the Office of
a Secretary, it is only an Undersecretary who can be designated as Acting
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Secretary. Is it correct? NO
Constitution.

1. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the

Commission on Appointments.
2. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on
Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes are resolutory
conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments.
The Constitutionality of Renewals of Appointments
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment.
Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 (ADMINISTRATIVE CODE) states
that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent person to perform the functions
of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoint in
an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the
President deems that person competent.

Petitioners further assert that while Congress is in session, there can be no
appointments, whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having obtained
its consent. Is it correct? NO
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a
stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the
appointment of a permanent occupant to the office.[16] In case of vacancy in an
office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to
appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego,
whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence.
Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on
the President who her alter ego should be.
Petitioners fail to consider that acting appointments cannot exceed one year as
expressly provided in Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292. The law
has incorporated this safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of acting
appointments as a way to circumvent confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Ad interim appointments vs appointments in acting capacity
The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section
17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may
temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other
competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.
Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the
government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
QUINTOS-DELES VS CA
Petitioner and three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the
President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section
7 of the Constitution.
Pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7, of the
Constitution, the President has appointed the following persons to the seats
reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph (1), Section 5 of Article VI of
the Constitution:
1. Teresita Quintos-Deles —-Women
xxxxx
However, petitioner and the three other sectoral representatives- appointees
were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of
Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the
Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must
first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their
oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives. This
opposition compelled Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. to suspend the oath-taking
of the four sectoral representatives.
The issue is, whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. YES
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by
nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints.
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5,
Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of
Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers
whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution," referred
to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
BERMUDEZ VS TORRES
The occurrence of a vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac
impelled the main contestants in this case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and
respondent Conrado Quiaoit, to take contrasting views on the proper
interpretation of a provision in the 1987 Revised Administrative
Code. Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and
Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, was a
recommendee[2] of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the
position of Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, would appear to
have had the support of then Representative Jose Yap of the Second Legislative
District of Tarlac.[3]
On 30 June 1997, Quiaoit emerged the victor when he was appointed by
President Ramos to the coveted office. Quiaoit received a certified xerox copy
of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his oath of office before
Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac,
Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and immediately informed the
President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission,
of that assumption. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of Provincial
Prosecutor claiming that the original copy of Quiaoits appointment had not yet
been released by the Secretary of Justice.[4]
Quiaoit, nonetheless, performed the functions and duties of the Office of
Provincial Prosecutor by issuing office orders and memoranda, signing
resolutions on preliminary investigations, and filing several informations before
the courts. Quiaoit had since been regularly receiving the salary, RATA and
other emoluments of the office.
The core issue for consideration is whether or not the absence of a there is no sharing of power to speak of, the latter being deemed for all intents
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held fatal to and purposes as being merely an extension of the personality of the President.
the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit. This question would, in turn,
pivot on the proper understanding of the provision of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987 (Book IV, Title III, Chapter II, Section 9) to the effect that-

All provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the
AGUINALDO VS AQUINO
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.

An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or
selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and
perform the duties and functions of an office or trust.[10] The appointment is
deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been
complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it
effective.[11] Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part
of the appointing authority.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the
right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding
for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary
qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power
xxx
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint.[16] In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral
part thereof.
On the merits of the case, the JBC asserts that in submitting six short lists for
six vacancies, it was only acting in accordance with the clear and unambiguous
mandate of Article VIII, Section 93 of the 1987 Constitution for the JBC to
submit a list for every vacancy. Considering its independence as a
constitutional body, the JBC has the discretion and wisdom to perform its
mandate in any manner as long as it is consistent with the Constitution.
According to the JBC, its new practice of "clustering," in fact, is more in accord
with the purpose of the JBC to rid the appointment process to the Judiciary
from political pressure as the President has to choose only from the nominees
for one particular vacancy. Otherwise, the President can choose whom he
pleases, and thereby completely disregard the purpose for the creation of the
JBC. The JBC clarifies that it numbered the vacancies, not to influence the order
of precedence, but for practical reasons, i.e., to distinguish one list from the
others and to avoid confusion. The JBC also points out that the acts invoked
against the JBC are based on practice or custom, but "practice, no matter how
long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right." The JBC, as a
constitutional body, enjoys independence, and as such, it may change its
practice from time to time in accordance with its wisdom.

IS THE CLUSTERING SCHEME HERE CONSTITUTIONAL? NO

When the Constitution[17] or the law[18] clothes the President with the power to

appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily
carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here
pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority
includes the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.
Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even
nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his
duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter,[19] as and when the
former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way, the President has
the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau
and office.[20]
It can accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the
exercise of discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their
recommendations.[21]
IS THE PRESIDENT LIMITED TO APPOINT ONLY NOMINEES SUBMITTED BY JBC
IN THE SHORTLIST FOR EACH VACANCY? NO
When he disregarded the list, he is said to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
So here in the case of Aguinaldo et al vs Aquino, the court concluded that the
President is not obliged to appoint from each of the shortlist submitted by JBC,
especially when the clustering encroached the President’s power to appoint
individuals to Judiciary. Hence, for as long as the President appointed an
individual nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid.

