Perlas Bernabe Cases

1. Dimagan vs. Dacworks United, Inc.
, 661 SCRA 438, November 28, 2011

Labor Law|Constructive Dismissal|Abandonment
1. Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Elements of .—“Forum shopping exists when a party repetitively
avails himself of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely by, some other
court.” The elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent
the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same set of facts; and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration.
2. Same; Same; Abandonment; Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee
to resume his employment; Elements to Constitute Abandonment of Work.-
—“Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.”
To constitute abandonment of work, two elements must concur: “(1) the employee must have failed to
report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) there must have
been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship
manifested by some overt act.” The employer bears the burden of proof to show the deliberate and
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning.
3. Same; Same; As held in the case of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. vs. Del Villar, 632 SCRA
293 (2010), the burden falls upon the company to prove that the employee’s assignment from one
position to another was not tantamount to constructive dismissal. In the case at bar, respondents failed
to discharge said burden. In fact, respondents never even disputed that petitioner was relegated from
the position of OIC to supervisor and, subsequently, to an ordinary technician. Clearly, the reduction
in petitioner’s responsibilities and duties, particularly from supervisor to ordinary technician,
constituted a demotion in rank tantamount to constructive dismissal.
4. Labor Law; Constructive Dismissal; Words and Phrases; Constructive dismissal is defined as a
quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there
is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable
person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the
circumstances. It is an act amounting to dismissal but is made to appear as if it were not. Constructive
dismissal is therefore a dismissal in disguise. The law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of
employees in order to protect their rights and interests from the coercive acts of the employer.
5. Same; Appeals; It is an established rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally
limited to reviewing errors of law; Rule that the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding
is not an ironclad.-
—It must be pointed out that the main issue in this case involves a question of fact. It is an established
rule that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. This Court is not a trier
of facts. In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding
and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. This rule, however,
is not ironclad. One of the recognized exceptions is when there is a divergence between the findings of
facts of the NLRC and that of the CA, as in this case. There is, therefore, a need to review the records
to determine which of them should be preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts.
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Bar2019Perlas-Bernabe ToGODbetheGLORY. -anne.quito1214-
2. Banaag vs. Espeleta, 661 SCRA 513, November 29, 2011
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court Personnel|Evidence
1. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct; Immorality; Definition
of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct.-
—After a careful evaluation of the records of the instant case, the Court finds respondent Olivia C.
Espeleta guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct under Section 46(b)(5), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title
I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 which, as defined in Section 1 of CSC Resolution No.
100912 dated May 17, 2010 (Revised Rules on the Administrative Offense of Disgraceful and Immoral
Conduct), is “an act which violates the basic norm of decency, morality and decorum abhorred and
condemned by the society” and “conduct which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinions of the good and respectable members of the community.”
2. Same; Same; Court employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality
and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and
integrity of courts of justice; Resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an easy way out
to evade an administrative liability or an administrative sanction.-
—It cannot be overstressed that the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and
otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court
employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their
professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of courts of justice.”
This Court has thus consistently penalized court personnel who had been found wanting of such
standards, even if they have precipitately resigned from their positions. Resignation should not be used
either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or an administrative
sanction.
3. Same; Same; Evidence; In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount
of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion is
required.-
—In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of
substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.
4. Same; Same; Same; Respondent’s act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a married man
comes within the purview of disgraceful and immoral conduct.-
—Respondent’s act of maintaining an illicit relationship with a married man comes within the purview
of disgraceful and immoral conduct, which is classified as a grave offense punishable with suspension
from the service for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal
for the second offense.
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3. Tiong vs. Florendo, 662 SCRA 1, December 12, 2011
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Attorneys|Disbarment
1. Administrative Law; Attorneys; Disbarment; It has been consistently held by the Court that
possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a continuing
requirement to maintain one’s good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law
practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.
Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in his public or private activities,
which tends to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient
to warrant his suspension or disbarment.
2. Same; Same; Same.- It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not
meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal
profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an
investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and
his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin
to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings.
3. Same; Same; Same; Respondent’s act of having an affair with his client’s wife manifested his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity.-
—Respondent’s act of having an affair with his client’s wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on
the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and
low regard for the ethics of his profession. Likewise, he violated the trust and confidence reposed on
him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Undeniably, therefore, his illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful
and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court. Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or suspended from his office by the Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, among others.
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4. Gagoomal vs. Villacorta, 663 SCRA 444, January 18, 2012
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Judgments
1. Remedial Law; Judgments; Levy; Writs of Possession; A writ of possession is an order by which
the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property. We clarified
in the case of Motos v. Real Bank (A Thrift Bank), Inc., 593 SCRA 216 92009), that a writ of possession
may be issued under any of the following instances: (a) land registration proceedings under Section 17
of Act No. 496; (b) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty
and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (c) extrajudicial foreclosure
of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118.
2. Same; Same; Judgments; As correctly observed by the CA, the quashal of a writ of possession does
not have the effect of modifying or abrogating the judgment of the RTC. “The settled rule is that a
judgment which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and hence may no longer
be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes—all the issues between the
parties being deemed resolved and laid to rest.” To reiterate, however, the court’s power with regard
to execution of judgments extends only to properties irrefutably belonging to the judgment debtor, which
does not obtain in this case.
3. Same; Same; Writs of Execution; Sheriffs; It bears to stress that the court issuing the writ of
execution may enforce its authority only over properties or rights of the judgment debtor, and the sheriff
acts properly only when he subjects to execution property undeniably belonging to the judgment debtor.
Should the sheriff levy upon the assets of a third person in which the judgment debtor has not even the
remotest interest, then he is acting beyond the limits of his authority. A judgment can only be executed
or issued against a party to the action, not against one who has not yet had his day in court.
4. Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in which the
only object sought is the recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to
property be incidentally affected.
To be sure, in Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Herbal Cove Realty Corporation, 399 SCRA 409 (2003), We
have previously explained that the doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in which
the only object sought is the recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to
property be incidentally affected. It is essential that the property be directly affected such as when the
relief sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or
an adjudication between conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right of possession to specific
property, or requiring its transfer or sale. Even if a party initially avails of a notice of lis pendens upon
the filing of a case in court, such notice is rendered nugatory if the case turns out to be a purely personal
action. In such event, the notice of lis pendens becomes functus officio
5. Same; Civil Procedure; Lis Pendens; Legal Effects of Filing a Notice of Lis Pendens.-The filing of
a notice of lis pendens has a dual effect: (1) to keep the property subject matter of the litigation within
the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent the defeat of the final
judgment by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or otherwise, of the property
subject of the litigation to the judgment that the court will subsequently promulgate. Relative thereto, a
notice of lis pendens is proper in the following actions and their concomitant proceedings: “(a) an
action to recover possession of real estate; (b) an action to quiet title thereto; (c) an action to remove
clouds thereon; (d) an action for partition; and (e) any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly
affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.”
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only
against property incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and if property belonging to any
third person is mistakenly levied upon to answer for another man’s indebtedness, such person has all
the right to challenge the levy through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court.
Section 16, Rule 39 thereof specifically provides that a third person may avail himself of the remedies
of either terceria, to determine whether the sheriff has rightly or wrongly taken hold of the property not
belonging to the judgment debtor or obligor, or an independent “separate action” to vindicate their
claim of ownership and/or possession over the foreclosed property. However, “a person other than the
judgment debtor who claims ownership or right over the levied properties is not precluded from taking
other legal remedies to prosecute his claim” ****
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5. Gonzales vs. Bugaay, 666 SCRA 493, February 22, 2012
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Demurrer to Evidence
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence; Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus,
a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment.-
—In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment. Being considered a
motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its
judgment. In this case, respondents demurred to petitioners’ evidence after the RTC promulgated its
Decision. While respondents’ motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was granted, it was for the
sole purpose of receiving and offering for admission the documents not presented at the trial. As
respondents never complied with the directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion
should be deemed abandoned. Consequently, the RTC’s original Decision stands.
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6. Layug vs. Commission on Elections, 667 SCRA 135, February 28, 2012
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Motions
1. Constitutional Law; Congress; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Section 17,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its
Members. Section 5 (1) of the same Article identifies who the “members” of the House are: Sec. 5. (1).
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations. (Underscoring added).
2. Same; Civil Procedure; Motions; A motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma.-
—It should likewise be pointed out that the aforesaid Motion for Reconsideration was filed without the
requisite notice of hearing. We have held time and again that the failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court renders the motion defective. As
a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma. None of the acceptable exceptions
obtain in this case.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Mandamus, as a remedy, is available to compel the doing
of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. It cannot compel the doing of an act involving the
exercise of discretion one way or the other. Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court clearly provides:
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at
some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Every pleading must be signed by the
party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a post office
box.
—A party may sue or defend an action pro se. Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, “(e)very
pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his address
which should not be a post office box.” x x x From the fact alone that the address which Layug furnished
the COMELEC was incorrect, his pretensions regarding the validity of the proceedings and
promulgation of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 for being in violation of his constitutional right to
due process are doomed to fail. His refusal to rectify the error despite knowledge thereof impels Us to
conclude that he deliberately stated an inexistent address with the end in view of delaying the
proceedings upon the plea of lack of due process. As the COMELEC aptly pointed out, Layug
contemptuously made a mockery of election laws and procedure by appearing before the Commission
by himself or by different counsels when he wants to, and giving a fictitious address to ensure that he
does not receive mails addressed to him. He cannot thus be allowed to profit from his own wrongdoing.
To rule otherwise, considering the circumstances in the instant case, would place the date of receipt of
pleadings, judgments and processes within Layug’s power to determine at his pleasure. This, We cannot
countenance.
5. Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Party-List System Act; Section 6 of said
Party-List System Act states that “the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition.”-
—Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-List, as it is vested
by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the COMELEC. Section 6 of said Act states that
“the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
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cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition xxx.” Accordingly, in the case of Abayon vs. HRET, We ruled that the HRET
did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat
Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the disqualifications of said party-lists.
Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC
provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
6. Same; Same; The members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who
shall be elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.-
—Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: (1) members who shall be
elected from legislative districts; and (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. In this case, Buhay Party-List was
entitled to two seats in the House that went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde,
Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth nominee, did not get a
seat and thus had not become a member of the House of Representatives. Indubitably, the HRET has no
jurisdiction over the issue of Brother Mike’s qualifications.
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7. Re:Pet. for JudicialClemency of Judge Zita V. Masamayor, 667 SCRA 467, March 06, 2012
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judicial Clemency
1. Administrative Law; Appointments; Disqualifications for appointment to any judicial post or as
Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman.-
—Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the JBC provides: “SEC. 5. Disqualification.—The following are
disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy
Ombudsman: 1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases; 2. Those with pending
criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and 3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal
case; or in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000,
unless he has been granted judicial clemency.”
2. Same; Judicial Clemency; Guidelines in Resolving Requests for Judicial Clemency.-
—In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency), 533 SCRA 539 (2007), the Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus: “1. There must be proof of remorse and
reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the
officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and
prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt
in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of
non-reformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reform; 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive
years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must
be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to
legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills),
as well as potential for public service. 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that
may justify clemency.”
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8. Baño vs. Bachelor Express, Inc., 667 SCRA 782, March 12, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Damages|Exemplary Damages
1. Civil Law; Common Carriers; Gross Negligence; Words and Phrases; Gross Negligence is one that
is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a
duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be effected.-
—In the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Pacific Airways Corporation, 629 SCRA 219
(2010), the Court has defined gross negligence as “one that is characterized by the want of even slight
care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully
and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.”
2. Same; Damages; Exemplary Damages; Exemplary Damages are awarded to serve as a warning to
the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of similar deleterious actions.-
—The CA erred in deleting the awards of exemplary damages, which the law grants to serve as a
warning to the public and as a deterrent against the repetition of similar deleterious actions. However,
the award should be tempered as it is not intended to enrich one party or to impoverish another. Thus,
the Court reinstates the separate awards of exemplary damages to petitioners in the amount of
P50,000.00.
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9. Del Mundo vs. Capistrano, 669 SCRA 462, April 16, 2012
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics|Practice of Law
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise
due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights.-
—Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in
protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a
good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes
him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society. His
workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case because it is settled that a lawyer must only
accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle.
2. Same; Same; Practice of Law; The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.-
—The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency
and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Falling short of this
standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty
based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in consideration of the surrounding facts.
3. Same; Same; A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession.
As trustee of such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted
to a lawyer for a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be
returned immediately upon demand.-
—A lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of
such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for
a specific purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned
immediately upon demand. Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it
in violation of the trust reposed on him. And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross
violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.
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10. Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branches 72 and 22,
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, 672 SCRA 21, June 13, 2012
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judges|Speedy Disposition of Cases|Gross Inefficiency
1. Administrative Law; Judges; Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue
delay, for justice delayed is justice denied; delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion
of public faith and confidence in the judicial system.-
—Judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without undue delay, for justice delayed is justice
denied. They have always been exhorted to observe strict adherence to the rule on speedy disposition
of cases, as delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in
the judicial system.
2. Same; Same; Same; Gross Inefficiency; Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure to
decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits
administrative sanction.-
—In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana, the Court held that a judge cannot choose his
deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension granted by the Court, the failure
to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits
administrative sanction. If a judge is unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters,
he can, for good reasons, ask for an extension.
3. Same; Same; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated
to decide and resolve cases within 90 days from submission.-
—Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases within 90 days
from submission. Corollary to this constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently,
fairly, and with reasonable promptness.
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11. LBP vs. Montinola-Escarilla and Co., Inc., 672 SCRA 261, June 13, 2012
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform Law|Just Compensation
1. Agrarian Reform Law; Just Compensation; For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair
market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and price at the time of taking.-
—For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and price at the time of taking. In the implementation of R.A. No. 6657,
Section 17 provides the manner by which just compensation is determined, thus: Section 17.
Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.
The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its
valuation. The potential use of the expropriated property is only considered in cases where there is a
great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, but should never control the
determination of just compensation.
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12. People vs. Matias, 672 SCRA 411, June 13, 2012
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Sexual Abuse|Penalties
1. Criminal Law; Sexual Abuse; Statutory Rape; Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation
to Republic Act (R.A.) 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should
not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal
Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua-
—on the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged with either sexual
abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the
Revised Penal Code.—In the case of People v. Pangilinan, 660 SCRA 16 (2011), which affirmed the
doctrines enunciated in the cases of People v. Dahilig, 651 SCRA 778 (2011), and People v. Abay, 580
SCRA 235 (2009), the Court explained: Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA
8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for
sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized
with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be
charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes
for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be
subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with
a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes),
a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized
by a special law.
2. Same; Same; Penalties; The penalty for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act
(R.A.) 7610 is reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) is penalized with reclusion perpetua.-
—The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted appellant for “rape” under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA
7610 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, upon a finding that AAA was a minor below 12 years
old at the time of the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. However, a punctilious scrutiny of the
records shows that AAA was born on April 23, 1991, which would make her 13 years old at the time of
the commission of the offense on June 6, 2004. Thus, appellant can be prosecuted and convicted either
under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 for sexual abuse, or under Article 266-A of the RPC, except for
rape under paragraph 1(d). It bears pointing out that the penalties under these two laws differ: the
penalty for sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal medium to
reclusion perpetua, while rape under Article 266-A of the RPC is penalized with reclusion perpetua.
****
13
13. Bangis vs. Heirs of Serafin and Salud Adolfo, 672 SCRA 468, June 13, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Interest Rates|Loans
1. Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; A petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court involves only questions of law and not of facts.-
—At the outset, it should be emphasized that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court involves only questions of law and not of facts. A question of law exists when there is
doubt as to what the law is on a given set of facts while a question of fact arises when there is doubt as
to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
2. Same; Interest Rates; Loans; A liability based on a loan or forbearance of money, shall be subject
to legal interest of 12% per annum.-
—Following the Court’s ruling in the iconic case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
234 SCRA 78 (1994), the foregoing liability, which is based on a loan or forbearance of money, shall
be subject to legal interest of 12% per annum from the date it was judicially determined by the CA on
March 30, 2009 until the finality of this Decision, and not from 1975 (the date of the constitution of the
mortgage); nor from 1998 (when an attempt to pay was made) or in 2000 at the time the complaint was
filed, because it was the Heirs of Adolfo and not Bangis who filed the instant suit to collect the
indebtedness. Thereafter, the judgment award inclusive of interest shall bear interest at 12% per annum
until its full satisfaction.
3. Same; Same; No title in derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession.-
—Settled is the rule that no title in derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, even if acquisitive prescription can be appreciated in
this case, the Heirs of Bangis’ possession being in bad faith is two years shy of the requisite 30-year
uninterrupted adverse possession required under Article 1137 of the Civil Code.
4. Same; Land Titles; If two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or
partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates of titles were
derived.-
—As held in the case of Top Management Programs Corporation v. Luis Fajardo and the Register of
Deeds of Las Piñas City, 652 SCRA 18 (2011): “if two certificates of title purport to include the same
land, whether wholly or partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the
certificates of titles were derived.” Having, thus, traced the roots of the parties’ respective titles
supported by the records of the Register of Deeds of Malaybalay City, the courts a quo were correct in
upholding the title of the Heirs of Adolfo as against TCT No. T-10567 of Bangis, notwithstanding its
earlier issuance on August 18, 1976 or long before the Heirs of Adolfo secured their own titles on May
26, 1998. To paraphrase the Court’s ruling in Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 556 (1998):
where two (2) transfer certificates of title have been issued on different dates, the one who holds the
earlier title may prevail only in the absence of any anomaly or irregularity in the process of its
registration, which circumstance does not obtain in this case.
5. Civil Law; Antichresis; For the contract of antichresis to be valid, Article 2134 of the Civil Code
requires that the amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise
the contract of antichresis shall be void.-
—For the contract of antichresis to be valid, Article 2134 of the Civil Code requires that “the amount
of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise the contract of antichresis
shall be void.” In this case, the Heirs of Adolfo were indisputably unable to produce any document in
support of their claim that the contract between Adolfo and Bangis was an antichresis, hence, the CA
properly held that no such relationship existed between the parties.
****
14
14. Philcomsat Holdings Corp vs. Senate of the Rep. of the Phils., 673 SCRA 611, June 19, 2012
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Right to Counsel
1. Constitutional Law; Congress; Power of Inquiry; Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, provides
as follows: “The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”-
—The respondents Senate Committees’ power of inquiry relative to PSR No. 455 has been passed upon
and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Camilo L.
Sabio, which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution, as follows: “The Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.” The Court explained that such conferral of the legislative power
of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry
with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge.
2. Same; Right to Counsel; The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under
custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during
such custodial investigation.-
—Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal’s allegation that their constitutionally-guaranteed right to
counsel was violated during the hearings held in furtherance of PSR No. 455 is specious. The right to
be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial investigation suspected for the
commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during such custodial investigation. Since
petitioners Locsin and Andal were invited to the public hearings as resource persons, they cannot
therefore validly invoke their right to counsel.
****
15
15. Ace Navigation Co., Inc. vs. FGU Insurance Corporation, 674 SCRA 348, June 25, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Agency
1. Mercantile Law; Bill of Lading; A bill of lading is defined as “an instrument in writing, signed by a
carrier or his agent, describing the freight so as to identify it, stating the name of the consignor, the
terms of the contract for carriage, and agreeing or directing that the freight to be delivered to the order
or assigns of a specified person at a specified place.”-
—A bill of lading is defined as “an instrument in writing, signed by a carrier or his agent, describing
the freight so as to identify it, stating the name of the consignor, the terms of the contract for carriage,
and agreeing or directing that the freight to be delivered to the order or assigns of a specified person
at a specified place.” It operates both as a receipt and as a contract. As a receipt, it recites the date
and place of shipment, describes the goods as to quantity, weight, dimensions, identification marks and
condition, quality, and value. As a contract, it names the contracting parties, which include the
consignee, fixes the route, destination, and freight rates or charges, and stipulates the rights and
obligations assumed by the parties. As such, it shall only be binding upon the parties who make them,
their assigns and heirs.
2. Civil Law; Agency; An agent is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he
expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice
of his powers.-
—Article 1868 of the Civil Code states: “ART. 1868. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself
to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent
or authority of the latter.” Corollarily, Article 1897 of the same Code provides that an agent is not
personally liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the
limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient notice of his powers.
****
16
16. Ogawa vs. Menigishi, 676 SCRA 14, July 09, 2012
Syllabi Class :Evidence|Preponderance of Evidence|Words and Phrases
1. Same; Preponderance of Evidence; Words and Phrases; “Preponderance of evidence” is the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater weight of credible evidence.”-
—“Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of evidence” or “greater
weight of credible evidence.” From the evidence on record, it is clear that respondent failed to prove
her counterclaim by preponderance of evidence.
2. Evidence; Receipts; Words and Phrases; A receipt is defined as a written and signed
acknowledgment that money or good was delivered or received.-
—A receipt is defined as a written and signed acknowledgment that money or good was delivered or
received. Exhibit 1, upon which respondent relies to support her counterclaim, sufficiently satisfies this
definition. However, while indubitably containing the signatures of both parties, a plain reading of the
contents of Exhibit 1 negates any inference as to the nature of the transaction for which the 1,000,000
Yen was received and who between the parties is the obligor and the obligee. What is apparent is a
mere written and signed acknowledgment that money was received. There are no terms and conditions
found therein from which a right or obligation may be established. Hence, it cannot be considered an
actionable document upon which an action or defense may be founded.
3. Same; Burden of Proof; It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her
right.-
—It is settled that the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a counterclaim,
the burden of proving the existence of the claim lies with the defendant, by the quantum of evidence
required by law, which in this case is preponderance of evidence.
****
17
17. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Ochoa, 676 SCRA 551, July 17, 2012
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Autonomy of Local Governments|State Policies
****
18
18. Soller vs. Heirs of Jeremias Ulayao, 677 SCRA 124, July 18, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Procedure|Prescription|Acquisitive Prescription
1. Civil Procedure; Judgments; Summary Judgments; Summary judgments are proper when, upon
motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not
tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law. In Viajar v. Estenzo, 89 SCRA 684 (1979), the Court explained: Relief by summary judgment is
intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there
be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment.
Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment
cannot take the place of a trial. x x x [R]elief by summary judgment can only be allowed after
compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a summary hearing considering
that this remedy is in derogation of a party’s right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party
who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine
issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.
2. Same; Prescription; Acquisitive Prescription; In this case, records show that the original defendant,
Jeremias, raised the special and affirmative defense of acquisitive prescription in his answer, claiming
that he was in open, continuous and notorious possession or the disputed property as, in fact, his house
and other permanent improvements are still existing thereon. As succinctly explained by the CA in its
assailed Decision, the defense of acquisitive prescription inevitably involves the issue of actual, physical
and material possession, which is always a question of fact. The existence of this issue therefore
necessitates, for its proper resolution, the presentation of competent and relevant evidence, which can
only be done in the course of a full-blown trial.
****
19
19. Go vs. People, 677 SCRA 213, July 18, 2012
Syllabi Class :Criminal Procedure|Right of Confrontation
1. Evidence; Testimonial Evidence; Depositions; The examination of witnesses must be done orally
before a judge in open court; It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes
the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu
of direct court testimony.-
—The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially
in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet
the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness’ credibility through his manner and
deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the
conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of
direct court testimony.
2. Criminal Procedure; Right of Confrontation; The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held
to apply specifically to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused
an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to
observe the deportment of witnesses. The Court explained in People v. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92 (1980),
that the constitutional requirement “insures that the witness will give his testimony under oath, thus
deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a
valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables the court to observe
the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility.”
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere
and not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused
of his right to attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the
prosecution witness’ deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable
when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case against the accused.
4. Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases,
more particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the
testimonial examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case
is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus: SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution.—
When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the
trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such examination, in
the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has
been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement
taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.
****
20
20. Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs-Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division, 677 SCRA 408, July 24, 2012
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings|Due Process
1. Administrative Law; Presidency; Reorganizations; Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292);
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following actions undertaken for such
purpose: (1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/
2. Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and
giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process, which simply means having the opportunity to
explain one’s side. Hence, as long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present
evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors
is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. The records show that petitioner was issued an Order
requiring him to submit his written explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave
misconduct filed against him. His own failure to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his
subsequent claim of denial of due process.
3. Administrative Law; Presidency; Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining
authority of the President. This proceeds from the well settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary
law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint
is vested. Having the power to remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President has the
corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct in office. Petitioner
is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily,
he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an
investigation into matters that require his informed decision.
4. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government; The equal protection of the
laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. It is embraced
under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the law, “all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.” The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable classification
so that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.
5. Ombudsman; Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for
grave misconduct, petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the
IAD-ODESLA from proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman’s authority to
investigate both elective and appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no
means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
6. Administrative Agencies; Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to “investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints against all presidential appointees in the government” and to
“submit its report and recommendations to the President.” The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and
recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate
cases.
7. Same; Same; Same; Same; A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for
purposes of economy and efficiency.-
—A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be
pursued in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes
of economy and efficiency. It appears in this case that the streamlining of functions within the Office of
the President Proper was pursued with such purposes in mind. In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as
bases for the reorganization the policy dictates of eradicating corruption in the government and
promoting economy and efficiency in the bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the
reorganization is shown by the fact that while Congress had initially appropriated P22 Million for the
PAGC’s operation in the 2010 annual budget, no separate or added funding of such a considerable
amount was ever required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the IAD-ODESLA.
21
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new,
additional and distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body
were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office of the President
Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of
the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division—the Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division—through which ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to
discharge under E.O. 13.
9. Same; Same; Same; Same; The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under
Section 31(1) on the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects
employees’ tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that
is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When
the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who
held the ranks of Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively, and was placed directly “under the Office
of the President.” On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been
transferred, is an office within the Office of the President Proper. Since both of these offices belong to
the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring
its functions to the ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
10. Same; Same; Same; Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC); The abolition of the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and the transfer of its functions to a division specially
created within the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) is properly
within the prerogative of the President under his continuing “delegated legislative authority to
reorganize” his own office pursuant to E.O. 292; Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer
of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of
the President under his continuing “delegated legislative authority to reorganize” his own office
pursuant to E.O. 292. Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to
transferring either an office or a function from the Office of the President to another Department or
Agency, and the other way around. Only Section 31(1) gives the President a virtual freehand in dealing
with the internal structure of the Office of the President Proper by allowing him to take actions as
extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart from the less drastic move of transferring
functions and offices from one unit to another.
****
22
21. Dela Cruz, Sr. vs. Fankhauser, 677 SCRA 744, July 30, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Procedure|Execution of Judgments|Appeals
1. Civil Procedure; Execution of Judgments; Appeals; Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court states
that no appeal may be taken from an order of execution; Exceptions.-
—Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court indeed states that no appeal may be taken from an order of
execution. However, in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 730 (1985), the Court stated that
there are certain instances when an appeal from an order of execution should be allowed, to wit: It is
also a settled rule that an order of execution of judgment is not appealable. However, where such order
of execution in the opinion of the defeated party varies the terms of the judgment and does not conform
to the essence thereof, or when the terms of the judgment are not clear and there is room for
interpretation and the interpretation given by the trial court as contained in its order of execution is
wrong in the opinion of the defeated party, the latter should be allowed to appeal from said order so
that the Appellate Tribunal may pass upon the legality and correctness of the said order. (Underscoring
supplied) Recently, the Court En Banc, in Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v.
Aumentado, Jr., 625 SCRA 241 (2010), reiterated that there are exceptions to the general rule that an
order of execution is not appealable, one of which is when the writ of execution varies the judgment.
****
23
22. Civil Service Commission vs. Yu, 678 SCRA 39, July 31, 2012
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Abandonment of Office|Devolution
1. Local Government Units; Devolution; Words and Phrases; As defined, “devolution” is the act by
which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units
to perform specific functions and responsibilities. Specifically, Section 17(i) of the same Code
prescribes the manner of devolution, as follows: (i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall
include the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel
of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities.
Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the local government units to which
they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as
determined by the said oversight committee: Provided, further, That regional directors who are career
executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be
absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the national government, without any
diminution of rank, salary or tenure.
2. Same; Same; View that Dr. Castillo’s manifest inaction to assert a legal right from 1992 up to her
retirement from government service in 1996 constituted abandonment by acquiescence, of whatever
legal right she had over the devolved position of Public Health Officer II (PHO II). Coupled with her
acceptance or consent to her re-absorption by the DOH in the DOH Regional Health Field Office No.
IX in Zamboanga City, she effectively abandoned any legal right she had to the PHO II position
devolved to the Province, which resulted in a vacancy in the said position. This paved the way for the
valid appointment in 1994 of Dr. Yu who then was a de jure, not a de facto officer. Having been validly
appointed to a vacant position that was mandatorily and automatically devolved to the Province by
operation of law, Dr. Yu, as correctly pointed out by the assailed ruling of the Court of Appeals, had a
vested right to the position of PHO II that was later re-nationalized and reclassified as Chief of Hospital
II by operation of a subsequent law. As such, she is entitled to all the corresponding salaries and benefits
pertaining to the said office which she had not received for the period not exceeding the day of her
retirement which was on August 24, 2004.
3. Administrative Law; Abandonment of Office; Devolution; View that Dr. Castillo did indeed
abandon her statutory right to the position by acquiescence. Otherwise, there would have been no
vacancy in the said devolved position to which Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu could be validly appointed.-
—I fully concur with the factual and legal basis of the conclusion reached by the ponencia of the
Honorable Justice Estrella M. Perlas-Bernabe save with respect to her opinion that Dr. Fortunata A.
Castillo (Dr. Castillo) did not abandon the devolved position of Public Health Officer II (PHO II). With
due respect, I maintain contrary view that Dr. Castillo did indeed abandon her statutory right to the
said position by acquiescence. Otherwise, there would have been no vacancy in the said devolved
position to which Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu (Dr. Yu) could be validly appointed.
4. Same; Abandonment of Office; “Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an
office by the holder with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to
constitute abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstance as clearly to indicate an
absolute relinquishment. There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the
law will infer a relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs from and is
accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. There are, therefore, two essential elements of
abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and, second, an overt or ‘external’ act by which the
intention is carried into effect.”
5. Administrative Law; Detail; Words and Phrases; A detail is defined and governed by Executive
Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6), thus: (6) Detail. A detail is the
movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall
be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and
scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal
his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory
unless otherwise ordered by the Commission.
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23. Tumbokon vs. Pefianco, 678 SCRA 60, August 01, 2012
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Disbarment
1. Attorneys; Practice of Law; The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As
such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession,
the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers
may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their
professional or in their private capacity.
2. Same; Disbarment; We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded
that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as member
of the bar, or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under scandalous circumstance,
which do not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as recommended.
3. Same; Illegal Money Lending; We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have
been sufficiently established. A “business” requires some form of investment and a sufficient number
of customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis. The lending of money to a
single person without showing that such service is made available to other persons on a consistent basis
cannot be construed as indicia that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.
4. Same; Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct; Respondent did not deny the accusation that he
abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children
notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of
Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard
of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP’s finding that respondent violated the Lawyer’s
Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
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24. Dhaliwal vs. Dumaguing, 678 SCRA 68, August 01, 2012
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf
of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation
of the trust reposed in him by his client.-
—Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as payment for the balance of the purchase
price of a parcel of land as in the present case, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately
returned. “A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives
rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.”
****
26
25. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Lee, 678 SCRA 171, August 01, 2012
Syllabi Class :Actions|Garnishment
1. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Parties; Section 5, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court requires that persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in court must be impleaded as
private respondents.-
—Section 5, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that persons interested in sustaining the
proceedings in court must be impleaded as private respondents. Upon the merger of Citytrust and BPI,
with the latter as the surviving corporation, and with all the liabilities and obligations of Citytrust
transferred to BPI as if it had incurred the same, BPI undoubtedly became a party interested in
sustaining the proceedings, as it stands to be prejudiced by the outcome of the case.
2. Actions; Garnishment; Upon service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a “virtual
party” or “forced intervenor” to the case and the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind the
garnishee to comply with its orders and processes.-
—It is a settled rule that upon service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a “virtual
party” or “forced intervenor” to the case and the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind the
garnishee to comply with its orders and processes. In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Ramolete,
203 SCRA 487 (1991), the Court ruled: In order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to
bind the person of the garnishee, it is not necessary that summons be served upon him. The garnishee
need not be impleaded as a party to the case. All that is necessary for the trial court lawfully to bind
the person of the garnishee or any person who has in his possession credits belonging to the judgment
debtor is service upon him of the writ of garnishment. The Rules of Court themselves do not require
that the garnishee be served with summons or impleaded in the case in order to make him liable. xxxx
Through the service of the writ of garnishment, the garnishee becomes a “virtual party” to, or a “forced
intervenor” in, the case and the trial court thereby acquires jurisdiction to bind him to compliance with
all orders and processes of the trial court with a view to the complete satisfaction of the judgment of
the court.
3. Same; Same; Garnishment has been defined as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging
to the judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation.-
—Garnishment has been defined as a specie of attachment for reaching credits belonging to the
judgment debtor and owing to him from a stranger to the litigation. A writ of attachment is substantially
a writ of execution except that it emanates at the beginning, instead of at the termination, of a suit. It
places the attached properties in custodia legis, obtaining pendente lite a lien until the judgment of the
proper tribunal on the plaintiff’s claim is established, when the lien becomes effective as of the date of
the levy.
4. Same; Same; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is not permitted to dissolve or discharge a preliminary
attachment or garnishment except on grounds specifically provided in the Revised Rules of Court.-
—The RTC is not permitted to dissolve or discharge a preliminary attachment or garnishment except
on grounds specifically provided in the Revised Rules of Court, namely, (a) the debtor has posted a
counter-bond or has made the requisite cash deposit; (b) the attachment was improperly or irregularly
issued as where there is no ground for attachment, or the affidavit and/or bond filed therefor are
defective or insufficient; (c) the attachment is excessive, but the discharge shall be limited to the excess;
(d) the property attachment is exempt from preliminary attachment; or (e) the judgment is rendered
against the attaching creditor.
****
27
26. Castro vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, 678 SCRA 730, August 22, 2012
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA)
1. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA); The benefits of a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) extend only to laborers and employees who are members of the collective bargaining
unit.-
—Settled is the rule that the benefits of a CBA extend only to laborers and employees who are members
of the collective bargaining unit. x x x Petitioners were no longer employees of PLDT nor members of
the collective bargaining unit represented by MKP when the CBA was signed on March 14, 2001 or
when it became effective on November 9, 2000 and are, thus, not entitled to avail of the benefits under
the new CBA. Accordingly, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in directing each
of the petitioners to return the amount of P133,000.00 which they respectively received from
respondents.
****
28
27. Global Resource for Outsourced workers, Inc. vs. Velasco, 678 SCRA 751, August 22, 2012
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Nominal Damages
1. Labor Law; Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; A party who has not appealed cannot obtain
any affirmative relief other than the one granted in the appealed decision; Exception.-
—In the case of Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. v. Chua, 550 SCRA 600 (2008), the Court cited an
exception to the rule that a party who has not appealed cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than
the one granted in the appealed decision. It stated: Indeed, a party who has failed to appeal from a
judgment is deemed to have acquiesced to it and can no longer obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than what was already granted under said judgment. However, when strict
adherence to such technical rule will impair a substantive right, such as that of an illegally dismissed
employee to monetary compensation as provided by law, then equity dictates that the Court set aside
the rule to pave the way for a full and just adjudication of the case.
2. Same; Civil Law; Obligations; Obligations arising from contracts, like an employment contract,
have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.-
—Obligations arising from contracts, like an employment contract, have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. When the terms of a contract are clear
and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations
governs. However, when the contract is vague and ambiguous, as in the case at bar, it is the Court’s
duty to determine the real intention of the contracting parties considering the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of the latter.
3. Civil Law; Contracts; Interpretation of Contracts; In case of conflict between the text of a contract
and the intent of the parties, it is the latter that prevails.-
—It should be emphasized that in case of conflict between the text of a contract and the intent of the
parties, it is the latter that prevails, for intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone
to mistakes, inadequacies or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence
to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
4. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Two-Notice Rule; To be totally free from liability, the
employer must not only show sufficient ground for the termination of employment but it must also
comply with procedural due process by giving the employees sought to be dismissed two notices.-
—To be totally free from liability, the employer must not only show sufficient ground for the termination
of employment but it must also comply with procedural due process by giving the employees sought to
be dismissed two notices: 1) notice of the intention to dismiss, indicating therein the acts or omissions
complained of, coupled with an opportunity for the employees to answer and rebut the charges against
them; and 2) notice of the decision to dismiss.
5. Same; Same; Nominal Damages; The employers’ failure to observe due process when it terminated
the worker’s employment for just cause did not invalidate the dismissal but rendered the former liable
for nominal damages.-
—The petitioners’ failure to observe due process when it terminated respondents’ employment for just
cause did not invalidate the dismissal but rendered petitioners liable for nominal damages. Under the
Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated
or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. The amount thereof is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, the Court deems it proper to award
to each of the respondents PhP30,000.00 as nominal damages.
****
29
28. Gonzales III vs. Office of the President of the Philippines, 679 SCRA 614, September 04, 2012
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Removal of Public Officers|Checks and Balances|Impeachment
1. Ombudsman; Administrative Law; While the Ombudsman’s authority to discipline administratively
is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only
of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such authority
is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman’s disciplinary
authority over all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express
power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor.
2. Statutory Construction; A construction that would render a provision inoperative should be
avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts
of a coordinated and harmonious whole.-
—It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that
every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not
as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that would render a provision inoperative
should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible
as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole. Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in
truncated parts. Every part thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
3. Ombudsman; Administrative Law; Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to
discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without question that the President has
concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions. Considering the principles attending concurrence of
jurisdiction where the Office of the President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales,
prudence should have prompted the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against
petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to the President’s assumption of
authority, especially when the administrative charge involved “demanding and soliciting a sum of
money” which constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds reserved
for the President’s exercise of his authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman.
4. Presidency; Power to Remove; Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with
it the power to remove. As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also
removable by him. The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise—that is, when
the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In
some cases, the Constitution expressly separates the power to remove from the President’s power to
appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and
judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme Court
may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while
judges of lower courts may be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative
supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII). The Chairpersons and
Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Section 1(2), Article IX(B)], the Commission on
Elections [Section 1(2), Article IX(C)], and the Commission on Audit [Section 1(2), Article IX(D)] shall
likewise be appointed by the President, but they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2,
Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by the President (Section 9,
Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).
5. Constitutional Law; Deputy Ombudsman; Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No.
6770);Impeachment; Paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman
may be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through
impeachment, namely, “culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.”-
—Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from political
influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the
President’s exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal
of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman
30
and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid
down in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states
that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman
may be removed through impeachment, namely, “culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” Thus, it cannot be rightly
said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for
that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman’s Deputies
and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds
provided by law.
6. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Administrative decisions in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.-
—The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can
only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. In the instant case, while
the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts
the correctness of the OP’s conclusion that the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty and grave
misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner’s offenses, as they factually
appear, weigh heavily enough to constitute betrayal of public trust would be to ignore the significance
of the legislature’s intent in prescribing the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special
Prosecutor for causes that, theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations that
justify the removal by impeachment of the highest officials of the land.
7. Constitutional Law; Impeachment; Betrayal of Public Trust; Words and Phrases; Betrayal of
public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the existing grounds
of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes.-
—Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the
existing grounds of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and
other high crimes. While it was deemed broad enough to cover any violation of the oath of office, the
impreciseness of its definition also created apprehension that “such an overarching standard may be
too broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by the legislature.” Indeed, the catch-all
phrase betrayal of public trust that referred to “all acts not punishable by statutes as penal offenses
but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office” could be easily utilized for every
conceivable misconduct or negligence in office.
8. Same; Same; Deputy Ombudsman; Special Prosecutors;—A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. However, by providing for their removal from office on the
same grounds as removal by impeachment, the legislature could not have intended to redefine
constitutional standards of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, as well as betrayal of public trust, and apply them less stringently. Hence,
where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of
official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for purposes of removing
a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for
impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the acuity of
their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly “overreach” to cover acts that are not vicious
or malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment.
9. Administrative Law; Ineptitude; Neglect of Duty; While the court’s determination of the propriety
of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution evidence on record, the disciplinary
authority’s determination of the prosecutor’s administrative liability is based on whether the plea
bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government’s best interest and the
diligent and efficient performance by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the
State. Consequently, the disciplining authority’s finding of ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part
of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing to pursue
or build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the
government finds “grossly disadvantageous,” could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding
court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered into.
31
10. Criminal Procedure; Plea Bargaining; Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does
not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused of the crime charged.-
—Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the
guilt of the accused of the crime charged. However, if the basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in
this case is the evidence on record, then it is significant to state that in its earlier Resolution
promulgated on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20)
prosecution witnesses and declared that “the conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution
is viewed by the Court to be of strong character that militates against the grant of bail.”
Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea
bargain with the accused Major General Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure
a conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the “standard of strong evidence of guilt
which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial probable
cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case.” Hence, in light of the apparently strong case
against accused Major General Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hardpressed not to look
into the whys and wherefores of the prosecution’s turnabout in the case.
11. Constitutional Law; Ombudsman; View that the Supreme Court cannot assume that the
independence of the Ombudsman is the same as the independence of the Judiciary. Neither is the
independence of the Constitutional Commissions the same as that of the National Economic and
Development Authority, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or the Commission on Human Rights.-
—Our Constitution does not impart a fixed and rigid concept of independence among the offices that it
creates. While it declares certain bodies as “‘independent”, we cannot assume that the independence
of the Ombudsman is the same as the independence of the Judiciary. Neither is the independence of the
Constitutional Commissions the same as that of the National Economic and Development Authority, the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or the Commission on Human Rights. This Court cannot make a “one size
fits all” concept of independence because the Constitution itself differentiates the degree of
independence of these bodies.
12. Same; Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770); View that Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act
does not violate the Constitution; One of the constitutive principles of our constitutional structure is
the system of checks and balances— a check that is not within a body, but outside of it.—I agree with
the ponencia that Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act does not violate the Constitution. The
constitutional principle of independence does not obviate the possibility of a check from another body.
After all, one of the constitutive principles of our constitutional structure is the system of checks and
balances—a check that is not within a body, but outside of it. This is how our democracy operates—on
the basis of distrust.
13. Same; Removal of Public Officers; View that Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
prescribes how all public officers and employees, both impeachable and non-impeachable, may be
removed.-
—Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution prescribes how all public officers and employees, both
impeachable and non-impeachable, may be removed. Section 2 provides: The President, the Vice
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.
All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
14. Same; Same; View that Congress, pursuant to Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and in
the exercise of its plenary power, enacted the Ombudsman Act, conferring on the President the power
to remove the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor as provided in Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act.-
—The Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor are not among the impeachable officers under
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, as expressly provided in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution, they
“may be removed from office as provided by law.” Congress, pursuant to this constitutional provision
and in the exercise of its plenary power, enacted the Ombudsman Act, conferring on the President the
power to remove the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor as provided in Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act.
32
15. Same; Same; View that pursuant to Section 8(2) and Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act, the
legislative intent is to grant concurrent jurisdiction to the President and the Ombudsman in the removal
of the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor.-
—In view of Section 8(2) and Section 21 of the Ombudsman Act, the legislative intent is to grant
concurrent jurisdiction to the President and the Ombudsman in the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman
and the Special Prosecutor. An “endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of a law x x x
so that each shall be effective.” This is not a hollow precept of statutory construction. This is based not
only on democratic principle but also on the separation of powers, that this Court should not be so
casual in voiding the acts of the popularly elected legislature unless there is a clear violation of the
Constitution.
16. Same; Same; —Any reading of the 1987 Constitution does not warrant the conclusion that all
bodies declared by the Constitution as “independent” have exclusive disciplinary authority over all
their respective officials and employees. Unlike the Judiciary where such exclusivity is expressly
provided for in the Constitution, there is no reason to read such provision in the Ombudsman where the
Constitution is silent. On the contrary, the constitutional provision that non-impeachable officers and
employees “may be removed from office as provided by law” removes any doubt that Congress can
determine the mode of removal of non-impeachable officers and employees of “independent” bodies
other than the Judiciary. An “independent” body does not have exclusive disciplinary authority over
its officials and employees unless the Constitution expressly so provides, as in the case of the Judiciary.
17. Same; Same; Checks and Balances; A completely “independent” body is alien to our constitutional
system. There is no office that is insulated from a possible correction from another office. The executive,
legislative and judicial branches of government operate through the system of checks and balances. All
independent constitutional bodies are subject to review by the courts. A fiscally autonomous body is
subject to audit by the Commission on Audit, and Congress cannot be compelled to appropriate a bigger
budget than that of the previous fiscal year.
18. Same; Same; Same; —Clearly, the Ombudsman is not constitutionally empowered to act alone.
Congress can even authorize the Department of Justice or the Office of the President to investigate
cases within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Similarly, the Ombudsman can investigate public
officers and employees ho are under the disciplinary authority of heads of other bodies or agencies.
The cases cited in the ponencia, i.e. Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, 251 SCRA 242 (1995), and Office the
Ombudsman v. Delijero, Jr., 634 SCRA 135 (2010)—illustrate that concurrent jurisdiction does not
impair the independence of the Ombudsman. Duplication of functions may not at all times promote
efficiency, but it is not proscribed y the Constitution.
19. Constitutional Law; Ombudsman; The Ombudsman’s duty to protect the people from unjust, illegal
and inefficient acts of all public officials emanates from Section 12, Article XI of the Constitution. These
broad powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials,
including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure.
20. Same; Checks and Balances; View that as a checks and balance mechanism, the Constitution,
the Rules of Court, and their implementing laws provide measures to check on the “independence”
granted to the Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman; the Supreme Court, as
the final arbiter of all legal questions, may review the decisions of the Constitutional Commissions and
the Office of the Ombudsman, especially when there is grave abuse of discretion.-
—The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman, by the Constitutional Commissions, and
by the Judiciary shares certain characteristics—they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress,
but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. For most, if not
for all of these “independent” bodies, the framers of the Constitution intended that they be insulated
from political pressure. As a checks and balance mechanism, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and
their implementing laws provide measures to check on the “independence” granted to the
Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the Ombudsman; the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter
of all legal questions, may review the decisions of the Constitutional Commissions and the Office of the
Ombudsman, especially when there is grave abuse of discretion. Of course, foisted over the Members
of the Supreme Court is the power of impeachment that Congress has the authority to initiate, and carry
into its logical end a meritorious impeachment case. Such is the symmetry that our Constitution
provides for the harmonious balance of all its component and “independent” parts.
33
21. Same; Removal of Public Officers; View that the absence of a constitutional provision providing
for the removal of the Commissioners and Deputy Ombudsmen does not mean that Congress can
empower the President to discipline or remove them in violation of the independence that the
Constitution textually and expressly provides.-
—The President can appoint Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman and her Deputies, but the Constitution categorically provides that the Chairmen of the
Constitutional Commissions and the Ombudsman can only be removed by impeachment. The absence
of a constitutional provision providing for the removal of the Commissioners and Deputy Ombudsmen
does not mean that Congress can empower the President to discipline or remove them in violation of
the independence that the Constitution textually and expressly provides. As members of independent
constitutional bodies, they should be similarly treated as lower court judges, subject to discipline only
by the head of their respective offices and subject to the general power of the Ombudsman to dismiss
officials and employees within the government for cause. No reason exists to treat them differently.
22. Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court cannot simply construe Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution to be a blanket authority for Congress to empower the President to remove all other public
officers and employees, including those under the independent constitutional bodies.-
—While I agree with Justice Carpio’s opinion that the Constitution empowered Congress to determine
the manner and causes for the removal of non-impeachable officers, we cannot simply construe Section
2, Article XI of the Constitution to be a blanket authority for Congress to empower the President to
remove all other public officers and employees, including those under the independent constitutional
bodies. When the Constitution states that Congress may provide for the removal of public officers and
employees by law, it does not mean that the law can violate the provisions and principles laid out in the
Constitution.
23. Constitutional Law; Removal of Public Officers; Ombudsman; View that with the exception of
those who are removable only by impeachment, the Office of the Ombudsman can investigate and take
action against any appointive or elected official for corruption in office, be they Congressmen, Senators,
Department Secretaries, Governors, Mayors, or Barangay Captains.-
—The Constitution has reasons for making the Office of the Ombudsman “independent.” Its primordial
duty is to investigate and discipline all elective and appointive government officials. Specifically,
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution vests in that Office the absolute power to investigate any
malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-feasance of public officers or employees. This function places it a
notch higher than other grievance-handling, investigating bodies. With the exception of those who are
removable only by impeachment, the Office of the Ombudsman can investigate and take action against
any appointive or elected official for corruption in office, be they Congressmen, Senators, Department
Secretaries, Governors, Mayors, or Barangay Captains.
24. Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Impeachment; View that the power to impeach is a function
of check and balance under the Constitution. But the power to remove “public officers and employees”
from office, in the realm of administrative law, is a function of supervision, if not control.-
—The power to impeach is a function of check and balance under the Constitution. But the power to
remove “public officers and employees” from office, in the realm of administrative law, is a function of
supervision, if not control. Keeping the Deputies in the Office of the Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor independent as the Constitution commands and subjecting them to the President’s control
or supervision are incompatible ideas.
****
34
29. City of Iriga vs. Camarines Sur Electric Co (CASURECO III), 680 SCRA 236, Sept 05, 2012
Syllabi Class :Taxation|Franchise Tax|Words and Phrases
1. Remedial Law; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; RA 9282, which took effect on April
23, 2004, expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to include, among others, the
power to review by appeal decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction.
2. Same; Same; Franchise tax shall be based on gross receipts precisely because it is a tax on business,
rather than on persons or property.-
—It should be stressed that what the petitioner seeks to collect from CASURECO III is a franchise tax,
which as defined, is a tax on the exercise of a privilege. As Section 137 of the LGC provides, franchise
tax shall be based on gross receipts precisely because it is a tax on business, rather than on persons or
property. Since it partakes of the nature of an excise tax, the situs of taxation is the place where the
privilege is exercised, in this case in the City of Iriga, where CASURECO III has its principal office
and from where it operates, regardless of the place where its services or products are delivered. Hence,
franchise tax covers all gross receipts from Iriga City and the Rinconada area.
3. Same; Same; Requisites That Must Concur in Order to be Liable for Local Franchise Tax.-
—To be liable for local franchise tax, the following requisites should concur: (1) that one has a
“franchise” in the sense of a secondary or special franchise; and (2) that it is exercising its rights or
privileges under this franchise within the territory of the pertinent local government unit.
4. Same; Franchise Tax; Words and Phrases; In National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan,
401 SCRA 259 (2003), the Court declared that “a franchise tax is ‘a tax on the privilege of transacting
business in the state and exercising corporate franchises granted by the state.’ ” It is not levied on the
corporation simply for existing as a corporation, upon its property or its income, but on its exercise of
the rights or privileges granted to it by the government. “It is within this context that the phrase tax on
businesses enjoying a franchise in Section 137 of the LGC should be interpreted and understood.”
5. Same; Local Taxation; The power of the local government units to impose and collect taxes is
derived from the Constitution itself which grants them “the power to create its own sources of revenues
and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the Congress may
provide.” This explicit constitutional grant of power to tax is consistent with the basic policy of local
autonomy and decentralization of governance. With this power, local government units have the fiscal
mechanisms to raise the funds needed to deliver basic services to their constituents and break the
culture of dependence on the national government. Thus, consistent with these objectives, the LGC was
enacted granting the local government units, like petitioner, the power to impose and collect franchise
tax.
6. Taxation; Cooperatives; Electric Cooperatives; In Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives
Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) v. The Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, 403
SCRA 558 (2003), the Court held that the tax privileges granted to electric cooperatives registered with
NEA under PD 269 were validly withdrawn and only those registered with the CDA under RA 6938
may continue to enjoy the tax privileges under the Cooperative Code. Therefore, CASURECO III can
no longer invoke PD 269 to evade payment of local taxes. Moreover, its provisional registration with
the CDA which granted it exemption for the payment of local taxes was extended only until May 4,
1992. Thereafter, it can no longer claim any exemption from the payment of local taxes, including the
subject franchise tax.
7. Void Judgments; A void judgment has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at
any place.-
—Considering that RA 9282 was already in effect when the RTC rendered its decision on February 7,
2005, CASURECO III should have filed its appeal, not with the CA, but with the CTA Division in
accordance with the applicable law and the rules of the CTA. Resort to the CA was, therefore, improper,
rendering its decision null and void for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. A void judgment
has no legal or binding force or efficacy for any purpose or at any place. Hence, the fact that petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration from the CA Decision was belatedly filed is inconsequential, because a void
and non-existent decision would never have acquired finality.
****
35
30. Atilano II vs. Asaali, 680 SCRA 345, September 10, 2012
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Execution of Judgments
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Docket Fees; Payment of the full amount of docket fees
is an indispensable step to the perfection of an appeal, and the Court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon such payment.-
—Payment of the full amount of docket fees is an indispensable step to the perfection of an appeal, and
the Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon such payment. Corollary to this, the Court has
consistently held that procedural rules are not to be disregarded simply because their non-observance
may result in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights.
2. Same; Execution of Judgments; Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a
party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party thereto, did not have his day in court.-
—It is well-settled that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by a judgment rendered by the court. Execution of a judgment can
only be issued against one who is a party to the action, and not against one who, not being a party
thereto, did not have his day in court. Due process dictates that a court decision can only bind a party
to the litigation and not against innocent third parties.
****
36
31. Velasco vs. Commission on Audit, 681 SCRA 102, September 18, 2012
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Public Officials
1. Administrative Law; Productivity Incentive Benefits; Administrative Order No. 161; Administrative
Order (AO) 161 was issued to rationalize the grant of productivity incentive benefits under a uniform
set of rules.-
—AO 161 was issued to rationalize the grant of productivity incentive benefits under a uniform set of
rules. It sought to address the dissension and dissatisfaction—which came about when some department
heads granted incentive benefits of varying amounts to their officials and employees based on the
provisions of Sections 31, 35 and 36 (2), Chapter 5, Subtitle I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987—among those government employees who received less or no benefits due to lack of funds. It
recognized the need to have a “standard system of incentive pay based on productivity and performance
among officials and employees of the Government.”
2. Same; Same; With regard to the employees who had no participation in the approval of the subject
incentives, they were neither in bad faith nor were they grossly negligent for having received the
benefits under the circumstances; Being in good faith, they are therefore under no obligation to refund
the subject benefits which they received.-
—With regard to the employees who had no participation in the approval of the subject incentives, they
were neither in bad faith nor were they grossly negligent for having received the benefits under the
circumstances. The approving officers’ allowance of the said awards certainly tended to give it a color
of legality from the perspective of these employees. Being in good faith, they are therefore under no
obligation to refund the subject benefits which they received.
3. Same; Public Officials; Public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have
been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted beyond their scope of authority
or where there is a showing of bad faith.-
—Indeed, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties.
However, public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed
in connection with official duties where they have acted beyond their scope of authority or where there
is a showing of bad faith. Thus, in the case of Casal v. Commission on Audit, 509 SCRA 138 (2006), the
Court held liable the approving officers who authorized the grant of productivity award in complete
disregard of the prohibition declared by a presidential issuance, ratiocinating that: The failure of
petitioners-approving officers to observe all these issuances cannot be deemed a mere lapse consistent
with the presumption of good faith. Rather, even if the grant of the incentive award were not for a
dishonest purpose as they claimed, the patent disregard of the issuances of the President and the
directives of the COA amounts to gross negligence, making them liable for the refund thereof. Similarly
in the present case, the blatant failure of the petitioners-approving officers to abide with the provisions
of AO 103 and AO 161 overcame the presumption of good faith. The deliberate disregard of these
issuances is equivalent to gross negligence amounting to bad faith. Therefore, the petitioners-approving
officers are accountable for the refund of the subject incentives which they received.
4. Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court finds that Administrative Order (AO) 161 was issued in
the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive departments; There is only one Chief
Executive who directs and controls the entire executive branch, and all other executive officials must
implement in good faith his directives and orders.-
—In the present case, and in line with the pronouncements in Casal v. Commission on Audit, 509 SCRA
138 (2006) and Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366 (1998), the Court finds that AO 161 was issued in
the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive departments, which Chairman Velasco was
duty bound to observe. “Executive officials who are subordinate to the President should not trifle with
the President’s constitutional power of control over the executive branch. There is only one Chief
Executive who directs and controls the entire executive branch, and all other executive officials must
implement in good faith his directives and orders. This is necessary to provide order, efficiency and
coherence in carrying out the plans, policies and programs of the executive branch.”
****
37
32. Pilot vs. Baron, 681 SCRA 481, September 24, 2012
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court Personnel|Sheriffs|Dishonesty|Grave Misconduct|Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS)
****
38
33. The New Philippine Skylanders, Inc. vs. Dakila, 681 SCRA 658, September 24, 2012
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Employer-Employee Relationship
****
39
34. Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. vs. CIR, 682 SCRA 49, September 26, 2012
Syllabi Class :Taxation|Tax Amnesty|Tax Amnesty Program (R.A. No. 9480)
****
40
35. Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., 682 SCRA 59, September 26, 2012
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Indispensable Parties
****
41
36. Asso. Marine Off. and Seamen's Union of the Phil vs. Decena, 682 SCRA 308,October 08, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act (R.A. No. 6552)
1. Civil Law; Contract to Sell; Words and Phrases; It is basic that a contract is what the law defines
it to be, and not what it is called by the contracting parties. A contract to sell is defined as a bilateral
contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property
despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds itself to sell the said property exclusively to the
prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase
price.
2. Same; Realty Installment Buyer Protection Act (R.A. No. 6552); As we emphasized in Pagtalunan
vs. Dela Cruz Vda. De Manzano, 533 SCRA 242 (2007), “R.A. No. 6552, otherwise known as the Realty
Installment Buyer Protection Act, recognizes in conditional sales of all kinds of real estate (industrial,
commercial, residential) the right of the seller to cancel the contract upon non-payment of an
installment by the buyer, which is simply an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey
title from acquiring binding force.” While we agreed that the cancellation of a contract to sell may be
done outside of court, however, “the cancellation by the seller must be in accordance with Sec. 3(b) of
R.A. No. 6552, which requires a notarial act of rescission and the refund to the buyer of the full payment
of the cash surrender value of the payments on the property.”
****
42
37. Neri vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy, 683 SCRA 553, October 10, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Prescription
****
43
38. People vs. De Los Reyes, 684 SCRA 216, October 16, 2012
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal Procedure|Appeals
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; With the Court’s pronouncement in the 2004 case of
People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 640 [2004], providing for and making mandatory the intermediate review
by the Court of Appeals of cases involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the proper course of action would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for the conduct of an
intermediate review.-
—At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review in view of the
RTC’s imposition of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997 Decision. However, with the
Court’s pronouncement in the 2004 case of People v. Mateo, 433 SCRA 640 [2004], providing for and
making mandatory the intermediate review by the CA of cases involving the death penalty, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the proper course of action would be to remand these cases to the
appellate court for the conduct of an intermediate review.
2. Same; Same; Appeals; The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such, may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.-
—It bears to stress that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege, and, as such, may be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of
the same must comply with the requirements of the Rules, failing which, the right to appeal is lost.
3. Same; Same; Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail as in appellant’s
case, or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits
to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom.-
—Records reveal that the appellant jumped bail during the proceedings before the RTC and was, in
fact, tried and convicted in absentia. There is dearth of evidence showing that he has since surrendered
to the court’s jurisdiction. Thus, he has no right to pray for affirmative relief before the courts. Once
an accused escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail as in appellant’s case, or flees to a foreign
country, he loses his standing in court, and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the
court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief therefrom.
****
44
39. Diageo Philippines, Inc. vs. CIR, 685 SCRA 168, November 12, 2012
Syllabi Class:Taxation|Excise Taxes|Tax Refund|Words and Phrases|Indirect Taxes|Taxpayer|Tax Exemptions
1. Same; Tax Exemptions; Statutes granting tax exemptions are construed stricissimi juris against the
taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.-
—Statutes granting tax exemptions are construed stricissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. A claim of tax exemption must be clearly shown and based on language
in law too plain to be mistaken. Unfortunately, Diageo failed to meet the burden of proof that it is
covered by the exemption granted under Section 130(D) of the Tax Code. In sum, Diageo, not being the
party statutorily liable to pay excise taxes and having failed to prove that it is covered by the exemption
granted under Section 130(D) of the Tax Code, is not the proper party to claim a refund or credit of the
excise taxes paid on the ingredients of its exported locally produced liquor.
2. Taxation; Excise Taxes; Tax Refund; The Court has categorically declared that “[t]he proper party
to question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is
imposed by law and who paid the same even if he shifts the burden thereof to another.”-
—The phrase “any excise tax paid thereon shall be credited or refunded” requires that the claimant be
the same person who paid the excise tax. In Silkair (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 544 SCRA 100 (2008), the Court has categorically declared that “[t]he proper party to
question, or seek a refund of, an indirect tax is the statutory taxpayer, the person on whom the tax is
imposed by law and who paid the same even if he shifts the burden thereof to another.”
3. Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Excise taxes imposed under Title VI of the Tax Code are taxes on
property which are imposed on “goods manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sales
or consumption or for any other disposition and to things imported.”-
—Excise taxes imposed under Title VI of the Tax Code are taxes on property which are imposed on
“goods manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any other
disposition and to things imported.” Though excise taxes are paid by the manufacturer or producer
before removal of domestic products from the place of production or by the owner or importer before
the release of imported articles from the customs house, the same partake of the nature of indirect taxes
when it is passed on to the subsequent purchaser.
4. Same; Same; Same; Indirect Taxes; Indirect taxes are defined as those wherein the liability for the
payment of the tax falls on one person but the burden thereof can be shifted to another person.-
—Indirect taxes are defined as those wherein the liability for the payment of the tax falls on one person
but the burden thereof can be shifted to another person. When the seller passes on the tax to his buyer,
he, in effect, shifts the tax burden, not the liability to pay it, to the purchaser as part of the price of
goods sold or services rendered. Accordingly, when the excise taxes paid by the supplier were passed
on to Diageo, what was shifted is not the tax per se but an additional cost of the goods sold. Thus, the
supplier remains the statutory taxpayer even if Diageo, the purchaser, actually shoulders the burden of
tax.
5. Same; Taxpayer; Words and Phrases; As defined in Section 22(N) of the Tax Code, a taxpayer
means any person subject to tax.-
—As defined in Section 22(N) of the Tax Code, a taxpayer means any person subject to tax. He is,
therefore, the person legally liable to file a return and pay the tax as provided for in Section 130(A). As
such, he is the person entitled to claim a refund.
6. Same; Excise Taxes; Tax Refund; The person entitled to claim a tax refund is the statutory taxpayer
or the person liable for or subject to tax.-
—The person entitled to claim a tax refund is the statutory taxpayer or the person liable for or subject
to tax. In the present case, it is not disputed that the supplier of Diageo imported the subject raw alcohol,
hence, it was the one directly liable and obligated to file a return and pay the excise taxes under the
Tax Code before the goods or products are removed from the customs house. It is, therefore, the
statutory taxpayer as contemplated by law and remains to be so, even if it shifts the burden of tax to
Diageo. Consequently, the right to claim a refund, if legally allowed, belongs to it and cannot be
transferred to another, in this case Diageo, without any clear provision of law allowing the same.
****
45
40. Lopez vs. Lopez, 685 SCRA 209, November 12, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Wills|Testamentary Succession|Attestation Clause
1. Civil Law; Wills; Testamentary Succession; Attestation Clause; The law is clear that the attestation
must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to
safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any
increase or decrease in the pages.-
—The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written.
The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its
pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. While Article 809 allows substantial
compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this respect. The
statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament that it “consists of 7
pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written” cannot be deemed
substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which
discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of
evidence aliunde.
****
46
41. Republic vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 685 SCRA 216, November 12, 2012
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Certiorari|Motions to Dismiss|Interlocutory Orders|Civil
Procedure|Courts|Jurisdiction
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether
the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action are to be determined from the material allegations of the
complaint, the law in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred.-
—It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such action
are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time the
complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled
to all or some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by
defendant in an answer to the complaint or a motion to dismiss the same.
2. Remedial Law; Certiorari; Motions to Dismiss; Interlocutory Orders; As a general rule, the denial
of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a remedy
designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. However, when the denial of the
motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari may be justified.-
—An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on
the merits. Thus, as a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special
civil action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. However, when the denial of the motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion,
the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be justified. By grave abuse of discretion is
meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation
of law.
****
47
42. Millan vs. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc., 685 SCRA 225, November 12, 2012
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Seafarers|Permanent Total Disability|Temporary Total Disability
1. Same; Same; Temporary Total Disability; The rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes
permanent when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or
when after the lapse of the same, he fails to make such declaration.-
—Despite the lapse of the 120-day period, petitioner was still considered to be under a state of
temporary total disability at the time he filed his complaint on August 29, 2003, 184 days from the date
of his medical repatriation which is well-within the 240-day applicable period in this case. Hence, he
cannot be said to have acquired a cause of action for total and permanent disability benefits. To stress,
the rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated
physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the same, he fails
to make such declaration.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Permanent Total Disability; A seafarer’s inability to resume his work after
the lapse of more than 120 days from the time he suffered an injury and/or illness is not a magic wand
that automatically warrants the grant of total and permanent disability benefits in his favor. In Vergara
v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008), the Court elucidated on the seeming
conflict between Paragraph 3, Section 20(B) of the POEA-SEC (Department Order No. 004-00) and
Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code in relation to Section 2(a), Rule X of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation, thus: As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel,
must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and
treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on
temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period
until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be
permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment
Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such
declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total
disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to
declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may
of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.
3. Same; Same; Same; Instances When a Seafarer may be Allowed to Pursue an Action for Total and
Permanent Disability Benefits.-
—Applying Vergara, the Court in the recent case of C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok, 677
SCRA 296 (2012), enumerated the following instances when a seafarer may be allowed to pursue an
action for total and permanent disability benefits, to wit: (a) The company-designated physician failed
to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-
day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total
disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days; (b) 240 days had lapsed without any
certification issued by the company-designated physician; (c) The company-designated physician
declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his
physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary
opinion; (d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled
but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability
is not only permanent but total as well; (e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is
totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading; (f) The company-
designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under
the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the
POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work; (g) The company-designated physician
declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding
benefits; and (h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled
within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after
the lapse of said periods.
****
48
43. Gua-an vs. Quirino, 685 SCRA 236, November 12, 2012
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Presidential Decree No. 27|Reversion|Abandonment of
Landholding|Words and Phrases
1. Same; Abandonment of Landholding; Words and Phrases; As defined in Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, abandonment is a willful failure of the
agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, “to cultivate, till, or develop his land to
produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two
calendar years.”-
—While CLT No. 0-025227 remains in Prisco’s+ name, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the fact
that Prisco+ surrendered possession and cultivation of the subject land to Ernesto, not for a mere
temporary period, but for a period of 11 years without any justifiable reason. Such act constituted
abandonment despite his avowed intent to resume possession of the land upon payment of the loan. As
defined in DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994, abandonment is a willful failure of the
agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm household, “to cultivate, till, or develop his land to
produce any crop, or to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two
calendar years.” It is a ground for cancellation by the DARAB of an award to the agrarian reform
beneficiary. Consequently, respondent and/or Prisco’s+ heirs had lost any right to redeem the subject
landholding.
2. Agrarian Reform; Presidential Decree No. 27; Upon the promulgation of P.D. 27, farmer-tenants
were deemed owners of the land they were tilling and given the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy
the landholding for themselves. Thus, P.D. 27 specifically prohibited any transfer of such landholding
except to the government or by hereditary succession. Section 27 of R.A. 6657 further allowed transfers
to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and to other qualified beneficiaries.-
—It bears to stress that upon the promulgation of P.D. 27, farmer-tenants were deemed owners of the
land they were tilling and given the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for themselves.
Thus, P.D. 27 specifically prohibited any transfer of such landholding except to the government or by
hereditary succession. Section 27 of R.A. 6657 further allowed transfers to the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) and to other qualified beneficiaries. Consequently, any other transfer constitutes a
violation of the above proscription and is null and void for being contrary to law. Relevant on this point
is Ministry of Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular No. 7, series of 1979 which provides: “Despite
the x x x prohibition, x x x many farmer-beneficiaries of P.D. 27 have transferred their ownership, rights
and/or possession of their farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the same to their former
landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of P.D. 27 and therefore null and void.”
3. Same; Same; Reversion; Reversion of the landholding to the former owner is proscribed under P.D.
No. 27.-
—The redemption made by petitioner Aurelia was ineffective and void since reversion of the
landholding to the former owner is likewise proscribed under P.D. No. 27 in accordance with its policy
of holding such lands under trust for the succeeding generations of farmers.
****
49
44. Ladaga vs. Mapagu, 685 SCRA 322, November 13, 2012
Syllabi Class: Constitutional Law|Writs of Amparo|Evidence|Freedom from Fear|Extraordinary Diligence
****
50
45. Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Dy, 685 SCRA 567, November 14, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Fraud|Words and Phrases
1. Civil Law; Contracts; The subsequent nullification of title to a property is not a ground to annul the
contractual right which may have been derived by a purchaser, mortgagee or other transferee who
acted in good faith.-
—While it is settled that a simulated deed of sale is null and void and therefore, does not convey any
right that could ripen into a valid title, it has been equally ruled that, for reasons of public policy, the
subsequent nullification of title to a property is not a ground to annul the contractual right which may
have been derived by a purchaser, mortgagee or other transferee who acted in good faith.
2. Same; Fraud; Words and Phrases; Fraud comprises “anything calculated to deceive, including all
acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal duty or equitable duty, trust, or confidence
justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage
is taken of another.”-
—To be sure, fraud comprises “anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal duty or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly reposed,
resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of
another.” In this light, the Dys’ and Sps. Delgado’s deliberate simulation of the sale intended to obtain
loan proceeds from and to prejudice Philbank clearly constitutes fraudulent conduct. As such, Sps.
Delgado cannot now be allowed to deny the validity of the mortgage executed by the Dys in favor of
Philbank as to hold otherwise would effectively sanction their blatant bad faith to Philbank’s detriment.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Nothing short of extraordinary diligence is required of banks whose
business is impressed with public interest.-
—A finding of negligence must always be contextualized in line with the attendant circumstances of a
particular case. As aptly held in Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of Estanislao Militar, 494 SCRA
308 (2006), “the diligence with which the law requires the individual or a corporation at all times to
govern a particular conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which one is placed, and the
importance of the act which is to be performed.” Thus, without diminishing the time-honored principle
that nothing short of extraordinary diligence is required of banks whose business is impressed with
public interest, Philbank’s inconsequential oversight should not and cannot serve as a bastion for fraud
and deceit.
4. Same; Loans; Banks and Banking; Extraordinary Diligence; In the case of banks and other
financial institutions, greater care and due diligence are required since they are imbued with public
interest, failing which renders the mortgagees in bad faith. Thus, before approving a loan application,
it is a standard operating practice for these institutions to conduct an ocular inspection of the property
offered for mortgage and to verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real owner(s) thereof.-
—Primarily, it bears noting that the doctrine of “mortgagee in good faith” is based on the rule that all
persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go beyond
what appears on the face of the title. This is in deference to the public interest in upholding the
indefeasibility of a certificate of title as evidence of lawful ownership of the land or of any encumbrance
thereon. In the case of banks and other financial institutions, however, greater care and due diligence
are required since they are imbued with public interest, failing which renders the mortgagees in bad
faith. Thus, before approving a loan application, it is a standard operating practice for these institutions
to conduct an ocular inspection of the property offered for mortgage and to verify the genuineness of
the title to determine the real owner(s) thereof. The apparent purpose of an ocular inspection is to
protect the “true owner” of the property as well as innocent third parties with a right, interest or claim
thereon from a usurper who may have acquired a fraudulent certificate of title thereto.
****
51
46. Aldersgate College, Inc. vs. Gauuan, 685 SCRA 646, November 14, 2012
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Motions to Dismiss|Intra-corporate Controversies
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motions to Dismiss; In an ordinary civil action, a motion to dismiss
must generally be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint.-
—In an ordinary civil action, a motion to dismiss must generally be filed “within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint” and on the grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court, to wit: (a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party; (b) That
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim; (c) That venue is improperly laid; (d)
That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; (e) That there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause; (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the
statute of limitations; (g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action; (h) That the
claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished; (i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions
of the statute of frauds; and (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied
with.
2. Same; Same; Same; Intra-corporate Controversies; Under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of
Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading.-
—Under Section 8, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, a
motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading. As this case involves an intra-corporate dispute, the motion
to dismiss is undeniably a prohibited pleading. Moreover, the Court finds no justification for the
dismissal of the case based on the mere issuance of a board resolution by the incumbent members of
the Board of Trustees of petitioner corporation recommending its dismissal, especially considering the
various issues raised by the parties before the court a quo. Hence, the RTC should not have entertained,
let alone have granted the subject motion to dismiss.
****
52
47. Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, 686 SCRA 1, November 20, 2012
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judges|Judicial Clemency|Accrued Leaves|Penalties|Forfeiture of
Benefits
****
53
48. PSBANK vs. Senate Impeachment Court, 686 SCRA 35, November 20, 2012
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Courts|Moot and Academic
1. Same; Same; Same; The supervening conviction of Chief Justice Corona on May 29, 2012, as well
as his execution of a waiver against the confidentiality of all his bank accounts, whether in peso or
foreign currency, has rendered the present petition moot and academic.-
—Indeed, the main issue of whether the Impeachment Court acted arbitrarily when it issued the assailed
subpoena to obtain information concerning the subject foreign currency deposits notwithstanding the
confidentiality of such deposits under RA 6426 has been overtaken by events. The supervening
conviction of Chief Justice Corona on May 29, 2012, as well as his execution of a waiver against the
confidentiality of all his bank accounts, whether in peso or foreign currency, has rendered the present
petition moot and academic.
2. Remedial Law; Courts; Moot and Academic; Courts will not determine questions that have become
moot and academic because there is no longer any justiciable controversy to speak of.-
—It is well-settled that courts will not determine questions that have become moot and academic
because there is no longer any justiciable controversy to speak of. The judgment will not serve any
useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.
In Gancho-on v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 271 SCRA 204 (1997), the Court ruled: It is a
rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not
consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases.
And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which
petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
****
54
49. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. vs. Bajaro, 686 SCRA 39, November 21, 2012
Syllabi Class :Statutes
****
55
50. Great White Shark Enterprises, Inc. vs. Caralde, Jr., 686 SCRA 201, November 21, 2012
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law|Trademarks|Dominancy Test|Holistic Test
****
56
51. Sutton vs. Lim, 686 SCRA 745, December 03, 2012
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Republic Act No. 9700
****
57
52. Beumer vs. Amores, 686 SCRA 770, December 03, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Principle of Unjust Enrichment
****
58
53. Crisologo vs. People, 686 SCRA 782, December 03, 2012
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Evidence|Payment|Burden of Proof
****
59
54. Ong vs. Basiya-Saratan, 688 SCRA 1, January 07, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court Personnel|Clerks of Court
1. Same; Same; Same; As an officer of the court, respondent was duty-bound to use reasonable skill
and diligence in the performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, 18 failing which,
warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.-
—As an officer of the court, respondent was duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the
performance of her officially-designated duties as clerk of court, failing which, warrants the imposition
of administrative sanctions. In this case, respondent unjustifiably failed to issue the alias writs of
execution to implement the judgment in Civil Case No. 18978 despite orders from the RTC. Moreover,
she failed to file the required comment in disregard of the duty of every employee in the judiciary to
obey the orders and processes of the Court without delay. Such act evinces lack of interest in clearing
her name, constituting an implied admission of the charges.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Clerks of Court; Clerks of Court are primarily responsible
for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and writs. Hence, they cannot be allowed to
slacken on their work since they are charged with the duty of keeping the records and the seal of the
court, issuing processes, entering judgments and orders, and giving certified copies of records upon
request.-
—Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel enjoins court personnel to perform
their official duties properly and with diligence at all times. Clerks of Court like respondent are
primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and writs. Hence, they
cannot be allowed to slacken on their work since they are charged with the duty of keeping the records
and the seal of the court, issuing processes, entering judgments and orders, and giving certified copies
of records upon request. As such, they are expected to possess a high degree of discipline and efficiency
in the performance of their functions to help ensure that the cause of justice is done without delay.
****
60
55. Dabalos vs. RTC, Branch 59, Angeles City (Pampanga), 688 SCRA 64, January 07, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal Procedure|Information|Amendment of Pleadings
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Amendment of Pleadings; Sec. 14 of Rule 110
of the Rules of Court provides that an information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. In the present case, the accused petitioner
has not yet been arraigned, hence, the RTC was correct in directing the amendment of the Information
and in denying the motion to quash the same.
2. Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Their Children; Republic Act No. 9262; The law on
violence against women and their children is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications
for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical
harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife,
former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a
common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.-
—Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads: SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—As used in this Act, (a) “Violence against
women and their children” refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x. The law is broad in scope but specifies
two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against
women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman
is the offender’s wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with
whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
3. Same; Same; Same; In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 618 SCRA 592 (2010) the Court enumerated the
elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment.-
—In Ang v. Court of Appeals, 618 SCRA 592 (2010), the Court enumerated the elements of the crime
of violence against women through harassment, to wit: 1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act
or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to her.
4. Same; Same; Same; Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act
of violence be a consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred.
Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither
should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against women with
whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. As correctly ruled by the RTC, it is
immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the
past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical
harm was committed. Consequently, the Court cannot depart from the parallelism in Ang and give
credence to petitioner’s assertion that the act of violence should be due to the sexual or dating
relationship.
5. Same; Same; Same; TNeither can the Court construe the statute in favor of petitioner using the rule
of lenity because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would necessitate any construction. While the
degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code are the same, there
is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent
is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on the offenders whose violent act/s physically harm
women with whom they have or had a sexual or dating relationship, and/or their children with the end
in view of promoting the protection of women and children.
****
61
56. Mamaril vs. The Boy Scout of the Philippines, 688 SCRA 437, January 14, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Damages|Actual Damages
****
62
57. Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Paruñgao, 688 SCRA 485, January 14, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Contempt
****
63
58. Re: Complaint of Leonardo A. Velasco againts Associate Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr.,
Alex L. Quiroz and Samuel R. Martires of the Sandiganbayan, 688 SCRA 498, January 15, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Execution of Judgments
****
64
59. Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. Against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando
E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario, Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, 688 SCRA 507,
January 15, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judges|Actions
****
65
60. Gontang vs. Alayan, 688 SCRA 659, January 16, 2013
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Right to Counsel:
1. Attorneys; Right to Counsel; In instances where personal liability on the part of local government
officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of private counsel. - The damages sought
therein could have resulted in personal liability, hence, petitioner cannot be deemed to have been
improperly represented by private counsel. In Alinsug v. RTC Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros
Occidental, 225 SCRA 553 (1993), the Court ruled that in instances like the present case where personal
liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of
private counsel, explaining: It can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official
capacity and sued in that capacity, is later held to have exceeded his authority. On the one hand, his
defense would have then been underwritten by the people’s money which ordinarily should have been
his personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without, however, his
having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice. In Correa v. CFI, the Court held
that in the discharge of governmental functions, ‘municipal corporations are responsible for the acts
of its officers, except if and when, and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law,
and in conformity with the requirements thereof. In such instance, this Court has sanctioned the
representation by private counsel. In one case, We held that where rigid adherence to the law on
representation of local officials in court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid
grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper. And in Albuera v. Torres, this Court also
said that a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may engage the services of private counsel
when “the complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from
the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity.
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66
61. Padillo vs. Rural Bank of Nabunturan, Inc., 689 SCRA 53, January 21, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Labor Law|Bad Faith
1. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Disease; Article 297 of the Labor Code contemplates a
situation where the employer, and not the employee, initiates the termination of employment on the
ground of the latter’s disease or sickness.-As held in Villaruel vs. Yeo Han Guan, 650 SCRA 64 (2011),
a precedent which the CA correctly applied, Article 297 of the Labor Code contemplates a situation
where the employer, and not the employee, initiates the termination of employment on the ground of the
latter’s disease or sickness, viz.: A plain reading of the [Article 297 of the Labor Code] clearly
presupposes that it is the employer who terminates the services of the employee found to be suffering
from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health
as well as to the health of his co-employees. It does not contemplate a situation where it is the employee
who severs his or her employment ties. This is precisely the reason why Section 8, Rule 1, Book VI of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, directs that an employer shall not terminate the
services of the employee unless there is a certification by a competent public health authority that the
disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months
even with proper medical treatment.
2. Same; Labor Law; Bad Faith; It is axiomatic that bad faith can never be presumed—it must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.—Neither can the grant of an early retirement package to
Lusan show that Padillo was unfairly discriminated upon. Records show that the same was merely an
isolated incident and petitioners have failed to show that any bad faith or motive attended such
disparate treatment between Lusan and Padillo. Irrefragably also, there is no showing that other Bank
employees were accorded the same benefits as that of Lusan which thereby dilutes the soundness of
petitioners’ imputation of discrimination and bad faith. Verily, it is axiomatic that held faith can never
be presumed—it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. This petitioners were unable to
prove in the case at bar.
3. Civil Law; Damages; Abuse of Rights; Damages may be recoverable due to an abuse of right under
Article 21 in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the following elements
must, however, obtain: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) exercised in bad faith; and (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.-—While the Court mindfully notes that damages may be
recoverable due to an abuse of right under Article 21 in conjunction with Article 19 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, the following elements must, however, obtain: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
exercised in bad faith; and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Records reveal that
none of these elements exists in the case at bar and thus, no damages on account of abuse of right may
he recovered.
4. Same; Company Practice; Words and Phrases; To be considered a company practice, the giving of
the benefits should have been done over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been
consistent and deliberate.-—Neither was it proven that there exists an established company policy of
giving early retirement packages to the Bank’s aging employees. In the case of Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company v. National Labor Relations Commission, 589 SCRA 376 (2009), it has been
pronounced that to be considered a company practice, the giving of the benefits should have been done
over a long period of time, and must be shown to have been consistent and deliberate. In this relation,
petitioners’ bare allegation of the solitary case of Lusan cannot—assuming such fact to be true—
sufficiently establish that the Bank’s grant of an early retirement package to her (Lusan) evolved into
an established company practice precisely because of the palpable lack of the element of consistency.
As such, petitioners’ reliance on the Lusan incident cannot bolster their claim.
5. Same; Retirement; In the absence of any applicable agreement, an employee must (1) retire when
he is at least sixty (60) years of age and (2) serve at least (5) years in the company to entitle him/her to
a retirement benefit of at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, with a fraction of
at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.-
—Simply stated, in the absence of any applicable agreement, an employee must (1) retire when he is at
least sixty (60) years of age and (2) serve at least (5) years in the company to entitle him/her to a
retirement benefit of at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, with a fraction of at
least six (6) months being considered as one whole year. Notably, these age and tenure requirements
are cumulative and non-compliance with one negates the employee’s entitlement to the retirement
67
benefits under Article 300 of the Labor Code altogether. In this case, it is undisputed that there exists
no retirement plan, collective bargaining agreement or any other equivalent contract between the
parties which set out the terms and condition for the retirement of employees, with the sole exception
of the Philam Life Plan which premiums had already been paid by the Bank.
6. Same; Managerial Employees; Confidential Employees; Types of Employees That Are Prohibited
to Self-Organize.-
—In this case, it cannot be said that Padillo belonged to the same class of employees prohibited to self-
organize which, at present, consist of: (1) managerial employees; and (2) confidential employees who
assist persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor
relations. Therefore, absent this equitable peculiarity, termination pay on the ground of disease under
Article 297 of the Labor Code and the Court’s ruling in Abaquin should not be applied.
****
68
62. Macarubbo vs. Macarubbo, 689 SCRA 69, January 22, 2013
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove
its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their
ways.-—From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has
sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of
him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of
society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers,
concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, as in this
case.
****
69
63. Vinzons-Chato vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 689 SCRA 107, January 22,
2013
Syllabi Class: Election Law|Constitutional Law|House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
1. Election Law; Courts; Supreme Court; Appeals; Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions
and orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion
committed by the tribunal; otherwise, it shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its
discretion or jurisdiction.-“It is hornbook principle that our jurisdiction to review decisions and orders
of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the
tribunal”; otherwise, we shall not interfere with the electoral tribunal’s exercise of its discretion or
jurisdiction. “Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment, or the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty.” The acts complained of in these cases pertain to the HRET’s
exercise of its discretion, an exercise which we find to be well within the bounds of its authority and,
therefore, beyond our power to restrict or curtail.
2. Same; Same; Same; At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as
the sole judge of election contests involving its members, we cannot substitute our own judgment for
that of the HRET on the issues of whether the evidence presented during the initial revision could affect
the officially proclaimed results and whether the continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to
a determination of the true will of the electorate. In any case, as pointed out by the HRET, the revision
proceedings for the remaining 75% protested clustered precincts had already been conducted from May
2-9, 2012 thereby rendering the issue moot and academic.
3. Same; Constitutional Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The Constitution
mandates that the HRET “shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of its members. By employing the word “sole,” the Constitution is emphatic that the
jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is intended to be
its own—full, complete and unimpaired. The Tribunal, thus, unequivocally asserted its exclusive control
in Rule 7 of the 2011 HRET Rules, as follows: Rule 7. Exclusive Control of Functions.—The Tribunal
shall have exclusive control, direction, and supervision of all matters pertaining to its own functions
and operation.
4. Same; Same; Encryption; Words and Phrases; It bears stressing that the digital images of the
ballots captured by the PCOS machine are stored in an encrypted format in the CF cards. “Encryption
is the process of encoding messages (or information) in such a way that eavesdroppers or hackers
cannot read it, but that authorized parties can. In an encryption scheme, the message or information
(referred to as plaintext) is encrypted using an encryption algorithm, turning it into an unreadable
ciphertext. This is usually done with the use of an encryption key, which specifies how the message is
to be encoded. Any adversary that can see the ciphertext, should not be able to determine anything
about the original message. An authorized party, however, is able to decode the ciphertext using a
decryption algorithm, that usually requires a secret decryption key, that adversaries do not have access
to.”
5. Same; Automated Election System (AES); Words and Phrases; —Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369
defines “official ballot” where AES is utilized as the “paper ballot, whether printed or generated by
the technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents the votes cast by a voter recorded or to be
recorded in electronic form.” An automated election system, or AES, is a system using appropriate
technology which has been demonstrated in the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and
transmission of election result, and other electoral process. There are two types of AES identified under
R.A. No. 9369: (1) paper-based election system; and (2) direct recording electronic election system. A
paper-based election system, such as the one adopted during the May 10, 2010 elections, is the type of
AES that “use paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates, consolidates/canvasses and transmits
electronically the results of the vote count.” On the other hand, direct recording electronic election
system “uses electronic ballots, records, votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical
or electro-optical component that can be activated by the voter, processes data by means of computer
programs, record voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting results electronically.”
****
70
64. People vs. Laba, 689 SCRA 367, January 28, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Evidence|Entries Made in Official Records
****
71
65. Re: Request of (Ref) Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban for Recomputation of His
Creditable Service for the Purpose of Recomputing His Retirement Benefits, 690 SCRA 242,
February 12, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Retirement|Government Service
****
72
66. Martinez vs. People, 690 SCRA 656, February 13, 2013
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Searches and Seizures|Warrantless Arrests
****
73
67. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. vs. Molon, 691 SCRA 113, February 18, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Illegal Dismissals|Reinstatement|Backwages
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court has the authority to
sift through the factual findings of both the Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations
Commission in the event of their conflict.-
—Parenthetically, in a special civil action for certiorari, the CA is authorized to make its own factual
determination when it finds that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in overlooking or disregarding
evidence which are material to the controversy. The Court, in turn, has the same authority to sift through
the factual findings of both the CA and the NLRC in the event of their conflict. Thus, in Plastimer
Industrial Corporation v. Gopo, 643 SCRA 502 (2011), the Court explained: In a special civil action
for certiorari, the Court of Appeals has ample authority to make its own factual determination. Thus,
the Court of Appeals can grant a petition for certiorari when it finds that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion by disregarding evidence material to the controversy. To make this finding, the
Court of Appeals necessarily has to look at the evidence and make its own factual determination. In the
same manner, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the factual issues when there are conflicting
findings by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. x x x x.
2. Same; Illegal Dismissals; Reinstatement; Backwages; An illegally dismissed employee is entitled
to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.
In certain cases, however, the Court has ordered the reinstatement of the employee without backwages
considering the fact that (1) the dismissal of the employee would be too harsh a penalty; and (2) the
employer was in good faith in terminating the employee. For instance, in the case of Cruz v. Minister
of Labor and Employment, 120 SCRA 15 (1983), the Court ruled as follows: The Court is convinced
that petitioner’s guilt was substantially established. Nevertheless, we agree with respondent Minister’s
order of reinstating petitioner without backwages instead of dismissal which may be too drastic. Denial
of backwages would sufficiently penalize her for her infractions. The bank officials acted in good faith.
They should be exempt from the burden of paying backwages. The good faith of the employer, when
clear under the circumstances, may preclude or diminish recovery of backwages. Only employees
discriminately dismissed are entitled to backpay. x x x.
3. Same; Quitclaims; A waiver or quitclaim is a valid and binding agreement between the parties,
provided that it constitutes a credible and reasonable settlement and the one accomplishing it has done
so voluntarily and with a full understanding of its import. The applicable provision is Article 232 of the
Labor Code which reads in part: ART. 232. Compromise Agreements.―Any compromise settlement,
including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the
assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding
upon the parties. x x x
4. Same; Union Busting; Under Article 276(c) of the Labor Code, there is union busting when the
existence of the union is threatened by the employer’s act of dismissing the former’s officers who have
been duly-elected in accordance with its constitution and by-laws. On the other hand, the term unfair
labor practice refers to that gamut of offenses defined in the Labor Code which, at their core, violates
the constitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization, with the sole exception of Article
257(f) (previously Article 248[f]). As explained in the case of Philcom Employees Union v. Philippine
Global Communications, 495 SCRA 214 (2006): Unfair labor practice refers to acts that violate the
workers’ right to organize. The prohibited acts are related to the workers’ right to self-organization
and to the observance of a CBA. Without that element, the acts, no matter how unfair, are not unfair
labor practices. The only exception is Article 248(f) [now Article 257(f)].
5. Same; Same; Same; The employer must prove the requirements for a valid retrenchment by clear
and convincing evidence; otherwise, said ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by
scheming employers who might be merely feigning losses or reverses in their business ventures in order
to ease out employees.-
—Essentially, the prerogative of an employer to retrench its employees must be exercised only as a last
resort, considering that it will lead to the loss of the employees’ livelihood. It is justified only when all
other less drastic means have been tried and found insufficient or inadequate. Corollary thereto, the
employer must prove the requirements for a valid retrenchment by clear and convincing evidence;
74
otherwise, said ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might
be merely feigning losses or reverses in their business ventures in order to ease out employees. These
requirements are: (1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses
which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if
only expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer; (2)
That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (3) That the employer pays
the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month
pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to
retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the
employees’ right to security of tenure; and (5) That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in
ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status,
efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain workers.
6. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Retrenchment; Words and Phrases; Retrenchment is
defined as the termination of employment initiated by the employer through no fault of the employee
and without prejudice to the latter, resorted by management during periods of business recession,
industrial depression or seasonal fluctuations or during lulls over shortage of materials. It is a
reduction in manpower, a measure utilized by an employer to minimize business losses incurred in the
operation of its business. Under Article 297 of the Labor Code, retrenchment is one of the authorized
causes to validly terminate an employment.
****
75
68. People vs. Lamsen, 691 SCRA 498, February 20, 2013
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Conspiracy
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the
witnesses is entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality, considering that it was the trial judge
who personally heard such witnesses, observed their demeanor, and the manner in which they testified
during trial.-
—Well-settled is the rule that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled
to great weight, sometimes even with finality, considering that it was the trial judge who personally
heard such witnesses, observed their demeanor, and the manner in which they testified during trial.
Thus, where there is no showing that the trial judge overlooked or misinterpreted some material facts
or that it gravely abused its discretion, then the Court shall not disturb the assessment of the facts and
credibility of the witnesses by the trial court.
2. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it may be inferred
from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime.-
—It is settled that direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it may be inferred from the
collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime. It can be presumed
from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose, design,
concerted action, and community of interests. As correctly found by the court a quo and affirmed by the
CA, the events surrounding the commission of the crime would readily establish conspiracy among the
accused-appellants in committing robbery with homicide. Thus, they were correctly convicted of the
aforementioned crime.
3. Same; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence; Elements of; Words and Phrases; Circumstantial
evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which
the fact-finder draws from the evidence established.-
—Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that indirectly proves a fact in issue through an
inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. It is sufficient for conviction if: [a]
there is more than one (1) circumstance; [b] the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and [c] the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person. The test to
determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is
that the series of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every
circumstance must be consistent with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with the accused’s innocence.
****
76
69. Philippine Plaza Holdings, Inc. vs. Episcope, 692 SCRA 227, February 27, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Loss of Trust and Confidence
77
****
70. Gotesco Properties, Inc. vs. Fajardo, 692 SCRA 319, February 27, 2013
Syllabi Class :Corporation Law|Liability of Corporate Officers
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Contract to Sell; Subdivisions and Condominiums; In a contract to sell, the
seller’s obligation to deliver the corresponding certificates of title is simultaneous and reciprocal to
the buyer’s full payment of the purchase price; Section 25 of PD 957 imposes on the subdivision owner
or developer the obligation to cause the transfer of the corresponding certificate of title to the buyer
upon full payment.-
—It is settled that in a contract to sell, the seller’s obligation to deliver the corresponding certificates
of title is simultaneous and reciprocal to the buyer’s full payment of the purchase price. In this relation,
Section 25 of PD 957, which regulates the subject transaction, imposes on the subdivision owner or
developer the obligation to cause the transfer of the corresponding certificate of title to the buyer upon
full payment, to wit: Sec. 25. Issuance of Title. The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot
or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required for the registration
of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In the event
a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the
owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six months
from such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot or unit may be secured and delivered
to the buyer in accordance herewith.
2. Corporation Law; Liability of Corporate Officers; In the absence of malice and bad faith, as in this
case, officers of the corporation cannot be made personally liable for liabilities of the corporation
which, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders, and
members.-
—The Court finds no basis to hold individual petitioners solidarily liable with petitioner GPI for the
payment of damages in favor of Sps. Fajardo since it was not shown that they acted maliciously or dealt
with the latter in bad faith. Settled is the rule that in the absence of malice and bad faith, as in this case,
officers of the corporation cannot be made personally liable for liabilities of the corporation which, by
legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders, and members.
3. Same; Same; Rescission of Contracts; Rescission does not merely terminate the contract and release
the parties from further obligations to each other, but abrogates the contract from its inception and
restores the parties to their original positions as if no contract has been made.-
—It is noteworthy to point out that rescission does not merely terminate the contract and release the
parties from further obligations to each other, but abrogates the contract from its inception and restores
the parties to their original positions as if no contract has been made. Consequently, mutual restitution,
which entails the return of the benefits that each party may have received as a result of the contract, is
thus required. To be sure, it has been settled that the effects of rescission as provided for in Article 1385
of the Code are equally applicable to cases under Article 1191.
****
78
71. Villamar-Sandoval vs. Cailipan, 692 SCRA 339, March 04, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Appeals|Certiorari
79
****
72. Jinon vs. Jiz, 692 SCRA 348, March 05, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings|Substantial Evidence
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Practice of Law; The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by
the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession.-
—The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their
clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code. “Lawyers may, thus, be
disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in
their private capacity.”
2. Administrative Proceedings; Substantial Evidence; In administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion, is required.-
—The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.
Having carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the Court therefore finds that the standard of
substantial evidence has been more than satisfied.
3. Same; Same; A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed to him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics.-
—Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for the processing of transfer of land
title, but not used for the purpose, should be immediately returned. “A lawyer’s failure to return upon
demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed to him by his client. Such act is
a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in
the legal profession and deserves punishment.”
4. Same; Same; When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence
in protecting the latter’s rights.-
—Undeniably, “when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence
in protecting the latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a
good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes
him answerable not just to client but also to the legal profession, the court and society.”
80
****
73. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Grageda, 693 SCRA 15, March 11, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings|Public Officers
1. Administrative Proceedings; Public Officers; In order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an
administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public
official or employee.-
—Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that in order for the Court to acquire jurisdiction over an
administrative proceeding, the complaint must be filed during the incumbency of the respondent public
official or employee. This is because the filing of an administrative case is predicated on the holding of
a position or office in the government service. However, once jurisdiction has attached, the same is not
lost by the mere fact that the public official or employee was no longer in office during the pendency of
the case. In fine, cessation from office by reason of resignation, death or retirement is not a ground to
dismiss the case filed against the said officer or employee at the time that he was still in the public
service or render it moot and academic.
2. Same; Same; In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., 654 SCRA 539 (2011), the
Court ruled that while the Ombudsman is not precluded from conducting an investigation against the
errant employee, it can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan who had already
resigned, more so since his resignation or severance of employment from the service was not availed
of to prevent the continuation of the pending administrative case or to pre-empt the imminent filing of
one.-
—In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Andutan, Jr., 654 SCRA 539 (2011), the Court ruled that
while the Ombudsman is not precluded from conducting an investigation against the errant employee,
it can no longer institute an administrative case against Andutan who had already resigned, more so
since his resignation or severance of employment from the service was not availed of to prevent the
continuation of the pending administrative case or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. The Court
also dismissed an administrative case filed against a retired court stenographer for having been
initiated over a month after her retirement from the service. Moreover, in Re: Missing Exhibits and
Court Properties in Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Panabo City, Davao del Norte, 692 SCRA 8 (2013),
the Court absolved herein respondent, Judge Grageda, from any administrative liability since the
complaint against him was filed after his retirement from the judiciary.
****
81
74. Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), vs. Centeno, 693 SCRA 110, March 11, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Law|Appeals
1. Civil Law; Land Registration; Consolidation of Titles; After consolidation of title in the purchaser’s
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens
into the absolute right of a confirmed owner.-
—It is well-established that after consolidation of title in the purchaser’s name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchaser’s right to possession ripens into the absolute right of
a confirmed owner. At that point, the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and
proof of title, to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial function,
unless it appears that the property is in possession of a third party claiming a right adverse to that of
the mortgagor. The foregoing rule is contained in Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which partly
provides.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Law; Appeals; Absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or
capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts are binding and conclusive upon the
Supreme Court.-
—On the issue regarding the identity of the lots as raised by respondent in his Comment, records show
that the RTC had already passed upon petitioner’s title over the subject lots during the course of the
proceedings. Accordingly, the identity of the said lots had already been established for the purpose of
issuing a writ of possession. It is hornbook principle that absent any clear showing of abuse,
arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts are binding and
conclusive upon the Court, as in this case.
3. Same; Same; In China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), the Court held that
the phrase “a third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor”
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that
of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary.-
—In China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), the Court held that the phrase “a
third party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor” contemplates a
situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner,
tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in
their own right, and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another
co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property should not only be possessed by a third
party, but also held by the third party adversely to the judgment obligor.
****
82
75. People vs. Villareal, 693 SCRA 549, March 18, 2013
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Exclusionary Rule|Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
1. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrantless Arrests; Elements that must concur for
warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate; Paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires
for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.-
—For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.
2. Constitutional Law; Exclusionary Rule; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; There being no lawful
warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is rendered inadmissible in evidence
for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti
of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; “Probable cause” has
been understood to mean a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged.-
—In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they
appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by
themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify
a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. “Probable cause” has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man’s belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested, which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.
4. Same; Same; Same; Flight; Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other
circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear
of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being
wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party. Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is
susceptible of various explanations; it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify
innocence.
5. Same; Same; Same; —A previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will
not suffice to satisfy the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a
lawful warrantless arrest. “Personal knowledge” of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just
been committed is required. To interpret “personal knowledge” as referring to a person’s reputation
or past criminal citations would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority
and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s
previous criminal infractions, rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5. It
was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on “personal
knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record,” as this is unquestionably
not what “personal knowledge” under the law contemplates, which must be strictly construed.
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83
76. Tagolino vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 693 SCRA 574, March 19, 2013
Syllabi Class :Election Law|House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
1. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; The Omnibus Election Code provides for certain remedies
to assail a candidate’s bid for public office.-
—The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for
public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for
disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate
of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.
2. Election Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); View that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal has no authority to review final and executory resolutions or
decisions of the Commission on Elections that it rendered pursuant to its powers under the Constitution,
no matter if such resolutions or decisions are erroneous.-
—So the Court comes to the real issue in this case: whether or not the HRET can review and reverse a
COMELEC decision, involving a member of the House of Representatives, that had already become
final and executory. The HRET has no authority to review final and executory resolutions or decisions
of the COMELEC that it rendered pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, no matter if such
resolutions or decisions are erroneous. The parties cannot by agreement confer such authority on
HRET. Neither the HRET nor the Court can set aside the COMELEC’s final and executory resolutions
that paved the way for Lucy Gomez to substitute her husband.
3. Same; Quo Warranto; Substitution of Candidates; View that the fact that the Petition for Quo
Warranto was filed out of time, there is no need to dwell on the issue of whether the Petition for Quo
Warranto may validly question the validity of the substitution of a candidate and to discuss the
constitutional boundaries of the respective jurisdictions of the Commission on Elections and the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.-
—Regarding the issue of whether a Petition for Quo Warranto is a proper legal remedy to assail the
validity of the substitution of a candidate under Section 77 of the OEC, it suffices here to state that,
under Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, the grounds for a Petition for Quo Warranto are ineligibility to run
for a public office or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Pertinently, Section 6, Article VI of
the Constitution, which provides for the qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives,
states as follows: Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of
age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereat for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election. The above-quoted provision refers to the personal attributes of a
candidate. The ponencia did not find any of the above qualifications absent in the case of respondent
Gomez. However, the ponencia attributed the ineligibility of respondent Gomez to its erroneous
assumption that the certificate of candidacy of Richard Gomez, whom she substituted, should have been
cancelled. As explained above, the COMELEC correctly did not so cancel said certificate, it having
found no factual basis to do so. This being the case and the fact that the Petition for Quo Warranto was
filed out of time, there is no need to dwell on the issue of whether the Petition for Quo Warranto may
validly question the validity of the substitution of a candidate and to discuss the constitutional
boundaries of the respective jurisdictions of the COMELEC and the HRET.
4. Same; Disqualification of Candidates; View that since the Commission on Elections did not cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Richard Gomez but only disqualified him from running in the elections,
the substitution by respondent Gomez of Richard Gomez squarely falls within the ambit of Section 77
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which uses the broad language “disqualification for any cause.”-
—Since the COMELEC did not cancel the certificate of candidacy of Richard Gomez but only
disqualified him from running in the elections, the substitution by respondent Gomez of Richard Gomez
squarely falls within the ambit of Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which uses the broad
language “disqualification for any cause,” as follows: Section 77. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another.―If after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
84
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may
file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The
substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for
the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the
election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election
and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the
political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.
5. Same; View that the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal to entertain the untimely Petition for Quo Warranto assailing the proclamation of private
respondent Gomez would suffice to dismiss outright the instant petition.-
—The lack of jurisdiction on the part of the HRET to entertain the untimely Petition for Quo Warranto
assailing the proclamation of private respondent Gomez would suffice to dismiss outright the instant
petition. Moreover, the substantive issue extensively discussed in the ponencia of the Honorable
Associate Justice Estela Perlas Bernabe, particularly as to the “divergent effects of disqualification
and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC (Certificate of Candidacy) cases vis-à-vis
candidate substitution” is inappropriate. Firstly, the certificate of candidacy of Richard Gomez, the
husband of respondent Gomez, was not cancelled by the COMELEC. Secondly, the decision by the
COMELEC not to cancel said certificate of candidacy was proper as the COMELEC did not reach any
finding that Richard Gomez deliberately committed a misrepresentation, which is a requisite for the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
6. Same; View that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the Supreme Court cannot set
aside at will the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) Rules mandating the timely filing
of election contests.-
—The HRET and this Court cannot set aside at will the HRET Rules mandating the timely filing of
election contests. Otherwise, a dangerous precedent will be set that will cause uncertainty in the
application of the HRET Rules and instability in the holding of an elective post by a proclaimed winning
candidate that may aversely affect public service. In view of the foregoing, I submit that the HRET is
bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by Tagolino, after the lapse of the
reglementary period prescribed by its own Rules. The proclamation of respondent Gomez has become
incontrovertible or unassailable after the expiration of ten (10) days from its date.
7. Election Law; Election Protests; View that in Hofer v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
428 SCRA 383 (2004), the Supreme Court sustained the dismissal by the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal of the election protest for failure to comply strictly with the period prescribed by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) Rules.-
—This Court has emphasized the importance of compliance with the HRET Rules prescribing
reglementary periods to be observed by the parties in an election contest to expedite the disposition of
election controversies so as not to frustrate the will of the electorate. In Hofer v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 428 SCRA 383 (2004), the Court sustained the dismissal by the
HRET of the election protest for failure to comply strictly with the period prescribed by the HRET Rules.
8. Same; Same; The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is not bound by previous COMELEC
pronouncements relative to the qualifications of the Members of the House.-
—Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to
the qualifications of the Members of the House. Being the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot be tied down by
COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate be circumvented and rendered nugatory.
9. Same; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); While it is well-recognized that the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole
judge” of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House,
the Supreme Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check “whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter.-
—Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently
violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. While it is well-recognized that the HRET
has been empowered by the Constitution to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the election,
85
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to
check “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction” on the part of the latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and
settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.
10. Same; Same; Same; Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that if an official candidate
of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person
belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.-
—Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same
political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. It states
that: Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another.—If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. (Emphasis supplied) Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an “official
candidate” before candidate substitution proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is death,
withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section unequivocally states that only an official
candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. As defined under Section 79(a) of the
OEC, the term “candidate” refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office who
has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment,
or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be
considered a candidate.
11. Same; Same; Disqualification of Candidates; Certificates of Candidacy; While a disqualified
candidate under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is still considered to have been a candidate
for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied
due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all.-
—Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a
candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due
course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason
being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy
and necessarily, to valid votes. In Talaga v. COMELEC (Talaga), 683 SCRA 197 (2012), the Court
ruled that: x x x x While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue
as a candidate, a person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
12. Same; Same; Certificate of Candidacy; If a candidate states a material representation in the
Certificate of Candidacy that is false, the Commission on Elections is empowered to deny due to or
cancel such certificate.-
—A denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC is
premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective
office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification; he or she must have
also made a false representation of the same in the CoC. The nature of a Section 78 petition was
discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC, 574 SCRA 782 (2008), where the Court illumined: Lest
it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack
of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which
may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the
candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC,
therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC
that is false the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is fired before
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proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Same; Same; One who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been
a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do
not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility.-
—Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s
possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country; or (b) his or her commission of certain
acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses
under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws. In particular, these are: (1) giving money or
other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing
electoral functions; (2) committing acts of terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) spending in one’s
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting, receiving or making
any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections
80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the OEC. Accordingly, the
same provision (Section 68) states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is
a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the COMELEC to have
committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public
office, or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected. It must be stressed
that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate,
albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however,
deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility
requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she
is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought about by the
commission of the above-mentioned election offenses.
****
87
77. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran, 696 SCRA 861, April 17, 2013
Syllabi Class :Local Government Units|Ultra Vires Acts
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suits; For a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites
must be met namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision
or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the
petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.-
—It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is
wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing
as a taxpayer, however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement
of public funds derived from taxation. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites
must be met namely, (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or
instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the
petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.
2. Local Government Units; Ultra Vires Acts; Case law states that public officials can be held
personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where
they have acted ultra vires.-
—Nevertheless, while the Subject Loans cannot bind the Municipality for being ultra vires, the officers
who authorized the passage of the Subject Resolutions are personally liable. Case law states that public
officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection
with official duties where they have acted ultra vires, as in this case.
3. Civil Law; Contracts; Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that purpose is contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy is considered void and as such, creates no rights
or obligations or any juridical relations.-
—Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code provides that a contract whose purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy is considered void and as such, creates no rights or
obligations or any juridical relations. Consequently, given the unlawful purpose behind the Subject
Loans which is to fund the commercialization of the Agoo Plaza pursuant to the Redevelopment Plan,
they are considered as ultra vires in the primary sense thus, rendering them void and in effect, non-
binding on the Municipality. At this juncture, it is equally observed that the land on which the Agoo
Plaza is situated cannot be converted into patrimonial property―as the SB tried to when it passed
Municipal Ordinance No. 02-2007―absent any express grant by the national government. As public
land used for public use, the foregoing lot rightfully belongs to and is subject to the administration and
control of the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, without the said grant, the Municipality has no right
to claim it as patrimonial property.
4. Local Government Units; Ultra Vires Acts; An act which is outside of the municipality’s jurisdiction
is considered as a void ultra vires act, while an act attended only by an irregularity but remains within
the municipality’s power is considered as an ultra vires act subject to ratification and/or validation.-
—Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is created
as defined by the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by law.
There are two (2) types of ultra vires acts. As held in Middletown Policemen’s Benevolent Association
v. Township of Middletown, 162 N.J. 361, 368 (2000): There is a distinction between an act utterly
beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the irregular exercise of a basic power under
the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are ultra vires in the primary
sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense which does not preclude ratification or
the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential justice. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) In other words, an act which is outside of the municipality’s jurisdiction is
considered as a void ultra vires act, while an act attended only by an irregularity but remains within
the municipality’s power is considered as an ultra vires act subject to ratification and/or validation. To
the former belongs municipal contracts which (a) are entered into beyond the express, implied or
inherent powers of the local government unit; and (b) do not comply with the substantive requirements
of law e.g., when expenditure of public funds is to be made, there must be an actual appropriation and
88
certificate of availability of funds; while to the latter belongs those which (a) are entered into by the
improper department, board, officer of agent; and (b) do not comply with the formal requirements of a
written contract e.g., the Statute of Frauds.
5. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suits; A taxpayer need not be a party to the contract
to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered
into by the government.-
—As a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran is directly affected by the conversion of the
Agoo Plaza which was funded by the proceeds of the Subject Loans. It is well-settled that public plazas
are properties for public use and therefore, belongs to the public dominion. As such, it can be used by
anybody and no one can exercise over it the rights of a private owner. In this light, Cacayuran had a
direct interest in ensuring that the Agoo Plaza would not be exploited for commercial purposes through
the APC’s construction. Moreover, Cacayuran need not be privy to the Subject Loans in order to proffer
his objections thereto. In Mamba v. Lara, 608 SCRA 149 (2009), it has been held that a taxpayer need
not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are involved, people have a right
to question contracts entered into by the government.
6. Local Government Units; Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA); The Municipality’s Internal Revenue
Allotment, which serves as the local government unit’s just share in the national taxes, is in the nature
of public funds derived from taxation.-
—Although the construction of the APC would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the Subject
Loans, which Land Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no denying that public funds derived
from taxation are bound to be expended as the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as a security
for the foregoing loans. Needless to state, the Municipality’s IRA, which serves as the local government
unit’s just share in the national taxes, is in the nature of public funds derived from taxation. The Court
believes, however, that although these funds may be posted as a security, its collateralization should
only be deemed effective during the incumbency of the public officers who approved the same, else those
who succeed them be effectively deprived of its use. In any event, it is observed that the proceeds from
the Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds by the Municipality’s receipt thereof.
Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of public funds when
they are under official custody.
****
89
78. Ecole De Cuisine Manille (Cordon Bleu of the Philippines), Inc. vs. Renaud Cointreau & Cie,
697 SCRA 345, June 05, 2013
Syllabi Class :Intellectual Properties|Trademarks|Intellectual Property Code of the Phils (R.A. No.
8293)
1. Intellectual Properties; Trademarks; Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 166, in order to register a
trademark, one must be the owner thereof and must have actually used the mark in commerce in the
Philippines for two (2) months prior to the application for registration.-
—Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 166, in order to register a trademark, one must be the owner thereof and
must have actually used the mark in commerce in the Philippines for two (2) months prior to the
application for registration. Section 2-A of the same law sets out to define how one goes about acquiring
ownership thereof. Under Section 2-A, it is clear that actual use in commerce is also the test of
ownership but the provision went further by saying that the mark must not have been so appropriated
by another. Additionally, it is significant to note that Section 2-A does not require that the actual use of
a trademark must be within the Philippines. Thus, as correctly mentioned by the CA, under R.A. No.
166, one may be an owner of a mark due to its actual use but may not yet have the right to register such
ownership here due to the owner’s failure to use the same in the Philippines for two (2) months prior
to registration.
2. Same; Same; Same; Courts will protect trade names or marks, although not registered or properly
selected as trademarks, on the broad ground of enforcing justice and protecting one in the fruits of his
toil.-
—As a final note, “the function of a trademark is to point out distinctly the origin or ownership of the
goods (or services) to which it is affixed; to secure to him, who has been instrumental in bringing into
the market a superior article of merchandise, the fruit of his industry and skill; to assure the public that
they are procuring the genuine article; to prevent fraud and imposition; and to protect the manufacturer
against substitution and sale of an inferior and different article as his product.” As such, courts will
protect trade names or marks, although not registered or properly selected as trademarks, on the broad
ground of enforcing justice and protecting one in the fruits of his toil.
3. Same; Same; Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 8293); The present law on
trademarks, Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the
Philippines, as amended, has already dispensed with the requirement of prior actual use at the time of
registration.-
—In any case, the present law on trademarks, Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, as amended, has already dispensed with the requirement
of prior actual use at the time of registration. Thus, there is more reason to allow the registration of the
subject mark under the name of Cointreau as its true and lawful owner.
4. Same; Same; Same; Paris Convention; The Philippines is obligated to assure nationals of the
signatory-countries that they are afforded an effective protection against violation of their intellectual
property rights in the Philippines in the same way that their own countries are obligated to accord
similar protection to Philippine nationals. “Thus, under Philippine law, a trade name of a national of
a State that is a party to the Paris Convention, whether or not the trade name forms part of a trademark,
is protected “without the obligation of filing or registration.’ ”
5. Same; Same; Trademark Infringement; Foreign marks which are not registered are still accorded
protection against infringement and/or unfair competition.-
—Nevertheless, foreign marks which are not registered are still accorded protection against
infringement and/or unfair competition. At this point, it is worthy to emphasize that the Philippines and
France, Cointreau’s country of origin, are both signatories to the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (Paris Convention).
****
90
79. Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. vs. Toledo, 697 SCRA 425, June 05, 2013
Syllabi Class :Taxation|Tax Credit|Tax Refund
1. Taxation; Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals; Appeals; Although the RRCTA does not
explicitly sanction extensions to file a petition for review with the CTA, Section 1, Rule 7 thereof reads
that in the absence of any express provision in the RRCTA, Rules 42, 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of Court
may be applied in a suppletory manner. In particular, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9282 makes
reference to the procedure under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. In this light, Section 1 of Rule 42 states
that the period for filing a petition for review may be extended upon motion of the concerned party.
Thus, in City of Manila v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., 595 SCRA 299 (2009), the Court held
that the original period for filing the petition for review may be extended for a period of fifteen (15)
days, which for the most compelling reasons, may be extended for another period not exceeding fifteen
(15) days. In other words, the reglementary period provided under Section 3, Rule 8 of the RRCTA is
extendible and as such, CTA Division’s grant of respondents’ motion for extension falls squarely within
the law.
2. Taxation; Tax Credit; Tax Refund; Indeed, it is hornbook principle that a claim for a tax
refund/credit is in the nature of a claim for an exemption and the law is construed in strictissimi juris
against the one claiming it and in favor of the taxing authority. Consequently, as petitioners have failed
to prove that they have complied with the procedural requisites stated under Section 196 of the LGC,
their claim for local tax refund/credit must be denied.
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Modes of Discovery; Request for Admission; Once a party serves
a request for admission regarding the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact, the party to
whom such request is served is given a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a sworn statement
answering the same. Should the latter fail to file and serve such answer, each of the matters of which
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. The exception to this rule is when the party to whom
such request for admission is served had already controverted the matters subject of such request in an
earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters in a request for admission have already been admitted
or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny
them anew. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and
thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Section 2, Rule 26.
4. Same; Local Government Code; Local Taxation; Tax Credit; Tax Refund; Procedural
Requirements in Order to be Entitled to a Refund/Credit of Local Taxes.-
—A perusal of Section 196 of the LGC reveals that in order to be entitled to a refund/credit of local
taxes, the following procedural requirements must concur: first, the taxpayer concerned must file a
written claim for refund/credit with the local treasurer; and second, the case or proceeding for refund
has to be filed within two (2) years from the date of the payment of the tax, fee, or charge or from the
date the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or credit.
5. Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled that dismissal of appeals based purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon as every party litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.-
—Neither did respondents’ failure to comply with Section 4, Rule 5 and Section 2, Rule 6 of the RRCTA
militate against giving due course to their Petition for Review. Respondents’ submission of only one
copy of the said petition and their failure to attach therewith a certified true copy of the RTC’s decision
constitute mere formal defects which may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. It is well-
settled that dismissal of appeals based purely on technical grounds is frowned upon as every party
litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. In this regard, the CTA Division did not overstep its
boundaries when it admitted respondents’ Petition for Review despite the aforementioned defects “in
the broader interest of justice.”
****
91
80. Borromeo vs. Mina, 697 SCRA 516, June 05, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Contracts|Void Contracts
1. Remedial Law; Theory of the Case; Settled is the rule that a party who adopts a certain theory upon
which the case is tried and decided by the lower courts or tribunals will not be permitted to change his
theory on appeal, not because of the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness.
Basic considerations of due process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court would not ordinarily be considered by a reviewing court, except when their
factual bases would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order to
enable him to properly meet the issue raised, such as when the factual bases of such novel theory, issue
or argument (a) is subject of judicial notice; or (b) had already been judicially admitted, which do not
obtain in this case.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; Void Contracts; A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil
effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.-
—In consequence, petitioner cannot assert any right over the subject landholding, such as his present
claim for landholding exemption, because his title springs from a null and void source. A void contract
is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a
juridical relation. Hence, notwithstanding the erroneous identification of the subject landholding by the
MARO as owned by Cipriano Borromeo, the fact remains that petitioner had no right to file a petition
for landholding exemption since the sale of the said property to him by Garcia in 1982 is null and void.
Proceeding from this, the finding that petitioner’s total agricultural landholdings is way below the
retention limits set forth by law thus, becomes irrelevant to his claim for landholding exemption
precisely because he has no right over the aforementioned landholding.
3. Agrarian Reform; Presidential Decree No. 27; PD 27 prohibits the transfer of ownership over
tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21, 1972 except only in favor of the actual tenant-tillers
thereon. As held in the case of Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation v. DAR Regional
Director for Region III, 555 SCRA 97 (2008) citing Heirs of Batongbacal v. CA, 389 SCRA 517 (389).
x x x P.D. No. 27, as amended, forbids the transfer or alienation of covered agricultural lands after
October 21, 1972 except to the tenant-beneficiary. x x x. In Heirs of Batongbacal v. Court of Appeals,
389 SCRA 517 (2002), involving the similar issue of sale of a covered agricultural land under P.D. No.
27, this Court held: Clearly, therefore, Philbanking committed breach of obligation as an agricultural
lessor. As the records show, private respondent was not informed about the sale between Philbanking
and petitioner, and neither was he privy to the transfer of ownership from Juana Luciano to
Philbanking. As an agricultural lessee, the law gives him the right to be informed about matters
affecting the land he tills, without need for him to inquire about it. x x x x In other words, transfer of
ownership over tenanted rice and/or corn lands after October 21, 1972 is allowed only in favor of the
actual tenant-tillers thereon. Hence, the sale executed by Philbanking on January 11, 1985 in favor of
petitioner was in violation of the aforequoted provision of P.D. 27 and its implementing guidelines, and
must thus be declared null and void.
****
92
81. Sy vs. Local Government of Quezon City, 697 SCRA 621, June 05, 2013
Syllabi Class :Expropriation|Taking|Just Compensation
1. Civil Law; Excusable Negligence; A claim of excusable negligence does not loosely warrant a
relaxation of the rules. Verily, the party invoking such should be able to show that the procedural
oversight or lapse is attended by a genuine miscalculation or unforeseen fortuitousness which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against so as to justify the relief sought. The standard of care required
is that which an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his important business. In this accord, the duty
rests on every counsel to see to adopt and strictly maintain a system that will efficiently take into account
all court notices sent to him.
2. Same; Same; Just Compensation; The Court cannot sustain the amount of P5,500.00/sq. m. as just
compensation which was set by the RTC and upheld by the CA. The said valuation was actually arrived
at after considering: (a) the September 4, 1996 recommendation of the City Appraisal Committee; (b)
several sworn statements made by Sy himself; and (c) Sy’s own tax declaration for 1996. It is well-
settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking. However,
the above-stated documents do not reflect the value of the subject property at the time of its taking in
1986 but rather, its valuation in 1996. Consequently, the case must be remanded to the RTC in order
to properly determine the amount of just compensation during such time the subject property was
actually taken.
3. Same; Taking;Notably, the lack of proper authorization, i.e., resolution to effect expropriation, did
not affect the character of the City’s taking of the subject property in 1986 as the CA, in its January 20,
2012 Decision, suggests. Case law dictates that there is “taking” when the owner is actually deprived
or dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material impairment of the
value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof. Therefore, notwithstanding the
lack of proper authorization, the legal character of the City’s action as one of “taking” did not change.
In this relation, the CA noted that the City enacted Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, only on April 12, 1994
and filed its expropriation complaint on November 7, 1996. However, as it previously admitted, it
already commenced with the taking of the subject property as early as 1986. Accordingly, interest must
run from such time.
4. Same; Same; —As to the reckoning point on which the legal interest should accrue, the same should
be computed from the time of the taking of the subject property in 1986 and not from the filing of the
complaint for expropriation on November 7, 1996. Records show that the City itself admitted in its
Appellee’s Brief filed before the CA that as early as 1986, “a burden was already imposed upon the
owner of the [subject] property x x x, considering that the expropriated property was already being
used as Barangay day care and office.” Thus, the property was actually taken during that time and
from thereon, legal interest should have already accrued. In this light, the Court has held that: x x x
[T]he final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court[.] x x x
(Emphasis supplied) This is based on the principle that interest “runs as a matter of law and follows
from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the
date of the taking.”
5. Expropriation; Interest Rates;Based on a judicious review of the records and application of
jurisprudential rulings, the Court holds that the correct rate of legal interest to be applied is twelve
percent (12%) and not six percent (6%) per annum, owing to the nature of the City’s obligation as an
effective forbearance. In the case of Republic v. CA, 383 SCRA 611, 622-623 (2002), the Court ruled
that the debt incurred by the government on account of the taking of the property subject of an
expropriation constitutes an effective forbearance which therefore, warrants the application of the 12%
legal interest rate.
6. Attorneys; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; —Be that as it may, procedural rules may,
nonetheless, be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an injustice
not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client, may not be
strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the client’s liberty
or property, or where the interest of justice so requires. ****
93
82. Kapisanang Pagkaunlaran ng Kababaihang Potrero,Inc. vs. Barreno, 698SCRA 79, June 10,
2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Forum Shopping
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Forum shopping exists “when one party
repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
raising substantially the same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by some other
court.” What is truly important to consider in determining whether it exists or not is the vexation caused
the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to
rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by different fora upon the same issues.
****
94
83. Surigao del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Gonzaga, 698 SCRA 103, June 10, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment
1. Same; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Gross and Habitual Neglect of
Duty;Serious Misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty are just causes for termination which
are explicitly enumerated under Article 296 of the Labor Code.―The Court finds the evidence
presented by the petitioners, as opposed to the bare denial of Gonzaga, sufficient to constitute
substantial evidence to prove that he committed serious misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of
duty to warrant his dismissal from employment. Such are just causes for termination which are explicitly
enumerated under Article 296 of the Labor Code, as amended: Article 296. Termination by Employer.-
—An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious Misconduct
or wilful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; x x x x At any
rate, Gonzaga had admitted that he failed to remit his collections daily in violation of SURNECO’s
company policy, rendering such fact conclusive and binding upon him. Therefore, for his equal violation
of Section 7.2.2 of the Code of Ethics (failure to remit collections/monies), his dismissal is justified
altogether.
****
95
84. Caballo vs. People, 698 SCRA 227, June 10, 2013
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Child Prostitution|Child Abuse Law (R.A. No. 7610)
1. Criminal Law; Child Prostitution; Elements of.―Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently
reads: SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.-
—Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: x
x x x (b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for rape and Article 336 of
Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be;
Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age
shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) As
determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA (Olivarez), 465 SCRA 465 (2005), the elements of the foregoing
offense are the following: (a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and (c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
****
96
85. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Palmares, 698 SCRA 655, June 17, 2013
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Just Compensation
1. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Principal Factors Enumerated Under Section 17 of R.A. No.
6657 that Guide Special Agrarian Courts in the Determination of Just Compensation.-
—The principal basis of the computation for just compensation is Section 17 of RA 6657, which
enumerates the following factors to guide the special agrarian courts in the determination thereof: (1)
the acquisition cost of the land; (2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and
income; (4) the sworn valuation by the owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment made by
government assessors; (7) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (8) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, if any. Pursuant to its rule-making power
under Section 49 of the same law, the DAR translated these factors into a basic formula.
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86. Abella vs. Barrios, Jr., 698 SCRA 683, June 18, 2013
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics|Practice of Law
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98
87. Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections, 698 SCRA 742, June 18, 2013
Syllabi Class :Election Law|Disqualification of Candidates|Certificate of Candidacy
1. Same; Election Law; Disqualification of Candidates; While Section 40(a) of the Local Government
Code allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time
he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes
a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for
elective office.―Section 40(a) of the LGC, applicable as it is to local elective candidates, provides:
SEC. 40. Disqualifications.-
—The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) And on the other hand, Article 30 of the RPC reads: ART. 30. Effects of the
penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification.—The penalties of perpetual or temporary
absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects: 1. The deprivation of the
public offices and employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such
office. 3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the
rights mentioned. In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article shall last during the term of the sentence. 4. The loss of all rights to
retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Keeping with the above-mentioned statutory construction principle, the Court observes that the conflict
between these provisions of law may be properly reconciled. In particular, while Section 40(a) of the
LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after the lapse of two (2) years from the time
he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes
a penalty, either as principal or accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for
elective office. An example of this would be Article 41 of the RPC, which imposes the penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification as an accessory to the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal: ART. 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal―Their accessory
penalties.―The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal shall carry with them that of
civil interdiction for life or during the period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual
absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for elective
office. To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar import, is based on the presumptive
rule that one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of
moral turpitude, is unfit to hold public office, as the same partakes of a privilege which the State grants
only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common good.
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99
88. Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 104, June 19, 2013
****
100
89. Bases Conversion Development Authority vs. Reyes, 699 SCRA 217, June 19, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Judgments|Immutability of Judgments
****
101
90. Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352, June 25, 2013
Syllabi Class :Statutes
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Family Courts; Family Courts Act of 1997 (R.A. No.
8369);
—At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional
Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and
children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the
Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified. To achieve
harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined
under the latter law.
2. Statutes; View that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative as though it had never been passed.-
—We have declared that “[a]n unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is x x x as inoperative as though it had never been
passed.” However, the seemingly all-inclusive statement of absolute retroactive invalidity may not
always be justified. One established exception is the doctrine of operative fact. The doctrine of operative
fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the
effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination
of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid
Law.
3. Violence Against Women and Children; View that it may be said that violence in the context of
intimate relationships should not be seen and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue.-
—In this light, it may be said that violence in the context of intimate relationships should not be seen
and encrusted as a gender issue; rather, it is a power issue. Thus, when laws are not gender-neutral,
male victims of domestic violence may also suffer from double victimization first by their abusers and
second by the judicial system. Incidentally, focusing on women as the victims entrenches some level of
heteronormativity. It is blind to the possibility that, whatever moral positions are taken by those who
are dominant, in reality intimate relationships can also happen between men.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; VLegal standing in cases that
raise constitutional issues is essential. Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question.” The fundamental question is “whether a party alleges such personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
5. Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 is based on the experiences of women who have been victims of
domestic violence.-Clearly, the substantive equality model inspired R.A. 9262. For one thing, Congress
enacted it because of compelling interest in preventing and addressing the serious problem of violence
against women in the context of intimate relationships — recognized all over the world as one of the
most insidious forms of gender discrimination. For another, R.A. 9262 is based on the experiences of
women who have been victims of domestic violence. The list of acts regarded as forms of violence come
from true-to-life stories of women who have suffered abuses from their male partners. Finally, R.A.
9262 seeks women’s full participation in society. Hence, the law grants them needed relief to ensure
equality, protection, and personal safety, enabling them to enjoy their civil, political, social, and
economic rights. The provision on protection orders, for instance, precisely aims to safeguard “the
victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the
opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life.”
6. Same; Same; Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW); In the context of women’s rights, substantive equality has been defined by the Convention
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as equality which requires
that women be given an equal start and that they be empowered by an enabling environment to achieve
102
equality of results. It is not enough to guarantee women treatment that is identical to that of men. Rather,
biological as well as socially and culturally constructed differences between women and men must be
taken into account. Under certain circumstances, non-identical treatment of women and men will be
required in order to address such differences.
7. Violence Against Women and Children; Equal Protection of the Law; What remedies does R.A.
9262 especially provide women and children? The law is gender-specific as only they may file the
prescribed actions against offenders, whether men or women, with whom the victims are or were in
lesbian relationships. The definition includes past or present marital, live-in, sexual or dating
relationships. This law also provides for the remedy of a protection order in a civil action or in a
criminal action, aside from the criminal action for its violation. It makes the process of securing a
restraining order against perpetrators easier and more immediate by providing for the legal remedy of
protection orders from both the courts and barangay officials.
8. Same; Same; Expanded Equal Protection Clause; —Chief Justice Puno goes on: “The Expanded
Equal Protection Clause, anchored on the human rights rationale, is designed as a weapon against the
indignity of discrimination so that in the patently unequal Philippine society, each person may be
restored to his or her rightful position as a person with equal moral status.” Specifically, the expanded
equal protection clause should be understood as meant to “reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.” Borrowing the language of Law v. Canada, 1 S.C.R. 497 (1999), case and adding his
own thoughts, the Chief Justice said: The purpose of the Expanded Equal Protection Clause is to protect
and enhance the right to dignity by: 1) preventing the imposition, perpetuation and aggravation “of
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political [,economic, cultural,] or social prejudice”; and 2) promo[ting
a Philippine] society in which all persons enjoy equal recognition at law as human beings.
9. Same; Same; View that the equal protection clause can no longer be interpreted as only a guarantee
of formal equality but of substantive equality.-
—Chief Justice Puno’s thesis is that the right to equal protection casts another shadow when the issue
raised under it involves persons protected by the social justice provision of the Constitution,
specifically, Section 1, Article XIII. The equal protection clause can no longer be interpreted as only a
guarantee of formal equality but of substantive equality. “It ought to be construed,” said the Chief
Justice, “in consonance with social justice as ‘the heart’ particularly of the 1987 Constitution — a
transformative covenant in which the Filipino people agreed to enshrine asymmetrical equality to uplift
disadvantaged groups and build a genuinely egalitarian democracy.” This means that the weak,
including women in relation to men, can be treated with a measure of bias that they may cease to be
weak.
10. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that men and women are supposed to be
equal yet this particular law provides immediate relief to complaining women and harsh consequences
to their men even before the matter reaches the courtroom, a relief not available to the latter.-
—This separate concurring opinion will address the issue of equal protection since it presents the more
serious challenge to the constitutionality of the law. Men and women are supposed to be equal yet this
particular law provides immediate relief to complaining women and harsh consequences to their men
even before the matter reaches the courtroom, a relief not available to the latter. The law, Garcia says,
violates his right to equal protection because it is gender-specific, favoring only women when men could
also be victims of domestic violence.
11. Same; Same; View that R.A. No. 9262 does not deny, restrict or curtail civil and human rights of
other persons falling outside the classification, particularly of the men members of the family who can
avail of remedies provided by other laws to ensure the protection of their own rights and interests.-
—With the objective of promoting solidarity and the development of the family, R.A. No. 9262 provides
the legal redress for domestic violence that particularly affects women and their children. Significantly,
the law does not deny, restrict or curtail civil and human rights of other persons falling outside the
classification, particularly of the men members of the family who can avail of remedies provided by
other laws to ensure the protection of their own rights and interests. Consequently, the resulting
classification under R.A. No. 9262 is not wholly intended and does not work an injustice by removing
remedies that are available to men in violence committed against them. The law furthermore does not
target men against women and children and is there simply to achieve a legitimate constitutional
103
objective, and it does not achieve this by a particularly harmful classification that can be labeled
“suspect” in the sense already established by jurisprudence. Under the circumstances, the use and
application of strict scrutiny review, or even the use of an expanded equal protection perspective, strike
me as both unnecessary and disproportionate.
12. Same; Same; View that the classification in the law was not immediately brought on by
considerations of gender or sex; it was simply a reality as unavoidable as the reality that in Philippine
society, a marriage is composed of a man, a woman and their children.-
—A suspect classification and the accompanying strict scrutiny standard cannot be solely based on the
circumstance that the law has the effect of being “gender-specific.” I believe that the classification in
the law was not immediately brought on by considerations of gender or sex; it was simply a reality as
unavoidable as the reality that in Philippine society, a marriage is composed of a man, a woman and
their children. An obvious reason, of course, why the classification did not solely depend on gender is
because the law also covers children, without regard to their sex or their sexual orientation.
13. Same; Same; Suspect Classification; In my view, a suspect classification and the accompanying
strict scrutiny should depend on the circumstances of the case, on the impact of the illegal differential
treatment on the group involved, on the needed protection and the impact of recognizing a suspect
classification on future classification. A suspect classification label cannot solely and automatically be
triggered by the circumstance that women and children are accorded special protection by the
Constitution. In fact, there is no place for a strict level of scrutiny when the Constitution itself has
recognized the need for special protection; where such recognition has been made, congressional
action should carry the presumption of validity.
14. Same; Same; I do not really see any indication that Congress actually intended to classify women
and children as a group against men, under the terms of R.A. No. 9262. Rather than a clear intent at
classification, the overriding intent of the law is indisputably to harmonize family relations and protect
the family as a basic social institution. After sifting through the comprehensive information gathered,
Congress found that domestic and other forms of violence against women and children impedes the
harmony of the family and the personal growth and development of family members. In the process,
Congress found that these types of violence must pointedly be addressed as they are more commonly
experienced by women and children due to the unequal power relations of men and women in our
society; Congress had removed these types of violence as they are impediments that block the
harmonious development that it envisions for the family, of which men are important component
members.
15. Same; Equal Protection of the Law; Suspect Classification; Words and Phrases;When the court
uses a strict standard for review to evaluate the constitutionality of a law, it proceeds from the premise
that the law established a “suspect classification.” A suspect classification is one where distinctions
are made based on the most invidious bases for classification that violate the most basic human rights,
i.e., on the basis of race, national origin, alien status, religious affiliation and, to a certain extent, sex
and sexual orientation. With a suspect classification, the most stringent scrutiny of the classification is
applied: the ordinary presumption of constitutionality is reversed and the government carries the
burden of proving the statute’s constitutionality. This approach is unlike the lowest level of scrutiny
(reasonableness test) that the Court has applied in the past where the classification is scrutinized and
constitutionally upheld if found to be germane to the purpose of the law. Under a reasonableness test,
there is a presumption of constitutionality and that the laws enacted by Congress are presumed to fall
within its constitutional powers.
16. Constitutional Law; Reasonableness Test; View that the reasonableness test has been consistently
applied to allow the courts to uphold State action as long as the action is found to be germane to the
purpose of the law, in this case to support the unity and development of the family.-
—My serious reservation on the use of an expanded equal protection clause and in applying a strict
scrutiny standard is, among others, based on lack of necessity; we do not need these measures when we
can fully examine R.A. No. 9262’s constitutionality using the reasonableness test. The family is a unit,
in fact a very basic one, and it cannot operate on an uneven standard where measures beyond what is
necessary are extended to women and children as against the man—the head of the family and the
family provider. The use of an expanded equal protection clause only stresses the concept of an uneven
equality that cannot long stand in a unit living at close quarters in a situation of mutual dependency on
104
one another. The reasonableness test, on the other hand, has been consistently applied to allow the
courts to uphold State action as long as the action is found to be germane to the purpose of the law, in
this case to support the unity and development of the family. If we are to deviate from or to modify this
established standard of scrutiny, we must do so carefully and for strong justifiable reasons.
17. Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; View that Congress found that domestic
and other forms of violence against women and children contribute to the failure to unify and strengthen
family ties, thereby impeding the State’s mandate to actively promote the family’s total development.-
—From the terms of the law, I find it plain that Congress enacted R.A. No. 9262 as a measure intended
to strengthen the family. Congress found that domestic and other forms of violence against women and
children contribute to the failure to unify and strengthen family ties, thereby impeding the State’s
mandate to actively promote the family’s total development. Congress also found, as a reality, that
women and children are more susceptible to domestic and other forms of violence due to, among others,
the pervasive bias and prejudice against women and the stereotyping of roles within the family
environment that traditionally exist in Philippine society. On this basis, Congress found it necessary to
recognize the substantial distinction within the family between men, on the one hand, and women and
children, on the other hand. This recognition, incidentally, is not the first to be made in the laws as our
law on persons and family under the Civil Code also recognize, in various ways, the distinctions
between men and women in the context of the family.
18. Same; View that in the case of a Barangay Protection Order, it is a mere provisional remedy
under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need of the victims for instant
protection; Under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the issuance of a Barangay
Protection Order or the pendency of an application for a Barangay Protection Order shall not preclude
the victim from applying for, or the court from granting, a Temporary Protection Order or Permanent
Protection Order.-
—While judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary, it may be conceded that the legislature may
confer on administrative boards or bodies, or even particular government officials, quasi-judicial
power involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of
administrative functions. But in so doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that
would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid,
only to those incidental to or in connection with the performance of administrative duties, which do not
amount to conferment of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts. In the case of a
BPO, it is a mere provisional remedy under Republic Act No. 9262, meant to address the pressing need
of the victims for instant protection. However, it does not take the place of appropriate judicial
proceedings and remedies that provide a more effective and comprehensive protection to the victim. In
fact, under the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9262, the issuance of a BPO or the pendency
of an application for a BPO shall not preclude the victim from applying for, or the court from granting,
a TPO or PPO. Where a TPO has already been granted by any court, the barangay official may no
longer issue a BPO. The same Implementing Rules also require that within twenty-four (24) hours after
the issuance of a BPO, the barangay official shall assist the victim in filing an application for a TPO
or PPO with the nearest court in the victim’s place of residence. If there is no Family Court or RTC,
the application may be filed in the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court or the
Metropolitan Trial Court.
19. Barangay Protection Order (BPO); Words and Phrases; View that a Barangay Protection Order
(BPO) refers to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay, or in his absence the Barangay
Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts of violence against the family or
household members particularly women and their children.-
—A Barangay Protection Order (BPO) refers to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay,
or in his absence the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts of
violence against the family or household members particularly women and their children. The authority
of barangay officials to issue a BPO is conferred under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9262: SEC. 14.
Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How.—Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs)
refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications
for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
105
determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the
application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the
BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the
Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time for the issuance of the BPO.
BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the
Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent,
or direct any barangay official to effect is personal service. The parties may be accompanied by a non-
lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
20. Same; Same; Police Power; View that Republic Act No. 9262 and its implementing regulations
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power of the State to protect
the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in this case, a particular sector
thereof), as well as the protection of human life, commonly designated as the police power.-
—The ex parte issuance of the TPO does not make it unconstitutional. Procedural due process refers
to the method or manner by which the law is enforced. It consists of the two basic rights of notice and
hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal. However, it
is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests like those involved herein. Republic Act No. 9262 and its
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign
power of the State to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public (in this
case, a particular sector thereof), as well as the protection of human life, commonly designated as the
police power.
21. Violence Against Women and Children; Temporary Protection Order; View that a protection
order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence
against a woman or her child.-
—A protection order is issued under Republic Act No. 9262 for the purpose of preventing further acts
of violence against a woman or her child. The circumstances surrounding the availment thereof are
often attended by urgency; thus, women and child victims must have immediate and uncomplicated
access to the same.
22. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that the equal protection clause in our
Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against classification.-
—The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under Republic Act No. 9262 is justified
to put them on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the
equality of women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed
differences between men and women. Republic Act No. 9262, by affording special and exclusive
protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves
the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights, insuring gender equality, and
empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special remedies prescribed by said law
in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially necessary, to achieve such
objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier judicial scrutiny. The
gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection clause embodied
in the 1987 Constitution.
23. Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A. No. 9262); In furtherance of the
governmental objectives, especially that of protecting human rights, violence against women and
children under this Act has been classified as a public offense, making its prosecution independent of
the victim’s initial participation. Verily, the classification made in Republic Act No. 9262 is
substantially related to the important governmental objectives of valuing every person’s dignity,
respecting human rights, safeguarding family life, protecting children, promoting gender equality, and
empowering women.
24. Temporary Protection Order (TPO); View that the law permits the issuance of protection orders
and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims, even without a hearing; Despite the ex parte
issuance of these protection orders, the temporary nature of these remedies allow them to be availed of
by the victim without violating the offender’s right to due process as it is only when a full-blown hearing
has been done that a permanent protection order may be issued.-
106
—The law takes into account the pervasive vulnerability of women and children, and the seriousness
and urgency of the situation, which, in the language of the law result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Hence, the law permits the issuance
of protection orders and the granting of certain reliefs to women victims, even without a hearing. The
law has granted authority for barangay officials to issue a protection order against the offender, based
on the victim’s application. The RTC may likewise grant an application for a temporary protection
order (TPO) and provide other reliefs, also on the mere basis of the application. Despite the ex parte
issuance of these protection orders, the temporary nature of these remedies allow them to be availed of
by the victim without violating the offender’s right to due process as it is only when a full-blown hearing
has been done that a permanent protection order may be issued. Thus, these remedies are suitable,
reasonable, and justified. More importantly, they serve the objectives of the law by providing the victims
necessary immediate protection from the violence they perceive as threats to their personal safety and
security. This translates to the fulfillment of other governmental objectives as well. By assuring the
victims instant relief from their situation, they are consequently empowered and restored to a place of
dignity and equality. Such is embodied in the purpose to be served by a protection order.
25. Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children (R.A. No. 9262); Preventing violence
against women and children through their availment of special legal remedies, serves the governmental
objectives of protecting the dignity and human rights of every person, preserving the sanctity of family
life, and promoting gender equality and empowering women. Although there exists other laws on
violence against women in the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9262 deals with the problem of violence
within the family and intimate relationships, which deserves special attention because it occurs in
situations or places where women and children should feel most safe and secure but are actually not.
The law provides the widest range of reliefs for women and children who are victims of violence, which
are often reported to have been committed not by strangers, but by a father or a husband or a person
with whom the victim has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Aside from filing a criminal case in
court, the law provides potent legal remedies to the victims that theretofore were not available. The law
recognizes, with valid factual support based on statistics that women and children are the most
vulnerable victims of violence, and therefore need legal intervention. On the other hand, there is a
dearth of empirical basis to anchor a conclusion that men need legal protection from violence
perpetuated by women.
26. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; Gender-Based Violence; As one of the country’s
pervasive social problems, violence against women is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal
power relationship between women and men and is otherwise known as “gender-based violence.”-
—As one of the country’s pervasive social problems, violence against women is deemed to be closely
linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men and is otherwise known as
“gender-based violence.” Violent acts towards women has been the subject of an examination on a
historic world-wide perspective. The exhaustive study of a foreign history professor noted that “[f]rom
the earliest civilizations on, the subjugation of women, in the form of violence, were facts of life,” as
three great bodies of thought, namely: Judeo-Christian religious ideas; Greek philosophy; and the
Common Law Legal Code, which have influenced western society’s views and treatment of women, all
“assumed patriarchy as natural; that is, male domination stemming from the view of male superiority.”
It cited 18th century legal expert William Blackstone, who explained that the common law doctrine of
coverture reflected the theological assumption that husband and wife were ‘one body’ before God; thus
“they were ‘one person’ under the law, and that one person was the husband,” a concept that evidently
found its way in some of our Civil Code provisions prior to the enactment of the Family Code.
27. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW);Republic Act No. 9262; View that Republic Act No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the
Philippines’ compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), which is committed to condemn discrimination against women and directs its
members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate means to eliminate discrimination against women
in all forms both in law and in practice.-
—It has been acknowledged that “gender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously
inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.” Republic Act
107
No. 9262 can be viewed therefore as the Philippines’ compliance with the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which is committed to condemn
discrimination against women and directs its members to undertake, without delay, all appropriate
means to eliminate discrimination against women in all forms both in law and in practice. Known as
the International Bill of Rights of Women, the CEDAW is the central and most comprehensive document
for the advancement of the welfare of women. It brings the women into the focus of human rights
concerns, and its spirit is rooted in the goals of the UN: to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women. The CEDAW, in
its preamble, explicitly acknowledges the existence of extensive discrimination against women, and
emphasized that such is a violation of the principles of equality of rights and respect for human dignity.
28. Same; Same; View that the Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates the purpose
of the said law, which is to fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights
of women and children by providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical,
psychological, and other forms of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim.-
—The Declaration of Policy in Republic Act No. 9262 enunciates the purpose of the said law, which is
to fulfill the government’s obligation to safeguard the dignity and human rights of women and children
by providing effective remedies against domestic violence or physical, psychological, and other forms
of abuse perpetuated by the husband, partner, or father of the victim. The said law is also viewed within
the context of the constitutional mandate to ensure gender equality, which is quoted as follows: Section
14. The State recognizes the role of women in nationbuilding, and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men.
29. Same; Same; View that by constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that
human rights and fundamental freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone.-
—By constitutional mandate, the Philippines is committed to ensure that human rights and fundamental
freedoms are fully enjoyed by everyone. It was one of the countries that voted in favor of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was a mere two years after it gained independence from
the United States of America. In addition, the Philippines is a signatory to many United Nations human
rights treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
among others.
30. Same; Same; View that in the context of the constitutional policy to “ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men” the level of scrutiny applicable, to test whether or not the
classification in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause, is the middle-tier scrutiny
or the intermediate standard of judicial review.-
—Since statutory remedies accorded to women are not made available to men, when the reality is that
there are men, regardless of their number, who are also suffering from domestic violence, the rational
basis test may be too wide and liberal to justify the statutory classification which in effect allows
different treatment of men who are similarly situated. In the context of the constitutional policy to
“ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men” the level of scrutiny applicable,
to test whether or not the classification in Republic Act No. 9262 violates the equal protection clause,
is the middle-tier scrutiny or the intermediate standard of judicial review. To survive intermediate
review, the classification in the challenged law must (1) serve important governmental objectives, and
(2) be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.
31. Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Law; View that recent Philippine jurisprudence has
recognized the need to apply different standards of scrutiny in testing the constitutionality of
classifications.-
—Recent Philippine jurisprudence has recognized the need to apply different standards of scrutiny in
testing the constitutionality of classifications. In British American Tobacco v. Camacho, 585 SCRA 36
(2009), this Court held that since the case therein neither involved a suspect classification nor impinged
on a fundamental right, then “the rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality
of the assailed law in the face of an equal protection challenge.”
32. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; View that when public interest requires the resolution of the
constitutional issue raised, and in keeping with the Supreme Court’s duty of determining whether other
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agencies or even co-equal branches of government have remained within the limits of the Constitution
and have not abused the discretion given them, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure
and resolve the constitutional issue.-
—Notwithstanding my position that the Court of Appeals properly dismissed the Petition for Prohibition
because of petitioner’s failure to raise the issue of constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 at the
earliest opportunity, I concur that the Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, should still pass
upon the said issue in the present Petition. Notable is the fact that not only the petitioner, but the private
respondent as well, pray that the Court resolve the constitutional issue considering its novelty and
paramount importance. Indeed, when public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issue
raised, and in keeping with this Court’s duty of determining whether other agencies or even co-equal
branches of government have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the
discretion given them, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve the
constitutional issue.
33. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Multiplicity of Suits; View that the filing of a separate action
before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the issues of constitutionality and propriety of
issuing a protection order raised by petitioner are inextricably intertwined.-
—The filing of a separate action before the Court of Appeals or the RTC for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 would result to multiplicity of suits. It is clear that the
issues of constitutionality and propriety of issuing a protection order raised by petitioner are
inextricably intertwined. Another court, whether it is an appellate court or a trial court, cannot resolve
the constitutionality question in the separate action without affecting the petition for the issuance of a
TPO. Bringing a separate action for the resolution of the issue of constitutionality will result in an
unresolved prejudicial question to the validity of issuing a protection order. If the proceedings for the
protection order is not suspended, it does create the danger of having inconsistent and conflicting
judgments between the two separate courts, whether of the same or different levels in the judicial
hierarchy. These two judgments would eventually be the subject of separate motions for
reconsideration, separate appeals, and separate petitions for review before this Court – the exact
scenario the policy against multiplicity of suits is avoiding. As we previously held, “the law and the
courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of actions.”
34. Statutes; View that the challenge to the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the earliest
opportunity.-
—The challenge to the constitutionality of the law must be raised at the earliest opportunity. In
Dasmariñas Water District v. Monterey Foods Corporation, 565 SCRA 624 (2008), we said: A law is
deemed valid unless declared null and void by a competent court; more so when the issue has not been
duly pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity. x x x. The settled rule is that courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it. (Citation omitted.) This Court held that such opportunity is in
the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve it, such that “if it is not raised in the pleadings,
it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on
appeal.” The decision upon the constitutional question is necessary to determine whether the TPO
should be issued against petitioner. Such question should have been raised at the earliest opportunity
as an affirmative defense in the Opposition filed with the RTC handling the protection order
proceedings, which was the competent court to pass upon the constitutional issue.
35. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that an action questioning the constitutionality of the law
cannot be filed separately even with another branch of the RTC. This is not technically feasible because
there will be no justiciable controversy or an independent cause of action that can be the subject of
such separate action if it were not for the issuance of the Temporary Protection Order against the
petitioner.-
—For all intents and purposes, the Petition for Prohibition filed before the Court of Appeals was
precipitated by and was ultimately directed against the issuance of the TPO, an interlocutory order,
which under Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC is a prohibited pleading. An action questioning the
constitutionality of the law also cannot be filed separately even with another branch of the RTC. This
is not technically feasible because there will be no justiciable controversy or an independent cause of
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action that can be the subject of such separate action if it were not for the issuance of the TPO against
the petitioner. Thus, the controversy, subject of a separate action, whether before the Court of Appeals
or the RTC, would still have to be the issuance of the TPO, which is the subject of another case in the
RTC.
36. Same; Same; Same; Same; Temporary Protection Order; View that the alleged unconstitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the trial court from granting the petition
for protection order against the petitioner.-
—The alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 is a matter that would have prevented the
trial court from granting the petition for protection order against the petitioner. Thus, petitioner should
have raised it in his Opposition as a defense against the issuance of a protection order against him.
37. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; View that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction to decide issues of
constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can be resolved in a
summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule that the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not be considered on appeal.-
—I agree with Justice Bernabe that the RTC, designated as a Family Court, is vested with jurisdiction
to decide issues of constitutionality of a law, and that the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 can
be resolved in a summary proceeding, in accordance with the rule that the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity, otherwise it may not be considered on appeal. Section 20 of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Republic Act No. 9262 provides: Sec. 20. Opposition to Petition.—
(a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued. (b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject
thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
38. Statutes; Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach or a
clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated
in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.-
—Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach or a clear
conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in
such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262,
which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394 (2001), courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with
full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of
the majority.
39. Same; Same; Barangay Protection Order (BPO); The Barangay Protection Order issued by the
Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening
to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws
and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.”-
—Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. On the other hand, executive power “is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance.” As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued
by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening
to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to “enforce all laws
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and ordinances,” and to “maintain public order in the barangay.” We have held that “(t)he mere fact
that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law
thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect
private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.”
40. Same; Same; Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the Violence
Against Women and Children case or any issue thereof to a mediator.-
—Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof
to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311
of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: This section prohibits a court from
ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a
process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement
about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves
parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation
of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently
unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order has been sought.
41. Same; Same; Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent’s
residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such
removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated.-
—Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the
residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a “blank check” issued to
the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home. The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does
not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states: SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the
offended party.—The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs: x x x x (c)
Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or
permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from
the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the residence;
x x x x Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent’s residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and
exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
42. Same; Same; The respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges
imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side; “To be heard” does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.-
—It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear
of petitioner of being “stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened” is a mere product of an
overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. “To be heard” does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.
43. Same; Same; Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or
dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of Violence Against Women and Children may
already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.-
—The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the time
in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the
hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts
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could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural
due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is protection
of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. It should be
pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service.
Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served immediately on
the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service
on the respondent. Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate
issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition
within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.
44. Remedial Law; Temporary Protection Order; Words and Phrases; A protection order is an order
issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household
members, and to grant other necessary reliefs; The rules require that petitions for protection order be
in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil,
for every allegation therein.-
—A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. “The scope of reliefs in protection
orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary
to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of
violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household member safety in the family
residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and
support of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect
the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
support.” The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
“time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,” the court is authorized
to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the
victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the
victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about
to recur.
45. Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Children; Conspiracy; While the law provides that
the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).-
—VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word “person” who has or had a sexual or
dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law
provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a
sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 567 SCRA 231 (2008), the
parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case
filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan’s husband) had community of
design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and
pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally,
mentally and physically.
46. Statutes; An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions.-
—There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner
in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between
the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor
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differ in its application. Yet, petitioner insists that phrases like “depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her child of a legal right,” “solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties,”
“marital infidelity,” and “causing mental or emotional anguish” are so vague that they make every
quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the “vagueness” doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity,
is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be
held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions.
47. Same; Same; The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their
children are threatened by violence and abuse.-
—The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to
future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and their children are
threatened by violence and abuse. R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer
violence and abuse.
48. Same; Same; The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262,
which is to address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
Policy.-
—The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the
family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security. Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against
women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and
the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international
human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
49. Same; Same; The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by
biases and prejudices against women.-
—The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men. Petitioner’s contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262
is discriminatory and that it is an “anti-male,” “husband-bashing,” and “hate-men” law deserves
scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate
measures “to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the
idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women.” Justice Puno correctly pointed out that “(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of
domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct
mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges.”
50. Same; Same; Gender-Based Violence; According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the
National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment), violence against women (VAW)
is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise
known as “gender-based violence.”-
—According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality
and Women’s Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the
unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as “gender-based violence.”
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take
on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men’s companions and supporters, and take
on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With
power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men’s expression of
controlling women to retain power.
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51. Same; Same; The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against
women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law.-
—The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than
men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make
for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states,
“the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality.”
52. Same; Equal Protection of the Laws; Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.-
—Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case
of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974), is instructive: The guaranty of
equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens
of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation
of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according
to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution
does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same.
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within
which it is to operate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without
saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that
is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally
to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
53. Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice,
policy, or expediency of a statute; By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.-
—It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute.
Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting
the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper
challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it
is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even
then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and
expediency of any law. We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none
was sufficiently shown in this case.
54. Same; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); It bears stressing
that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of
violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
Violence Against Women and Children.-
—As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its enforcement,
with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant
to have the same enjoined. In Younger v. Harris, Jr., 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court of the
United States declared, thus: Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety
or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course,
even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from
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prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even
though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which
exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.
(Citations omitted) The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court
hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex
parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against
such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
55. Same; Temporary Protection Order (TPO); If a temporary protection order issued is due to expire,
the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until final
judgment is rendered.-
—To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary,
Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to
expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until
final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order
as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running
afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
56. Same; Evidence; Constitutional Law; The question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is
one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.-
—That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a
statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.
57. Same; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; The unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of
action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.-
—We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and
third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party. A crossclaim, on the other hand, is any claim by
one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either
of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. As pointed out by Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that could
be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited
from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
58. Same; Violence Against Women and Children; Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on
Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.-
—Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays
down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an
answer. Thus: SEC. 20. Opposition to petition.—(a) The respondent may file an opposition to the
petition which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued; (b) Respondent shall
not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of
action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.
59. Same; Same; Same; Regional Trial Courts; It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of
their conformity to the fundamental law.”-
—Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority
as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that
RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this authority being embraced in
the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
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criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.” The Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA, 3 SCRA 696 (1961), that, “[p]lainly
the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior
courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.”
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116
91. Inter-Orient Maritime, Incorporated vs. Candava, 700 SCRA 174, June 26, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Seafarers|Work-related Illness
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117
92. Abulencia vs. Hermosisima, 699 SCRA 576, June 26, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court Personnel|Simple Misconduct|Penalties|Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS)
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93. De Los Santos-Dio vs. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 614, June 26, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal Procedure|Probable Cause|Determination of probable cause
may be either executive or judicial
1. Same; Same; Once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his
primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if
he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts
the existence of probable cause.―In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor’s
authority, it must be stressed that the judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases
when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause-
— that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably
negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record
shows that, more likely than not, the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to
trial. In doubtful cases, however, the appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation
of additional evidence. In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge
proceeds with his primordial task of evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a
warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in
case he doubts the existence of probable cause.
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94. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 700 SCRA 322, July 01, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Courts|Supreme Court|Appeals
1. Taxation; Excise Taxes;—Under Section 129 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as
amended, excise taxes are imposed on two (2) kinds of goods, namely: (a) goods manufactured or
produced in the Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any other disposition; and (b)
things imported. With respect to the first kind of goods, Section 130 of the NIRC states that, unless
otherwise specifically allowed, the taxpayer obligated to file the return and pay the excise taxes due
thereon is the manufacturer/producer. On the other hand, with respect to the second kind of goods,
Section 131 of the NIRC states that the taxpayer obligated to file the return and pay the excise taxes
due thereon is the owner or importer, unless the imported articles are exempt from excise taxes and the
person found to be in possession of the same is other than those legally entitled to such tax exemption.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Supreme Court; Appeals; It is hornbook principle that the
Court is not a trier of facts and often, remands cases to the lower courts for the determination of
questions of such character. However, when the trial court had already received all the evidence of the
parties, the Court may resolve the case on the merits instead of remanding them in the interest of
expediency and to better serve the ends of justice.
3. Same; Same; Tax Exemptions;—PAL’s payment of either the basic corporate income tax or
franchise tax, whichever is lower, shall be in lieu of all other taxes, duties, royalties, registration,
license, and other fees and charges, except only real property tax. The phrase “in lieu of all other taxes”
includes but is not limited to taxes that are “directly due from or imposable upon the purchaser or the
seller, producer, manufacturer, or importer of said petroleum products but are billed or passed on the
grantee either as part of the price or cost thereof or by mutual agreement or other arrangement.” In
other words, in view of PAL’s payment of either the basic corporate income tax or franchise tax,
whichever is lower, PAL is exempt from paying: (a) taxes directly due from or imposable upon it as the
purchaser of the subject petroleum products; and (b) the cost of the taxes billed or passed on to it by
the seller, producer, manufacturer, or importer of the said products either as part of the purchase price
or by mutual agreement or other arrangement. Therefore, given the foregoing direct and indirect tax
exemptions under its franchise, and applying the principles as above-discussed, PAL is endowed with
the legal standing to file the subject tax refund claim, notwithstanding the fact that it is not the statutory
taxpayer as contemplated by law.
4. Same; Same; It may be observed that the propriety of a tax refund claim is hinged on the kind of
exemption which forms its basis. If the law confers an exemption from both direct or indirect taxes, a
claimant is entitled to a tax refund even if it only bears the economic burden of the applicable tax. On
the other hand, if the exemption conferred only applies to direct taxes, then the statutory taxpayer is
regarded as the proper party to file the refund claim.
5. Same; Tax Refunds; Section 204(c) of the NIRC states that it is the statutory taxpayer which has the
legal personality to file a claim for refund. Accordingly, in cases involving excise tax exemptions on
petroleum products under Section 135 of the NIRC, the Court has consistently held that it is the statutory
taxpayer who is entitled to claim a tax refund based thereon and not the party who merely bears its
economic burden.
6. Same; Indirect Taxes; Jurisprudence states that indirect taxes are those which are demanded in the
first instance from one person with the expectation and intention that he can shift the economic burden
to someone else. In this regard, the statutory taxpayer can transfer to its customers the value of the
excise taxes it paid or would be liable to pay to the government by treating it as part of the cost of the
goods and tacking it on to the selling price. Notably, this shifting process, otherwise known as “passing
on,” is largely a contractual affair between the parties. Meaning, even if the purchaser effectively pays
the value of the tax, the manufacturer/producer (in case of goods manufactured or produced in the
Philippines for domestic sales or consumption or for any other disposition) or the owner or importer
(in case of imported goods) are still regarded as the statutory taxpayers under the law. To this end, the
purchaser does not really pay the tax; rather, he only pays the seller more for the goods because of the
latter’s obligation to the government as the statutory taxpayer.
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95. Lim, Jr. vs. Lazaro, 700 SCRA 547, July 03, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Provisional Remedies|Attachment|Preliminary Attachment
1. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Attachment; Preliminary Attachment; By its nature,
preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary remedy applied
for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected
to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action.-
—By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court (Rule 57), is an ancillary
remedy applied for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought
and expected to be granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to
the main action. As such, it is available during its pendency which may be resorted to by a litigant to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the interim, awaiting the ultimate effects of a
final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction
over the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or
substituted service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected.
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96. Caranza Vda. de Saldivar vs. Cabanes, Jr., 700 SCRA 734, July 08, 2013
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics|Gross Negligence|Penalties
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122
97. PNOC-Energy Development Corporation vs. Estrella, 700 SCRA 767, July 08, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Evidence|Substantial Evidence
1. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Not every form of misconduct can
be considered as a just cause for termination. The law explicitly qualifies that the misconduct must be
both serious and made in connection with the employee’s work.―Fundamental is the rule that an
employee can be dismissed from employment only for a valid cause. Serious misconduct is one of the
just causes for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code, which reads in part: ART. 282.
Termination By Employer.-
—An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct
or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work; x x x x Thus, not every form of misconduct can be considered as a just cause
for termination. The law explicitly qualifies that the misconduct must be both serious and made in
connection with the employee’s work. As clarified in Cosmos Bottling Corp. v. Fermin, 674 SCRA 310
(2012): Misconduct involves “the transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error
in judgment.” For misconduct to be serious and therefore a valid ground for dismissal, it must be (1)
of grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant and (2) connected with the
work of the employee.
2. Same; Same; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; The employer bears the burden of proving, through
substantial evidence, that the aforesaid just cause ― or any other valid cause for that matter―forms
the basis of the employee’s dismissal from work.―It is well to stress that the employer bears the burden
of proving, through substantial evidence, that the aforesaid just cause-
— or any other valid cause for that matter — forms the basis of the employee’s dismissal from work.
Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.
As long as this evidentiary threshold is met, the dismissal of the employee should, as a general rule, be
upheld.
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98. Heirs of Magdaleno Ypon vs. Ricaforte, 700 SCRA 778, July 08, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Law|Succession
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99. Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 701 SCRA 188, July 15, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal Procedure|Judgments
1. Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; A person’s right to the speedy disposition
of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This
constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.-
—A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) which provides: SEC. 16. All persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties
in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-
judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action to all officials who are
tasked with the administration of justice.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides
that an acquittal in a criminal case does not bar the private offended party from pursuing a subsequent
civil case based on the delict, unless the judgment of acquittal explicitly declares that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. As explained in the case of Abejuela v. People, 200
SCRA 806 (1991), citing Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325 (1987): The Rules provide: “The extinction
of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases,
the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by
law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for
the damage suffered.” x x x x In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325 (1987), we declared: “While an
act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can
readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone
to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law.”
3. Same; Same; Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely hinged
towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice but also to prevent the
oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time.
Akin to the right to speedy trial, its “salutary objective” is to assure that an innocent person may be
free from the anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate
defense he may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the
passage of time should be weighed against the State and in favor of the individual.
4. Same; Same;—It must be noted, that the right to speedy disposition of cases should be understood
to be a relative or flexible concept such that a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would
not be sufficient. Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only when the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Hence, in the determination of whether the
defendant has been denied his right to a speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be
considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
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100. Martinez vs. Central Pangasinan Coorperatuin, 701 SCRA 205, July 15, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Loss of Trust and Confidence
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126
101. Philippine Tourism Authority vs. Sabandal-Herzenstiel, 701 SCRA 517, July 17, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Action|Forcible Entry
1. Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Forcible Entry; —In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff
must prove that he was in prior possession of the disputed property and that the defendant deprived him
of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules, namely: force,
intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth. In this case, respondents failed to establish their prior and
continued possession of the subject property after its sale in favor of petitioner in 1981. On the contrary,
they even admitted in their answer to the complaint that petitioner exercised dominion over the same
by instituting caretakers and leasing portions thereof to third persons. Suffice it to state that possession
in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground
before he is deemed in possession. Thus, finding petitioner’s assertion to be well-founded, the MCTC
properly adjudged petitioner to have prior possession over the subject property as against Sabandal-
Herzenstiel, who never claimed ownership or possession thereof.
2. Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the exclusion
of the lawful possessor-
— as petitioner had sufficiently demonstrated — would necessarily imply the use of force.—Petitioner’s
supposed failure to describe in detail the manner of respondents’ entry into the subject property is
inconsequential. Jurisprudence states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the exclusion of the
lawful possessor — as petitioner had sufficiently demonstrated — would necessarily imply the use of
force. As held in Estel v. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr., 663 SCRA 17 (2012): x x x Unlawfully entering
the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use of
force and this is all that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to
institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. In the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that
respondents sufficiently alleged that the possession of the subject property was wrested from them
through violence and force.
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102. Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz, 701 SCRA 682, July 23, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Certification Against Forum Shopping; The
prohibition against forum shopping is different from a violation of the certification requirement under
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.-
—At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the prohibition against forum shopping is different from
a violation of the certification requirement under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. In Sps. Ong
v. CA, 384 SCRA 139 (2002), the Court explained that: x x x The distinction between the prohibition
against forum shopping and the certification requirement should by now be too elementary to be
misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from
and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the
treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition
against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing
them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice [to the filing] of the
complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for
summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt.
2. Same; Same; Same; Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the
same parties, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.-
—Forum shopping takes place when a litigant files multiple suits involving the same parties, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two (2) cases
is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
3. Same; Same; Same; Section 5(b), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that a plaintiff who files a
case should provide a complete statement of the present status of any pending case if the latter involves
the same issues as the one that was filed. If there is no such similar pending case, Section 5(a) of the
same rule provides that the plaintiff is obliged to declare under oath that to the best of his knowledge,
no such other action or claim is pending.
4. Labor Law; Probationary Employees; A probationary employee, like a regular employee, enjoys
security of tenure. However, in cases of probationary employment, aside from just or authorized causes
of termination, an additional ground is provided under Article 295 of the Labor Code, i.e., the
probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of
the engagement. Thus, the services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may
be terminated for any of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause; and (c) when he fails to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer.
5. Same; Same; Section 6(d), Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provides
that if the employer fails to inform the probationary employee of the reasonable standards upon which
the regularization would be based on at the time of the engagement, then the said employee shall be
deemed a regular employee, viz.: (d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make
known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at the time of
his engagement. Where no standards are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed
a regular employee. In other words, the employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements when
dealing with a probationary employee: first, the employer must communicate the regularization
standards to the probationary employee; and second, the employer must make such communication at
the time of the probationary employee’s engagement. If the employer fails to comply with either, the
employee is deemed as a regular and not a probationary employee.
6. Same; Same; An employer is deemed to have made known the standards that would qualify a
probationary employee to be a regular employee when it has exerted reasonable efforts to apprise the
employee of what he is expected to do or accomplish during the trial period of probation. This goes
without saying that the employee is sufficiently made aware of his probationary status as well as the
length of time of the probation. The exception to the foregoing is when the job is self-descriptive in
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nature, for instance, in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or messengers. Also, in Aberdeen Court, Inc.
v. Agustin, 456 SCRA 32 (2005), it has been held that the rule on notifying a probationary employee of
the standards of regularization should not be used to exculpate an employee who acts in a manner
contrary to basic knowledge and common sense in regard to which there is no need to spell out a policy
or standard to be met. In the same light, an employee’s failure to perform the duties and responsibilities
which have been clearly made known to him constitutes a justifiable basis for a probationary
employee’s nonregularization.
7. Same; Same; Verily, basic knowledge and common sense dictate that the adequate performance of
one’s duties is, by and of itself, an inherent and implied standard for a probationary employee to be
regularized; such is a regularization standard which need not be literally spelled out or mapped into
technical indicators in every case. In this regard, it must be observed that the assessment of adequate
duty performance is in the nature of a management prerogative which when reasonably exercised — as
Abbott did in this case — should be respected. This is especially true of a managerial employee like
Alcaraz who was tasked with the vital responsibility of handling the personnel and important matters
of her department.
8. Same; Same; A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary employee; the usual
two-notice rule does not govern. Section 2, Rule I, Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code
states that “[i]f the termination is brought about by the x x x failure of an employee to meet the standards
of the employer in case of probationary employment, it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served
the employee, within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination.”
9. Same; Company Policy; A company policy partakes of the nature of an implied contract between the
employer and employee. In Parts Depot, Inc. v. Beiswenger, 170 S.W.3d 354 (Ky. 2005), it has been
held that: [E]mployer statements of policy . . . can give rise to contractual rights in employees without
evidence that the parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would create contractual rights in
the employee, and, hence, although the statement of policy is signed by neither party, can be unilaterally
amended by the employer without notice to the employee, and contains no reference to a specific
employee, his job description or compensation, and although no reference was made to the policy
statement in pre-employment interviews and the employee does not learn of its existence until after his
hiring. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892. The principle is akin to estoppel. Once an employer establishes
an express personnel policy and the employee continues to work while the policy remains in effect, the
policy is deemed an implied contract for so long as it remains in effect. If the employer unilaterally
changes the policy, the terms of the implied contract are also thereby changed.
10. Same; Termination of Employment; Nominal Damages; Case law has settled that an employer
who terminates an employee for a valid cause but does so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the
latter nominal damages. In Agabon v. NLRC (Agabon), 442 SCRA 573 (2004), the Court pronounced
that where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for
the violation of his statutory rights. Thus, in Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay the employee
nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
11. Same; Same; If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code (now
Article 296) but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed
upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act
imputable to the employee; if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 (now
Article 297) but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer
because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative.-
—It was explained that if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code
(now Article 296) but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be
imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act
imputable to the employee; if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 (now
Article 297) but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer
because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative.
Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was dismissed for an authorized cause of retrenchment — as
contradistinguished from the employee in Agabon who was dismissed for a just cause of neglect of duty
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— the Court ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal damages at the higher amount of
P50,000.00.
12. Corporation Law; Liability of Corporate Directors; Requisites to Hold Corporate Directors,
Trustees or Officers Personally Liable for Corporate Acts.-
—It is hornbook principle that personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers attaches
only when: (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when they are guilty of bad
faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in
damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (b) they consent to the issuance of
watered down stocks or when, having knowledge of such issuance, do not forthwith file with the
corporate secretary their written objection; (c) they agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily
liable with the corporation; or (d) they are made by specific provision of law personally answerable
for their corporate action.
13. Civil Law; Bad Faith; It is a well-settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed and he who alleges
bad faith has the onus of proving it.-
—A judicious perusal of the records show that other than her unfounded assertions on the matter, there
is no evidence to support the fact that the individual petitioners herein, in their capacity as Abbott’s
officers and employees, acted in bad faith or were motivated by ill will in terminating Alcaraz’s services.
The fact that Alcaraz was made to resign and not allowed to enter the workplace does not necessarily
indicate bad faith on Abbott’s part since a sufficient ground existed for the latter to actually proceed
with her termination. On the alleged loss of her personal belongings, records are bereft of any showing
that the same could be attributed to Abbott or any of its officers. It is a well-settled rule that bad faith
cannot be presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. All told, since Alcaraz
failed to prove any malicious act on the part of Abbott or any of its officers, the Court finds the award
of moral or exemplary damages unwarranted.
14. Labor Law; Appeals; View that a labor case finds its way into the judicial system from the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) whose decision is final and executory; A labor case
finds its way into the judicial system from the NLRC whose decision is final and executory. Finality
simply means that the NLRC ruling is no longer appealable; the legal intent is to confine adjudication
of labor cases to labor tribunals with the expertise in these cases and thereby bring the resolution of
the case to a close at the soonest possible time. When an administrative ruling (or any ruling for that
matter) is already final and unappealable, the only recourse open under the Rules of Court is through
a limited review on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65. This has been the mode of review followed
since the Labor Code took effect in November 1974; labor cases were directly brought to this Court but
only on jurisdictional grounds under Rule 65.
15. Same; Same; View that under Section 65 of the Rules of Court, the sole ground or issue allowed is
jurisdictional-
— the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in ruling on the case; whereas, a Rule 45 review the Supreme Court simply
determines whether the legal correctness of the Court of Appeal’s finding that the NLRC ruling of illegal
dismissal had basis in fact and in law.—Under the Rule 65 review by the CA, Montoya reiterates that
the sole ground or issue allowed is jurisdictional – the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC in ruling on the case. To state the obvious, this kind of review would have made
it easier for the CA to handle the case; in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion, it can dismiss
labor cases for lack of grave abuse of discretion as we do in this Court. From the CA, further recourse
is through a Rule 45 review by this Court on questions of law in accordance with prevailing rulings.
The office of a petition for review on certiorari is not to examine and settle factual questions already
ruled upon below. In this review, the Court simply determines whether the legal correctness of the CA’s
finding that the NLRC ruling of illegal dismissal had basis in fact and in law.
16. Same; Probationary Employees; While the respondent might have been hired as a probationary
employee, the petitioners’ evidence did not establish the employers’ compliance with the probationary
employment requirements under Article 281 of the Labor Code (as amended) and Section 6(d) of the
Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code (as amended). Thus, the respondent should
be considered a regular employee and the case should be reviewed on this basis. Article 281 of the
Labor Code, as amended, provides: ART. 281. Probationary employment.—Probationary employment
130
shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an
apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an employee who has been
engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a
regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the
employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary
period shall be considered a regular employee. [italics supplied; emphasis ours] Further, Section 6(d)
of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor Code, as amended, states: Sec. 6.