It is the considered view of the Court, given the above disquisition, that the
It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used
phrase upon recommendation of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II,
to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative
Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted, as it is
to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy
normally so understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which
in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints
is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party
someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid. On this score, the
to whom it is made.[22] The recommendation is here nothing really more than
Court finds herein that President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new
advisory in nature.[23] The President, being the head of the Executive
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice from each of the six shortlists submitted by
Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the
the JBC, especially when the clustering of nominees into the six shortlists
departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority,
encroached on President Aquino's power to appoint members of the Judiciary
and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his
from all those whom the JBC had considered to be qualified for the same
authority.
positions of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

Moreover, in the case at bar, there were six simultaneous vacancies for the
In the instant case, the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, and the JBC cannot, by clustering
appointment of the President are acts of the Executive Department itself, and of the nominees, designate a numerical order of seniority of the prospective
appointees. The Sandiganbayan, a collegiate court, is composed of a Presiding
Justice and 20 Associate Justices divided into seven divisions, with three members
each. The numerical order of the seniority or order of preference of the 20
Associate Justices is determined pursuant to law by the date and order of their
commission or appointment by the President.
It bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a
collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the
seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members by controlling
the date and order of issuance of said members' appointment or commission
papers. By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC
would be establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before their appointment by the President
and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the President's power of
appointment.
Furthermore, the JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six clusters, one for
every vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its constitutional
mandate of recommending qualified nominees to the President. Clustering
impinges upon the President's power of appointment, as well as restricts the
chances for appointment of the qualified nominees, because (1) the President's
option for every vacancy is limited to the five to seven nominees in the cluster;
and (2) once the President has appointed from one cluster, then he is proscribed
from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies.
The said limitations are utterly without legal basis and in contravention of the
President's appointing power.
It also deprives qualified nominees equal opportunity to be considered for all
vacancies, not just a specific one.
The JBC avers that it has no duty to increase the chances of appointment of every
candidate it has adjudged to have met the minimum qualifications for a judicial
post. The Court does not impose upon the JBC such duty, it only requires that the
JBC gives all qualified nominees fair and equal opportunity to be appointed. The
clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies
in collegiate courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular
nominee. A favored nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong
contender to ensure his/her appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed
in a cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her chances of
appointment.
RUFINO VS ENDRIGA
Appointees to the Board of Trustees of CCP: Pres Estrada entrusted new group
(Rufino Group) replacing the old group (Endriga Group)
Nagrek
Are the appointments here valid? YES. Did the President validly appointed the
trustees? YES
Further, Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes Congress to
vest "in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards" the
power to appoint lower-ranked officers. Section 16 provides:
The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank
in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.
The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or
boards is a matter of legislative grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to,
or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain
conditions for the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the
recommendation of subordinate officers or the concurrence of the other
members of the commission or board.
This is in contrast to the President's power to appoint which is a self-executing
power vested by the Constitution itself and thus not subject to legislative
limitations or conditions.28 The power to appoint conferred directly by the
Constitution on the Supreme Court en banc29 and on the Constitutional
Commissions30 is also self-executing and not subject to legislative limitations
or conditions.
As an enumeration of offices, what applies to the first office in the
enumeration also applies to the succeeding offices mentioned in the
enumeration. Since the words "in the heads of" refer to "departments," the
same words "in the heads of" also refer to the other offices listed in the
enumeration, namely, "agencies, commissions, or boards."
LOWER RANK LANG ANG MAPILI AND NOT HEAD.
Otherwise, it would become a self-perpetuating entity independent of the
Presisent.
GONZALES VS OFFICE OF THE RPESIDENT 2012
Power of Implication. President has power to appoint an power to remove.
General rule, except when the power to remove is vested to other office other
than the appointing authoirty.
Power to appoint is corollary to power to remove.
Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the
power to remove.48 As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the
President are also removable by him.49 The exception to this is when the law
expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly
vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some
cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the
President's power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts
shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court
may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress
(Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may be removed only by the
Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel
(Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Covered ang judiciary
Service Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections
Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D)
shall likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by
DE RAMA VS CA
impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself
shall be appointed by the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be
removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
Midnight appointment done by mayor, he appointed 14 before he leave the
office. Does the prohibition cover local government? NO, it does not apply. It
only applies to presidential appointments. There is no law that prohibits
In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
midnight appointments in the last days of his tenure.
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is
already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the
aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
But in the case of Prov Government of Aurora even if it does not apply, it does
not limit CSC to issue rules to limit bureaucracy in local govt units. We have to
reckon existing CSC issuances. It can establish to promote professionalism and
MR - this involves the admin charges against deputy ombudsman and special
efficiency in local govt. CSC prohibited mass appointments prior and after
prosecutor. Sec 8 par 2 is unconstitutional. That
election before. Even with that finding, it does apply because it was
superseded with another resolution. All appointments of elective officials will
be disapproved except it is qualified and underwent screening process. Diri
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of nahulog ang kay governor under Aurora case. Pwede ilimit sa CSC ang
the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive appointments.
officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
[emphasis ours, italics supplied]

Public Interest vs Elma

As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman,"37 the Court has
upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under the broad powers granted it
by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line Her appointment is unconstitutional because of the incompatibility of their
with its official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.38 duties (CPLC and PCGG)

The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of Does the prohibition on Cabinet member apply? No, appointive public officials,
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including they are allowed as long as prohibited by law or there is incompatible office.
Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To
support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of
the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and partisan
Elma in effect had vacated his PCGG office when she accepted CPLC.
politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent" office.