Probationary employment.—There is probationary employment where the employee, upon his
engagement, is made to undergo a trial period during which the employer determines his fitness to
qualify for regular employment, based on reasonable standards made known to him at the time of
engagement. [emphasis supplied]
17. Same; Same; View that a valid probationary employment requires the concurrence of two
requirements; Failing in one or both, the employee, even if initially hired as a probationary employee,
should be viewed and considered a regular employee.-
—A valid probationary employment requires the concurrence of two requirements. First, the employer
shall make known the reasonable standard (performance standard) whose compliance will render the
employee qualified to be a regular employee. Second, the employer shall inform the employee of the
applicable performance standard at the time of his/her engagement. Failing in one or both, the
employee, even if initially hired as a probationary employee, should be viewed and considered a regular
employee. The ponencia apparently fully agrees with the above statement of the applicable law as it
substantially recites the same requirements, including the consequence that upon failure to comply with
these same requirements, “the employee is deemed as a regular and not a probationary employee.” It
continues, however, with a twist that effectively negates what it has stated and admitted about the need
to communicate the regularization standards to the employee.
18. Same; Termination of Employment; View that to justify the dismissal of an employee, the employer
carries the burden of proving that the dismissal was for a just cause and with the observance of due
process prior to dismissal.-
—To justify the dismissal of an employee, the employer carries the burden of proving that the dismissal
was for a just cause and with the observance of due process prior to dismissal. The employer has to
discharge this burden by clear, accurate, consistent and convincing evidence; in case of doubt, the
presumption in the employee’s favor under Article 4 of the Labor Code should apply.
19. Same; Same; View that a probationary employee does not have lesser rights than a regular
employee under the Labor Code in terms of the just cause for the termination of an employment.-
—An important legal point that should not be lost in considering this case is that a probationary
employee does not have lesser rights than a regular employee under the Labor Code in terms of the just
cause for the termination of an employment. While the strict application of Article 282 of the Labor
Code may be relaxed because the employee is still under probation (so that analogous probationary
status rules may apply), the same essential just cause for dismissal must be present and must be proven.
In other words, probationary employment does not mean that the employee is under an “employment
at will” situation as that phrase is understood in American jurisprudence. To reiterate, the fact that the
respondent was still in her probationary period of employment did not lessen the burden of proof that
the law imposed on the petitioners to prove the just cause for her dismissal. Probationary employees
are protected by the security of tenure provision of the Constitution and they cannot be removed from
their position except only for cause.
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131
103. Province of Cagayan vs. Lara, 702 SCRA 183, July 24, 2013
Syllabi Class :Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)|Quarrying Operations
1. Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160); Quarrying Operations; Section 138(2) of RA 7160
requires that such entity must first secure a governor’s permit prior to the start of his quarrying
operations.―In order for an entity to legally undertake a quarrying business, he must first comply with
all the requirements imposed not only by the national government, but also by the local government
unit where his business is situated. Particularly, Section 138(2) of RA 7160 requires that such entity
must first secure a governor’s permit prior to the start of his quarrying operations, viz.: SECTION 138.
Tax on Sand, Gravel and Other Quarry Resources.-
—x x x. The permit to extract sand, gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the
provincial governor, pursuant to the ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan.
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132
104. Republic vs. De Asis, Jr.., 702 SCRA 258, July 24, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Reconstitution of Titles
1. Civil Law; Reconstitution of Titles; Reconstitution requires that (a) notice of the petition should
be published in two (2) successive issues of the Official Gazette; and (b) publication should be made
at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing.―At the outset, the Court notes that the present
amended petition for reconstitution is anchored on the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 8240-
— a source for reconstitution of title under Section 3(a) of RA 26 which, in turn, is governed by the
provisions of Section 10 in relation to Section 9 of RA 26 with respect to the publication, posting, and
notice requirements. Section 10 reads: SEC. 10. Nothing hereinbefore provided shall prevent any
registered owner or person in interest from filing the petition mentioned in section five of this Act
directly with the proper Court of First Instance, based on sources enumerated in sections 2(a), 2(b),
3(a), 3(b), and/or 4(a) of this Act: Provided, however, That the court shall cause a notice of the petition,
before hearing and granting the same, to be published in the manner stated in section nine hereof: And,
provided, further, That certificates of title reconstituted pursuant to this section shall not be subject to
the encumbrance referred to in section seven of this Act. Corollarily, Section 9 reads in part: SEC. 9. x
x x Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition to be published, at the expense of the
petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of
the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the land lies,
at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing, shall determine the petition and
render such judgment as justice and equity may require. x x x. The foregoing provisions, therefore,
clearly require that (a) notice of the petition should be published in two (2) successive issues of the
Official Gazette; and (b) publication should be made at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of
hearing. Substantial compliance with this jurisdictional requirement is not enough; it bears stressing
that the acquisition of jurisdiction over a reconstitution case is hinged on a strict compliance with the
requirements of the law.
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133
105. BPI vs. Sarabia Manor Hotel Corporation, 702 SCRA 432, July 29, 2013
Syllabi Class :Corporation Law|Corporate Rehabilitation
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134
106. Heirs of Alejandra Delfin vs. Rabadon, 702 SCRA 587, July 31, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Tax Declaration|Tax Receipts
1. Civil Law; Certificate of Title; As against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations and/or
tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered therein, an
original certificate of title, which indicates true and legal ownership by the registered owners over the
disputed premises, must prevail.-
—It is an elemental rule that a decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may
have existed prior to the decree of registration. By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and
title thereto quieted, subject only to certain exceptions under the property registration decree. In the
case of Ferrer-Lopez v. CA, 150 SCRA 393 (1987), the Court ruled that as against an array of proofs
consisting of tax declarations and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor
proof of the area covered therein, an original certificate of title, which indicates true and legal
ownership by the registered owners over the disputed premises, must prevail. Accordingly, respondents’
Decree No. 98992 for which an original certificate of title was issued should be accorded greater weight
as against the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners in this case.
2. Same; Tax Declaration; Tax Receipts; Tax declarations and tax receipts may only become the basis
of a claim for ownership when they are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property.-
—Tax declarations and tax receipts may only become the basis of a claim for ownership when they are
coupled with proof of actual possession of the property. In this case, records are bereft of any showing
that petitioners, or any of their predecessors-in-interest, have been in actual possession of the subject
property prior to 1989 as they claim. The tax declarations and tax receipts are insufficient to prove
their proffered theory that their predecessor-in-interest, Remegio, was the lawful possessor and owner
of the foregoing property even before the last World War. In fact, petitioners altogether failed to prove
the legitimacy of Remegio’s possession and ownership since they failed to present the pertinent deed of
sale or any other evidence of the latter’s title. On the contrary, aside from the LRA certification and
daybook entry which prove the existence of Decree No. 98992, respondents’ possession of the subject
property prior to petitioners’ entry in 1989 was attested to by one Marcelina Tabora who, as the CA
notes, appears to be an unbiased witness. All told, by sheer preponderance of evidence, respondents
have shown a better right to the ownership and possession of the subject property and hence, must be
awarded the same.
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135
107. Lihaylihay vs. People, 702 SCRA 755, July 31, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Appeals|Sandiganbayan
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Sandiganbayan; It bears pointing out that in appeals
from the Sandiganbayan, only questions of law and not questions of fact may be raised.-
—At the outset, it bears pointing out that in appeals from the Sandiganbayan, as in this case, only
questions of law and not questions of fact may be raised. Issues brought to the Court on whether the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whether the
presumption of innocence was sufficiently debunked, whether or not conspiracy was satisfactorily
established, or whether or not good faith was properly appreciated, are all, invariably, questions of
fact. Hence, absent any of the recognized exceptions to the above-mentioned rule, the Sandiganbayan’s
findings on the foregoing matters should be deemed as conclusive.
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136
108. Sec of the Dept of Finance vs. CTA Second Division), 703 SCRA 187, August 07, 2013
Syllabi Class :Grave Abuse of Discretion
1. Grave Abuse of Discretion; An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.-
—It is a standing jurisprudential rule that not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. An act of a court or tribunal can only
be considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In order to be qualified as
“grave,” the abuse of discretion must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in contemplation of law. Finding that this
characterization does not fit the CTA’s exercise of discretion in this case, the Court holds that no grave
abuse of discretion attended its grant of KCTMPC’s motion to release.
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137
109. Tan vs. Andrade, 703 SCRA 198, August 07, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Property Relations|Conjugal Properties
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; When the trial court’s
factual findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, said findings are generally conclusive and
binding upon the Supreme Court, and may no longer be reviewed on Rule 45 petitions.-
—Settled is the rule that when the trial court’s factual findings have been affirmed by the CA, said
findings are generally conclusive and binding upon the Court, and may no longer be reviewed on Rule
45 petitions. While there exists exceptions to this rule — such as when the CA’s and RTC’s findings are
in conflict with each other — the Court observes that none applies with respect to the ruling that the
subject transaction was one of sale and not an equitable mortgage. Records readily reveal that both the
RTC and the CA observed that there is no clear and convincing evidence to show that the parties agreed
upon a mortgage. Hence, absent any glaring error therein or any other compelling reason to hold
otherwise, this finding should now be deemed as conclusive and perforce must stand.
2. Civil Law; Property Relations; Conjugal Properties; All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.-
—Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code which states that “[a]ll
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” For this presumption to apply, the party invoking
the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during the
marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane, 489 SCRA 107 (2006): x x x As a condition sine qua non for the
operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption
must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. In other words, the presumption
in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical
and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses,
and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
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138
110. The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda and Aseoche vs. Fria, 703 SCRA 258, Aug. 7, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal Procedure|Jurisdiction|Grave Abuse of Discretion
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139
111.Delos Santos vs. Commission on Audit, 703 SCRA 501, August 13, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Evidence|Presumption of Regularity
1. Constitutional Law; Commission on Audit (COA); Check and Balance; The exercise of the
Commission on Audit’s general audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to
the check and balance system inherent in our form of government.-
—At the outset, it must be emphasized that the CoA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures
of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government’s, and ultimately the people’s, property. The exercise of its general audit power is among
the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our form of
government.
2. Same; Same; Judgments; It is the general policy of the Supreme Court to sustain the decisions of
administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created, such as the Commission on
Audit, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise
in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.-
—It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially
one which is constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of
separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.
Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision
and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of
discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning
its rulings. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism. In this case, the Court
finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CoA in issuing the assailed Decisions as will be
discussed below.
3. Same; Same; Public Officers; It is a standing rule that public officers who are custodians of
government funds shall be liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against
loss or damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in accordance with the
law and existing regulations, and on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary records.-
—It is a standing rule that public officers who are custodians of government funds shall be liable for
their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or damage, and that they are
expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in accordance with the law and existing regulations, and
on the basis of prescribed documents and necessary records. However, as pointed out by the SAT,
provisions of the National Budget Circular No. (NBC) 476 dated September 20, 2001 prescribing the
guidelines on the release of funds for a congressman’s PDAF authorized under Republic Act No. 8760
were not followed in the implementation of the TNT Program, as well as other existing auditing laws,
rules and regulations governing the procurement of medicines.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; Absent any showing of bad faith and malice,
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.-
—Jurisprudence holds that, absent any showing of bad faith and malice, there is a presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties. However, this presumption must fail in the presence of
an explicit rule that was violated. For instance, in Reyna v. CoA (Reyna), 642 SCRA 210 (2011), the
Court affirmed the liability of the public officers therein, notwithstanding their proffered claims of good
faith, since their actions violated an explicit rule in the Landbank of the Philippines’ Manual on Lending
Operations.
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140
112. J.R.A. Philippines, Inc. vs. CIR, 704 SCRA 94, August 28, 2013
Syllabi Class :Taxation|Tax Refunds|Tax Credit
1. Taxation; Tax Refunds; Tax Credit; Case law dictates that in a claim for tax refund or tax credit,
the applicant must prove not only entitlement to the claim but also compliance with all the documentary
and evidentiary requirements therefor.-
—Case law dictates that in a claim for tax refund or tax credit, the applicant must prove not only
entitlement to the claim but also compliance with all the documentary and evidentiary requirements
therefor. Section 110(A)(1) of the NIRC provides that creditable input taxes must be evidenced by a
VAT invoice or official receipt, which must, in turn, comply with Sections 237 and 238 of the same law,
as well as Section 4.108.1 of RR 7-95. The foregoing provisions require, inter alia, that an invoice must
reflect, as required by law: (a) the BIR Permit to Print; (b) the TIN-V of the purchaser; and (c) the
word “zero-rated” imprinted thereon. In this relation, failure to comply with the said invoicing
requirements provides sufficient ground to deny a claim for tax refund or tax credit.
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141
113. Yalong vs. People, 704 SCRA 195, August 28, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Criminal Procedure|Venue
1. Same; Criminal Procedure; Venue; The court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material
acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first
court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other.―It is well-settled that violation of BP 22
cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which means that the acts material and
essential thereto occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly,
the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains
jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. Applying these
principles, a criminal case for violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its
elements occurred-
— in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or dishonored.
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142
114. Castells vs. Saudi Arabian Airlines, 704 SCRA 206, August 28, 2013
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law|Certiorari|Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari
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143
115. B. Sta. Rita & Co., Inc. vs. Gueco, 704 SCRA 320, August 28, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Parties|Board of Directors
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144
116. Asian Constn and Devt Corp vs. Sumitomo Corp, 704 SCRA 332, August 28, 2013
Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees
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145
117. Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. vs. Pionilla, 704 SCRA 362, August 28, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Illegal Dismissals| Reinstatement |Backwages
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146
118. Sangguniang Barangay of Pangasugan, Baybay, Leyte vs. Exploration Permit Application
(EXTA-000005-VIII) of Philippine National Oil Company, 704 SCRA 446, September 02, 2013
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Judgments; Under the doctrine of
immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable,
and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land.-
—It is well-settled that under the doctrine of immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the
court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must
immediately be struck down. This doctrine has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business;
and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why
courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must
not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrine is not a mere technicality to be easily
brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as a time-honored principle of procedural law.
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147
119. First Gas Power Corp vs. Rep of the Philippines, 704 SCRA 453, September 02, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Judgments|Judicial Stability
1. Civil Law; Land Registration; It is a long-standing rule that an applicant who seeks to have a land
registered in his name has the burden of proving that he is its owner in fee simple, even though there is
no opposition thereto.-
—It is a long-standing rule that an applicant who seeks to have a land registered in his name has the
burden of proving that he is its owner in fee simple, even though there is no opposition thereto. As held
in Republic v. Lee, 197 SCRA 13 (1991): The most basic rule in land registration cases is that “no
person is entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he is the owner
in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposition presented against such registration by
third persons. x x x In order that the petitioner for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have
the same registered, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally, issued, the
burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Judicial Stability; The doctrine of judicial stability
states that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be interfered with by any court of
concurrent jurisdiction.-
—As amply addressed by the CA, the RTC’s Amended Order was issued in violation of the doctrine of
judicial stability. This doctrine states that the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction may not be
interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. The rationale for the same is founded on the
concept of jurisdiction — verily, a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment
therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial
officers acting in connection with this judgment. Therefore, as the RTC’s Amended Order was issued
in stark contravention of this rule, the CA correctly ordered its nullification.
3. Same; Same; Publication; Land registration proceedings are in rem in nature and, hence, by virtue
of the publication requirement, all claimants and occupants of the subject property are deemed to be
notified of the existence of a cadastral case involving the subject lots.-
—As the CA correctly pointed out, land registration proceedings are in rem in nature and, hence, by
virtue of the publication requirement, all claimants and occupants of the subject property are deemed
to be notified of the existence of a cadastral case involving the subject lots. In this regard, petitioner
cannot, therefore, take refuge on the lack of any personal knowledge on its part previous to its
application. Case law dictates that a cadastral proceeding is one in rem and binds the whole world.
Under this doctrine, parties are precluded from re-litigating the same issues already determined by
final judgment.
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148
120. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Tala Realty Services Corporation, 705 SCRA
208, September 09, 2013
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Judgments|Principle of Stare Decisis
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149
121. Cruz vs. Manila International Airport Authority, 705 SCRA 275, September 09, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Appeals
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150
122. Orola vs. Ramos, 705 SCRA 350, September 11, 2013
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics|Conflicting Interests|Code of Professional Responsibility
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Conflicting Interests; It is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from
representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not
they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases.-
—It is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those
of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally
unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste. It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
2. Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client.-
—It must be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that
occurred beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the
lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former
client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
3. Same; Same; Same; A lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the latter’s
opponent in the same case.-
—Respondent’s justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate
him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as enunciated in Hornilla,
provides an absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case.
In other words, a lawyer cannot change his representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in
the same case. That respondent’s previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was
only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the aforesaid rule holds
even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and
with no intention to represent conflicting interests.
4. Same; Same; Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Rule 15.04, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned before he
may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.-
—Rule 15.04, Canon 15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all
concerned before he may act as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably,
respondent failed in this respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in his duty to make a
full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio’s counsel to all the Heirs of Antonio —
particularly, Karen — and equally secure their express written consent before consummating the same.
Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any
of the parties to it. Accordingly, for respondent’s violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary sanction
is warranted.
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151
123. Unicapital, Inc. vs. Consing, Jr., 705 SCRA 511, September 11, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Consolidation of Cases
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Actions; Words and Phrases; A cause of action
is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the
existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.-
—A cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is
well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In
this relation, a complaint is said to sufficiently assert a cause of action if, admitting what appears solely
on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Thus, if the allegations
furnish adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, then the same should not be
dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.
2. Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground for a motion to
dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.-
—As edified in the case of Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, 524 SCRA 153 (2007), citing
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Limited v. Catalan (HSBC), 440 SCRA 498 (2004): The
elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the
facts alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If
the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be
dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants. (Emphasis supplied) Stated
otherwise, the resolution on this matter should stem from an analysis on whether or not the complaint
is able to convey a cause of action; and not that the complainant has no cause of action. Lest it be
misunderstood, failure to state a cause of action is properly a ground for a motion to dismiss under
Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (Rules), while the latter is not a ground for dismissal under
the same rule.
3. Same; Same; Motion to Dismiss; It is a standing rule that issues that require the contravention of
the allegations of the complaint, as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case,
should not be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss.-
—It is a standing rule that issues that require the contravention of the allegations of the complaint, as
well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not be within the province of
a mere motion to dismiss, as in this case. Hence, as what is only required is that the allegations furnish
adequate basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the Court — in view of the above-stated
reasons — finds that the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et al.’s motion to dismiss on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion which would
necessitate the reversal of the CA’s ruling. Verily, for grave abuse of discretion to exist, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
4. Same; Same; Cause of Action; Misjoinder of Causes of Action; The rule is that a party’s failure to
observe the conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court results in a misjoinder of causes of
action.-
—The rule is that a party’s failure to observe the following conditions under Section 5, Rule 2 of the
Rules results in a misjoinder of causes of action: SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action.—A party may in
one pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against
an opposing party, subject to the following conditions: (a) The party joining the causes of action shall
comply with the rules on joinder of parties; (b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions
governed by special rules; (c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to
different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one
of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and (d)
Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggregate amount
claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
5. Same; Same; Docket Fees; It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over
any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing
of the complaint does not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are
paid within a reasonable period.-
152
—Neither should Consing, Jr.’s failure to pay the required docket fees lead to the dismissal of his
complaint. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its non-payment at the time of the filing of the complaint does
not automatically cause the dismissal of the complaint provided that the fees are paid within a
reasonable period. Consequently, Unicapital, et al.’s insistence that the stringent rule on non-payment
of docket fees enunciated in the case of Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, 149 SCRA 562
(1987), should be applied in this case cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that Consing, Jr.
intended to defraud the government by his failure to pay the correct amount of filing fees.
6. Same; Same; Consolidation of Cases; It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases
involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, the same must be consolidated and
jointly tried, in order to serve the best interest of the parties and to settle the issues between them
promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and inexpensive determination of cases.-
—It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely
related subject matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best
interest of the parties and to settle the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and
inexpensive determination of cases. In addition, consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding the
possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which otherwise could
be disposed of in a single suit. The governing rule is Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules which provides:
SEC. 1. Consolidation.—When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
****
153
124. Remulla vs. Maliksi, 706 SCRA 35, September 18, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Taxpayer’s Suit
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Taxpayer’s Suit; Jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance.-
—Jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance. In this
case, public funds of the Province of Cavite stand to be expended to enforce the compromise judgment.
As such, Remulla — being a resident-taxpayer of the Province of Cavite — has the legal standing to
file the petition for annulment of judgment and, therefore, the same should not have been dismissed on
said ground. Notably, the fact that there lies no proof that public funds have already been disbursed
should not preclude Remulla from assailing the validity of the compromise judgment. Lest it be
misunderstood, the concept of legal standing is ultimately a procedural technicality which may be
relaxed by the Court if the circumstances so warrant. As observed in Mamba v. Lara, 608 SCRA 149
(2009), the Court did not hesitate to give standing to taxpayers in cases where serious legal issues were
raised or where public expenditures of millions of pesos were involved. Likewise, it has also been ruled
that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract in order to challenge its validity, or to seek the
annulment of the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud. Indeed, for as long as taxes are involved, the
people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government, as in this case.
****
154
125. Bagayas vs. Bagayas, 706 SCRA 73, September 18, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Partition|Co-ownership|Torrens Title|Collateral Attack
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Partition; Co-ownership; An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of
co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.-
—An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved. The determination, therefore, as to the
existence of co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. As held in the case
of Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989): The first phase of a partition and/or
accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and
a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement
of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not
entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally
prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree,
make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the
partition so agreed upon. In either case — i.e., either the action is dismissed or partition and/or
accounting is decreed — the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
2. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action or proceeding is deemed to be an attack on a certificate
of title when its objective is to nullify the same, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the
certificate of title was decreed.-
—Jurisprudence instructs that an action or proceeding is deemed to be an attack on a certificate of title
when its objective is to nullify the same, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the
certificate of title was decreed. Corollary thereto, it is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether
the certificate of title was procured by falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly
instituted for such purpose. As explicated in Borbajo v. Hidden View Homeowners, Inc., 450 SCRA 315
(2005): It is a well-known doctrine that the issue as to whether [the certificate of] title was procured by
falsification or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose. A Torrens title
can be attacked only for fraud, within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of
registration. Such attack must be direct, and not by a collateral proceeding. The title represented by
the certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a collateral proceeding.
The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein.
3. Same; Same; Same; Torrens Title; Collateral Attack; In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., 645 SCRA 677
(2011), which is an action for partition premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership
between the parties, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on the issue of
ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral attack.-
—In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., 645 SCRA 677 (2011), (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition
premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically
pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over
the disputed realties to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally
attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan: There is no dispute
that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the case
at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself. The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast,
the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that
document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the certificate of title. Title as a concept of
ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although
both are interchangeably used. ****
155
126. Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Court of Appeals, 706 SCRA 213, September 23, 2013
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Agricultural Lands|Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR)|Jurisdiction
1. Same; Same; Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); Jurisdiction; The determination of the land’s
classification as either an agricultural or industrial land-
— and, in turn, whether or not the land falls under agrarian reform exemption — must be preliminarily
threshed out before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), particularly, before the DAR
Secretary.―The determination of the land’s classification as either an agricultural or industrial land
— and, in turn, whether or not the land falls under agrarian reform exemption — must be preliminarily
threshed out before the DAR, particularly, before the DAR Secretary. Verily, issues of exclusion or
exemption partake the nature of Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases which are well within the
competence and jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. Towards this end, the latter is ordained to exercise
his legal mandate of excluding or exempting a property from CARP coverage based on the factual
circumstances of each case and in accordance with the law and applicable jurisprudence. Thus,
considering too his technical expertise on the matter, courts cannot simply brush aside his
pronouncements regarding the status of the land in dispute, i.e., as to whether or not it falls under CARP
coverage.
****
156
127. Heirs of the Late Spouses Flaviano Maglasang and Salud Adaza-Maglasang vs. Manila
Banking Corporation, 706 SCRA 235, September 23, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Foreclosure of Mortgage|Venue
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons; Claims against
deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their estate.―Claims against
deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their estate. Such proceedings
are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules
governing ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these special rules,
Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules (Section 7, Rule 86) provides the rule in dealing with secured claims
against the estate: SEC. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate.-
—A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other collateral security,
may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the
general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his
security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a
judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the
foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in
the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone,
and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he
shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of
the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming
the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the
direction of the court, if the court shall adjudged it to be for the best interest of the estate that such
redemption shall be made.
****
157
128. Republic vs. Roque, 706 SCRA 273, September 24, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Justiciable Controversy|Words and Phrases
****
158
129. Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr., 706 SCRA 440, September 30, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Evidence|Burden of Proof
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Petitioners had the burden of proving their own
allegation.—Petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to
do. In the similar case of Figuerres v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 206 (1999) citing United States v.
Cristobal, 34 Phil. 825 (1916), the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein
despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local government to show that public
hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of controverting evidence to
demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that
the local government’s non-compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s cause of
action.
****
159
130. Re: Request for Guidance/Clarification on Section 7, Rule 111 of Republic Act. No. 10154
Requiring Retiring Government Employees to Secure a Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of
Casels from the Civil Service Commission, 706 SCRA 502, October 01, 2013
Syllabi Class :Administrative Supervision|Courts|Supreme Court
1. Administrative Supervision; Courts; Supreme Court; Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel.-
—Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) exclusively vests in the Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel. As such, it oversees the court
personnel’s compliance with all laws and takes the proper administrative action against them for any
violation thereof. As an adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody records pertaining to the administrative
cases of retiring court personnel.
2. Same; Same; Same; A clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by
the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court personnel as
it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision.-
—It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the Judiciary administrative
supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the clearance requirement obtains with respect
to criminal cases. As such, a clearance requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed
by the appropriate government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman, on retiring court personnel
as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciary’s power of administrative supervision.
3. Same; Same; Same; A prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the
Office of the President (albeit some court personnel are presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court
Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman should not equally apply to retiring court personnel.-
—To further clarify the matter, the same principles dictate that a prior clearance of pendency/non-
pendency of administrative case/s from the Office of the President (albeit some court personnel are
presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court Justices) or the Office of the Ombudsman should not
equally apply to retiring court personnel. Verily, the administrative supervision of court personnel and
all affairs related thereto fall within the exclusive province of the Judiciary.
4. Same; Same; Same; The provision-
— which requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-
pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the Civil Service Commission — should not be
made to apply to employees of the Judiciary.—The Court rules that the subject provision — which
requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-pendency of
administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC — should not be made to apply to employees of the
Judiciary. To deem it otherwise would disregard the Court’s constitutionally-enshrined power of
administrative supervision over its personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to
secure a prior clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court which
makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement contrary to the declared state
policy of RA 10154.
****
160
131. Ventura vs. Heirs of Spouses Eustacio T. Endaya, 706 SCRA 631, October 02, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Contracts|Contracts to Sell|Words and Phrases
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Contract to Sell; Words and Phrases; A contract to sell is defined as a
bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject
property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property
exclusively to the latter upon his fulfillment of the conditions agreed upon, i.e., the full payment of the
purchase price and/or compliance with the other obligations stated in the contract to sell.-
—A contract to sell is defined as a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while expressly
reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds
himself to sell the said property exclusively to the latter upon his fulfillment of the conditions agreed
upon, i.e., the full payment of the purchase price and/or compliance with the other obligations stated in
the contract to sell. Given its contingent nature, the failure of the prospective buyer to make full payment
and/or abide by his commitments stated in the contract to sell prevents the obligation of the prospective
seller to execute the corresponding deed of sale to effect the transfer of ownership to the buyer from
arising. As discussed in Sps. Serrano and Herrera v. Caguiat, 517 SCRA 57 (2007): A contract to sell
is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to transfer
title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the suspensive condition
does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.
2. Same; Same; “Contract to Sell” and “Conditional Contract of Sale,” Distinguished.-
—To note, while the quality of contingency inheres in a contract to sell, the same should not be confused
with a conditional contract of sale. In a contract to sell, the fulfillment of the suspensive condition will
not automatically transfer ownership to the buyer although the property may have been previously
delivered to him. The prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by entering into
a contract of absolute sale. On the other hand, in a conditional contract of sale, the fulfillment of the
suspensive condition renders the sale absolute and the previous delivery of the property has the effect
of automatically transferring the seller’s ownership or title to the property to the buyer.
****
161
132. Pitcher vs. Gagate, 707 SCRA 13, October 08, 2013
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics|Penalties|Practice of Law
1. Same; Same; The Supreme Court sustains the Office of the Bar Confidant’s recommendation for the
return of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee received by respondent from complainant since the same is
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.―The Court sustains the OBC’s recommendation
for the return of the P150,000.00 acceptance fee received by respondent from complainant since the
same is intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. While the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s
administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to
claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature-
— for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction
separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement (such as the
acceptance fee in this case). Hence, considering further that the fact of respondent’s receipt of the
P150,000.00 acceptance fee from complainant remains undisputed, the Court finds the return of the
said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to be in order.
2. Same; Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Respondent’s act of advising complainant to go
into hiding in order to evade arrest in the criminal case can hardly be maintained as proper legal advice
since the same constitutes transgression of the ordinary processes of law. By virtue of the foregoing,
respondent clearly violated his duty to his client to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice,
in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.―It bears emphasis
that complainant’s right over the properties of her deceased husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently
established. As such, the high-handed action taken by respondent to enforce complainant’s claim of
ownership over the latter’s interest in Consulting Edge-
— i.e., causing the change of the office door lock which thereby prevented the free ingress and egress
of the employees of the said company — was highly improper. Verily, a person cannot take the law into
his own hands, regardless of the merits of his theory. In the same light, respondent’s act of advising
complainant to go into hiding in order to evade arrest in the criminal case can hardly be maintained as
proper legal advice since the same constitutes transgression of the ordinary processes of law. By virtue
of the foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty to his client to use peaceful and lawful methods
in seeking justice, in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code as above-quoted. To note further,
since such courses of action were not only improper but also erroneous, respondent equally failed to
serve his client with competence and diligence in violation of Canon 18 of the Code. In the same regard,
he also remained unmindful of his client’s trust in him — in particular, her trust that respondent would
only provide her with the proper legal advice in pursuing her interests — thereby violating Canon 17
of the Code.
****
162
133. Tañada, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 708 SCRA 188, October 22, 2013
Syllabi Class :Election Law|Commission on Elections (COMELEC)|House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET)|Jurisdiction
1. Constitutional Law; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); Section 17, Article VI
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective
members.-
—Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that the HRET is the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members: Sec. 17. The
Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal, shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its
Chairman.
2. Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET); Jurisdiction; Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate
following the election divests the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal.-
—Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests the
COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET. The phrase “election, returns and qualifications”
refers to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee’s title. In particular, the term “election” refers
to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and
the casting and counting of the votes; “returns” refers to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers
and the authenticity of the election returns; and “qualifications” refers to matters that could be raised
in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or
the inadequacy of his CoC.
****
163
134. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) vs. Court of Appeals, 708 SCRA 523, Oct. 23, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Provisional Remedies|Preliminary Injunction
****
164
135. Segovia-Ribaya vs. Lawsin, 709 SCRA 287, November 13, 2013
****
165
136. People vs. Lamsen, 709 SCRA 522, November 13, 2013
Syllabi Class :Recantations|Affidavits of Desistance
****
166
137. Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1, November 19, 2013
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Separation of Powers|Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF)|Pork Barrel System
****
167
138. Government Service Insurance System vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., 710
SCRA 337,November 20, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Judgment on the Pleadings
****
168
139. Birkenstock Orthopaedie GMBH and Co. KG (formerly Birkenstock Orthopaedie GMBH)
vs. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp, 710 SCRA 474, November 20, 2013
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law|Intellectual Property Right|Trademarks
****
169
140. Heirs of Romulo D. Sandueta vs. Robles, 710 SCRA 491, November 20, 2013
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Right of Retention
****
170
141. Dagala vs. Quesada, Jr., 711 SCRA 206, December 02, 2013
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Legal Ethics|Penalties|Penalties
****
171
142. Paraguya vs. Escurel-Crucillo, 711 SCRA 275, December 02, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Property|Land Titles|Spanish Titles
****
172
143. Metro Concast Steel Corp vs. Allied Bank Corp, 711 SCRA 479, December 04, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Obligations|Extinguishment of Obligations|Fortuitous Events|Words and
Phrases
****
173
144. Optimum Development Bank vs. Jovellanos, 711 SCRA 548, December 04, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Contracts|Contracts to Sell|Maceda Law|Realty Installment Buyer Protection
Act (R.A. No. 6552)
****
174
145. Ramos vs. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., 711 SCRA 590, December 04, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Evidence|Substantial Evidence
****
175
146. Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. vs. Sangwoo Philippines, Inc. Employees Union-Olalia, 711 SCRA
618,December 09, 2013
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Damages|Nominal Damages
****
176
147. Philippine Postal Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 711 SCRA 632, December 09, 2013
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Law|Res Judicata
****
177
148. Ace Foods, Inc. vs. Micro Pacific Tech Co., Ltd., 712 SCRA 679, December 11, 2013
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Novation
****
178
149. The President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints vs. BTL Construction
Corporation, 713 SCRA 455, January 15, 2014
Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees
****
179
150. INC Shipmanagement, Inc. vs. Moradas, 713 SCRA 475, January 15, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Evidence|Substantial Evidence|Words and Phrases
****
180
151. Rivelisa Realty, Inc, vs. First Sta. Clara Builders Corp. 713 SCRA 618, January 15, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Contracts|Quantum Meruit
****
181
152. Heirs of Victorino Sarili, The vs. Lagrosa, 713 SCRA 726, January 15, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Builders in Good Faith
****
182
153. Union Bank of the Phil vs. Development Bank of the Phil, 714 SCRA 306, Jan. 20, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Obligations|Compensation|Words and Phrases
****
183
154. Marquez vs. Alindog, 714 SCRA 460, January 22, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage
****
184
155. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Mondejar, 714 SCRA 514, January 22, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Certiorari|Small Claims Cases
****
185
156. Marquez vs. Ovejera, 715 SCRA 332, February 05, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (R.A. No. 6713)|Public Officers|Penalties
****
186
157. Quintos vs. Dept. of Agrarian Adjudication Board, 715 SCRA 592, February 10, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Foreclosure of Mortgage
****
187
158. Republic vs. De Gracia, 716 SCRA 8, February 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Family Law|Marriages|Husband and Wife|Annulment of
Marriage|Psychological Incapacity
****
188
159. Trade and Invt Devt Corp of the Phil vs. Asia Paces Corporation, 716 SCRA 67, Feb 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Suretyship|Guaranty|Guarantor
****
189
160. Atienza vs. People, 716 SCRA 84, February 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Presumption of Innocence
****
190
161. Ligon vs. Regional Trial Court, br 56, Makati City, 717 SCRA 373, February 26, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Contempt|Indirect Contempt|Words and Phrases
****
191
162. GMA Network, Inc. vs. NTC, 717 SCRA 435, February 26, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Estoppel
****
192
163. Ayungo vs. Beamko Shipmanagement Corporation, 717 SCRA 538, February 26, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Seafarers|Hypertension
****
193
164. Vales vs. Galinato, 718 SCRA 100, March 05, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
****
194
165. Republic vs. Drugmaker's Laboratories, Inc., 718 SCRA 153, March 05, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Pharmaceutical Products
****
195
166. Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. vs. Sugar Regulatory Admin, 718 SCRA 212, March 05, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Moot and Academic
****
196
167. Marcelo vs. Pichay, 718 SCRA 464, March 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judges|Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision
****
197
168. People vs. Cadano, Jr., 719 SCRA 234, March 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Rape|Qualified Rape
****
198
169. Espinas vs. Commission on Audit, 720 SCRA 302, April 01, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Agencies|Commission on Audit (COA)|Extraordinary and Miscellaneous
Expenses (EME)
****
199
170. Lozada vs. Bracewell, 720 SCRA 371, April 02, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Venue
****
200
171. Nieves vs. Duldulao, 720 SCRA 437, April 02, 2014
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Ejectment|Failure to Pay Leasehold Rentals|Agricultural Land Reform
Code (R.A. No. 3844)
****
201
172. People vs. Hallarte, 720 SCRA 582, April 02, 2014
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Rape
****
202
173. National Housing Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 720 SCRA 658, April 07, 2014
****
203
174. Roque vs. Aguado, 720 SCRA 780, April 07, 2014
****
204
175. Republic vs. Transunion Corporation, 722 SCRA 273, April 21, 2014
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law|Due Process
****
205
176. Abbott Laboratories, Philippines vs. Alcaraz, 723 SCRA 25, April 22, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Probationary Employees|Regular Employees|Moral Damages|Exemplary
Damages
****
206
177. Dulang vs. Regencia, 724 SCRA 214, June 02, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Judges|Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision
1. Administrative Law; Judges; Undue Delay in Rendering Decision; Undue delay in rendering a
decision is classified as a less serious charge, punishable either by: (a) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months; or (b) a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.-
—Undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a less serious charge, punishable either by: (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. In imposing the proper
sanction on Judge Regencia, the Court notes that aside from her aforementioned misrepresentation,
she was also previously found administratively liable for gross inefficiency where she was ordered to
pay a fine of P5,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely. Moreover, as correctly observed by Justice Arturo D. Brion during the deliberations of
this case, her length of service of more than 17 years should be taken against her instead of being
considered a mitigating factor as she should have already known that Civil Case No. 212-B, being an
ejectment case, is a summary proceeding and, thus, ought to be expeditiously resolved. Hence, a fine of
P40,000.00, instead of suspension, should be the appropriate penalty for Judge Regencia’s misconduct.
2. Administrative Law; Judges; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Prompt disposition of cases is attained
basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of judges.-
—Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and dedication to duty of
judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the disposition of cases is inevitable to the
prejudice of the litigants. Accordingly, judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice promptly. This is embodied in
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which states that “[a] judge shall dispose of the
court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required periods” and echoed in Section 5,
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provides that
“[j]udges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly, and with reasonable promptness.”
3. Remedial Law; Rules of Summary Procedure; Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules
of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last
affidavit or position paper within which a decision thereon must be issued.-
—Being an ejectment case, it is governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which clearly sets a
period of thirty (30) days from the submission of the last affidavit or position paper within which a
decision thereon must be issued. Despite this, Judge Regencia rendered judgment only about two (2)
years and four (4) months later, or on February 18, 2011. While rules prescribing the time within which
certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy
disposition of cases and, thus, should be regarded as mandatory, the Court has nevertheless been
mindful of the plight of judges and has been understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from
promptly disposing of their businesses and, as such, has allowed extensions of time due to justifiable
reasons. However, Judge Regencia failed to proffer any acceptable reason in delaying the disposition
of the ejectment case, thus, making her administratively liable for undue delay in rendering a decision.
****
207
178. Office of the Administrator vs. Ampong, 724 SCRA 488, June 04, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court Personnel
1. Same; Court Personnel; It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be an
example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest
sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal
and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing. The image of
a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat,
from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these
stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the
Judiciary.
2. Administrative Jurisdiction; Court Personnel; Administrative jurisdiction over a court employee
belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary.-
—Notably, the Court also addressed Ampong’s misgivings on the issue of jurisdiction in the same case,
viz.: It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. As defined under the
Constitution and the Administrative Code, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision,
and instrumentality of the government, and government-owned or controlled corporations. Pursuant to
its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to “control, supervise, and coordinate the
Civil Service examinations.” This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any
irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations. However, the Constitution provides that the
Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By
virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s
compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. Thus, this Court ruled that the Ombudsman
cannot justify its investigation of a judge on the powers granted to it by the Constitution. It violates the
specific mandate of the Constitution granting to the Supreme Court supervisory powers over all courts
and their personnel; it undermines the independence of the judiciary. x x x That she committed the
dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the administrative reach of the
Supreme Court. The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the
Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the
judiciary.
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Immutability of Judgments; Pursuant to the doctrine of
immutability of judgment, which states that “a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,” Ampong could no longer seek the August 26, 2008
Decision’s modification and reversal. Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from service on account
of Ampong’s Dishonesty should be enforced in its full course. In line with Section 58(a) of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), the penalty of dismissal carries with it
the following administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of
retirement benefits; and (c) perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency
or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government
financial institution. Ampong should be made to similarly suffer the same.
4. Administrative Law; Dismissal from Service; Leave Credits; Despite Ampong’s dismissal on the
ground of dishonesty, she should nevertheless be entitled to receive her accrued leave credits, if any,
pursuant to the aforementioned provision of the URACCS, which does not include the forfeiture of the
same. It is a standing rule that despite their dismissal from the service, government employees are
entitled to the leave credits that they have earned during the period of their employment. As a matter of
fairness and law, they may not be deprived of such remuneration, which they have earned prior to their
dismissal.
****
208
179. Republic vs. Manalo, 724 SCRA 668, June 04, 2014
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Moot and Academic; A case or issue is considered moot and
academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.-
—A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy
by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would
be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner
would be entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case
which presents a moot question can no longer be enforced.
****
209
180. People vs. Dela Cruz, 724 SCRA 676, June 04, 2014
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Moot and Academic; A case or issue is considered moot and
academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an
adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use.-
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness, as a judgment in a case
which presents a moot question can no longer be enforced.
****
210
181. Sahar Int. Trading, Inc. vs. Warner Lambert Co., LLC, 725 SCRA 460, June 09, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Actions|Dismissal of Actions|Moot and Academic
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Moot and Academic; A case or
issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical value or use.-
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment
will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it
cannot be enforced.
****
211
182. People vs. Umawid, 725 SCRA 597, June 09, 2014
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Aberratio Ictus
1. Same; Aberratio Ictus; The Supreme Court (SC) observes that Maureen’s death is a case of aberratio
ictus, given that the fatal blow therefor was only delivered by mistake as it was actually Vicente who
was Umawid’s intended target.-
—The Court observes that Maureen’s death is a case of aberratio ictus, given that the fatal blow
therefor was only delivered by mistake as it was actually Vicente who was Umawid’s intended target.
In this regard, Umawid’s single deed actually resulted in the: (a) Attempted Murder of Vicente; and (b)
Consummated Murder of Maureen. This may be classified as species of complex crime defined under
Article 48 of the RPC, particularly, a delito compuesto, or a compound crime where a single act
produces two (2) or more grave or less grave felonies. Based on the foregoing, Umawid should have
been punished for committing the complex crime of Murder and Attempted Murder, pursuant to Article
48 in relation to Article 4(1) of the RPC. However, considering that the information in Criminal Case
No. 23-0471 only charged him with the Murder of Maureen, Umawid cannot be convicted of a complex
crime because to do so would be violative of his right to due process.
2. Criminal Law; Exempting Circumstances; Insanity; The defense of insanity is in the nature of
confession and avoidance because an accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime
but claims that he or she is not guilty because of such insanity.-
—As case law instructs, the defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance because an
accused invoking the same admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is not guilty
because of such insanity. As there is a presumption in favor of sanity, anyone who pleads the said
defense bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the evidence
on this matter must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of
the offense/s with which he is charged. Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of
intelligence while committing the act, i.e., when the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the
least discernment because there is a complete absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation
of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender
has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the
mental faculties and is manifested in language and conduct. Thus, in order to lend credence to a defense
of insanity, it must be shown that the accused had no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his or her acts.
3. Same; Murder; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), treachery qualifies the killing of a person to the crime of Murder.-
—Under Article 248 of the RPC, treachery qualifies the killing of a person to the crime of Murder: Art.
248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the
aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Two (2) conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated: first,
the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate; and, second, the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.-
—The concept of treachery in criminal law is well-established — there is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. Based on the foregoing, it may then be deduced that two
(2) conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated: first, the employment of means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and, second, the means
of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; The killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner
of the assault is not shown because the weakness of the victim due to her tender age results in the
absence of any danger to the accused.-
—Jurisprudence states that an unexpected and sudden attack which renders the victim unable and
unprepared to put up a defense is the essence of treachery. Likewise, it has been held that the killing of
212
a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown because the weakness
of the victim due to her tender age results in the absence of any danger to the accused. With these
principles in mind, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the CA that treachery was
attendant in the killing of Maureen. The facts of this case show that Umawid suddenly appeared at the
terrace of Vicente’s house and started attacking Vicente with panabas. However, the latter was able to
evade Umawid’s attacks, resulting in Maureen being inadvertently hit and killed in the process. While
it was not shown that Umawid consciously employed treachery so as to insure the death of Maureen,
who was then just two (2) years old at the time, it is well to reiterate that the killing by an adult of a
minor child is treacherous, and thus, qualifies Maureen’s killing to Murder.
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; While it is true that treachery may also be appreciated even when the
victim was warned of the danger to his person and what is decisive is that the execution of the attack
made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.-
—Treachery exists in Umawid’s attack on Jeffrey, albeit the Court disagrees with the RTC and the CA’s
finding that Umawid employed means, methods, and forms that rendered Jeffrey incapable of raising a
credible defense. While it is true that treachery may also be appreciated even when the victim was
warned of the danger to his person and what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate, a review of the factual circumstances herein
would reveal that it was not impossible for Jeffrey to put up a defense against Umawid’s attacks. In
fact, Jeffrey was sufficiently informed of Umawid’s impending assault upon him as he saw the latter
charging at him. Jeffrey even attempted to prevent Umawid from entering the house, albeit he was
unsuccessful in doing so. Despite this, Jeffrey was still capable of mounting a defense against Umawid’s
attacks — but it was simply unfortunate that he chose not to do so when he crouched and covered his
head with his arms. Nevertheless, treachery may still be appreciated on account of Jeffrey’s minority,
considering that he was just 15 years of age when Umawid attacked him. Instructive on this point is the
case of People v. Guzman, 513 SCRA 156 (2007), where it was held that treachery attended the killing
of a 17-year old victim due to his minority.
****
213
183. Crisostomo vs. Nazareno, 726 SCRA 1, June 10, 2014
Syllabi Class :Notarial Law|Notary Public
1. Same; Same; Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive
public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.-
—Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded that: Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and
the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument. x x x x When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery
of the document under his hand and seal he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of
the purposes of requiring documents to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the
solemnity which should surround the execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such
documents to be given without further proof of their execution and delivery. Where the notary public is
a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and
to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of
his unwarranted actions.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Under Section 5, Rule 7
of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a certification against forum shopping
constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions.-
—Separate from the proscription against forum shopping is the violation of the certification
requirement against forum shopping, which was distinguished in the case of Sps. Ong v. Court of
Appeals, 384 SCRA 139 (2002), as follows: The distinction between the prohibition against forum
shopping and the certification requirement should by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To
reiterate, compliance with the certification against forum shopping is separate from and independent
of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. There is a difference in the treatment between
failure to comply with the certification requirement and violation of the prohibition against forum
shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in the manner of enforcing them. The former
constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory
pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a ground for summary dismissal thereof and
for direct contempt. x x x. Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries
in a certification against forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects
the erring counsel to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions.
3. Notarial Law; It is a standing rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial
register at the time of the notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the document
notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him a number corresponding to the one in his register.-
—Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public,
considering that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the certifications
against forum shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment
despite the fact that each of them should have been treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing
rule that for every notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of the
notarization, among others, the entry and page number of the document notarized, and that he shall
give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register. Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing
rule.
4. Same; Notary Public; Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached
to all the aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood,
i.e., that Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending actions
or proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum.-
—Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the aforementioned
complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e., that Rudex had not
214
commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending actions or proceedings
involving the same issues in any other forum. The administrative liability of an erring notary public in
this respect was clearly delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code in the case of Heirs
of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio, 512 SCRA 17 (2007), to wit: Where admittedly the
notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information contained in the instrument
to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to
discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the
integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence on notarial
documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the Code which proscribes
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. (Emphasis supplied) In
said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing false statements had his notarial
commission revoked and was disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of one (1)
year. Thus, for his malpractice as a notary public, the Court is wont to additionally impose the same
penalties of such nature against him. However, due to the multiplicity of his infractions on this front,
coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, the Court deems it proper to revoke his
existing commission and permanently disqualify him from being commissioned as a notary public.
****
215
184. Golden Valley Exploration, Inc. vs. Pinkian Mining Co, 726 SCRA 259, June 11, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Obligations|Rescission|Reciprocal Obligations
1. Same; Same; Same; The invocation of a stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission effectively puts
an end to the contract and, thus, releases the parties from the obligations thereunder, notwithstanding
the lack of a judicial decree for the purpose. In the case at bar, PMC, through its Letter dated June 8,
1999 to GVEI, invoked Section 8.01, Article VIII in relation to Section 5.01, Article V of the OA which
allows it to extrajudicially rescind the contract for GVEI’s nonpayment of royalties. Thus, at that point
in time, PMC had effectively rescinded the OA and was then considered to have been released from its
legal effects. Accordingly, there stood no legal impediment so as to hinder PMC from entering into a
contract with CVI covering the same mining claims subject of this case.
2. Civil Law; Obligations; Rescission; Reciprocal Obligations; In reciprocal obligations, either party
may rescind the contract upon the other’s substantial breach of the obligation/s he had assumed
thereunder. The basis therefor is Article 1191 of the Civil Code which states as follows: Art. 1191. The
power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply
with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the
rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission,
even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. The court shall decree the
rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. This is understood to
be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with
Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law. More accurately referred to as resolution, the right of
rescission under Article 1191 is predicated on a breach of faith that violates the reciprocity between
parties to the contract. This retaliatory remedy is given to the contracting party who suffers the injurious
breach on the premise that it is “unjust that a party be held bound to fulfill his promises when the other
violates his.”
3. Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, the power to rescind an obligation must be invoked judicially
and cannot be exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the other has committed a breach of the
obligation. This is so because rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach,
but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the very object of the parties
in making the agreement. As a well-established exception, however, an injured party need not resort to
court action in order to rescind a contract when the contract itself provides that it may be revoked or
cancelled upon violation of its terms and conditions.
4. Same; Same; Same; Where parties agree to a stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission, no
judicial decree is necessary for rescission to take place; the extrajudicial rescission immediately
releases the party from its obligation under the contract, subject only to court reversal if found
improper.-
—While it remains apparent that PMC had not judicially invoked the other grounds to rescind in this
case, the only recognizable effect, however, is with respect to the reckoning point as to when the contract
would be formally regarded as rescinded. Where parties agree to a stipulation allowing extrajudicial
rescission, no judicial decree is necessary for rescission to take place; the extrajudicial rescission
immediately releases the party from its obligation under the contract, subject only to court reversal if
found improper. On the other hand, without a stipulation allowing extrajudicial rescission, it is the
judicial decree that rescinds, and not the will of the rescinding party. This may be gathered from
previous Court rulings on the matter.
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216
185. Piedad vs. Gurieza, 727 SCRA 71, June 18, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Special Civil Actions|Unlawful Detainer|Actions
****
217
186. Taganito Mining Corp vs. Comm of Internal Revenue, 726 SCRA 637, June 18, 2014
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Taganito did not appeal the CTA Division’s partial denial
of its claim for refund on the ground that it failed to provide sufficient evidence that its suppliers did
not avail of the benefits of zero-rating. It is well-settled that a party who does not appeal from a
judgment can no longer seek modification or reversal of the same. For this reason, Taganito may no
longer question the propriety and correctness of the said partial disallowance as it had lapsed into
finality and may no longer be modified. In fine, Taganito is only entitled to the partial refund of its
unutilized input VAT in the amount of P537,645.43, as was originally granted to it by the CTA Division
and herein upheld.
2. Taxation; Tax Refunds; As correctly pointed out by the CTA En Banc, the Court, in the 2010 Aichi
case, ruled that the observance of the 120-day period is a mandatory and jurisdictional requisite to the
filing of a judicial claim for refund before the CTA. Consequently, nonobservance thereof would lead
to the dismissal of the judicial claim due to the CTA’s lack of jurisdiction. The Court, in the same case,
also clarified that the two (2)-year prescriptive period applies only to administrative claims and not to
judicial claims. In other words, the Aichi case instructs that once the administrative claim is filed within
the prescriptive period, the claimant must wait for the 120-day period to end and, thereafter, he is given
a 30-day period to file his judicial claim before the CTA, even if said 120-day and 30-day periods would
exceed the aforementioned two (2)-year prescriptive period.
3. Same; Same; Equitable Estoppel; In the recent case of CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation (San
Roque), 690 SCRA 336, the Court, however, recognized an exception to the mandatory and
jurisdictional treatment of the 120-day period as pronounced in Aichi. In San Roque, the Court ruled
that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated December 10, 2003 — wherein the BIR stated that the “taxpayer-
claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the
CTA by way of Petition for Review” — provided taxpayers-claimants the opportunity to raise a valid
claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of the NIRC, viz.: There is no dispute that the 120-day
period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the CTA does not acquire jurisdiction over a judicial
claim that is filed before the expiration of the 120-day period. There are, however, two exceptions to
this rule. The first exception is if the Commissioner, through a specific ruling, misleads a particular
taxpayer to prematurely file a judicial claim with the CTA. Such specific ruling is applicable only to
such particular taxpayer. The second exception is where the Commissioner, through a general
interpretative rule issued under Section 4 of the Tax Code, misleads all taxpayers into filing prematurely
judicial claims with the CTA. In these cases, the Commissioner cannot be allowed to later on question
the CTA’s assumption of jurisdiction over such claim since equitable estoppel has set in as expressly
authorized under Section 246 of the Tax Code.
4. Same; Same; Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must
therefore be that during the period December 10, 2003 (when Bureau of Internal Revenue [BIR] Ruling
No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-
claimants need not observe the 120-day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess
input Value-Added Tax (VAT) before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Before and after the
aforementioned period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day
period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.-
—Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must therefore be that
during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010
(when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-day period
before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and after the
period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.
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218
187. Rana vs. Wong, 727 SCRA 539, June 30, 2014
Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees|Damages
****
219
188. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Capistrano, 728 SCRA 439, July 02, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court Personnel|Judiciary
1. Same; Same; Judiciary; The Supreme Court (SC) reminds every employee of the Judiciary to be an
exemplar of integrity, uprightness, and honesty, considering that the sacrosanct image of a Court
dispensing justice is mirrored in its very own personnel.-
—The Court reminds every employee of the Judiciary to be an exemplar of integrity, uprightness, and
honesty, considering that the sacrosanct image of a Court dispensing justice is mirrored in its very own
personnel. As pronounced in Re: Falsification of Daily Time Records of Maria Fe P. Brooks, Court
Interpreter, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Br. 96, and Andria Forteza-Crisostomo, Clerk III,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 39, 473 SCRA 483 (2005): [N]o other office in the government
service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the
Judiciary. [The Court has] repeatedly emphasized that the conduct of court personnel, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary.
The Court condemns and would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those
involved in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and
diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Daily Time Records; Under Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 7-2003 dated January 9, 2003, it is incumbent upon every court
official and employee to truthfully and accurately indicate the time of their arrival in and departure
from office in their respective Daily Time Records (DTRs)/Bundy Cards.-
—Under OCA Circular No. 7-2003 dated January 9, 2003, it is incumbent upon every court official and
employee to truthfully and accurately indicate the time of their arrival in and departure from office in
their respective Daily Time Records (DTRs)/Bundy Cards, viz.: In the submission of Certificates of
Service and Daily Time Records (DTRs)/Bundy Cards by Judges and court personnel, the following
guidelines shall be observed: 1. After the end of each month, every official and employee of each court
shall accomplish the Daily Time Record (Civil Service Form No. 48)/Bundy Card, indicating therein
truthfully and accurately the time of arrival in and departure from the office.
3. Same; Same; Same; Dishonesty; Jurisprudence dictates that erring court employees who falsify
their Daily Time Records (DTRs) are guilty of dishonesty.-
—Jurisprudence dictates that erring court employees who falsify their DTRs are guilty of dishonesty.
Further, under Rule XIV, Section 21 of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of official documents, which
includes DTRs, and dishonesty are treated as grave offenses. Accordingly, the commission of these acts
carries the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service.
4. Same; Same; Mitigating Circumstances; Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RURACCS) grants the disciplining authority, the Supreme
Court (SC) in this case, the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the final
penalty.-
—Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service grants
the disciplining authority, the Court in this case, the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in
the imposition of the final penalty. These factors range, among others, from the erring individual’s
admission of guilt, remorse, length of service, or high performance rating. In this case, Capistrano
readily admitted to the fact that she indeed falsified the entries in her April and May 2009 bundy cards,
and concomitantly, has expressed her remorse and promised not to commit the same. Thus, considering
too that said infraction would be Capistrano’s first administrative offense, the Court finds it proper to
adopt the OCA’s recommendation to impose against her the penalty of suspension for a period of six
(6) months, without pay, and not the supreme penalty of dismissal in view of the mitigating factors
attendant herein.
****
220
189. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Atlanta Industries, Inc., 729 SCRA 12, July 02, 2014
Syllabi Class :International Law|Pacta Sunt Servanda|Words and Phrases
1. Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; Words and Phrases; Pacta sunt servanda is a fundamental maxim of
international law that requires the parties to keep their agreement in good faith.-
—The Government of the Philippines is therefore obligated to observe its terms and conditions under
the rule of pacta sunt servanda, a fundamental maxim of international law that requires the parties to
keep their agreement in good faith. It bears pointing out that the pacta sunt servanda rule has become
part of the law of the land through the incorporation clause found under Section 2, Article II of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, which states that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.”
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Prohibition; A petition for prohibition is a special civil action
that seeks for a judgment ordering the respondent to desist from continuing with the commission of an
act perceived to be illegal.-
—A petition for prohibition is a special civil action that seeks for a judgment ordering the respondent
to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. Section 2, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court (Rules) reads: Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition.—When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein,
or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
3. Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; While the Supreme Court (SC), Court of Appeals (CA) and Regional
Trial Court (RTC) have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, if what is assailed relates to “acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person,” the petition must be filed “in the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial
area as defined by the Court.”-
—While the Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, if what is assailed relates to “acts or omissions of
a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person,” the petition must be filed “in the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Court.” Section 4 of the
same Rules provides that: Sec. 4. When and Where to file the petition.—The petition shall be filed not
later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall
be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. If the petition
relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a
person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area
as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the
Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition
involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
4. Same; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court (SC) already ruled in numerous cases,
beginning with the very early case of Castaño v. Lobingier, 7 Phil. 91 (1906), that the power to
administer justice conferred upon judges of the Regional Trial Courts (RTC), formerly Courts of First
Instance (CFI), can only be exercised within the limits of their respective districts, outside of which they
have no jurisdiction whatsoever.-
—The Court already ruled in numerous cases, beginning with the very early case of Castaño v.
Lobingier, 7 Phil. 91 (1906), that the power to administer justice conferred upon judges of the Regional
Trial Courts, formerly Courts of First Instance (CFI), can only be exercised within the limits of their
respective districts, outside of which they have no jurisdiction whatsoever. Applying previous
legislation similar to the present Section 21 of BP 129 and its complementary provision, i.e., Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules, the Court held in said case that the CFI of Leyte had no power to issue writs of
221
injunction and certiorari against the Justice of the Peace of Manila, as the same was outside the
territorial boundaries of the issuing court. Also, in Samar Mining Co., Inc. v. Arnado, 2 SCRA 782
(1961), a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed in the CFI of
Manila to question the authority of the Regional Administrator and Labor Attorney of the Department
of Labor in Cebu City to hear a complaint for sickness compensation in Catbalogan, Samar and to
enjoin said respondents from conducting further proceedings thereat. The Court affirmed the dismissal
of the case on the ground of improper venue, holding that the CFI of Manila had no authority to issue
writs of injunction, certiorari, and prohibition affecting persons outside its territorial boundaries.
Further, in both Cudiamat v. Torres (Cudiamat), 22 SCRA 695 (1968), and National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority v. Reyes, 22 SCRA 905 (1968), (NAWASA), the losing bidders succeeded in
securing an injunctive writ from the CFI of Rizal in order to restrain, in Cudiamat, the implementation
of an award on a public bidding for the supply of a police call and signal box system for the City of
Manila, and, in NAWASA, the conduct of the public bidding for the supply of steel pipes for its Manila
and Suburbs Waterworks Project. The Court held in both cases that the injunction issued by the CFI of
Rizal purporting to restrain acts outside the province of Rizal was null and void for want of jurisdiction.
5. Bids and Bidding; Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184, the decisions of the Bids and Awards
Committee (BAC) in all stages of procurement may be protested to the head of the procuring entity
through a verified position paper and upon payment of a protest fee.-
—The Court further discerns that the Manila RTC should have dismissed the case outright for failure
of Atlanta to exhaust administrative remedies. Under RA No. 9184, the decisions of the BAC in all
stages of procurement may be protested to the head of the procuring entity through a verified position
paper and upon payment of a protest fee. The necessity for the complaining bid participant to complete
the protest process before resorting to court action cannot be overemphasized. It is a condition
precedent to the court’s taking cognizance of an action that assails a bid process. When precipitately
taken prior to the completion of the protest process, such case shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
While Atlanta may have written the BAC a letter objecting to some of the terms and conditions contained
in the bidding documents to be used for the rebidding, its action fell short of the required protest. It
failed to follow through with its protest and opted instead to participate in the rebidding with full
knowledge that the IBRD Procurement Guidelines were to be followed throughout the conduct of the
bid. Having failed to observe the protest procedure required by law, Atlanta’s case should not have
prospered with the RTC altogether.
6. Same; While mandating adherence to the general policy of the government that contracts for the
procurement of civil works or supply of goods and equipment shall be undertaken only after competitive
public bidding, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9184 recognizes the country’s commitment to abide by its
obligations under any treaty or international or executive agreement.-
—While mandating adherence to the general policy of the government that contracts for the
procurement of civil works or supply of goods and equipment shall be undertaken only after competitive
public bidding, RA 9184 recognizes the country’s commitment to abide by its obligations under any
treaty or international or executive agreement. This is pertinently provided in Section 4 of RA No. 9184
which reads as follows: Sec. 4. Scope and Application.—This Act shall apply to the Procurement of
Infrastructure Projects, Goods and Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds, whether local
or foreign, by all branches and instrumentalities of the government, its department, offices and
agencies, including government owned and/or controlled corporations and local government units,
subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138. Any treaty or international or executive
agreement affecting the subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory
shall be observed.
7. International Law; International Agreements; In Bayan Muna v. Romulo (Bayan Muna), 641
SCRA 244 (2011), the Supreme Court (SC) defined an international agreement as one concluded
between states in written form and governed by international law, “whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation,” and
further expounded that it may be in the form of either (a) treaties that require legislative concurrence
after executive ratification; or (b) executive agreements that are similar to treaties, except that they do
not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with a narrower range of
subject matters than treaties.-
222
—In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244 (2011), (Bayan Muna) the Court defined an international
agreement as one concluded between states in written form and governed by international law,
“whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its
particular designation,” and further expounded that it may be in the form of either (a) treaties that
require legislative concurrence after executive ratification; or (b) executive agreements that are similar
to treaties, except that they do not require legislative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal
with a narrower range of subject matters than treaties. Examining its features, Loan Agreement No.
4833-PH between the IBRD and the Land Bank is an integral component of the Guarantee Agreement
executed by the Government of the Philippines as a subject of international law possessed of a treaty-
making capacity, and the IBRD, which, as an international lending institution organized by world
governments to provide loans conditioned upon the guarantee of repayment by the borrowing sovereign
state, is likewise regarded a subject of international law and possessed of the capacity to enter into
executive agreements with sovereign states. Being similar to a treaty but without requiring legislative
concurrence, Loan Agreement No. 4833-PH — following the definition given in the Bayan Muna case
— is an executive agreement and is, thus, governed by international law.
****
223
190. Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. vs. Santos, 729 SCRA 35, July 02, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure|Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
1. Same; Same; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; The expeditious disposition of cases is as much
the duty of petitioner, being the plaintiff, as the court’s.-
—The expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of petitioner, being the plaintiff, as the
court’s. Indeed, respondents, as the defendants, cannot be wearingly denied of their right to the speedy
disposition of the case filed against them. After more than two (2) decades, respondents certainly do
not deserve the agony of going through the same issues all over again with petitioner, which could have
been settled had the latter simply proceeded to pre-trial and had given the trial court the opportunity
to evaluate the evidence, apply the law, and decree the proper judgment. At the end of the day, the
unfortunate fault can fall on no one’s hands but on petitioner’s. Indeed, there is a price to pay when
one trifles with the rules.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion for Postponement; The trial court has the discretion on
whether to grant or deny a motion to postpone and/or reschedule the pre-trial conference in accordance
with the circumstances obtaining in the case.-
—At the outset, it should be emphasized that the trial court has the discretion on whether to grant or
deny a motion to postpone and/or reschedule the pre-trial conference in accordance with the
circumstances obtaining in the case. This must be so as it is the trial court which is able to witness
firsthand the events as they unfold during the trial of a case. Postponements, while permissible, must
not be countenanced except for clearly meritorious grounds and in light of the attendant circumstances.
3. Same; Same; Pre-Trial; It is mandatory for the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases in order
to realize the paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating, and expediting trial.-
—A pre-trial has been institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of
cases. Hailed as the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth
century, it paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case. It is, thus, mandatory for
the trial court to conduct pre-trial in civil cases in order to realize the paramount objective of
simplifying; abbreviating, and expediting trial.
4. Same; Same; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; The rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience
of the litigants. These rules are established to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of the judicial
system.-
—It bears stressing that the rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigants. These
rules are established to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of the judicial system. By trifling
with the rules and the court processes, and openly defying the order of the trial court to proceed to pre-
trial, petitioner only has itself to blame for the dismissal of its Complaint. The dismissal is a matter
within the trial court’s sound discretion, which, as authorized by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court hereunder quoted, must stand absent any justifiable reason to the contrary, as in this case: SEC.
3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.—If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date
of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unrea-
sonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right
of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
****
224
191. Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Sta. Romana, 729 SCRA 387, July 09, 2014
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Just Compensation|Interest Rates
1. Same; Same; The Regional Trial Court (RTC) is reminded that while it should take into account the
different formula created by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in arriving at its just
compensation valuation, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not warrant their
application.-
—The Regional Trial Court is reminded, however, that while it should take into account the different
formula created by the DAR in arriving at its just compensation valuation, it is not strictly bound thereto
if the situations before it do not warrant their application.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is
still incomplete, as in this case where the just compensation for the subject land acquired under
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 27 has yet to be paid, just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, with PD 27 and Executive Order No. (EO) 228
having mere suppletory effects.-
—Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in this case where the
just compensation for the subject land acquired under PD 27 has yet to be paid, just compensation
should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having mere
suppletory effects. This means that PD 27 and EO 228 only apply when there are gaps in RA 6657;
where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 and EO 228 are superseded.
3. Same; Same; For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking.-
—For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. In addition, the factors enumerated under
Section 17 of RA 6657, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties,
(c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation,
(e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and
(h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land, if any, must be equally considered.
4. Same; Same; Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines.-
—Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived
of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before the trial court for the
valuation of the subject land must be based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like
agricultural lands.
5. Same; Same; Interest Rates; The Supreme Court (SC) has allowed the grant of legal interest in
expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the
landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State; Beginning July 1,
2013, until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate
of 6% interest p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary
Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.-
—In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there
is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest per
annum (p.a.). from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013,
until fully paid, the just compensation due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of
6% interest p.a. in line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
****
225
192. Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Beriña, 729 SCRA 403, July 09, 2014
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform|Just Compensation|Courts|Regional Trial Courts
1. Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; The Regional Trial Court is reminded, however, that
while it should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in arriving at the just
compensation for the subject portion, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do not
warrant their application.
still incomplete, as in this case where payment for the subject portion acquired under PD 27 has yet to
be made, just compensation should be determined and the process be concluded under Republic Act
No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,” with PD 27 and
EO 228 having mere suppletory effect. This means that PD 27 and EO 228 only apply when there are
gaps in RA 6657; where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27 and EO 228 are superseded.
3. Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Special Agrarian Courts; While the LBP is charged
with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under the land reform program
and the compensation to be paid for their taking, guided by the records/documents contained in the
claim folders, it must be emphasized that its valuation is considered only as an initial determination,
which is not conclusive. Verily, it is the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that
should make the final determination of just compensation and which has the final say on what the
amount of just compensation will be pursuant to the well-settled rule that the determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. This rule notwithstanding, a review of the records, nonetheless,
impels the Court to order the remand of the case to the RTC considering the failure of both the RTC
and the CA to consider the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, in determining
the just compensation for the subject portion.
4. Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator.-
—Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking. In addition, the
factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land,
(b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property and the income
therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by
government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.
5. Same; Same; Compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before the trial court for
the valuation of the subject portion must be based on the values prevalent at such time of taking for like
agricultural lands.
6. Same; Same; The Regional Trial Court may impose interest on the just compensation as may be
warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing jurisprudence. In previous cases,
the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the
payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance
on the part of the State. Legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% p.a. from the time of taking
until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, the just compensation
due the landowners shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% p.a. in line with the amendment
introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
****
226
193. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Valencerina, 730 SCRA 12, July 14, 2014
Syllabi Class :Statutory Construction
1. Statutory Construction; It is a fundamental legal principle that when two rules apply to a particular
case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other. Evidently, the
aforesaid Section 7, Rule III is a special rule applicable to administrative complaints cognizable by the
OMB, while Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules applies to appeals from quasi-judicial bodies in general,
including the OMB. Thus, as between the two rules, Section 7, Rule III should prevail over the
application of Section 12, Rule 43 of the Rules in appeals from a decision of the OMB in an
administrative case.
2. Ombudsman; Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Section
7, Rule III), as amended by Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, provides that the
office’s decision imposing the penalty of removal, among others, shall be executed as a matter of course
and shall not be stopped by an appeal thereto, viz.: Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.—
Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed
is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision
may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and
conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written
Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. An appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins
such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. A
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course.
The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly
implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the
Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for
disciplinary action against said officer.
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194. Aboitiz Trans System Corp vs. Carlos A. Gothong Lines,Inc., 730 SCRA 178, July 18, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Alternative Dispute Resolution|Arbitration
1. Civil Law; Alternative Dispute Resolution; Arbitration; Disputes do not go to arbitration unless
and until the parties have agreed to abide by the arbitrator’s decision.-
—In Gonzales v. Climax Mining, Ltd., 512 SCRA 148 (2007), the Court explained that “[d]isputes do
not go to arbitration unless and until the parties have agreed to abide by the arbitrator’s decision.
Necessarily, a contract is required for arbitration to take place and to be binding.” Furthermore, in
Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 373 (2001), the Court stated that “[t]he
provision to submit to arbitration any dispute arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is
part of that contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties and
produce effect as between them, their assigns and heirs.” Succinctly put, only those parties who have
agreed to submit a controversy to arbitration who, as against each other, may be compelled to submit
to arbitration.
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195. Mauleon vs. Porter, 730 SCRA 229, July 18, 2014
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Judgments; It is settled that when a decision
has acquired finality, the same becomes immutable and unalterable. By this principle of immutability
of judgments, the Court is now precluded from further examining the MeTC Decision and to further
dwell on petitioner’s perceived errors therein, i.e., that her possession of the subject property was not
by virtue of respondent’s tolerance, hence, the ejectment complaint should have been dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction; and that the pending annulment of documents and reconveyance case was prejudicial
to the ejectment suit.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motion to Postpone; No party has the right to assume that his
motion to postpone would be approved by the courts.-
—Petitioner’s asseveration that her nonappearance in the March 27, 2009 hearing was due to her
counsel’s assurance that he had duly filed a motion for postponement, which the MeTC should have
purportedly granted, cannot be sustained since no party has the right to assume that such motion would
be approved by the courts. Consequently, absent any justifiable reason for her and her counsel’s
nonappearance at the said preliminary conference, the Court concurs with the RTC’s finding that no
grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed against the MeTC in submitting the case for decision and,
subsequently, ordering petitioner’s ejectment from the subject property.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides for the
immediate execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff in ejectment cases, which can only be stayed
if the defendant perfects an appeal, files a supersedeas bond, and makes periodic deposit of rental or
other reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject premises during the pendency
of the appeal.-
—No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed against the MeTC in issuing the August 18, 2009
Order directing the execution of its Decision. Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides for the
immediate execution of judgment in favor of the plaintiff in ejectment cases, which can only be stayed
if the defendant perfects an appeal, files a supersedeas bond, and makes periodic deposit of rental or
other reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the subject premises during the pendency
of the appeal. These requirements are mandatory and concurrent, without which execution will issue
as a matter of right.
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196. Shang Prop Realty Corporation vs. St. Francis Devt Corp, 730 SCRA 275, July 21, 2014
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law|Unfair Competition|Geographically Descriptive Term
1. Same; Same; Same; Under Section 123.2 of the IP Code, specific requirements have to be met in
order to conclude that a geographically-descriptive mark has acquired secondary meaning, to wit: (a)
the secondary meaning must have arisen as a result of substantial commercial use of a mark in the
Philippines; (b) such use must result in the distinctiveness of the mark insofar as the goods or the
products are concerned; and (c) proof of substantially exclusive and continuous commercial use in the
Philippines for five (5) years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is made. Unless
secondary meaning has been established, a geographically-descriptive mark, due to its general public
domain classification, is perceptibly disqualified from trademark registration. Section 123.1(j) of the
IP Code states this rule as follows: SEC. 123. Registrability.—123.1 A mark cannot be registered if it:
x x x x (j) Consists exclusively of signs or of indications that may serve in trade to designate the kind,
quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, time or production of the goods or
rendering of the services, or other characteristics of the goods or services.
2. Mercantile Law; Unfair Competition; Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines; Section 168 of
Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the “Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines” (IP Code),
provides for the rules and regulations on unfair competition. To begin, Section 168.1 qualifies who is entitled to
protection against unfair competition. It states that “[a] person who has identified in the mind of the public the
goods he manufactures or deals in, his business or services from those of others, whether or not a registered
mark is employed, has a property right in the goodwill of the said goods, business or services so identified, which
will be protected in the same manner as other property rights.” Section 168.2 proceeds to the core of the
provision, describing forthwith who may be found guilty of and subject to an action of unfair competition — that
is, “[a]ny person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass
off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having
established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result x x x.”
3. Same; Same; The statutory attribution of the unfair competition concept is well-supplemented by
jurisprudential pronouncements. In the recent case of Republic Gas Corporation v. Petron Corporation, 698
SCRA 666 (2013), the Court has echoed the classic definition of the term which is “‘the passing off (or palming
off) or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or business of one person as the goods or business of
another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public.’ Passing off (or palming off) takes place where
the defendant, by imitative devices on the general appearance of the goods, misleads prospective purchasers into
buying his merchandise under the impression that they are buying that of his competitors. [In other words], the
defendant gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of his competitor with the intention of deceiving
the public that the goods are those of his competitor.” The “true test” of unfair competition has thus been
“whether the acts of the defendant have the intent of deceiving or are calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer
making his purchases under the ordinary conditions of the particular trade to which the controversy relates.”
Based on the foregoing, it is therefore essential to prove the existence of fraud, or the intent to deceive, actual or
probable, determined through a judicious scrutiny of the factual circumstances attendant to a particular case.
4. Same; Same; Geographically Descriptive Term; Words and Phrases; The Court finds the element of
fraud to be wanting; hence, there can be no unfair competition. The CA’s contrary conclusion was faultily
premised on its impression that respondent had the right to the exclusive use of the mark “ST. FRANCIS,” for
which the latter had purportedly established considerable goodwill. What the CA appears to have disregarded
or been mistaken in its disquisition, however, is the geographically-descriptive nature of the mark “ST.
FRANCIS” which thus bars its exclusive appropriability, unless a secondary meaning is acquired. As deftly
explained in the U.S. case of Great Southern Bank v. First Southern Bank: “[d]escriptive geographical terms
are in the ‘public domain’ in the sense that every seller should have the right to inform customers of the
geographical origin of his goods. A ‘geographically descriptive term’ is any noun or adjective that designates
geographical location and would tend to be regarded by buyers as descriptive of the geographic location of
origin of the goods or services. A geographically descriptive term can indicate any geographic location on earth,
such as continents, nations, regions, states, cities, streets and addresses, areas of cities, rivers, and any other
location referred to by a recognized name. In order to determine whether or not the geographic term in question
is descriptively used, the following question is relevant: (1) Is the mark the name of the place or region from
which the goods actually come? If the answer is yes, then the geographic term is probably used in a descriptive
sense, and secondary meaning is required for protection.”
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197. People vs. Viterbo, 730 SCRA 672, July 23, 2014
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Dangerous Drugs Act|Chain of Custody Rule
1. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; The presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus
delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized
items.--The Court concludes that there exists reasonable doubt on the integrity and evidentiary value
of the confiscated items, necessitating therefor strict compliance with the provisions of Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165. As it has been established that there was noncompliance with its provisions, i.e.,
that there was no physical inventory or photographs of the seized evidence, nor was there any
representative from the media, or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official present
during the subject seizure and confiscation, it is therefore clear that the identity of the prohibited drugs
had not been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, hence, rendering improper accused-
appellants’ conviction. Verily, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the
crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing
in which, the acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right.
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the
following elements must concur: (a) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration;
and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an
integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the
prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account
for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the
accused up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.
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231
198. People vs. Dionaldo, 731 SCRA 68, July 23, 2014
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law|Damages|Exemplary Damages
1. Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; —Exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of
the confluence of the aforesaid qualifying circumstances and in order to deter others from committing
the same atrocious acts. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, therefore, the Court awards
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the family of the kidnap victim.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of
witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine.-
—Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to
determine. Its assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is conclusive
and binding unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered. Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect
the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the credibility of witnesses
deserves high respect by the appellate court.
3. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; —Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the
crime, the Court likewise finds the conclusion of the RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be
well-taken. Conspiracy exists when two or more person s come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the responsibility
of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the
extent of their respective participations. In this relation, direct proof is not essential to establish
conspiracy, as it can be presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose,
design, concerted action, and community of interests. Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case
clearly show that accused-appellants acted in concert at the time of the commission of the crime and
that their acts emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing unity in its execution, the
CA, affirming the trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.
4. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; The Court is, however, constrained to modify the
ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime the accused-appellants have committed does not, as the
records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the
special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim’s (i.e.,
Edwin’s) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the Information, and (b) clearly established
during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the
Court, the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal
case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate
court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.
5. Criminal Law; Penalties; Death Penalty; The enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 had
suspended the imposition of the death penalty.-
—Further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom, accused-appellants’ conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the
penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346 had suspended the imposition of the
death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could, as the CA and trial court properly ruled,
only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the accused-
appellants are not eligible for parole.
6. Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is
warranted in this case. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury, while Article
2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal detention. It
cannot be denied, in this case, that the kidnap victim’s family suffered mental anguish, fright, and
serious anxiety over the detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such, and in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to
the family of the victim.
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232
199. Rural Bank of Cabadbaran, Inc. vs. Melecio-Yap, 731 SCRA 244, July 30, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Estoppel
1. Same; Estoppel; Under Article 1431 of the Civil Code, an essential element of estoppel is that the
person invoking it has been influenced and has relied on the representations or conduct of the person
sought to be estopped.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Preliminarily, the rule
is settled that the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only
questions of law, not of fact. The theory of forgery advanced by respondents involves a question of fact.
While it is not the function of the Court to undertake a reexamination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case, there are, however, recognized exceptions, among which
is when the findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting, as in this case.
3. Civil Law; Mortgages; —The settled rule is that persons constituting a mortgage must be legally
authorized for the purpose. In the present case, while Erna appears to be a co-owner of the mortgaged
properties, she made it appear that she was duly authorized to sell the entire properties by virtue of the
notarized SPA dated August 24, 1990.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Notarized Documents; Generally, a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged
before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence. However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be
affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A defective notarization
will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private document. Hence, when there
is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally
attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the measure to test the validity of such
document is preponderance of evidence.
5. Same; Same; Private Documents; Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that “before
any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or (b) by evidence of
the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.”-
—Having failed to sufficiently establish the regularity in the execution of the SPA, the presumption of
regularity accorded by law to notarized documents can no longer apply and the questioned SPA is to
be examined under the parameters of Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides that
“[b]efore any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either (a) [b]y anyone who saw the document executed or written, or (b)
[b]y evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.”
6. Civil Law; Laches; Words and Phrases; Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it.-
—The Court cannot subscribe to RBCI’s contention that respondents are barred by laches from laying
claim over the subject properties in view of their inexplicable inaction from the time they learned of the
falsification. Laches is principally a doctrine of equity. It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned or declined to assert it. In this case, the complaint for nullification of the SPA was filed
before the RTC on April 17, 1996, or barely three years from respondents’ discovery of the averred
forgery in 1993, which is within the four-year prescriptive period provided under Article 1146 of the
Civil Code to institute an action upon the injury to their rights over the subject properties. A delay
within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is not considered to be a delay that would bar
relief. Laches applies only in the absence of a statutory prescriptive period. Furthermore, the doctrine
of laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the more prudent rule
that courts, under the principle of equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations
or the doctrine of laches when by doing so, manifest wrong or injustice would result, as in this case.
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200. National Trans Corp vs. Alphaomega Integrated Corp, 731 SCRA 299, July 30, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law|Civil Procedure
1. Same; Same; It is well-settled that no relief can be granted a party who does not appeal and that a
party who did not appeal the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the appellate court
other than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal.-
—It must be emphasized that the petition for review before the CA was filed by TRANSCO. AIC never
elevated before the courts the matter concerning the discrepancy between the amount of the award
stated in the body of the Final Award and the total award shown in its dispositive portion. The issue
was touched upon by the CA only after AIC raised the same through its Comment (With Motion to
Acknowledge Actual Amount of Award) to TRANSCO’s petition for review. The CA should not have
modified the amount of the award to favor AIC because it is well-settled that no relief can be granted a
party who does not appeal and that a party who did not appeal the decision may not obtain any
affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he had obtained from the lower court, if any,
whose decision is brought up on appeal. The disposition, as stated in the fallo of the CIAC Arbitral
Tribunal’s Final Award, should therefore stand.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for
review on certiorari under the said rule, as in this case, “shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth.”-
—TRANSCO seeks through this petition a recalibration of the evidence presented before the CIAC
Arbitral Tribunal, insisting that AIC is not entitled to any damages not only because it had previously
waived all claims for standby fees in case of project delays but had eventually failed to perform the
workable portions of the projects. This is evidently a factual question which cannot be the proper subject
of the present petition. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for review on
certiorari under the said rule, as in this case, “shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth.” Thus, absent any of the existing exceptions impelling the contrary, the Court is, as a general
rule, precluded from delving on factual determinations, as what TRANSCO essentially seeks in this
case.
3. Same; Same; It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired
expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only
respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA).-
—The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal on the matter
of AIC’s entitlement to damages which the CA affirmed as being well supported by evidence and
properly referred to in the record. It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the CA. The CIAC possesses
that required expertise in the field of construction arbitration and the factual findings of its construction
arbitrators are final and conclusive, not reviewable by this Court on appeal.
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234
201. Agot vs. Rivera, 732 SCRA 12, August 05, 2014
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235
202. Heirs of Fransisco I. Narvasa, Sr. vs. Imbornal, 732 SCRA 171, August 06, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law|Trusts|Riparian Owners|Alluvium
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236
203. People vs. Piccio, 732 SCRA 254, August 06, 2014
Syllabi Class :Attorneys|Office of the Solicitor General
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237
204. Benson Industries Emp Union- vs. Benson Industries, Inc., 732 SCRA 318, Aug 6, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law|Termination of Employment|Closure of Business|Separation Pay
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238
205. Lagado vs. Leonido, 732 SCRA 579, August 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law|Court Personnel
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239
206. Krystle Realty Development Corporation vs. Alibin, 733 SCRA 1, August 13, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they
cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.-
—The Court likewise rejects the belated claim of res judicata anchored on the dismissal of the petition
for certiorari in G.R. No. 127995 filed by Domingo as per its Resolution dated April 28, 1997, which
became final and executory on June 16, 1997. As the records disclose, petitioners never raised this
issue in the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 54912 before the CA, and even in the subsequent proceedings
before the RTC and the CA in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 92765. Settled is the rule that points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be considered by a
reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of
fairness and due process impel this rule.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is a settled rule that the Supreme Court (SC) is not a
trier of facts and, hence, does not normally undertake the reexamination of the evidence presented by
the contending parties during the trial of the case, considering that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals (CA) are generally conclusive and binding on the Court, especially if they do not contradict
those of the trial court, as in this case.-
—It is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and, hence, does not normally undertake the
reexamination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case,
considering that the factual findings of the CA are generally conclusive and binding on the Court,
especially if they do not contradict those of the trial court, as in this case.
3. Same; Evidence; Handwriting Experts; The opinion of a handwriting expert, therefore, does not
mandatorily bind the court, the expert’s function being to place before the court data upon which it can
form its own opinion.-
—As correctly pointed out by the CA, the authenticity of a signature is a matter that is not so highly
technical as to preclude a judge from examining the signature himself and ruling upon the question of
whether the signature on a document is forged or not. The opinion of a handwriting expert, therefore,
does not mandatorily bind the court, the expert’s function being to place before the court data upon
which it can form its own opinion.
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240
207. Fernandez vs. Botica Claudio, 733 SCRA 133, August 13, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Due Process ;
1. Labor Law; Due Process; The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or as
applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.-
—It is undisputed that Jose eventually participated in the appeal proceedings by filing not only one but
two motions for reconsideration from the NLRC Resolution, thereby negating any supposed denial of
due process on her part. As held in the case of Angeles v. Fernandez, 513 SCRA 378 (2007), the
availment of the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of in labor cases
amounts to due process. After all, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or
as applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of
the opportunity to be heard, thus, an aggrieved party cannot feign denial of due process where he had
been afforded the opportunity to ventilate his side, as Jose was in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration; It is settled that the
filing of a motion for reconsideration from the order, resolution or decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can avail of a
petition for certiorari.-
—At the outset, the Court notes that the CA gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to
respondent’s Rule 65 certiorari petition despite its finding that the latter still had a pending motion for
reconsideration from the Decision dated March 15, 2010 before the NLRC. It is settled that the filing
of a motion for reconsideration from the order, resolution or decision of the NLRC is an indispensable
condition before an aggrieved party can avail of a petition for certiorari. This is to afford the NLRC an
opportunity to rectify its perceived errors or mistakes, if any. Hence, the more prudent recourse for
respondent should have been to move for the immediate resolution of its motion for reconsideration
before the NLRC instead of filing a petition for certiorari before the CA. Having failed to do so, her
petition for certiorari was prematurely filed, and the CA should have dismissed the same.
3. Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The Supreme Court (SC) has held that the mere failure to serve a
copy of the memorandum on appeal upon the opposing party does not bar the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) from giving due course to an appeal.-
—While Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 3(a), Rule VI of the then New Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC require the party intending to appeal from the LA’s ruling to furnish the other party a copy
of his memorandum of appeal, the Court has held that the mere failure to serve the same upon the
opposing party does not bar the NLRC from giving due course to an appeal. Such failure is only treated
as a formal lapse, an excusable neglect, and, hence, not a jurisdictional defect warranting the dismissal
of an appeal. Instead, the NLRC should require the appellant to provide the opposing party copies of
the notice of appeal and memorandum of appeal.
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241
208. Grace Christian High School vs. Lavandera, 733 SCRA 498, August 20, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Retirement ; One-Half Month Salary ; Words
and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; Same; One-Half Month Salary; Words and Phrases; The Supreme Court (SC), in the
case of Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 676 SCRA 463 (2012), has recently affirmed that “one-half
(1⁄2) month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th
month pay and the remaining five (5) days for Service Incentive Leave (SIL).”-
—The Court, in the case of Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 676 SCRA 463 (2012), has recently
affirmed that “one-half (1/2) month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-
twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for [SIL].” The Court sees no reason to
depart from this interpretation. GCHS’ argument therefore that the 5 days SIL should be likewise
prorated to their 1/12 equivalent must fail.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Retirement; Republic Act (RA) No. 7641, which was
enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of the Labor Code, providing for the rules on
retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the
establishment.-
—RA 7641, which was enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of the Labor Code,
providing for the rules on retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any
retirement plan in the establishment. The said law states that “an employee’s retirement benefits under
any collective bargaining [agreement (CBA)] and other agreements shall not be less than those
provided” under the same — that is, at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a
fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year — and that “[u]nless the parties
provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus
one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service
incentive leaves.” The foregoing provision is applicable where (a) there is no CBA or other applicable
agreement providing for retirement benefits to employees, or (b) there is a CBA or other applicable
agreement providing for retirement benefits but it is below the requirement set by law. Verily, the
determining factor in choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of benefits
provided.
****
242
209. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Lajom, 733 SCRA 511, August 20, 2014
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Just Compensation ; Expropriation Proceedings ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The Court would like to emphasize that while the agrarian reform program was
undertaken primarily for the benefit of our landless farmers, this undertaking should, however, not result in the
oppression of landowners by pegging the cheapest value for their lands. Indeed, although the taking of properties
for agrarian reform purposes is a revolutionary kind of expropriation, it should not be carried out at the undue
expense of landowners who are also entitled to protection under the Constitution and agrarian reform laws.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Case law instructs that when the agrarian reform process under
PD 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657, such as when the just compensation due the landowner
has yet to be settled, as in this case, such just compensation should be determined and the process concluded
under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only suppletorily. Hence, where RA 6657 is sufficient, PD 27
and EO 228 are superseded. Records show that even before Lajom filed a petition for the judicial determination
of just compensation in May 1993, RA 6657 had already taken effect on June 15, 1988. Similarly, the
emancipation patents had been issued in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries prior to the filing of the said petition,
and both the taking and the valuation of the subject portion occurred after the passage of RA 6657. Quite
evidently, the matters pertaining to the correct just compensation award for the subject portion were still in
contention at the time RA 6657 took effect; thus, as correctly ruled by the CA, its provisions should have been
applied, with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only suppletorily.
3. Same; Same; Taking; As to the proper reckoning point, it is fundamental that just compensation
should be determined at the time of the property’s taking; —As to the proper reckoning point, it is
fundamental that just compensation should be determined at the time of the property’s taking. Taking may be
deemed to occur, for instance, at the time emancipation patents are issued by the government. As enunciated in
LBP v. Heirs of Angel T. Domingo, 543 SCRA 627 (2008): The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of
computing just compensation should be reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents. An
emancipation patent constitutes the conclusive authority for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the
name of the grantee. It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the vested
right of ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowner. (Emphasis
supplied) Since the emancipation patents in this case had been issued between the years 1994 and 1998, the just
compensation for the subject portion should then be reckoned therefrom, being considered the “time of taking”
or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property.
4. Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; It must be emphasized that while the LBP is charged
with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under the land reform and,
accordingly, the just compensation therefor, its valuation is considered only as an initial determination
and, thus, not conclusive. Verily, it is well-settled that it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court,
which should make the final determination of just compensation in the exercise of its judicial function.
In this respect, the RTC is required to consider the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended.
5. Same; Same; —The evidence must conform to Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment
by RA 9700. While RA 9700 took effect on July 1, 2009, which amended further certain provisions of RA 6657,
as amended, among them Section 17, declaring “[t]hat all previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject
to challenge by landowners shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Section 17 of [RA 6657], as
amended,” the law should not be applied retroactively to pending cases. Considering that the present
consolidated petitions had been filed before the effectivity of RA 9700, or on December 8, 2008 for G.R. No.
184982 and May 18, 2009 for G.R. No. 185048, Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its further
amendment by RA 9700, should therefore apply.
6. Same; Same; Expropriation Proceedings; Interest Rates; —With respect to the commonly raised issue
on interest, the RTC may impose the same on the just compensation award as may be justified by the
circumstances of the case and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. The Court has previously allowed
the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there was delay in the payment of just compensation,
deeming the same to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. To clarify, this incremental interest is
not granted on the computed just compensation; rather, it is a penalty imposed for damages incurred by the
landowner due to the delay in its payment. Thus, legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% p.a. from the
time of taking until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, just compensation shall
earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% p.a., conformably with the modification on the rules respecting interest
rates introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
****
243
210. Fernandez vs. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548, August 20, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Certification Against Forum Shopping ;
1. Same; Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Where the plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense-
— the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against forum shopping
may be relaxed.—Following paragraph 5 of the guidelines as aforestated, there was also substantial
compliance with the certification against forum shopping requirement, notwithstanding the fact that
only Lourdes signed the same. It has been held that under reasonable or justifiable circumstances —
as in this case where the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause
of action or defense — the rule requiring all such plaintiffs or petitioners to sign the certification against
forum shopping may be relaxed. Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the petition on this score.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Verification; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Guidelines
with Respect to Non-Compliance with the Requirements on or Submission of a Defective Verification
and Certification Against Forum Shopping.-
—The Court laid down the following guidelines with respect to noncompliance with the requirements
on or submission of a defective verification and certification against forum shopping, viz.: 1) A
distinction must be made between noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective
verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification
against forum shopping. 2) As to verification, noncompliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or
act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. 3) Verification is deemed
substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations
in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been
made in good faith or are true and correct. 4) As to certification against forum shopping,
noncompliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
“substantial compliance” or presence of “special circumstances or compelling reasons.” 5) The
certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule. 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must
be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons,
the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel
of record to sign on his behalf.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Ejectment; Co-Ownership; Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly
provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment, without the necessity of joining
all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.-
—Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for
ejectment, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is
deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. To reiterate, both Lourdes and Cecilia are co-plaintiffs in
the ejectment suit. Thus, they share a commonality of interest and cause of action as against
respondents. Notably, even the petition for review filed before the CA indicated that they are the
petitioners therein and that the same was filed on their behalf. Hence, the lone signature of Lourdes on
the verification attached to the CA petition constituted substantial compliance with the rules.
4. Same; Civil Procedure; Verification; It is settled that the verification of a pleading is only a formal,
not a jurisdictional requirement intended to secure the assurance that the matters alleged in a pleading
are true and correct. Therefore, the courts may simply order the correction of the pleadings or act on
them and waive strict compliance with the rules, as in this case.
****
244
211. Lopez vs. Irvine Construction Corp., 733 SCRA 589, August 20, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Suspension of Business Operation ;
1. Same; Same; Suspension of Business Operation; In invoking Article 286 of the Labor Code, the
paramount consideration should be the dire exigency of the business of the employer that compels it to
put some of its employees temporarily out of work. This means that the employer should be able to prove
that it is faced with a clear and compelling economic reason which reasonably forces it to temporarily
shut down its business operations or a particular undertaking, incidentally resulting to the temporary
layoff of its employees. Due to the grim economic consequences to the employee, case law states that
the employer should also bear the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the
employee temporarily out of work can be assigned. Thus, in the case of Mobile Protective & Detective
Agency v. Ompad, 458 SCRA 308 (2005), the Court found that the security guards therein were
constructively dismissed considering that their employer was not able to show any dire exigency
justifying the latter’s failure to give said employees any further assignment.
2. Labor Law; Project Employees; Case law states that the principal test for determining whether
particular employees are properly characterized as “project employees” as distinguished from
“regular employees,” is whether or not the “project employees” were assigned to carry out a “specific
project or undertaking,” the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employees were
engaged for that project. The project could either be (1) a particular job or undertaking that is within
the regular or usual business of the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and
identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the company; or (2) a particular job or undertaking
that is not within the regular business of the corporation. In order to safeguard the rights of workers
against the arbitrary use of the word “project” to prevent employees from attaining the status of regular
employees, employers claiming that their workers are project employees should not only prove that the
duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged, but also that there
was indeed a project.
3. Same; Regular Employees; Article 280 of the Labor Code provides that any employee who has
rendered at least one (1) year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee.-
—The NLRC found that no substantial evidence had been presented by Irvine to show that Lopez had
been assigned to carry out a “specific project or undertaking,” with its duration and scope specified at
the time of engagement. In view of the weight accorded by the courts to factual findings of labor
tribunals such as the NLRC, the Court, absent any cogent reason to hold otherwise, concurs with its
ruling that Lopez was not a project but a regular employee. This conclusion is bolstered by the
undisputed fact that Lopez had been employed by Irvine since November 1994, or more than 10 years
from the time he was laid off on December 27, 2005. Article 280 of the Labor Code provides that any
employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee.
4. Same; Termination of Employment; Retrenchment; Among the authorized causes for termination
under Article 283 of the Labor Code is retrenchment, or what is sometimes referred to as a “layoff.”-
—Among the authorized causes for termination under Article 283 of the Labor Code is retrenchment,
or what is sometimes referred to as a “layoff.” x x x It is defined as the severance of employment,
through no fault of and without prejudice to the employee, resorted to by management during the
periods of business recession, industrial depression, or seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls caused by
lack of orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant to a new production program or the
introduction of new methods or more efficient machinery, or of automation. Elsewise stated, layoff is
an act of the employer of dismissing employees because of losses in the operation, lack of work, and
considerable reduction on the volume of its business, a right recognized and affirmed by the Court.
However, a layoff would be tantamount to a dismissal only if it is permanent. When a layoff is only
temporary, the employment status of the employee is not deemed terminated, but merely suspended.
5. Same; Same; Suspension of Business Operations; Pursuant to Article 286 of the Labor Code, the
suspension of the operation of business or undertaking in a temporary layoff situation must not exceed
six (6) months: ART. 286. When Employment not Deemed Terminated.—The bona fide suspension of
the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months, or the fulfillment
by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate employment. In all such cases, the
245
employer shall reinstate the employee to his former position without loss of seniority rights if he
indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the resumption of operations
of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty. (Emphasis supplied) Within this six-
month period, the employee should either be recalled or permanently retrenched. Otherwise, the
employee would be deemed to have been dismissed, and the employee held liable therefor.
6. Same; Same; One-Month Notice Rule; In both a permanent and temporary layoff, jurisprudence
dictates that the one (1)-month notice rule to both the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
and the employee under Article 283 of the Labor Code, as above cited, is mandatory.-
—Notably, in both a permanent and temporary layoff, jurisprudence dictates that the one-month notice
rule to both the DOLE and the employee under Article 283 of the Labor Code, as above cited, is
mandatory. Also, in both cases, the layoff, being an exercise of the employer’s management prerogative,
must be exercised in good faith — that is, one which is intended for the advancement of employers’
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special
laws or under valid agreements.
7. Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The burden to prove the validity and legality of the termination of
employment falls on the employer.-
—Although the NLRC did not expound on the matter, it is readily apparent that the supposed layoff of
Lopez was hardly justified considering the absence of any causal relation between the cessation of
Irvine’s project in Cavite with the suspension of Lopez’s work. To repeat, Lopez is a regular and not a
project employee. Hence, the continuation of his engagement with Irvine, either in Cavite, or possibly,
in any of its business locations, should not have been affected by the culmination of the Cavite project
alone. In light of the well-entrenched rule that the burden to prove the validity and legality of the
termination of employment falls on the employer, Irvine should have established the bona fide
suspension of its business operations or undertaking that would have resulted in the temporary layoff
of its employees for a period not exceeding six (6) months in accordance with Article 286 of the Labor
Code.
****
246
212. Omni Hauling Services, Inc. vs. Bon, 734 SCRA 270, September 03, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Regular Employees ;
1. Same; Regular Employees; —Records are bereft of any evidence to show that respondents were
made to sign employment contracts explicitly stating that they were going to be hired as project
employees, with the period of their employment to be co-terminus with the original period of Omni’s
service contract with the Quezon City government. Neither is petitioners’ allegation that respondents
were duly apprised of the project-based nature of their employment supported by any other evidentiary
proof. Thus, the logical conclusion is that respondents were not clearly and knowingly informed of their
employment status as mere project employees, with the duration and scope of the project specified at
the time they were engaged. As such, the presumption of regular employment should be accorded in
their favor pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code which provides that “[employees] who have
rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken [— as respondents
in this case —] shall be considered as [regular employees] with respect to the activity in which [they]
are employed and [their] employment shall continue while such activity actually exists.” Add to this the
obvious fact that respondents have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of Omni, i.e., garbage hauling, thereby confirming the strength
of the aforesaid conclusion.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a
capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered “grave,”
discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Labor Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion; In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions
reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence.-
—In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings
and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence. This requirement of
substantial evidence is clearly expressed in Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides
that “[i]n cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established
if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”
4. Same; Project Employees; —A project employee is assigned to a project which begins and ends at
determined or determinable times. Unlike regular employees who may only be dismissed for just and/or
authorized causes under the Labor Code, the services of employees who are hired as “project
employees” may be lawfully terminated at the completion of the project.
5. Same; Same; According to jurisprudence, the principal test for determining whether particular
employees are properly characterized as “project employees” as distinguished from “regular
employees,” is whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out a “specific project or
undertaking,” the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time they were engaged for that
project. The project could either be (1) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or
usual business of the employer company, but which is distinct and separate, and identifiable as such,
from the other undertakings of the company; or (2) a particular job or undertaking that is not within
the regular business of the corporation. In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary
use of the word “project” to prevent employees from attaining a regular status, employers claiming
that their workers are project employees should not only prove that the duration and scope of the
employment was specified at the time they were engaged, but also that there was indeed a project.
****
247
213. Philippine Touristers, Inc. vs. MAS Transit Workers Union-Anglo-KMU, 734 SCRA 298,
September 03, 2014
1. Same; Same; Same; For purposes of compliance with [the bond requirement under the 2011
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Rules of Procedure], a motion shall be accompanied by
the posting of a provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the monetary award
subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages, and attorney’s fees.-
—The absence of grave abuse of discretion in this case is bolstered by the fact that petitioners’ motion
to reduce bond was accompanied by a P5,000,000.00 surety bond which was seasonably posted within
the reglementary period to appeal. In McBurnie v. Ganzon, 707 SCRA 646 (2013), the Court ruled that,
“[f]or purposes of compliance with [the bond requirement under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure],
a motion shall be accompanied by the posting of a provisional cash or surety bond equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the monetary award subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages, and attorney’s fees.”
Seeing no cogent reason to deviate from the same, the Court deems that the posting of the aforesaid
partial bond, being evidently more than ten percent (10%) of the full judgment award of
P12,833,000.00, already constituted substantial compliance with the governing rules at the onset.
2. Labor Law; Appeals; Bond; For an appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s (LA’s) ruling to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to be perfected, Article 223 (now Article 229) of the Labor Code
requires the posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.-
—For an appeal from the LA’s ruling to the NLRC to be perfected, Article 223 (now Article 229) of the
Labor Code requires the posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
3. Same; Same; Same; While it has been settled that the posting of a cash or surety bond is
indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of
the Labor Arbiter (LA), the Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
particularly Section 6, Rule VI thereof, nonetheless allows the reduction of the bond upon a showing of
(a) the existence of a meritorious ground for reduction, and (b) the posting of a bond in a reasonable
amount in relation to the monetary award.-
— While it has been settled that the posting of a cash or surety bond is indispensable to the perfection
of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA, the Rules of Procedure
of the NLRC (the Rules), particularly Section 6, Rule VI thereof, nonetheless allows the reduction of the
bond upon a showing of (a) the existence of a meritorious ground for reduction, and (b) the posting of
a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award, viz.: SEC. 6. BOND.—In case the
decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. The appeal bond shall either
be in cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of damages and
attorney’s fees. x x x x No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds
and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award. The filing of
the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding paragraph shall not
stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In this
regard, it bears stressing that the reduction of the bond provided thereunder is not a matter of right on
the part of the movant and its grant still lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon a showing
of meritorious grounds and the reasonableness of the bond tendered under the circumstances.
****
248
214. Pulgar vs. Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon, Br 64, 734 SCRA 527, Sept 10, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Jurisdiction ; Intervention ; Actions ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Intervention; Actions; Jurisdiction over an
intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action.-
—Jurisdiction over an intervention is governed by jurisdiction over the main action. Accordingly, an
intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. In this case, Pulgar
does not contest the RTC’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 0587-M for lack of jurisdiction, but oddly
maintains his intervention by asking in this appeal a review of the correctness of the subject realty tax
assessment. This recourse, the Court, however, finds to be improper since the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction
over the main case necessarily resulted in the dismissal of his intervention. In other words, the cessation
of the principal litigation — on jurisdictional grounds at that — means that Pulgar had, as a matter of
course, lost his right to intervene.
****
249
215. Sierra vs. Paic Savings and Mortgage Bank, Inc., 734 SCRA 694, September 10, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Laches ;
1. Same; Laches; Laches operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one’s rights, but rather
to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.-
—As the records disclose, despite notice on June 19, 1984 of the scheduled foreclosure sale, petitioners,
for unexplained reasons, failed to impugn the real estate mortgage and oppose the public auction sale
for a period of more than seven (7) years from said notice. As such, petitioners’ action is already barred
by laches, which, as case law holds, operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one’s rights,
but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As
mortgagors desiring to attack a mortgage as invalid, petitioners should act with reasonable
promptness, else its unreasonable delay may amount to ratification. Verily, to allow petitioners to assert
their right to the subject properties now after their unjustified failure to act within a reasonable time
would be grossly unfair to PSMB, and perforce should not be sanctioned.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; The rule is that he who alleges mistake affecting a
transaction must substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular.-
—Time and again, the Court has stressed that allegations must be proven by sufficient evidence because
mere allegation is not evidence. Thus, one who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a
contract must establish the same by full, clear, and convincing evidence, not merely by preponderance
of evidence. The rule is that he who alleges mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate his
allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and that private
transactions have been fair and regular. Where mistake or error is alleged by parties who claim to have
not had the benefit of a good education, as in this case, they must establish that their personal
circumstances prevented them from giving their free, voluntary, and spontaneous consent to a contract.
3. Civil Law; Mortgages; Accommodation Mortgagors; Like an accommodation party to a negotiable
instrument, the accommodation mortgagor in effect becomes a surety to enable the accommodated
debtor to obtain credit.-
—There being valid consent on the part of petitioners to act as accommodation mortgagors, no
reversible error was committed by the CA in setting aside the RTC’s Decision declaring the real estate
mortgage as void for vices of consent and awarding damages to petitioners. As mere accommodation
mortgagors, petitioners are not entitled to the proceeds of the loan, nor were required to be furnished
with the loan documents or notice of the borrower’s default in paying the principal, interests, penalties,
and other charges on due date, or of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, unless stipulated in the
subject deed. As jurisprudence states, an accommodation mortgagor is a third person who is not a
debtor to a principal obligation but merely secures it by mortgaging his or her own property. Like an
accommodation party to a negotiable instrument, the accommodation mortgagor in effect becomes a
surety to enable the accommodated debtor to obtain credit, as petitioners in this case.
4. Same; Same; Prescription; Since the complaint for annulment was anchored on a claim of mistake,
i.e., that petitioners are the borrowers under the loan secured by the mortgage, the action should have
been brought within four (4) years from its discovery.-
—In any event, even assuming that petitioners have a valid cause of action, the four-year prescriptive
period on voidable contracts shall apply. Since the complaint for annulment was anchored on a claim
of mistake, i.e., that petitioners are the borrowers under the loan secured by the mortgage, the action
should have been brought within four (4) years from its discovery.
****
250
216. Co vs. Yeung, 735 SCRA 66, September 10, 2014
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Unfair Competition ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Mercantile Law; Unfair Competition; Words and Phrases; Unfair competition is defined as the
passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public of the goods or business of one
person as the goods or business of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public.-
—Unfair competition is defined as the passing off (or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the
public of the goods or business of one person as the goods or business of another with the end and
probable effect of deceiving the public. This takes place where the defendant gives his goods the general
appearance of the goods of his competitor with the intention of deceiving the public that the goods are
those of his competitor. Here, it has been established that Co conspired with the Laus in the
sale/distribution of counterfeit Greenstone products to the public, which were even packaged in bottles
identical to that of the original, thereby giving rise to the presumption of fraudulent intent. In light of
the foregoing definition, it is thus clear that Co, together with the Laus, committed unfair competition,
and should, consequently, be held liable therefor.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Well-settled rule is
that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain
exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court’s judgment of the
appellate court’s misapprehension of the adduced facts.-
—The Court’s review of the present case is via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues raised. The well-settled rule is that
questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for review under Rule 45, subject only to certain
exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient support in evidence of the trial court’s judgment or the
appellate court’s misapprehension of the adduced facts.
3. Same; Same; Same; Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals (CA), are entitled to great weight and respect by the Court and are deemed final and
conclusive when supported by the evidence on record.-
—Co, who mainly interposes a denial of the acts imputed against him, fails to convince the Court that
any of the exceptions exists so as to warrant a review of the findings of facts in this case. Factual
findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and respect by the Court and
are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record. The Court finds that both
the RTC and the CA fully considered the evidence presented by the parties, and have adequately
explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that Co committed acts of unfair competition.
****
251
217. Almazan, Sr. vs. Suerte-Felipe, 735 SCRA 230, September 17, 2014
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ; Lawyer’s Oath ;
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyer’s Oath; For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he
was a notary public for and in the City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted
that he was not, respondent further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to
the lawyer’s oath.-
—As the Investigating Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself admitted that he was
commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San
Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999, could not notarize the subject document’s
acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as said notarial act is beyond the jurisdiction of the
commissioning court, i.e., the RTC of Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction
is crystal clear from Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice: Sec. 11. Jurisdiction
and Term.—A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first
day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the
notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied) Said principle
is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, of which Section 240, Article II states: Sec. 240. Territorial
jurisdiction.—The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be coextensive with the province.
The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be coextensive with said city. No notary
shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied)
For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the City of
Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further
committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer’s oath. Perceptibly, said
transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
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252
218. Yupangco-Nakpil vs. Uy, 735 SCRA 239, September 17, 2014
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ;
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.-
—The Court finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct by, as admitted, mortgaging the
subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the merits of his
own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should
not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a property violation nor any action
which would endanger the Bar’s reputation. Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the
legal profession. By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a member
of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct fell short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as compared to
what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon
1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the peculiar circumstances of this case,
the Court believes that a fine of P15,000.00 would suffice.
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253
219. Puerto Azul Land,Inc. vs. Pacific Wide Realty and Devt Corp, 735 SCRA 333, Sept 17, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgment ; Res Judicata ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; “Bar by prior judgment” and “Conclusiveness of judgment,”
Distinguished.-—There is a bar by prior judgment where there is identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred. There is conclusiveness of judgment, on the other hand, where there is identity of
parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Words and Phrases; Res judicata
(meaning, a “matter adjudged”) is a fundamental principle of law which precludes parties from re-
litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment.-
—Res judicata (meaning, a “matter adjudged”) is a fundamental principle of law which precludes
parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It
means that “a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the
former suit.” Res judicata has two (2) concepts. The first is “bar by prior judgment” in which the
judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between
the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action before the same or other tribunal. The second is “conclusiveness of judgment” in which
any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an
action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not
the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
****
254
220. CIR vs. CE Luzon Geothermal Power Company, Inc., 735 SCRA 421,September 17, 2014
Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Prescription ;
1. Taxation; Prescription; Once the administrative claim is filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive
period, the claimant must wait for the one hundred twenty (120)-day period to end and, thereafter, he
is given a thirty (30)-day period to file his judicial claim before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), even
if said 120-day and 30-day periods would exceed the aforementioned 2-year prescriptive period.-
—In CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi), 632 SCRA 422 (2010), the Court held that the
observance of the 120-day period is a mandatory and jurisdictional requisite to the filing of a judicial
claim for refund before the CTA. Consequently, its nonobservance would lead to the dismissal of the
judicial claim on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Aichi also clarified that the two (2)-year prescriptive
period applies only to administrative claims and not to judicial claims. Succinctly put, once the
administrative claim is filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period, the claimant must wait for the
120-day period to end and, thereafter, he is given a 30-day period to file his judicial claim before the
CTA, even if said 120-day and 30-day periods would exceed the aforementioned two (2)-year
prescriptive period. However, in CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation (San Roque), 690 SCRA 336
(2013), the Court categorically recognized an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of
the 120-day period. It ruled that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated December 10, 2003 provided a valid
claim for equitable estoppel under Section 246 of the NIRC. In essence, the aforesaid BIR Ruling stated
that “taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial
relief with the CTA by way of Petition for Review.”
****
255
221. Pagdanganan, Jr. vs. Sarmiento, 735 SCRA 584, September 17, 2014
Syllabi Class :Pleadings and Practice ;
1. Same; Fundamental is the rule that until a counsel’s dismissal or withdrawal is formally made, any
court record sent to him binds the client, despite an internal arrangement between them.-
—The Court cannot give credence to Sarmiento’s contention that Atty. Borromeo had been discharged
as counsel even before Sarmiento received the December 30, 2010 Resolution, considering that Atty.
Borromeo never filed a formal withdrawal of appearance prior thereto, conformably with Section 26,
Rule 138 of the Rules. For his failure to observe the proper legal formalities, Atty. Borromeo remained
as Sarmiento’s counsel on record. Fundamental is the rule that until a counsel’s dismissal or
withdrawal is formally made, any court record sent to him binds the client, despite an internal
arrangement between them terminating their professional relationship, as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, an aggrieved party has sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed
decision, order or resolution within which to file a petition for certiorari.-
—Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, an
aggrieved party has sixty (60) days from receipt of the assailed decision, order or resolution within
which to file a petition for certiorari, viz.: SEC. 4. When and where to file petition.—The petition shall
be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion
for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall
be filed not latter than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
3. Pleadings and Practice; If a litigant is represented by counsel, notices of all kinds, including court
orders and decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to him is considered notice to his
client.-
—In the present case, and as correctly pointed out by petitioners, the 60-day reglementary period for
the purpose of filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from January 12, 2011, the date Atty.
Borromeo, Sarmiento’s then counsel of record, had the notice of the December 30, 2010 Resolution,
and not February 10, 2011, the date when Sarmiento was personally notified thereof. This is in
consonance with the well-settled rule that if a litigant is represented by counsel, notices of all kinds,
including court orders and decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to him is considered
notice to his client.
****
256
222. H.H. Hollero Const, Inc. vs. GSIS, 736 SCRA 303, September 24, 2014
Syllabi Class :Insurance Law ; Prescription ; Final Rejection ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; Final Rejection; Words and Phrases; “Final rejection” simply means denial by the
insurer of the claims of the insured and not the rejection or denial by the insurer of the insured’s motion
or request for reconsideration.-
—As correctly observed by the CA, “final rejection” simply means denial by the insurer of the claims
of the insured and not the rejection or denial by the insurer of the insured’s motion or request for
reconsideration. The rejection referred to should be construed as the rejection in the first instance, as
in the two instances above discussed.
2. Insurance Law; Contracts; Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed
according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties themselves have used.-
—Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to the sense and meaning
of the terms which the parties themselves have used. If such terms are clear and unambiguous, they
must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense.
3. Same; Prescription; Case law illumines that the prescriptive period for the insured’s action for
indemnity should be reckoned from the “final rejection” of the claim.-
—Section 10 of the General Conditions of the subject CAR Policies commonly read: 10. If a claim is in
any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration is made or used in support thereof, or if any fraudulent
means or devices are used by the Insured or anyone acting on his behalf to obtain any benefit under
this Policy, or if a claim is made and rejected and no action or suit is commenced within twelve months
after such rejection or, in case of arbitration taking place as provided herein, within twelve months
after the Arbitrator or Arbitrators or Umpire have made their award, all benefit under this Policy shall
be forfeited. (Emphases supplied) In this relation, case law illumines that the prescriptive period for
the insured’s action for indemnity should be reckoned from the “final rejection” of the claim.
****
257
223. People vs. Go, 736 SCRA 501, September 24, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Parties ; Indispensable Parties ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; The absence of such indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as
to the absent parties but even as to those present.-
—While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal of an
action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or
on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just, it remains essential — as
it is jurisdictional — that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before the court
renders judgment. This is because the absence of such indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
as to those present.
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258
224. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Amor, 737 SCRA 509, October 07, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ;
1. Same; Court Personnel; It must be emphasized that those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of
justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the
Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the
service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms
of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice
system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts
towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the
public.
2. Administrative Law; Grave Abuse of Authority; Words and Phrases; Grave abuse of authority is
defined as a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who, under color of his office, wrongfully
inflicts upon a person any bodily harm, imprisonment, or other injury; it is an act characterized with
cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority.-
3. Same; Grave Misconduct; Dismissal from Service; To warrant dismissal from service, the
misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling.-
—Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal
from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling.
The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a
direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting
either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office.
In order to differentiate grave misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.
4. Same; Same; It is generally contrary to human nature to remain silent and say nothing in the face
of false accusations.-—In the instant case, the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of the charges
against him. As aptly pointed out, respondent’s failure to file a comment despite all the opportunities
afforded him constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself. In the natural order of things, a man
would resist an unfounded claim or imputation against him. It is generally contrary to human nature to
remain silent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. As such, respondent’s silence may thus
be construed as an implied admission and acknowledgment of the veracity of the allegations against
him.
5. Same; Judges; Gross Misconduct; Insubordination; —The OCA properly found respondent guilty
of Gross Misconduct and Insubordination for refusing to comply with the numerous directives of the
Court to file a comment on the administrative complaint against him. Verily, a judge who deliberately
and continuously fails and refuses to comply with the resolution of the Court is guilty of the same. Such
willful disobedience and disregard of the directives of the Court constitute grave and serious
misconduct affecting his fitness and worthiness of the honor and integrity attached to his office. In this
case, it is noteworthy that respondent was afforded several opportunities, not to mention a generous
amount of time to comply with the Court’s lawful orders, but he has failed and continuously refused to
heed the same. This continued refusal to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court is glaring
proof that he has become disinterested to remain with the judicial system to which he purports to belong.
6. Same; Same; Resignation; It is well-settled that resignation should not be used either as an escape
or an easy way out to evade an administrative liability or administrative sanction.-
—The OCA correctly noted that respondent’s automatic resignation due to his filing of a COC for the
2002 Barangay Elections did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction in determining his administrative
liability. It is well-settled that resignation should not be used either as an escape or an easy way out to
evade an administrative liability or administrative sanction. In this light, respondent’s administrative
liability for his acts stands.
****
259
225. Re: Anonymous Letter vs. Soluren, 737 SCRA 522, October 08, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ;
1. Same; Same; Those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their
part immeasurably affects its honor and dignity and the people’s confidence in it.-
—As parting words, court employees like Tuzon would do well to constantly keep in mind that those in
the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects
its honor and dignity and the people’s confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible
individuals in the service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would
violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people
in the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine
its efforts towards an effective and efficient administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes
of the public.
2. Administrative Law; Dismissal from Service; Grave Misconduct; To warrant dismissal from
service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling.-
—Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the
misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct
must imply a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation
to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order
to differentiate Grave Misconduct from Simple Misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule, must be manifest in the former.
3. Same; Court Personnel; Court Researchers; The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) correctly
found that Tuzon, being a Legal Researcher, was not authorized to receive any settlement money from
party-litigants.-
—The OCA therefore correctly found that Tuzon, being a Legal Researcher, was not authorized to
receive any settlement money from party-litigants. Neither was it shown that Judge Soluren instructed
him to receive the same. Having kept the money in his possession and exercised control over it, Tuzon
evidently overstepped his authority and, thus, committed a form of misconduct.
****
260
226. Centennial Guarantee Assu Corp vs. Universal Motors Corp, 737 SCRA 654, Oct 8, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Suretyship ;
1. Civil Law; Suretyship; That CGAC’s financial standing differs from that of NSSC does not negate
the order of execution pending appeal. As the latter’s surety, CGAC is considered by law as being the
same party as the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching the obligation of the latter, and
their liabilities are interwoven as to be inseparable. Verily, in a contract of suretyship, one lends his
credit by joining in the principal debtor’s obligation so as to render himself directly and primarily
responsible with him, and without reference to the solvency of the principal. Thus, execution pending
appeal against NSSC means that the same course of action is warranted against its surety, CGAC. The
same reason stands for CGAC’s other principal, Orimaco, who was determined to have permanently
left the country with his family to evade execution of any judgment against him.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Execution Pending Appeal; The execution of a
judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final judgment may be
executed; hence, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules), the existence of “good reasons”
for the immediate execution of a judgment is an indispensable requirement as this is what confers
discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending appeal.-
—The execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule that only a final
judgment may be executed; hence, under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules), the existence
of “good reasons” for the immediate execution of a judgment is an indispensable requirement as this
is what confers discretionary power on a court to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. Good
reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying immediate execution, lest judgment becomes
illusory, that is, the prevailing party’s chances for recovery on execution from the judgment debtor are
altogether nullified. The “good reason” yardstick imports a superior circumstance demanding urgency
that will outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party and one such “good reason” that has been
held to justify discretionary execution is the imminent danger of insolvency of the defeated party.
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261
227. Zuñiga-Santos vs. Santos-Gran, 738 SCRA 33, October 08, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Reconveyance ; Prescription ;
1. Same; Same; Prescription; To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for
reconveyance, the plaintiff’s possession of the disputed property is material. If there is an actual need
to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession, the action for reconveyance based
on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the reference point being the date of registration of the
deed or the issuance of the title. On the other hand, if the real owner of the property remains in
possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does
not run against him and in such case, the action for reconveyance would be in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title which is imprescriptible.
2. Actions; Dismissal of Actions; —Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are
distinct grounds to dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations
in the pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for
failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion
to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised
any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or
evidence presented by the plaintiff.
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Elements of.-
—A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state
the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.
4. Same; Complaints; Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court states that the complaint need only allege
the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.-
—It is well to point out that the plaintiff’s cause of action should not merely be “stated” but,
importantly, the statement thereof should be “sufficient.” This is why the elementary test in a motion to
dismiss on such ground is whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the
relief demanded. As a corollary, it has been held that only ultimate facts and not legal conclusions or
evidentiary facts are considered for purposes of applying the test. This is consistent with Section 1, Rule
8 of the Rules of Court which states that the complaint need only allege the ultimate facts or the essential
facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if they cannot be stricken out without
leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the
veracity, of the material allegations, it follows that the analysis should be confined to the four corners
of the complaint, and no other.
5. Civil Law; Reconveyance; An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property,
wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.-
—It is evident that petitioner ultimately seeks for the reconveyance to her of the subject properties
through the nullification of their supposed sale to Gran. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks
to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner. Having alleged
the commission of fraud by Gran in the transfer and registration of the subject properties in her name,
there was, in effect, an implied trust created by operation of law pursuant to Article 1456 of the Civil
Code which provides: Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining
it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes.
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262
228. Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59, October 08, 2014
Syllabi Class: Constitutional Law ; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC) ; Right to Privacy ; Sex
Videos ;
1. Same; Same; Right to Privacy; Sex Videos; As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter
evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to
life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account
certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible.-
—In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in
life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of
this video — which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for
public consumption — he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of
his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible
transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually
proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial
in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data
petition dismissible, as in this case.
2. Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); —A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule
on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective
and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most
especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as “the right to control the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself.”
3. Same; Same; As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands
as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the
issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently
alleges, among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the petition must adequately
show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty
or security on the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of
the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague and doubtful.
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263
229. Canuel vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, 738 SCRA 120, October 13, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Work-Related Illness ;
1. Same; Same; Same; —Considering the constitutional mandate on labor as well as relative
jurisprudential context, the rule, restated for a final time, should be as follows: if the seafarer’s work-
related injury or illness (that eventually causes his medical repatriation and, thereafter, his death, as
in this case) occurs during the term of his employment, then the employer becomes liable for death
compensation benefits under Section 20(A) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. The provision cannot be construed
otherwise for to do so would not only transgress prevailing constitutional policy and deride the bearings
of relevant case law but also result in a travesty of fairness and an indifference to social justice.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Death Benefits; The provisions currently governing the entitlement of the
seafarer’s beneficiaries to death benefits are found in Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Part A(1)
thereof states that the seafarer’s beneficiaries may successfully claim death benefits if they are able to
establish that the seafarer’s death is (a) work-related, and (b) had occurred during the term of his
employment contract.
3. Same; Same; Same; That Nancing was suffering from lung cancer, which was found to have been
preexisting, hardly impels a contrary conclusion since — as the LA herein earlier noted — the February
20, 2007 injury actually led to the deterioration of his condition. As held in More Maritime Agencies,
Inc. v. NLRC, 307 SCRA 189 (1999), “[i]f the injury is the proximate cause of [the seafarer’s] death
or disability for which compensation is sought, [his] previous physical condition x x x is unimportant
and recovery may be had for injury independent of any preexisting weakness or disease,” viz.:
Compensability x x x does not depend on whether the injury or disease was preexisting at the time of
the employment but rather if the disease or injury is work-related or aggravated his condition. It is
indeed safe to presume that, at the very least, the arduous nature of [the seafarer’s] employment had
contributed to the aggravation of his injury, if indeed it was preexisting at the time of his employment.
Therefore, it is but just that he be duly compensated for it. It is not necessary, in order for an employee
to recover compensation, that he must have been in perfect condition or health at the time he received
the injury, or that he be free from disease. Every workman brings with him to his employment certain
infirmities, and while the employer is not the insurer of the health of his employees, he takes them as he
finds them, and assumes the risk of having a weakened condition aggravated by some injury which
might not hurt or bother a perfectly normal, healthy person. If the injury is the proximate cause of his
death or disability for which compensation is sought, the previous physical condition of the employee
is unimportant and recovery may be had for injury independent of any preexisting weakness or disease.
4. Same; Same; Same; With respect to the second requirement for death compensability, the Court
takes this opportunity to clarify that while the general rule is that the seafarer’s death should occur
during the term of his employment, the seafarer’s death occurring after the termination of his
employment due to his medical repatriation on account of a work-related injury or illness constitutes
an exception thereto. This is based on a liberal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC as impelled by the
plight of the bereaved heirs who stand to be deprived of a just and reasonable compensation for the
seafarer’s death, notwithstanding its evident work-connection. The present petition is a case in point.
Here, Nancing’s repatriation occurred during the eighth (8th) month of his one (1) year employment
contract. Were it not for his injury, which had been earlier established as work-related, he would not
have been repatriated for medical reasons and his contract consequently terminated pursuant to Part
1 of Section 18(B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
5. Same; Same; Liberal Construction; A strict and literal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC,
especially when the same would result into inequitable consequences against labor, is not subscribed
to in this jurisdiction. Concordant with the State’s avowed policy to give maximum aid and full
protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, contracts of labor,
such as the 2000 POEA-SEC, are deemed to be so impressed with public interest that the more
beneficial conditions must be endeavoured in favor of the laborer. The rule therefore is one of liberal
construction. As enunciated in the case of Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. NLRC, 353 SCRA
47 (2001): The POEA-Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the
protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment
6. Same; Same; Work-Related Illness; It is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness
which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his employment.-
264
—Applying the rule on liberal construction, the Court is thus brought to the recognition that medical
repatriation cases should be considered as an exception to Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
Accordingly, the phrase “work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his employment
contract” under Part A(1) of the said provision should not be strictly and literally construed to mean
that the seafarer’s work-related death should have precisely occurred during the term of his
employment. Rather, it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually
causes his death should have occurred during the term of his employment. Taking all things into
account, the Court reckons that it is by this method of construction that undue prejudice to the laborer
and his heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be championed. For if the
laborer’s death was brought about (whether fully or partially) by the work he had harbored for his
master’s profit, then it is but proper that his demise be compensated. Here, since it has been established
that (a) the seafarer had been suffering from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his
employment, (b) his injury or illness was the cause for his medical repatriation, and (c) it was later
determined that the injury or illness for which he was medically repatriated was the proximate cause
of his actual death although the same occurred after the term of his employment, the above mentioned
rule should squarely apply. Perforce, the present claim for death benefits should be granted.
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265
230. Rimando vs. Aldaba, 738 SCRA 232, October 13, 2014
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 ; Bouncing Checks Law ; Estafa ;
1. Same; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; Bouncing Checks Law; Estafa; Essentially, while a BP 22 case
and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different
causes of action, which, under the law, are considered “separate, distinct, and independent” from each
other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final adjudication — both as to their criminal and
civil aspects — subject to the prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case
concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing whatsoever in
the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance.
2. Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; The extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only
civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of
which the accused is acquitted.-
—At the outset, the Court notes that Rimando’s acquittal in the estafa case does not necessarily absolve
her from any civil liability to private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-settled that “the acquittal of
the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action
based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused
did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.”
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266
231. CIR vs. Burmeister andWain Scandi Contractor Mindanao, Inc.,739 SCRA 147, Oct 22, 2014
Syllabi Class :Taxation ;
1. Same; Indeed, it has been pronounced time and again that taxes are the lifeblood of the government
and, consequently, tax laws must be faithfully and strictly implemented as they are not intended to be
liberally construed. Hence, with this in mind and in light of the foregoing considerations, the Court so
holds that the CTA En Banc committed reversible error when it granted respondent’s claim for refund
or tax credit despite its noncompliance with the mandatory periods under Section 112(D) (now
renumbered as Section 112[C]) of RA 8424. Accordingly, the claim for refund/tax credit must be denied.
2. Taxation; In the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Dev’t. Corp. v. CIR (Atlas), 524 SCRA 73,
which was promulgated on June 8, 2007, the two-year prescriptive period stated in Section 112(A) was
counted from the date of payment of the output VAT. At that time, the output VAT must be paid at the
time of filing of the quarterly tax returns, which meant within 20 days following the end of each quarter.
However, on September 12, 2008, the Atlas doctrine was abandoned in the case of CIR v. Mirant
Pagbilao Corp., 565 SCRA 154, which adopted the verba legis rule and counted the two-year
prescriptive period from the “close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made” as expressly
stated in the law, regardless when the input VAT was paid. In the recent case of CIR v. San Roque
Power Corporation (San Roque), 690 SCRA 336, promulgated on February 12, 2013, the Court
clarified that (a) the Atlas doctrine was effective only from its promulgation on June 8, 2007 until its
abandonment on September 12, 2008 in Mirant, and (b) prior to the Atlas doctrine, Section 112(A)
should be applied following the verba legis rule adopted in Mirant.
3. Same; Tax Refund; Tax Credit; The taxpayer can file its administrative claim for refund or credit at any
time within the two (2)-year prescriptive period. If it files its claim on the last day of said period, it is still filed
on time. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) will have one hundred twenty (120) days from such
filing to decide the claim. If the CIR decides the claim on the 120th day, or does not decide it on that day, the
taxpayer still has thirty (30) days to file its judicial claim with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA); otherwise, the
judicial claim would be, properly speaking, dismissed for being filed out of time and not, as the CTA En Banc
puts it, prescribed.-
—In fine, the taxpayer can file its administrative claim for refund or credit at any time within the two-year
prescriptive period. If it files its claim on the last day of said period, it is still filed on time. The CIR will have
120 days from such filing to decide the claim. If the CIR decides the claim on the 120th day, or does not decide
it on that day, the taxpayer still has 30 days to file its judicial claim with the CTA; otherwise, the judicial claim
would be, properly speaking, dismissed for being filed out of time and not, as the CTA En Banc puts it, prescribed.
It bears emphasis that Section 112(D) (now renumbered as Section 112[C]) of RA 8424, which is explicit on the
mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30-day period, was already effective on January 1, 1998. Hence,
it is of no consequence that the Aichi and San Roque rulings were not yet in existence when respondent’s
administrative claim was filed in 1999, so as to rid itself of the said section’s mandatory and jurisdictional
application.
4. Same; Same; Same; The inaction of the CIR on the claim during the 120-day period is, by express
provision of law, “deemed a denial” of such claim, and the failure of the taxpayer to file its judicial
claim within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period shall render the “deemed a denial”
decision of the CIR final and inappealable. The right to appeal to the CTA from a decision or “deemed
a denial” decision of the Commissioner is merely a statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. The
exercise of such statutory privilege requires strict compliance with the conditions attached by the statute
for its exercise. Thus, respondent’s failure to comply with the statutory conditions is fatal to its claim.
This is so, notwithstanding the fact that the CIR, for his part, failed to raise the issue of noncompliance
with the mandatory periods at the earliest opportunity.
5. Same; Same; Same; In the case of Nippon Express (Philippines) Corporation v. CIR, 693 SCRA 456
(2013), the Court ruled that, because the 120+30-day period is jurisdictional, the issue of whether the
taxpayer complied with the said time frame may be broached at any stage, even on appeal. Well-settled
is the rule that the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at any time during the
proceedings. Jurisdiction cannot be waived because it is conferred by law and is not dependent on the
consent or objection or the acts or omissions of the parties or any one of them. Therefore, respondent’s
contention on this score is of no moment.
****
267
232. Majestic Finance and Investment Co., Inc. vs. Tito, 739 SCRA 217, October 22, 2014
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases ;
1. Constitutional Law; Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases; The expeditious disposition of cases is
as much the duty of the plaintiff as the court.-
—While Sps. Nazal moved to set the case for pretrial on December 9, 1987, no further action was taken
by them after the court a quo failed to calendar the case and set the same for pretrial. Disconcerting is
the fact that it took Sps. Nazal almost eleven (11) years, or on October 20, 1998 to move for the setting
of the case for hearing, as they were apparently compelled to act only upon the threat of being
dispossessed of the subject property with the filing of the unlawful detainer case by the new registered
owners, Sps. Lim. Notably, while under both the present and the old Rules of Court, the clerk of court
has the duty to set the case for pretrial, the same does not relieve the plaintiffs of their own duty to
prosecute the case diligently. Truth be told, the expeditious disposition of cases is as much the duty of
the plaintiff as the court.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Actions; Intervention; Case law states that intervention is never
an independent action, but is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation.-
—Case law states that intervention is never an independent action, but is merely ancillary and
supplemental to the existing litigation. Its purpose is not to obstruct or unnecessarily delay the placid
operation of the machinery of trial, but merely to afford one not an original party, who is claiming a
certain right or interest in the pending case, the opportunity to appear and be joined so he could assert
or protect such right or interests. In other words, the right of an intervenor should only be in aid of the
right of the original party. Thus, as a general rule, where the right of the latter has ceased to exist, there
is nothing to aid or fight for and, consequently, the right of intervention ceases.
****
268
233. Metro Manila Shopping Mecca Corp. vs. Toledo, 739 SCRA 399, November 10, 2014
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ; Compromise Agreements ;
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269
234. Racelis vs. United Philippine Lines, Inc., 740 SCRA 122, November 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Work-Related Death ;
1. Same; Same; Work-Related Death; In essence, the Supreme Court (SC) held that under such
circumstance, the work-related death need not precisely occur during the term of his employment as it
is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death had
occurred during the term of his employment.-
—Consistent with the State’s avowed policy to afford full protection to labor as enshrined in Article
XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the POEA-SEC was designed primarily for the protection and
benefit of Filipino seafarers in the pursuit of their employment onboard ocean-going vessels. As such,
it is a standing principle that its provisions are to be construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and
liberally in their favor. Guided by this principle, the Court, in the recent case of Canuel v. Magsaysay
Maritime Corporation, 738 SCRA 120 (2014), recognized that a medical repatriation case constitutes
an exception to the second requirement under Section 20(A)(1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, i.e., that the
seafarer’s death had occurred during the term of his employment, in view of the terminative
consequences of a medical repatriation under Section 18(B) of the same. In essence, the Court held that
under such circumstance, the work-related death need not precisely occur during the term of his
employment as it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes
his death had occurred during the term of his employment.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment
Contract; Deemed incorporated in every seafarer’s employment contract, denominated as the POEA-
SEC or the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract, is a set
of standard provisions determined and implemented by the POEA, called the “Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels,” which
are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of
Filipino seafarers onboard foreign ocean-going vessels.
3. Same; Same; Work-Related Illness; Case law explains that “[t]he words ‘arising out of’ refer to
the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words ‘in the course
of’ refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. As a matter of
general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise ‘in the course of employment’ when it takes
place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while
he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.”
4. Same; Same; Same; Even if the illness is not listed under Section 32-A of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) as an occupational disease
or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to
overcome the presumption.-
—While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is not listed as an occupational
disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC, Section 20(B)(4) of the same explicitly provides
that “[t]he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during
the term of his contract are as follows: (t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are
disputably presumed as work-related.” In other words, the 2000 POEA-SEC “has created a disputable
presumption in favor of compensability[,] saying that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 are
disputably presumed as work-related. This means that even if the illness is not listed under Section 32-
A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness, it will still be presumed as work-related, and
it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the presumption.” This presumption should be
overturned only when the employer’s refutation is found to be supported by substantial evidence, which,
as traditionally defined is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to
support a conclusion.”
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270
235. Cosmos Bottling Corp vs. Commission En Banc of the SEC, 740 SCRA 169, Nov 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Admin Agencies; SEC; Delegation of Powers; Appeals ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Appeals; This power of review is squarely addressed by Section 11-1, Rule XI
of the 2006 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rules of Procedure, which provides that “[a]n
appeal to the Commission En Banc may be taken from a decision, order, or resolution issued by an
Operating Department if there are questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.”-
—Naturally, the aforesaid provision also gives the SEC the power to review the acts performed by its
operating departments in the exercise of the former’s delegated functions. This power of review is
squarely addressed by Section 11-1, Rule XI of the 2006 SEC Rules of Procedure, which provides that
“[a]n appeal to the Commission En Banc may be taken from a decision, order, or resolution issued by
an Operating Department if there are questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.”
2. Administrative Agencies; Securities and Exchange Commission; Delegation of Powers; As an
administrative agency with both regulatory and adjudicatory functions, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) was given the authority to delegate some of its functions to, inter alia, its various
operating departments, such as the SEC-Corporation Finance Department (SEC-CFD), the
Enforcement and Investor Protection Department, and the Company Registration and Monitoring
Department, pursuant to Section 4.6 of the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).-
—As an administrative agency with both regulatory and adjudicatory functions, the SEC was given the
authority to delegate some of its functions to, inter alia, its various operating departments, such as the
SEC-CFD, the Enforcement and Investor Protection Department, and the Company Registration and
Monitoring Department, pursuant to Section 4.6 of the SRC.
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271
236. S.V. More Pharma Corp vs. Drugmakers Lab, Inc., 740 SCRA 253, Nov 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Temperate Damages ;
1. Temperate Damages; Article 2224 of the Civil Code states that “temperate or moderate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty.”-
—Considering that respondents palpably suffered some form of pecuniary loss resulting from
petitioners’ breach of contract, the Court deems it proper to, instead, award in their favor the sum of
P100,000.00 in the form of temperate damages. This course of action is hinged on Article 2224 of the
Civil Code which states that “temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less
than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty,” as in this case.
2. Civil Law; Damages; Actual Damages; As case law holds, the amount of loss warranting the grant
of actual or compensatory damages must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, based on
competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.-
—Since the sales projection on which the CA based its award for actual damages was derived from
figures representing the “alleged unregistered or fabricated sales invoices” of E.A. Northam from 1990
to 1993 and the “desired profit” of 15-20%, it would therefore be a legal mishap to sustain that award.
As case law holds, the amount of loss warranting the grant of actual or compensatory damages must
be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, based on competent proof and the best evidence
obtainable by the injured party. The CA’s finding on respondents’ supposed loss of profits in the amount
of P6,000,000.00 based on the erroneous sales projection hardly meets this requirement. Accordingly,
it must be set aside.
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272
237. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. vs. Hipe, Jr., 740 SCRA 330, November 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Compensable Illness ;
1. Same; Same; Compensable Illness; Two (2) elements must concur for an injury or illness of a
seafarer to be compensable: (a) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (b) that the work-related
injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract.
of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the
character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.
3. Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; Burden of Proof; In labor disputes, grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported
by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. The onus probandi falls on the seafarer to establish his claim for
disability benefits by the requisite quantum of evidence to justify the grant of relief.
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273
238. Apo Cement Corp vs. Mingson Mining Industries Corp, 740 SCRA 383, Nov. 12, 2014
Syllabi Class :Due Process ;
1. Same; An apparent lack of due process may be raised by a party at any time since due process is a
jurisdictional requisite that all tribunals, whether administrative or judicial, are duty-bound to observe.
In Salva v. Valle, 694 SCRA 422 (2013), the Court pronounced that “[a] decision rendered without due
process is void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate
action, or by resisting such decision in any action or proceeding where it is invoked.” The Court sees
no defensible reason as to why this principle should not be herein applied.
2. Due Process; Mines and Mining; Philippine Mining Act of 1995; Sections 223 (on preliminary
conference), 224 (on hearing), and 227 (on the proceedings before the POA), as well as Sections 221
(on due course) and 222 (on answers) of DENR DAO 95-23, or the Implementing Rules of the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995, clearly require that the parties involved in mining disputes be given the opportunity
to be heard. These rules — which were already in effect during the time the dispute between the parties
arose — flesh out the core requirement of due process; thus, a stark and unjustified contravention of
the same would oust the errant tribunal of its jurisdiction and, in effect, render its decision null and
void.
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274
239. Mah-Arevalo vs. Mantua, 740 SCRA 567, November 19, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Judges ; Immorality ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In the case at bar, it was adequately proven that respondent engaged in an
extramarital affair with his mistress. The respective testimonies of complainant and Nuñez clearly
demonstrated how respondent paraded his mistress in full view of his colleagues, court personnel, and
even the general public by bringing her to fiestas and other public places, without any regard to
consequences that may arise as a result thereof. Worse, respondent even had the audacity to use his
chambers as a haven for their morally depraved acts. In doing so, respondent failed to adhere to the
exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of the judiciary is expected to observe.
There is no doubt that engaging in an extramarital affair is not only a violation of the moral standards
expected of the members and employees of the judiciary but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the
institution of marriage which the Court abhors and is, thus, punishable.
2. Administrative Law; Judges; Halls of Justice; The Halls of Justice may be used only for purposes
directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any
other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein
any trade or profession.-
—SC Administrative Circular No. 3-92 explicitly states that the Halls of Justice may only be used for
functions related to the administration of justice and for no other purpose: SC ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 3-92, AUGUST 31, 1992 TO: ALL JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL SUBJECT:
PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL
PURPOSES All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice may be used
only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not
be devoted to any other use, least of all as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for
carrying on therein any trade or profession.
3. Same; Same; Immorality; Words and Phrases; Immorality has been defined “to include not only
sexual matters but also ‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency,
depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference
to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude toward good order
and public welfare.’”-
—The Investigating Justice and the OCA correctly found respondent guilty of Immorality. Immorality
has been defined “to include not only sexual matters but also ‘conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless
conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.’” It is a serious charge which may be
punishable by any of the following: (a) dismissal from service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as
the Court may determine except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
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275
240. Michelin Asia Pacific Application Support Ctr, Inc. vs. Ortiz, 741 SCRA 121, Nov 19, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments; Settled is the rule that
a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable.-
—A definitive final judgment [— such as the NLRC’s March 24, 2008 Resolution —] however
erroneous, is no longer subject to change or revision.” Settled is the rule that “[a] decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the
modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact and law.”
of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
abused the discretion conferred upon them.-
—To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that
the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon them. Grave abuse
of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. To be considered “grave,” the discretionary authority must be exercised in a
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law.
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276
241. Garcia, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 741 SCRA 172, November 19, 2014
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Technical Malversation ;
1. Criminal Law; Technical Malversation; Technical Malversation does not include, or is not
necessarily included in the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.-
—While Garcia insists upon the sufficiency of his evidence to indict respondents for Technical
Malversation, the Court cannot pass upon this issue, considering that the Complaint-Affidavit filed
before the Ombudsman originally charged respondents not with Technical Malversation under Article
220 of the RPC, but with Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents,
defined and penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171 of the RPC, a complex crime. It bears
stressing that the elements of Malversation of Public Funds are distinctly different from those of
Technical Malversation. In the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, the offender misappropriates
public funds for his own personal use or allows any other person to take such public funds for the
latter’s personal use. On the other hand, in Technical Malversation, the public officer applies public
funds under his administration not for his or another’s personal use, but to a public use other than that
for which the fund was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical Malversation does not include, or
is not necessarily included in the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.
2. Ombudsman; The present Constitution and RA 6770, otherwise known as the “Ombudsman Act of
1989,” have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in the exercise of its
investigatory and prosecutorial powers, to pass upon criminal complaints involving public officials and
employees. Hence, as a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s findings and
respects the initiative and independence inherent in its office, which “beholden to no one, acts as the
champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.”
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; —Probable cause, for the purpose of filing
a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. To engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and to determine if the suspect is probably guilty of the
same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based
on the principle that every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most,
no criminal offense.
4. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Elements of Violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.-
—The elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019 are as follows: (a) the offender must
be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (b) he must have acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused
any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
5. Administrative Agencies; Commission on Audit;—That the Ombudsman had not, in any manner,
mentioned the two (2) CoA AOMs, i.e., AOM Nos. 2005-004-100 (2004) (i.e., the CoA Memo) and 2004-
26, in its ruling leads the Court to believe that it deliberately failed to consider the same. As the Court
sees it, these are significant pieces of evidence which should not have been casually ignored. This stems
from a becoming respect which all government agencies should accord to the CoA’s findings. Verily,
being the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government, the CoA is vested with broad powers
over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and
property. As held in the case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 (2013): [I]t is the general policy of
the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-
created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are
accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness
or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.
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277
242. Layos vs. Villanueva, 743 SCRA 334, December 01, 2014
1. Same; Same; It must be stressed that public interest requires that an attorney exert his best efforts
in the prosecution or defense of a client’s cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interests of his client, he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the
bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. Lawyers are indispensable
part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a time when strong and
disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the legal profession, strict compliance with one’s oath of office
and the canons of professional ethics is an imperative.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Under Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the CPR, it is the
lawyer’s duty to serve his client’s interest with utmost zeal, candor and diligence. As such, he must keep
abreast of all the developments in his client’s case and should inform the latter of the same, as it is
crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence.
3. Same; Same; As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever
important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of
any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping
the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust
and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is
defending the client’s interests. In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his
actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. As such, the lawyer is expected to
be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the
right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a wholehearted
fealty to the client’s cause.
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278
243. Javier vs. Lumontad, 744 SCRA 1, December 03, 2014
Syllabi Class :RemLaw; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; Ejectment; Jurisdiction ; MTC;
1. Same; Same; Same; Ejectment; Jurisdiction; Municipal Trial Courts; Even in cases where the
issue of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain
exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as they are given the authority to make an
initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession.-
—Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts by
express provision of Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in relation to Section 1, Rule 70, of the
Rules of Court. Even in cases where the issue of possession is closely intertwined with the issue of
ownership, the first level courts maintain exclusive and original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, as
they are given the authority to make an initial determination of ownership for the purpose of settling
the issue of possession. It must be clarified, however, that such adjudication is merely provisional and
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property. It is,
therefore, not conclusive as to the issue of ownership.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; In forcible entry, the complaint must
necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that
possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.-
— As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao, 662 SCRA 14 (2011), “[t]he invariable rule is that
what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are
the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of
facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint must necessarily allege that
one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that possession by another through
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential, however, that the complaint should
expressly employ the language of the law, but it would suffice that facts are set up showing that
dispossession took place under said conditions. In other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior
to the defendant’s act of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in
prior physical possession of the property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as the
allegations demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter.”
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279
244. Tze Sun Wong vs. Wong, 743 SCRA 567, December 03, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Burden of Proof ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; —Petitioner’s argument is correct in theory since
deliberation by all members of the collegial body is evidently what the rule contemplates, with the votes
of only two (2) members being sufficient for a decision to prevail. Unfortunately, however, petitioner
has not shown any proof that deliberations were not conducted by all commissioners before the
questioned Judgment was made. The rule is well-settled that he who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence. Thus, once more, his self-serving assertion cannot be
given credence. This is especially so in light of the presumption of regularity, which herein ought to
prevail due to the absence of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Bustillo v. People, 620
SCRA 483 (2010), states: The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption
is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction should
be in favor of its lawfulness.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court clearly states that
decisions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions (except to judgments
or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Phils) shall be appealed to the CA under this rule.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Case law explains that “[a] remedy is plain, speedy and
adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or
resolution of the lower court or agency.” In this relation, it has been recognized that the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper “when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and
injury to a party, x x x where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient, x x x and x x x in
case of urgency.” In this case, petitioner instituted an administrative appeal before the Secretary of
Justice and thereafter sought direct recourse to the CA via certiorari, thereby leap-frogging other
available remedies, the first being a subsequent administrative appeal to the OP and, eventually, an
appeal of the OP decision to the CA via Rule 43. While these remedies remained available to him, the
Court deems that they would not afford him speedy and adequate relief in view of the plain imminence
of his deportation, by virtue of the issuance of a warrant of deportation. The urgency of such
circumstance therefore justified his direct resort to certiorari.
4. Same; Same; Same; “In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction
over a case, the petitioner carries the burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not merely
a reversible error but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the impugned order. Showing mere abuse of discretion is not enough, for the abuse must be shown to
be grave. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent
judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to
act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”
5. Administrative Agencies; Bureau of Immigration; Petitioner’s certiorari petition before the CA
basically revolves on his denial of the acts of misrepresentation imputed against him, claiming that the
same do not warrant his deportation. However, the commission of said acts involves factual matters
that have already been established during the proceedings before the BOI Board of Commissioners. In
this regard, it is crucial to point out that “[t]he Bureau is the agency that can best determine whether
petitioner violated certain provisions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. In this
jurisdiction, courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies. By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
administrative departments over matters falling within their jurisdiction, they are in a better position
to pass judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not
finality, by the courts.” As petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated any cogent reason to deviate
from the BOI Board of Commissioners’ findings, courts are wont to defer to its judgment.
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280
245. CBK Power Co Ltd vs. Comm of Internal Revenue, 743 SCRA 693, December 03, 2014
Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Tax Refunds ;
1. Taxation; Tax Refunds; Recently, in Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR, 726 SCRA 637 (2014),
the Court reconciled the pronouncements in the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA
422 (2010), and CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA 336 (2013), cases in the following
manner: Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must therefore be
that during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6,
2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-day period
before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and after the
period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied) In this case, records disclose that CBK Power filed its administrative and judicial claims for
issuance of tax credits on March 29, 2005 and April 18, 2005, respectively or during the period when
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place, i.e., from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As such, it
need not wait for the expiration of the 120-day period before filing its judicial claim before the CTA,
which was timely filed. In view of the foregoing, the CTA En Banc erred in dismissing CBK Power’s
claim on the ground of prematurity and, thus, its ruling must be corrected accordingly.
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281
246. Martinez vs. Martin, 743 SCRA 719, December 03, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Mandamus ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Words and Phrases; As case law defines, a writ
of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the
state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person,
requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official
station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.-
—As case law defines, a writ of mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
jurisdiction, in the name of the state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or board, or
to some corporation or person, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.
It is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty which, as opposed to a
discretionary one, is that which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its
own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. Being an extraordinary remedy,
mandamus is available only when there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, such as a motion for reconsideration.
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282
247. Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership vs. CIR, 744 SCRA 143, December 08, 2014
1. Taxation; Tax Refunds; During the period December 10, 2003 (when Bureau of Internal Revenue
[BIR] Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company
of Asia, Inc. [Aichi], 632 SCRA 422 [2010], case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not
observe the one hundred twenty (120)-day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess
input Value-Added Tax (VAT) before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Before and after the
period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.-
—Recently, in Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR, 726 SCRA 637 (2014), the Court reconciled the
pronouncements in the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422 [2010], and CIR v.
San Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA 336 (2013), cases in the following manner: Reconciling the
pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must therefore be that during the period
December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi
case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-day period before it could file a
judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and after the aforementioned
period (i.e., December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory
and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) In this case,
records disclose that petitioner filed its administrative and judicial claims for refund/credit of its input
VAT in CTA Case No. 8082 on December 28, 2009 and March 30, 2010, respectively, or during the
period when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was in place, i.e., from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010.
As such, it need not wait for the expiration of the 120-day period before filing its judicial claim before
the CTA, and hence, is deemed timely filed. In view of the foregoing, both the CTA Division and the
CTA En Banc erred in dismissing outright petitioner’s claim on the ground of prematurity.
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283
248. PAGCor vs. De Guzman, 744 SCRA 153, December 08, 2014
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings ; Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
1. Same; Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation; Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) is the proper disciplinary authority of PAGCOR employees, and as such,
formal charges against its employees in administrative disciplinary proceedings should emanate from
it, through its Board of Directors.-
—In the case at bar, it is undisputed that PAGCOR was the one that appointed De Guzman to her
position. Adhering to the well-settled principle that the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in
the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested, only PAGCOR has the power to discipline
or remove De Guzman for any transgressions she may have committed. As a corporate entity, PAGCOR
may only act through its Board of Directors as a collective body, which is vested with the power and
responsibility to exercise all corporate powers under the law. Simply put, PAGCOR is the proper
disciplinary authority of PAGCOR employees, and as such, formal charges against its employees in
administrative disciplinary proceedings should emanate from it, through its Board of Directors, as in
this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a general rule, an appeal is not a matter of right but
a mere statutory privilege, and as such, may only be availed in the manner provided by the law and
the rules; However, as in all cases, there are exceptions to the strict application of the rules in
perfecting an appeal, such as when said appeal is meritorious.-
—As a general rule, an appeal is not a matter of right but a mere statutory privilege, and as such, may
only be availed in the manner provided by the law and the rules. Thus, a party who seeks to exercise
the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules; otherwise, the privilege is lost.
Therefore, an appeal must be perfected within the reglementary period provided by law; otherwise, the
decision becomes final and executory. However, as in all cases, there are exceptions to the strict
application of the rules in perfecting an appeal, such as when said appeal is meritorious. Verily, strict
implementation of the rules on appeals must give way to the factual and legal reality that is evident
from the records of the case. After all, the primary objective of the laws is to dispense justice and equity,
not the contrary.
3. Administrative Proceedings; Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Section
16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) requires in
administrative disciplinary proceedings that the disciplinary authority furnish the employee concerned
a formal charge specifying the latter’s acts and/or omissions complained of, and directing him to
answer the charges stated therein.-
—Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) requires in
administrative disciplinary proceedings that the disciplinary authority furnish the employee concerned
a formal charge specifying the latter’s acts and/or omissions complained of, and directing him to
answer the charges stated therein, viz.: Section 16. Formal Charge.—After a finding of a prima facie
case, the disciplining authority shall formally charge the person complained of. The formal charge shall
contain a specification of charge(s), a brief statement of material or relevant facts, accompanied by
certified true copies of the documentary evidence, if any, sworn statements covering the testimony of
witnesses, a directive to answer the charge(s) in writing under oath in not less than seventy-two (72)
hours from receipt thereof, an advice for the respondent to indicate in his answer whether or not he
elects a formal investigation of the charge(s), and a notice that he is entitled to be assisted by a counsel
of his choice.
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284
249. Montallana vs. La Consolacion College Manila, 744 SCRA 163, December 08, 2014
Syllabi Class :Corporations ; Liability of Corporate Officers ;
1. Corporations; Liability of Corporate Officers; Circumstances When Personal Liability of Corporate
Directors, Trustees or Officers Attaches.-
—It is a rule that personal liability of corporate directors, trustees or officers attaches only when: (a)
they assent to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or when they are guilty of bad faith or gross
negligence in directing its affairs, or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the
corporation, its stockholders or other persons; (b) they consent to the issuance of watered down stocks
or when, having knowledge of such issuance, do not forthwith file with the corporate secretary their
written objection; (c) they agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily liable with the
corporation; or (d) they are made by specific provision of law personally answerable for their corporate
action. None of these circumstances, insofar as Mora and Manalili are concerned, were shown to be
present in this case; hence, there is no reason for them to be held liable for Montallana’s backwages.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Willful Disobedience; “Willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work” is one of
the just causes to terminate an employee under Article 296(a) (formerly Article 282[a]) of the Labor
Code.-
—“Willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work” is one of the just causes to terminate an employee under Article 296(a)
(formerly Article 282[a]) of the Labor Code. In order for this ground to be properly invoked as a just
cause for dismissal, the conduct must be willful or intentional, willfulness being characterized by a
wrongful and perverse mental attitude. In Dongon v. Rapid Movers and Forwarders Co., Inc., 704
SCRA 56 (2013), “willfulness” was described as “attended by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude
rendering the employee’s act inconsistent with proper subordination.” It is well to stress that it is the
employer who bears the burden of proving, through substantial evidence, that the aforesaid just cause
— or any other authorized cause for that matter — forms the basis of the employee’s dismissal from
work. Failing in which, the dismissal should be adjudged as illegal.
3. Same; Same; Same; The case of an employee who is compelled to apologize for a previous infraction
but fails to do so is not one which would properly warrant his termination, absent any proof that the
refusal was made in brazen disrespect of his employer.-
—Even on the assumption that there was willful disobedience, still, the Court finds the penalty of
dismissal too harsh. It bears to stress that not every case of insubordination or willful disobedience by
an employee reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal. The penalty to be imposed on an erring
employee must be commensurate with the gravity of his offense. To the Court’s mind, the case of an
employee who is compelled to apologize for a previous infraction but fails to do so is not one which
would properly warrant his termination, absent any proof that the refusal was made in brazen
disrespect of his employer. While there is no question that teachers are held to a peculiar standard of
behavior in view of their significant role in the rearing of our youth, educational institutions are, in the
meantime, held against a legal standard imposed against all employers, among which, is the reservation
of the ultimate penalty of dismissal for serious infractions enumerated as just causes under Article 296
of the Labor Code. Unfortunately, respondents herein failed to prove the seriousness of Montallana’s
omission by the evidentiary benchmark of substantial evidence. And to add, on a related note, while La
Consolacion’s Administrative Affairs Manual discloses that acts of insubordination (particularly, that
of refusing or neglecting to obey the school’s lawful directive) are dismissible violations, they are only
so if imposed as a third sanction. In the same vein, records are bereft of any showing that Montallana’s
failure to apologize was being punished as such.
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285
250. Candelaria vs. People, 744 SCRA 178, December 08, 2014
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Qualified Theft ; Penalties ;
1. Criminal Law; Qualified Theft; Penalties—The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft
depends upon the value of the thing stolen. To prove the value of the stolen property for purposes of
fixing the imposable penalty under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, as amended, the Court explained
in People v. Anabe, 566 SCRA 92 (2008), that the prosecution must present more than a mere
uncorroborated “estimate.” In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate,
the courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken
based on the attendant circumstances of the case. In Merida v. People (Merida), 554 SCRA 366 (2008),
which applied the doctrine enunciated in People v. Dator (Dator), 344 SCRA 222 (2000), the Court
deemed it improper to take judicial notice of the selling price of narra at the time of the commission of
its theft, as such evidence would be “unreliable and inconclusive considering the lack of independent
and competent source of such information.”
2. Criminal Law; Qualified Theft; Elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article 310 in
relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are: (a) the taking of personal
property; (b) the said property belongs to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d)
it be done without the owner’s consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated
in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Circumstantial Evidence;Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; the circumstances proved
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at the
same time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary thereto, a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence.
4. Same; Same; Flight; —Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a congruent
picture that the crime of Qualified Theft had been committed and that Candelaria had perpetrated the
same. To be sure, this determination is not sullied by the fact that Candelaria’s companion, Romano,
had died before he could testify as to the truth of his allegation that the former had threatened him with
a balisong on August 23, 2006. It is a gaping hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was admittedly
placed under Candelaria’s custody and remains unaccounted for. Candelaria did not proffer any
persuasive reason to explain the loss of said goods and merely banked on a general denial, which, as
case law holds, is an inherently weak defense due to the ease by which it can be concocted. With these,
and, moreover, the tell-tale fact that Candelaria has not returned or reported back to work at Unioil
since the incident, the Court draws no other reasonable inference other than that which points to his
guilt. Verily, while it is true that flight per se is not synonymous with guilt, unexplained flight
nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the existence of a guilty conscience, especially when taken together
with all the other circumstantial evidence attendant in this case. Thus, all things considered,
Candelaria’s conviction for the crime of Qualified Theft stands.
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286
251. Daluraya vs. Olivia, 744 SCRA 193, December 08, 2014
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Judgments ;
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires
that the judgment state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of
the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.-
—In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state “whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.”
2. Criminal Law; Civil Liability; Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable; The
acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil
liability.-
—Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the
crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of
Appeals, 350 SCRA 387 (2001), the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our
law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows: Our law recognizes
two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on
the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
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287
252. CBK Power Company Ltd vs. Comm of Internal Revenue, 746 SCRA 93, January 14, 2015
1. Same; Same; Sections 204 and 229 of the NIRC pertain to the refund of erroneously or illegally
collected taxes. Section 204 applies to administrative claims for refund, while Section 229 to judicial
claims for refund. In both instances, the taxpayer’s claim must be filed within two (2) years from the
date of payment of the tax or penalty. However, Section 229 of the NIRC further states the condition
that a judicial claim for refund may not be maintained until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the Commissioner.
2. International Law; Pacta Sunt Servanda; The Philippine Constitution provides for adherence to the
general principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The time-honored international
principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the
part of the states that enter into the agreement. In this jurisdiction, treaties have the force and effect of
law.
3. Taxation; Tax Refunds;It bears reiterating that the application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR
should merely operate to confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief. Since CBK Power had
requested for confirmation from the ITAD on June 8, 2001 and October 28, 2002 before it filed on April
14, 2003 its administrative claim for refund of its excess final withholding taxes, the same should be
deemed substantial compliance with RMO No. 1-2000, as in Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 704 SCRA 216 (2013). To rule otherwise would defeat the purpose
of Section 229 of the NIRC in providing the taxpayer a remedy for erroneously paid tax solely on the
ground of failure to make prior application for tax treaty relief. As the Court exhorted in Republic v.
GST Philippines, Inc., 707 SCRA 695 (2013), while the taxpayer has an obligation to honestly pay the
right taxes, the government has a corollary duty to implement tax laws in good faith; to discharge its
duty to collect what is due to it; and to justly return what has been erroneously and excessively given
to it.
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288
253. Briones vs. Court of Appeals, 746 SCRA 240, January 14, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Venue ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Venue;The general rule is that the venue of real actions is the court which
has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated; while
the venue of personal actions is the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant
resides, at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, jurisprudence in Legaspi v. Rep. of the Phils.,
559 SCRA 410 (2008), instructs that the parties, thru a written instrument, may either introduce another
venue where actions arising from such instrument may be filed, or restrict the filing of said actions in
a certain exclusive venue.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; At the outset, the
Court stresses that “[t]o justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, [the petitioner]
must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion
conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical
manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered ‘grave,’ discretion must be exercised
in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to
all in contemplation of law.”
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289
254. People vs. Tibayan, 746 SCRA 259, January 14, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Estafa ; Ponzi Scheme ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; Ponzi Scheme; Words and Phrases; A Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that
involves the payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new
investors.—To be sure, a Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that involves the payment of
purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers often
solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns with
little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make
promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false appearance that investors are profiting
from a legitimate business. It is not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only
as long as there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the scheme. It is difficult to
sustain the scheme over a long period of time because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later
investors to continue paying the promised profits to early investors. The idea behind this type of swindle
is that the “con-man” collects his money from his second or third round of investors and then absconds
before anyone else shows up to collect. Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the
most.
2. Criminal Law; Estafa; Estafa by Means of Deceit; Elements of.-
—The elements of estafa by means of deceit under this provision are the following: (a) that there must
be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent
representation was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c)
that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced
to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
3. Same; Same; Syndicated Estafa; Elements of.-
—Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate
of five (5) or more persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed
by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’
associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public.
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290
255. Sia vs. Arcenas, 746 SCRA 272, January 14, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Dispositive Portions ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Dispositive Portions; It is well-settled that orders pertaining to
execution of judgments must substantially conform to the dispositive portion of the decision sought to
be executed. As such, it may not vary, or go beyond, the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Where
the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity.
Had the petitioner pursued an action for ejectment or reconveyance, the issuance of writs of possession
and demolition would have been proper; but not in a special civil action for mandamus, as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Words and Phrases; As case law defines, a writ
of mandamus is a “command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the
state or sovereign, directed to an inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person,
requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official
station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law. It is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, which, as opposed to a discretionary one, is that
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his or its own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.”
3. Same; Same; Writs of Possession; Words and Phrases; A writ of possession is defined as a “writ
of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff
to enter the land and give its possession to the person entitled under the judgment.” It may be issued
under the following instances: (a) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496,
otherwise known as “The Land Registration Act”; (b) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in
possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had
intervened; (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118; and (d) in execution sales. Proceeding therefrom, the issuance of a writ of
possession is only proper in order to execute judgments ordering the delivery of specific properties to
a litigant, in accordance with Section 10, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.
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291
256. People vs. Balute, 748 SCRA 172, January 21, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Alibi ; Denials ;
1. Same; Alibi; Denials; It is well-settled that “alibi and denial are outweighed by positive
identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the
[eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter.”-
—In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTC’s finding that the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that Balute poked his gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latter’s mobile phone, and
thereafter, shot him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention. This is buttressed
by Cristita and Blesilda’s positive identification of Balute as the one who committed the crime as
opposed to the latter’s denial and alibi which was correctly considered by both the RTC and the CA as
weak and self-serving, as it is well-settled that “alibi and denial are outweighed by positive
identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the
[eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter.” This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives
of the victim — such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1 Manaois,
respectively — since “[t]he natural interest of witnesses, who are relatives of the victim, in securing
the conviction of the guilty would actually deter them from implicating persons other than the true
culprits.”
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; —It must be stressed that in criminal cases, factual
findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when
such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional circumstances,
such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Court will recalibrate
and evaluate the factual findings of the court below. Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds
no cogent reason to disturb the RTC’s factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
3. Criminal Law; Robbery with Homicide;—In People v. Ibañez, 698 SCRA 161 (2013), the Court
exhaustively explained that “[a] special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a
homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for
robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal
property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used
in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main
purpose, and [the] objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery.” Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance,
it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession
by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate
witnesses in the commission of the crime.
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292
257.Gonzaga vs. People, 746 SCRA 551, January 21, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Reckless Imprudence ; Complex Crimes ;
1. Same; Same; Complex Crimes; Under Article 365 of the RPC, when reckless imprudence in the use
of a motor vehicle results in the death of a person, as in this case, the accused shall be punished with
the penalty of prisión correccional in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of said
penalty should be taken from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisión correccional in its
minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Consequently,
the Court finds a need to modify the penalty to be imposed on Rogelio and thus, sentences him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prisión correccional in its minimum, as minimum, to six
years of prisión correccional in its maximum, as maximum.
2. Criminal Law; Reckless Imprudence; Words and Phrases; Reckless imprudence, as defined in
Article 365 of the RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
3. Same; Same; In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it
must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more
than a mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle — a willful and wanton disregard of the
consequences is required. Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the
meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action
which injures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge
of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of
precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct which supplies the criminal
intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law,
without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault.
4. Same; Same; It is elementary in traffic school that a driver slows down before negotiating a curve
as it may be reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may appear from the opposite direction at any
moment. Hence, excessive speed, combined with other circumstances such as the occurrence of the
accident on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes negligence. Consequently, the Court finds that
Rogelio acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast speed on the wrong side of the road while
approaching the curve where the incident happened, thereby rendering him criminally liable, as well
as civilly accountable for the material damages resulting therefrom.
5. Same; Same; Penalties; Complex Crimes;Here, Rogelio was charged with the offense of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property
under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC, a complex crime. Article 48 of the RPC provides
that when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime, in this case, Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
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293
258. Panay Power Corp vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 746 SCRA 588, Jan. 21, 2015
Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Tax Refunds ; Tax Credit ;
1. Taxation; Tax Refunds; Tax Credit; During the period December 10, 2003 (when Bureau of Internal
Revenue [BIR] Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the CIR v. Aichi Forging
Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422, case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not observe
the one hundred twenty (120)-day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund of excess input
value-added tax (VAT) before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). Before and after the aforementioned
and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim.-
—Recently, in Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR, 726 SCRA 637 (2014), the Court reconciled the
pronouncements in the CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010), and CIR v.
San Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA 336 (2013), cases in the following manner: Reconciling the
pronouncements in the Aichi and San Roque cases, the rule must therefore be that during the period
December 10, 2003 (when BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi
case was promulgated), taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-day period before it could file a
judicial claim for refund of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and after the aforementioned
and jurisdictional to the filing of such claim. (Emphases and underscoring supplied) In this case,
records disclose that petitioner filed its administrative and judicial claims for refund/credit of its input
VAT on December 29, 2005 and January 20, 2006, respectively, or during the period when BIR Ruling
No. DA-489-03 was in place, i.e., from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010. As such, it need not wait
for the expiration of the 120-day period before filing its judicial claim before the CTA, and hence, is
deemed timely filed. In view of the foregoing, the CTA En Banc erred in dismissing outright petitioner’s
claim on the ground of prematurity.
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294
259. Ruks Konsult and Const vs. Adworld Sign and Advertising Corp, 746SCRA 622, Jan21, 2015
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Quasi-Delicts ; Joint Tortfeasors ; Solidary Obligations ;
1. Same; Same; Joint Tortfeasors; Solidary Obligations; Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint
tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage; Joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals,
to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.-
—Both Transworld and Ruks were fully aware that the foundation for the former’s billboard was weak;
yet, neither of them took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely relied on each other’s
word that repairs would be done to such foundation, but none was done at all. Clearly, the foregoing
circumstances show that both Transworld and Ruks are guilty of negligence in the construction of the
former’s billboard, and perforce, should be held liable for its collapse and the resulting damage to
Adworld’s billboard structure. As joint tortfeasors, therefore, they are solidarily liable to Adworld.
Verily, “[j]oint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit. They are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose
acts, if independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury. Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code,
joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each
liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful
act themselves.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Factual findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA), are entitled to great weight by the Supreme Court (SC) and are
deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record.-
—At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled
to great weight by the Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on
record. Absent any exceptions to this rule — such as when it is established that the trial court ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances that, if considered, would
change the outcome of the case — such findings must stand.
3. Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence defines negligence as the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.-
—Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
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295
260. Office of the Ombudsman vs. De Zosa, 746 SCRA 632, January 21, 2015
Syllabi Class :Dismissal from Service ; Misconduct ;
1. Dismissal from Service; Misconduct; To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be
grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling.-
—Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the
misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct
must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to
and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order
to differentiate gross misconduct from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to
violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in the former.
2. Administrative Cases; Substantial Evidence; In administrative cases, substantial evidence is
required to support any findings.-
—At the outset, it must be stressed that in administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to
support any findings. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to
believe that one is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be
overwhelming. In cases before the Office of the Ombudsman, jurisprudence instructs that “the
fundamental rule in administrative proceedings is that the complainant has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is unequivocal:
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are
conclusive. Conversely, therefore, when the findings of fact by the Ombudsman are not adequately
supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding upon the courts.” Thus, the Court must
make its own factual review of the case when the Ombudsman’s findings are contradictory to that of
the CA, as in this case.
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296
261. People vs. Matibag, 754 SCRA 529, January 25, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Murder ; Civil Liability ; Moral Damages ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Moral Damages;—In line with recent jurisprudence, civil indemnity in the
amount of P100,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are awarded to Duhan’s
heirs without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime and Duhan’s death. Considering
further that the crime was committed with treachery, exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 is
also granted.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals;In the review of a case, the Court is guided by the
long-standing principle that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA,
deserve great weight and respect. These factual findings should not be disturbed on appeal, unless there
are facts of weight and substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially
affect the disposition of the case. The Court has carefully scrutinized the records and finds no reason
to deviate from the RTC and CA’s factual findings. There is no indication that the trial court, whose
findings the CA affirmed, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and
circumstances of the case. Hence, the Court defers to the trial court on this score, considering too that
it was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both
parties.
3. Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.-Matibag is charged with the crime of Murder, which is defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended. In order to warrant a conviction, the
prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the
accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned
in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing is not Parricide or Infanticide.
4. Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In People v. Tan, 315 SCRA 375 (1999),
the Court explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. In People v. Perez, 351 SCRA 549 (2001), it
was explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance
may still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time
to prepare for his or her defense.
5. Same; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Elements of.—This finding of treachery further
correlates to Matibag’s plea of self-defense. Note that by invoking self-defense, Matibag, in effect,
admitted to the commission of the act for which he was charged, albeit under circumstances that, if
proven, would have exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to Matibag to show
that the killing of Duhan was attended by the following circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression;
and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.
6. Same; Same; Same; Unlawful Aggression; It is well-settled that there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the
person who resorted to self-defense. Jurisprudence states that not every form or degree of aggression
justifies a claim of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual,
sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating
attitude, as against the one claiming self-defense.
7. Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Special Aggravating Circumstances; Use of Unlicensed
Firearm; If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.-
—As the RTC and CA held, the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, which
was duly alleged in the Information, should be appreciated in the imposition of penalty. Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8294, treats the unauthorized use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special aggravating
circumstance: Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows: Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms
or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
297
Ammunition.—x x x. x x x x If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; When Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof was
unauthorized under the purview of Republic Act (RA) 8294 and is equally appreciated as a special
aggravating circumstance.-
—Under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the term “unlicensed firearm” has already been expanded
as follows: Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm.—The term unlicensed firearm shall
include: 1. firearms with expired license; or 2. unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission
of the crime. (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use
thereof was unauthorized under the purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a special
aggravating circumstance. As a result, the imposition of the maximum penalty of death, which is
reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA 9346, stands proper. To this, the Court adds that Matibag
is not eligible for parole.
9. Same; Murder; Civil Liability; Liabilities for Death Resulting from Murder.-
—Case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of Murder, the heirs of the victim are
entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim without need
of evidence other than the commission of the crime; (b) actual or compensatory damages to the extent
proved, or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be
provided with certainty; (c) moral damages; and (d) exemplary damages when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances.
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298
263. Gadia vs. Sykes Asia, Inc., 748 SCRA 633, January 28, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ;
1. Labor Law; “Project Employees” and “Regular Employees,” Distinguished.-
—Article 294 of the Labor Code, as amended, distinguishes a project-based employee from a regular
employee as follows: Art. 294. Regular and casual employment.—The provisions of written agreement
to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment
shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. x x x x (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) In Omni Hauling Services, Inc. v. Bon, 734 SCRA 270 (2014), the Court
extensively discussed how to determine whether an employee may be properly deemed project-based or
regular, to wit: A project employee is assigned to a project which begins and ends at determined or
determinable times. Unlike regular employees who may only be dismissed for just and/or authorized
causes under the Labor Code, the services of employees who are hired as “project[-based] employees”
may be lawfully terminated at the completion of the project. According to jurisprudence, the principal
test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterised as “project[-based]
employees” as distinguished from “regular employees,” is whether or not the employees were assigned
to carry out a “specific project or undertaking,” the duration (and scope) of which were specified at
the time they were engaged for that project. The project could either be (1) a particular job or
undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer company, but which is distinct
and separate, and identifiable as such, from the other undertakings of the company; or (2) a particular
job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. In order to safeguard the
rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word “project” to prevent employees from attaining
a regular status, employers claiming that their workers are project[-based] employees should not only
prove that the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged, but
also, that there was indeed a project.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Grave Abuse of Discretion; At the outset, it must
be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioners must
satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred
upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner
that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered “grave,” discretion must be exercised in a
all in contemplation of law.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Labor Law;—In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not
supported by substantial evidence. This requirement of substantial evidence is clearly expressed in
Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that “in cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.”
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299
264. Concepcion vs. Dela Rosa, 749 SCRA 26, February 03, 2015
1. Same; Same; Same; In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to
pay the same, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing,
failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.-
—In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly refusing to pay the same,
respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Thus, he should be equally held administratively
liable on this score.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Borrowing Money from Clients; Code of Professional Responsibility;
—Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer is prohibited from borrowing money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected: CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his clients that may come into his possession. Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow
money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is
intended to prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client.-
—The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this “trust and confidence”
is prone to abuse. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent
the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. In
Frias v. Atty. Lozada (Frias), 477 SCRA 393 (2005), the Court categorically declared that a lawyer’s
act of asking a client for a loan, as what herein respondent did, is unethical.