LIBAN VS GORDON

Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor is not expressly made part of the
composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it performs as an organic Red Cross partakes of sui generis character. Gordon is incumbent member of
component of that Office militates against a differential treatment between the congress and chairman of PNRC. It is not a GOCC, it is not part of executive
Ombudsman’s Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on the branch. Its appointment does not fall on
other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her
Deputies but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents
of the Ombudsman herself in the performance of her duties.
It is a sui generis entity.

IN RE HON MATEO VALENZUELA

(MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS - APPOINTMENTS ON THE EVE OF CESSATION OF
YOUR OFFICE)
Does the prohibition on midnight appointments cover the judiciary? YES
Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently
established. Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of
the government, nor a government-owned or -controlled corporation or a
subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so
much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his
position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private corporation
within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution, that must be
organized under the Corporation Code.As correctly mentioned by Justice
Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the
government in the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under
international law. This Court cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its
existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter
was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has
responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to
provide a substantial portion of the countrys blood requirements. Its
humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the
core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative
consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities
but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the international
community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must
therefore stay.
DE CASTRO VS JBC
Can the incumbent president appoint SC Justice? YES
Does it violate the constitutional ban on midnight appointments? NO
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial
and Bar Council for every vacancy.
the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against
presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to
appointments in the Judiciary.
IN RE VALENZUELA WAS REVERSED.
Article VII Sec. 15 does not apply to appointments in SC as well as other
appointments in the Judiciary. the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger
that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in
a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations.
The provis on the consti are well thought out. The consti contains separate articles
for the three great branches of the government emphasizing the separation of the
three great powers of their political structure.
Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department.
The judiciary has a separate article, particularly sec 4, it mandates the president to
appoint within 90 days. It did not intend to extend the prohibition to the judiciary.
It should have been made explicit if they have done so.
Valenzuela is obiter dictum only. It disregarded the imperative command to fill
up the vacancy in SC within 90 days. “Shall” pertains to an imperative duty to
be imposed and not to be disregarded.
BETOY VS BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Ra 9136 - EPIRA - there was a board created. Now NpD issued several orders
and removed some employees, reorg the structure to remove the bureaucracy.
May nagreklamo. Board members kay mostly cabinet memers daw. It must not
be.
Are they correct? SC said it is wrong because it is carried out in an ex officio
capacity.
But there was no mention that it was held in ex officio capacity. However, the
court found other provisions by considering the law as a whole.
Cabinet members can hold other office in ex officio capacity and they are not
receiving emoluments or compensation.
It is valid. Even if there was no mention, there was mere designation. They
were imposed additional duties.
this Court agrees with the contention of the Solicitor General that the
constitutional prohibition was not violated, considering that the concerned
Cabinet secretaries were merely imposed additional duties and their posts in
the NPB do not constitute any other office within the contemplation of the
constitutional prohibition.
The delegation of the said official to the respective Board of Directors were
designation by Congress of additional functions and duties to the officials
concerned, i.e., they were designated as members of the Board of
Directors. Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by
law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier
appointment.[34] Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits
or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached
to the position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the
officer to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee's
right to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved
appointment to the position, and not a mere designation.[35]
Hence, Congress specifically intended that the position of member of the
Board of NPB shall be ex-officio or automatically attached to the respective
offices of the members composing the board. It is clear from the wordings of
the law that it was the intention of Congress that the subject posts will be
adjunct to the respective offices of the official designated to such posts.
CONCEPCION BAUTISTA VS SALONGA
CHR - Is it a constitutional commission? Like COA, CSC, and COMELEC?

What created CHR?

Art XIII Sec 17 created the CHR. It was created by law

COncepcion Bautista was appointed chairman of CHR. She discharged the

functions and duties of chairman. CA sent her a letter reqesting documents in
regard to her confirmation to CA.

Is the appointment of chairman of CHR subject to confirmation of CA? SC says NO.

Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not among
the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments, it follows that the appointment by the President of
the Chairman of the (CHR), is to be made without the review or participation of
the Commission on Appointments.

To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the

Commission on Human Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution
itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, whose appointments are
expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. 2

The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they are among the
officers of government "whom he (the President) may be authorized by law to
appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987, authorizes the
President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights. It provides:

(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be
appointed by the President for a term of seven years without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor.

When the president converted Bautista’s designation from acting chairman to

permanent appointment, she already qualified upon the performance of her
duties as chairman of the CHR. All she has to do is to reject or accept her
appointment.

Is it an ad interim appointment? SC says NO. Because to be considered ad interim,

it must be an appointment which requires CA confirmation. But since
appointment of Chairman and members of CHR does not require confirmation of
CA. Ad interim appointements do not apply to appointments that are solely for
the president to make.

Temporary appointment and temporary designations must be for one year only.