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300
265. Salita vs. Salve, 749 SCRA 463, February 04, 2015
Syllabi Class :Notary Public ;
1. Same; In the case of Atty. Dela Cruz v. Atty. Zabala, 442 SCRA 407 (2004), the Court revoked the
errant lawyer’s notarial commission and disqualified him from being commissioned as such for a period
of two (2) years for similarly committing gross negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary
public through his failure to ascertain the identities of the persons executing the Deed of Absolute sale
he notarized. Thus, due to the infractions’ relative comparability, the Court finds it apt to impose the
same against Atty. Salve, thereby effectively modifying the suspension initially recommended by the
IBP.
2. Notary Public; Verily, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the
contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be delegated because
what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to.
Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed
the same.
3. Same; —The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements. By affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he converted the Deed of Absolute Sale,
from a private document into a public document. In doing so, Atty. Salve, as borne from the records of
this case, effectively proclaimed to the world that: (a) all the parties therein personally appeared before
him; (b) they are all personally known to him; (c) they were the same persons who executed the
instruments; (d) he inquired into the voluntariness of execution of the instrument; and (e) they
acknowledged personally before him that they voluntarily and freely executed the same. As a lawyer
commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Salve is mandated to discharge his sacred duties with faithful
observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat. Having
failed in this regard, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion. His act of certifying under oath an irregular Deed of Absolute Sale without requiring the
personal appearance of the persons executing the same constitutes gross negligence in the performance
of duty as a notary public.
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301
266. Umaguing vs. De Vera, 749 SCRA 473, February 04, 2015
1. Same; Same; —All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; —Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the
courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These
expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of
the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of
this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law Profession.
3. Same; Same; Lawyer’s Oath; The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of
the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing
of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients.-
—The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well
as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law
as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore,
that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code
of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”
4. Same; Same; Truth be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark
about the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court when his professional duty
requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the law.-
—The final lining to it all — for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation — is
that Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated retraction
of the questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for
this Court, merit significant consideration as its submission appears to be a mere afterthought,
prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De
Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the
court when his professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of
the law. Likewise, he is prohibited from handling any legal matter without adequate preparation or
allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.
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302
267. Tordilla vs. Amilano, 749 SCRA 487, February 04, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Failure to Pay Just Debts ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; Words and Phrases; —Clearly, under the Rules, the term “just debts” may refer not
only to claims adjudicated by a court of law but also to claims the existence and justness of which are
admitted by the debtor, as respondent in this case. As such, the OCA’s classification of respondent’s
infraction as simple misconduct — instead, of willful refusal to pay just debts — was therefore
erroneous.
2. Administrative Law; Failure to Pay Just Debts; Penalties; Willful failure to pay just debts is
classified as a light offense, with the corresponding penalty of reprimand.-
—Executive Order No. (EO) 292, otherwise known as the “Administrative Code of 1987,” provides that
a public employee’s failure to pay just debts is a ground for disciplinary action. Section 22, Rule XIV
of the Rules Implementing Book V of EO 292, as modified by Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Rules), defines “just debts” as those: (a) claims
adjudicated by a court of law; or (b) claims the existence and justness of which are admitted by the
debtor. Under the same Rules, willful failure to pay just debts is classified as a light offense, with the
corresponding penalty of reprimand for the first offense.
****
303
268. ReiconRealty BuildersCorp vs. DiamondDragon Realty&Mgt,Inc., 750SCRA37,Feb 04, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Jurisdiction ;
1. Same; Same; —In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, 588 SCRA 612 (2009),
it was ruled that [a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare
that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a
default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary
submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional
appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the court’s
jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; A certiorari proceeding is, by nature, an original
and independent action, and, therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of.-
—On this score, the Court notes that Diamond declared the aforesaid address as its business address
in its complaint before the RTC, and that there is dearth of evidence to show that it had since changed
its address or had moved out. Hence, Reicon cannot be faulted for adopting the said address in serving
a copy of its certiorari petition to Diamond in light of the requirement under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 46
of the Rules as above cited, which merely entails service of the petition upon the respondent itself, not
upon his counsel. The underlying rationale behind this rule is that a certiorari proceeding is, by nature,
an original and independent action, and therefore not considered as part of the trial that had resulted
in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. Hence, at the preliminary point of serving the
certiorari petition, as in other initiatory pleadings, it cannot be said that an appearance for respondent
has been made by his counsel. Consequently, the requirement under Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules,
which provides that if any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his
counsel, should not apply.
3. Same; Jurisdiction; Conditional Appearance; —In ordinary civil cases, a conditional appearance
to object to a trial court’s jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be made when said party
specifically objects to the service of summons, which is an issuance directed by the court, not the
complainant. If the defendant, however, enters a special appearance but grounds the same on the
service of the complainant’s initiatory pleading to him, then that would not be considered as an
objection to the court’s jurisdiction over his person. It must be underscored that the service of the
initiatory pleading has nothing to do with how courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant in an ordinary civil action. Rather, it is the propriety of the trial court’s service of summons
— same as the CA’s service of its resolution indicating its initial action on the certiorari petition —
which remains material to the matter of the court’s acquisition jurisdiction over the
defendant’s/respondents’ person.
****
304
269. Villena vs. Batangas II Electric Cooperative, Inc., 750 SCRA 55, February 04, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Retirement Pay ; Separation Pay ;
1. Labor Law; Retirement Pay; Separation Pay; The Supreme Court (SC) is not unaware of its rulings
wherein it pronounced that retirement pay and separation pay are not mutually exclusive (unless there
is a specific prohibition in the collective bargaining agreement or retirement plan against the payment
of both benefits); however, with Villena’s entitlement to retirement pay not included as an issue in an
illegal dismissal case which had already been finally decided, it is quite absurd for Villena to submit a
“contemporaneous” claim for retirement pay on the execution phase of these proceedings. In fine, the
plea to include retirement pay in the execution of the final and executory August 31, 2001 CA Decision
and March 22, 2007 NLRC Resolution, under the phrase “other benefits,” cannot be granted.
****
305
270. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Jesus Alsua, 750 SCRA 121, February 04, 2015
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Just Compensation ; Interest Rates ;
1. Same; Same; Interest Rates; —The RTC may impose interest on the just compensation as may be
warranted by the circumstances of the case. In previous cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal
interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since the just compensation due to
the landowners was deemed to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal interest shall
be pegged at the rate of 12% interest p.a. from the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter,
or beginning July 1, 2013, until fully paid, interest shall be at 6% p.a. in line with the amendment
introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, Series of 2013.
still incomplete, such as in this case where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled,
just compensation should be determined and the process be concluded under RA 6657. For purposes of
determining just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its
character and its price at the time of taking, or the “time when the landowner was deprived of the use
and benefit of his property,” such as when title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries, as in this
case. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of
the land, (b) the current value of like properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property and the
income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by
government assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured
from any government financing institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.
3. Same; Same; Just compensation shall be the price or value of the property at the time it was taken
from the owner and appropriated by the government.-
—While the CA correctly held that just compensation shall be the price or value of the property at the
time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government, or on November 29, 2001, it,
departed from the parameters prescribed under DAR AO No. 5, Series of 1998 in computing the
capitalized net income (CNI) in order to arrive at the land value (LV) for the subject lands. Particularly,
under the foregoing AO, the selling price (SP) for purposes of computing the capitalized net income
(CNI) shall be “the average of the latest available 12-months’ selling prices prior to the date of receipt
of the CF by LBP for processing, such prices to be secured from the Department of Agriculture (DA)
and other appropriate regulatory bodies or, in their absence, from the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics.
4. Same; Same; Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the landowner
was deprived of the use and benefit of his property.-
—Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the “time when the landowner was deprived
of the use and benefit of his property, in this case, upon the issuance of OCT Nos. C-27721 and 27722
in the names of the agrarian reform beneficiaries on November 29, 2001. Hence, the evidence to be
presented by the parties before the trial court for the valuation of the subject lands must be based on
the values prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands.
5. Same; Same; All previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners
shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Section 17 of (Republic Act [RA] 6657), as
amended.-
—The evidence must conform to Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA
9700. It bears pointing out that while Congress passed RA 9700 on July 1, 2009, amending certain
provisions of RA 6657, as amended, among them, Section 17, and declaring “[t]hat all previously
acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners shall be completed and finally
resolved pursuant to Section 17 of [RA 6657], as amended,” the law should not be retroactively applied
to pending claims/cases. In fact, DAR AO No. 2, Series of 2009 implementing RA 9700 expressly
excepted from the application of the amended Section 17 all claim folders received by LBP prior to July
1, 2009, which shall be valued in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its
further amendment by RA No. 9700.
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306
271. People vs. Sumili, 750 SCRA 143, February 04, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Chain of Custody Rule ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs
which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty
that they are the same seized items.-
—It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the
drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving with moral
certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the acquittal of the accused on the
ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, as in this case.
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody Rule; The dangerous drug presented in court
as evidence against an accused must be the same as that seized from him.-
—In order to convict an accused for violation of RA 9165, or the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must establish the concurrence of the following elements: (a) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Note
that what remains material for conviction is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled
with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. It is also important that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items be preserved. Simply put, the dangerous drug presented in court
as evidence against an accused must be the same as that seized from him. The chain of custody
requirement removes any unnecessary doubts regarding the identity of the evidence.
3. Same; Same; Same; Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 provides the “chain of custody rule”
outlining the procedure that the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in
order to preserve its integrity and evidentiary value.-
—To expand, Section 21 of RA 9165 provides the “chain of custody rule” outlining the procedure that
the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its integrity
and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team that has initial custody
over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take photographs of the same in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or the accused’s or the
person’s representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and any
elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes.
While the “chain of custody rule” demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, as well as jurisprudence nevertheless
provide that noncompliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure
and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such
noncompliance; AND (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any
divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
****
307
272. Bonsurbe, Jr. vs. Yerro, 750 SCRA 490, February 11, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Provisional Dismissal ;
1. Same; Criminal Procedure; Provisional Dismissals; Requisites of.- The provisional dismissal of a
criminal case, which is a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof, is governed by
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which reads: SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal.—A case shall not
be provisionally dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended
party. The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or
a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without
the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6)
years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order
without the case having been revived. Under the aforecited provision, a case is provisionally dismissed
if the following requisites concur: (a) The prosecution with the express conformity of the accused, or
the accused, moves for a provisional dismissal (sin perjuicio) of his case; or both the prosecution and
the accused move for its provisional dismissal; (b) The offended party is notified of the motion for a
provisional dismissal of the case; (c) The court issues an Order granting the motion and dismissing the
case provisionally; and (d) The public prosecutor is served with a copy of the Order of provisional
dismissal of the case.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy;At the outset, it must be borne in mind that
a dismissal grounded on the denial of the right of the accused to speedy trial has the effect of acquittal
that would bar the further prosecution of the accused for the same offense. In People v. Judge
Hernandez, 499 SCRA 688 (2006), the Court explained the parameters of this rule: As a general rule,
the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in
a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. Thus, errors of judgment are
not appealable by the prosecution. Appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the criminal
case by the trial court may be allowed only on errors of jurisdiction when there was denial of due
process resulting in loss or lack of jurisdiction. This is so as while it is true that double jeopardy will
attach in case the prosecution appeals a [D]ecision acquitting the accused, an acquittal rendered in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction does not really “acquit” and
therefore does not terminate the case as there can be no double jeopardy based on a void indictment.
In the case at bar, the trial court dismissed the cases against private respondents for the denial of their
right to speedy trial. In a long line of cases, we have held that a dismissal on the ground of the denial
of the accused’s right to a speedy trial will have the effect of acquittal that would bar further prosecution
of the accused for the same offense. Thus, we have held that where after such dismissal the prosecution
moved for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the court reset the case for trial, the accused
can successfully claim double jeopardy as the said order was actually an acquittal, was final and cannot
be reconsidered.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; While the remedy of certiorari may be availed of in order
to challenge the judgment or order of acquittal, petitioner must prove that the trial court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely errors of judgment, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Under its classic formulation, grave abuse of discretion means such capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of
the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined,
or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.
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308
273. Yap-Co vs. Uy, 750 SCRA 504, February 11, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Actions ; Dismissal of Actions ;
1. Remedial Law; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Fundamental is the rule that a motion to dismiss
grounded on failure to state a cause of action refers only to the insufficiency of the pleading.-
—It bears pointing out that while the RTC dismissed the case impliedly by reason of respondents’
repeated failure to appear in court and prosecute their case, it also inaccurately expressed the view
that such dismissal may properly be taken as its favorable action on petitioner’s standing motion to
dismiss. The Court takes note, however, that the cited motion to dismiss was not premised on the
respondents’ failure to prosecute their case but on the alleged failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action. Fundamental is the rule that a motion to dismiss grounded on failure to state a cause of action
refers only to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the
existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) the legal right of the plaintiff;
(b) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) the act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said right. If these elements are present such that the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed. In this case, the Court finds that the
subject complaint sufficiently averred actual fraud on the part of petitioner in procuring her title to the
subject property to the prejudice of respondents who claim to have acquired it first. Thus, outright
dismissal for failure to state a cause of action was improper.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Relief is accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s
palpable mistake or negligence and where the interest of justice so requires.-
—Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that “[i]f plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the
trial, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any
order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own
motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise
provided by the court.” However, the application of the foregoing rule is not, to the Court’s mind,
warranted in this case since, as correctly found by the CA, respondents’ counsel acted negligently in
failing to attend the scheduled hearing dates and even notify respondents of the same so as to enable
them to travel all the way from Aurora, Isabela to Manila and attend said hearings. Verily, relief is
accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s palpable mistake or negligence and where
the interest of justice so requires. Concurring with the CA, the Court finds that respondents would be
deprived of the opportunity to prove the legitimacy of their claims if the RTC’s dismissal of the case —
on a procedural technicality at that, which was clearly caused by the palpable negligence of their
counsel — is sustained. Considering that respondents appear to have legal and factual bases for their
grievance, it would better serve the higher interest of substantial justice to allow the parties’ conflicting
claims to be resolved on the merits.
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309
274. De Leon vs. Dela Llana, 750 SCRA 531, February 11, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Judgment on the Merits ;
1. Same; Same; Judgments; Judgment on the Merits; A judgment on the merits is one wherein there
is an unequivocal determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the causes
of action and the subject matter.-
—Simply stated, a judgment on the merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal determination of the
rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter, such as
the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab’s January 24, 2006 Decision which had resolved the substantive issue
in Civil Case No. 821 as above explained. Contrary to respondents’ stance, said Decision was not
premised on a mere technical ground, particularly, on improper venue. This is evinced by the qualifier
“granting arguendo” which opens the discussion thereof, to show that the first ejectment complaint
would, according to the MCTC-Nabunturan-Mawab, have been dismissed on improper venue
notwithstanding the undated lease contract’s simulated character.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Words and Phrases; Res judicata (meaning, a
“matter adjudged”) is a fundamental principle of law which precludes parties from re-litigating issues
actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment.-
—Res judicata (meaning, a “matter adjudged”) is a fundamental principle of law which precludes
parties from re-litigating issues actually litigated and determined by a prior and final judgment. It
means that “a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the
former suit.” Notably, res judicata has two (2) concepts. The first is “bar by prior judgment” in which
the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation
between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action before the same or other tribunal, while the second concept is “conclusiveness of
judgment” in which any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their
privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
There is a bar by prior judgment where there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action
between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred.
There is conclusiveness of judgment, on the other hand, where there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action.
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310
275. Guevarra vs. The Commoner Lending Corporation, Inc., 751 SCRA 144, February 18, 2015
Syllabi Class :Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage ; Redemption ;
1. Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage; Redemption; In addition to the principal and interest, the
repurchase price should also include all the expenses of foreclosure, i.e., Judicial Commission,
Publication Fee, and Sheriff’s Fee, in accordance with Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000.-
—In addition to the principal and interest, the repurchase price should also include all the expenses of
foreclosure, i.e., Judicial Commission, Publication Fee, and Sheriff’s Fee, in accordance with Section
47 of the General Banking Law of 2000. Considering further that Sps. Guevarra failed to redeem the
subject property within the one-year reglementary period, they are liable to reimburse TCLC for the
corresponding Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) and Capital Gains Tax (CGT) it paid pursuant to Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) Revenue Regulations No. 4-99, which requires the payment of DST on
extrajudicial foreclosure sales of capital assets initiated by banks, finance and insurance companies,
as well as CGT in cases of non-redemption. CGT and DST are expenses incident to TCLC’s custody of
the subject property, hence, likewise due, under the above provision of law.
2. Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage; Rural Banks Act;—In an extrajudicial foreclosure of
registered land acquired under a free patent, the mortgagor may redeem the property within two (2)
years from the date of foreclosure if the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under Republic Act No. (RA)
720, as amended, otherwise known as the Rural Banks Act, or within one (1) year from the registration
of the certificate of sale if the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural banks pursuant to Act No.
3135. If the mortgagor fails to exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the property
within five (5) years from the expiration of the aforementioned redemption period pursuant to Section
119 of the Public Land Act, which states: SEC. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free
patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his
widow, or legal heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.
3. Same; Redemption; The Supreme Court (SC) has rules that redemptions from lending or credit
institutions, like The Commoner Lending Corporation, Inc. (TCLC), are governed by Section 78 of the
General Banking Act (now Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000), which amended Section 6
of Act No. 3135 in relation to the proper redemption price when the mortgagee is a bank, or a banking
or credit institution.-—The Court has, however, ruled that redemptions from lending or credit
institutions, like TCLC, are governed by Section 78 of the General Banking Act (now Section 47 of the
General Banking Law of 2000), which amended Section 6 of Act No. 3135 in relation to the proper
redemption price when the mortgagee is a bank, or a banking or credit institution.
4. Interest Rates; In a plethora of cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed that stipulated interest
rates of three percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and
exorbitant, hence, illegal and void for being contrary to morals.-
—The Court notes that the stipulated three percent (3%) monthly interest is excessive and
unconscionable. In a plethora of cases, the Court has affirmed that stipulated interest rates of three
percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable, and exorbitant, hence,
illegal and void for being contrary to morals.
****
311
276. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. vs. Avestruz, 751 SCRA 161, February 18, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Two Notice Rule ; Due Process ;
1. Same; Same; Two-Notice Rule; Due Process; The Court affirms the finding of the CA that Avestruz
was not accorded procedural due process, there being no compliance with the provisions of Section 17
of the POEA-SEC as above cited, which requires the “two-notice rule.” As explained in Skippers
Pacific, Inc. v. Mira, 392 SCRA 371 (2002): An erring seaman is given a written notice of the charge
against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Should sanctions be imposed,
then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall be furnished the erring seafarer. It is only
in the exceptional case of clear and existing danger to the safety of the crew or vessel that the required
notices are dispensed with; but just the same, a complete report should be sent to the manning agency,
supported by substantial evidence of the findings.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Generally, a
reexamination of factual findings cannot be done by the Court acting on a petition for review on
certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts but reviews only questions of law. Thus, in petitions
for review on certiorari, only questions of law may generally be put into issue. This rule, however,
admits of certain exceptions. In this case, considering that the factual findings of the LA and the NLRC,
on the one hand, and the CA, on the other hand, are contradictory, the general rule that only legal
issues may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not
apply, and the Court retains the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions
therefrom.
3. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Burden of Proof; It is well-settled that the burden of
proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or authorized cause lies with the employer.
If the employer fails to meet this burden, the conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified and,
therefore, illegal. In order to discharge this burden, the employer must present substantial evidence,
which is defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion, and not based on mere surmises or conjectures.
4. Same; Same; Insubordination; Insubordination, as a just cause for the dismissal of an employee,
necessitates the concurrence of at least two requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have
been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must
have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he
had been engaged to discharge.
****
312
277. People vs. Palma, 751 SCRA 233, February 18, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Robbery with Homicide ;
1. Same; Same; Conspiracy having been established, when a homicide takes place by reason of or on
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an
endeavour to prevent the killing.-
—It is settled that the positive identification of accused-appellants prevails over their defense of alibi
considering that in this jurisdiction the latter is considered as inherently weak and, thus, cannot
outweigh the testimony of eyewitnesses establishing that accused-appellants committed the crime.
Moreover, conspiracy having been established, when a homicide takes place by reason of or on
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an
endeavour to prevent the killing.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when
the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that the Supreme Court (SC) will evaluate the
factual findings of the court below.-
—It is settled that in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great
weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on
record. It is only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and
relevant matters, that the Court will evaluate the factual findings of the court below. Guided by the
foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the RTC’s factual findings, as affirmed
by the CA.
3. Criminal Law; Robbery With Homicide; Elements of.-
—In People v. Uy, 649 SCRA 236 (2011), the Court explained that the elements for the crime of robbery
with homicide are: (a) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation
against persons; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to
gain; and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, homicide was committed. A conviction
requires that the robbery is the main purpose and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery.
****
313
278. DENR vs. United Planners Consultants, Inc. (UPCI), 751 SCRA 389, February 23, 2015
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Money Judgments ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Money Judgments; —Section 26 of PD 1445 expressly provides that execution
of money judgment against the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities is
within the primary jurisdiction of the COA, to wit: SEC. 26. General jurisdiction.—The authority and
powers of the Commission shall extend to and comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures,
systems and controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the preservation of
vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years, the examination and inspection of the books,
records, and papers relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the accounts of all
persons respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable capacity, as well as
the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing to the
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to
all government-owned or -controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and other self-
governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, and as herein prescribed, including
non¬governmental entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donation through the
government, those required to pay levies or government share, and those for which the government has
put up a counterpart fund or those partly funded by the government. (Emphases supplied) From the
foregoing, the settlement of respondent’s money claim is still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the
COA despite finality of the confirmed arbitral award by the RTC pursuant to the Special ADR Rules.
Hence, the respondent has to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim. This appears
to have been complied with by the latter when it filed a “Petition for Enforcement and Payment of Final
and Executory Arbitral Award” before the COA. Accordingly, it is now the COA which has the authority
to rule on this latter petition.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Law; Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004; Republic Act (RA) No. 9285,
otherwise known as the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,” institutionalized the use of an
Alternative Dispute Resolution System (ADR System) in the Philippines.-
—Republic Act No. 9285, otherwise known as the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,”
institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System (ADR System) in the Philippines.
The Act, however, was without prejudice to the adoption by the Supreme Court of any ADR system as
a means of achieving speedy and efficient means of resolving cases pending before all courts in the
Philippines. Accordingly, A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC was created setting forth the Special Rules of Court
on Alternative Dispute Resolution (referred herein as Special ADR Rules) that shall govern the
procedure to be followed by the courts whenever judicial intervention is sought in ADR proceedings in
the specific cases where it is allowed.
3. Same; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Execution of Judgments; Execution is fittingly called the fruit
and end of suit and the life of the law.-
—Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A judgment, if left
unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. While it appears that the
Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the execution of a confirmed arbitral award, it
is the Court’s considered view that the Rules’ procedural mechanisms cover not only aspects of
confirmation but necessarily extend to a confirmed award’s execution in light of the doctrine of
necessary implication which states that every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to
include all incidental power, right or privilege.
****
314
279. Anglo vs. Valencia, 751 SCRA 588, February 25, 2015
Syllabi Class :Legal Ethics ; Attorneys ; Conflict of Interest ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer
to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.-
—As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents’ pronounced liability is not altered by the fact
that the labor cases against complainant had long been terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-
client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The client’s confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere
expiration of professional employment.
2. Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict of Interest; There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing parties.-
—In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, 405 SCRA 220 (2003), the Court explained the concept of conflict of
interest in this wise: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two
or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. As such, a lawyer is prohibited from
they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste.
3. Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Conflict of Interest; There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing parties.-
—In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat, 405 SCRA 220 (2003), the Court explained the concept of conflict of
interest in this wise: There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two
or more opposing parties. The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for
one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client.” This rule covers
not only cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the
new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in
any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to
use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. As such, a lawyer is prohibited from
they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste.
****
315
280. Benabaye vs. People, 752 SCRA 26, February 25, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Appeals ;
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; While it is true that only Benabaye was able to
successfully perfect her appeal, the rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole
case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. Considering that under
Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as abovequoted, a favorable
judgment, as in this case, shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from
their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final and executory,
Benabaye’s discharge for the crime of estafa is likewise applicable to Tupag. Note that the dismissal of
the estafa charge against Tupag is similarly without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal
charge against him as may be warranted under the circumstances pertinent to him.
2. Criminal Law; Estafa; —Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, as amended, under which
Benabaye was charged and prosecuted, states: Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall
defraud another by any means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. The penalty of prisión
correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud
is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the
penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be[.] x x x x 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: x x x x (b) By
misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal
property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property[.] The elements of estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender’s receipt of money, goods,
or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by
the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (c) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended
party that the offender return the money or property received.
3. Same; Theft; —It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an
employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. The material possession
of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of
the employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-
perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence, conversion of
personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property
constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have
been transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa.
4. Same; Estafa; —In Chua-Burce v. CA, 331 SCRA 1 (2000), the Court acquitted therein petitioner
Cristeta Chua-Burce (Chua-Burce) of estafa on the ground that the element of juridical possession was
absent. As a bank cash custodian, the Court ruled that she had no juridical possession over the missing
funds. Relative thereto, in Guzman v. CA, 99 Phil. 703 (1956), where a travelling sales agent was
convicted of the crime of estafa for his failure to return to his principal the proceeds of the goods he
was commissioned to sell, the Court had occasion to explain the distinction between the possession of
a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability for estafa, viz.: There is an
essential distinction between the possession of a receiving teller of funds received from third persons
paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in
agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the
bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right
or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert,
as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain the money or goods received
in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made,
and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault. ****
316
281. Tatel vs. JLFP Investigation Security Agency, Inc., 752 SCRA 55, February 25, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Strained Relations ; Separation Pay ;
1. Same; Strained Relations; Separation Pay; —The CA therefore erred in ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC which, in fact, correctly found Tatel to have been illegally dismissed.
Verily, an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion
when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction; this is clearly not the case with respect to the pronouncement of the NLRC here. In
consequence of the foregoing, Tatel is entitled to reinstatement and backwages. However, as
reinstatement is no longer feasible in this case because of the strained relations between the parties
and the fact that Tatel had since been employed with another company, separation pay is awarded in
lieu of reinstatement. On the matter of the computation of the monetary awards, the Court delegates
and defers the same to the NLRC, being a matter falling within its expertise.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Exceptions.-It is a
well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court being bound by the findings of fact made by
the appellate court. The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower court. The rule, however, is not without exception. In New City Builders, Inc.
v. NLRC, 460 SCRA 220 (2005), the Court recognized the following exceptions to the general rule, to
wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary
to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.
3. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Constructive Dismissal; Constructive dismissal exists
when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain, on the part of the employer has become
so unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment, or when
there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or
unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay.
4. Same; Same; Abandonment; —In this regard, the Court concurs with the finding of the NLRC that
respondents failed to establish that Tatel abandoned his work. To constitute abandonment, two elements
must concur: (a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (b) a
clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. The
employer has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume
his employment without any intention of returning. Abandonment is incompatible with constructive
dismissal.
5. Same; Same; Same; Tatel refuted respondents’ allegation that he did not heed their directive to
return to work following his receipt of the November 26, 2009 Memorandum. The Court finds no
compelling reason not to give credence to such rebuff, especially in light of the filing of the instant
complaint for illegal dismissal. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his layoff cannot, as
a general rule, be said to have abandoned his work, and the filing of the complaint is proof enough of
his desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment. As the Court sees it, it is
simply incongruent for Tatel to refuse any offer of an assignment and thereafter, seek redress by filing
a case for illegal dismissal.
****
317
282. People vs. Casas, 752 SCRA 94, February 25, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Aggravating Circumstances ; Treachery ;
1. Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Treachery; —Among the qualifying circumstances thus
enumerated in Article 248 is treachery. Under Article 14 of the RPC, “[t]here is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.” In other words, to appreciate treachery, it must
be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself
or retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted; indeed,
treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
2. Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; There can be no self-defense unless the
victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.-
—Preliminarily, Casas failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of either Joel or Eligio,
which is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to obtain. As case law
puts it, there can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person
who resorted to self-defense. As shown by the records, it was Casas who was actually the aggressor, as
he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate, and
again on Eligio as he was fleeing. Being the party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly
weapon, Casas cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Verily, for unlawful
aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, as against the one claiming self-
defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.
3. Same; Same; Same; —It bears clarification that the initial fistfight between Eligio and Casas does
not indicate that unlawful aggression was employed by the former against the latter considering that
Eligio had already yielded from the brawl and, in fact, proceeded to flee. It is well-settled that the
moment the first aggressor runs away — if and so such was the case with respect to Eligio — unlawful
aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression ceases, the
defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation, and not
self-defense, is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that
was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the
aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused.
4. Same; Murder; Elements of.-
—The elements of Murder that the prosecution must establish are: (a) that a person was killed; (b) that
the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
****
318
283. Divinagracia vs. Parilla, 753 SCRA 87, March 11, 2015
Syllabi Class :RemedialLaw; CivPro; Parties; IndispParties; Non-Joinder of Indispensable Parties ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Non-Joinder of Indispensable
Parties; The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action; The
remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable.-
—The CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the complaint on account of Santiago’s failure to implead
all the indispensable parties in his complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr., 695 SCRA 345
(2013), the Court definitively explained that in instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties, the
proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case, to wit: The non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at
such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal
concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to
implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Words and Phrases; An
indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and
without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter
of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal
presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a
resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable. Thus,
the absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Co-Heirs; All the coheirs and persons having an interest in the property
are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said
parties.-
—With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons
interested in the property shall be joined as defendants, viz.: SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition
of real estate.—A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided
in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description
of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested
in the property. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus, all the coheirs and persons having an
interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without
the joinder of the said parties.
4. Civil Law; Partition; Co-Ownership; In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an
order to divide the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership.-
—Santiago’s contention that he had already bought the interests of the majority of the heirs and, thus,
they should no longer be regarded as indispensable parties deserves no merit. As correctly noted by the
CA, in actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it
first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue
of ownership, which is the first stage in an action for partition. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless
this issue of co-ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition
of the disputed properties.
****
319
284. Cargill Phil, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 753 SCRA 124, March 11, 2015
1. Taxation; Tax Refunds; —In the more recent case of Taganito Mining Corporation v. CIR, 726
SCRA 637 (2014), the Court reconciled the pronouncements in CIR v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia,
Inc., 632 SCRA 422 (2010), and CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, 690 SCRA 336 (2013), holding
that from December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010 which refers to the interregnum when BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03 was issued until the date of promulgation of Aichi, taxpayer-claimants need not observe the
stringent 120-day period; but before and after said window period, the mandatory and jurisdictional
nature of the 120-day period remained in force, viz.: Reconciling the pronouncements in the Aichi and
San Roque cases, the rule must therefore be that during the period December 10, 2003 (when BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued) to October 6, 2010 (when the Aichi case was promulgated),
taxpayers-claimants need not observe the 120-day period before it could file a judicial claim for refund
of excess input VAT before the CTA. Before and after the aforementioned period (i.e., December 10,
2003 to October 6, 2010), the observance of the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional to the
filing of such claim.
****
320
285. St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. vs. Sanchez, 753 SCRA 218, March 11, 2015
Syllabi Class: Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Conviction in Criminal Case;
1. Same; Same; Conviction in Criminal Case; The Court finds it inconsequential that SLMC has not
suffered any actual damage. While damage aggravates the charge, its absence does not mitigate nor
negate the employee’s liability. Neither is SLMC’s non-filing of the appropriate criminal charges
relevant to this analysis. An employee’s guilt or innocence in a criminal case is not determinative of the
existence of a just or authorized cause for his or her dismissal. It is well-settled that conviction in a
criminal case is not necessary to find just cause for termination of employment, as in this case. Criminal
and labor cases involving an employee arising from the same infraction are separate and distinct
proceedings which should not arrest any judgment from one to the other. As it stands, the Court thus
holds that the dismissal of Sanchez was for a just cause, supported by substantial evidence, and is
therefore in order. By declaring otherwise, bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC issued a patently
and grossly erroneous ruling tantamount to grave abuse of discretion, which, in turn, means that the
CA erred when it affirmed the same. In consequence, the grant of the present petition is warranted.
2. Labor Law; Management Prerogatives;The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of
employment, aptly called “management prerogative,” gives employers the freedom to regulate,
according to their discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, including work assignment,
working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work
supervision, layoff of workers and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. In this light, courts
often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. In fact, labor laws discourage
interference in employers’ judgment concerning the conduct of their business. Among the employer’s
management prerogatives is the right to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper
for the conduct of its business or concern, to provide certain disciplinary measures to implement said
rules and to assure that the same would be complied with. At the same time, the employee has the
corollary duty to obey all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions of the employer; and willful or
intentional disobedience thereto, as a general rule, justifies termination of the contract of service and
the dismissal of the employee.
3. Same; Termination of Employment; Willful Disobedience; An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his representative in connection with his work; x x x x
Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this ground, the employer’s orders, regulations,
or instructions must be: (1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) in
connection with the duties which the employee has been engaged to discharge.”
4. Same; Same; Same; —The Court observes that there lies no competent basis to support the common
observation of the NLRC and the CA that the retention of excess medical supplies was a tolerated
practice among the nurses at the Pediatric Unit. While there were previous incidents of “hoarding,” it
appears that such acts were — in similar fashion — furtively made and the items secretly kept, as any
excess items found in the concerned nurse’s possession would have to be confiscated. Hence, the fact
that no one was caught and/or sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not mean that
the so-called “hoarding” practice was tolerated by SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe the justification
behind the violation of the company rules regarding excess medical supplies is immaterial since it has
been established that an infraction was deliberately committed. Doubtless, the deliberate disregard or
disobedience of rules by the employee cannot be countenanced as it may encourage him or her to do
even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe.
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286. Maglente vs. Agcaoili, Jr., 753 SCRA 350, March 18, 2015
Syllabi Class : Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ; Attorney-Client Relationship ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The Court sustains the directive for respondent to account for or return the
amount of P48,000.00 to complainant. It is well to note that “while the Court has previously held that
disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s
administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to
claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys
received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically
linked to his professional engagement.” Since the aforesaid amount was intended to answer for filing
fees which is intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and respondent,
the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Attorney-Client Relationship; Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his
client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with
diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.-It must be stressed that once a
lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to
attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes
inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the CPR, which reads: CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. x x x x Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall render him liable.
3. Same; Same; Same; A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands
is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity.-
—Respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund the
amount of P48,000.00 that complainant gave him despite repeated demands, viz.: CANON 16 – A
LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client. x x x x Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x. Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the
client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that
the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly,
the same must be immediately returned to the client. A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client
despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of
integrity, as in this case. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of
the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional employment, and
hence, must be disciplined accordingly.
4. Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Suspension; Jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where
lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or
property despite demand, the Court meted out the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In
Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, 709 SCRA 287 (2013), the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one
(1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and
to return the money given to him by the latter. Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino, 483 SCRA 212 (2006),
the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who failed to render any legal service to his client as well
as to return the money he received for such purpose. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds it
appropriate that respondent be meted with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year.
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287. Northern Islands Co., Inc. vs. Garcia, 753 SCRA 603, March 18, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Provisional Remedies ; Attachment ;
1. Same; Provisional Remedies; Attachment; Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral, 188 SCRA 692
(1990), the Supreme Court (SC), in view of the nature of a preliminary attachment, definitively ruled
that the attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the principal action
because the attachment was only an incident of such action.-
—Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral, 188 SCRA 692 (1990), the Court, in view of the nature of a
preliminary attachment, definitively ruled that the attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate
action independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action,
viz.: Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an adverse party is taken
into legal custody, either at the commencement of an action or at any time thereafter, as a security for
the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party. It is an
auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart from the main suit or claim instituted
by the plaintiff against the defendant. Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment
must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified. The
consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have been issued as
an incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the
court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the principal
action because the attachment was only an incident of such action.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Notice of Appeal; —Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
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288. Olayta-Camba vs. Bongon, 754 SCRA 205, March 25, 2015
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ; Penalties ; Suspension from Practice of Law ;
1. Same; Same; Penalties; Suspension from Practice of Law; —Jurisprudence provides that in similar
cases where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s
money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, 709 SCRA 287 (2013), the Court suspended the lawyer
for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement
with his client and to return the money given to him by the latter. Similarly, in Meneses v. Macalino,
483 SCRA 212 (2006), the same penalty was imposed on a lawyer who failed to render any legal service
to his client as well as to return the money he received for such purpose. These pronouncements
notwithstanding, there have been instances where the Court tempered the penalty imposed upon a
lawyer due to humanitarian and equitable considerations. In view of the foregoing, and taking into
consideration respondent’s advanced age, medical condition, and the fact that this is his first offense,
the Court finds it appropriate to sustain the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) month.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Negligence; Code of Professional Responsibility; It must be stressed that
once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and
to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes
inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable for violating Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the CPR.
3. Same; Same; A lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a
violation of the trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity.-
—Verily, when a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound
to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if not used accordingly, the money must be returned immediately to the client. As such,
a lawyer’s failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the trust
reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case.
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289. Dept of Health vs. Philip Morris Phil Manufacturing, Inc., 754 SCRA 452, March 25, 2015
Syllabi Class: Statutory Construction ;
1. Statutory Construction; Where two (2) statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular
case, the one specially designed therefore should prevail.-
—Finally, it must be stressed that RA 9211 is a special legislation which exclusively deals with the
subject of tobacco products and related activities. On the other hand, RA 7394 is broader and more
general in scope, and treats of the general welfare and interests of consumers vis-à-vis proper conduct
for business and industry. As such, lex specialis derogat generali. General legislation must give way to
special legislation on the same subject, and generally is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in
which the special provisions are not applicable. In other words, where two statutes are of equal
theoretical application to a particular case, the one specially designed therefore should prevail.
2. Tobacco Sales Promotions; Statutes; —After a meticulous examination of the above quoted pertinent
provisions of RA 7394 and RA 9211, the Court finds that the latter law impliedly repealed the relevant
provisions of the former with respect to the authority of the DOH to regulate tobacco sales promotions.
At this point, the Court notes that both laws separately treat “promotion” as one of the activities related
to tobacco: RA 7394 defines “sales promotion” under Article 4(bm), while RA 9211 speaks of
“promotion” or “tobacco promotion” under Section 4(1).
3. Same; Outside RA 7394, “sales promotion” refers to activities which make use of “media and non-
media marketing communication for a predetermined, limited time to increase consumer demand,
stimulate market demand or improve product availability,” “to provide added value or incentives to
consumers, wholesalers, retailers, or other organizational customers to stimulate immediate sales” and
“product interest, trial, or purchase.” Examples of devices used in “sales promotion” are contests,
coupons, freebies, point-of-purchase displays, premiums, raffle prizes, product samples, sweepstakes,
and rebates.
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290. BPI FSavings Bank,Inc. vs. St. Michael Medical Center, Inc., 754 SCRA 493, March 25, 2015
Syllabi Class: Mercantile Law ; Corporations ; Corporate Rehabilitation ;
1. Same; Same; Same; While the Court recognizes the financial predicaments of upstart corporations
under the prevailing economic climate, it must nonetheless remain forthright in limiting the remedy of
rehabilitation only to meritorious cases. As above mentioned, the purpose of rehabilitation proceedings
is not only to enable the company to gain a new lease on life but also to allow creditors to be paid their
claims from its earnings, when so rehabilitated. Hence, the remedy must be accorded only after a
judicious regard of all stakeholders’ interests; it is not a one-sided tool that may be graciously invoked
to escape every position of distress. In this case, not only has the petitioning debtor failed to show that
it has formally began its operations which would warrant restoration, but also it has failed to show
compliance with the key requirements under the Rules, the purpose of which are vital in determining
the propriety of rehabilitation. Thus, for all the reasons hereinabove explained, the Court is constrained
to rule in favor of BPI Family and hereby dismiss SMMCI’s Rehabilitation Petition. With this
pronouncement, it is now unnecessary to delve on the other ancillary issues raised herein.
2. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Restoration is the central idea behind the remedy of corporate
rehabilitation. In common parlance, to “restore” means “to bring back to or put back into a former or
original state.” Case law explains that corporate rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of
corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position
of successful operation and solvency, the purpose being to enable the company to gain a new lease on
life and allow its creditors to be paid their claims out of its earnings. Consistent therewith is the term’s
statutory definition under Republic Act No. 10142, otherwise known as the “Financial Rehabilitation
and Insolvency Act of 2010” (FRIA), which provides: Section 4. Definition of Terms.—As used in this
Act, the term: x x x x (gg) Rehabilitation shall refer to the restoration of the debtor to a condition of
successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of operation is economically
feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the plan,
more if the debtor continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.
3. Same; Same; Same; —A material financial commitment becomes significant in gauging the resolve,
determination, earnestness and good faith of the distressed corporation in financing the proposed
rehabilitation plan. This commitment may include the voluntary undertakings of the stockholders or the
would-be investors of the debtor-corporation indicating their readiness, willingness and ability to
contribute funds or property to guarantee the continued successful operation of the debtor corporation
during the period of rehabilitation. In this case, aside from the harped on merger of St. Michael Hospital
with SMMCI, the only proposed source of revenue the Rehabilitation Plan suggests is the capital which
would come from SMMCI’s potential investors, which negotiations are merely pending. Evidently, both
propositions commonly border on the speculative and, hence, hardly fit the description of a material
financial commitment which would inspire confidence that the rehabilitation would turn out to be
successful.
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291. Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation vs. Fong, 754 SCRA 544, March 25, 2015
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Assignment of Credit ;
1. Same; Assignment of Credit; Case law states that when a person assigns his credit to another person,
the latter is deemed subrogated to the rights as well as to the obligations of the former.-
—Case law states that when a person assigns his credit to another person, the latter is deemed
subrogated to the rights as well as to the obligations of the former. By virtue of the Deed of Assignment,
the assignee is deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of the assignor and is bound by exactly
the same conditions as those which bound the assignor. Accordingly, an assignee cannot acquire
greater rights than those pertaining to the assignor. The general rule is that an assignee of a
nonnegotiable chose in action acquires no greater right than what was possessed by his assignor and
simply stands into the shoes of the latter.
2. Civil Law; Obligations; Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.-
—Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should
be complied with in good faith. As such, the stipulations in contracts are binding on them unless the
contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The same principle on
obligatory force applies by extension to the contracting party’s assignees, in turn, by virtue of the
principle of relativity of contracts which is fleshed out in Article 1311 of the Civil Code, viz.: Art. 1311.
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights
and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.
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292. People vs. Sorin, 754 SCRA 594, March 25, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Object Evidence ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Object Evidence; —It is well-settled that in criminal prosecutions
involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime
calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. The lack of
conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from the accused strongly militates against
a finding of guilt, as in this case. Therefore, as reasonable doubt persists on the identity of the drugs
allegedly seized from the accused, the latter’s acquittal should come as a matter of course.
—In order to convict an accused charged with violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution
must be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
3. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; The dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against
an accused must be the same as that seized from him.-
—It must be shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of such seized items have been preserved.
In other words, the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against an accused must be the same
as that seized from him. The chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning
the identity of the evidence are removed.
4. Same; Same; Same; Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act
(RA) No. 9165 as well as jurisprudence, nevertheless provides that noncompliance with the
requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and
invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance; and (b) the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved.-
—Note that while the “chain of custody rule” demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers,
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as jurisprudence,
nevertheless provides that
5. Same; Same; Same; Marking; —The Court cannot overemphasize the significance of marking in
illegal drugs cases. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus
of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence. Hence, in People v. Sabdula, 722 SCRA 90 (2014), the Court acquitted the
accused on the ground of failure to mark the plastic sachets confiscated during the buy-bust operation.
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; —In this case, SPO1 Mugot admitted that he did not mark the plastic
sachets which contained the seized drugs, but instead placed the marking on the “transparent plastic
cellophane” wherein he placed the seized sachets. To the Court’s mind, the act of marking only the
cellophane and not the individual plastic sachets renders the corpus delicti highly susceptible to
tampering, switching, planting, and contamination of the evidence — the very acts which the
requirement of marking seeks to prevent. As the cellophane passed hands, it can now no longer be
determined with certainty that its contents have remained intact, especially considering the dearth of
testimony from SPO1 Mugot that the cellophane was tightly sealed or, at the very least, secured.
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293. Ciron vs. Gutierrez, 756 SCRA 110, April 20, 2015
Syllabi Class: RemLaw; CrimProcedure ; Preliminary Investigation ; Doctrine of Noninterference ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Noninterference; —The Court emphasizes that in our criminal justice
system, the public prosecutor, which is the Office of the Ombudsman in this case, exercises wide latitude of
discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court. Courts cannot interfere with the
Ombudsman’s discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigations and in the determination of probable cause
where the Ombudsman’s discretion prevails over judicial discretion except when there is grave abuse of
discretion, which does not obtain in this case.
2. Ombudsman; Doctrine of Noninterference; —At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has
consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of
probable cause and to decide whether an Information should be filed. In this relation, it is settled that the
Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed. Nonetheless, this
Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner
which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; —As already stated, respondents were accused
of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for issuing the Supplemental Resolutions without Ortega filing a new
complaint before the OCP-Iriga. The essential elements of such crime are as follows: (a) that the accused must
be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in
conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; —In Bañares II v. Balising, 328 SCRA 36 (2000),
the private prosecutor attempted to reinstate the criminal cases which had been dismissed without prejudice by
mere motion more than two (2) months after it had notice of the order of dismissal, without a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal having been filed. The Court explained that an order dismissing a case without
prejudice can attain finality if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed and that, in such
case, the proper remedy to revive the case is not to file a motion as the court already lost its power to amend or
modify its order.
5. Same; Criminal Procedure; Revival of Actions; Actions; Information; “Complaint” for purposes of
reviving a case must then refer to Informations where what is involved is a criminal case.-
—The Court is not oblivious to the fact that Bañares II, where criminal cases were involved, uses the phrase “file
a new complaint.” It must be clarified, however, that Bañares II and Ortigas instead, the action must be instituted
anew. Bañares II and Ortigas did not require a new complaint for preliminary investigation in order to revive a
criminal case. In this regard, it must be emphasized that “complaint” in civil cases is different from a
“complaint” in criminal cases. In civil cases, the complaint is the initiatory pleading filed in court, whereas in
criminal cases, what is filed in court is an Information and not a complaint, which is filed before the public
prosecutor for purposes of conducting a preliminary investigation. Thus, “complaint” for purposes of reviving
a case must then refer to Informations where what is involved is a criminal case.
6. Same; Same; Verily, the Court has, in several cases, held that criminal cases which have been dismissed
without prejudice may be reinstated by motion before the order of dismissal becomes final, or thereafter, by filing
a new Information for the offense. The Court, therefore, disagrees with Ciron’s view that a new complaint for
preliminary investigation had to be filed before the charges against her could be revived.
7. Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Instances When a New Preliminary Investigation Must be
Conducted to Accord the Accused the Right to Submit Counter-affidavits and Evidence.-
—Anent the argument that a new preliminary investigation must be conducted, it is settled that the same is only
required in order to accord the accused the right to submit counter-affidavits and evidence only in the following
instances: (a) where the original witnesses of the prosecution or some of them may have recanted their
testimonies or may have died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have emerged; (b)
where aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same
offense or necessarily included therein; (c) if under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been
upgraded; or (d) if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal liability of the accused is upgraded from being
an accessory to that of a principal. Since none of the foregoing instances obtain in this case, the Court holds that
the OCP-Iriga, through Beltran and Contreras, need not conduct another preliminary investigation before it can
issue the Supplemental Resolutions and subsequently, file the consequent Informations in court.
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294. Paz vs. New International Environmental Universality, Inc., 756 SCRA 284, April 20, 2015
Syllabi Class: Obligations ;
1. Obligations; It is settled that courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations they voluntarily
assumed, simply because their contracts turn out to be disastrous.-
—Petitioner’s pleadings, however, abound with clear indications of a business relationship gone sour.
In his third letter dated July 19, 2002, petitioner lamented the fact that Capt. Clarke’s alleged promise
to buy an aircraft had not materialized. He likewise insinuated that Capt. Clarke’s real motive in staying
in the leased premises was the acquisition of petitioner’s right to possess and use the hangar space. Be
that as it may, it is settled that courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations they voluntarily
assumed, simply because their contracts turn out to be disastrous deals or unwise investments.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; —It should be emphasized, as it has been time and again,
that this Court is not a trier of facts, and is thus not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence
introduced in and considered by the tribunals. When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of
fact by the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless
the case falls under any of the exceptions, none of which was established herein.
3. Corporation Law; Obligations; —Section 21 of the Corporation Code explicitly provides that one
who assumes an obligation to an ostensible corporation, as such, cannot resist performance thereof on
the ground that there was in fact no corporation. Clearly, petitioner is bound by his obligation under
the MOA not only on estoppel but by express provision of law. As aptly raised by respondent in its
Comment to the instant petition, it is futile to insist that petitioner issued the receipts for rental payments
in respondent’s name and not with Capt. Clarke’s, whom petitioner allegedly contracted in the latter’s
personal capacity, only because it was upon the instruction of an employee. Indeed, it is disputably
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns, and that all private transactions have been
fair and regular. Hence, it is assumed that petitioner, who is a pilot, knew what he was doing with
respect to his business with respondent.
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295. The Plaza, Inc. vs. Ayala Land, Inc., 756 SCRA 350, April 20, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Compromise Agreements ; Cause of Action ;
1. Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; Cause of Action; In Genova v. De Castro, 407 SCRA 165
(2003), the Court stated that a party’s violation of a compromise agreement may give rise to a new
cause of action, which may be pursued in a separate action as it is not barred by res judicata:
[P]etitioner’s violation of the terms of the compromise judgment gave rise to a new cause of action on
the part of respondent, i.e., the right to enforce the terms thereof. When she failed to obtain this by mere
motion filed with the trial court, she was constrained to institute the proper suit for ejectment. The filing
of a separate case based on a cause of action that arises from the application or violation of a
compromise agreement is not barred by res judicata in the first action. Noticeably, Plaza’s Motion for
Restitution is not one of the remedies that can be availed against ALI’s purported violation of the
Compromise Agreement. On the contrary, the same is a new cause of action arising therefrom.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Execution of Judgments; Compromise Agreements;
The Compromise Judgment, covering the surrender of the possession of the subject premises, as well
as the demolition period of the Building and/or removal of the materials salvaged therefrom, is, by
nature, “immediately executory, unless a motion is filed to set aside the compromise on the ground of
fraud, mistake, or duress in which event an appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion.”-
—At the onset, it should be pointed out that Civil Case No. 01-1352 — the case from which the present
petition originates — comes before the Court at its execution stage. Notably, the Compromise Judgment,
covering the surrender of the possession of the subject premises, as well as the demolition period of the
Building and/or removal of the materials salvaged therefrom, is, by nature, “immediately executory,
unless a motion is filed to set aside the compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake, or duress in which
event an appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion.” With no such motion having been
filed, the RTC is bound to issue a writ of execution to carry out the said judgment to its full force and
effect. In Far Eastern Surety or when it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued,
or that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that judgment debt has been
paid or otherwise satisfied; or when the writ has been issued without authority.
3. Same; Same; Same; Compromise Agreements; Judges have the ministerial and mandatory duty to
implement and enforce a compromise agreement.-
—Although the fixing of a period of demolition would have been merely incidental to the execution of
the Compromise Judgment, as it covered, among others, the demolition of the Building, the parties’
explicit agreement on said period precluded the RTC from resolving Plaza’s Motion to Fix. As the CA
aptly observed, to allow the RTC to fix such period would allow it to amend a substantial part of the
parties’ agreement. Verily, judges have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce
a compromise agreement. Absent any appeal or motion to set aside the judgment, courts cannot modify,
impose conditions different from the terms of a compromise agreement, or set aside the compromises
and reciprocal concessions made in good faith by the parties without gravely abusing their discretion,
as in this case.
****
331
296. People vs. Samuya, 756 SCRA 365, April 20, 2015
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law; Murder; Damages; Temperate Damages;
1. Same; Same; Same; Temperate Damages;—While records do not show that the prosecution was
able to prove the amount actually expended for burial and funeral expenses, prevailing jurisprudence
nonetheless allows the Court to award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 to the victim’s
heirs as it cannot be denied that they suffered pecuniary loss due to the crime committed. And lastly,
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Resolution until fully
paid is imposed on all monetary awards.
2. Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.-—In order to convict a person charged with the crime of
Murder, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the
accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned
in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide.
3. Same; Treachery; —Among the qualifying circumstances found in Article 248 of the RPC is
treachery. Under Article 14 of the same Code, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. In People v. Tan, 315 SCRA 375 (1999), the Court held that the essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the
person attacked. In People v. Perez, 351 SCRA 549 (2001), it was explained that a frontal attack does
not necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack
was so sudden and so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.
4. Same; Justifying Circumstances; Self-defense; It is settled that without unlawful aggression, there
can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.-
—The existence of unlawful aggression is the basic requirement in a plea of self-defense, either to justify
the commission of a crime or to mitigate the imposable penalty. It is settled that without unlawful
aggression, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. For unlawful aggression to
justify or mitigate a crime, the same must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger
thereof, and not merely threatening and intimidating attitude, towards the one claiming self¬-defense.
5. Same; Murder; Damages; Civil Liability; Awards in Case of Death Resulting from the Crime of
Murder.-
—On the matter of damages, case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of Murder, the
heirs of the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime; (b) actual or compensatory
damages to the extent proved, or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount cannot be provided with certainty; (c) moral damages; and (d) exemplary damages when
the crime was committed with one (1) or more aggravating circumstances.
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332
297. People vs. Arguta, 756 SCRA 376, April 20, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Penalties ;
1. Same; Penalties; —Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346
provides that “[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act
No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.” Pursuant thereto,
accused-appellants should be sentenced with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; —At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal
cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct
errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based
on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate
court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to modify accused-appellants’
conviction from Simple Rape to Qualified Rape, as will be explained hereunder.
3. Criminal Law; Rape; Qualified Rape; —In this case, the Court notes that the rape occurred during
the effectivity of the old rape provision of the RPC, i.e., Article 335, and, thus, the latter provision is
controlling in this case, to wit: Art. 335. When and how rape is committed.—Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or
intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the
woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under this provision, the elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim;
and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the victim
was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve (12) years of
age or demented. The provision also states that if the act is committed either with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition
of a higher penalty.
4. Same; Same; —In this case, records reveal that accused-appellants threatened AAA with a bladed
instrument and tied her up before having carnal knowledge of her without her consent. Jurisprudence
holds that force or intimidation, as an element of Rape, need not be irresistible; as long as the
assailant’s objective is accomplished, any question of whether the force employed was irresistible or
not becomes irrelevant. Intimidation must be viewed from the lens of the victim’s perception and
judgment and it is enough that the victim fears that something will happen to her should she resist her
assailant’s advances. In this regard, case law provides that the act of holding a bladed instrument, by
itself, is strongly suggestive of force or, at least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with the same
is sufficient to bring her into submission.
5. Same; Same; Considering that the crime was committed by two (2) persons, the accused-appellants
herein, with the use of a bladed weapon, it is only appropriate to increase their conviction from Simple
Rape to Qualified Rape.-
—The Court finds no reason to deviate from the findings of fact made by the courts a quo that accused-
appellants are guilty as charged, i.e., of raping AAA with the use of a deadly weapon, as the same are
supported by the records. It must be noted that the assessment and findings of the trial court are
generally accorded great weight, and are conclusive and binding to the Court if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, as in this case.
Nevertheless, considering that the crime was committed by two (2) persons, the accused-appellants
herein, with the use of a bladed weapon, it is only appropriate to increase their conviction from Simple
Rape to Qualified Rape.
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333
298. Pabillo vs. Commission on Elections En Banc, 756 SCRA 606, April 21, 2015
Syllabi Class: Bids and Bidding ; Direct Contracting ; Warranty ; Automated Election System ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; View that it is still premature at this point to rule that performing the
auxiliary services will necessarily affect the source code.-
—While I maintain my position that the hardware and software of the PCOS machines are closely
intertwined — the software being embedded on the hardware, I echo the concern that it is still premature
at this point to rule that performing the auxiliary services will necessarily affect the source code. The
initial industry survey, after all, may reveal that these services may actually be rendered without
altering the software’s algorithms, proving the COMELEC’s fears to be unfounded. Thus, should the
COMELEC opt to conduct an initial industry survey, I implore the Commission to include a technical
study to ascertain the veracity of its claim. If it were to be discovered that the said auxiliary services
cannot be performed by entities other than by COMELEC and Smartmatic¬-TIM without necessarily
altering the source code, the Commission cannot then contract out the said services except to
Smartmatic-TIM. This is so because the rights granted to COMELEC to alter and/or modify the Source
Code under Article 9 of the 2009 AES Contract, to reiterate, is nontransferable and cannot be
performed by any other entity in its stead, lest the Commission contravene Articles 9 and 10 of the 2009
AES Contract, and violate Smartmatic-TIM’s intellectual property rights.
2. Election Law; Automated Election System: Precinct Count Optical Scan Machines; Words and
Phrases; Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) means “a technology wherein an optical ballot scanner,
into which optical scan paper ballots marked by hand by the voter are inserted to be counted, is located
in every precinct.”-
—Indeed, the conduct of the upcoming 2016 Elections is dependent on the functional state of the existing
PCOS machines purchased by the COMELEC. PCOS means “a technology wherein an optical ballot
scanner, into which optical scan paper ballots marked by hand by the voter are inserted to be counted,
is located in every precinct.” As the AES’s groundwork mechanism, it is imperative that the PCOS
machines, come election day, are of optimal utility. Following the CAC’s recommendation to reuse the
existing technology for the said elections, the COMELEC proceeded to procure services for the repair
and refurbishment of the PCOS machines. The COMELEC, however, through its Resolution No. 9922,
decided to pursue a direct contracting arrangement with Smartmatic-TIM, which has now resulted in
the execution of the Extended Warranty Contract (Program 1). Petitioners assail the validity of the
foregoing courses of action mainly for violating the GPRA. Thus, if only to ensure that the upcoming
elections is not mired with illegality at this basic, initial front, this Court, pursuant to its unyielding
duty as final arbiter of the laws, deems it proper to thresh out the above stated substantive issues,
reasonably unfettered by the rigors of procedure.
3. Bids and Bidding; Government Contracts; In this jurisdiction, public bidding is the established
procedure in the grant of government contracts.-
—In this jurisdiction, public bidding is the established procedure in the grant of government contracts.
Section 3, Article I of the GPRA — the standing procurement law approved on January 10, 2003 —
states that “[a]ll procurement of the national government, its departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and/or -controlled corporations,
government financial institutions and local government units, shall, in all cases, be governed by these
principles: (a) Transparency in the procurement process and in the implementation of procurement
contracts. (b) Competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable private contracting parties
who are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding. (c) Streamlined procurement process
that will uniformly apply to all government procurement. The procurement process shall be simple and
made adaptable to advances in modern technology in order to ensure an effective and efficient method.
(d) System of accountability where both the public officials directly or indirectly involved in the
procurement process as well as in the implementation of procurement contracts and the private parties
that deal with government are, when warranted by circumstances, investigated and held liable for their
actions relative thereto. (e) Public monitoring of the procurement process and the implementation of
awarded contracts with the end in view of guaranteeing that these contracts are awarded pursuant to
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations, and that all these contracts are
performed strictly according to specifications.”
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4. Same; By its very nature, public bidding aims to protect public interest by giving the public the best
possible advantages through open competition.-
—By its very nature, public bidding aims to protect public interest by giving the public the best possible
advantages through open competition. Under Section 5(e), Article I of the GPRA, public bidding is
referred to as “Competitive Bidding,” which is defined as “a method of procurement which is open to
participation by any interested party and which consists of the following processes: advertisement, pre-
bid conference, eligibility screening of prospective bidders, receipt and opening of bids, evaluations of
bids, post-qualification, and award of contract, the specific requirements and mechanics of which shall
be defined in the [GPRA’s Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)].” Case law states that
competition requires not only bidding upon a common standard, a common basis, upon the same thing,
the same subject matter, and the same undertaking, but also that it be legitimate, fair and honest and
not designed to injure or defraud the government. The essence of competition in public bidding is that
the bidders are placed on equal footing which means that all qualified bidders have an equal chance of
winning the auction through their bids. Another self-evident purpose of competitive bidding is to avoid
or preclude suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of public contracts.
5. Same; Government Procurement; It is an established public policy, as well as a statutory mandate
that all government procurement shall be done through competitive public bidding.-
—It is an established public policy, as well as a statutory mandate that all government procurement
shall be done through competitive public bidding. However, as an exception, Article XVI of the GPRA
sanctions a resort to alternative methods of procurement, among others, via direct contracting.
6. Same; Direct Contracting; Words and Phrases; —Direct contracting, otherwise known as “Single
Source Procurement,” refers to “a method of Procurement that does not require elaborate Bidding
Documents because the supplier is simply asked to submit a price quotation or a pro forma invoice
together with the conditions of sale, which offer may be accepted immediately or after some
negotiations.”
7. Same; Same; Government Procurement Reform Act;—Under Section 50(a), Article XVI of the
GPRA, direct contracting may be allowed when the procurement involves goods of proprietary nature,
which can be obtained only from the proprietary source — that is, when patents, trade secrets, and
copyrights prohibit others from manufacturing the same item. The applicability of said condition was
explicated in the GPPB Manual as follows: This is applicable when the goods or services being
procured are covered by a patent, trade secret or copyright duly acquired under the law. Under the
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 8293), the registered owner of a patent, a
copyright or any other form of intellectual property has exclusive rights over the product, design or
process covered by such patent, copyright or registration. Such exclusive right includes the right to use,
manufacture, sell, or otherwise to derive economic benefit from the item, design or process.
8. Same; Same; Same; Automated Election System; Even if it is assumed that Smartmatic-TIM is the
proprietary source of the services or that the intended repair and refurbishment would necessarily
entail a modification of the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) hardware and software of which its
existing intellectual property rights cover, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is still not bound
to engage Smartmatic-TIM on an exclusive basis.-
—A perusal of the aforementioned patent and copyright documents reveals that Smartmatic-TIM’s
existing intellectual property rights do not cover the services subject of these cases. No evidence has
been presented to show that it possessed intellectual property rights over the method, process, system,
program, or work of servicing the said PCOS machines for their repair and refurbishment. Accordingly,
Smartmatic-TIM cannot be said to be the services’ proprietary source, thus, negating its purported
exclusivity as the COMELEC claims. At any rate, even if it is assumed that Smartmatic-TIM is the
proprietary source of the services or that the intended repair and refurbishment would necessarily
entail a modification of the PCOS hardware and software of which its existing intellectual property
rights cover, the COMELEC is still not bound to engage Smartmatic-TIM on an exclusive basis. Based
on the 2009 AES Contract, Smartmatic-TIM would grant the COMELEC a perpetual, but
nonex¬clusive license to use, modify, and customize the PCOS systems and software, including the right
to alter and modify the source code itself, for all future elections, when the latter exercises its option to
purchase (which it eventually did), with certain limitations.
335
9. Civil Law; Sales; Warranties; —Albeit undefined in our local statutes, a warranty has been
ordinarily considered as an agreement to be responsible for all damages that arise from the falsity of a
statement or assurance of fact. In other words, a warranty promises indemnity against defects in an
article sold. In Ang v. CA, 567 SCRA 54 (2008), a warranty was defined as “a statement or
representation made by the seller of goods, contemporaneously and as part of the contract of sale,
having reference to the character, quality or title of the goods, and by which he promises or undertakes
to insure that certain facts are or shall be as he then represents them.”
10. Same; Same; Same; Automated Election System; —With the warranty on manufacturing defects
having lost its effect, there is no way that the COMELEC’s engagement of another service contractor
would constitute a breach of that warranty.
11. Same; Same; Same; Same; While Smartmatic-TIM may be the exclusive manufacturer and
distributor of the PCOS machines and software in the Philippines, there is no evidence to show that it
is the sole entity capable of repairing and/or refurbishing the same. Smartmatic-TIM’s certification —
aside from being self-serving and, thus, of doubtful probative value — is not evidence of the company’s
exclusive capability. A business dictionary defines “certification” as a “formal procedure by which an
accredited or authorized person or agency assesses and verifies (and attests in writing by issuing a
certificate) the attributes, characteristics, quality, qualification, or status of individuals or
organizations, goods or services, procedures or processes, or events or situations, in accordance with
established requirements or standards.” Paralleled against this definition, the certification thus
operates only as a formal assurance that any work performed by the issuer’s employees would conform
to its own established requirements and standards, for which the client, based on the issuer’s goodwill
and reputation, is led to expect a certain quality of work. With the COMELEC appearing to rely solely
on Smartmatic-TIM’s certification, and more importantly, absent the conduct of an initial industry
survey (which again may, in itself, be considered as a ground to invalidate the resultant contract as
above explained), it remains uncertain if the repair and refurbishment of the PCOS machines can be
accomplished by other equally capable service providers at more advantageous terms to the
government. With this, the Court concludes that the third condition — similar to the previous two
conditions — which would justify a resort to direct contracting under Section 50, Article XVI of the
GPRA had not been complied with.
12. Same; Same; Same; Same; While Smartmatic-TIM may be the exclusive manufacturer and
distributor of the PCOS machines and software in the Philippines, there is no evidence to show that it
is the sole entity capable of repairing and/or refurbishing the same. Smartmatic-TIM’s certification —
aside from being self-serving and, thus, of doubtful probative value — is not evidence of the company’s
exclusive capability. A business dictionary defines “certification” as a “formal procedure by which an
accredited or authorized person or agency assesses and verifies (and attests in writing by issuing a
certificate) the attributes, characteristics, quality, qualification, or status of individuals or
organizations, goods or services, procedures or processes, or events or situations, in accordance with
established requirements or standards.” Paralleled against this definition, the certification thus
operates only as a formal assurance that any work performed by the issuer’s employees would conform
to its own established requirements and standards, for which the client, based on the issuer’s goodwill
and reputation, is led to expect a certain quality of work. With the COMELEC appearing to rely solely
on Smartmatic-TIM’s certification, and more importantly, absent the conduct of an initial industry
survey (which again may, in itself, be considered as a ground to invalidate the resultant contract as
above explained), it remains uncertain if the repair and refurbishment of the PCOS machines can be
accomplished by other equally capable service providers at more advantageous terms to the
government. With this, the Court concludes that the third condition — similar to the previous two
conditions — which would justify a resort to direct contracting under Section 50, Article XVI of the
GPRA had not been complied with.
13. Same; Same; —It has already been resolved that the COMELEC failed to comply with any of the
conditions by which its selected mode of procurement, i.e., direct contracting, would have been allowed.
Meanwhile, it has not argued that any other alternative method of procurement can be applied. This
notwithstanding, the COMELEC attempts to go beyond the scope of the GPRA and extend Section
52(h)’s application based on two (2) practical considerations, namely: (a) the alleged tight schedule of
conducting a public bidding and having the PCOS machines repaired/refurbished in time for the 2016
336
elections; and (b) the great risk of having the PCOS machines repaired/refurbished by any third party
provider in view of the highly technical nature of the goods.
14. Same; Same; Automated Election System;—At the outset, it should be underscored that the
COMELEC could have already had the PCOS machines inspected and diagnosed by its own in-¬house
personnel as early as the time it had resolved to reuse the same. The COMELEC’s ITD could have even
proceeded to conduct preventive maintenance procedures, which it admits it is capable of under its
memorandum dated May 14, 2014.
15. Same; Same; Same; —In fact, as may be above gleaned, it appears that the COMELEC could have
just procured the “the tools for repair and parts for replacement,” and have the repair and
refurbishment done by its own in-house personnel. Note that a sufficient number of ITD personnel could
have well been trained by Smartmatic-TIM itself on matters related to the repair, refurbishment, tuning
up and maintenance of the PCOS machines, as well as the electronic transmission facility, pursuant to
Item No. 8.2.4, Part V of the 2009 RFP.
16. Same; Same; Same; Smartmatic-TIM’s training obligation-
— an obligation that was incipiently required in the Request for Proposal (RFP) to which all bidders
at that time were subjected to and, in fact, included in the 2009 Automated Election System (AES)
Contract’s project scope — spans both aspects of preventive maintenance and repair. With this, the
Supreme Court (SC) is in a quandary as to why the services subject of these cases would still have to
be procured by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from an outside service provider, let alone
under an exclusive direct contracting arrangement with Smartmatic-TIM.—Clearly, Smartmatic-TIM’s
training obligation — an obligation that was incipiently required in the RFP to which all bidders at
that time were subjected to and, in fact, included in the 2009 AES Contract’s project scope — spans
both aspects of preventive maintenance and repair. With this, the Court is in a quandary as to why the
services subject of these cases would still have to be procured by the COMELEC from an outside service
provider, let alone under an exclusive direct contracting arrangement with Smartmatic-TIM. Curiously,
Smartmatic-TIM has been communicating with the COMELEC about its proposed extended warranty
as early as 2013. Hence, unless the COMELEC was already bent on pursuing its current deal with
Smartmatic-TIM, then the latter’s training obligation should have been enforced. To the Court’s mind,
this would have been the more prudent course of action: ideally, this would not only narrow down the
COMELEC’s task to the procurement of the necessary tools and replacement parts, but also provide it
with a considerable degree of sustainability by minimizing — if not eliminating — its reliance on
Smartmatic-TIM with respect to the upkeep of the PCOS machines.
17. Same; Same; Same; —Nothing on record convinces this Court that there is no other service
provider which is capable of servicing the PCOS machines without the need to reverse engineer the
same. Neither is this Court convinced that reverse engineering, if done properly, would impair the
machines’ integrity or put “back to zero” the know-how already accumulated. The bid guidelines may
very well qualify the COMELEC’s desired body of work, and the bidding process itself screens the
capability of potential bidders to comply with the same. As it was in its earlier asseveration, the
COMELEC is quick to assume the worst but its assumptions remain unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the
COMELEC’s arguments at this juncture are denied altogether.
18. Same; Same; Same; —Nothing on record convinces this Court that there is no other service
provider which is capable of servicing the PCOS machines without the need to reverse engineer the
same. Neither is this Court convinced that reverse engineering, if done properly, would impair the
machines’ integrity or put “back to zero” the know-how already accumulated. The bid guidelines may
very well qualify the COMELEC’s desired body of work, and the bidding process itself screens the
capability of potential bidders to comply with the same. As it was in its earlier asseveration, the
COMELEC is quick to assume the worst but its assumptions remain unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the
COMELEC’s arguments at this juncture are denied altogether.
19. Same; Same; Same; Same; —An extended warranty gives a prolonged warranty to consumers to
provide the additional service of replacing or repairing goods, the defects of which are directly related
to how the item was manufactured. As an “extension,” the defect to be repaired should occur within
the extended period covered in the agreement. In these cases, the warranty period for manufacturing
defects had, as above discussed, lapsed a long time ago, or last March 30, 2013, which follows the one
337
(1) year warranty period for the PCOS machines, reckoned from March 30, 2012 when the 2012 Deed
of Sale was executed.
20. Same; Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has failed to justify its
reasons for directly contracting with Smartmatic-TIM: it had not shown that any of the conditions under
Section 50, Article XVI of the Government Procurement Reform Act (GPRA) exists; its claims of
impracticality were not supported by independently verified and competent data; and lastly, its
perceived “warranty extension” is, in reality, just a circumvention of the procurement law.-
—There are no qualms about the task of having the PCOS machines repaired and refurbished. However,
there are serious and unignorable legal flaws about how the COMELEC intends to pursue this
undertaking. Bluntly, the COMELEC has failed to justify its reasons for directly contracting with
Smartmatic-TIM: it had not shown that any of the conditions under Section 50, Article XVI of the GPRA
exists; its claims of impracticality were not supported by independently verified and competent data;
and lastly, its perceived “warranty extension” is, in reality, just a circumvention of the procurement
law. For all these counts, the conclusion thus reached is that the COMELEC had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As a result, its Resolution No. 9922 and
the Extended Warranty Contract (Program 1) should be stricken down, and necessarily, all amounts
paid to Smartmatic-TIM pursuant to the said contract, if any, being public funds sourced from
taxpayers’ money, should be returned to the government in accordance with the procedures contained
in existing rules and regulations. Note that the disposition of these cases does not prohibit the
COMELEC from resorting to direct contracting anew or other alternative method of procurement with
any service contractor, subject to compliance with the conditions provided in the GPRA and all the
pertinent rules and procedures.
21. Bids and Bidding; Direct Contracting; Warranty; Automated Election System; I concur with the
majority that failure to comply with the set pre¬conditions for direct contracting, specifically the
conduct of an initial industry survey and pre-procurement conference, is a ground to nullify the
Extended Warranty Contract subject of these consolidated cases, and that the disposition of these cases
ought not prohibit the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from resorting to direct contracting anew
or resorting to other alternative modes of procurement with any service provider.
22. Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the parties herein agree that the subject “goods” of the
Extended Warranty Contract neither pertain to the PCOS machines nor the software program, but to
the services, particularly diagnostics, preventive maintenance, repair, and replacement of the PCOS
machines previously bought from Smartmatic-TIM. Here, it has been duly proved that Smartmatic-TIM
has proprietary rights over the PCOS machines’ hardware and software, but whether these proprietary
rights extend to the services contracted remains to be seen. It is likewise premature at this point to draw
a conclusion on whether or not Smartmatic-TIM is the sole distributor of the services to be rendered.
This is in view of the fact that the COMELEC, as correctly pointed out by the ponencia, failed to comply
with two key requirements prior to directly contracting with Smartmatic-TIM, namely: the conduct of
(a) an initial industry survey, and (b) a pre-procurement conference. On this point alone, the Extended
Warranty Contract ought to be nullified.
23. Same; Same; Same; Same; View that it is undisputed that the COMELEC has the right to reverse
engineer, disassemble, decompile, alter, modify, or transmit the technology it purchased in any form or
by any means, but, as can be gleaned, these rights to alter and/or modify the PCOS machine hardware,
and the software embedded thereon, pertain exclusively to COMELEC. In the same vein, the exception
under Article 10 indeed allows for the exploitation and reproduction of the technology transferred but
only if it is performed by COMELEC itself. To be sure, the provisions, as couched, do not evince that
the said rights mentioned thereon are actually transferrable. On the contrary, the language of the 2009
AES Contract prohibits the same.
****
338
299. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran, 757 SCRA 160, April 22, 2015
Syllabi Class: Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Parties ; Indispensable Parties ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction and, corollarily, the issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.-
—Be that as it may, the Court is not precluded from taking cognizance of the Municipality’s status as
an indispensable party even at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, the presence of indispensable
parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction and, corollarily, the issue on jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. Thus, as it has now come to the fore that any resolution of this
case would not be possible and, hence, not attain any real finality due to the nonjoinder of the
Municipality, the Court is constrained to set aside all subsequent actuations of the courts a quo in this
case, including that of the Court’s, and remand the case all the way back to the RTC for the inclusion
of all indispensable parties to the case and its immediate disposition on the merits. With this, the
propriety of the Municipality’s present intervention is now mooted.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Indispensable Parties; Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be joined in a suit.-
—Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be joined in a
suit, viz.: SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties.—Parties-in-interest without whom no
final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “An indispensable party is one whose interest will
be affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case
can be had. The party’s interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is
an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before
the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.” Thus, the absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; It must be stressed that the failure to implead any indispensable party to
a suit does not necessarily result in the outright dismissal of the complaint.-
—Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the failure to implead any indispensable party to a suit does not
necessarily result in the outright dismissal of the complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian, Sr.,
695 SCRA 345 (2013), the Court definitively explained that in instances of nonjoinder of indispensable
parties, the proper remedy is to implead them and not to dismiss the case: The nonjoinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial proceeding
and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of
the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of
the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The
remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable.
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300. Vergara vs. Sonkin, 757 SCRA 442, June 15, 2015
Syllabi Class : Civil Law ; Quasi-delicts ; Negligence ; Contributory Negligence ;
1. Same; Quasi-delicts; Negligence; Contributory Negligence; —In view of Sps. Sonkin’s undisputed
failure to observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, and in light of the
order of the courts a quo directing Sps. Vergara to provide an adequate drainage system within their
property, the Court likewise deems it proper, equitable, and necessary to order Erlinda, who is solely
impleaded as respondent before the Court, to comply with the aforesaid rule by the removal of the
portion of her house directly abutting the partition wall. The underlying precept on contributory
negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must therefore
be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.
2. Civil Law; Quasi-delicts; Negligence; Contributory Negligence; Words and Phrases; —
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the
harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the
Vergara property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the waters that flow from the latter, pursuant
to Article 637 of the Civil Code. This provision refers to the legal easement pertaining to the natural
drainage of lands, which obliges lower estates to receive from the higher estates water which naturally
and without the intervention of man descends from the latter, i.e., not those collected artificially in
reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth carried by the waters, viz.: Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged
to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher
estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot
construct works which will impede this easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works
which will increase the burden. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) In this light, Sps. Sonkin should
have been aware of such circumstance and, accordingly, made the necessary adjustments to their
property so as to minimize the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so, they
disregarded the easement and constructed their house directly against the perimeter wall which adjoins
the Vergara property, thereby violating the National Building Code in the process, specifically Section
708(a) thereof which reads: Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Dwellings.—(a)
Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy. The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety percent of a
corner lot and eighty percent of an inside lot, and subject to the provisions on Easement on Light and
View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2 meters from the property line.
3. Same; Damages; Moral Damages; -In view of Sps. Sonkin’s contributory negligence, the Court
deems it appropriate to delete the award of moral damages in their favor. While moral damages may
be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided
in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, they are only given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering and
should, therefore, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.
4. Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; —Anent the issue on attorney’s fees, the general rule is that the same
cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the
right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to
award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable
justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith
could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause. In this case, the Court observes that neither Sps. Sonkin nor Sps. Vergara
(thru their compulsory counterclaim) were shown to have acted in bad faith in pursuing their respective
claims against each other. The existence of bad faith is negated by the fact that both parties have valid
contentions against each other. Thus, absent cogent reason to hold otherwise, the Court deems it
inappropriate to award attorney’s fees in favor of either party.
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301. Bucal vs. Bucal, 759 SCRA 262, June 17, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not
prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by a party to a case. The rationale for
the rule was explained in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Teston, 545 SCRA 422 (2008), viz.:
Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the
scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity
to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement that
allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.
For the same reason, this protection against surprises granted to defendants should also be available
to petitioners. Verily, both parties to a suit are entitled to due process against unforeseen and arbitrary
judgments. The very essence of due process is “the sporting idea of fair play” which forbids the grant
of relief on matters where a party to the suit was not given an opportunity to be heard. The records do
not show that Manny prayed for visitation rights. While he was present during the hearing for the
issuance of the TPO and PPO, he neither manifested nor filed any pleading which would indicate that
he was seeking for such relief.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Motion for Reconsideration; The settled rule is
that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari.-
—The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or
the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity
for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is
involved.
3. Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act
of 2004; Protection Order; The urgency for resolution also rendered such filing unnecessary. It should
be emphasized that Cherith had already been issued a PPO. As defined in Section 8 of RA 9262, “[a]
protection order is an order issued x x x for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against
a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief
granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm,
minimizing any disruption in the victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the
victim to independently regain control over her life. x x x.” With a standing PPO issued for the purpose
of protecting not only the woman, but also her child against acts of violence committed by the person
against whom the order is issued — in this case, Manny — the resolution of the issue of whether or not
Manny should be given visitation rights, despite any discernible basis therefor, is urgent, else Cherith
and Francheska be unduly exposed to the very danger which they are seeking protection from. As the
Court sees it, any further delay would substantially prejudice their interests, thus, allowing a direct
recourse to certiorari.
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302. Ace Navigation Company vs. Garcia, 759 SCRA 274, June 17, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Disability Benefits ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In any case, the findings of Dr. Salvador and Dr. Cruz, the company-designated
physicians, should prevail considering that they examined, diagnosed, and treated Garcia from his
repatriation on May 20, 2010 until he was assessed with a Grade 10 disability rating; whereas the
independent physician, Dr. Escutin, only examined Garcia sparingly on April 25, 2011 after he filed
his claim for total and permanent disability benefits before the NLRC on November 8, 2010.
Jurisprudence holds that, under these circumstances, the assessment of the company-designated
physician should be given more credence for having been arrived at after months of medical attendance
and diagnosis, compared with the assessment of a private physician done in one day on the basis of an
examination or existing medical records.
2. Labor Law; Grave Abuse of Discretion; To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused
the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, grave
abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions
reached thereby are not supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In a seafarer’s claim for disability,
the onus probandi falls on the seafarer to establish his claim for disability benefits by the requisite
quantum of evidence to justify the relief sought.
3. Same; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; Permanent Total Disability; A judicious review of the records
reveals that Garcia was indeed unable to obtain any gainful employment for more than 120 days after
his repatriation; however, this fact does not ipso facto render his disability total and permanent. In
Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008), the Court held that the company-
designated physician is given a leeway of an additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from
repatriation, to give the seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature
of the latter’s disability. Thus, it is only upon the lapse of 240 days, or when so declared by the company-
designated physician, that a seafarer may be deemed totally and permanently disabled.
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303. Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corp vs. Bureau of Customs, 759 SCRA 306, June 17, 2015
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; In view of respondent’s availment of a wrong mode of
appeal via notice of appeal stating that it was elevating the case to the CA — instead of appealing by
way of a petition for review to the CTA within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy of the RTC’s
August 3, 2012 Order, as required by Section 11 of RA 1125, as amended by Section 9 of RA 9282 —
the Court is constrained to deem the RTC’s dismissal of respondent’s collection case against petitioner
final and executory. It is settled that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set
by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional as well, and that failure to perfect an appeal within the
period fixed by law renders the judgment appealed from final and executory.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of
a court to hear, try, and decide a case. In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority
to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general
class to which the proceedings in question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
3. Taxation; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; Jurisdiction; The CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over tax collection cases originally decided by the RTC. In the instant case, the CA has no jurisdiction
over respondent’s appeal; hence, it cannot perform any action on the same except to order its dismissal
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, the act of the CA in referring
respondent’s wrongful appeal before it to the CTA under the guise of furthering the interests of
substantial justice is blatantly erroneous, and thus, stands to be corrected. In Anderson v. Ho, 688
SCRA 8 (2013), the Court held that the invocation of substantial justice is not a magic wand that would
readily dispel the application of procedural rules.
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304. Province of Leyte vs. Energy Development Corporation, 760 SCRA 149, June 22, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Proofs of Service ;
1. Same; Same; Proof of Service; Admittedly, the Rules require that the petition filed before the CA
should include proof of service to the other party. Essentially, the purpose of this rule is to apprise such
party of the pendency of an action in the CA. Thus, if such party had already been notified of the same
and had even participated in the proceedings, such purpose would have already been served.
Considering that in this case, the CA had already issued a Resolution dated November 4, 2009 directing
EDC to file a comment which the latter had complied with, it cannot be denied that EDC was already
aware of the certiorari proceedings before the CA and that jurisdiction had been acquired over its
person. The CA, therefore, should have brushed aside the Province of Leyte’s procedural mishap and
resolved the case on the merits in the interest of substantial justice.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Certiorari; In petitions for certiorari filed
before the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent
upon: (a) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA’s initial action on the petition to
the respondent; or (b) the voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction.-
—Thus, in petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent upon: (a) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA’s initial action on the
petition to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its Resolution dated November 4, 2009 indicating
its initial action on the Province of Leyte’s certiorari petition before it, i.e., directing EDC to file a
comment to the petition, among others. In fact, the EDC complied with such directive by filing its
comment dated December 14, 2009 to such petition. Hence, the CA had already acquired jurisdiction
over both parties to the instant case.
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305. People vs. Inciong, 760 SCRA 249, June 22, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Witnesses ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; On this score, this Court has stated that, in the absence of any
clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which
would alter a conviction, it generally defers to the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
especially if such findings are affirmed by the CA. This must be so since the trial courts are in a better
position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having
observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination.
2. Criminal Law; Justifying Circumstances; Self-Defense; Unlawful Aggression; No self-defense can
exist without unlawful aggression since there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent or repel.-
—In order for self-defense to be appreciated, accused-appellant must be able to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the following elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself. An accused who invokes self-defense has the burden to
prove all the aforesaid elements, the most important of which is unlawful aggression. Being the basic
requirement in a plea of self-defense, unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense
to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. No self-defense can exist without unlawful
aggression since there is no attack that the accused will have to prevent or repel.
3. Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; Treachery is present when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.-
—Similarly, treachery as a qualifying circumstance was correctly appreciated. Treachery is present
when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in
the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In this case, a credible eyewitness
account established that accused-appellant, upon meeting Lumbera by the roadside, suddenly fired a
sumpak against the latter, leaving him unable to defend himself or evade the attack. The assault on
Lumbera ensured that accused-appellant would be able to consummate the crime without risk to his
own person, hence, the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Finally, with regard to the use of an
unlicensed firearm, a circumstance alleged in the information, the Court shall no longer delve upon its
significance in this case, the same not having been appreciated by the courts a quo.
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306. Wacoy vs. People, 760 SCRA 259, June 22, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Homicide ; Intent to Kill ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its
minimum period due to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong under Article 13(3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and Quibac, as correctly appreciated
by the CA. In determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that since intention
is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the accused’s intention must be judged by his
conduct and external overt acts. In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to
Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro
on the stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the purpose of merely maltreating or
inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life of Aro.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal
on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate
court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the
judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray; Elements of.-
—The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several
persons; (b) that they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another
in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the affray; (e) that
it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (f) that the person or persons who
inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified. Based on case law, a
tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a
confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author
thereof cannot be ascertained.
4. Same; Homicide; Elements of.-
—The crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC, which reads: Art. 249.
Homicide.—Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, without
the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed
guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal. The elements of Homicide are the following:
(a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused
had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.
5. Same; Same; Intent to Kill; Even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because with
respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following
the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.-
—Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different
from that intended and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and
not to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act
(praeter intentionem), as in this case. It is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act
of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In such case, even if there is no intent to kill,
the crime is Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for
all the consequences thereof.
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307. Go Tong Electrical Supply Co., Inc. vs. BPI FS Bank, Inc., 760 SCRA 486, June 29, 2015
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Obligations ; Suretyship ;
1. Same; Same; Suretyship; As established through the CSA, Go had clearly bound himself as a surety
to Go Tong Electrical’s loan obligation. Thus, there is no question that Go’s liability thereto is solidary
with the former. As provided in Article 2047 of the Civil Code, “the surety undertakes to be bound
solidarily with the principal obligor. That undertaking makes a surety agreement an ancillary contract
as it presupposes the existence of a principal contract. Although the contract of a surety is in essence
secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the surety becomes liable for the debt or duty of another
although it possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does it receive any benefit
therefrom. Let it be stressed that notwithstanding the fact that the surety contract is secondary to the
principal obligation, the surety assumes liability as a regular party to the undertaking,” as Go in this
case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; General Denial; A general denial does not become specific by the
use of the word “specifically.”-
—A reading of the Answer shows that petitioners failed to specifically deny the execution of the Credit
Agreement, PN, and CSA under the auspices of the above quoted rule. The mere statement in paragraph
4 of their Answer, i.e., that they “specifically deny” the pertinent allegations of the Complaint “for
being self-serving and pure conclusions intended to suit plaintiff’s purposes,” does not constitute an
effective specific denial as contemplated by law. Verily, a denial is not specific simply because it is so
qualified by the defendant. Stated otherwise, a general denial does not become specific by the use of
the word “specifically.” Neither does it become so by the simple expedient of coupling the same with a
broad conclusion of law that the allegations contested are “self-serving” or are intended “to suit
plaintiff’s purposes.”
3. Same; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules further requires that the
defendant “sets forth what he claims to be the facts,” which requirement, likewise, remains absent from
the Answer in this case. Thus, with said pleading failing to comply with the “specific denial under oath”
requirement under Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules, the proper conclusion, as arrived at by the CA, is that
petitioners had impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the documents evidencing their
loan obligation to respondent. To this, case law enlightens that “[t]he admission of the genuineness
and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he
voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the
time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying
upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively eliminated
any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the document was
spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as the one executed by the parties; or that the
signatures appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were unauthorized.”
4. Civil Law; Obligations; Payment; Of particular note is the affirmative defense of payment raised
during the proceedings a quo. While petitioners insisted that they had paid, albeit partially, their loan
obligation to respondent, the fact of such payment was never established by petitioners in this case.
Jurisprudence abounds that, in civil cases, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the
burden rests on the defendant, i.e., petitioners, to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff, i.e.,
respondent, to prove nonpayment. When the creditor is in possession of the document of credit, proof
of nonpayment is not needed for it is presumed. Here, respondent’s possession of the Credit Agreement,
PN, and CSA, especially with their genuineness and due execution already having been admitted,
cements its claim that the obligation of petitioners has not been extinguished. Instructive too is the
Court’s disquisition in Jison v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 495 (1998), on the evidentiary burdens
attendant in a civil proceeding
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308. Noble III vs. Ailes, 761 SCRA 1, July 01, 2015
1. Same; Same; Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this
case, constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While a lawyer
is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party.
Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he
maligned Maximino to his client.
2. Practice of Law; The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of
legal proficiency and morality.-
—The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal proficiency
and morality. It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal profession, the courts,
their clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to uphold
integrity and promote the public’s faith in the profession. Consequently, a lawyer must at all times,
whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers.
3. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always
be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language
and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum. In Buatis, Jr. v. People, 485
SCRA 275 (2006), the Court treated a lawyer’s use of the words “lousy,” “inutile,” “carabao English,”
“stupidity,” and “satan” in a letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious which
effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing
counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession.
4. Same; Same; It must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions such that a lawyer’s words and actions directly affect the public’s opinion of the legal
profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should
remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the event their
conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them. Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the
statements were merely relayed to Orlando’s brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando
should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer
to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to interfere and insult
Maximino to his client.
****
348
309. Alangdeo vs. Do Mogan, 761 SCRA 272, July 01, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Provisional Remedies ; Injunction ;
1. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; It is well-settled that for an injunction to issue,
two (2) requisites must concur: first, there must be a right to be protected; and second, the acts against
which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.-
—In fine, DO No. 05, which ordered the summary demolition of petitioners’ structures, has no legal
moorings and perforce was invalidly issued. Accordingly, an injunctive writ to enjoin its implementation
is in order. It is well-settled that for an injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: first, there must
be a right to be protected; and second, the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are
violative of said right. Here, the two (2) requisites are present: there is a right to be protected — that
is, petitioners’ right over their structures which should be preserved unless their removal is warranted
by law; and the act, i.e., the summary demolition of the structures under DO No. 05, against which the
injunction is directed, would violate said right.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides for three (3) ways
by which an appeal from the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) decision may be undertaken, depending
on the nature of the attendant circumstances of the case.-
—On the preliminary procedural issue, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (Rules) provides for three (3)
ways by which an appeal from the RTC’s decision may be undertaken, depending on the nature of the
attendant circumstances of the case, namely: (a) an ordinary appeal to the CA in cases decided by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (b) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (c) a petition for review on certiorari directly
filed with the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved. The first mode of appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules is available on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and of law. The second
mode of appeal, governed by Rule 42 of the Rules, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and of law. The third mode of appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules is filed with the
Court only on questions of law.
3. Same; Same; Same; “Question of Law” and “Question of Fact,” Distinguished.-
—There is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a “question of fact” when the doubt or
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as
to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.
4. Squatters; Summary Eviction; Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992; Section 2 of the
Summary Eviction IRR provides that only new squatter families whose structures were built after the
effectivity of RA 7279, otherwise known as the “Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992,” and
squatter families identified by the local government unit (LGU) as professional squatters or members
of squatting syndicates shall be subject of summary eviction: SECTION 2. Coverage.—The following
shall be subject for summary eviction: 1.0 New squatter families whose structures were built after the
effectivity of RA 7279; and 2.0 Squatter families identified by the LGU in cooperation with the
Presidential Commission of the Urban Poor (PCUP), Philippine National Police (PNP) and accredited
Urban Poor [O]rganization (UPO) as professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates as
defined in the Act. Under the Summary Eviction IRR, the term “summary eviction” has been defined as
“the immediate dismantling of new illegal structures by the local government units or government
agency authorized to [demolish] in coordination with the affected urban poor organizations without
providing the structure owner(s) any benefits of the Urban Development and Housing Program.”
5. Demolition; Building Permits; National Building Code of the Philippines; Under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1096, otherwise known as the “National Building Code of the Philippines” (NBCP),
the mere fact that a structure is constructed without a building permit, as well as noncompliance with
work stoppage order, without more, will not call for a summary demolition, but subjects the violator to
an administrative fine under Section 212, Chapter II of the NBCP, or a criminal case under Section 213
of the same law.-
—While respondents make much ado of petitioners’ lack of building permits, it should be underscored
that under Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the “National Building Code of the
Philippines” (NBCP), the mere fact that a structure is constructed without a building permit, as well as
349
noncompliance with work stoppage order, without more, will not call for a summary demolition, but
subjects the violator to an administrative fine under Section 212, Chapter II of the NBCP, or a criminal
case under Section 213 of the same law. Indeed, while Section 301, Chapter III of the NBCP states that
“[n]o person, firm or corporation, including any agency or instrumentality of the government shall
erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or demolish any building or structure or cause the same
to be done without first obtaining a building permit therefor from the Building Official assigned in the
place where the subject building is located or the building work is to be done,” the remedy of summary
abatement against the bare absence of a building permit was not provided for.
6. Same; Building Official; National Building Code of the Philippines; It is the Building Official, and
not the City Mayor, who has the authority to order the demolition of the structures under the National
Building Code of the Philippines (NBCP).-
—To this, it bears noting that it is the Building Official, and not the City Mayor, who has the authority
to order the demolition of the structures under the NBCP. As held in Gancayco v. City Government of
Quezon City, 658 SCRA 853 (2011): [T]he Building Code clearly provides the process by which a
building may be demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building
Official.
****
350
310. Bahia Shipping Services, Inc. vs. Flores, Jr., 761 SCRA 323, July 01, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Permanent Total Disability ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Records reveal that after respondent was repatriated on April 18, 2009, he
underwent continuous medical care from the company-designated physician. He was even given an
interim disability rating of Grade 7 (moderate residual or disorder) on July 17, 2009, and thereafter,
went through further tests and procedures. However, after October 12, 2009, respondent’s treatment
stopped without him recovering from his ailment. Notably, the company-designated physician neither
issued to respondent a fit-to-work certification nor a final disability rating on or before December 14,
2009, the 240th day since respondent’s repatriation. Case law instructs that, if after the lapse of the
240-day period, the seafarer is still incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties and the company-
designated physician had not yet declared him fit to work or permanently disabled, whether total or
permanent, the conclusive presumption that the seafarer is totally and permanently disabled arises.
Perforce, it is but proper to hold that respondent was permanently and totally disabled, and hence,
entitled to the corresponding benefits stated under the CBA.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Permanent Total Disability; At the outset, the Court notes that petitioners
correctly ascribed error on the part of the CA in holding that respondent’s inability to obtain gainful
employment for more than 120 days after his repatriation, and that the failure of the company-
designated physician to declare him fit to work or to give him a final disability rating within the same
period ipso facto rendered respondent’s disability to be permanent and total. In Vergara v. Hammonia
Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008), the Court held that the company-designated physician
is given a leeway of an additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to give the seafarer
further treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature of the latter’s disability. Thus, it
is only upon the lapse of 240 days from repatriation, or when so declared by the company-designated
physician, that a seafarer may be deemed totally and permanently disabled.
****
351
311. People vs. Balcueva, 761 SCRA 489, July 01, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Rape ; Qualified Rape ; Death Penalty ; Damages ;
1. Criminal Law; Rape; Qualified Rape; Death Penalty; Damages; In view of prevailing
jurisprudence, where the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed
upon Balcueva because of the provisions of Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, the Court hereby increases
the damages awarded to AAA as follows: (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P100,000.00 as
moral damages; and (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.-
—In view of prevailing jurisprudence, where the penalty for the crime committed is death which,
however, cannot be imposed upon Balcueva because of the provisions of RA No. 9346, the Court hereby
increases the damages awarded to AAA as follows: (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P100,000.00
as moral damages; and (c) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In addition, the Court imposes interest
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all monetary awards from the date of finality of this
Resolution until fully paid.
2. Criminal Law; Rape; Qualified Rape; Elements of.-
—The elements of Qualified Rape under the foregoing provisions are as follows: (a) the victim is a
female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force,
threat or intimidation; or when she is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Child Witnesses; A young girl would not concoct a sordid tale
of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her private
part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than
a fervent desire to seek justice.-
—As correctly ruled, AAA’s clear, categorical, and unwavering testimony reveals that she was indeed
raped by Balcueva, her own father. Suffice it to say that Balcueva’s flimsy defense of denial and alibi
cannot prevail over AAA’s positive and categorical testimony and identification of him as the
perpetrator of the crime. Verily, a young girl would not concoct a sordid tale of a crime as serious as
rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her private part, and subject herself
to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive was other than a fervent desire to seek
justice. Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA would testify against her own father, imputing to
him the grave crime of rape, if this crime did not happen.
****
352
312. Tom vs. Rodriguez, 761 SCRA 679, July 06, 2015
Syllabi Class :Corporation Law ; Board of Directors ;
1. Corporation Law; Board of Directors; The Court finds that the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying Tom’s prayer for the issuance of a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The issuance of an injunctive writ is warranted to enjoin
the RTC-Nabunturan from implementing its November 13, 2013 and December 11, 2013 Orders in the
specific performance case placing the management and control of GDITI to Rodriguez, among other
directives. This pronouncement follows the well-entrenched rule that a corporation exercises its powers
through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents, except in instances where
the Corporation Code requires stockholders’ approval for certain specific acts. As statutorily provided
for in Section 23 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 68, otherwise known as “The Corporation Code of the
Philippines”: SEC. 23. The board of directors or trustees.—Unless otherwise provided in this Code,
the corporate powers of all corporations formed under this Code shall be exercised, all business
conducted and all property of such corporations controlled and held by the board of directors or
trustees to be elected from among the holders of stocks, or where there is no stock, from among the
members of the corporation, who shall hold office for one (1) year until their successors are elected
and qualified. Every director must own at least one (1) share of the capital stock of the corporation of
which he is a director, which share shall stand in his name on the books of the corporation. Any director
who ceases to be the owner of at least one (1) share of the capital stock of the corporation of which he
is a director shall thereby cease to be a director. Trustees of non-stock corporations must be members
thereof. A majority of the directors or trustees of all corporations organized under this Code must be
residents of the Philippines.
2. Grave Abuse of Discretion; As traditionally described, grave abuse of discretion refers to capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 652
SCRA 341 (2011), the Court explained that: The term “grave abuse of discretion” has a specific
meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.” The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an “evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.” Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to “truly extraordinary
cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.”
3. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Injunction; Case law holds that the issuance of an
injunctive writ rests upon the sound discretion of the court that took cognizance of the case; as such,
the exercise of judicial discretion by a court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except
when there is grave abuse of discretion.-
—As the existence of grave abuse of discretion in this case relates to the propriety of issuing a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, which, by nature, are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies
for the protection of substantive rights and interests, it is important to lay down the issuance’s
requisites, namely: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is
directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and
irreparable damage. Case law holds that the issuance of an injunctive writ rests upon the sound
discretion of the court that took cognizance of the case; as such, the exercise of judicial discretion by a
court in injunctive matters must not be interfered with, except when there is grave abuse of discretion.
****
353
313. Re: Report of Atty. Caridad A. Pabello, Chief of Office, Office of Administrative Services-
Office of the Court Administra (OAS-OCA), 762 SCRA 26, July 08, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ; Penalties ; Mitigating Circumstances ;
1. Same; Same; Penalties; Mitigating Circumstances; Under Section 46(D)(1), Rule 10 of Civil
Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 1101502 dated November 8, 2011, otherwise known as the
“Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service” (RRACCS), simple neglect of duty is a
less grave offense, punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the
first offense. This notwithstanding, the disciplining authority, the Court in this case, is granted the
discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the final penalty. These factors
range, among others, from the erring individual’s admission of guilt, remorse, length of service, or high
performance rating.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Human Resource Management Officers; Simple Neglect
of Duty; Words and Phrases; Under Item XIV(14)(a) of Revised A.C. No. 50-2001, “[f]or appointment
by promotion, the performance rating of the appointee for the last rating period prior to the effectivity
date of the appointment should be at least very satisfactory” — a requirement which Andres is aware
of. Nonetheless, he failed to meticulously check Puerto’s qualifications and indicate in the list of lacking
requirements, the absence of Puerto’s PR form. While applications “with incomplete form or lacking
requirement/s shall still be included in the list to be submitted to the SPB-LC with a notation as to the
lacking form or requirement/s,” subject to subsequent accomplishment/submission as the SPB-LC may
require, Andres likewise erroneously reported Puerto’s performance rating as “Very Satisfactory”
instead of “Satisfactory,” which eventually led to the latter’s promotion from Clerk III to Sheriff IV,
albeit disqualified. From the foregoing circumstances, Andres was clearly remiss and negligent in
performing his assigned tasks as a processor-in-charge, and is guilty of simple neglect of duty, defined
as “the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required task or to discharge a duty due to
carelessness or indifference.”
3. Same; Same; Section 1, Canon IV of A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC, otherwise known as the “Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel,” mandates that “[c]ourt personnel shall at all times perform official
duties properly and with diligence. x x x.” The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the “[j]udicial
machinery can only function if every employee performs his task with the highest degree of
professionalism. Court personnel are obligated to perform their duties properly and with diligence. Any
task given to an employee of the judiciary, however menial it may be, must be done in the most prompt
and diligent way.” Andres’ attribution of the mistake to human error and his alleged heavy workload
at the time cannot be given credence because a heavy workload is not a compelling reason to justify
failure to perform one’s duties properly. Otherwise, every government employee charged with
negligence and dereliction of duty would always proffer a similar excuse to escape punishment, to the
prejudice of the government service. Truth be told, it is incumbent upon every government employee to
adapt all reasonable means to cope with the heavy workload, for the occupation demands no less than
full and uncomplaining dedication to the public service.
****
354
314. Westmont Bank vs. Funai Philippines Corp, 762 SCRA 82,July 08, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ; Sheriffs ; Injunction ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Injunction; The Court does not find credence in Sheriff Cachero’s insistence
that while he may have “gotten wind” of the TRO through a cellular phone call, he was not bound
thereby unless an official copy of the TRO was duly served upon him. Settled is the rule that where a
party has actual notice, no matter how acquired, of an injunction clearly informing him from what he
must abstain, he is “legally bound from that time to desist from what he is restrained and inhibited from
doing, and will be punished for a violation thereof, even though it may not have served, or may have
been served on him defectively.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; Failure to State a Cause of Action; Lack of
Cause of Action; “Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to
dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading,
while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for failure to state a
cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a motion to dismiss
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time
after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence
presented by the plaintiff.”
3. Same; Same; Cause of Action; A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the
existence of the three (3) essential elements of a cause of action.-
—“A complaint states a cause of action if it sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3) essential
elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If the allegations of the complaint do not state
the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.”
4. Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; It bears to stress that “while the facts alleged in the complaint
are hypothetically admitted by the defendant, who moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action, it must, nevertheless, be remembered that the hypothetical admission
extends only to the relevant and material facts well pleaded in the complaint, as well as inferences fairly
deductible therefrom.” Verily, the filing of the motion to dismiss assailing the sufficiency of the
complaint “does not admit the truth of mere epithets of fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor
an erroneous statement of law; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts not stated; nor mere
conclusions of law; nor allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice; nor matters
of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter; nor scandalous matter inserted merely to insult the
opposing party; nor to legally impossible facts; nor to facts which appear unfounded by a record
incorporated in the pleading, or by a document referred to; nor to general averments contradicted by
more specific averments.”
5. Attorney’s Fees; The courts possess the power to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees whether
intended as an indemnity or a penalty, if the same is iniquitous or unconscionable.-
—Anent the award of attorney’s fees, it is relevant to note that the stipulations on attorney’s fees
contained in the PNs constitute what is known as a penal clause. The award of attorney’s fees by the
CA, therefore, is not in the nature of an indemnity but rather a penalty in the form of liquidated damages
in accordance with the contract between Westmont and the original defendants. “Such a stipulation
has been upheld by [the] Court as binding between the parties so long as it does not contravene the
law, morals, public order or public policy.” Nevertheless, the courts possess the power to reduce the
amount of attorney’s fees whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, if the same is iniquitous or
unconscionable. Thus, in Trade & Investment Dev’t. Corp. of the Phils. v. Roblett Industrial
Construction Corp., 474 SCRA 510 (2005), the Court equitably reduced the amount of attorney’s fees
to be paid since interests (and penalties) had ballooned to thrice as much as the principal debt. In the
present case, interest alone runs to more than thrice the principal amount of the loan obligation. In real
terms, therefore, attorney’s fees at the stipulated rate of 20% of the total amount due of over
P42,000,000.00, or about P8,400,000.00, is manifestly exorbitant. Hence, the Court concurs with the
355
CA that the amount of attorney’s fees should be equitably reduced to five percent (5%) of the principal
debt, which the Court finds reasonable under the premises.
6. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; In serving the court’s writs and processes and in
implementing the orders of the court, sheriffs cannot afford to err without affecting the efficiency of the
process of the administration of justice.-
—It is well-settled that a sheriff performs a sensitive role in the dispensation of justice. He is duty-
bound to know the basic rules in the implementation of a writ of execution and be vigilant in the exercise
of that authority. While sheriffs have the ministerial duty to implement writs of execution promptly, they
are bound to discharge their duties with prudence, caution, and attention which careful men usually
exercise in the management of their affairs. Sheriffs, as officers of the court upon whom the execution
of a judgment depends, must be circumspect and proper in their behavior. Anything less is unacceptable
because in serving the court’s writs and processes and in implementing the orders of the court, sheriffs
cannot afford to err without affecting the efficiency of the process of the administration of justice.
****
356
315. Dy vs. Yu, 762 SCRA 357, July 08, 2015
Syllabi Class :Attorney’s Fees ;
1. Attorney’s Fees; It bears to stress that power of the court to award attorney’s fees demands factual,
legal, and equitable justification, without which the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis
being improperly left to speculation and conjecture. In fact, such failure or oversight of the trial court
cannot even be supplanted by the CA.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Res judicata literally means “a matter
adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.”-
—Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment.” Paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court state
the doctrine of res judicata.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment
or order must be on the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.-
—Res judicata comprehends two concepts: (1) bar by former judgment, and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment. “For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the
merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties;
and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action. When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists
res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. Although it does not have the same effect as
res judicata in the form of bar by former judgment which prohibits the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment bars the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation between the same parties on a different
claim or cause of action.”
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; The res judicata doctrine applies only when a judgment on the merits
is finally rendered on the first complaint; A judgment on the merits presupposes that trial has been
conducted, evidence presented, and issues sufficiently heard and passed upon.-
—Material to this discourse is the doctrine’s second element, which evokes that the res judicata doctrine
applies only when a judgment on the merits is finally rendered on the first complaint. The term “merits”
has been defined as a matter of substance in law, as distinguished from matter of form; it refers to the
real or substantial grounds of action or defense as contrasted with some technical or collateral matter
raised in the course of the suit. Thus, a judgment on the merits presupposes that trial has been
conducted, evidence presented, and issues sufficiently heard and passed upon. It is a judgment rendered
after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some
preliminary or formal technical point. Stated differently, a judgment is “on the merits” when it amounts
to a legal declaration of the respective rights and duties of the parties, based upon the disclosed facts
and upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objectives
or contentions.
5. Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases; Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who
repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other
court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. To
determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is
whether the element of litis pendentia is present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another. Otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the
two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
If a situation of litis pendentia or res judicata arises by virtue of a party’s commencement of a judicial
remedy identical to one which already exists (either pending or already resolved), then a forum
shopping infraction is committed.
357
6. Same; Same; Litis Pendentia; As opposed to res judicata which was already hereinabove explained,
litis pendentia refers to a situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy
against multiplicity of suits. The requirements of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at
least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
7. Same; Same; Forum Shopping; With the elements of litis pendentia attendant hereto as caused by
Rosario’s institution of the Annulment Case while the Reconveyance Case was pending, the conclusion
is that forum shopping was committed. Under the last sentence of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court, “[i]f the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping,
the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions.”
8. Civil Law; Reconveyance; Words and Phrases; It is well to point out that an action for reconveyance
— as in Roberto’s Recovery Case — is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful land owner
whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another, to compel the registered
owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him. By fraudulently including in his application for the
registration of title over Lot 1519 the disputed portion, i.e., Lot 1519-A, in his name, Roberto holds the
title to said portion in trust for the benefit of Rosario as the true owner. Indeed, registration does not
vest title but merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. Thus, not being the owner of
the subject portion, Roberto could not have transferred ownership thereof to his children, petitioners
Jose and Alteza.
9. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.-
—With all these considerations in mind, the Court has come to the conclusion that it cannot
precipitately order the summary dismissal of the Annulment Case and set aside the judgments therein
rendered in view of a mere forum shopping infraction as aforediscussed. To act otherwise would be
tantamount to a blatant disregard of substantial justice in the name of unwarranted technical
adherence. Case law dictates that technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of
the other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. As aptly pointed out in Barcelona
v. CA, 412 SCRA 41 (2003), the rule on forum shopping should not be interpreted with such absolute
literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure
— which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. After all, the dispensation of
justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. Accordingly, the partial nullification of the June
28, 1994 Deed of Donation between spouses-petitioners Roberto and Chloe and petitioners Jose and
Alteza insofar as it concerns Lot 1519-A owned by Rosario and, now respondents, as her heirs, is in
order.
****
358
316. Ang vs. Pacunio, 762 SCRA 411, July 08, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Parties ; Real Parties-in-Interest ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Basic is the rule that no relief can be extended in a judgment to a stranger
or one who is not a party to a case.-
—Having established that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to the instant suit, the proper
course of action was for the CA to merely affirm the RTC’s dismissal of their complaint. It therefore
erred in proceeding to resolve the other substantive issues of the case and granting one of the principal
reliefs sought by respondents, which is the declaration of the nullity of the Questioned Deed of Absolute
Sale. In the same vein, the CA erred in awarding portions of the subject land to various nonparties to
the case, such as the Heirs of Gaccion and Udiaan’s children. Basic is the rule that no relief can be
extended in a judgment to a stranger or one who is not a party to a case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Parties-in-Interest; The rule on real parties-in-
interest has two (2) requirements, namely: (a) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real
party-in-interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.-
—The rule on real parties-in-interest has two (2) requirements, namely: (a) to institute an action, the
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest; and (b) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party-in-interest. Interest within the meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest
in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved. One having no material interest cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the
plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action. In Spouses Oco v. Limbaring, 481 SCRA 348 (2006), the Court
expounded on the purpose of this rule, to wit: Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to
prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require
that the actual party entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid multiplicity
of suits; and 4) discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to public policy.
****
359
317. Dacles vs. Millenium Erectors Corporation, 762 SCRA 420, July 08, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Project Employees ;
1. Same; Same; The repeated and successive rehiring of project employees does not, by and of itself,
qualify them as regular employees.-
—At any rate, the repeated and successive rehiring of project employees does not, by and of itself,
qualify them as regular employees. Case law states that length of service (through rehiring) is not the
controlling determinant of the employment tenure, but whether the employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking, with its completion having been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee. While generally, length of service provides a fair yardstick for determining
when an employee initially hired on a temporary basis becomes a permanent one, entitled to the security
and benefits of regularization, this standard will not be fair, if applied to the construction industry
because construction firms cannot guarantee work and funding for its payrolls beyond the life of each
project as they have no control over the decisions and resources of project proponents or owners. Thus,
once the project is completed it would be unjust to require the employer to maintain these employees in
their payroll since this would be tantamount to making the employee a privileged retainer who collects
payment from his employer for work not done, and amounts to labor coddling at the expense of
management.
abused the discretion conferred upon it.-
—It must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, petitioner must
satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred
upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner
that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered “grave,” discretion must be exercised in a
all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC
when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not supported by substantial
evidence, “or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.”
3. Labor Law; Project Employees; For an employee to be considered project-based, the employer
must show that: (a) the employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b)
the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employee was engaged for such project.-
—For an employee to be considered project-based, the employer must show that: (a) the employee was
assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope of which were
specified at the time the employee was engaged for such project. Being assigned to a project or a phase
thereof which begins and ends at determined or determinable times, the services of project employees
may be lawfully terminated at the completion of such project or phase. Consequently, in order to
safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word “project” to prevent them from
attaining regular status, employers claiming that their workers are project employees should prove
that: (a) the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged; and
(b) there was indeed a project.
****
360
318. Vicente vs. Acil Corporation, 763 SCRA 1, July 15, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Judgments ; Forum Shopping ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Forum Shopping; Indeed, Vicente’s protraction of
this case should not be countenanced. It is fundamental that every litigation must come to an end. While
a litigant’s right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, once his case has been adjudicated by
a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar suits hoping
to secure a favorable ruling, for this will result to endless litigations detrimental to the administration
of justice. After all, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution
of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the “life of the law,” as Acil in
this case.
****
361
319. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation vs. Panogalinog, 763 SCRA 140, July 15, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Disability Benefits ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The findings of Dr. Lim and Dr. Chuasuan should prevail over that of Dr.
Jacinto considering that the former examined, diagnosed, and treated respondent from his repatriation
on May 9, 2010 until he was assessed fit to work on September 15, 2010; whereas, it appears that the
independent physician, Dr. Jacinto, only examined respondent on October 13, 2010 which was the same
day the latter filed his claim for permanent total disability benefits. While the medical certificate
indicates that respondent was under Dr. Jacinto’s service beginning “September 2010,” no supporting
document on record shows this to be true. In fact, the NLRC even observed that the medical certificate
of Dr. Jacinto was issued after a one-time examination and worse, without any medical support. Case
law dictates that, under these circumstances, the assessment of the company-designated physician
should be given more credence for having been arrived at after months of medical attendance and
diagnosis, compared with the assessment of a private physician done in one day on the basis of an
examination or existing medical records.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Law; Appeals; To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari,
the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the
discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, the character of
which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. In labor disputes, grave abuse of
discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported
by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.
3. Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; A seafarer shall be entitled to the payment of the full
amount of disability compensation only if his injury, regardless of the degree of disability, results in
loss of profession, i.e., his physical condition prevents a return to sea service. Based on the submissions
of the parties, this contractual attribution refers to permanent total disability compensation as known
in labor law. Thus, the Court examines the presence of such disability in this case. Preliminarily, the
task of assessing the seaman’s disability or fitness to work is entrusted to the company-designated
physician.
4. Same; Same; Same; Under the Labor Code, there are three kinds of disability, namely: (1) temporary
total disability; (2) permanent total disability; and (3) permanent partial disability. Section 2, Rule VII
of the AREC differentiates the disabilities as follows: SEC. 2. Disability.—(a) A total disability is
temporary if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable to perform any gainful
occupation for a continuous period not exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise provided in Rule X of
these Rules. (b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee
is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as
otherwise provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
5. Same; Same; Same; Permanent Total Disability; Recent jurisprudence now holds that the said 120-
day rule is not a magic wand that automatically warrants the grant of total and permanent disability
benefits in his favor. As clarified by the Court in the later case of Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime
Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008): [T]he petitioner has repeatedly invoked our ruling in Crystal
Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, apparently for its statement that the respondent in the case “was unable to
perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability.” This
declaration of a permanent total disability after the initial 120 days of temporary total disability cannot,
however, be simply lifted and applied as a general rule for all cases in all contexts. The specific context
of the application should be considered, as we must do in the application of all rulings and even of the
law and of the implementing regulations. Elucidating on this point, Vergara discussed the seeming
conflict between Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC and Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code on
permanent total disability in relation to Section 2(a), Rule X of the AREC that provided for a 240-day
period in case of further medical treatment, thus: As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-
off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival
for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the
seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage
362
during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the
company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA-
Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is
exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then
the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right
of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists.
The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his
medical condition. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Thus, temporary total disability only
becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated physician within the periods he is
allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a
declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.
6. Same; Same; Same; Note that while respondent has the right to seek the opinion of other doctors
under Section 20(B) of the POEA-SEC and the CBA, it bears stressing that the employer is liable for a
seafarer’s disability, arising from a work-related injury or illness, only after the degree of disability
has been established by the company-designated physician and, if the seafarer consulted with a
physician of his choice whose assessment disagrees with that of the company-designated physician, the
disagreement must be referred to a third doctor for a final assessment. No such mandated third doctor
was, however, consulted to settle the conflicting findings of the company-designated physicians (Dr.
Lim and Dr. Chuasuan) and the respondent’s own doctor (Dr. Jacinto).
****
363
320. Marilag vs. Martinez, 763 SCRA 533, July 22, 2015
1. Attorney’s Fees; Inasmuch as the court a quo failed to state in the body of its decision the factual or
legal basis for the award of attorney’s fees to the respondent, as required under Article 2208 of the New
Civil Code, the Court resolves to delete the same. The rule is well-settled that the trial court must clearly
state the reasons for awarding attorney’s fees in the body of its decision, not merely in its dispositive portion,
as the appellate courts are precluded from supplementing the bases for such award.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Elements of. A case is barred by prior
judgment or res judicata when the following elements concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar the new action
must be final; (b) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (c) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must
be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
3. Same; Same; Actions; Dismissal of Actions; Litis Pendentia; To lay down the basics, litis pendentia,
as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary
and vexatious. For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity
of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful would amount to res judicata in the other. The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory
that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and for the
same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be
the subject of controversy in courts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be
avoided for the sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and
expenses incident to numerous suits. Consequently, a party will not be permitted to split up a single cause
of action and make it a basis for several suits as the whole cause must be determined in one action. To be
sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action, but with different prayers, where the ground of dismissal is litis pendentia (or res judicata,
as the case may be).
4. Loans; In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has
a single cause of action against the debtor-mortgagor, i.e., to recover the debt, through the filing of a
personal action for collection of sum of money or the institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage
security. The two remedies are alternative, not cumulative or successive, and each remedy is complete by
itself. Thus, if the creditor-mortgagee opts to foreclose the real estate mortgage, he waives the action for
the collection of the unpaid debt, except only for the recovery of whatever deficiency may remain in the
outstanding obligation of the debtor-mortgagor after deducting the bid price in the public auction sale of
the mortgaged properties. Accordingly, a deficiency judgment shall only issue after it is established that the
mortgaged property was sold at public auction for an amount less than the outstanding obligation.
5. Same; While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note executed by respondent
who was not the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of loan which
would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are bereft of any
indication that respondent’s agreement to pay Rafael’s loan obligation and the execution of the subject PN
extinguished by novation the contract of loan between Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of express
agreement or any act of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed, but must be
clearly and unequivocally shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties
to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one, which
was not shown here.
6. Foreclosure of Mortgage; As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the
mortgaged property, she is now barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless
of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the
collection case is in order. Considering, however, that respondent’s claim for return of excess payment
partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and, thus, survives the dismissal of petitioner’s
collection suit, the same should be resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
****
364
321. Visayan Electric Company Employees Union-ALU-TUCP vs. Visayan Electric Company,
Inc. (VECO), 763 SCRA 566, July 22, 2015
1. Same; As a final word, while it is the state’s responsibility to afford protection to labor, this policy should
not be used as an instrument to oppress management and capital. In resolving disputes between labor and
capital, fairness and justice should always prevail. Social justice does not mandate that every dispute should
be automatically decided in favor of labor. Justice is to be granted to the deserving and dispensed in the
light of the established facts and the applicable law and doctrine.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, certiorari should be filed “not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution” sought to be assailed. The provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable
as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot
trifle with.
3. Same; Same; Same; The fact that the delay in the filing of the petition for certiorari was only one day
is not a legal justification for noncompliance with the rule requiring that it be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution. The Court cannot subscribe to the theory
that the ends of justice would be better subserved by allowing a petition for certiorari filed only one-day
late. When the law fixes sixty (60) days, it cannot be taken to mean also sixty-one (61) days, as the Court
had previously declared in this wise: [W]hen the law fixes thirty days [or sixty days as in the present case],
we cannot take it to mean also thirty-one days. If that deadline could be stretched to thirty-one days in one
case, what would prevent its being further stretched to thirty-two days in another case, and so on, step by
step, until the original line is forgotten or buried in the growing confusion resulting from the alterations?
That is intolerable. We cannot fix a period with the solemnity of a statute and disregard it like a joke. If law
is founded on reason, whim and fancy should play no part in its application.
4. Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements; True, it is a fundamental doctrine in labor law that
the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the provisions
of the CBA seem clear and unambiguous, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control. However,
as in this case, when general and specific provisions of the CBA are inconsistent, the specific provision shall
be paramount to and govern the general provision. Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA states that “(a)ny
difference of opinion, controversy, dispute problem or complaint arising from Company-Union or
Company-Worker relations concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement or regarding any
matter affecting Company-Union or Company-Worker relations shall be considered a grievance.” On the
other hand, under Section 13, Article XIV, “(t)he Company agrees that henceforth there shall be a fair and
uniform application of its rules and regulations. It is understood that disciplinary actions imposed on
employee or laborer shall be governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the Company as well
as those provided for by existing laws on the matter.”
5. Same; Termination of Employment; Loss of Trust and Confidence; The Court has consistently held
that “x x x loss of trust and confidence must be based on willful breach of the trust reposed in the employee
by his employer. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.
Moreover, it must be based on substantial evidence and not on the employer’s whims or caprices or
suspicions[,] otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of the employer. x x x. And, in
order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related and show that the
employee concerned is unfit to continue working for the employer. In addition, loss of confidence x x x is
premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust, and confidence
or that the employee concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as
handling or care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the
essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized.”
6. Same; Same; With the derogatory statements issued by Mahilum that were intended to incite, not just
public condemnation of VECO, but antagonism and obstruction against rate increases in electricity that it
may be allowed, by law, to fix, there can be no dispute that VECO, indeed, had lost its trust and confidence
in Mahilum and his ability to perform his tasks with utmost efficiency and loyalty expected of an employee
entrusted to handle customers and funds. Settled is the rule that an employer cannot be compelled to retain
an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the interests of the employer. A company has the right to dismiss
its employee if only as a measure of self-protection. ****
365
322. Comerciante vs. People, 763 SCRA 587, July 22, 2015
Syllabi Class :Consti Law; CrimPro; Searches and Seizures; Stop and Frisk Searches (Terry Searches);
1. Same; Same; Searches and Seizures; Stop and Frisk Searches (Terry Searches); The Court finds
respondent’s assertion that there was a valid “stop and frisk” search made on Comerciante untenable.
In People v. Cogaed, 731 SCRA 427 (2014), the Court had an opportunity to exhaustively explain “stop
and frisk” searches: “Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary
for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission
of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in
accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of
“suspiciousness” present where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly
based on the experience of the police officer. Experienced police officers have personal experience
dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have the ability to discern —based
on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious manner. Clearly,
a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the
facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. x x x x Normally, “stop and frisk” searches do not give
the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas v. Court
of Appeals, one of the earliest cases adopting the “stop and frisk” doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence,
this court approximated the suspicious circumstances as probable cause: The probable cause is that
when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable
cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same. For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as “a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.”
2. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on
the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of
such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, “unreasonable” within the meaning
of said constitutional provision.-
—Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the
absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, “unreasonable” within
the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other
words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence
for any purpose in any proceeding.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Exclusionary Rule; The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made-
— the process cannot be reversed.—The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid
proscription. One of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a
lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made — the process cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows: SEC. 5. Arrest without
warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
366
4. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; For a warrantless arrest
under Section 5(a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.-
—For a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5(b) requires for its application that at the
time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. In both instances, the officer’s personal
knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5(a), the
officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5(b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been
committed.
****
367
323. Go vs. Estate of the Late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, 763 SCRA 632, July 22, 2015
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Trusts ; Buyer in Good Faith ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; Words and Phrases; A purchaser in good faith is one who buys
the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or an interest in, such
property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice
of some other person’s claim or interest in the property. Corollary thereto, when a piece of land is in
the actual possession of persons other than the seller, the buyer must be wary and should investigate
the rights of those in possession. Without making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer in
good faith. When a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his duty is to read the public manuscript,
that is, to look and see who is there upon it and what his rights are. A want of caution and diligence,
which an honest man of ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases, is in
contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land
sold to him is in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith.
2. Civil Law; Trusts; Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which
is vested in another. It is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for
the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An
express trust is created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust comes into
being by operation of law.
3. Same; Same; Express Trusts; Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties,
by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to
create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, “[n]o particular words are required for the
creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended.” It is possible to create a
trust without using the word “trust” or “trustee.” Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used
does not necessarily indicate an intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the
trustor manifested an intention to create the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It
is immaterial whether or not he knows that the relationship which he intends to create is called a trust,
and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust.
4. Same; Same; Same; Reconveyance; Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action
for reconveyance instituted by respondents has not yet prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule
that express trusts prescribe in ten (10) years from the time the trust is repudiated. In this case, there
was a repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as the remaining trustee, sold the subject property
to Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997. As the complaint for reconveyance and damages was filed
by respondents on October 17, 1997, or only a few months after the sale of the subject property to
Wilson and Peter, it cannot be said that the same has prescribed.
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368
324. Central Bicol State Univ. of Agri. vs. Prov of Camarines Sur, 764 SCRA 394, July 29, 2015
Syllabi:
1. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Time and again, the Court has held that although procedural
rules ought to be strictly enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the legal system, the Court
has, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure in several cases to afford the
parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is because the ends of justice
would be better served if the parties were given the chance to argue their causes and defenses. After
all, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the opposing claims
of the competing parties, bearing always in mind the principle that procedure must not hinder but,
rather, promote the administration of justice.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; As a general rule, a petition for certiorari must be
filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where
no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for certiorari exists, unlike in the
previous Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which allowed the filing of such a motion but only for
compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15 days. Under exceptional cases, however, the Court has
held that the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound discretion. Eventually, in
Labao v. Flores, 634 SCRA 723 (2010), the Court laid down the following recognized exceptions to the
strict observance of the 60-day reglementary period: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to
relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from
the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the
case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each
case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious
explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
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369
325. Central Azucarera de Bais vs. Siason, 764 SCRA 494, July 29, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Resignation ;
1. Same; Same; Resignation; Verily, Chan’s decision to give Siason a graceful exit rather than to file
an action for redress is perfectly within the discretion of the former; as it is not uncommon that an
employee is permitted to resign to avoid the humiliation and embarrassment of being terminated for
just cause after the exposure of her malfeasance. It is settled that there is nothing reprehensible or
illegal when the employer grants the employee a chance to resign and save face rather than smear the
latter’s employment record, as in this case.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Resignation; Resignation is the formal pronouncement
or relinquishment of a position or office. It is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation
where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and
he has then no other choice but to disassociate himself from employment. The intent to relinquish must
concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged
resignation must be considered in determining whether he in fact intended to terminate his employment.
In illegal dismissal cases, it is a fundamental rule that when an employer interposes the defense of
resignation, on him necessarily rests the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned.
3. Same; Same; Constructive Dismissal; Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work
because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving
a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and other benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an
act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise,
exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable
on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued
employment. It must be noted, however, that bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when
uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence.
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370
326. Baron vs. EPE Transport, Inc., 765 SCRA 345, August 05, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Separation Pay ;
1. Same; Separation Pay; All told, since petitioners’ abandonment was not proven by respondents in
this case, the NLRC correctly ruled that the former were illegally dismissed. Consequently, the CA
committed reversible error when it held otherwise and granted respondents’ certiorari petition. Thus,
following Article 293 of the Labor Code, as amended, petitioners are entitled to reinstatement and
backwages. However, since reinstatement is no longer feasible in view of the enmity between the parties,
the award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is in order.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.-
—Preliminarily, it should be pointed out that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely
reexamine the evidence presented by the contending parties. Nevertheless, the divergence in the findings
of fact by the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and that of the CA on the other — as in this case —
is a recognized exception for the Court to open and scrutinize the records to determine whether the CA,
in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC in ruling that petitioners were illegally dismissed.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. It has also been held
that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence. The existence of such patent violation evinces that the assailed
judicial or quasi-judicial act is tainted with the quality of whim and caprice, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
4. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals; In a catena of cases, the Supreme
Court (SC) has held that the onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed, his
dismissal was not illegal fully rests on the employer; the failure to discharge such onus would mean
that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal.-
—In a catena of cases, the Court has held that the onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed
or, if dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal fully rests on the employer; the failure to discharge such
onus would mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal. The doctrine can be traced
back to the 1999 case of Barros v. NLRC, 315 SCRA 23 (1999), where the Court denied the employer’s
argument that the seafarer voluntarily terminated his employment (on the claim that he himself
requested repatriation), finding that since the fact of repatriation was not disputed, “it is incumbent
upon [the employer] to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law that [the seafarer] was not
dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be
unjustified.”
5. Same; Same; Abandonment; Abandonment of work does not per se sever the employer-employee
relationship. It is merely a form of neglect of duty, which is, in turn, a just cause for termination of
employment.-
—Abandonment connotes a deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employee to resume his
employment. Notably, “abandonment of work does not per se sever the employer-employee
relationship. It is merely a form of neglect of duty, which is, in turn, a just cause for termination of
employment. The operative act that will ultimately put an end to this relationship is the dismissal of the
employee after complying with the procedure prescribed by law.” For a valid finding of abandonment,
two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable cause; and (b) clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.
6. Same; Same; Same; In this case, no proof was adduced by respondents to prove their theory of
abandonment. Nothing on record would show that petitioners’ absence from work was deliberate and
unjustified, with a clear intent to sever the employment relationship. On the contrary, such intention is
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belied by the fact that shortly after petitioners ceased from working, they immediately instituted the
complaint for illegal dismissal. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his layoff cannot, as
a general rule, be said to have abandoned his work, for it is well-settled that the filing by an employee
of a complaint for illegal dismissal is proof enough of his desire to return to work, thus negating any
suggestion of abandonment. Indeed, it would be illogical for petitioners to have left their job and
thereafter seek redress by filing a complaint against their employer.
7. Same; Collective Bargaining Agreements; Voluntary Arbitrators; What was referred to the
grievance machinery was the unfair labor practice case filed by the petitioners before they were
terminated, which contains issues that are different and distinct from their cause of action for illegal
dismissal. It bears to note that Article 223(c) of the Labor Code, as amended, is explicit that the LA
shall refer to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration, as provided in the CBA, those cases
that involve the interpretation of said agreements. Further, Article 272 of the same Code provides that
all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA, including
violations of said agreement, are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. As such, petitioners cannot be faulted in invoking the
grievance machinery even after they had been dismissed in compliance with the provisions of the CBA,
to which they were bound.
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372
327. Apique vs. Fahnenstich, 765 SCRA 399, August 05, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Answer ; Waiver of Defenses ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Answer; Waiver of Defenses; Corollarily, the Court cannot subscribe to
Dominador’s claim for payment of compensation as administrator of the business affairs of Evangeline
based on the principle of quantum meruit, which was not raised as an affirmative defense or
counterclaim in his answer to the complaint. Settled is the rule that defenses which are not raised in the
answer are deemed waived, and counterclaims not set up in the answer shall be barred.
2. Banks and Banking; Joint Accounts; A joint account is one that is held jointly by two or more
natural persons, or by two or more juridical persons or entities. Under such setup, the depositors are
joint owners or co-owners of the said account, and their share in the deposits shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proved, pursuant to Article 485 of the Civil Code, which provides: Art. 485. The
share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their respective
interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-
owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved.
3. Same; Same; The common banking practice is that regardless of who puts the money into the
account, each of the named account holder has an undivided right to the entire balance, and any of
them may deposit and/or withdraw, partially or wholly, the funds without the need or consent of the
other, during their lifetime. Nevertheless, as between the account holders, their right against each other
may depend on what they have agreed upon, and the purpose for which the account was opened and
how it will be operated.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Thus, the party who asserts the
affirmative of an issue has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment. For
the plaintiff, the burden to prove its positive assertions never parts. For the defendant, an affirmative
defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but one
which, if established, will be a good defense, i.e., an avoidance of the claim. Dominador miserably
failed in this respect.
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373
328. OKS DesignTech vs. Caccam, 765 SCRA 433, August 05, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Presumptions ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; That respondent was made to believe that her contract
will just be renewed every time it expires was not supported by substantial evidence. It bears stressing
that self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are not sufficient where the quantum of evidence
required to establish a fact is substantial evidence, described as more than a mere scintilla. Moreover,
Section 3(d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court carries a legal presumption that a person takes ordinary
care of his concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a
document without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. Also, Section 3(p) of the
same Rule equally presumes that private transactions have been fair and regular. It therefore behooves
every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs the same. To add,
since the employment contracts were duly acknowledged before a notary public, it is deemed prima
facie evidence of the facts expressed therein and such notarial documents have in their favor the
presumption of regularity that may be contradicted only by clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant evidence, which respondent failed to show in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It is well-settled that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely examine the evidence presented by the
contending parties. Nevertheless, the divergence in the findings of fact by the LA and the NLRC, on the
one hand, and that of the CA, on the other, is a recognized exception for the Court to open and scrutinize
the records to determine whether the CA, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, erred in finding
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that respondent was not illegally dismissed.
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. It has also been held
that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence. The existence of such patent violation evinces that the assailed
judicial or quasi-judicial act is snared with the quality of whim and caprice, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
4. Labor Law; Fixed-term Employment; Under the foregoing provision, regular employment exists
when the employee is: (a) one engaged to perform activities that are necessary or desirable in the usual
trade or business of the employer; or (b) a casual employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which he is employed. Meanwhile,
an employee is said to be under a fixed-term employment when he is hired under a contract which
specifies that the employment will last only for a definite period.
5. Same; Same; Fixed-term employment could not be construed as a circumvention of the law on
security of tenure.-—In light of the foregoing, the Court laid down the following indicators under which
fixed-term employment could not be construed as a circumvention of the law on security of tenure: (a)
The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any
force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other
circumstances vitiating his consent; or (b) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee
dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by the former or
the latter.
6. Same; Same; —An examination of the contracts entered into by respondent reveals that her
employment was clearly limited to a fixed period and did not go beyond such period. She, however,
asserted that she is deemed a regular employee in view of the nature of her employment as an
accountant, an activity that is necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of the company.
This notwithstanding, case law dictates that even if an employee is engaged to perform activities that
are necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer, the same does not preclude
the fixing of employment for a definite period. There is nothing essentially contradictory between a
definite period of employment and the nature of the employee’s duties. In St. Theresa’s School of
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Novaliches Foundation v. NLRC, 289 SCRA 110 (1998), it was explained: Article 280 [now, Article
294] of the Labor Code does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period
provided the same is entered into by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstance vitiating consent. It does not
necessarily follow that where the duties of the employee consist of activities usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business of the employer, the parties are forbidden from agreeing on a period of
time for the performance of such activities. There is thus nothing essentially contradictory between a
definite period of employment and the nature of the employee’s duties.
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375
329. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. vs. Pelagio, 766 SCRA 447, August 12, 2015
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Compromise Agreements; To be considered valid and binding between the
contracting parties, a compromise agreement must be: (a) not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, and public policy; (b) freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties; and
(c) compliant with the requisites and principles of contracts.-
—A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid
a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. To be considered valid and binding between the
contracting parties, a compromise agreement must be: (a) not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, and public policy; (b) freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties; and
(c) compliant with the requisites and principles of contracts. Once entered into, it has the effect and the
authority of res judicata upon the parties. In other words, a valid compromise agreement may render a
pending case moot and academic. However, the parties may opt to put therein clauses, conditions, and
the like that would prevent a pending case from becoming moot and academic — such as when the
execution of such agreement is without prejudice to the final disposition of the said case. After all, a
compromise agreement is still a contract by nature, and as such, the parties are free to insert clauses
to modify its legal effects, so long as such modifications are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.
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376
330. AQA Global Construction, Inc. vs. Planters Devt Bank, 766 SCRA 463, August 12, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Third Party Claims ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Third-Party Claims; The Court would like to take exception to the
CA’s ruling, limiting the remedies of the adverse third party to vindicate his claim of ownership and/or
possession over the foreclosed property to a terceria and an independent separate action once a writ
of possession had already been issued, as in this case. In Gagoomal v. Spouses Villacorta, 663 SCRA
444 (2012), the Court ruled that aside from such remedies, the adverse third party may take other legal
remedies to prosecute his claim, such as invoking the supervisory power of the RTC to enjoin the
enforcement/implementation of the writ of possession, as what petitioners did in this case.
Unquestionably, the RTC has a general supervisory control over the entire execution process, and such
authority carries with it the right to determine every question which may be invariably involved in the
execution, and ensure that it is enforcing its judgment only against properties irrefutably belonging to
the judgment debtor. However, in such instances, the RTC does not and cannot pass upon the question
of title to the property, with any character of finality, and can treat of the matter only as may be
necessary to decide the question of whether or not the person in possession holds the property adversely
to the judgment obligor. If the claimant’s proofs do not persuade the court of the validity of his title or
right of possession thereto, the claim will be denied.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Writ of Possession; Words and Phrases; A writ of possession is
an order by which the sheriff is commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal
property. It may be issued under any of the following instances: (a) land registration proceedings under
Section 17 of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the “The Land Registration Act”; (b) judicial
foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a
party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; and (c) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage
under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
3. Same; Special Civil Actions; Foreclosure of Mortgage; The general rule is that after the lapse of
the redemption period, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property
purchased who is entitled to the possession of the said property; The exception, however, is provided
under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules, which applies suppletorily to extrajudicial foreclosures of real
estate mortgages.-
—The general rule is that after the lapse of the redemption period, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale
becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased who is entitled to the possession of the said
property. Upon ex parte petition, it is ministerial upon the trial court to issue the writ of possession in
his favor. The exception, however, is provided under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules, which applies
suppletorily to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages. Under the said provision of law, the
possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure
unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
4. Same; Same; Same; Where a parcel of land levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other
than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to order a hearing to determine the nature of
said adverse possession. For the exception to apply, however, the property need not only be possessed
by a third party, but also held by him adversely to the judgment obligor — such as that of a co-owner,
agricultural tenant or usufructuary, who possess the property in their own right and not merely the
successor or transferee of the right of possession of, or privy to, the judgment obligor.
5. Civil Law; Lease; Tenants; In China Bank v. Spouses Lozada, 557 SCRA 177 (2008), the “tenant”
contemplated clearly refers to an “agricultural tenant” who: (a) possesses the property in his own
right; and (b) is protected by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1038 wherein a tenant-tiller of private
agricultural lands devoted to crops other than rice and/or corn shall not be removed, ejected, ousted
or excluded from his farmholding unless directed by a final decision or order of the court for causes
provided by law, which does not include sale of the land-
— and not to a “civil law tenant.”—Clearly, the stay of the implementation of the writ of possession
prayed for by Je-An on the basis of such inchoate right would becloud the integrity and derogate the
indefeasibility of the torrens title issued in favor of Plantersbank as a confirmed owner, which the Court
cannot allow. Corollarily, the enforcement of the writ of possession cannot also be stayed in favor of
AQA which merely derived its possession from Je-An through an unregistered contract of lease. The
Court simply cannot subscribe to AQA’s claim that its status as a tenant renders its possession adverse
377
to that of Plantersbank, in consonance with the ruling in China Bank v. Spouses Lozada, 557 SCRA 177
(2008). In the said case, the “tenant” contemplated clearly refers to an “agricultural tenant” who: (a)
possesses the property in his own right; and (b) is protected by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1038
wherein a tenant-tiller of private agricultural lands devoted to crops other than rice and/or corn shall
not be removed, ejected, ousted or excluded from his farmholding unless directed by a final decision or
order of the court for causes provided by law, which does not include sale of the land — and not to a
“civil law tenant.”
6. Same; Land Registration; It bears to emphasize that a civil law lease is a mere personal right. It
partakes of the nature of a real right when it is recorded on the title of the lessor only in the sense that
it is binding even as against third persons without actual notice of the transaction. Under Section 51 of
PD No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land Registration Decree, “no deed, mortgage, lease or other
voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land” until its registration. In the present case, AQA’s unregistered lease with
Je-An is, thus, not binding on Plantersbank. Consequently, Je-An and AQA cannot be considered third
parties holding the subject properties adversely to KTC, the defaulting debtor-mortgagor. Resultantly,
the general rule, and not the exception, applies to the instant petitions, rendering it the mandatory and
ministerial duty of the RTC to issue the writ of possession in favor of Plantersbank as the confirmed
owner, and of the Sheriff to implement the said writ. As this Court ruled in St. Dominic Corp. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 577 (1987).
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378
331. Republic vs. Legal Heirs of Jose L. Africa, 767 SCRA 640, August 19, 2015
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379
332. Bautista vs. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., 767 SCRA 657, August 19, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Occupational Diseases ;
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380
333. Marigomen vs. Labar, 768 SCRA 15, August 24, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ; Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service ; Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations ; Gambling Prohibited by
Law ;
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381
334. CE Luzon Geothermal Power Co, Inc. vs. CIR, 768 SCRA 269, August 26, 2015
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382
335. Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp (PDIC) vs. Casimiro, 769 SCRA 110, September 02, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Probable Cause ;
1. Criminal Law; Probable Cause; It must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime
charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima
facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty.-
—In this case, assuming arguendo that Gomez’s statements, as written in her affidavit are indeed
hearsay, there is nevertheless substantial basis to credit the same, considering that she was a former
Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI — a high-ranking officer that may be privy to delicate
transactions such as the purported “under-the-table” deal involving private respondents. In this
regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of
arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e.,
a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. To
reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party’s defense or accusations as well as the admissibility of
testimonies and evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the preliminary stage.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Ombudsman; Principle of Non-Interference; Probable
Cause;The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information
should be filed.-
—At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the
discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or
not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Same; Same; Preliminary Investigations; Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode
of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the person charged should be held responsible for it.-
—Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there
is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be
held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. “[A preliminary
investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution’s] evidence.
The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense
that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.” Hence, “the validity and merits of a
party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.”
4. Criminal Law; Direct Bribery; Elements of.-
—As already stated, Apelo was accused of committing the crime of Direct Bribery, which has the
following elements: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he received directly or through
another some gift or present, offer or promise; (c) that such gift, present or promise has been given in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from
doing something which is his official duty to do; and (d) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of
his functions as a public officer.
5. Same; Corruption of Public Officials; Elements of.-
—Cu and Zate were accused of committing the crime of Corruption of Public Officials, the elements of
which are as follows: (a) that the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a
public officer; and (b) that the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a public
officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery.
6. Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Manifest Partiality; Elements of.-
—All private respondents were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The essential
elements of such crime are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging
383
administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such
public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence;
and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions.
7. Remedial Law; Evidence; Preliminary Investigations; Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings.-
—It was error on the part of the Ombudsman to simply discredit Gomez’s affidavit as inadmissible in
evidence for being hearsay. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of
preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its
proceedings. In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court declared that
hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because
such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that probable
cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay.
****
384
336. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Bichara, 769 SCRA 139, September 02, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Demotion ;
1. Labor Law; Demotion; Since Bichara’s illegal demotion has been finally decreed, he should be
entitled to (a) backwages, at the salary rate of a flight purser, from the time of retrenchment in July
1998 up until his compulsory retirement in July 2005; (b) retirement benefits of a flight purser in
accordance with the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) at the time of Bichara’s
retirement; and (c) attorney’s fees, moral, and exemplary damages, if any.-
—It deserves mentioning that since Bichara’s illegal demotion has been finally decreed, he should be
entitled to (a) backwages, at the salary rate of a flight purser, from the time of retrenchment in July
1998 up until his compulsory retirement in July 2005; (b) retirement benefits of a flight purser in
accordance with the existing CBA at the time of Bichara’s retirement; and (c) attorney’s fees, moral,
and exemplary damages, if any, but only if this Court, in the Flight Attendants and Stewards Assn. of
the Phils. v. PAL, Patria T. Chiong, and CA, 559 SCRA 252 (2008), case, finally rules that the subject
retrenchment is invalid. Otherwise, he should only be entitled to the above stated salary differential, as
well as the corresponding separation pay required under the relevant CBA, or Article 297 (formerly
Article 283) of the Labor Code if no such CBA provision exists. The awards of backwages, and
retirement benefits, including attorney’s fees, moral, and exemplary damages, if any, cannot, however,
be executed in these proceedings since they are incidents which pertain to the illegal retrenchment case,
hence, executable only when the FASAP case is finally concluded.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Dispositive Portion; A judgment should be
implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and well-established rule.-
—A judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and
well-established rule. As such, where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the
judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity.
3. Same; Same; Same; Immutability of Final Judgments; A companion to this rule is the principle of
immutability of final judgments, which states that a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended
or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to
be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court renders it.-
—A companion to this rule is the principle of immutability of final judgments, which states that a final
judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and
regardless of what court renders it. Any attempt to insert, change or add matters not clearly
contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on immutability of judgments. But like any
other rule, this principle has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called
nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
4. Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence holds that courts may modify or alter the judgment to harmonize
the same with justice and the facts when after judgment has been rendered and the latter has become
final, facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust.-
—It should be pointed out that the principle of immutability of judgments, from which the above stated
rule on writ of executions proceed, allow courts, as an exception, to recognize circumstances that
transpire after the finality of the decision which would render its execution unjust and inequitable and
act accordingly. Thus, in view of the supervening events above mentioned, this Court deems the award
of salary differential to be the just and equitable award under the circumstances herein prevailing.
Jurisprudence holds that courts may modify or alter the judgment to harmonize the same with justice
and the facts when after judgment has been rendered and the latter has become final, facts and
circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust, as in this case.
****
385
337. Silang vs. Commission on Audit, 770 SCRA 110, September 08, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Public Officers ; Local Government Units ;
1. Same; Same; Same; View that the only set of employees who are not obliged to reimburse the illegally
disbursed funds in the present case are its passive recipients, i.e., the ordinary rank-and-file employees of the
LGU of Tayabas, including the UNGKAT members and officers who had no direct participation in the
negotiations. The reason for this conclusion is that they had been mere passive recipients of good graces and
they had (and still have) every right to rely on the presumptions of regularity and good faith accorded to public
officers responsible for the disbursement and expenditure of public funds. In particular, as mere passive
recipients, they did not actively take part in the CNA, had no responsibility to undertake in carrying out the
requirements for union registration and accreditation, and could not have known the taints of irregularities that
the funds released to them carried.
2. Administrative Law; Public Officers; Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds; —As a general rule,
public officials who are directly responsible for any illegal expenditure of public funds are personally
liable therefor.
3. Same; Same; Same; —Section 342, Chapter IV, Title V, Book II of the LGC states that the superior
officer directing, or the department head participating in the illegal or improper use or application or
deposit of government funds or property, shall be jointly and severally liable with the local treasurer,
accountant, budget officer, or other accountable officer for the sum or property so illegally or
improperly used, applied or deposited.
4. Same; Same; Same;—Section 104, Chapter 5 of the Auditing Code provides that the treasurer of the
local government unit shall exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising the
accountable officers under him; otherwise, he shall be jointly and solidarily liable with them for the
loss of government funds or property under their control.
5. Same; Same; Same; —By way of exception, however, passive recipients or payees of disallowed salaries,
emoluments, benefits, and other allowances need not refund such disallowed amounts if they received the same
in good faith. Stated otherwise, government officials and employees who unwittingly received disallowed benefits
or allowances are not liable for their reimbursement if there is no finding of bad faith. In Lumayna v. COA, 601
SCRA 163 (2009), the Court declared that notwithstanding the disallowance of benefits by COA, the affected
personnel who received the said benefits in good faith should not be ordered to refund the disallowed benefits.
6. Administrative Law; Public Officers; Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds; View that this liability of
government employees and officials for illegal expenditures similarly finds support in the Local Government
Code (LGC), which imputes personal liability for unlawful expenditures against the official or employee
responsible for it.-
—Section 52, Chapter 9, Title I-B, Book V of the Administrative Code expressly provides that persons who are
directly responsible for the illegal expenditures of public funds shall be liable: General Liability for Unlawful
Expenditures.—Expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or
regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.
[Emphasis supplied] This liability of government employees and officials for illegal expenditures similarly finds
support in the Local Government Code, which imputes personal liability for unlawful expenditures against the
official or employee responsible for it, viz.: Section 351. General Liability for Unlawful Expenditures.—
Expenditures of funds or use of property in violation of this Title and other laws shall be a personal liability of
the official or employee responsible therefor.
7. Same; Same; Local Government Units;—Under the local government code, an ordinance is necessary
for the use of local funds. The local chief executive prepares the budget proposal, which is the basis for the
budget to be enacted by the local Sanggunian. As a rule, savings generated from the annual budget revert back
to the general fund. DBM Circular No. 2006-1 authorizes the local chief executive and the Sanggunian to use
savings from released Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) funds to grant cash incentives to
rank-and-file employees of the local government, through a CNA.
8. Same; Same; Illegal Expenditure of Public Funds; —That these approving officers did not receive any
of these funds is not sufficient justification to absolve them from liability. The receipt or nonreceipt of illegally
disbursed funds is immaterial to the solidary liability of government officials directly responsible therefor. We
had the occasion to rule on this point in the recent case Maritime Industry Audit v. COA, 745 SCRA 300 (2015),
where the Court En Banc held the approving officers who acted in bad faith to be solidarily liable for the return
of the disallowed funds even if they did not receive any part of the fund.
****
386
338. Halili vs. Justice for Children International, 770 SCRA 241, September 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ;
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Applicable laws form part of, and are read into, contracts without need for
any express reference thereto; more so, when it pertains to a labor contract which is imbued with
public interest.-
—Applicable laws form part of, and are read into, contracts without need for any express reference
thereto; more so, when it pertains to a labor contract which is imbued with public interest. Each
contract thus contains not only what was explicitly stipulated therein, but also the statutory provisions
that have any bearing on the matter.
****
387
339. People vs. Dionaldo, 770 SCRA 350, September 09, 2015
Syllabi Class: Crim Law; Death of the Accused Pending Appeal ; Crim Liability ; Civil Liabilities ;
1. Criminal Law; Death of the Accused Pending Appeal; Criminal Liability; Civil Liability; The death
of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil
liability ex delicto.-
—In People v. Amistoso, 704 SCRA 369 (2013), the Court explained that the death of the accused
pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex
delicto. Consequently, Renato’s death on June 10, 2014 renders the Court’s July 23, 2014 Resolution
irrelevant and ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal case against
Renato is dismissed.
****
388
340. People vs. Dionaldo, 770 SCRA 350, September 09, 2015
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not
prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party.-
—With the RTC’s jurisdiction established over the above mentioned causes of action, Vital’s claim of
P500,000.00 due from WBGI’ s acquisition of his shares of stocks should therefore be offset against the
P923,843.59 in arrearages payable to WBGI by ERJ Enterprises owned by respondents, as prayed for
by him. Hence, no amount can be adjudicated in Vital’s favor, since it is the respondents who, after due
computation, would be left liable to WBGI in the net amount of P423,843.59. This notwithstanding,
WBGI cannot recover this latter amount in this case since it never interposed a permissive counterclaim
therefor in its answer. It is well-settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings
or in excess of what is being sought by the party. WBGI may, however, opt to file a separate collection
suit, including those related thereto (e.g., moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees), to
recover such sum.
****
389
341. WT Construction, Inc. vs. Province of Cebu, 771 SCRA 13, September 16, 2015
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Interest Rates ;
1. Same; Interest Rates; The legal interest rate of six percent (6%) shall be imposed from the finality
of the herein judgment until satisfaction thereof.-
—The Court agrees with the CA that the legal interest rate of 6% shall be imposed from the finality of
the herein judgment until satisfaction thereof. This is in view of the principle that in the interim, the
obligation assumes the nature of a forbearance of credit which, pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. as modified by Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 703 SCRA 439 (2013), is subject to legal interest at the
rate of 6% per annum.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It is a settled rule that
questions of law may be brought before the Supreme Court (SC) on petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.-
—At the outset, it must be pointed out that a determination of whether or not there was a perfected oral
contract between the Province of Cebu and WTCI is a question of fact which is beyond the scope of the
Court’s power in a petition for review on certiorari, subject to certain exceptions which do not obtain
in this case. It is a settled rule that questions of law may be brought before this Court on petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court is not a trier of facts and factual
findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, as in this case, are entitled to great weight and respect
by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence on record.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the liability of the Province of Cebu to WTCI in the amount of
P257,413,911.73 which corresponds to the value of the additional works.
3. Civil Law; Contracts; Forbearance; Words and Phrases; The term “forbearance,” within the
context of usury law, has been described as a contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain,
during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan or debt then due
and payable.-
—There is no question that the present case does not involve an obligation arising from a loan; what is
at issue is whether the liability of the Province of Cebu involves a forbearance of money, based on
WTCI’s claim that it merely advanced the cost of the additional works. In Sunga-Chan v. CA, 555 SCRA
275 (2008), the Court characterized a transaction involving forbearance of money as follows: The term
“forbearance,” within the context of usury law, has been described as a contractual obligation of a
lender or creditor to refrain, during a given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to
repay the loan or debt then due and payable.
4. Same; Same; Contracts of Service; Liabilities arising from construction contracts do not partake of
loans or forbearance of money but are in the nature of contracts of service.-
—Verily, the Court has repeatedly recognized that liabilities arising from construction contracts do not
partake of loans or forbearance of money but are in the nature of contracts of service. In Federal
Builders, Inc. v. Foundation Specialists, Inc., 734 SCRA 379 (2014), the Court ruled that the liability
arising from the nonpayment for the construction works, specifically the construction of a diaphragm
wall, capping beam, and guide walls of the Trafalgar Plaza in Makati City, do not partake of a loan or
forbearance of money but is more in the nature of a contract of service. The Court, therefore, sustains
the CA’s ruling that the rate of legal interest imposable on the liability of the Province of Cebu to WTCI
is 6% per annum, in accordance with the guidelines laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994) (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.).
****
390
342. CIR vs. Nippon Express (Phils.) Corporation, 771 SCRA 27, September 16, 2015
Syllabi Class :Pleadings and Practice ; Prescription ;
1. Pleadings and Practice; Prescription; Although prescription was not raised as an issue, it is well-
settled that if the pleadings or the evidence on record show that the claim is barred by prescription, the
Court may motu proprio order its dismissal on said ground.-
—The Court has observed that based on the records, Nippon’s administrative claim for the first taxable
quarter of 2002 which closed on March 31, 2002 was already time-barred for being filed on April 22,
2004, or beyond the two (2)-year prescriptive period pursuant to Section 112(A) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997. Although prescription was not raised as an issue, it is well-settled that if the
pleadings or the evidence on record show that the claim is barred by prescription, the Court may motu
proprio order its dismissal on said ground.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Withdrawal of Appeals; When the case is deemed
submitted for resolution, withdrawal of appeals made after the filing of the appellee’s brief may still be
allowed in the discretion of the court.-
—A perusal of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals (RRCTA) reveals the lack of provisions
governing the procedure for the withdrawal of pending appeals before the CTA. Hence, pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 1 of the RRCTA, the Rules of Court shall suppletorily apply: Sec. 3. Applicability of the
Rules of Court.—The Rules of Court in the Philippines shall apply suppletorily to these Rules. Rule 50
of the Rules of Court — an adjunct rule to the appellate procedure in the CA under Rules 42, 43, 44,
and 46 of the Rules of Court which are equally adopted in the RRCTA — states that when the case is
deemed submitted for resolution, withdrawal of appeals made after the filing of the appellee’s brief may
still be allowed in the discretion of the court.
3. Taxation; In matters of taxation, the government cannot be estopped by the mistakes, errors or
omissions of its agents for upon it depends the ability of the government to serve the people for whose
benefit taxes are collected.-
—It deserves mentioning that the CIR is not estopped from assailing the validity of the July 27, 2011
Tax Credit Certificate which was issued by her subordinates in the BIR. In matters of taxation, the
government cannot be estopped by the mistakes, errors or omissions of its agents for upon it depends
the ability of the government to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected.
****
391
343. Gargallo vs. Dohle Seafront Crewing (Manila), Inc., 771 SCRA 88, September 16, 2015
1. Attorney’s Fees; —Anent petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees, while respondents have not been
shown to have acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy petitioner’s demands, it is
settled that where an employee is forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his right and interest,
he is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award at the
time of actual payment.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; —The entitlement of overseas seafarers to disability
benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but also by law and contract. The pertinent
statutory provisions are Articles 197 to 199 (formerly Articles 191 to 193) of the Labor Code in relation
to Section 2(a), Rule X of the Rules implementing Title II, Book IV of the said Code. On the other hand,
the relevant contracts are: (a) the POEA-SEC, which is a standard set of provisions that is deemed
incorporated in every seafarer’s contract of employment; (b) the CBA, if any; and (c) the employment
agreement between the seafarer and his employer. In this case, petitioner executed his employment
contract with respondents during the effectivity of the 2010 POEA-SEC; hence, its provisions are
applicable and should govern their relations, and not the 2000 POEA-SEC as held by the CA.
3. Same; Same; Same; Permanent Total Disability; It is only upon the lapse of two hundred forty (240)
days, or when so declared by the company-designated physician, that a seafarer may be deemed totally
and permanently disabled.-
—In the recent case of Ace Navigation Company v. Garcia, 759 SCRA 274 (2015), citing Vergara v.
Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. (Vergara), 567 SCRA 610 (2008), the Court reiterated that the
company-designated physician is given an additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation,
to provide the seafarer further treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature of the
latter’s disability. Thus, it is only upon the lapse of 240 days, or when so declared by the company-
designated physician, that a seafarer may be deemed totally and permanently disabled, viz.: As these
provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the company-designated
physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the
treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally
unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his
temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as
his condition is defined under the [POEA-SEC] and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days
initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical
attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days,
subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total
disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such
declaration is justified by his medical condition. x x x x As we outlined above, a temporary total
disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is
allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a
declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In the present case, while
the initial 120-day treatment or temporary total disability period was exceeded, the company-
designated doctor duly made a declaration well within the extended 240-day period that the petitioner
was fit to work.
4. Liability of Corporate Officers; Settled is the rule that in the absence of malice and bad faith, or a
specific provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such officer cannot be made personally
liable for corporate liabilities.-
—The Court finds no basis to hold respondent Dohle Seafront President Padiz, solidarily liable with
respondents Dohle Manning and Dohle Seafront for the payment of the monetary awards granted to
petitioner, absent any showing that he had acted beyond the scope of his authority or with malice.
Settled is the rule that in the absence of malice and bad faith, or a specific provision of law making a
corporate officer liable, such officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate liabilities.
****
392
344. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hababag, Sr., 770 SCRA 491, September 16, 2015
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Just Compensation ; Market Value ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Same; In order to be just, the compensation for the land must be what the farmer-beneficiaries
can reasonably afford to pay based on what the land can produce.-
—Since they generally live on a hand-to-mouth existence, their source of repaying the just compensation
is but derived out of their income from their cultivation of the land. Hence, in order to be just, the
compensation for the land must be what the farmer-beneficiaries can reasonably afford to pay based
on what the land can produce. It would therefore be highly inequitable that in the 30-year allowable
period to pay the annual amortizations for the lands, farmer-beneficiaries would be required to pay for
the same income they expect to earn therefrom on top of the computed market value of the landholdings.
Such could not have been the intent of the State’s agrarian reform program. In fine, the Court cannot
sustain the RTC’s application of the Income Productivity Approach used as one of its bases in arriving
at its decreed valuation. Not only is the same aversive to the jurisprudential concept of “market value,”
but it also deviates from the factors laid down in Section 17 of RA 6657 and thus, remains legally
baseless and unfounded.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Words and Phrases; —In the landmark case of Association
of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343
(1989), the Court defined the term “just compensation” as follows: Just compensation is defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly
stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is
used to intensify the meaning of the word “compensation” to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full [and] ample.
3. Same; Same; Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 enumerates the factors which must be taken
into consideration to accurately determine the amount of just compensation to be awarded in a
particular case.-—The RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has been conferred with the original
and exclusive power to determine just compensation for parcels of land acquired by the State pursuant
to the agrarian reform program. To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates
the factors which must be taken into consideration to accurately determine the amount of just
compensation to be awarded in a particular case. They are: (a) the acquisition cost of the land; (b) the
current value of like properties; (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom;
(d) the owner’s sworn valuation; (e) the tax declarations; (f) the assessment made by government
assessors; (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and
by the government to the property; and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land, if any. Corollarily, pursuant to its rule-making power
under Section 49 of the same law, the DAR translated these factors into a basic formula, which courts
have often referred to and applied, as the CA did in this case. It, however, bears stressing that courts
are not constrained to adopt the said formula in every case since the determination of the amount of
just compensation essentially partakes the nature of a judicial function. In this accord, courts may either
adopt the DAR formula or proceed with its own application for as long as the factors listed in Section
17 of RA 6657 have been duly considered.
4. Same; Same; Market Value; Words and Phrases; —To elucidate, in determining the amount of just
compensation for the subject lands, the RTC applied the Income Productivity Approach which
approximated the income for the remaining productive life of the crops therein, without considering the
fortuitous events and plant diseases, and with the expectation that they would be compensated by
developments which could be made by the property owner. The Court has repeatedly ruled that the
constitutional limitation of just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent of the market value
of the property, which is, in turn, defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between one who
receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. In this
accord, therefore, the Court cannot sustain the formula used by the RTC which was “based on the
principle of anticipation which implies that the value of a property is dependent on the potential net
benefit that may be derived from its ownership.” Clearly, this approach, which is largely characterized
by the element of futurity, is inconsistent with the idea of valuing the expropriated property at the time
of the taking. ****
393
345. Bartolome vs. Basilio, 772 SCRA 213, October 14, 2015
Syllabi Class :Notary Public ;
1. Notary Public; —A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries
must inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow
themselves to be part of illegal transactions. In line with this mandate, a notary public should not
notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very person who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. By
failing in this regard, the notary public permits a falsehood which does not only transgress the Notarial
Rules but also Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Verily, a notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face; and it is for this reason that a notary
public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise,
the public’s confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
2. Notary Public; —The act of notarization is impressed with public interest. As such, a notary public
must observe the highest degree of care in complying with the basic requirements in the performance
of his duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system.
3. Notarized Documents; Notarial Certificates; Words and Phrases; —A notarial certificate, as
defined in Section 8, Rule II of the Notarial Rules, requires a statement of the facts attested to by the
notary public in a particular notarization, viz.: SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate.—“Notarial Certificate”
refers to the part of, or attachment to, a notarized instrument or document that is completed by the
notary public, bears the notary’s signature and seal, and states the facts attested to by the notary public
in a particular notarization as provided for by these Rules.
4. Same; Jurat; Words and Phrases; A jurat is, among others, an attestation that the person who
presented the instrument or document to be notarized is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by the Notarial Rules:
SEC. 6. Jurat.—“Jurat” refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in
person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the
notary public or identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath
or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.
5. Notarial Rules; —Basilio violated Section 2(b), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules which prohibits the
notarization of a document if the person involved is not personally known to the notary public or has
not identified himself through competent evidence of identity: SEC. 2. Prohibitions.—x x x x x x x (b) A
person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document
— (1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and (2) is not personally
known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules.
6. Notarized Documents; —Since the notarial register is a record of the notary public’s official acts,
he is charged with recording therein the necessary information regarding the document or instrument
notarized. If the document or instrument does not appear in the notarial records, doubt as to its nature
arises so that the alleged notarized document cannot be considered a public document. Considering the
evidentiary value given to the notarized documents, the failure of the notary public to record the
document in his notarial register is tantamount to falsely making it appear that the document was
notarized when, in fact, it was not, as in this case.
7. Same; Notarial Rules; The requirement therefor, as stated under Section 2(h), Rule VI of the Notarial
Rules, applies only to instruments acknowledged before the notary public.-
—It should be clarified, however, that while Basilio had also failed to submit a copy of the Joint Affidavit
to the Clerk of Court of the RTC, and to retain a copy thereof for his own records, the requirement
therefor, as stated under Section 2(h), Rule VI of the Notarial Rules, applies only to instruments
acknowledged before the notary public. Documents like the Joint Affidavit which contain a jurat and
not an acknowledgment are not required to be forwarded to the Clerk of Court. Hence, there should be
no administrative infraction on this score. Nevertheless, Basilio’s aforediscussed violations of the
Notarial Rules are grave enough to warrant sanctions from the Court.
****
394
346. G.V. Florida Trans, Inc. vs. Heirs of Romeo L. Battung, Jr., 772 SCRA 579, October 14, 2015
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Common Carriers ; Diligence of a Good Father of the Family ;
1. Same; Same; Same; —Case law states that the concept of diligence of a good father of a family
“connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have
observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether negligence attended
the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence.”
2. Civil Law; Common Carriers; Extraordinary Diligence;—The law exacts from common carriers
(i.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their
services to the public) the highest degree of diligence (i.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the
safety of its passengers. Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code state: Art. 1733. Common carriers,
from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
according to all the circumstances of each case. Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
3. Same; Same; Same; —In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n case of
death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733
and 1755.” This disputable presumption may also be overcome by a showing that the accident was
caused by a fortuitous event.
4. Same; Same; Same; —It is imperative for a party claiming against a common carrier under the
above said provisions to show that the injury or death to the passenger/s arose from the negligence of
the common carrier and/or its employees in providing safe transport to its passengers. In Pilapil v. CA,
180 SCRA 546 (1989), the Court clarified that where the injury sustained by the passenger was in no
way due (1) to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting, or (2) to the
negligent or willful acts of the common carrier’s employees with respect to the foregoing — such as
when the injury arises wholly from causes created by strangers which the carrier had no control of or
prior knowledge to prevent — there would be no issue regarding the common carrier’s negligence in
its duty to provide safe and suitable care, as well as competent employees in relation to its transport
business; as such, the presumption of fault/negligence foisted under Article 1756 of the Civil Code
should not apply.
5. Same; Same; Diligence of a Good Father of the Family;—Since Battung’s death was caused by a
co-passenger, the applicable provision is Article 1763 of the Civil Code, which states that “a common
carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence
of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.” Notably,
for this obligation, the law provides a lesser degree of diligence, i.e., diligence of a good father of a
family, in assessing the existence of any culpability on the common carrier’s part.
****
395
347. Mallo vs. Southeast Asian College, Inc., 772 SCRA 657, October 14, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Abandonment ; Reinstatement ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Reinstatement; Jurisprudence provides that in instances where there was
neither dismissal by the employer nor abandonment by the employee, the proper remedy is to reinstate
the employee to his former position but without the award of backwages.-
—In sum, since Mallo was not dismissed and that he never abandoned his job, it is only proper for him
to report back to work and for respondents to reinstate him to his former position or a substantially
equivalent one in its stead. In this regard, jurisprudence provides that in instances where there was
neither dismissal by the employer nor abandonment by the employee, the proper remedy is to reinstate
the employee to his former position but without the award of backwages.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; In petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the scope of the Court’s judicial review is generally
confined to errors of law and does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon
which the lower courts and/or quasi-judicial agencies had based their determination.-
—It bears stressing that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
scope of the Court’s judicial review is generally confined to errors of law and does not extend to a
reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the lower courts and/or quasi-judicial
agencies had based their determination. Indeed, it is axiomatic that the factual findings of the LA and
the NLRC, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded not only great respect, but also finality,
and are deemed binding upon the Court so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. However,
in instances where there is a divergence in the findings of facts of the NLRC and that of the CA, there
is a need for the Court to review the records to determine which of them should be preferred as more
conformable to evidentiary facts, as in this case.
3. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Burden of Proof; In termination cases, the onus of
proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal fully rests
on the employer; the failure to discharge such onus would mean that the dismissal was not justified
and, therefore, illegal.-
—In termination cases, the onus of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed, his
dismissal was not illegal fully rests on the employer; the failure to discharge such onus would mean
that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal. The records readily show that as early as
April 2011, respondents already assigned Mallo a teaching load for the First Semester of SY 2011-2012
as a Clinical Instructor for SACI students to be assigned at NCMH, which the latter accepted.
Unfortunately, Mallo failed the qualifying tests at NCMH twice, thus, virtually disqualifying him from
performing his work as SACI’s Clinical Instructor thereat. Despite these developments, respondents
were able to remedy the situation, albeit belatedly, by assigning Mallo as a Clinical Instructor at
UDMC instead, as shown in the Tentative Faculty Loading dated June 24, 2011. In view of the
foregoing, the Court is inclined to hold that respondents never dismissed Mallo from his job.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; —In this case, records are bereft of any indication
that Mallo’s absence from work was deliberate, unjustified, and with a clear intent to sever his
employment relationship with SACI. While respondents claim to have assigned Mallo as Clinical
Instructor at UDMC after failing the qualifying tests at NCMH, which assignment the latter initially
accepted, but eventually declined, there is no proof that Mallo was informed of such assignment. It
bears stressing that a party alleging a critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence
for any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process.
5. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Abandonment; Abandonment of position is a matter of
intention and cannot be lightly inferred, much less legally presumed, from certain equivocal acts.-
—More importantly, Mallo’s filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with his prior acts of
actively inquiring about his teaching load, negate any intention on his part to sever his employment.
Indeed, it is simply absurd for Mallo to provide continuous service to SACI for more than three (3)
years in order to attain a regular status, only to leave his job without any justifiable reason and,
thereafter, file a case in an attempt to recover the same. To reiterate, abandonment of position is a
matter of intention and cannot be lightly inferred, much less legally presumed, from certain equivocal
acts.
****
396
348. Maybank Philippines, Inc. vs. Tarrosa, 772 SCRA 670, October 14, 2015
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Mortgages ; Default ;
1. Same; Same; Default; In order that the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that: (a) the
obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and (c) the
creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially, unless demand is not necessary-
— i.e., when there is an express stipulation to that effect; where the law so provides; when the period
is the controlling motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the obligation; and where
demand would be useless.—In order that the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that: (a) the
obligation be demandable and already liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and (c) the
creditor requires the performance judicially or extrajudicially, unless demand is not necessary — i.e.,
when there is an express stipulation to that effect; where the law so provides; when the period is the
controlling motive or the principal inducement for the creation of the obligation; and where demand
would be useless. Moreover, it is not sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a date for performance;
it must further state expressly that after the period lapses, default will commence. Thus, it is only when
demand to pay is unnecessary in case of the aforementioned circumstances, or when required, such
demand is made and subsequently refused that the mortgagor can be considered in default and the
mortgagee obtains the right to file an action to collect the debt or foreclose the mortgage.
2. Civil Law; Mortgages; Prescription; An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should
be enforced within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor
defaults in the payment of his obligation to the mortgagee; otherwise, it will be barred by prescription
and the mortgagee will lose his rights under the mortgage.-
—An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should be enforced within ten (10) years from
the time the right of action accrues, i.e., when the mortgagor defaults in the payment of his obligation
to the mortgagee; otherwise, it will be barred by prescription and the mortgagee will lose his rights
under the mortgage. However, mere delinquency in payment does not necessarily mean delay in the
legal concept. To be in default is different from mere delay in the grammatical sense, because it involves
the beginning of a special condition or status which has its own peculiar effects or results.
****
397
349. People vs. Parba, 773 SCRA 83, October 19, 2015
Syllabi Class :Damages ; Death Due to a Crime ; Damages When Death Results From the Commission
of a Crime ;
1. Damages; Death Due To A Crime; Damages When Death Results From the Commission of a Crime.-
—On the matter of damages, when death results from the commission of a crime, the heirs of the victim
are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim without
need of evidence other than the commission of the crime; (b) actual or compensatory damages to the
extent proved, or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot
be provided with certainty; (c) moral damages; and (d) exemplary damages when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
2. Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.-
—In order to convict a person charged with the crime of Murder, the prosecution must establish the
following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him
or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of
the RPC; and (d) the killing does not constitute Parricide or Infanticide.
3. Same; Qualifying Circumstances; Treachery; There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.-
—One of the circumstances which qualifies the killing to Murder is the existence of treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In People v. Gunda, 715 SCRA
505 (2014), it was explained that when the attack against an unarmed victim is so sudden and
unexpected that he had no inkling of what the assailant was about to do, there is treachery.
4. Same; Alibi; To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was present at another place at
the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene
of the crime.-
—Anent Parba’s alibi, the Court finds the same to be unavailing. It is well-settled that alibi as a defense
is inherently weak and unreliable owing to the fact that it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove that: (a) he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
5. Same; Same; A distance of about two (2) kilometers, three (3) kilometers, or even five (5) kilometers
were consistently held not too far to preclude the possibility that the accused was present at the locus
criminis.-
—A distance of one and a half (1 1/2) to two (2) kilometers was held not too far to traverse by walking.
Likewise, a distance of about two (2) kilometers, three (3) kilometers, or even five (5) kilometers were
consistently held not too far to preclude the possibility that the accused was present at the locus
criminis. Surely then, a distance of 100 meters, as in this case, is not the “physical impossibility”
contemplated to satisfy the defense of alibi. Moreover, considering its doubtful nature, clear and
convincing evidence must be submitted to support the alibi of an accused, otherwise, it is considered
negative, self-serving, and undeserving of weight in law. Thus, alibi and denial cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime, especially in cases where the
testimonies of the witnesses are categorical, consistent and untainted by ill will.
****
398
350. Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Navarro-Gutierrez, 773 SCRA 434,
October 21, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Probable Cause ;
1. Same; Same; Probable Cause; It must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime
charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima
facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty.-
—In this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime charged for
purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case
against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability
of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence that would justify a
conviction. To reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party’s defense or accusations and the
admissibility of testimonies and evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the
preliminary stage. In sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict individual
respondents of violating Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint
against them.
2. Ombudsman; Doctrine of Non-Interference; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently refrained
from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause
and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded
from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion.-
—At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the
discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or
not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the
Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The
Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Probable Cause; The conduct of
preliminary investigation proceedings-
— whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor — is geared only to determine whether or not
probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he
committed.—In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation
proceedings — whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor — is geared only to determine
whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime
that he committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113 (2012), the Court defined probable
cause and the parameters in finding the existence thereof in the following manner, to wit: Probable
cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably
guilty thereof. The term does not mean “actual or positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty.
It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry whether
there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations
of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is
determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
4. Same; Same; Same; Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering
whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person
charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of
399
probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a
conviction.-
—Verily, Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there
is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be
held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. “[A preliminary
investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution’s] evidence.
The presence and absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense
that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.” Hence, “the validity and merits of a
party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.”
5. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Elements of Violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.-
—As already stated, individual respondents were accused of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the
elements of which are as follows: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such
public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence;
and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. In the
same vein, they were likewise charged with violation of Section 3(g) of the same law, which has the
following elements: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that he entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and (c) that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. Notably, private individuals may also be charged with
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with public officers.
6. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Hearsay Evidence Rule; In the
recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2005), the Supreme Court (SC) declared that
hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because
such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of
parties.-
—It was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG’s findings contained in the Executive
Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-serving, and of little
probative value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. In
the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court declared that hearsay evidence
is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because such investigation
is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that probable cause can be established
with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
****
400
351. Santiago vs. Tulfo, 773 SCRA 558, October 21, 2015
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; ExtralegalKillings; Enforced Disappearances;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; While the foregoing rule, as per Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s first
paragraph, does state that the writ is a remedy to protect the right to life, liberty, and security of the
person desiring to avail of it, the same section’s second paragraph qualifies that the protection of such
rights specifically pertain to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof, which
are more concrete cases that involve protection to the rights to life, liberty and security. The two
paragraphs should indeed be read together in order to construe the meaning of the provision. Clearly
applicable is the statutory construction rule that “clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute [or, in this case,
procedural rule] must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute
must be considered together with other parts of the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.”
2. Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), the Court has already explained that the writ of amparo, under its present
procedural formulation, namely, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, otherwise known as “The Rule on the Writ of
Amparo,” was intended to address and, thus, is presently confined to cases involving extralegal killings
and/or enforced disappearances, or threats thereof: As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present
form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) Indeed, while amparo (which literally means “protection” in Spanish) has been regarded as
a special remedy provided for the enforcement of constitutional rights, the parameters of protection are
not the same in every jurisdiction.
3. Same; Same; Extralegal Killings; Enforced Disappearances; Words and Phrases; In our
jurisdiction, the contextual genesis, at least, for the present Amparo Rule has limited the remedy as a
response to extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. “Extrajudicial
killings,” according to case law, are generally characterized as “killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings,” while “enforced
disappearances,” according to Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 9851, otherwise known as the
“Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes
Against Humanity,” “means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge
that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the
intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.” In Navia v.
Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), the Court held that it must be shown and proved by substantial evidence
that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on
the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden
of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation. Notably, the
same requirement of government participation should also apply to extralegal killings, considering that
the writ of amparo was, according to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, who headed the Committee
on the Revision of the Rules of Court that drafted A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, intended to “hold public
authorities, those who took their oath to defend the constitution and enforce our laws, to a high standard
of official conduct and hold them accountable to our people. [In this light] [t]he sovereign Filipino
people should be assured that if their right[s] to life and liberty are threatened or violated, they will
find vindication in our courts of justice.” Stated differently, the writ of amparo is an extraordinary
remedy that is meant to balance out the government’s incredible power in order to curtail human rights
abuses on its end.
****
401
352. Leones Vda. de Miller vs. Miranda, 774 SCRA 205, November 10, 2015
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Respondent’s failure to carefully double-check the draft of the original SPA
submitted to him by his secretary led him to notarize a document which did not reflect the true intent of
his client. His attempt to escape administrative sanctions by pinning the blame on his secretary cannot
be condoned as case law instructs that in these instances, the lawyer himself, not merely his secretary,
should be held accountable for these kinds of misdeeds. Worse, respondent himself caused the
intercalation of the notarized SPA by inserting handwritten alterations therein which changed its
meaning — thus, violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
Absent any competent proof, respondent’s assertion that he was verbally authorized by Magbuhos in
altering the SPA is self-serving and cannot be given any credence.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Notarized Documents; A notary public is empowered to perform a variety
of notarial acts, most common of which are the acknowledgment and affirmation of documents or
instruments. In the performance of these notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the
significance of the notarial seal affixed on documents. The notarial seal converts a document from a
private to a public instrument, after which it may be presented as evidence without need of proof of its
genuineness and due execution. Thus, notarization should not be treated as an empty, meaningless or
routinary act. A notary public exercises duties calling for carefulness and faithfulness. Notaries must
inform themselves of the facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow
themselves to be part of illegal transactions.
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402
353. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Borja, 774 SCRA 228, November 10, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service ;
1. Same; Same; Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service has been consistently held to
pertain to acts that tarnish the image and integrity of the public office, although not necessarily related
or connected to the public officer’s function. Thus, while the absence of bad faith may negate criminal
liability for graft and corrupt practices under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, it does not automatically absolve
Borja of administrative liability for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, considering
that the only question material to the latter is whether the public officer’s acts tarnished the image or
integrity of the public office. At this juncture, the Court deems it fit to emphasize that a public office is
a public trust. As such, public officers must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; It is well-settled
that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. Such judgment
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted
to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must
become final at some definite point in time.
3. Administrative Law; Civil Service; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; While
there is no concrete description of what specific acts constitute the offense of conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service under the civil service law and rules, it has been jurisprudentially held to
pertain to acts that tarnish the image and integrity of the public office, even if it not be related or
connected to the public officer’s function. Among others, the Court has considered the following acts
or omissions such as: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back
to work without prior notice, failure to safe keep public records and property, making false entries in
public documents, and falsification of court orders. On the basis of the foregoing, the Court holds that
Borja acted in a manner prejudicial to the best interest of the service. By causing SPCWD to pay the
backwages and other benefits due Eje and Tolentino, Borja clearly placed said office in a financial
disadvantage as it was made to pay a liability which did not belong to it, especially considering that
the amount involved and taken from SPCWD’s funds, i.e., P1,942,031.82, is by no means negligible. In
doing so, the integrity of Borja’s office was put in to question, and SPCWD was placed in a deleterious
financial position.
4. Same; The fact that the criminal charge against Borja for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 had
been dismissed upon the Ombudsman’s manifestation that it lacked basis to prosecute him is of no
moment. As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, the dismissal of the criminal case is not a ground
for the dismissal of the administrative case, in consonance with the rule that a criminal case is separate
from an administrative case and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable
to each case. Moreover, in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt before a conviction could be had, while liability in administrative cases is only hinged
on the lesser threshold of substantial evidence, defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
5. Same; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; Besides, the elements for the
commission of graft and corrupt practices under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, are different from what
constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which is an administrative offense.
The following are the essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019: (1) The accused must
be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) He must have acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) That his action caused
any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
****
403
354. Gonzales vs. GJH Land, Inc. (formerly S.J. Land, Inc.), 774 SCRA 242, November 10, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Regional Trial Courts ; Jurisdiction ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC did not create a new class of courts. Its purpose
is operational efficiency. In its own words, it was adopted to serve “the interest of a speedy and efficient
administration of justice[.]” It is, thus, but a procedural and administrative mechanism aimed (to echo
the words of the ponencia) “to promote expediency and efficiency in the exercise of the [Regional Trial
Courts’] jurisdiction[.]” Also in its own words, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC was adopted only “[t]o
implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 [or the Securities Regulation Code].”
Thus, in adopting A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, this court was fully cognizant of how Section 5.2 limited its
authority to designate only “in the exercise of its authority[.]” Indeed, this court could not have
intended to overstep the constitutional limits of its authority.
2. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Intra-Corporate Controversies; Special Commercial
Courts;Jurisdiction; Applying the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test, the suit
between the parties is clearly rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate relationship and pertains to
the enforcement of their correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and the internal
and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation, hence, intra-corporate, which should be heard
by the designated Special Commercial Court as provided under A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC dated June 17,
2003 in relation to Item 5.2, Section 5 of RA 8799.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; As a basic premise, let it be emphasized that a court’s acquisition of
jurisdiction over a particular case’s subject matter is different from incidents pertaining to the exercise
of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law, whereas a court’s
exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is governed by the Rules of Court or by the
orders issued from time to time by the Court. In Lozada v. Bracewell, 720 SCRA 371 (2014), it was
recently held that the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure and has nothing
to do with the question of jurisdiction. Pertinent to this case is RA 8799 which took effect on August 8,
2000. By virtue of said law, jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A was transferred from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to the RTCs, being courts
of general jurisdiction.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; It was only on November 21, 2000 that the Court designated certain
RTC branches to try and decide said SEC cases without, however, providing for the transfer of the cases
already distributed to or filed with the regular branches thereof. Thus, on January 23, 2001, the Court
issued SC Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 directing the transfer of said cases to the designated
courts (commercial SEC courts). Later, or on June 17, 2003, the Court issued A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC
consolidating the commercial SEC courts and the intellectual property courts in one RTC branch in a
particular locality, i.e., the Special Commercial Court, to streamline the court structure and to promote
expediency. Accordingly, the RTC branch so designated was mandated to try and decide SEC cases, as
well as those involving violations of intellectual property rights, which were, thereupon, required to be
filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial
Courts.
5. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; According to jurisprudence, “it is not the caption but the
allegations in the complaint or other initiatory pleading which give meaning to the pleading and on the
basis of which such pleading may be legally characterized.” However, so as to avert any future
confusion, the Court requires henceforth, that all initiatory pleadings state the action’s nature both in
its caption and the body, which parameters are defined in the dispositive portion of this Decision.
6. Raffle of Cases; Regional Trial Courts; Special Commercial Courts; The erroneous raffling to a
regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure-
— that is, an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction — and, thus, should not negate the
jurisdiction which the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a
scenario, the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch
276 should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case;
thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only designated Special Commercial
Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256.—The Court nonetheless deems that the erroneous raffling to a
regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a matter of procedure — that is, an
404
incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction — and, thus, should not negate the jurisdiction which the
RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a scenario, the proper course of action was not
for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276 should have first referred the case to the
Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then
assign said case to the only designated Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256. Note
that the procedure would be different where the RTC acquiring jurisdiction over the case has multiple
special commercial court branches; in such a scenario, the Executive Judge, after re-docketing the
same as a commercial case, should proceed to order its re-raffling among the said special branches.
7. Same; Same; Same; If the RTC acquiring jurisdiction has no branch designated as a Special
Commercial Court, then it should refer the case to the nearest RTC with a designated Special
Commercial Court branch within the judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was
referred to should re-docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one
branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if
the said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case among
those special branches.
8. Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; The designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely
intended as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction.-
—The Court finds it apt to point out that the same principles apply to the inverse situation of ordinary
civil cases filed before the proper RTCs but wrongly raffled to its branches designated as Special
Commercial Courts. In such a scenario, the ordinary civil case should then be referred to the Executive
Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case; thereafter, the Executive Judge should then order the
raffling of the case to all branches of the same RTC, subject to limitations under existing internal rules,
and the payment of the correct docket fees in case of any difference. Unlike the limited
assignment/raffling of a commercial case only to branches designated as Special Commercial Courts
in the scenarios stated above, the re-raffling of an ordinary civil case in this instance to all courts is
permissible due to the fact that a particular branch which has been designated as a Special Commercial
Court does not shed the RTC’s general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases under the imprimatur of
statutory law, i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129. To restate, the designation of Special Commercial
Courts was merely intended as a procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line
with the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was not made by statute but only by an internal
Supreme Court rule under its authority to promulgate rules governing matters of procedure and its
constitutional mandate to supervise the administration of all courts and the personnel thereof.
Certainly, an internal rule promulgated by the Court cannot go beyond the commanding statute. But as
a more fundamental reason, the designation of Special Commercial Courts is, to stress, merely an
incident related to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction, which, as first discussed, is distinct from the
concept of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The RTC’s general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases
is therefore not abdicated by an internal rule streamlining court procedure.
9. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdictions; View that the ponencia
proceeds from the wrong premise that the law vested jurisdiction over transferred Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) cases on all the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) and that the designation
by the Supreme Court (SC) of Special Commercial Courts concern only an “exercise of jurisdiction.”
10. Statutory Construction; It is first axiom in legal hermeneutics that a statutory provision is read as
a whole and not in disjointed parts. The rule is as respected as it is ancient. Its sum and substance has
not been diluted no matter how frequent the free paraphrases have been.
11. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A.
No. 8799 did not transfer the cases enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to all the RTCs. If
that was the legislative intention, then the provision should have simply stated that such cases are
“hereby transferred to the Regional Trial Courts.” The complete investiture is, however, on “the courts
of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, that the Supreme Court, in
the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise
jurisdiction over the cases.” If the law is a general conferment of jurisdiction on all RTC, then the
phrase “or the appropriate Regional Trial Court” is an inutile surplusage and the proviso that “the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that
405
shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases” is a purposeless appendage and wasted words. A general
grant to all RTCs renders irrelevant the “Supreme Court’s exercise of authority” on the matter. Such
a general grant renders meaningless the designation by the Supreme Court of the RTC branches that
shall exercise jurisdiction over the cases.
12. Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 should therefore be read to mean
that SEC’s jurisdiction over all cases under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A is transferred to the specific
RTC branch designated by the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority. This is the reading of the
Supreme Court as expressed with precision in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC dated 21 November 2000 which
is aptly titled “Resolution Designating Certain Branches of Regional Trial Courts To Try and Decide
Cases Formerly Cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission” “arising within their
respective territorial jurisdictions with respect to the National Capital Region and within the respective
provinces in the First to the Twelfth Judicial Regions.” This En Banc Resolution opened with a purpose
clause reading “to implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities
Regulation Code). This is an unequivocal statement that the Court interprets the provision to mean that
only the RTC Branches that it shall designate to hear and decide Special Commercial Court cases can
exercise jurisdiction over such cases.
13. Same; Same; Same; Same; There has been, as just enumerated, as many iterations by the court
itself of its reading of Section 5, Item 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 i.e., that the law transferred the SEC
jurisdiction over the cases listed in Sec. 5 of P.D. No. 902-A to the particular branches of the RTCs
designated by the Supreme Court as such. Unavoidable, therefore, is the conclusion that all other
Branches of the RTCs without the Supreme Court designation are without jurisdiction over SEC cases.
And following unreversed rulings the other Branches of the RTC before whom a SEC case is filed must
dismiss such case for want of jurisdiction. Furthermore, absent such jurisdiction, the non-SEC RTC
cannot direct the case to the “proper” court.
14. Same; Same; Same; Same; Palpably, RTC caseloads and the need to equalize the caseloads among
all branches determine the need for the Court to issue regulations regarding the Commercial Courts’
exercise of jurisdiction over noncommercial cases. In all, the RTC Commercial Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over commercial cases and can still exercise jurisdiction over regular cases if, as
determined by the Supreme Court, the caseloads necessitate such exercise. While there may be
arguments in favor of a simpler arrangement whereby all the RTCs in all the Judicial Districts are
made Commercial Courts, such arguments cannot be submitted for resolution by the Court. The
settlement is in the legislature.
15. Same; Same; Same; Same; Plainly, the designation of Special Commercial Courts, as implemented
by the Supreme Court through its various rules, pertains to the statutorily conferred jurisdiction and
not merely an incident related to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. The ponencia fails to address an
equally important precept on subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction is determined by the
averments and allegations of the complaint which in this instance is inarguably a commercial case
concerning subscription of shares in a corporation. From the onset, petitioners, by the filing of their
Complaint, supplied the occasion for the exercise of jurisdiction vested by law in a particular court. In
short, petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC (not as a court of general jurisdiction), and with
the allegations in their Complaint, specifically invoked the RTC designated as a Special Commercial
Court under Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, implemented under A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC. Petitioners cannot
just simply file their Complaint before the RTC without any specificity, given the allegations contained
therein and the reliefs they prayed for.
16. Same; Same; Same; Same; With the incorrect labeling of their Complaint and the wrong invocation
of the RTC’s regular jurisdiction, the designated Special Commercial Court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the Complaint by the mere filing thereof with the multi sala RTC. Since petitioners had filed what
they labeled as a Civil Case, they knowingly filed it pursuant to the general jurisdiction of the RTC
under Sec. 19 of B.P. Blg. 129. The mere filing of the Complaint before the Office of the Clerk of Court
in the RTC of Muntinlupa City, in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court as
what occurred herein, is not equivalent to the correct and proper filing of the Complaint before the
appropriate Regional Trial Court specially designated by the Supreme Court to hear and decide cases
enumerated under Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A. Branch 276 of the RTC, to which the Complaint was
consequently raffled, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, cannot order the transfer of the
406
Complaint to Branch 256, the designated Special Commercial Court. Branch 276 cannot do so on the
basis of authority over the case which it did not have. Neither does it have authority over a coequal
court.
17. Same; Same; Same; Same; Indeed, We should, as warranted, require from counsels disciplined
knowledge of procedure. Courts should not themselves correct the procedural mistakes of pleaders. I
cannot overemphasize, and ultimately revert to the fact, that subject matter jurisdiction was conferred
by law (Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799) to the appropriate RTC as determined thru the designation by the
Supreme Court.
18. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Regional Trial Courts; Jurisdiction; I concur with the ponencia’s
conclusion that the designation of certain Regional Trial Court branches as Special Commercial Courts
does not work to confer jurisdiction over the branches designated as such. It was an error for the
Muntinlupa City Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, to dismiss the Complaint filed by petitioners. As
the ponencia underscores, Branch 276 should have instead transferred the case to the Muntinlupa City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 256, the branch duly designated to perform the Muntinlupa City Regional
Trial Court’s functions as a Special Commercial Court. The present Petition must, thus, be granted.
19. Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over what the ponencia collectively refers to as SEC Cases
was vested by Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, in Regional
Trial Courts and is not limited to the Regional Trial Court branches designated by this court as Special
Commercial Courts. It is only the legislature that has the power “to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of various courts[.]” As Congress does not share this power with this court, in relation
with these issues, this court’s competence is limited to “administrative supervision over all courts[,]”
as well as the “[p]romulgat[ion of] rules concerning . . . pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts[.]” It was purely in the exercise of these powers, and not for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction
where previously there was none, that this court designated certain Regional Trial Court branches as
Special Commercial Courts.
20. Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 902-A, which were previously under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, was vested in Regional Trial Courts by Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code.
21. Same; Same; Same; Same; This statutory provision was adopted pursuant to the legislature’s
power under Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution “to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts[.]” In contrast, the designation of Special Commercial Courts, through
this court’s November 21, 2000 Resolution in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, was pursuant to this court’s power
under Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution to exercise “administrative supervision over all
courts.” A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC did not work to confer jurisdiction independently of Section 5.2 of the
Securities Regulation Code. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC itself declares that it was adopted merely “[t]o
implement the provisions of Sec. 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799[.]”
22. Same; Same; Same; Same; The identity of Regional Trial Courts as courts of general jurisdiction
is no bar to designating certain Regional Trial Court branches to focus on certain types of cases. To
the contrary, it is this identity which permits it. Designating branches to focus on certain types of cases,
in order to facilitate the efficient dispensation of justice, is well within their nature as courts competent
to take cognizance of cases not falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of any other court, tribunal,
person, or body. Designating branches as such balances two considerations: on the one hand, their
nature as courts, which because they have general jurisdiction, can exercise jurisdiction over the
specific matter to which they were assigned; and on the other, their duty to speedily administer justice.
23. Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5.2’s qualification that this court’s power to designate is
necessarily only “in the exercise of its authority” is illuminating. It is to say that, in going about its task
of designating, this court cannot act in excess of its constitutional authority. This affirms the
Constitution’s segregation of the competencies of Congress from those of this court. It affirms the
exclusivity of Congress’ power “to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various
courts[.]” This affirms the reality that, bereft of this power, this court’s competence is limited to
“administrative supervision over all courts[,]” as well as the “[p]romulgat[ion] [of] rules concerning
. . . pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts[.]”
****
407
355. F & S Velasco Company, Inc. vs. Madrid, 774 SCRA 388, November 10, 2015
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Corporations ; Shares of Stock ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The case of Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., Inc. v. Bitanga, 362 SCRA 635
(2001), instructs that an owner of shares of stock cannot be accorded the rights pertaining to a
stockholder — such as the right to call for a meeting and the right to vote, or be voted for — if his
ownership of such shares is not recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book.
2. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Shares of Stock; Verily, all transfers of shares of stock must be
registered in the corporate books in order to be binding on the corporation. Specifically, this refers to
the Stock and Transfer Book, which is described in Section 74 of the same Code.
****
408
356. Tanchuling vs. Cantela, 774 SCRA 406, November 10, 2015
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ; Simulated Contracts ; Fraud ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Fraud; The undated deed, which serves as a counter-agreement to, and which
was simultaneously executed with, the subject deed, unmistakably evinces absolute simulation. While
Cantela posits that he was tricked into signing the undated deed as it was supposedly surreptitiously
inserted by Sps. Tanchuling into the copies of the subject deed at the time of their signing, nothing,
aside from his self-serving assertions, support his account. It is well-settled that fraud is never presumed
but must be proven by clear and convincing evidence by the same party who alleges it. Besides, Navarro
and Botero, who equally witnessed the signing of the undated deed, never testified on any irregularity.
Notably, the fact that the undated deed was not notarized is rendered irrelevant by Cantela’s own
admission of the document’s execution, which, unless proven to be fraudulent, must be presumed to be
fair and regular, as in all private transactions.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; Simulated Contracts; “Simulation takes place when the parties do not really
want the contract they have executed to produce the legal effects expressed by its wordings. Simulation
or vices of declaration may be either absolute or relative.” Article 1345 of the Civil Code distinguishes
an absolute simulation from a relative one; while Article 1346 discusses their effects, as follows: Art.
1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place when the parties do
not intend to be bound at all; the latter when the parties conceal their true agreement. Art. 1346. An
absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation, when it does not prejudice a
third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy binds the parties to their agreement.
3. Same; Same; Same; In Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta, Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M. Ureta, 657 SCRA
555 (2011), the Court explained that “[i]n absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has
no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute
simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal effect or in
any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an absolutely simulated or fictitious
contract is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the
contract.” In this case, the Court agrees with the RTC that the subject deed was absolutely simulated.
The parties never intended to be bound by any sale agreement. Instead, the subject deed was executed
merely as a front to show the public that Sps. Tanchuling were the owners of the properties in order to
deter the group of John Mercado from illegally selling the same.
****
409
357. Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774 SCRA 431, November 10, 2015
Syllabi Class :Preventive Suspension ;
1. Preventive Suspension; In the meanwhile, the Ombudsman found Binay, Jr. administratively liable,
and dismissed him from the service. By such dismissal, the questions raised against the CA’s issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction against the Ombudsman were rendered moot and academic. I join
the Majority in saying that the preventive suspension order, being an ancillary issuance, was dissolved
upon the Ombudsman’s resolution of the administrative charges on the merits. Thus, to dwell on the
preventive suspension of Binay, Jr. and his co-respondents any further would be superfluous, for, as
the Court said in Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court, 686 SCRA 35 (2012): It is a
rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not
consider questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases.
And where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which
petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition; A common requirement to both a
petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
3. Same; Same; Same; Motion for Reconsideration; As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration
must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or
prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; Exceptions.-
—As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to
resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration
may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
rationale for the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of
the case. Jurisprudence states that “[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other
legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the
propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly
relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court
or agency. x x x.” In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior
motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to
a petition for prohibition. These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo
has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a
criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
4. Same; Courts; Jurisdiction; A court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage
of the proceedings.-
—Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum, it is nonetheless proper to
resolve the issue on the CA’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a court’s jurisdiction over the
subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the
CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 139453 petition, as the
same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point
410
out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue, as he, in fact, duly
submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman’s Memorandum. That being said, the
Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.
5. Ombudsman Act; The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court
(except the Supreme Court) from issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, “[i]njunction is a judicial writ, process or
proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main
action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action.” Considering the
textual qualifier “to delay,” which connotes a suspension of an action while the main case remains
pending, the “writ of injunction” mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the
provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief. The exception to the no
injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the office’s jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies,
with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Nonetheless,
the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed
by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment,
if warranted. Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases
which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary
jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
6. Same; On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or
application for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the
exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman
particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial
review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase
“application for remedy” or the word “findings” refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural
remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of
law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.
7. Same; Statutory Construction; As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual
proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to
what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations
may be adopted, albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.
8. Same; Same; As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range
of remedies against issuances of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision
or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) “any application of remedy” (subject to the exception below)
against the same. To clarify, the phrase “application for remedy,” being a generally worded provision,
and being separated from the term “appeal” by the disjunctive “or,” refers to any remedy (whether
taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general sense. By the same principle, the word
“findings,” which is also separated from the word “decision” by the disjunctive “or,” would therefore
refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision. The
subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific
procedural vehicle is not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against “the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman,” a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme Court
on “pure questions of law,” whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
9. Doctrine of Non-Interference; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Congress cannot
interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply
to interlocutory “findings” issued by the Ombudsman.-
—Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770’s extremely limited restriction on remedies
is inappropriate since a Rule 45 appeal — which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure
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promulgated by this Court — can only be taken against final decisions or orders of lower courts, and
not against “findings” of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot
interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply
to interlocutory “findings” issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to
a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction,
in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however,
that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of
Section 27, RA 6770 (as above cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desierto, 295
SCRA 470 (1998).
10. Same; Judicial Power; The concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to
insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are
apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence,
the Ombudsman’s notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power — that is, a
provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order — clearly strays from the concept’s
rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.
11. Remedial Law; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts; Certiorari; Note that the CA’s certiorari jurisdiction,
as above stated, is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts (under Section
21[1], Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these courts’ jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma, 172 SCRA
415 (1989), the doctrine was explained as follows: [T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be
taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of
the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals. When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred
unto it by law, said court may then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called
judicial power.
12. Judicial Power; Words and Phrases; Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other
courts established by law, has been defined as the “totality of powers a court exercises when it assumes
jurisdiction and hears and decides a case.” Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it
includes “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.”wor
13. Same; Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court’s exercise of the jurisdiction it has
acquired over a particular case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly
promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure is the framework within which judicial power is
exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523 (1911), the Court elucidated that
“[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure
in a given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs
the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is
not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to
exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the
subject matter.” While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts
belongs exclusively to this Court.
14. Remedial Law; Temporary Restraining Order; Preliminary Injunction; A temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the
pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are
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dependent upon the result of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole object of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made to
appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act
or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the
status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words,
they are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a
cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit. In a sense, they are regulatory processes
meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
15. Same; Same; Same; With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed
the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to
issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it encroached upon
this Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature,
provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters
of procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing
right since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant’s right in esse which is
threatened to be violated during the course of a pending litigation.
16. Political Law; Separation of Powers; That Congress has been vested with the authority to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section 2, Article VIII, supra, as
well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII, supra, does not result in an abnegation
of the Court’s own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5(5),
Article VIII, supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate
and distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court
and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court
through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-
vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion
the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts,
particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown to have been
repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was
created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and
inherent to every court’s exercise of judicial power. Without the Court’s consent to the proscription, as
may be manifested by an adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular issued therefor, there thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers
principle.
17. Same; Judicial Power; It should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting
provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine
the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its
functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional
injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court’s acquired
jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of
judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court’s inability
to regulate what occurs during a proceeding’s course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the
subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should be
unclipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution,
the Court’s duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by
statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should only
subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the
same.
18. Administrative Law; Preventive Suspension; By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a
penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting Ombudsman Gervacio, 466 SCRA 277
(2005), the Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be
suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential
witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:
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Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and
suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily
cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a
preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the
suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of
his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution
of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated
is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty.
19. Same; Same; The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of
an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation, namely: (1) The evidence of guilt is strong;
and (2) Either of the following circumstances coexist with the first requirement: (a) The charge involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) The charge would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) The respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the
case filed against him.
20. Same; Condonation; Words and Phrases; Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as
“[a] victim’s express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if
there had been no offense.” The condonation doctrine — which connotes this same sense of complete
extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated upon — is not based on statutory law. It is a
jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
21. Same; Condonation Doctrine; The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor, 554 SCRA 160
(2008), also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to
them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
22. Civil Service; Public Officers; After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People
have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies in Article II that “[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.” Learning how unbridled power
could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity
of the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly,
the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times: Section 1.
Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives. In Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 (2013), it was explained that:
[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that “public
office is a public trust,” is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should
exercise their official functions only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which
embodies the parameters of the people’s trust. The notion of a public trust connotes accountability x x
x. (Emphasis supplied) The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section
of the Civil Service Commission, and also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees.
23. Same; Same; For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or
remove an elective local official from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise
known as the “Local Government Code of 1991” (LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and
took effect on January 1, 1992: Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action.—An elective local official
may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds: (a) Disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines; (b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; (c) Dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; (d) Commission of any offense
involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prisión mayor; (e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang
barangay; (g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant of another country; and (h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other
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laws. An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order
of the proper court.
24. Same; Same; Related to this provision is Section 40(b) of the LGC which states that those removed
from office as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local
position: Section 40. Disqualifications.—The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position: x x x x (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
25. Same; Same; Condonation Doctrine; The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.-
—Section 52(a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office: Section 52. Administrative Disabilities
Inherent in Certain Penalties.—a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and bar from
taking the civil service examinations. In contrast, Section 66(b) of the LGC states that the penalty of
suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local official nor constitute a bar to his
candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the
provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official’s candidacy. Nothing
therein states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of reelection: Section
66. Form and Notice of Decision.—x x x. x x x x (b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative offense, nor
shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office. Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above cited legal
provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of
legal bases.
26. Same; Same; Same; The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and
there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an
offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may
be condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 (1991), to apply to administrative offenses.
27. Same; Same; Same; At best, Section 66(b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of
suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the elective local official’s prior term, and likewise allows
said official to still run for reelection. This treatment is similar to People ex rel. Bagshaw v. Thompson,
(55 Cal. App. 2d 147; 130 P.2d.237 [1942]), and Montgomery v. Nowell, (183 Ark. 1116; 40 S.W.2d
418 [1931]), both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot be suspended for a
misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66(b)
states that the elective local official’s administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of reelection.
Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
28. Same; Same; Same; This Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine
in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US
rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from — and now rendered obsolete by — the current
legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that
originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo v. Santos,
212 SCRA 768 (1992), Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 257 SCRA 55 (1996), Mayor Garcia v. Mojica, 314
SCRA 207 (1999), and Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, 586 SCRA 799 (2009), which were all relied upon
by the CA. It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Unto this
Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound
to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council, 618 SCRA 639 (2010):
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned,
necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations,
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not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to
them.
29. Grave Abuse of Discretion; It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered
as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility. It has also been held that “grave abuse of discretion arises
when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.”
30. Civil Service; Public Officers; Condonation Doctrine; This Court deems it apt to clarify that the
mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case does
not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation
doctrine. As explained in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., “‘the moot and academic principle’ is not a magical
formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character
of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth,
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.”
31. Same; Same; Same; It would be a violation of the Court’s own duty to uphold and defend the
Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become
apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine is simply
impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public
office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.
32. Same; Same; Same; The condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has
persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the
legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation of exceptional
character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a
perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials
throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.
33. Same; Same; Same; The defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local
officials against the administrative charges filed against them. To provide a sample size, the
Ombudsman has informed the Court that “for the period of July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85
cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of
condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct — involving
infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct — were placed
beyond the reach of the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial powers.” Evidently, this fortifies
the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review. In any event, the
abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own
jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the
Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot.
34. The Ombudsman’s Act; I am writing this separate opinion to memorialize my concurrence with the
declaration of the ineffectiveness of the first paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770, and of
the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph thereof. The main opinion has been written well by our
esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, who has exhibited her scholarly bent
once again. But let me assure my colleagues in the Majority that if I submit this concurrence, I do not
mean to diminish in any way or degree the forcefulness and correctness of the justification for the
declaration. I simply want to underscore that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck
down for authorizing the undue interference with the prerogatives of the courts of law to adopt whatever
means were allowed by law and procedure to exercise their jurisdiction in the cases properly cognizable
by them.
35. Ombudsman; Preventive Suspension; Administrative Cases; In line with the power to investigate
administrative cases, the Ombudsman is vested with the authority to preventively suspend respondent
public officials and employees pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, which provides: Section
24. Preventive Suspension.—The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or
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employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong,
and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the
service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The
preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but
not more than six (6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the
Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the
period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
36. Same; Same; It is important to note, however, that the Ombudsman has no authority to issue the
preventive suspension order in connection with criminal investigations of government officials or
employees because such authority rests in the courts in which the criminal cases are filed.
37. Civil Service; Public Officers; Condonation Doctrine; It is clear to me that, based on the language
and the factual milieu of Aguinaldo v. Santos, 212 SCRA 768 (1992), and Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,
257 SCRA 55 (1996), which both cited Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466
(1959), and of other akin rulings, condonation shall apply only in case of the reelection of a public
officer who is sought to be permanently removed from office as a result of his misconduct, not while
such public officer is undergoing investigation. Condonation necessarily implies that the condoned act
has already been found to have been committed by the public officer. Hence, condonation applies to the
penalty or punishment imposed after the conduct of an administrative investigation. Under the
circumstances, the pronouncements in Aguinaldo, Salalima and the others could not be applicable to
the preventive suspension order issued to Binay, Jr. pending his administrative investigation because
preventive suspension pending the conduct of an investigation was not yet a penalty in itself, but a mere
measure of precaution to enable the disciplining authority to investigate the charges by precluding the
respondent from influencing the witnesses against him.
38. Same; Same; Same; Suspension; As I see it, the CA misconstrued the milieu in Garcia, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, 586 SCRA 799 (2009), and Joson III v. Court of Appeals, 482 SCRA 360 (2006), as an
application of the doctrine of condonation. The Court notably stated in Garcia, Jr. and Joson III that
“suspension from office of an elective official would deprive the electorate of the services of the person
they voted into office” in the context of determining the propriety of the issuance of the preventive
suspension order. In other words, the statement only served to remind the Ombudsman to issue the
preventive suspension orders with utmost caution in view of the gravity of the effects of suspending an
incumbent elective local official. Hence, Garcia, Jr. and Joson III did not apply the doctrine of
condonation.
39. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; A preliminary injunction is an
order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a court,
agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. The requirements for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order are clearly set forth in Section 3, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court. The sole objective of the writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the case can be heard fully. The writ of preliminary injunction is generally based
solely on initial and incomplete evidence; hence, it should not determine the merits of a case, or decide
controverted facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further
injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.
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358. Cayago, Jr. vs. Cantara, 776 SCRA 23, December 02, 2015
1. Same; Same; Same; Procedural rules were established primarily to provide order and prevent
needless delays for the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The Court has long declared
that the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege, subject to the court’s discretion by virtue of
which no party can assume that its motion for extension would be granted. Being discretionary in
nature, it behooves upon the appellants to follow up on their motions and ascertain its status, as the
failure to strictly comply with the provisions on reglementary periods renders the remedy of appeal
unavailable. Further, as a purely statutory right, the appellant must strictly comply with the requisites
laid down by the Rules of Court. However, where strong considerations of substantial justice are
present, the stringent application of technical rules could be relaxed in the exercise of equity
jurisdiction as in cases where petitioners showed no intent to delay the final disposition of the case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a general rule, appeals are perfected when it is filed
within the period prescribed under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court provides that appeals to the CA taken from a decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction should be filed and served within fifteen (15) days, counted from notice of the
judgment appealed from or from the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The original 15-
day period to appeal is extendible for an additional 15 days upon the filing of a proper motion and the
payment of docket fees within the reglementary period of appeal. Failure to successfully comply with
the aforementioned procedure, especially in filing the appeal within the prescribed period, renders the
petition for review dismissible.
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359. Diaz vs. People, 776 SCRA 43, December 02, 2015
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Presumptions ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section
3(d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns. To this, case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document
without first informing himself of its contents and consequences. Further, under Section 3(p) of the
same Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular. This behooves
every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he signs and delivers it.
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail. In
this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent’s
possession of the document pertaining to the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has
not been extinguished. Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more
convincing than the opposing evidence. All things considered, the evidence in this case clearly
preponderates in respondent’s favor.
2. Criminal Law; Extinction of Penal Actions; It is noteworthy to mention that the extinction of the
penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence, or “greater weight of the credible evidence,” is
required. Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still be held civilly liable where the facts established
by the evidence so warrant, as in this case.
****
419
359. Diaz vs. People, 776 SCRA 43, December 02, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Security Guards ; Floating Status ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The security guard must not remain in a floating status for a period of more
than six (6) months; otherwise, he is deemed terminated.-
—To clarify, placing a security guard in temporary “off-detail” or “floating status” is part of
management prerogative of the employer-security agency and does not, per se, constitute a severance
of the employer-employee relationship. However, being an exercise of management prerogative, it must
be exercised in good faith — that is, one which is intended for the advancement of the employer’s
interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special
laws or under valid agreements. Moreover, due to the grim economic consequences to the security
guard in which he does not receive any salary while in temporary “off-detail” or “floating status,” the
employer-security agency should bear the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which
the security guard temporarily out of work can be assigned. Furthermore, the security guard must not
remain in such status for a period of more than six (6) months; otherwise, he is deemed terminated.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; “To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a
capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered ‘grave,’
discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.”
3. Labor Disputes; Substantial Evidence; “In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and the conclusions reached thereby are not
supported by substantial evidence. This requirement of substantial evidence is clearly expressed in
Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides that ‘[i]n cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.’”
4. Labor Law; Security Guards; Floating Status; Case law provides that the concept of temporary
“off-detail” or “floating status” of security guards employed by private security agencies — a form of
a temporary retrenchment or layoff — relates to the period of time when security guards are in between
assignments or when they are made to wait after being relieved from a previous post until they are
transferred to a new one. This takes place when the security agency’s clients decide not to renew their
contracts with the agency, resulting in a situation where the available posts under its existing contracts
are less than the number of guards in its roster. It also happens in instances where contracts for security
services stipulate that the client may request the agency for the replacement of the guards assigned to
it, even for want of cause, such that the replaced security guard may be placed on temporary “off-
detail” if there are no available posts under the agency’s existing contracts. As the circumstance is
generally outside the control of the security agency or employer, the Court has ruled that when a
security guard is placed on a “floating status,” he or she does not receive any salary or financial benefit
provided by law.
****
420
361. Narra Nickel Mining and Devt Corp vs. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp, 777 SCRA 258,
December 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement ;
1. Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement; Thus, at least with respect to cases affecting an
FTAA’s validity, the Court holds that the OP has no quasi-judicial power to adjudicate the propriety of
its cancellation/revocation. At the risk of belaboring the point, the FTAA is a contract to which the OP
itself represents a party, i.e., the Republic. It merely exercised a contractual right by
cancelling/revoking said agreement, a purely administrative action which should not be considered
quasi-judicial in nature. Thus, absent the OP’s proper exercise of a quasi-judicial function, the CA had
no appellate jurisdiction over the case, and its Decision is, perforce, null and void. With this, it is
unnecessary to delve into the other ancillary issues raised in the course of these proceedings.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is a fundamental rule that the question of
jurisdiction may be tackled motu proprio on appeal even if none of the parties raised the same. The
reason for the rule is that a court without jurisdiction cannot render a valid judgment. Cast against this
light, the Court finds that the CA improperly took cognizance of the case on appeal under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court for the reason that the OP’s cancellation and/or revocation of the FTAA was not one
which could be classified as an exercise of its quasi-judicial authority, thus negating the CA’s
jurisdiction over the case. The jurisdictional parameter that the appeal be taken against a judgment,
final order, resolution or award of a “quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions” is explicitly stated in Section 1 of the said Rule.
3. Administrative Agencies; Quasi-Judicial Power; Words and Phrases; Quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory power is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of
persons before it. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially executive or administrative in nature, where the power to
act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it.
4. Adjudicate; Words and Phrases; “‘Adjudicate’ as commonly or popularly understood, means to
adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, or settle. The dictionary defines the term
as ‘to settle finally (the rights and duties of parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: x x x
to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge.’” “In the legal sense, ‘adjudicate’ means:
‘[t]o settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its
strictest sense’; and ‘adjudge’ means: ‘[t]o pass on judicially, to decide, settle, or decree, or to sentence
or condemn. x x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment.’”
5. Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement; Principle of Mutuality of Contracts; With the legal
treatment and parameters of an FTAA in mind, it becomes apparent that the OP’s cancellation and/or
revocation of the FTAA is an exercise of a contractual right that is purely administrative in nature, and
thus, cannot be treated as an adjudication, again, in the sense above discussed. As one of the contracting
parties to the FTAA, the OP could not have adjudicated on the matter in which it is an interested party,
as in a court case where rights and duties of parties are settled before an impartial tribunal. In a very
loose sense, the OP’s cancellation/revocation may be taken as a “decision” but only to the extent of
considering it as its final administrative action internal to its channels. It is not one for which we should
employ the conventional import of the phrase “final and executory,” as accorded to proper
judicial/quasi-judicial decisions, and its concomitant effect of barring further recourse of a party. To
reiterate, being a government or public contract, the FTAA is subject to fundamental contract
principles, one of which is the principle of mutuality of contracts which would definitely be violated if
one were to accept the view that the OP, a contracting party, can adjudicate on the contract’s own
validity. The principle of mutuality of contracts is expressed in Article 1308 of the Civil Code.
6. Mines and Mining; Philippine Mining Act of 1995; Under Section 45 of DENR Administrative
Order No. 2010-21, otherwise known as the “Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7942,
or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995” (RIRR), mining contractor may opt to convert totally or partially
his existing mineral agreement, e.g., an MPSA to an FTAA, by filing a Letter of Intent with the MGB,
copy furnished the Regional Office where the area covered by said mineral agreement is located. Within
sixty (60) days from the filing of the Letter of Intent, the contractor must comply with the requirements
for the grant of an FTAA laid down in Sections 49 to 69, Chapter VII of the RIRR, as well as pay the
421
conversion fee. The application for conversion shall be evaluated and eventually, approved upon
compliance. Note that the term of the FTAA arising from such conversion shall be equivalent to the
remaining period of its predecessor-mineral agreement.
7. Same; DENR Administrative Order No. 2010-21; Section 55 of the same DENR issuance requires
a publication/posting/radio announcement of an FTAA application. Any adverse claim, protest, or
opposition to the said FTAA should be filed directly to the Regional Office, Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office, or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office concerned,
within ten (10) days from the date of publication or from the last date of posting/radio announcement.
The said adverse claim, protest, or opposition shall then be resolved by the POA of the DENR, whose
ruling may then be appealed to the proper tribunals. To this, it bears pointing out that Section 55
explicitly exempts “previously published valid and existing mining claims or FTAA applications
originating from Exploration Permits that have undergone the [publication requirement]” from the
aforesaid publication requirement.
****
422
362. Ebdane, Jr. vs. Apurillo, 777 SCRA 324, December 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings ; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies ;
1. Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Having established that there was no violation of
respondents’ rights to administrative due process, the CA incorrectly exempted respondents from
compliance with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. They are therefore required to go
through the full course of the administrative process where they are still left with remedies. As case law
states, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative
procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention. If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.
2. Administrative Proceedings; Procedural Due Process; In administrative proceedings, procedural
due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of; Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.-
—The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real
opportunity to be heard. In administrative proceedings, as in the case at bar, procedural due process
simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. “To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may
also be heard thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
****
423
363. Tatel vs. JLFP Investigation and Security Agency, Inc., 777 SCRA 347, December 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Abandonment ;
1. Same; Same; Abandonment; To constitute abandonment of work, two (2) elements must be present:
first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or
justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to
sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt act. The burden to prove whether
the employee abandoned his or her work rests on the employer. The mere absence or failure to report
for work, even after notice to return, does not necessarily amount to abandonment. Abandonment is a
matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute
abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-
employee relationship. The operative act is still the employee’s ultimate act of putting an end to his
employment.
2. Labor Law; Security Guards; Temporary Off-Detail; The onus of proving that an employee was not
dismissed or, if dismissed, his dismissal was not illegal, fully rests on the employer, and the failure to
discharge the onus would mean that the dismissal was not justified and was illegal. The burden of
proving the allegations rests upon the party alleging and the proof must be clear, positive, and
convincing. Specifically with respect to cases involving security guards, a relief and transfer order in
itself does not sever employment relationship between a security guard and his agency. An employee
has the right to security of tenure, but this does not give him a vested right to his position as would
deprive the company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where his service, as
security guard, will be most beneficial to the client. Temporary “off-detail” or the period of time
security guards are made to wait until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or client does not
constitute constructive dismissal, so long as such status does not continue beyond six (6) months. The
onus of proving that there is no post available to which the security guard can be assigned rests on the
employer.
3. Same; Termination of Employment; Burden of Proof; Jurisprudence has placed upon the employer
the burden of proving that an employee was not dismissed or, if dismissed, that the dismissal was for a
valid or authorized cause. In this case, respondents have adequately discharged this burden, proving
that they did not dismiss Tatel. Accordingly, the burden of proof has shifted to the latter to establish
otherwise, which he, however, failed to do. Apart from mere allegations, Tatel was unable to proffer
any evidence to substantiate his claim of dismissal. On the contrary, records are bereft of any indication
that he was prevented from returning to work or otherwise deprived of any work assignment by
respondents.
4. Same; Same; Illegal Dismissals; Since Tatel was not dismissed, he is not entitled to backwages and
separation pay. Article 293 of the Labor Code of the Philippines states that “[i]n cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of [an] employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.” As such, there being
no dismissal in this case, petitioner is not entitled to either backwages or separation pay.
****
424
364. Nolasco vs. Cuerpo, 777 SCRA 447, December 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Theory of the Case ;
1. Theory of the Case; It is settled that “[w]hen a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the
case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on
appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.” The Court’s
pronouncement in Peña v. Spouses Tolentino, 642 SCRA 310 (2011), is instructive on this matter, to
wit: Indeed, the settled rule in this jurisdiction, according to Mon v. Court of Appeals, is that a party
cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on appeal. This rule affirms that “courts of
justice have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue.” Thus, a judgment that goes
beyond the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties is
not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid. The legal theory under which the controversy was
heard and decided in the trial court should be the same theory under which the review on appeal is
conducted. Otherwise, prejudice will result to the adverse party. We stress that points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the lower court will not be ordinarily
considered by a reviewing court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
2. Civil Law; Obligations; Reciprocal Obligations; In reciprocal obligations, either party may rescind
— or more appropriately, resolve — the contract upon the other party’s substantial breach of the
obligation/s he had assumed thereunder. This is expressly provided for in Article 1191 of the Civil Code
which states: Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of
the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose between
the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may
also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. The
court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing,
in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
3. Same; Contracts; Rescission; “More accurately referred to as resolution, the right of rescission
under Article 1191 is predicated on a breach of faith that violates the reciprocity between the parties
to the contract. This retaliatory remedy is given to the contracting party who suffers the injurious breach
on the premise that it is ‘unjust that a party be held bound to fulfill his promises when the other violates
his.’” Note that the rescission (or resolution) of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual
breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the very object of the
parties in making the agreement. Ultimately, the question of whether a breach of contract is substantial
depends upon the attending circumstances.
4. Same; Same; Same; For a contracting party to be entitled to rescission (or resolution) in accordance
with Article 1191 of the Civil Code, the other contracting party must be in substantial breach of the
terms and conditions of their contract. A substantial breach of a contract, unlike slight and casual
breaches thereof, is a fundamental breach that defeats the object of the parties in entering into an
agreement. Here, it cannot be said that petitioners’ failure to undertake their obligation under
paragraph 7 defeats the object of the parties in entering into the subject contract, considering that the
same paragraph provides respondents contractual recourse in the event of petitioners’ nonperformance
of the aforesaid obligation, that is, to cause such transfer themselves in behalf and at the expense of
petitioners.
****
425
365. Abadilla, Jr. vs. Obrero, 777 SCRA 457, December 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Procedural Rules and Technicalities ;
1. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; It should be stressed that procedural rules are not to be
disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective
law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and
manner and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they
acknowledge. Procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of
justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice,
or whimsicality.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final
order; An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the
proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower court. A final order is
appealable, in accordance with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court (Rules) declaring that “[a]n appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.”
3. Same; Same; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; Given the improper remedy taken, the
order of dismissal rendered by the RTC has, thus, become final and immutable and, therefore, can no
longer be altered or modified in any respect. The doctrine of immutability of judgments bars courts
from modifying decisions that had already attained finality, even if the purpose of the modification is
to correct errors of fact or law. As the only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments
are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice
to any party, and (3) void judgments, none of which are obtaining in this case, and considering further
that there lies no compelling reason to relax the rules of procedure, the CA erred when it took
cognizance of respondents’ certiorari petition and rendered judgment thereon.
****
426
366. Filinvest Alabang, Inc. vs. Century Iron Works, Inc., 777 SCRA 519, Dec 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ; Fixed Lump Sum Contracts ;
1. Same; Same; Same; It must be clarified that Article 1724 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
parties from stipulating on additional works to the project covered by said fixed lump sum contract
which would entail added liabilities on the part of the project owner. In fact, the said provision allows
contractors to recover from project owners additional costs in fixed lump sum contracts, as well as the
increase in price for any additional work due to a subsequent change in the original plans and
specifications, provided that there exists: (a) a written authority from the developer or project owner
ordering or allowing the written changes in work; and (b) written agreement of the parties with regard
to the increase in price or cost due to the change in work or design modification. Jurisprudence instructs
that compliance with these two (2) requisites is a condition precedent for recovery and hence, the
absence of one or the other condition bars the claim for additional costs. Notably, neither the authority
for the changes made nor the additional price to be paid therefor may be proved by any evidence other
than the written authority and agreement as above mentioned.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; At the outset, it must
be stressed that a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law.
Questions of fact are not reviewable, absent any of the exceptions recognized by case law. This rule is
rooted on the doctrine that findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of
respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can
otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should not be ignored. Hence, absent any clear
showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed by the lower court, its findings of facts,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive upon this Court.
3. Civil Law; Estoppel; In the instant case, both the RTC and the CA found that petitioner had issued
to respondent a Certificate of Completion and Acceptance signifying that it had already accepted
respondent’s work as up to par. As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, this factual finding
already estops petitioner from withholding the amounts due to respondent’s purported substandard
workmanship. It is settled that “[w]henever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief,
he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it,”
as in this case. Therefore, it is but proper that petitioner remit to respondent the amounts of P40,880.00
and P227,500.00 it withheld from the latter.
4. Same; Contracts; Fixed Lump Sum Contracts; In a fixed lump sum contract, the project owner
agrees to pay the contractor a specified amount for completing a scope of work involving a variety of
unspecified items of work without requiring a cost breakdown. The contractor estimates the project cost
based on the scope of work and schedule and considers probable errors in measurement and changes
in the price of materials. Otherwise stated, in fixed lump sum contracts, the project owner’s liability to
the contractor is generally limited to what is stipulated therein.
****
427
367. Quantum Foods, Inc. vs. Esloyo, 777 SCRA 532, December 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Grave Abuse of Discretion ;
Syllabi:
1. Grave Abuse of Discretion; It should be emphasized that the NLRC has full discretion to grant or
deny the motion to reduce bond, and its ruling will not be disturbed unless tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. Verily, an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave abuse
of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, which clearly is not extant with respect to the NLRC’s cognizance of QFI’s
appeal. Far from having gravely abused its discretion, the NLRC correctly preferred substantial justice
over the rigid and stringent application of procedural rules. This, by all means, is not a case of grave
abuse of discretion calling for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, warranting the reversal of the CA’s
ruling granting the certiorari petition and the remand of the case to the CA for appropriate action.
2. Labor Law; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Due Process; In the present case, it is apparent
that the plausible merit of the case was the “special circumstance” or “compelling reason” that
prompted the NLRC to relax the certification requirement and give due course to QFI’s appeal as it, in
fact, arrived at a contrary ruling from that of the LA. It is well to emphasize that technical rules are not
binding in cases submitted before the NLRC. In fact, labor officials are enjoined to use every and
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, in the interest of due process. Consequently, the NLRC cannot be
faulted for relaxing its own rules in the interest of substantial justice.
3. Same; Appeal Bonds; Coming now to the bond requirement, while it has been settled that the posting
of a cash or surety bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary
awards from the decision of the LA, in several cases, the Court has relaxed this stringent requirement
whenever justified. Thus, the Rules — specifically Section 6, Rule VI — thereof, allow the reduction of
the appeal bond upon a showing of: (a) the existence of a meritorious ground for reduction, and (b) the
posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award.
4. Same; Same; Case law has held that for purposes of justifying the reduction of the appeal bond, the
merit referred to may pertain to (a) an appellant’s lack of financial capability to pay the full amount of
the bond, or (b) the merits of the main appeal such as when there is a valid claim that there was no
illegal dismissal to justify the award, the absence of an employer-employee relationship, prescription
of claims, and other similarly valid issues that are raised in the appeal. In this case, the NLRC held that
a liberal application of the requirement on the timely filing of the appeal bond is justified, finding that
(a) the posting of a P400,000.00 cash bond within the reglementary period to appeal and the subsequent
posting of a surety bond constitute substantial compliance of the bond requirement; and (b) there is
merit in QFI’s appeal.
****
428
368. Manansala vs. People, 777 SCRA 563, December 09, 2015
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Exempting Circumstances ; Impulse of Uncontrollable Fear ;
1. Same; Exempting Circumstances; Impulse of Uncontrollable Fear; To begin with, “acting under
an impulse of uncontrollable fear” is not among the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Article 13
of the RPC, but is an exempting circumstance provided under Article 12(6) of the same Code. Moreover,
for such a circumstance to be appreciated in favor of an accused, the following elements must concur:
(a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear
of an injury is greater than, or at least equal to, that committed. For such defense to prosper, the duress,
force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury
is not enough.
on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court
full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Falsification of Private Documents; Elements of.-
—The elements of Falsification of Private Documents under Article 172(2) of the RPC are: (a) that the
offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 171(7) of the same Code; (b)
that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (c) that the falsification caused
damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
On the other hand the elements of Falsification under Article 171(4) of the RPC are as follows: (a) the
offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are
absolutely false.
****
429
369. Kabataan Party-list vs. Commission on Elections, 777 SCRA 574, Dec. 16, 2015
Syllabi Class :Election Law ; Right of Suffrage ; Biometrics ; Biometrics Law ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; The requirement of biometric registration, therefore, is not an additional
qualification but rather a means to ensure and protect the identity of the voter. Names are deactivated
because these do not correspond to real persons. Thus, there is no disqualification inasmuch as
fictitious names or names of the deceased do not represent real persons. A ghost cannot be disqualified
because it does not exist.
2. Election Law; Right of Suffrage; As early as the 1936 case of The People of the Philippine Islands
v. Corral, 62 Phil. 945, it has been recognized that “[t]he right to vote is not a natural right but is a
right created by law. Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as are most
likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the evolution of the representative system
of government, the exercise of the right of suffrage was limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But
with the spread of democratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has come to
embrace the mass of the audit classes of persons are excluded from the franchise.”
3. Same; Same;Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution delineates the current parameters for the
exercise of suffrage: Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the
exercise of suffrage. Dissecting the provision, one must meet the following qualifications in order to
exercise the right of suffrage: first, he must be a Filipino citizen; second, he must not be disqualified by
law; and third, he must have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the place wherein
he proposes to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
4. Same; Same; Biometrics; Words and Phrases; RA 8189 primarily governs the process of
registration. It defines “registration” as “the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application
for registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein he
resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the [ERB].” As stated
in Section 2 thereof, RA 8189 was passed in order “to systematize the present method of registration in
order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters.” To complement RA 8189
in light of the advances in modern technology, RA 10367, or the assailed Biometrics Law, was signed
into law in February 2013. It built on the policy considerations behind RA 8189 as it institutionalized
biometrics validation as part of the registration process: Section 1. Declaration of Policy.—It is the
policy of the State to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters through the
adoption of biometric technology. “Biometrics refers to a quantitative analysis that provides a positive
identification of an individual such as voice, photograph, fingerprint, signature, iris, and/or such other
identifiable features.”
5. Same; Same; Same; Biometrics Law; Sections 3 and 10 of RA 10367 respectively require registered
and new voters to submit themselves for biometrics validation: Section 3. Who Shall Submit for
Validation.—Registered voters whose biometrics have not been captured shall submit themselves for
validation. Section 10. Mandatory Biometrics Registration.—The Commission shall implement a
mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters. Under Section 2(d) of RA 10367, “validation”
is defined as “the process of taking the biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics have not yet
been captured.”
6. Same; Same; Same; Deactivation; Words and Phrases; The consequence of noncompliance is
“deactivation,” which “refers to the removal of the registration record of the registered voter from the
corresponding precinct book of voters for failure to comply with the validation process as required by
[RA 10367].” Section 7 states: Section 7. Deactivation.—Voters who fail to submit for validation on or
before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016 elections shall
be deactivated pursuant to this Act. (Emphases supplied) Notably, the penalty of deactivation, as well
as the requirement of validation, neutrally applies to all voters. Thus, petitioners’ argument that the
law creates artificial class of voters is more imagined than real. There is no favor accorded to an
“obedient group.” If anything, noncompliance by the “disobedient” only rightfully results into
prescribed consequences. Surely, this is beyond the intended mantle of the equal protection of the laws,
430
which only works “against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.”
7. Judicial Review; In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the
standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the
regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with
the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its
earlier applications to equal protection. As pointed out by petitioners, the United States Supreme Court
has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access,
and interstate travel. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.
8. Election Law; Right of Suffrage; Biometrics; Section 6 of Resolution No. 9721 sets the procedure
for biometrics validation, whereby the registered voter is only required to: (a) personally appear before
the Office of the Election Officer; (b) present a competent evidence of identity; and (c) have his photo,
signature, and fingerprints recorded. It is, in effect, a manner of updating one’s registration for those
already registered under RA 8189, or a first-time registration for new registrants. The re-registration
process is amply justified by the fact that the government is adopting a novel technology like biometrics
in order to address the bane of electoral fraud that has enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in
this country. While registrants may be inconvenienced by waiting in long lines or by not being
accommodated on certain days due to heavy volume of work, these are typical burdens of voting that
are remedied by bureaucratic improvements to be implemented by the COMELEC as an administrative
institution.
9. Same; Same; Same; Biometrics Law; The public has been sufficiently informed of the
implementation of Republic Act (RA) No. 10367 and its deactivation feature.-
—It deserves emphasis that the public has been sufficiently informed of the implementation of RA 10367
and its deactivation feature. RA 10367 was duly published as early as February 22, 2013, and took
effect fifteen (15) days after. Accordingly, dating to the day of its publications, all are bound to know
the terms of its provisions, including the consequences of
10. Judicial Review; Statutes; It is significant to point out that questions relating to the wisdom,
morality, or practicability of statutes are policy matters that should not be addressed to the judiciary.-
—Petitioners aver that the poor experience of other countries — i.e., Guatemala, Britain, Côte d’Ivoire,
Uganda, and Kenya — in implementing biometrics registration should serve as warning in adhering to
the system. They highlighted the inherent difficulties in launching the same such as environmental and
geographical challenges, lack of training and skills, mechanical breakdown, and the need for re-
registration. They even admitted that while biometrics may address electoral fraud caused by multiple
registrants, it does not, however, solve other election-related problems such as vote-buying and source-
code manipulation. Aside from treading on mere speculation, the insinuations are improper. Clearly,
petitioners’ submissions principally assail the wisdom of the legislature in adopting the biometrics
registration system in curbing electoral fraud. In this relation, it is significant to point out that questions
relating to the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are policy matters that should not be
addressed to the judiciary.
11. Election Law; Biometrics; In the exercise of its legislative power, Congress has a wide latitude of
discretion to enact laws, such as RA 10367, to combat electoral fraud which, in this case, was through
the establishment of an updated voter registry. In making such choices to achieve its desired result,
Congress has necessarily sifted through the policy’s wisdom, which this Court has no authority to
review, much less reverse. Whether RA 10367 was wise or unwise, or was the best means in curtailing
electoral fraud is a question that does not present a justiciable issue cognizable by the courts. Indeed,
the reason behind the legislature’s choice of adopting biometrics registration notwithstanding the
experience of foreign countries, the difficulties in its implementation, or its concomitant failure to
address equally pressing election problems, is essentially a policy question and, hence, beyond the pale
of judicial scrutiny.
12. Administrative Agencies; Commission on Elections; Aside from committing forum shopping by
raising this issue despite already being subject of a prior petition filed before this Court, i.e., G.R. No.
220918, petitioners fail to consider that the 120- and 90-day periods stated therein refer to the
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prohibitive period beyond which voter registration may no longer be conducted. As already resolved in
this Court’s Resolution dated December 8, 2015 in G.R. No. 220918, the subject provision does not
mandate COMELEC to conduct voter registration up to such time; rather, it only provides a period
which may not be reduced, but may be extended depending on the administrative necessities and other
exigencies. Verily, as the constitutional body tasked to enforce and implement election laws, the
COMELEC has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to fulfill its mandate.
Perforce, this power includes the determination of the periods to accomplish certain preelection acts,
such as voter registration.
13. Same; Same; This Court reiterates that voter registration does not begin and end with the filing of
applications which, in reality, is just the initial phase that must be followed by the approval of
applications by the ERB. Thereafter, the process of filing petitions for inclusion and exclusion follows.
These steps are necessary for the generation of the final list of voters which, in turn, is a prerequisite
for the preparation and completion of the Project of Precincts (POP) that is vital for the actual
elections. The POP contains the number of registered voters in each precinct and clustered precinct,
the names of the barangays, municipalities, cities, provinces, legislative districts, and regions included
in the precincts, and the names and locations of polling centers where each precinct and clustered
precinct are assigned. The POP is necessary to determine the total number of boards of election
inspectors to be constituted, the allocation of forms and supplies to be procured for the election day,
the number of vote counting machines and other paraphernalia to be deployed, and the budget needed.
More importantly, the POP will be used as the basis for the finalization of the Election Management
System (EMS) which generates the templates of the official ballots and determines the voting
jurisdiction of legislative districts, cities, municipalities, and provinces. The EMS determines the
configuration of the canvassing and consolidation system for each voting jurisdiction. Accordingly, as
the constitutional body specifically charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, the
COMELEC should be given sufficient leeway in accounting for the exigencies of the upcoming elections.
14. Election Law; Right of Suffrage; Biometrics; Biometrics Law; Republic Act No. 10367 is a valid
regulation that assists in the identification of a person for purposes of ensuring that the right to vote is
exercised only by that person. It is also a measure to purge the voters list of spurious names or ghost
voters. Viewed this way, Republic Act No. 10367 is not a burden on the right of suffrage; rather, it
enhances this fundamental right. It provides mechanisms to ensure the identity of the voter, prevent
multiple votes for a single individual, and deter the casting of ballots in the names of persons who do
not actually exist or who, at the time of the elections, are already deceased.
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432
370. Fernandez vs. Alerta, 780 SCRA 248, January 13, 2016
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Moonlighting ; Court Personnel;
1. Same; Same; Court Personnel; Case law dictates that officials and employees of the judiciary must
serve with the highest degree of responsibility and integrity and are enjoined to conduct themselves
with propriety even in private life, as any reproach to them is bound to reflect adversely on their office.
As such, Officials and employees are prohibited from engaging directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession even outside office hours to ensure full-time service so that there may be no
undue delay in the administration of justice and in the disposition of cases as required by prevailing
rules.
2. Administrative Law; Moonlighting; Words and Phrases;In a number of administrative cases,
officers and employees of the judiciary engaging in any private business, vocation or profession without
prior approval of the Court were adjudged guilty of “moonlighting.” Under the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, “moonlighting” is denominated as the light offense of “[t]he
pursuit of a private business or vocation without the permission required under Civil Service rules and
regulations.” It is punishable by reprimand for the first offense, suspension from office for a period of
one (1) to thirty (30) days for the second offense, and dismissal from service for the third offense.
3. Same; Same; Respondent’s engagement was clearly in pursuit of a private business venture, akin to
the services offered by real estate brokers. In dealing and transacting with external government
agencies, more particularly, the Registry of Deeds, she had not only expended time and effort which
should have been devoted to the performance of her official functions, but she had also tainted the
integrity of her office by giving, at the very least, the impression that she could have wielded her
authority or influence in exchange for unofficial favors. Overall, absent any showing that such conduct
was permitted, she violated the rule against “moonlighting” and hence, being her first infraction
therefor, should be meted with the penalty of reprimand, with a stern warning that a commission of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
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433
371. Cheng vs. People, 780 SCRA 374, January 13, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Estafa Through Misappropriation ;
1. Same; Same; View that the dishonor did not alter the character of the transactions as sales but only rendered
Rodriguez an unpaid seller. The relationship between them resulting from the dishonor was that of a creditor-
and-debtor. In a purely debtor-and-creditor relationship, the debtor who merely refuses to pay or denies the
indebtedness cannot be held liable for estafa by misappropriation. The reason is readily apparent. To convict a
person of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, the State must prove that she has the
obligation to deliver or return the same money, goods or personal property received. Considering that the
petitioner already became the owner of the pieces of jewelry, she could dispose of the same, and her disposal of
them would not amount to the misappropriation thereof. In short, the petitioner did not thereby violate any trust
or other obligation to account for the items of jewelry that she already owned.
2. Criminal Law; Estafa; Elements of.-The elements of Estafa under this provision are as follows: (1) the
offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or
conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (3)
the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended party
that the offender return the money or property received. In the case of Pamintuan v. People, 621 SCRA 538
(2010), the Court had the opportunity to elucidate further on the essence of the aforesaid crime, as well as the
proof needed to sustain a conviction for the same, to wit: The essence of this kind of [E]stafa is the appropriation
or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The
words “convert” and “misappropriate” connote the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were
one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one’s
own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the
property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption
of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be
sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Indisputably, there is no reason to deviate from the
findings of the RTC and the CA as they have fully considered the evidence presented by the prosecution and the
defense, and they have adequately explained the legal and evidentiary reasons in concluding that Cheng is indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Estafa by misappropriation defined and penalized under
Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC. It is settled that factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled
to great weight and respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence
on record, as in this case.
4. Criminal Law; Estafa Through Misappropriation; View on the Elements of Estafa Through
Misappropriation.-The elements of estafa through misappropriation are: (a) that personal property is received
in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstances involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion or
diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on her part that she received it; (c)
that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another; and (d) that there be demand for the return
of the property.
5. Same; Same; I cannot join my distinguished Brethren in the conclusion that the CA correctly affirmed the
conviction of the petitioner. My assiduous and thorough review of the records of the trial convinces me that the
real agreement between the parties was a sale of the items of jewelry, not the supposed agency to sell such items
on commission basis as the RTC and the CA concluded. It is conceded that the text of Exhibit A, Exhibit A-1 and
Exhibit A-2 — the documents evidencing the transactions — seemed to allude to the petitioner’s obligation as
one of agency to sell the items of jewelry on commission basis. Under ordinary circumstances, the literal terms
of such documents would control and be regarded as the manifestation of the true intention of the parties. But to
give outright credence to the interpretation of the evidence as the CA did would be to ignore and disregard what
complainant Rowena Rodriguez had herself declared to be the true nature of the transactions with the petitioner.
6. Same; Same; The right to a commission only establishes the relation of principal and agent, with the agent
coming under the obligation to turn over to the principal the amount collected minus such commission. If the
agent should retain more than the commission, she would be guilty of estafa through misappropriation. Yet,
because the transaction between Rodriguez and the petitioner was a sale, the former effectively transferred to
the latter the possession and the ownership of the items of jewelry. Once the ownership of the jewelry became
vested in the latter, she could not misappropriate the items of jewelry.
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434
372. Gonzales vs. Marmaine Realty Corporation, 781 SCRA 63, January 13, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Lis Pendens ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Under Section 14, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled “after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or
that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.” In the same vein,
case law likewise instructs that a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled in situations where: (a) there
are exceptional circumstances imputable to the party who caused the annotation; (b) the litigation was
unduly prolonged to the prejudice of the other party because of several continuances procured by
petitioner; (c) the case which is the basis for the lis pendens notation was dismissed for non-prosequitur
on the part of the plaintiff; or (d) judgment was rendered against the party who caused such a notation.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is
that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this
doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies.
Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed. In view of this doctrine, jurisprudence instructs that before
a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a precondition that he avail himself of all
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court’s power of judicial
review can be sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly,
absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. However,
it must be clarified that the aforementioned doctrine is not absolute as it is subject to certain exceptions,
one of which is when the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the
courts of justice.
3. Same; Same; Lis Pendens; “Lis pendens,” which literally means pending suit, refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over a property involved in a suit, pending the
continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis
pendens is intended to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation
is terminated; and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation. Its notice
is an announcement to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning
that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the
result of the litigation over said property. The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (a)
to keep the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final
judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations; and (b) to bind a
purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court
will promulgate subsequently.
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435
373. Quisay vs. People, 781 SCRA 98, January 13, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Procedure ; Pleadings and Practice ; Information ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071,
which gave the City Prosecutor the power to “[i]nvestigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges
of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and filed against the
persons accused,” he may indeed delegate his power to his subordinates as he may deem necessary in
the interest of the prosecution service. The CA also correctly stressed that it is under the auspice of this
provision that the City Prosecutor of Makati issued OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32, which gave
division chiefs or review prosecutors “authority to approve or act on any resolution, order, issuance,
other action, and any information recommended by any prosecutor for approval,” without necessarily
diminishing the City Prosecutor’s authority to act directly in appropriate cases. By virtue of the
foregoing issuances, the City Prosecutor validly designated SACP Hirang, Deputy City Prosecutor
Emmanuel D. Medina, and Senior Assistant City Prosecutor William Celestino T. Uy as review
prosecutors for the OCP-Makati.
2. Criminal Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Information; Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information requires a prior written
authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed
before the courts, viz.: SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review.—If the
investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution
and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that
the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was
given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of
the complaint. Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of
offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on
the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties
of such action. No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor
without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied) Thus, as a
general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or
approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to
quashal pursuant to Section 3(d), Rule 117 of the same Rules.
3. Same; Same; Same; In this relation, People v. Garfin, 426 SCRA 393 (2004), firmly instructs that
the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same constitutes a
jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express
consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.
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436
374. Cebu People's Multi-Purpose Cooperative vs. Carbonilla, Jr., 782 SCRA 418, Jan. 27, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Loss of Trust and Confidence ;
1. Same; Same; Loss of Trust and Confidence; Carbonilla, Jr.’s dismissal was also justified on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence. According to jurisprudence, loss of trust and confidence will
validate an employee’s dismissal when it is shown that: (a) the employee concerned holds a position of
trust and confidence; and (b) he performs an act that would justify such loss of trust and confidence.
There are two (2) classes of positions of trust: first, managerial employees whose primary duty consists
of the management of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or a subdivision
thereof, and to other officers or members of the managerial staff; and second, fiduciary rank-and-file
employees, such as cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal exercise of their
functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. These employees, though rank-
and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or property, and are
thus classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence.
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may
be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion. Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the CA committed
reversible error in granting Carbonilla, Jr.’s certiorari petition since the NLRC did not gravely abuse
its discretion in ruling that he was validly dismissed from employment as CPMPC was able to prove,
through substantial evidence, the existence of just causes warranting the same.
4. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Basic is the rule that an employer may validly terminate
the services of an employee for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 296 (formerly Article
282) of the Labor Code, namely: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) Gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed
in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the
employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representatives; and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
5. Same; Same; Misconduct; Case law characterizes misconduct as a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. For misconduct to be considered as a just
cause for termination, the following requisites must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it
must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties showing that the employee has become unfit to
continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.
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437
375. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Santos, 782 SCRA 441, January 27, 2016
Syllabi Class :Expropriation Proceedings ;
1. Expropriation Proceedings; In expropriation cases, interest is imposed if there is delay in the
payment of just compensation to the landowner since the obligation is deemed to be an effective
forbearance on the part of the State. Such interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum on the unpaid balance of the just compensation, reckoned from the time of taking, or the
time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is
transferred to the Republic, or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until full payment.
To clarify, unlike the six percent (6%) annual incremental interest allowed under DAR AO No. 13,
Series of 1994, DAR AO No. 2, Series of 2004 and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2008, this twelve percent
(12%) annual interest is not granted on the computed just compensation; rather, it is a penalty imposed
for damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay in its payment.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; The Court has repeatedly held that the seizure of
landholdings or properties covered by PD 27 did not take place on October 21, 1972, but upon the
payment of just compensation. Thus, if the agrarian reform process is still incomplete, as in this case
where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under RA 6657.
3. Same; Same; Special Agrarian Courts; As summarized in LBP v. Sps. Banal, 434 SCRA 543 (2004),
the procedure for the determination of just compensation under RA 6657 commences with the LBP
determining the initial valuation of the lands under the land reform program. Using the LBP’s
valuation, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner. In case the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR
adjudicator conducts a summary administrative proceeding to determine the compensation for the land
by requiring the landowner, the LBP, and other interested parties to submit evidence on the just
compensation of the land. A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring
the matter to the RTC, designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final determination of just
compensation.
4. Grave Abuse of Discretion; Grave abuse of discretion connotes an arbitrary or despotic exercise of
power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious
exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or
to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse
of discretion, the abuse must be patent and gross.
5. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Res judicata means a matter adjudged,
a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. The doctrine of res
judicata provides that a final judgment, on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent
actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The elements of res judicata are (a)
identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two
(2) particulars is such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
6. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Regional Trial Courts; It bears stressing that the original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation is vested in the
RTC, hence, it cannot be unduly restricted in the exercise of its judicial function.
7. Same; Same; It is doctrinal that the concept of just compensation contemplates of just and timely
payment. It embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but
also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking, as otherwise, compensation
cannot be considered “just,” for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for years before actually receiving the amount necessary
to cope with his loss.
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438
376. Lopez vs. Limos, 782 SCRA 609, February 02, 2016
1. Same; Legal Ethics; The Court sustains the IBP’s recommendation ordering respondent to return the
amount of P75,000.00 she received from complainants as legal fees. It is well to note that “[w]hile the Court has
previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-
lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to
claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by
the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement.” Since respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of her legal fees, the Court, thus, finds the
return thereof to be in order, with legal interest as recommended by the IBP Investigating Commissioner.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter
with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes
inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable, as in this case.
3. Same; Same; Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on
a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure
to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client — as in this case — gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics.
4. Same; Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that, as
officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Indubitably, respondent fell short of such standard when she
committed the aforedescribed acts of deception against complainants. Such acts are not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; they reveal basic moral flaws that make him unfit to
practice law. To aggravate further respondent’s administrative liability, the Court notes that it repeatedly
required her to comment on complainants’ petition, but respondent ignored such commands. Similarly, when the
instant case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, respondent again
disregarded the directives of the Investigating Commissioner to attend the mandatory conference and to submit
a position paper. Such audacity on the part of respondent — which caused undue delay in the resolution of the
instant administrative case — contravenes Canon 11 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the CPR.
5. Same; Same; Undoubtedly, “[t]he Court’s patience has been tested to the limit by what in hindsight amounts
to a lawyer’s impudence and disrespectful bent. At the minimum, members of the legal fraternity owe courts of
justice respect, courtesy, and such other becoming conduct essential in the promotion of orderly, impartial, and
speedy justice.” What respondent has done was the exact opposite, and hence, she must be disciplined
accordingly.
6. Same; Penalties; Anent the proper penalty for respondent, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases
where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or
property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In
Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin, 709 SCRA 287 (2013), the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year
for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the
money given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz, 692 SCRA 348 (2013), the Court suspended the lawyer for
a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his legal services which he
never performed. Finally, in Agot v. Rivera, 732 SCRA 12 (2014), the Court suspended the lawyer for a period
of two (2) years for his: (a) failure to handle the legal matter entrusted to him and to return the legal fees in
connection thereto; and (b) misrepresentation that he was an immigration lawyer, when in truth, he was not. In
this case, not only did respondent fail to file a petition for adoption on behalf of complainants and to return the
money she received as legal fees, she likewise committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting that she had already
filed such petition when nothing was actually filed, resulting in undue prejudice to complainants. On top of these,
respondent showed impertinence not only to the IBP Investigating Commissioner, but to the Court as well, when
she ignored directives to comment on the complainants’ petition against her and to participate in the
investigation of the case. Under these circumstances, the Court imposes on respondent the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, as recommended by the IBP.
****
439
377. Laus vs. Optimum Security Services, Inc., 783 SCRA 257, February 03, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Parties ; Nonjoinder of Indispensable Parties ;
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Parties; Nonjoinder of Indispensable Parties; In Plasabas v. Court of
Appeals, 582 SCRA 686 (2009), it was held that “the nonjoinder of indispensable parties is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable.
Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff’s/petitioner’s
failure to comply therewith.” In this case, while the alleged real owners of the subject properties may
be considered as real parties-in-interest for the reason that their supposed rights over these properties
stand to be prejudiced, they are not indispensable parties to the instant suit. Despite its denomination
as an action for “damages” in the complaint’s caption, the action, as may be gleaned from the
pleading’s allegations, is really one for injunction as it ultimately seeks to permanently enjoin
respondent and the other defendants, from restricting petitioners’ access to the subject properties. The
crux of the main case, therefore, is whether or not respondent and said defendants were justified in
preventing petitioners from conducting the relocation survey on the subject properties. Damages are
also sought as ancillary relief for the acts complained of. These issues can be resolved independent of
the participation of the alleged real owners of the subject properties. Hence, they are not indispensable
parties, without whom no final determination can be had.
2. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; To be entitled to an injunctive writ,
the right to be protected and the violation against that right must be shown. A writ of preliminary
injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual existing right to be protected during the
pendency of the principal action. When the complainant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, he does
not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is not proper. Corollarily,
preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the possession and control of one
party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right is being disputed. After all, a writ of
preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo or the last actual, peaceable, and uncontested
situation which precedes a controversy.
3. Same; Same; Same; Preliminary injunction is not a proper remedy to take property out of the
possession and control of one party and to deliver the same to the other party where such right is being
disputed, as in this case. As earlier intimated, preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy.
Preliminary injunction should not create new relations between the parties, but must only maintain the
status quo until the merits of the case is fully heard. Hence, for these reasons, the RTC gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the WPI involved herein. Besides, as the CA further observed, the WPI issued
by the RTC no longer serves any purpose, considering that respondent already vacated the subject
properties since the Security Service Contract with Mr. Arceo had already expired. Time and again, the
Court has repeatedly held that when the act sought to be enjoined has become fait accompli, the prayer
for preliminary injunction should be denied. Indeed, when the events sought to be prevented by
injunction or prohibition had already happened, nothing more could be enjoined or prohibited. An
injunction will not issue to restrain the performance of an act already done.
****
440
378. Young vs. People, 783 SCRA 286, February 03, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 ;
1. Criminal Law; Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003; In this case, the assailed RTC Order was
a patent nullity for being rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. Significantly, the present case involves public interest as it imputes violations of RA 9208,
or the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003,” a crime so abhorrent and reprehensible that is
characterized by sexual violence and slavery. Accordingly, direct resort to a certiorari petition sans a
motion for reconsideration is clearly sanctioned in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Determination of probable cause is either
executive or judicial in nature. The first pertains to the duty of the public prosecutor during preliminary
investigation for the purpose of filing an information in court. At this juncture, the investigating
prosecutor evaluates if the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. On the other hand, judicial determination of
probable cause refers to the prerogative of the judge to ascertain if a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. At this stage, the judge makes a preliminary examination of the evidence submitted,
and on the strength thereof, and independent from the findings of the public prosecutor, determines the
necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
3. Same; Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; A judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause
only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause — that is
when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate
the existence of the elements of the crime charged. Applying the standard set forth in De Los Santos-
Dio v. Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 614 (2013), the evidence on record herein does not reveal the
unmistakable and clear-cut absence of probable cause against petitioners. Instead, a punctilious
examination thereof shows that the prosecution was able to establish a prima facie case against
petitioners for violation of Sections 4(a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6(a) and (c) of RA 9208. As it
appears from the records, petitioners recruited and hired the AAA Group and, consequently, maintained
them under their employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. In view of this, probable
cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest.
4. Same; Special Civil Actions; Motion for Reconsideration; Jurisprudence has carved out specific
exceptions allowing direct resort to a certiorari petition.-
—Anent the question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to the filing of a
certiorari petition, the Court finds the OSG’s argument well-taken. In this regard, jurisprudence has
carved out specific exceptions allowing direct resort to a certiorari petition, such as: (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same
as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of
the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte, or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved.
****
441
379. Security Bank Savings Corp vs. Singson, 784 SCRA 30, February 10, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Length of Service ;
1. Same; Same; Length of Service; Notably, respondent’s long years of service and clean employment
record will not justify the award of separation pay in view of the gravity of the foregoing infractions.
Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the employer. As ruled in
Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC, 528 SCRA 146 (2007): Although long years
of service might generally be considered for the award of separation benefits or some form of financial
assistance to mitigate the effects of termination, this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity
under the Labor Code nor under our prior decisions. The fact that private respondent served petitioner
for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal, in our view of this case, does
not call for such award of benefits, since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse,
betrayal of the company. If an employee’s length of service is to be regarded as a justification for
moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty, distorting
the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Separation Pay; As an exception, case law instructs that
in certain circumstances, the grant of separation pay or financial assistance to a legally dismissed
employee has been allowed as a measure of social justice or on grounds of equity.-
—Separation pay is warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee’s
fault, such as those provided in Articles 298 and 299 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of illegal
dismissal where reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand, an employee dismissed for any
of the just causes enumerated under Article 297 of the same Code, being causes attributable to the
employee’s fault, is not, as a general rule, entitled to separation pay. The non-grant of such right to
separation pay is premised on the reason that an erring employee should not benefit from their wrongful
acts. Under Section 7, Rule I, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, such
dismissed employee is nonetheless entitled to whatever rights, benefits, and privileges he may have
under the applicable individual or collective agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy
or practice. As an exception, case law instructs that in certain circumstances, the grant of separation
pay or financial assistance to a legally dismissed employee has been allowed as a measure of social
justice or on grounds of equity. In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC (PLDT), 164 SCRA
671 (1988), the Court laid down the parameters in awarding separation pay to dismissed employees
based on social justice.
3. Same; Same; Same; In the PLDT case, the Court required that the grant of separation pay as
financial assistance given in light of social justice be allowed only when the dismissal: (a) was not for
serious misconduct; and (b) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee or would involve
moral turpitude. However, in the later case of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers
Association v. NLRC (Toyota), 537 SCRA 171 (2007), the Court further excluded from the grant of
separation pay based on social justice the other instances listed under Article 282 (now 296) of the
Labor Code, namely, willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duty, fraud or willful breach
of trust, and commission of a crime against the employer or his family. But with respect to analogous
cases for termination like inefficiency, drug use, and others, the social justice exception could be made
to apply depending on certain considerations, such as the lengths of service of the employee, the amount
involved, whether the act is the first offense, the performance of the employee, and the like.
4. Same; Same; Same; The grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is primarily determined
by the cause of the dismissal. In the case at bar, respondent’s established act of repeatedly allowing
Branch Manager Pinero to bring the checkbooks and bank forms outside of the bank’s premises in
violation of the company’s rules and regulations had already been declared by the LA to be gross and
habitual neglect of duty under Article 282 of the Labor Code, which finding was not contested on appeal
by respondent. It was petitioners who interposed an appeal solely with respect to the award of
separation pay as financial assistance. As they aptly pointed out, the infractions, while not clearly
indicative of any wrongful intent, is, nonetheless, serious in nature when one considers the employee’s
functions, rendering it inequitable to award separation pay based on social justice. As the records show,
respondent was the custodian of accountable bank forms in his assigned branch and as such, was
mandated to strictly comply with the monitoring procedure and disposition thereof as a security
measure to avoid the attendant high risk to the bank. Indeed, it is true that the failure to observe the
442
processes and risk preventive measures and worse, to take action and address its violation, may subject
the bank to regulatory sanction. It bears stressing that the banking industry is imbued with public
interest. Banks are required to possess not only ordinary diligence in the conduct of its business but
extraordinary diligence in the care of its accounts and the interests of its stakeholders. The banking
business is highly sensitive with a fiduciary duty towards its client and the public in general, such that
central measures must be strictly observed. It is undisputed that respondent failed to perform his duties
diligently, and therefore, not only violated established company policy but also put the bank’s
credibility and business at risk. The excuse that his Branch Manager, Pinero, merely prompted him
towards such ineptitude is of no moment. He readily admitted that he violated established company
policy against bringing out checkbooks and bank forms, which means that he was well aware of the fact
that the same was prohibited. Nevertheless, he still chose to, regardless of his superior’s influence,
disobey the same not only once, but on numerous occasions. All throughout, there is no showing that
he questioned the acts of Branch Manager Pinero; neither did he take it upon himself to report said
irregularities to a higher authority. Hence, under these circumstances, the award of separation pay
based on social justice would be improper.
****
443
380. Lee vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, 784 SCRA 342, February 17, 2016
1. Same; Same; Same; That the RTC retained jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal is beyond cavil, as
provided under Section 9, Rule 41 above quoted. As a result of respondent’s failure to perfect an appeal
within the period fixed by law, no court could exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the RTC decision.
To reiterate, perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and noncompliance with such requirements is considered fatal and has the effect of
rendering the judgment final and executory. It bears to stress that the right to appeal is a statutory right
and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Docket Fees; In Gipa v. Southern Luzon Institute, 726
SCRA 559 (2014), citing Gonzales v. Pe, 655 SCRA 176 (2011), the Court clarified the requirement of
full payment of docket and other lawful fees under the above quoted rule in this wise: [T]he procedural
requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment of the docket and other
legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It bears stressing that an
appeal is not a right, but a mere statutory privilege. An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order
of the RTC to the CA must be made within 15 days from notice. And within this period, the full amount
of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from. The requirement of paying the full amount of the appellate
docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of
docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such
payment, the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory. Further,
under Section 1(c), Rule 50, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the ground of the nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary
period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41. The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an
indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In both original and appellate cases, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees.
****
444
381. PCGG vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 785 SCRA 55, February 24, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Preliminary Investigation ;
1. Same; Same; Same; That the PCGG failed to make or submit an independent valuation of the
properties in order to support its stance that the loans were undercollateralized is of no moment.
Included in the records of this case is the Executive Summary of the TWG, citing as evidence numerous
documents from PNB showing, on its face, that the loans granted to HMOI by PNB were under
collateralized. Hence, the lack of independent valuation alone is not sufficient to dismiss the case for
insufficiency of evidence to establish mere probable cause. To be sure, preliminary investigation is not
the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence. It is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-founded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof. The validity and merits of a party’s accusation or defense, as well
as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during the trial proper.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify judicial
intervention, the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
3. Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 requires
that there be injury caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties
who conspire with public officers. Its elements are: (1) that the accused are public officers or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that said public officers commit the prohibited acts during
the performance of their official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused
undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) that such injury is caused by
giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officers
have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
4. Same; Same; Section 3(g) of RA 3019 does not require the giving of unwarranted benefits,
advantages or preferences to private parties who conspire with public officers, its core element being
the engagement in a transaction or contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. The elements of the offense are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered
into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
5. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Ombudsman; It bears stressing
that the duty of the Ombudsman in the conduct of a preliminary investigation is to establish whether
there exists probable cause to file an information in court against the accused. A finding of probable
cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, the accused committed the
crime. Taking into account the quantum of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, the
Court finds that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint
for lack of probable cause.
****
445
382. Luriz vs. Republic, 785 SCRA 142, February 24, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Land Titles and Deeds ; Reconstitution of Titles ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Notably, these findings should not be taken as an adjudication on the ownership of the
subject lands. As priorly intimated, they are but determinations of whether or not the certificate of title sought to
be reconstituted is authentic, genuine, and in force and effect at the time it was lost or destroyed, which, based
on case law, are central to resolving petitions for reconstitution of title. Clearly, a reconstitution of title
proceeding involves only the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition. In this light, the court does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed
certificate, as the said matter should be threshed out in a separate proceeding for the purpose.
2. Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; The reconstitution of a certificate of title
denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a
person to a piece of land. It partakes of a land registration proceeding. Thus, it must be granted only upon clear
proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed issued to the petitioner or his predecessor-in-interest, and
such title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed. In the present case, the reconstitution petition is
anchored on a purported owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 1297 — a source for reconstitution of title under
Section 3(a) of Republic Act (RA) No. 26. Based on the provisions of the said law, the following must be present
for an order of reconstitution to issue: (a) the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) the documents
presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of
title; (c) the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) the certificate of title
was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) the description, area, and boundaries of the property
are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Particularly, when the
reconstitution is based on an extant owner’s duplicate TCT, the main concern is the authenticity and genuineness
of the certificate. Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Luriz was not able to prove that TCT No.
1297 sought to be reconstituted was authentic, genuine, and in force at the time it was lost and destroyed.
3. Remedial Law; Evidence; Vesting Order No. P-89; Official Records; Being an official record of a
duty especially enjoined by laws in force in the Philippines at the time it was issued, Vesting Order No. P-89 is,
therefore, prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Vesting Order No. P-89 dated April 9, 1947 stated
that, after proper investigation, the Philippine Alien Property Administration had found that the properties
particularly described in Exhibit A, i.e., the Transcript of TCT No. 1297; B[oo]k T-9 P[age] 47, were owned or
controlled by “nationals of a designated enemy country (Japan).”
4. Same; Same; Same; The legal effect of a vesting order was to effectuate immediately the transfer of title to
the US by operation of law, without any necessity for any court action, and as completely as if by conveyance,
transfer, or assignment, thereby completely divesting the former owner of every right with respect to the vested
property. It is worthy to note that under Section 39(a) of the Trading with the Enemy Act, properties of Japanese
nationals vested after December 17, 1941 shall not be returned to their owners, and the US shall not pay
compensation therefor. Instead, the vested properties were to be conveyed to the Republic as part of its overall
plan of rehabilitation. Nonetheless, to safeguard the rights of citizens and friendly aliens — i.e., persons who are
not enemies or allies of enemies — claiming any interest, right, or title to the vested properties, the Trading with
the Enemy Act, both in its original and amendatory provisions, permits the filing of suits for the recovery of any
property vested or seized on or after December 18, 1941, until April 30, 1949 or after the expiration of two (2)
years from the date of vesting, whichever is later.
5. Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; It is clear that after the execution of Vesting
Order No. P-89 on April 9, 1947, the registered owner, Yoichiro Urakami, was divested of any title or interest
in the vested properties registered in his name under TCT No. 1297, which was thereby rendered of no force and
effect at the time it was lost or destroyed, i.e., on June 1988 and, thus, cannot be reconstituted. In addition, the
records are bereft of showing that any citizen or friendly alien made any claim to the vested properties under
Vesting Order No. P-89 within the prescriptive period ending April 30, 1949. Accordingly, the vested properties
were transferred by the Attorney General of the US to the Republic under Transfer Agreement dated May 7,
1953, and thereafter became the subject of two (2) Presidential Proclamations, namely: (a) Proclamation No.
438 issued by then President Elpidio R. Quirino on December 23, 1953, reserving them for dormitory, site
purposes of the North General Hospital; and (b) Proclamation No. 732 issued by then President Carlos P. Garcia
on February 28, 1961, reserving them, instead, for dormitory site purposes of the National Orthopedic Hospital,
now POC, which is presently in possession thereof.
****
446
383. Republic vs. Romero II, 785 SCRA 164, February 24, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Family Law ; Marriages ; Annulment of Marriage ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The Court can only commiserate with the parties’ plight as their marriage may
have failed. It must be reiterated, however, that the remedy is not always to have it declared void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code must not be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves;
rather, it must be limited to cases where there is a downright incapacity or inability to assume and
fulfill the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. Thus, absent sufficient evidence to prove psychological incapacity within the
context of Article 36 of the Family Code, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the
marital tie.
2. Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity; The policy
of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution,
and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally
inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Thus, it has consistently been held
that psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It must be a malady that is
so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Verily, all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated
traits associated with certain personality disorders and there is hardly any doubt that the intention of
the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases. Thus, to
warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds that
the foregoing requirements do not concur. As aptly pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis’ testimony
shows that he was able to comply with his marital obligations which, therefore, negates the existence
of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived
together as husband and wife under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both of them contributed in
purchasing their own house in Parañaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take care
of his family, as he categorically stated that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to
them. That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean
that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code.
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Indeed, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of
psychological evaluation reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the
principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the
indissolubility of the marital tie. After all, marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State.
Accordingly, it cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the pieces of evidence
presented are grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
condition of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential
marital duties.
****
447
384. Miano vs. Aguilar, 785 SCRA 338, March 02, 2016
Syllabi Class :Judges ; Motion for Extension of Time ;
1. Same; Same; The rules and jurisprudence are clear on the matter of delay. Failure to decide cases and
other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. Judges must decide cases and resolve matters with
dispatch because any delay in the administration of justice deprives litigants of their right to a speedy
disposition of their case and undermines the people’s faith in the judiciary. Indeed, justice delayed is justice
denied. In light of all the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent is administratively liable for Undue
Delay in Issuing Orders in Several Cases and Undue Delay in Transmitting the Records of a Case, which
are classified as less serious charges under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court that merit the penalty
of (a) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three
(3) months; or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. Considering the
circumstances of this case and the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been held
administratively liable, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the penalty of suspension for a period of
three (3) months against respondent.
2. Judges; Judicial Ethics; To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the
legal system, judges should be embodiments of competence, integrity and independence. Judges are also
expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules and to apply
them properly in all good faith. They are likewise expected to demonstrate mastery of the principles of law,
keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence, and discharge their duties in accordance therewith.
3. Same; Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; The Court has ruled that when a judge displays an utter
lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is
gross ignorance of the law. However, gross ignorance of the law is more than an erroneous application of
legal provisions. Not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders
him liable, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice. To
constitute gross ignorance of the law and for administrative liability to attach, it is not enough that the
decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption
or had committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.
4. Bad Faith; Respondent had already clarified that she issued the said Order merely to inform the OCA
of her inhibition from the subject case, and while it is true that there was no necessity therefor, respondent’s
act in itself is not indicative of bad faith. Moreover, she explained that she had instructed her Branch Clerk
to transmit the records of the Migano case to the pairing judge in RTC-Alaminos City, only to discover later
on that the transmittal letter was not properly attached to the records, resulting in the delay in its transmittal.
Hence, while it may be inferred under the circumstances that respondent was careless and did not exercise
diligence in ensuring that the records of the Migano case were immediately transmitted to the pairing judge
of RTC-Alaminos City for proper disposition, records are bereft of evidence to show that the resulting delay
was deliberately or maliciously caused as to amount to bad faith. Instead, what is evident in this case is that
the delay was caused by inadvertence and negligence. As such, while it may be considered an unfortunate
error on respondent’s part to hold in abeyance the proceedings in the Migano case and to fail to promptly
transmit the records thereof to the pairing judge in RTC-Alaminos City, such error does not appear to have
been tainted with or impelled by bad faith. Bad faith cannot be presumed and the Court cannot conclude
that bad faith attended respondent’s acts when none has been shown in this case. Consequently, respondent
need not be subjected to administrative sanction in this respect.
5. Judges; Motion for Extension of Time; With regard, however, to the delay in the resolution of pending
motions for inhibition within the prescribed period, records are bereft of evidence to show that respondent
filed any request for an extension of time within which to resolve them, which the Court could have granted.
As such, even if the Court were to accept her excuse that her combined caseload in RTC-Alaminos City, as
well as in RTC-Burgos, the courts where she was concurrently presiding, was indeed heavy, she could have
requested an extension of time within which to decide and dispose of pending cases and justified the same.
The Court is not unmindful of the circumstances that may delay the speedy disposition of cases assigned to
judges, thus, the Court allows extensions of time within which pending cases may be disposed of, upon a
seasonable filing of a request therefor and sufficient justification. For failing to do so, respondent cannot
evade administrative liability.
****
448
385. Espiritu vs. Sazon, 785 SCRA 454, March 02, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Provisional Remedies ; Preliminary Injunction ;
1. Same; Same; Same; It is apropos to reiterate the settled rule that injunctive reliefs are not granted
for the purpose of taking the property, the legal title to which is in dispute, out of the possession of one
person and putting it into the hands of another before the right of ownership is determined. The reason
for this doctrine is that before the issue of ownership is determined in light of the evidence presented,
justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in their status quo so that no advantage may
be given to one to the prejudice of the other.
2. Remedial Law; Provisional Remedies; Preliminary Injunction; Words and Phrases; A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. Its
essential role is preservative of the rights of the parties in order to protect the ability of the court to
render a meaningful decision, or in order to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper
or prevent the granting of the proper relief after the trial on the merits. In a sense, it is a regulatory
process meant to prevent a case from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.
3. Same; Same; Same; In the present case, the CA found that the RTC correctly appreciated the
evidence presented during the hearing on the application for writ of preliminary injunction. At this
point, it bears to stress that a writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or
incomplete evidence as the plaintiff is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final
relief prayed for in his complaint. As such, the evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to
give the trial court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on the
merits of the case. Significantly, the rule is well-entrenched that the grant or denial of a writ of
preliminary injunction is discretionary upon the trial court because the assessment and evaluation of
evidence towards that end involve findings of fact left to the said court for its conclusive determination.
For this reason, the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be disturbed unless it
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, which does not
obtain in this case. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary injunction issued in the instant case must be
upheld, and the status quo — or the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the
actual controversy, which is existing at the time of the filing of the case — must be preserved until the
merits of the case can be heard fully.
****
449
386. Bigler vs. People, 785 SCRA 479, March 02, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Penalties ;
1. Criminal Law; Penalties; In a catena of similar cases where the accused failed to perfect their appeal
on their respective judgments of conviction, the Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding
the finality of the decisions because they were outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is
thus, no reason to deprive herein petitioner of the relief afforded the accused in the aforesaid similar
cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess
of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant
was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; It must be stressed that a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court covers only questions of law. Questions of fact are not reviewable, absent any
of the exceptions recognized by case law. This rule is rooted on the doctrine that findings of fact made
by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear
disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case, those findings should
not be ignored. Hence, absent any clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness committed
by the lower court, its findings of facts, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding
and conclusive upon this Court, as in this case.
3. Same; Same; Judgments; Immutability of Final Judgments; Under the doctrine of finality of
judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the
Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power
and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice considering: (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c)
the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous
and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
****
450
387. People vs. Comboy, 785 SCRA 512, March 02, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Rape ;
1. Same; Rape; In this regard, it has been long settled that “a young girl would not concoct a sordid
tale of a crime as serious as rape at the hands of her very own father, allow the examination of her
private part, and subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were
other than a fervent desire to seek justice. Hence, there is no plausible reason why AAA would testify
against her own father, imputing to him the grave crime of rape, if this crime did not happen,” as in
this case.
3. Criminal Law; Rape; Elements of.-The elements of Rape under Article 266-A(1)(a) are: (a) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) said carnal knowledge was accomplished through
force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of Rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her
will. On the other hand, Statutory Rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) is committed by having sexual
intercourse with a woman below twelve (12) years of age regardless of her consent, or lack of it, to the
sexual act. Proof of force, threat, or intimidation, or consent of the offended party is unnecessary as
these are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively
presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve (12). The law presumes that the offended party
does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, to
sustain a conviction for statutory rape, the prosecution must establish the following: (a) the age of the
complainant; (b) the identity of the accused; and (c) the sexual intercourse between the accused and
the complainant. The foregoing acts of Rape shall be qualified pursuant to Article 266-B(1) of the RPC
if: (a) the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age; and (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim.
4. Same; Denials; Alibi; In the case at bar, the Court agrees with the finding of the courts a quo that
the prosecution was able to prove that Comboy: (a) had carnal knowledge of her without her consent
on two (2) separate occasions, the first occurring sometime in 2006 and the second in February 2008;
and (b) attempted to have carnal knowledge of her on May 17, 2009, but was stopped by a reason other
than his own desistance, i.e., BBB’s intervention. Suffice it to say that Comboy’s flimsy defense of denial
and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of AAA identifying him as the
perpetrator of the crimes.
****
451
388. Mejorado vs. Abad, 787 SCRA 249, March 09, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Mandamus ;
1. Same; Same; Same; It bears reiteration that the writ of mandamus may only issue if the party
claiming it has a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing demanded, and that it was the
imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required to accord the same upon him. Petitioner’s
prayer for the issuance of the NCA to cover the amount of his second claim falls short of this standard,
there being no clear and specific duty on the part of the respondent to issue the same.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel
the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to
which a substantial doubt exists. In Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc. v. Puerto
Princesa City, 722 SCRA 66 (2014), a case cited at length by petitioner himself, the Court elucidated
on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
****
452
389. Equitable Savings Bank (“BDO Unibank, Inc.”) vs. Palces, 787 SCRA 260, March 09, 2016
1. Attorney’s Fees; Anent the issue of attorney’s fees, it is settled that attorney’s fees “cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.
Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
rights, still, attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be
reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of
his cause.” In this case, suffice it to say that the CA correctly ruled that the award of attorney’s fees
and costs of suit should be deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
2. Civil Law; Sales; Sale on Installments; Article 1484 of the Civil Code, which governs the sale of
personal properties in installments, states in full: Article 1484. In a contract of sale of personal property
the price of which is payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any of the following remedies:
(1) Exact fulfilment of the obligation, should the vendee fail to pay; (2) Cancel the sale, should the
vendee’s failure to pay cover two or more installments; (3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing
sold, if one has been constituted, should the vendee’s failure to pay cover two or more installments. In
this case, he shall have no further action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the
price. Any agreement to the contrary shall be void.
3. Same; Same; In this case, there was no vendor-vendee relationship between respondent and
petitioner. A judicious perusal of the records would reveal that respondent never bought the subject
vehicle from petitioner but from a third party, and merely sought financing from petitioner for its full
purchase price. In order to document the loan transaction between petitioner and respondent, a
Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage dated August 18, 2005 was executed wherein, inter alia,
respondent acknowledged her indebtedness to petitioner in the amount of P1,196,100.00 and placed
the subject vehicle as a security for the loan. Indubitably, a loan contract with the accessory chattel
mortgage contract — and not a contract of sale of personal property in installments — was entered into
by the parties with respondent standing as the debtor-mortgagor and petitioner as the creditor-
mortgagee. Therefore, the conclusion of the CA that Article 1484 finds application in this case is
misplaced, and thus, must be set aside.
4. Same; Same; Chattel Mortgage; There is nothing in the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage
that bars petitioner from receiving any late partial payments from respondent. If at all, petitioner’s
acceptance of respondent’s late partial payments in the aggregate amount of P103,000.00 will only
operate to reduce her outstanding obligation to petitioner from P664,500.00 to P561,500.00. Such a
reduction in respondent’s outstanding obligation should be accounted for when petitioner conducts the
impending foreclosure sale of the subject vehicle. Once such foreclosure sale has been made, the
proceeds thereof should be applied to the reduced amount of respondent’s outstanding obligation, and
the excess of said proceeds, if any, should be returned to her. In sum, the CA erred in ordering petitioner
to return the amount of P103,000.00 to respondent. In view of petitioner’s prayer for and subsequent
possession of the subject vehicle in preparation for its foreclosure, it is only proper that petitioner be
ordered to commence foreclosure proceedings, if none yet has been conducted/concluded, over the
vehicle in accordance with the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law, i.e., within thirty (30) days from
the finality of this Decision.
****
453
390. Reyes vs. Ombudsman, 787 SCRA 354, March 15, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Preliminary Investigation ;
1. Same; Same; Same; A trial court’s finding of probable cause does not rely on the prosecutor’s
finding of probable cause. Once the trial court finds the existence of probable cause, which results in
the issuance of a warrant of arrest, any question on the prosecutor’s conduct of preliminary
investigation has already become moot.
2. Ombudsman; Doctrine of Non-Interference; At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has
consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence
of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, this Court
is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
3. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; In assessing if the Ombudsman had
committed grave abuse of discretion, attention must be drawn to the context of its ruling — that, is:
preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be
held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, “a finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.” In Fenequito
v. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113 (2012), “[p]robable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean
‘actual or positive cause’ nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry x x x whether there is sufficient evidence
to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged.”
4. Same; Same; Same; In determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a
finding of probable cause, “only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the [accused] are
required, not absolute certainty.” In this case, petitioners were charged with the crimes of Plunder and
violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
5. Criminal Law; Plunder; Elements of.-
—Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following elements:
(a) that the offender is a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts described in Section 1(d) thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
wealth is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). On the other hand, the elements of violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers);
(b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his
action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. Owing to the nature
of a preliminary investigation and its purpose, all of the foregoing elements need not be definitively
established for it is enough that their presence becomes reasonably apparent. This is because probable
cause — the determinative matter in a preliminary investigation — implies mere probability of guilt;
thus, a finding based on more than bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction
would suffice.
6. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; It should be pointed out that a
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution’s
evidence, and that the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is
a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. Therefore, “the
validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and
evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.”
454
7. Same; Same; Probable Cause; Owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the
“technical rules of evidence should not be applied” in the course of its proceedings, keeping in mind
that “the determination of probable cause does not depend on the validity or merits of a party’s
accusation or defense or on the admissibilitv or veracity of testimonies presented.” Thus, in Estrada v.
Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court declared that since a preliminary investigation does not
finally adjudicate the rights and obligations of parties, “probable cause can be established with hearsay
evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.”
8. Same; Same; State Witnesses; The Court rejects Reyes’s theory that the whistleblowers and Tuason
are the “most guilty” in the perpetuation of the PDAF scam and, thus, rebuffs her claim that the
Ombudsman violated Section 17, Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure by granting
immunity to them. To begin with, “[t]he authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function.
Indeed, Congress has vested such power in the Ombudsman[,] as well as in the Secretary of Justice.
Besides, the decision to employ an accused as a state witness must necessarily originate from the public
prosecutors whose mission is to obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused before the courts.
The latter do not, as a rule[,] have a vision of the true strength of the prosecution’s evidence until after
the trial is over. Consequently, courts should generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution and
deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be used as a witness only in clear cases of failure to
meet the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 [of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure].”
9. Forgery; Anent Reyes’s claim that her signatures in the documentary evidence presented were false,
falsified, and fictitious, it must be emphasized that “[a]s a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must
be proved by clear, positive[,] and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party
alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself
reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison
between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose
signature is theorized upon to have been forged.” Here, Reyes has yet to overcome the burden to present
clear and convincing evidence to prove her claim of forgery, especially in light of the following
considerations pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment on the petition in G.R.
Nos. 212593-94: (a) in a letter dated March 21, 2012 addressed to the COA, Senator Enrile himself
admitted that his signatures, as well as those of Reyes, found on the documents covered by the COA’s
Special Audit Report are authentic; and (b) Rogelio Azores, the supposed document examiner who now
works as a freelance consultant, aside from only analyzing photocopies of the aforesaid documents and
not the originals thereof, did not categorically state that Reyes’s signatures on the endorsement letters
were forged. As there is no clear showing of forgery, at least at this stage of the proceedings, the Court
cannot subscribe to Reyes’s contrary submission. Notably, however, she retains the right to raise and
substantiate the same defense during trial proper.
10. Criminal Law; Plunder; Based on the evidence in support thereof, the Supreme Court (SC) is
convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of plunder.-
—Anent Janet Napoles’s complicity in the above mentioned crimes, records similarly show that she, in
all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the calculated misuse of Senator Enrile’s PDAF.
As exhibited in the modus operandi discussed earlier, once Janet Napoles was informed of the
availability of a PDAF allocation, either she or Luy, as the “lead employee” of the JLN Corporation,
would prepare a listing of the available projects specifically indicating the IAs. After said listing is
released by the Office of Senator Enrile to the DBM, Janet Napoles would give a down payment from
her own pockets for delivery to Senator Enrile through Reyes, with the remainder of the amount given
to the Senator after the SARO and/or NCA is released. Senator Enrile would then indorse Janet
Napoles’s NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded projects, which were “ghost projects” that allowed
Janet Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the PDAF allocation. Based on the evidence in support thereof,
the Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder
as it has prima facie been established that: (a) she, in conspiracy with Senator Enrile, Reyes, and other
personalities, was significantly involved in the aforedescribed modus operandi to obtain Senator
Enrile’s PDAF, who supposedly abused his authority as a public officer in order to do so; (b) through
this modus operandi, it appears that Senator Enrile repeatedly received ill-gotten wealth in the form of
“kickbacks” in the years 2004-2010; and (c) the total value of “kickbacks’’ given to Senator Enrile
amounted to at least P172,834,500.00.
455
11. Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; There is probable cause against Janet Napoles for
violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019.-
—In the same manner, there is probable cause against Janet Napoles for violations of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, as it is ostensible that: (a) she conspired with public officials, i.e., Senator Enrile and his
chief-of-staff, Reyes, who exercised official functions whenever they would enter into transactions
involving illegal disbursements of the PDAF; (b) Senator Enrile, among others, has shown manifest
partiality and evident bad faith by repeatedly indorsing the JLN-controlled NGOs as beneficiaries of
his PDAF-funded projects — even without the benefit of a public bidding and/or negotiated
procurement, in direct violation of existing laws, rules, and regulations on government procurement;
and (c) the “ghost” PDAF-funded projects caused undue prejudice to the government in the amount of
P345,000,000.00.
12. Same; Same; Plunder; Conspiracy; At this juncture, the Court must disabuse Janet Napoles of her
mistaken notion that as a private individual, she cannot be held answerable for the crimes of Plunder
and violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public officers.
While the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be
held liable for the same if they are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same.
This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
In this case, given that the evidence gathered perceptibly shows Janet Napoles’s engagement in the
illegal hemorrhaging of Senator Enrile’s PDAF, the Ombudsman rightfully charged her, with Enrile
and Reyes, as a coconspirator for the aforestated crimes.
13. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; The fundamental test in determining the
sufficiency of the averments in a complaint or information is, whether the facts alleged therein, if
hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.-
—There is no merit in Janet Napoles’s assertion that the complaints are insufficient in form and in
substance for the reason that it lacked certain particularities such as the time, place, and manner of the
commission of the crimes charged. “According to Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the complaint or information is sufficient if it states the names of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense was committed. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the
averments in a complaint or information is, therefore, whether the facts alleged therein, if hypothetically
admitted, constitute the elements of the offense.” In this case, the NBI and the FIO Complaints stated
that: (a) Senator Enrile, Reyes, and Janet Napoles, among others, are the ones responsible for the
PDAF scam; (b) Janet Napoles, et al. are being accused of Plunder and violations of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019; (c) they used a certain modus operandi to perpetuate said scam, details of which were stated
therein; (d) because of the PDAF scam, the Philippine government was prejudiced and defrauded in
the approximate amount of P345,000,000.00; and (e) the PDAF scam happened sometime between the
years 2004 and 2010, specifically in Taguig City, Pasig City, Quezon City, and Pasay City. The
aforesaid allegations were essentially reproduced in the sixteen (16) Informations — one (1) for
Plunder and fifteen (15) for violation of RA 3019 — filed before the Sandiganbayan. Evidently, these
factual assertions already square with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure as above cited. Upon such averments, there is no gainsaying that Janet Napoles has been
completely informed of the accusations against her to enable her to prepare for an intelligent defense.
The NBI and the FIO Complaints are, therefore, sufficient in form and in substance.
14. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; It is a fundamental legal axiom that “[w]hen there is conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all.”-
—As regards the finding of probable cause against the Napoles siblings and De Asis, it must be first
highlighted that they are placed in the same situation as Janet Napoles in that they are being charged
with crime/s principally performed by public officers (specifically, of Plunder and/or multiple violations
of Section 3[e] of RA 3019) despite their standing as private individuals on account of their alleged
conspiracy with public officers, Senator Enrile and Reyes. It is a fundamental legal axiom that “[w]hen
there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.” Thus, the reasonable likelihood that conspiracy
exists between them denotes the probable existence of the elements of the crimes above discussed
equally as to them. “Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the accused
456
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interests.”
15. Remedial Law; Evidence; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule; The res inter alios acta rule under Section
28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be
rigidly applied in the course of preliminary investigation proceedings; Ultimately, as case law edifies,
“[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over
the conduct of a preliminary investigation.”-
—Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based on their
invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, which
states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another,
unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule. To be
sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly applied in
the course of preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the
Ombudsman’s appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under
technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation “as long as there is substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay.” This is because “such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.” Applying the same logic, and with the similar
observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein,
the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should
falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, “[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal
who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation,” as in this case.
16. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that there are equally well-grounded
bases to believe that, in all possibility, De Asis, thru his participation as President of Kaupdanan Para
sa Mangunguma Foundation, Inc. (KPMFI) and member/incorporator of Countrywide Agri and Rural
Economic Development Foundation, Inc. (CARED), as well as his acts of receiving checks in the name
of said Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), depositing them in the NGOs’ bank accounts,
delivering money to Janet Napoles, and assisting in the delivery of “kickbacks” and “commissions” of
the legislators, conspired with the other petitioners to commit the crimes charged against them.-
—In the same vein, the evidence on record exhibits probable cause for De Asis’s involvement as a
coconspirator for the crime of Plunder, as well as violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. A perusal
thereof readily reveals that De Asis is the President of KPMFI and a member/incorporator of CARED
— two (2) among the many JLN-controlled NGOs that were used in the perpetuation of the scam
particularly involved in the illegal disbursement of Senator Enrile’s PDAF. Moreover, in the
Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay of whistleblowers Luy and Suñas, as well as their respective
Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay they tagged De Asis as one of those who prepared money to be
given to the lawmaker; that he, among others, received the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and
deposited the same in the bank; and that, after the money is withdrawn from the bank, De Asis was also
one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles’s house. With these, the Court finds that there
are equally well-grounded bases to believe that, in all possibility, De Asis, thru his participation as
President of KPMFI and member/incorporator of CARED, as well as his acts of receiving checks in the
name of said NGOs, depositing them in the NGOs’ bank accounts, delivering money to Janet Napoles,
and assisting in the delivery of “kickbacks” and “commissions” of the legislators, conspired with the
other petitioners to commit the crimes charged against them.
17. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; A preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution’s evidence; and the presence
or absence of the elements of the crime charged is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that
may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits.-
—Certainly, De Asis’s defenses, which are anchored on the want of criminal intent, as well as the
absence of all the elements of the crime of Plunder on his part, are better ventilated during trial and
not during preliminary investigation. At the risk of belaboring the point, a preliminary investigation is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the prosecution’s evidence; and the presence or
absence of the elements of the crime charged is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that
may be passed upon only after a full-blown trial on the merits. Hence, for De Asis’s apparent
participation in the PDAF scam, the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding
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probable cause against him for one (1) count of Plunder and fifteen (15) counts of violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 as charged.
18. Same; Same; Probable Cause; Once the public prosecutor (or the Ombudsman) determines
probable cause and thus, elevates the case to the trial court (or the Sandiganbayan), a judicial
determination of probable cause is made in order to determine if a warrant of arrest should be issued
ordering the detention of the accused. The Court, in People v. Castillo, 590 SCRA 95 (2009), delineated
the functions and purposes of a determination of probable cause made by the public prosecutor, on the
one hand, and the trial court, on the other: There are two kinds of determination of probable case:
executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official
has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court.
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or
not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that
the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The judicial determination of
probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest
should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of
justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.
19. Same; Same; Same; The option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not
mandatory and reiterated that the court’s first option x x x is for it to immediately dismiss the case if
the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.-
—The Court in Mendoza v. People, 722 SCRA 647 (2014), clarified that the trial court (or the
Sandiganbayan) is given three (3) distinct options upon the filing of a criminal information before it,
namely to: (a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (b)
issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. The Court went on to elaborate that
“the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory” and reiterated
that “the court’s first option x x x is for it to ‘immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause.’” Verily, when a criminal Information is filed before the trial
court, the judge, motu proprio or upon motion of the accused, is entitled to make his own assessment of
the evidence on record to determine whether there is probable cause to order the arrest of the accused
and proceed with the trial; or in the absence thereof, to order the immediate dismissal of the criminal
case. This is in line with the fundamental doctrine that “once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the
accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court.” Nevertheless, the Court, in Mendoza cautions the
trial courts in proceeding with dismissals of this nature: Although jurisprudence and procedural rules
allow it, a judge must always proceed with caution in dismissing cases due to lack of probable cause,
considering the preliminary nature of the evidence before it. It is only when he or she finds that the
evidence on hand absolutely fails to support a finding of probable cause that he or she can dismiss the
case. On the other hand, if a judge finds probable cause, he or she must not hesitate to proceed with
arraignment and trial in order that justice may be served.
20. Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Unlike an appeal, a petition for certiorari is an original
action; it is not a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. It is designed to correct only errors
of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.-
—No grave abuse of discretion may be imputed on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying Reyes’s
motion to suspend proceedings against her in view of her filing of a petition for certiorari questioning
the Ombudsman’s issuances before the Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 212593-94. Under Section 7, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, a mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari in relation to a case pending
before the court a quo does not ipso facto stay the proceedings therein, unless the higher court issues a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the conduct of such
proceedings. Otherwise stated, a petition for certiorari does not divest the lower courts of jurisdiction
validly acquired over the case pending before them. Unlike an appeal, a petition for certiorari is an
458
original action; it is not a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. It is designed to correct
only errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 7 of Rule 65, the higher court should issue against the public
respondent a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction in order to interrupt the
course of the principal case. The petitioner in a Rule 65 petition has the burden of proof to show that
there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of an injunctive writ or order to suspend the proceedings
before the public respondent. She should show the existence of an, urgent necessity for the writ or order,
so that serious damage may be prevented. In this case, since the Court did not issue any temporary
restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction in G.R. Nos. 212593-94, then the
Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for continuing with the proceedings before it.
21. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Moot and Academic; View that the Petitions before the
Supreme Court (SC) could also be dismissed for being moot and academic.-
—The Petitions before us could also be dismissed for being moot and academic. When the
Sandiganbayan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners after finding probable cause, all petitions
questioning the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause, including these Petitions before us, have
already become moot.
22. Same; Same; Probable Cause; The determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is different
from the determination of probable cause by the trial court. A preliminary investigation is conducted
by the prosecutor to determine whether there is probable cause to file an information or whether the
complaint should be dismissed. Once the information is filed, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over
the case. The trial court then determines the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. Any question relating to the disposition of the case should be addressed to the trial court.
23. Same; Same; Same; Although both the prosecutor and the trial court may rely on the same records
and evidence, their findings are arrived at independently. Executive determination of probable cause is
outlined by the Rules of Court, Republic Act No. 6770, and various issuances by the Department of
Justice. It is the Constitution, however, that mandates the conduct of judicial determination of probable
cause.
24. Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; View that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is
also not a venue for an exhaustive display of petitioners’ evidence.-
—The conduct of a preliminary investigation is also not a venue for an exhaustive display of petitioners’
evidence. It is merely preparatory to a criminal action. In Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 280
(1996): Probable cause should be determined in a summary but scrupulous manner to prevent material
damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right of liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair
play. The preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’
evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence as may engender a well-grounded belief that an
offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering
the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime. The validity and merits of a party’s defense
and accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
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459
391. Republic vs. Tampus, 787 SCRA 563, March 16, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Family Law ; Persons and Family Relations ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The “well-founded belief” in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse
to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse
and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent
spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one. As such, the mere
absence of the spouse for such periods prescribed under the law, lack of any news that such absentee
spouse is still alive, failure to communicate, or general presumption of absence under the Civil Code
would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of the Family Code places upon the present spouse the
burden of complying with the stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can only be
discharged upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only
the absent spouse’s whereabouts, but more importantly, whether the latter is still alive or is already
dead.
2. Civil Law; Family Law; Persons and Family Relations; Judicial Declaration of Presumptive
Death;Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code), there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that
the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a
well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. The burden of proof rests on the
present spouse to show that all the foregoing requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code exist. Since
it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the
affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
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460
392. Perez vs. Aquino, 787 SCRA 581, March 16, 2016
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Agricultural Leasehold Relationship ;
1. Same; Agricultural Leasehold Relationship; This notwithstanding, petitioner, as the new owner, is
bound to respect and maintain respondent as tenant of the subject land because of the latter’s tenancy
right attached to the land regardless of who its owner may be. Under the law, the existence of an
agricultural leasehold relationship is not terminated by changes in ownership in case of sale, as in this
case, since the purpose of the law is to strengthen the security of tenure of tenants.
2. Agrarian Reform; Right of Redemption; An agricultural lessor has the right to sell his land, with
or without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, subject, however, to the latter’s right of redemption
over the said land. In this relation, Section 12 of RA 3844, as amended, pertinently provides: Section
12. Lessee’s Right of Redemption.—In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the
knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable
price and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall
be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right
of redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing
which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform
upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The
redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale.
3. Same; Same; Requirements for a Valid Exercise of the Right of Redemption.-
—The right of redemption is validly exercised upon compliance with the following requirements: (a)
the redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee or share tenant; (b) the land must have been sold by
the owner to a third party without prior written notice of the sale given to the lessee or lessees and the
DAR; (c) only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed; and (d) the right of
redemption must be exercised within 180 days from written notice of the sale by the vendee.
4. Same; Same; Case law further holds that tender or consignation is an indispensable requirement to
the proper exercise of the right of redemption by the agricultural lessee. Thus, an offer to redeem can
be properly effected through: (a) a formal tender with consignation, or (b) a complaint filed in court
coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period. It must be stressed that
in making a repurchase, it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifests his desire
to repurchase. This statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender
of payment of the full amount of the repurchase price, i.e., the consideration of the sale, otherwise the
offer to redeem will be held ineffectual.
5. Same; Same; Having elected to exercise his right to redeem the subject land by filing a complaint in
court, it behooved upon respondent to comply with the requirements for a valid and effective exercise
of such right, i.e., the filing of the complaint should have been coupled with the consignation of the
redemption price to show his willingness and ability to pay. Considering that respondent failed to
consign the redemption price of P20,000.00 when he filed the complaint for redemption before the
PARAD on January 15, 2002, there was no valid exercise of the right to redeem the subject land. It
bears stressing that while the right of redemption under Section 12 of RA 3844, as amended, is an
essential mandate of the agrarian reform legislation to implement the State’s policy of owner-
cultivatorship and to achieve a dignified, self-reliant existence for small farmers, such laudable and
commendable policy is never intended to unduly transgress the corresponding rights of purchasers of
land. Consequently, the dismissal of the complaint for redemption is in order.
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461
393. Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation vs. Ablay, 787 SCRA 593, March 16, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ;
1. Same; Same; The CA correctly observed that Ablay’s conviction as an accomplice to the murder of
petitioner’s former assistant manager had strained the relationship between Ablay and petitioner.
Hence, Ablay should not be reinstated in the company and, instead, be paid separation pay, as
reinstatement would only create an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism would be generated as to
adversely affect his efficiency and productivity. In this relation, it should be clarified that said strained
relation should not affect the grant of benefits in his favor prior to his conviction, as the latter pertains
to an offense entirely separate and distinct from the acts constituting petitioner’s charges against him
in the case at bar, i.e., taking of the company equipment without authority. Petitioner’s payment of
separation pay to Ablay in lieu of his reinstatement is therefore warranted.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Misconduct is defined as an
improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error
in judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning of Article 282 of
the Labor Code, the employee’s misconduct must be serious, i.e., of such grave and aggravated
character, and not merely trivial or unimportant. Additionally, the misconduct must be related to the
performance of the employee’s duties showing him to be unfit to continue working for the employer.
Further, and equally important and required, the act or conduct must have been performed with
wrongful intent. In other words, for serious misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the concurrence
of the following elements is required: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employee’s duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working
for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.
3. Same; Same; Illegal Dismissals; Reinstatement; Backwages; As a general rule, an illegally
dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement (or separation pay, if reinstatement is not viable) and
payment of full backwages; Exceptions.-
—As a general rule, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement (or separation pay, if
reinstatement is not viable) and payment of full backwages. In certain cases, however, the Court has
carved out an exception to the foregoing rule and thereby ordered the reinstatement of the employee
without backwages on account of the following: (a) the fact that the dismissal of the employee would
be too harsh a penalty; and (b) that the employer was in good faith in terminating the employee.
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462
394. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Piccio, 789 SCRA 93, April 11, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Venue ; Libel ;
1. Same; Same; Libel; Generally speaking, “the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a
private individual is limited to only either of two (2) places, namely: 1) where the complainant
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory
article was printed and first published.”-
—Generally speaking, “the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited
to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
2. Attorneys; Office of the Solicitor General; The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal
cases before the Supreme Court (SC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) is vested solely in the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) which is “the law office of the Government whose specific powers and
functions include that of representing the Republic and/or the People [of the Philippines] before any
court in any action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.”-
—The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Court and the CA is vested
solely in the OSG which is “the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions
include that of representing the Republic and/or the People [of the Philippines] before any court in any
action which affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.” Section 35(1), Chapter
12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code provides that: Section 35. Powers and
Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation
or matter requiring the services of a lawyer, x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and
functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, and Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
3. Criminal Law; Venue; Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime
was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of
jurisdiction.-
—“Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This
principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360 [of the RPC], as amended
[by Republic Act No. 4363], specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the
criminal and civil aspects of such cases.”
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463
395. Nulada vs. Paulma, 789 SCRA 111, April 12, 2016
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ;
1. Same; A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting
in a public or private capacity.-
—It should be emphasized that membership in the legal profession is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting
in a public or private capacity. Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public’s faith in the legal profession as a whole. In this
case, respondent’s conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a member of the bar,
for which he must suffer the necessary consequences.
2. Attorneys; Lawyer’s Oath; By taking the lawyer’s oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and
an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of justice. As such, he can be disciplined for
any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be an officer
of the court.-
—Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar “to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law x x x.” Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By taking the lawyer’s oath, a lawyer becomes a
guardian of the law and an indispensable instrument for the orderly administration of justice. As such,
he can be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit
to continue to be an officer of the court.
3. Same; Legal Ethics; Suspension from Practice of Law; In Heenan v. Espejo, 711 SCRA 290 (2013),
the Supreme Court (SC) suspended therein respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.-
—In Heenan v. Espejo, 711 SCRA 290 (2013), the Court suspended therein respondent from the practice
of law for a period of two (2) years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio, 622 SCRA 616 (2010), the same penalty
was imposed by the Court to respondent who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan. Likewise, in
Dizon v. De Taza, 726 SCRA 70 (2014), the Court meted the penalty of suspension for a period of two
(2) years to respondent for having issued bouncing checks, among other infractions. Finally, in Wong
v. Moya II, 569 SCRA 256 (2008), respondent was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, because aside from issuing worthless checks and failure to pay his debts,
respondent also breached his client’s trust and confidence to his personal advantage and had shown a
wanton disregard of the IBP’s Orders in the course of its proceedings. Accordingly, and in view of the
foregoing instances when the erring lawyer was suspended for a period of two (2) years for the same
violation, the Court finds it appropriate to mete the same penalty to respondent in this case.
****
464
396. Consular Area Residents Association, Inc. vs. Casanova, 789 SCRA 209, April 12, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ; Presumption of Regularity ;
1. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumption of Regularity; Case law states that [t]he presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform
a duty.-
—Bereft of any clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, such certificate should be accorded the
presumption of regularity in the performance of the official duties of respondent Local Housing Board
of Taguig City. Case law states that “[t]he presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails
until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support
of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, construction
should be in favor of its lawfulness,” as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Prohibition; Case law dictates that “[f]or a party to be
entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed
against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial[, quasi-judicial] or
ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”-
—While the instant petition is denominated as one for prohibition, a careful perusal of the same reveals
that it is actually a petition for injunction as it ultimately seeks that a writ of injunction be issued to
permanently stop “[r]espondents, or any other person acting under their orders or authority, from
carrying out, or causing to carry out, the demolition of [p]etitioner’s properties.” More significantly,
respondents (with the exception of Casanova as will be herein discussed) are not asked to be prevented
from exercising any judicial or ministerial function on account of any lack or excess of jurisdiction, or
grave abuse of discretion, which allegation is key in an action for prohibition. Case law dictates that
“[f]or a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it
must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial[, quasi-
judicial] or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
3. Same; Injunction; Military Reservations; It is a fundamental rule of procedural law that it is not
the caption of the pleading that determines the nature of the complaint but rather its allegations. Hence,
considering the above discussed allegations, the petition, albeit denominated as one for prohibition, is
essentially an action for injunction, which means that Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court would
not apply. Instead, it is Section 21 of RA 7227, which solely authorizes the Supreme Court to issue
injunctions to restrain or enjoin “[t]he implementation of the projects for the conversion into
alternative productive uses of the military reservations,” that would govern: Section 21. Injunction and
Restraining Order.—The implementation of the projects for the conversion into alternative productive
uses of the military reservations are urgent and necessary and shall not be restrained or enjoined except
by an order issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines.
4. Same; Special Civil Actions; Quo Warranto; The title to a public office may not be contested except
directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally.-
—The Court observes that the collateral attack on respondent Casanova’s title as President and Chief
Executive Officer, which is a public office by nature is improper to resolve in this petition. The title to
a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be
assailed collaterally. Also, it has already been settled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the
validity of the appointment of a public officer. In fact, petitioner impliedly recognized the impropriety
of raising this issue herein by stating that “until the final resolution regarding the purported authority
of [respondent Casanova], he should be prohibited from acting for and on behalf of BCDA and from
issuing notices of demolition.” Thus, at all events, the foregoing characterization of this action as one
for injunction, and the consequent conclusion that it was properly filed before the Court remain. That
being said, the Court now proceeds to the main issue in this case.
465
5. Same; Same; Injunction; Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the
petitioner should be able to establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected; (b) a violation of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.-
—Jurisprudence teaches that in order for a writ of injunction to issue, the petitioner should be able to
establish: (a) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) a violation of that
right; and (c) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal right, the writ must not issue. A restraining order or an
injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantial rights and interests, and it is not
designed to protect contingent or future rights. Verily, the possibility of irreparable damage without
proof of adequate existing rights is not a ground for injunction.
6. Demolitions; Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992; For another, petitioner argues against
the legality of the intended demolition, insisting that there should be a court order authorizing the
demolition pursuant to Article 536 of the Civil Code and Section 28 of RA 7279, and not a mere
Certificate of Compliance on Demolition. However, contrary to petitioner’s argument, the Court has
already settled, in the case of Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. v. Robredo, 730 SCRA 322
(2014), that demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even without a judicial order when,
among others, government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented
pursuant to Section 28(b) of RA 7279, which reads: Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition.—Eviction or
demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under
the following situations: (a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad
tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks,
roads, parks, and playgrounds; (b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding
are about to be implemented; or (c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
****
466
397. Pacific Rehouse Corporation vs. Ngo, 789 SCRA 308, April 12, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Consolidation of Cases ;
1. Same; Same; Consolidation of Cases; Case law states that consolidation of cases, when proper,
results in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the resources of the parties and the
courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial; Likewise, it avoids the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the courts in two (2) or more cases which would otherwise require a single
judgment.-
—In sum, the CA erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 2031-08 based solely on Bautista’s death. As such,
it should be reinstated and consolidated with LRC Case No. 1117-09, considering that the two cases
involve the same property and, as correctly opined by the court a quo, any adjudication in either case
would necessarily affect the other. In this relation, case law states that consolidation of cases, when
proper, results in the simplification of proceedings, which saves time, the resources of the parties and
the courts, and a possible major abbreviation of trial. It is a desirable end to be achieved, within the
context of the present state of affairs where court dockets are full and individual and state finances are
limited. It contributes to the swift dispensation of justice, and is in accord with the aim of affording the
parties a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases before the courts. Likewise, it avoids
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the courts in two or more cases which would
otherwise require a single judgment.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Substitution of Parties; Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court allows the substitution of a party-litigant who dies during the pendency of a case by his heirs,
provided that the claim subject of said case is not extinguished by his death. As early as in Bonilla v.
Barcena, 71 SCRA 491 (1976), the Court has settled that if the claim in an action affects property and
property rights, then the action survives the death of a party-litigant, viz.: The question as to whether
an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of
action which survive the wrong complained affects primarily and principally property and property
rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not
survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental.
****
467
398. PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation vs. Lokin, Jr., 790 SCRA 173, April 19, 2016
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ; Penalties ;
1. Same; Same; Penalties; Anent the proper penalty to be meted to respondents, jurisprudence provides
that in similar cases where lawyers perform acts which tend to erode the public confidence in the courts,
put the courts in a bad light, and bring the justice system into disrepute, the Court imposed upon them
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. In Baculi v. Battung, 658 SCRA 209 (2011), the
Court meted the aforesaid penalty to a lawyer for his disrespect to the courts, to the point of being
scandalous and offensive to the integrity of the judicial system itself. Under the foregoing
circumstances, the Court imposes upon Atty. Labastilla the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year for his complicity in the making of the subject checkbook entry. On the
other hand, since Atty. Lokin, Jr. was the one directly responsible for the making of the subject
checkbook entry, the Court deems it appropriate to impose upon him the graver penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, as recommended by the IBP.
2. Attorneys; Criminal Contempt; Words and Phrases; Criminal contempt is conduct that is directed
against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.-
—At the outset, the Court notes that the indirect contempt case originally filed before the
Sandiganbayan is in the nature of a criminal contempt. “[C]riminal contempt is conduct that is directed
against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrespute or disrespect.” “[C]riminal
contempt, being directed against the dignity and authority of the court, is an offense against organized
society and, in addition, is also held to be an offense against public justice which raises an issue between
the public and the accused, and the proceedings to punish it are punitive.”
3. Same; Disbarment; Since the indirect contempt case is criminal in nature, respondents cannot insist
that the filing of an administrative case against them on the basis of the Sandiganbayan’s ruling in the
aforesaid case is premature on the premise that their conviction has not attained finality. It is well-
settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and distinct from a criminal action filed against a
lawyer despite being involved in the same set of facts. Case law instructs that a finding of guilt in the
criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
the lawyer’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate them administratively.
4. Same; Legal Ethics; As members of the Bar, respondents should not perform acts that would tend to
undermine and/or denigrate the integrity of the courts, such as the subject checkbook entry which
contumaciously imputed corruption against the Sandiganbayan. It is their sworn duty as lawyers and
officers of the court to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts. Respect for the courts guarantees
the stability of the judicial institution; without this guarantee, the institution would be resting on very
shaky foundations. This is the very thrust of Canon 11 of the CPR, which provides that “[a] lawyer
shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.” Hence, lawyers who are remiss in performing such sworn duty violate the
aforesaid Canon 11, and as such, should be held administratively liable and penalized accordingly, as
in this case.
5. Same; Same; Canon 7 of the CPR commands every lawyer to “at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession” for the strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity
of its members. It is every lawyer’s duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by staying true to
his oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. It must be reiterated that as an officer of the court,
it is a lawyer’s sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice; as acts and/or omissions
emanating from lawyers which tend to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of
the government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus, all lawyers should be bound
not only to safeguard the good name of the legal profession, but also to keep inviolable the honor,
prestige, and reputation of the judiciary. In this case, respondents compromised the integrity of the
judiciary by maliciously imputing corrupt motives against the Sandiganbayan through the subject
checkbook entry. Clearly, respondents also violated Canon 7 of the CPR and, thus, should be held
administratively liable therefor.
****
468
399. William Go Que Construction vs. Court of Appeals, 790 SCRA 309, April 19, 2016
Syllabi Class :Liberal Interpretation ;
1. Liberal Interpretation; It is well to stress that “procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere
technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party, x x x. Justice has to be
administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality.” Resort
to the liberal application of procedural rules remains the exception rather than the rule; it cannot be
made without any valid reasons underpinning the said course of action. To merit liberality, the one
seeking such treatment must show reasonable cause justifying its noncompliance with the Rules, and
must establish that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of substantial
justice. Procedural rules must, at all times, be followed, save for instances when a litigant must be
rescued from an injustice far graver than the degree of his carelessness in not complying with the
prescribed procedure. The limited exception does not obtain in this case.
2. Labor Law; Quitclaims; At the outset, it should be pointed out that in a Resolution dated July 15,
2010, the CA had already dismissed the petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 109427 with respect
to private respondents Singson and Pasaqui on account of the Satisfaction of Judgment/Release of
Claim they executed in petitioner’s favor subsequent to the filing of the instant case. Notably, Singson
and Pasaqui, thru their counsel, Atty. Perez, moved that the instant petition be dismissed, without
prejudice to the claims of the other private respondents, Lominiqui and Andales, who are “on the run.”
The settled rule is that legitimate waivers resulting from voluntary settlements of laborers’ claims
should be treated and upheld as the law between the parties. In view of the foregoing developments,
there is no longer any justiciable controversy between petitioner and private respondents Singson and
Pasaqui, rendering the instant case moot and academic, and dismissible with respect to them.
3. Pleadings and Practice; Verification; Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that
“[a] pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.” “A pleading
required to be verified which x x x lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.”
4. Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Requirements of a Certification Against Forum
Shopping.-
—Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he plaintiff or principal party shall
certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b)
if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and
(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending,
he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.” “Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided.
5. Same; Verification; In Fernandez v. Villegas, 733 SCRA 548 (2014), the Court pronounced that
noncompliance with the verification requirement or a defect therein “does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if
the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.” “Verification is deemed substantially complied
with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith
or are true and correct.” Here, there was no substantial compliance with the verification requirement
as it cannot be ascertained that any of the private respondents actually swore to the truth of the
allegations in the petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 109427 given the lack of competent
evidence of any of their identities. Because of this, the fact that even one of the private respondents
swore that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and belief is shrouded
in doubt. For the same reason, neither was there substantial compliance with the certification against
forum shopping requirement. In Fernandez, the Court explained that “noncompliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction
469
thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance’ or presence
of ‘special circumstances or compelling reasons.’” Here, the CA did not mention — nor does there
exist — any perceivable special circumstance or compelling reason which justifies the rules’ relaxation.
At all events, it is uncertain if any of the private respondents certified under oath that no similar action
has been filed or is pending in another forum.
6. Same; Same; Certification Against Forum Shopping; Case law states that “[v]erification is
required to secure an assurance that the allegations in the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct, and not merely speculative.” On the other hand, “[t]he certification against forum
shopping is required based on the principle that a party-litigant should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in different fora.” The important purposes behind these requirements cannot be
simply brushed aside absent any sustainable explanation justifying their relaxation. In this case, proper
justification is especially called for in light of the serious allegations of forgery as to the signatures of
the remaining private respondents, i.e., Lominiqui and Andales. Thus, by simply treating the insufficient
submissions before it as compliance with its Resolution dated August 13, 2009 requiring anew the
submission of a proper verification/certification against forum shopping, the CA patently and grossly
ignored settled procedural rules and, hence, gravely abused its discretion. All things considered, the
proper course of action was for it to dismiss the petition.
****
470
400. PNCC SkywayCorp vs. Sec. of Labor and Employment, 790 SCRA 427, April 19, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Grave Abuse of Discretion ;
1. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Grave Abuse of Discretion;—All told, considering that PSC
had complied with Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor Code, as amended, the indemnity
award in favor of the terminated employees was grossly improper and must therefore be nullified, in
this respect, the DOLE Secretary gravely abused its discretion and the CA erred in ruling otherwise.
When, a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law, or existing jurisprudence,
grave abuse of discretion is committed, as in this case.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Closure of Business;—Closure of business is an authorized
cause for termination of employment, Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor Code, as amended, reads:
ART. 298. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel.—The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent
losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry
of Labor and Employment at least one (1)-month before the intended date thereof. x x x. In case of retrenchment
to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1)-month pay or to
at least one-half (1/2)-month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered one (1) whole year. (Emphases supplied) In this relation, jurisprudence provides that
“[t]he determination to cease operations is a prerogative of management which the State does not usually
interfere with, as no business or undertaking must be required to continue operating simply because it has to
maintain its workers in employment, and such act would be tantamount to a taking of property without due
process of law. As long as the company’s exercise of the same is in good faith to advance its interest and not for
the purpose of circumventing the rights of employees under the law or a valid agreement, such exercise will be
upheld.”
3. Same; Same; Same; Procedurally, Article 298 (formerly, Article 283) of the Labor Code, as amended
provides for three (3) requirements to properly effectuate termination on the ground of closure or
cessation of business operations. These are: (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the
DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date of termination; (b) the cessation of business must
be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one (1)-
month pay or at least one-half-month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
4. Same; Same; Nominal Damages; Case law has settled that an employer who terminates an employee for
a valid cause but does so through invalid procedure is liable to pay the latter nominal damages. In Agabon v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), the Court pronounced that, where the dismissal
is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights. Thus,
in Agabon, the employer was ordered to pay the employee nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
Proceeding from the same ratio, the Court modified Agabon in the case of Jaka Food Processing Corporation v.
Pacot, 454 SCRA 119 (2005), where it created a distinction between procedurally defective dismissals due to a
just cause, on the one hand, and those due to an authorized cause, on the other. In Jaka, it was explained that if
the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 (now, Article 297) of the Labor Code but the employer
failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because
the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee; if the dismissal is based on an
authorized cause under Article 283 (now, Article 298) of the Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with
the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the
employer’s exercise of his management prerogative. Hence, in Jaka, where the employee was dismissed for an
authorized cause of retrenchment — as contradistinguished from the employee in Agabon who was dismissed for
a just cause of neglect of duty — the Court ordered the employer to pay the employee nominal damages at the
higher amount of P50,000.00.
5. Same; Same; —Ultimately, it was within PSC’s prerogative and discretion as employer to retain the services
of its employees for one month after the turnover date to SOMCO and to continue paying their salaries and
benefits corresponding to that period even when there is no more work to be done, if only “to ensure a smooth
transition and gradual phasing in of the new operator, which had yet to familiarize itself with the business.”
Case law teaches that an employer may opt not to require the dismissed employees to report for work during the
30-day notice period.
****
471
401. Republic vs. Dagondon, 790 SCRA 414, April 19, 2016
1. Same; Same; Same; Verily, case law provides that “[t]he reconstitution of a certificate of title
denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the
title of a person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing
the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the
loss or destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be
reconstituted has already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System.” Hence, under the
aforesaid law, the following must be present for an order for reconstitution to issue: (a) that the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are
sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the
petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of
title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries
of the property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
Thus, petitioner correctly pointed out that the applicability of RA 26 in this case is contingent on the
existence of a previously issued OCT which has been lost or destroyed.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgments;
Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court
loses its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The mandatory character, however, of the rule
on immutability of final judgments was not designed to be an inflexible tool to excuse and overlook
prejudicial circumstances. Hence, the doctrine must yield to practicality, logic, fairness, and substantial
justice. In Sumbilla v. Matrix Finance Corporation, 760 SCRA 532 (2015), the Court had the occasion
to name certain circumstances which necessitate a relaxation of the rule on the immutability of final
judgments.
3. Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; Republic Act (RA) No. 26 governs the
process by which a judicial reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title may be done. Specifically,
Section 2 of the said law enumerates in the following order the competent and exclusive sources from
which reconstitution of an OCT may be based, viz.: Section 2. Original certificates of title shall be
reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following
order: (a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s
duplicate of the certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the
register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) An authenticated copy of the decree of registration
or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate of title was issued; (e) A
document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in
said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document
showing that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the
court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
****
472
402. Office of the Ombudsman-FIO vs. Faller, 792 SCRA 361, June 06, 2016
Syllabi Class :Admin Law; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service ; Penalties ;
1. Same; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Penalties; Simple misconduct is
classified as a less grave offense punishable by suspension for a period of one (1) month and one (1)
day to six (6) months for the first offense, while conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is
classified as a grave offense punishable by suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year for the first offense. Under Section 50 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, if the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges, the penalty for the most
serious charge shall be imposed and the other charges shall be considered as aggravating
circumstances. Likewise, under Section 49 of the same Rules, the maximum of the penalty shall be
imposed where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, as in this case.
Accordingly, the Court concurs with the CA that the penalty of suspension for one (1) year must be
imposed upon Faller, and, conformably with Section 52 of the same Rules, meted the accessory penalty
of disqualification from promotion for the entire period of the suspension.
2. Administrative Law; Misconduct; Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. To
constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance
of the official functions and duties of a public officer. The misconduct is considered as grave if it
involves additional elements such as corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proven by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only
simple. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary
person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself
or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.
3. Same; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases; Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of
truth in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the performance of his duty. It implies
a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty,
probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray.
4. Same; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; Faller’s mistakes and/or the
irregularities involved in the contested disbursements which he actually received resulted in an anomaly
that tainted the public’s perception of his office, thereby subjecting him to administrative liability for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Jurisprudence states that acts may constitute
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of
his/her public office, as in this case.
****
473
403. Eustaquio vs. Navales, 792 SCRA 377, June 08, 2016
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Practice of Law ;
1. Same; Same; As a final note, it must be stressed that “[d]isbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that
aims to purge the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility
and honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring
lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate
its preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose
a less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.”
2. Attorneys; Practice of Law; It is settled that the Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
practice of law. As such, when the Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, he must
desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of
suspension. This includes desisting from holding a position in government requiring the authority to
practice law. The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. It includes performing acts
which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any kind of service which requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
3. Same; Same; Section 9 of Republic Act No. (RA) 10071, otherwise known as the “Prosecution
Service Act of 2010,” provides the powers and functions of prosecutors, to wit: Section 9. Powers and
Functions of the Provincial Prosecutor or City Prosecutor.—The provincial prosecutor or the city
prosecutor shall: (a) Be the law officer of the province of the city officer, as the case may be; (b)
Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal
laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations
he/she or any of his/her assistants shall receive the statements under oath or take oral evidence of
witnesses, and for this purpose may by subpoena summon witnesses to appear and testify under oath
before him/her, and the attendance or evidence of an absent or recalcitrant witness may be enforced by
application to any trial court; and (c) Have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and
violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts at the province or city and therein discharge all
the duties incident to the institution of criminal actions, subject to the provisions of the second
paragraph of Section 5 hereof. Verily, a plain reading of the foregoing provision evidently shows that
the government office of Assistant City Prosecutor requires its holder to be authorized to practice law.
Hence, respondent’s continuous discharge of his functions as such constitutes practice of law and, thus,
a clear defiance of the Court’s order of suspension against him.
4. Same; Same; Willful Disobedience to Lawful Order of a Superior Court; Disbarment; Suspension;
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court and willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so-
— acts which respondent is guilty of in this case — are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.—Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful
order of a superior court and wilfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so — acts which
respondent is guilty of in this case — are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law, to wit: Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.—
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
****
474
404. Facturan vs. Barcelona, Jr., 792 SCRA 389, June 08, 2016
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Prosecutors ;
1. Same; Same;Indeed, respondent’s actions and omissions in this case, i.e., his failure to resolve I.S.
No. 04-211 and to turn over the case records thereof despite orders to do so, appear to have been
committed for the benefit of and to safeguard private interests. As a lawyer who is also a public officer,
respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession.
It bears stressing that a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, he must also uphold
the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. Accordingly, the
Court finds that suspension for a period of one (1) year, as recommended by the IBP, should be meted
upon respondent.
2. Attorneys; The Court concurs with the IBP’s factual findings and recommendation to hold
respondent administratively liable, but not for violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, but instead,
of Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the same Code. The pertinent rules provide: CANON 6 – THESE CANONS
SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR
OFFICIAL TASKS. x x x x Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties. Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. He may be disciplined by
this Court as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as
a lawyer. In this regard, Rule 6.02 above quoted is particularly directed to lawyers in the government
service, enjoining them from using one’s public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance
private interests; or (3) allow private interests to interfere with public duties.
3. Same; Prosecutors; Absent any intelligent explanation as regards his lapses in the handling of I.S.
No. 04-211 and his failure to timely return the case records thereof for further action, despite the
directive to do so, it can only be inferred that respondent not merely failed, but obstinately and
deliberately refused to perform his duties as a prosecutor. Such refusal, under the circumstances,
evidently worked to the advantage of the respondents in I.S. No. 04-21.1 — which included respondent’s
cousin, Elezar — as the absence of the case records in the office of the Provincial Prosecutor resulted
in the delay in the filing of the appropriate criminal information in court against them. Hence, it is
apparent that respondent used his public position as a prosecutor to advance and protect the private
interest of his relative, which is clearly proscribed in the CPR.
****
475
405. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Hababag, Sr., 792 SCRA 399, June 08, 2016
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform ; Just Compensation ;
1. Same; Same; That being said, the Court, in view of the LBP’s alternative Motion for Clarification,
illumines that the interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) on the
unpaid balance, reckoned from the time of taking, or the time when the landowner was deprived of the
use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic), or emancipation patents are issued by the government, until June 30, 2013, and thereafter,
at six percent (6%) p.a. until full payment. However, while the LBP averred that the landowner’s title
was cancelled in favor of the Republic, copies of the Republic’s title/s was/were not attached to the
records of these consolidated cases. Accordingly, the Court hereby directs the LBP to submit certified
true copies of the Republic’s title/s to the RTC upon remand of these cases, and the latter to compute
the correct amount of legal interests due to the Heirs of Alfredo Hababag, Sr. reckoned from the date
of the issuance of the said titles/s.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; In Apo Fruits Corporation v. LBP, 632 SCRA 727 (2010),
the Court had illuminated that the substantiality of the payments made by the LBP is not the determining
factor in the imposition of interest as nothing less than full payment of just compensation is required.
The value of the landholdings themselves should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just
compensation due, and that interest is due and should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of
this principal sum after the taking has been completed.
3. Same; Same; In the recent case of LBP v. Santos, 782 SCRA 441 (2016), the Court reemphasized
that just compensation contemplates of just and timely payment, and elucidated that “prompt payment”
of just compensation encompasses the payment in full of the just compensation to the landholders as
finally determined by the courts. Hence, the requirement of the law is not satisfied by the mere deposit
by the LBP with any accessible bank of the provisional compensation determined by it or by the DAR,
and its subsequent release to the landowner after compliance with the legal requirements set forth by
RA 6657.
****
476
406. First Mega Holdings Corp. vs. Guiguinto Water District, 792 SCRA 670, June 08, 2016
Syllabi Class :Water Permits ; Permit to Drill ;
1. Same; Permit to Drill; As petitioner in this case — to the imposition of appropriate fines and
penalties, and the stoppage of the use of water, without prejudice to the institution of a criminal/civil
action as the facts and circumstances may warrant.—The drilling of a well and appropriation of water
without the necessary permits constitute grave offenses under Section 82 of the IRR, and shall subject
the violator who is not a permittee or grantee — as petitioner in this case — to the imposition of
appropriate fines and penalties, and the stoppage of the use of water, without prejudice to the institution
of a criminal/civil action as the facts and circumstances may warrant. There having been a willful and
deliberate nonobservance and/or noncompliance with the IRR and the NWRB’s lawful order, which
would have otherwise subjected a permittee or grantee to a summary revocation/suspension of its water
permit or other rights to use water, the NWRB was well within its authority to deny petitioner’s WPA.
To rule otherwise would effectively emasculate it and prevent it from exercising its regulatory functions.
2. Attorneys; Government-Owned and -Controlled Corporations; As a general rule, government-
owned or -controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings, and government
acquired asset corporations (collectively referred to as GOCCs) are not allowed to engage the legal
services of private counsels. Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of Executive Order No. (EO) 292,
otherwise known as the “Administrative Code of 1987,” is clear that the OGCC shall act as the
principal law office of GOCCs. Accordingly, Section 1 of AO No. 130, S. 1994 enjoined GOCCs to
exclusively refer all legal matters pertaining to them to the OGCC, unless their respective charters
expressly name the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as their legal counsel. Nonetheless, in
exceptional cases, private counsel can be hired with the prior written conformity and acquiescence of
the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate Counsel, and the prior written concurrence of the
Commission on Audit (COA). Case law holds that the lack of authority on the part of a private lawyer
to file a suit in behalf of any GOCC shall be a sufficient ground to dismiss the action filed by the said
lawyer.
3. Same; Same; Public policy considerations are behind the imposition of the requirements relative to
the engagement by GOCCs of private counsel. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel
Corporation, 414 SCRA 327 (2003), the Court held: It was only with the enactment of Memorandum
Circular No. 9 in 1998 that an exception to the general prohibition was allowed for the first time since
P.D. No. 1415 was enacted in 1978. However, indispensable conditions precedent were imposed before
any hiring of private lawyer could be effected. First, private counsel can be hired only in exceptional
cases. Second, the GOCC must first secure the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor
General or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, before any hiring can be done. And
third, the written concurrence of the COA must also be secured prior to the hiring. There are strong
reasons behind this public policy. One is the need of the government to curtail unnecessary public
expenditures, such as the legal fees charged by private lawyers against GOCCs. x x x: x x x x The other
factor is anchored on the perceived strong ties of the OGCC lawyers to their client government
corporations. Thus, compared to outside lawyers the OGCC lawyers are expected to be imbued with a
deeper sense of fidelity to the government’s cause and more attuned to the need to preserve the
confidentiality of sensitive information. Evidently, OGCC is tasked by law to serve as the law office of
GOCCs to the exclusion of private lawyers. Evidently again, there is a strong policy bias against the
hiring by GOCCs of private counsel.
4. Water Permits; Water Controversy; It is well to note that in an application for a water permit before
the NWRB, the presence of a protest converts the proceeding to a water controversy, which shall then
be governed by the rules prescribed for resolving water use controversies, i.e., Rule IV of the IRR.
However, absent a protest, or where a protest cannot be considered — as in this case where the
protestant, a GOCC, was not properly represented by the OGCC — the application shall subsist. The
existence of a protest is only one of the factors that the NWRB may consider in granting or denying a
water permit application. The filing of an improper protest only deprives the NWRB of the authority to
consider the substantial issues raised in the protest but does not strip it of the power to act on the
application.
5. Same; Same; Where extraction of ground water is sought, as in this case, a permit to drill must first
be secured from the NWRB. However, before a permit to drill is issued, the NWRB shall conduct a field
477
investigation to determine any adverse effect that may be caused to public or private interests. Only
after it has determined that the application meets the requirements and is not prejudicial to any public
or private interests shall it issue the permit to drill which shall be regarded as a temporary permit, until
the rate of water withdrawal/yield of the well has been determined and assessed, and the application is
finally (a) approved and a water permit is issued subject to such conditions as the NWRB may impose,
or (b) disapproved and returned to the applicant, stating the reasons therefor. It should be emphasized
that it is only through a duly issued water permit that any person acquires the right to appropriate
water, or to take or divert waters from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose allowed by
law.
****
478
407. Burgos, Jr. vs. Naval, 793 SCRA 120, June 08, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Civil Liability ;
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Civil Liability;It is noteworthy to point out that “[t]he
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where[:] (a) the
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. The civil action based
on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.” In this case, the
RTC did not render any ruling that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist; instead, the RTC granted the motion to quash and thereby, dismissed the criminal case on the
sole ground of prescription. Any misgivings regarding the propriety of that disposition is for the People,
thru the OSG, and not for Burgos to argue. As earlier intimated, Burgos’s remedy is to institute a civil
case under the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2. Appeals; Attorneys; Office of the Solicitor General; Jurisprudence dictates that it is the OSG which
possesses the requisite authority to represent the People in an appeal on the criminal aspect of a case.
The OSG is “the law office of the Government whose specific powers and functions include that of
representing the Republic and/or the [P]eople before any court in any action which affects the welfare
of the people as the ends of justice may require.” Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code provides that: Section 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor
General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of
lawyer. x x x. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government
in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil
actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity
is a party.
3. Same; It must, however, be clarified that the CA’s dismissal of Burgos’s certiorari petition is without
prejudice to his filing of the appropriate action to preserve his interest in the civil aspect of the Estafa
through Falsification of Public Documents case, provided that the parameters of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure are complied with.
****
479
408. Heirs of Jose Extremadura vs. Extremadura, 793 SCRA 581, June 15, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Property ; Possession ; Tax Declarations ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Tax Declarations; Not only did Jose exercise his right as owner of the subject
land by receiving the fruits thereof, he likewise performed his duties by paying taxes therefor, evidence
of which he presented in court during trial. “Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in
the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests
not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim
against the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues
to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.”
2. Civil Law; Property; Quieting of Titles; In order for an action for quieting of title to prosper, it is
essential that the plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the
subject matter of the action. Legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means
beneficial ownership.
3. Same; Same; Equitable Title; Words and Phrases; Based on jurisprudence, equitable title has been
defined as “[a] title derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on recognized equitable
principles; the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred to him. x x x. In
order that a plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title, he must show that the one from whom he
derives his right had himself a right to transfer. x x x.” In this case, Jose’s title to the subject land was
derived through a contract of sale, as evidenced by a notarized document denominated as Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 18, 1984, whereby the previous owner/s, Corazon, the widow of Alfredo,
transferred the subject land and two (2) other adjoining parcels to Jose for and in consideration of
P6,000.00, for which Jose duly paid the required capital gains tax. That Corazon had the right to
transfer the land by virtue of her ownership thereof was clearly established during the trial.
4. Same; Same; Possession; Constructive Possession; Article 1477 of the Civil Code recognizes that
the “ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery thereof.” Related to this article is Article 1497 of the same Code which provides that “[t]he
thing sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is placed in the control and possession of the
vendee.” Article 1498 of the Civil Code lays down the general rule that the execution of a public
instrument “shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from
the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.” However, the execution of a
public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery, which is negated by the
failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. A person who does not have actual
possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive possession by the execution and delivery of a
public instrument.
5. Same; Same; Same; Case law teaches that “[i]t is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land
should himself occupy the property as someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the
owner of real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property,
or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy,” as the parties in
this case. Notably, the fact that respondents delivered the produce of the land to Jose, which Manuel
admitted in open court, can only be construed as his recognition of Jose’s ownership of the land despite
his tenuous claim that he merely did so because Jose is his brother.
****
480
409. Tiu vs. Dizon, 793 SCRA 595, June 15, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinction of Criminal Liability ; Pardon ;
1. Same; Same; Same; It has long been recognized that the exercise of the pardoning power, notwithstanding
the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. Stated otherwise, since the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution to act
in person, he may not delegate the authority to pardon prisoners under the doctrine of qualified political agency,
which “essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the
President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the
acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts.”
2. Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Habeas Corpus; The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the
detainee. Well-settled is the rule that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record. The writ is denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex
merito justicias. In this case, petitioner is serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment convicting him of the
offense of selling and delivering prohibited drugs defined and penalized under Section 15, Article III of RA 6425,
as amended by RA 7659. He failed to show, however, that his further incarceration is no longer lawful and that
he is entitled to relief under a writ of habeas corpus.
3. Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Pardon; It must be emphasized that pardon is an act
of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on
whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though
official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not
communicated officially to the court. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential.
4. Same; Same; Same; Conditional Pardon; The executive clemency extended by PGMA on June 3, 2010
to a number of prisoners including petitioner was made “subject to the conditions indicated in the corresponding
documents.” It is undisputed, however, that no individual pardon papers were issued in petitioner’s favour,
thereby rendering the grant of executive clemency to him as incomplete and ineffective, as clarified by Deputy
Executive Secretary Aguinaldo. The necessity for the individual pardon papers is best explained by the nature of
a conditional pardon, which is “a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted
criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply
with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or
an additional one. By the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby
placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the
pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon.” The individual pardon papers, therefore,
contain the terms and conditions of the contract of pardon, the compliance of which is essential to the pardonee’s
freedom from recommitment to prison.
5. Same; Colonist Status; As correctly argued by the OSG, the conferment by the Director of Corrections of
a colonist status to petitioner did not operate to reduce the latter’s sentence. Section 5 of Act No. 2489 is clear
and unambiguous: “[p]risoners serving sentences of life imprisonment receiving and retaining the classification
of penal colonists or trusties will automatically have the sentence of life imprisonment modified to a sentence of
thirty (30) years when receiving the executive approval for this classification upon which the regular credit now
authorized by law and special credit authorized in the preceding paragraph, for good conduct, may be made.”
6. Same; Same; The wording of the law is such that the act of classification as a penal colonist or trustie is
separate from and necessarily precedes the act of approval by the Executive. Under Section 6, Chapter 3, Part
II, Book I of the BuCor-OM quoted earlier, the Director of Corrections may, upon the recommendation of the
Classification Board of the Bureau of Corrections, classify an inmate as a colonist. It is crucial, however, that
the prisoner not only receives, but retains such classification, because the grant of a colonist status may, for
cause, be revoked at any time by the Superintendent with the approval of the Director of Corrections pursuant
to Section 9 of the same Chapter. It is the classification of the penal colonist and trustie of the Director of
Corrections which subsequently receives executive approval.
7. Same; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Pardon; The reduction of a prisoner’s sentence is a partial
pardon, and our Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive prerogative to extend the
same. The 1987 Constitution, specifically under Section 19, Article VII thereof, provides that the President
possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, which petitioner explicitly
recognized by applying for commutation of sentence even during the pendency of his request for the
implementation of the conditional pardon.
****
481
410. Tan vs. Cinco, 793 SCRA 610, June 15, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Courts ; Jurisdiction ; Voidable Judgments ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Void Judgments; A judgment rendered by a court without
jurisdiction is null and void and may be attacked anytime. It creates no rights and produces no effect.
It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court
or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity. A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment
at all. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Judicial Stability; Doctrine of Non-interference; In
Barroso v. Omelio, 772 SCRA 437 (2015), the Court explained the doctrine of judicial stability as
follows: The doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference in the regular orders or judgments of a
coequal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to
grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over
all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in
connection with this judgment. Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case where an execution order has
been issued is considered as still pending, so that all the proceedings on the execution are still
proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes. To
hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the resolution of incidents
arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to the orderly administration of
justice. x x x x To be sure, the law and the rules are not unaware that an issuing court may violate the
law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized that there should be a remedy against this
violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to another coequal body but to a higher court with
authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is precisely the judicial power that the 1987
Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2, speaks of and which this Court has
operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
****
482
411. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Kho, 793 SCRA 651, June 15, 2016
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Guidelines in the Remand of Agrarian Cases;
1. Same; Same; Guidelines in the Remand of Agrarian Cases.-
— While the parties did not raise as issue the improper application of DAR AO 1, Series of 2010, the
Court finds a need to remand the case to the RTC for the determination of just compensation to ensure
compliance with the law, and to give everyone — the landowner, the farmers, and the State — their due.
To this end, the RTC is hereby directed to observe the following guidelines in the remand of the case:
1. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking, or the time when the owner was deprived of
the use and benefit of his property, in this case, when emancipation patents were issued in the names of
the farmer-beneficiaries on May 27, 2002. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before
the trial court for the valuation of the subject land must be based on the values prevalent on such time
of taking for like agricultural lands. 2. Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines
set forth in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA 9700. However, the RTC
is reminded that while it should take into account the different formula created by the DAR in arriving
at the just compensation for the subject land, it is not strictly bound thereto if the situations before it do
not warrant their application. In any event, should the RTC find the said guidelines to be inapplicable,
it must clearly explain the reasons for deviating therefrom, and for using other factors or formula in
arriving at the reasonable just compensation for the acquired property. 3. Interest may be awarded as
may be warranted by the circumstances of the case and based on prevailing jurisprudence. In previous
cases, the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there is delay in
the payment since the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to be an effective
forbearance on the part of the State.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Case law dictates that when the acquisition process under
PD 27 is still incomplete, such as in this case where the just compensation due to the landowner has
yet to be settled, just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657, as
amended.
3. Same; Same; Fair Market Value; For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market
value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or
the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title
is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of
RA 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like properties,
(c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner’s sworn valuation,
(e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the social and economic
benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and
(h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land, if any, must be equally considered.
4. Same; Same; Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Special Agrarian Courts; The RTC, acting as a SAC,
is reminded that it is not strictly bound by the different formula created by the DAR if the situations
before it do not warrant their application. To insist on a rigid application of the formula goes beyond
the intent and spirit of the law, bearing in mind that the valuation of property or the determination of
just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts, and not with
administrative agencies. Therefore, the RTC must still be able to reasonably exercise its judicial
discretion in the evaluation of the factors for just compensation, which cannot be restricted by a formula
dictated by the DAR when faced with situations that do not warrant its strict application. However, the
RTC must explain and justify in clear terms the reason for any deviation from the prescribed factors
and formula.
****
483
412. Cagayan Electric Power &Lamp; Light Company, Inc. (CEPALCO) vs. CEPALCO
Employee’s Labor Union-Associated Labor Unions-Trade Union Congress of the Philippines
(TUCP), 794 SCRA 95, June 20, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Labor-only Contracting ;
1. Same; Same; If at all, it would be the employees of CESCO who are entitled to seek the foregoing
reliefs since in cases of labor-only contracting, “the person or intermediary shall be considered merely
as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as
if the latter were directly employed by him.” However, they have not been impleaded in these cases.
Thus, as prayed for by petitioners, the Court must set aside the portions of the assailed CA Decisions
declaring: (a) the workers hired by CESCO, pursuant to the contracts subject of these cases, as regular
employees of CEPALCO; and (b) the latter responsible to said workers in the same manner and extent
as if they were directly employed by it. This pronouncement not only squares with the rules on real
party-in-interest and legal standing, but also with the precept that no one shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and that strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment
rendered by the court.
2. Labor Law; Labor-only Contracting; Under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, labor-only
contracting is an arrangement where the contractor, who does not have substantial capital or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, supplies workers
to an employer and the workers recruited are performing activities which are directly related to the
principal business of such employer. Section 5 of Department Order No. 18-02, Series of 2002,
otherwise known as the “Rules Implementing Articles 106 to 109 of the Labor Code, As Amended” (DO
18-02), provides the following criteria to gauge whether or not an arrangement constitutes labor-only
contracting: Section 5. Prohibition against labor-only contracting.—Labor-only contracting is hereby
declared prohibited. For this purpose, labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the
contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or
service for a principal, and any of the following elements are present: i) The contractor or
subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service
to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor
are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or ii) the
contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual
employee. The foregoing provisions shall be without prejudice to the application of Article 248(C) of
the Labor Code, as amended. “Substantial capital or investment” refers to capital stocks and
subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations, tools, equipment, implements, machineries and
work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance or
completion of the job, work or service contracted out. The “right to control” shall refer to the right
reserved to the person for whom the services of the contractual workers are performed, to determine
not only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end.
3. Same; Same; Unfair Labor Practices; Labor-only contracting is considered as a form of ULP when
the same is devised by the employer to “interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization.” Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, which enumerates certain
prohibited activities constitutive of ULP, provides: Article 259. Unfair Labor Practices of Employers.—
It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: x x x x (c) To
contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization. x x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied) The need to determine whether or not the contracting out of services (or any
particular activity or scheme devised by the employer for that matter) was intended to defeat the
workers’ right to self-organization is impelled by the underlying concept of ULP.
****
484
413. Del Rosario vs. Ocampo-Ferrer, 794 SCRA 116, June 20, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Noninterference ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Doctrine of Judicial Stability or Noninterference; At the outset,
the Court emphasizes that under the doctrine of judicial stability or noninterference in the regular
orders or judgments of a coequal court, the various trial courts of a province or city, having the same
equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much
less with their orders or judgments. In Barroso v. Omelio, 772 SCRA 414 (2015), the Court had the
opportunity to thoroughly explain the said doctrine in this manner: The doctrine of judicial stability or
noninterference in the regular orders or judgments of a coequal court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another
court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The
rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over
the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other
coordinate courts, for its execution and over all incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the
conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment. Thus, we have repeatedly held
that a case where an execution order has been issued is considered as still pending, so that all
proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit. A court which issued a writ of execution
has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and
to control its own processes. To hold otherwise would be to divide the jurisdiction of the appropriate
forum in the resolution of incidents arising in execution proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is
obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice. x x x x To be sure, the law and the rules are not
unaware that an issuing court may violate the law in issuing a writ of execution and have recognized
that there should be a remedy against this violation. The remedy, however, is not the resort to another
coequal body but to a higher court with authority to nullify the action of the issuing court. This is
precisely the judicial power that the 1987 Constitution, under Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2,
speaks of and which this Court has operationalized through a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. x x x x It is not a viable legal position to claim that a TRO against a writ of execution
is issued against an erring sheriff, not against the issuing Judge. A TRO enjoining the enforceability of
a writ addresses the writ itself, not merely the executing sheriff. x x x As already mentioned above, the
appropriate action is to assail the implementation of the writ before the issuing court in whose behalf
the sheriff acts, and, upon failure, to seek redress through a higher judicial body.
****
485
414. Ting Trucking vs. Makilan, 794 SCRA 140, June 20, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Serious Misconduct ;
1. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Serious misconduct is one (1) of the
just causes for termination under Article 297 of the Labor Code.-
—Fundamental is the rule that an employee can be dismissed from employment only for a valid cause.
Serious misconduct is one of the just causes for termination under Article 297 of the Labor Code, which
reads in part: ART. 297. Termination By Employer.—An employer may terminate an employment for
any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work. x x x x Misconduct is
defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not
mere error in judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning of
Article [297] of the Labor Code, the employee’s misconduct must be serious — that is, of such grave
and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Additionally, the misconduct must be
related to the performance of the employee’s duties showing him to be unfit to continue working for the
employer. Further, the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent. Thus, for serious
misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the concurrence of the following elements is required: (a)
the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties showing
that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been
performed with wrongful intent.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; At the outset, it is
settled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. The Court is not the proper venue to
consider a factual issue as it is not a trier of facts. The rule, however, is not ironclad and a departure
therefrom may be warranted where the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and
the CA, on the other hand, are contradictory, as in this case. There is therefore a need to review the
records to determine whether the CA, in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction, erred in finding grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, in ruling that respondent was not illegally dismissed.
abuse of discretion may be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not
supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
****
486
415. Balao vs. Ermita, 794 SCRA 177, June 21, 2016
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Amparo Rule ; Writ of Amparo ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence states that archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed
to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate action is expected, but where no
grounds exist for their outright dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in
abeyance until the situation obtains in which action thereon can be taken. To be sure, the Amparo rule
sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it is impelled by a valid cause, such as when the witnesses
fail to appear due to threats on their lives or to similar analogous causes that would prevent the court
from effectively hearing and conducting the amparo proceedings which, however, do not obtain in these
cases.
2. Constitutional Law; Amparo Rule; Writ of Amparo; Under Section 20 of the Amparo rule, the court
is mandated to archive, and not dismiss, the case should it determine that it could not proceed for a
valid cause, viz.: Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases.—The court shall not dismiss the petition,
but shall archive it, if upon its determination it cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of
petitioner or witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives. A periodic review of the archived cases
shall be made by the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any party, order their
revival when ready for further proceedings. The petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure
to prosecute the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner of the order archiving
the case. The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court Administrator a consolidated list of
archived cases under this Rule not later than the first week of January of every year.
****
487
416. Philippine Asset Growth Two, Inc. vs. Fastech Synergy Philippines, Inc. (formerly First Asia
System Technology, Inc.), 794 SCRA 625, June 28, 2016
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Corporations ; Corporate Rehabilitation ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In view of all the foregoing, the Court is therefore constrained to grant the
instant petition, notwithstanding the preliminary technical error as above discussed. A distressed
corporation should not be rehabilitated when the results of the financial examination and analysis
clearly indicate that there lies no reasonable probability that it may be revived, to the detriment of its
numerous stakeholders which include not only the corporation’s creditors but also the public at large.
2. Attorneys; It is a long standing doctrine that where a party is represented by several counsels, notice
to one is sufficient, and binds the said party. Notice to anyone of the several counsels on record is
equivalent to notice to all, and such notice starts the running of the period to appeal notwithstanding
that the other counsel on record has not received a copy of the decision or resolution.
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Generally, the failure to perfect an appeal in the manner
and within the period provided for by law renders the decision appealed from final and executory, and
beyond the competence of the Court to review. However, the Court has repeatedly relaxed this
procedural rule in the higher interest of substantial justice. In Barnes v. Padilla, 439 SCRA 675 (2004),
it was held that: [A] final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be
modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. However, this Court has relaxed
this rule in order to serve substantial justice[,] considering (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property,
(b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will
not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
4. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Words and Phrases; “Rehabilitation,” Defined.-
—Rehabilitation is statutorily defined under Republic Act No. 10142, otherwise known as the
“Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010” (FRIA), as follows: Section 4. Definition of
Terms.—As used in this Act, the term: x x x x (gg) Rehabilitation shall refer to the restoration of the
debtor to a condition of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continuance of
operation is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments
projected in the plan, more if the debtor continues as a going concern than if it is immediately
liquidated.
5. Same; Same; Corporate Rehabilitation; Case law explains that corporate rehabilitation
contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the
corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency, the purpose being to enable the
company to gain a new lease on life and allow its creditors to be paid their claims out of its earnings.
Thus, the basic issues in rehabilitation proceedings concern the viability and desirability of continuing
the business operations of the distressed corporation, all with a view of effectively restoring it to a state
of solvency or to its former healthy financial condition through the adoption of a rehabilitation plan.
6. Same; Same; Same; A material financial commitment becomes significant in gauging the resolve,
determination, earnestness, and good faith of the distressed corporation in financing the proposed
rehabilitation plan. This commitment may include the voluntary undertakings of the stockholders or the
would-be investors of the debtor-corporation indicating their readiness, willingness, and ability to
contribute funds or property to guarantee the continued successful operation of the debtor-corporation
during the period of rehabilitation.
7. Same; Same; Same; The failure of the Rehabilitation Plan to state any material financial
commitment to support rehabilitation, as well as to include a liquidation analysis, renders the CA’s
considerations for approving the same, i.e., that: (a) respondents would be able to meet their obligations
to their creditors within their operating cash profits and other assets without disrupting their business
operations; (b) the Rehabilitation Receiver’s opinion carries great weight; and (c) rehabilitation will
be beneficial for respondents’ creditors, employees, stockholders, and the economy, as actually
unsubstantiated, and hence, insufficient to decree the feasibility of respondents’ rehabilitation. It is well
to emphasize that the remedy of rehabilitation should be denied to corporations that do not qualify
under the Rules. Neither should it be allowed to corporations whose sole purpose is to delay the
enforcement of any of the rights of the creditors.
488
8. Same; Same; Same; The purpose of rehabilitation proceedings is not only to enable the company to
gain a new lease on life, but also to allow creditors to be paid their claims from its earnings when so
rehabilitated. Hence, the remedy must be accorded only after a judicious regard of all stakeholders’
interests; it is not a one-sided tool that may be graciously invoked to escape every position of distress.
Thus, the remedy of rehabilitation should be denied to corporations whose insolvency appears to be
irreversible and whose sole purpose is to delay the enforcement of any of the rights of the creditors,
which is rendered obvious by: (a) the absence of a sound and workable business plan; (b) baseless and
unexplained assumptions, targets, and goals; and (c) speculative capital infusion or complete lack
thereof for the execution of the business plan, as in this case.
****
489
417. Odiamar vs. Valencia, 795 SCRA 18, June 28, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Interest Rates ;
1. Same; Interest Rates; It is fundamental that for monetary interest to be due, there must be an express
written agreement therefor. Article 1956 of the Civil Code provides that “[n]o interest shall be due
unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.” In this relation, case law states that the lack of a
written stipulation to pay interest on the loaned amount bars a creditor from charging monetary interest
and the collection of interest without any stipulation therefor in writing is prohibited by law.
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Admissions; Judicial Admissions; Having admitted that she obtained
loans from respondent without showing that the same had already been paid or otherwise extinguished,
petitioner cannot now aver otherwise. It is settled that judicial admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not
require further evidence to prove them. They are legally binding on the party making it, except when it
is shown that they have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was actually
made, neither of which was shown to exist in this case. Accordingly, petitioner is bound by her
admission of liability and the only material question remaining is the extent of such liability.
3. Civil Law; Obligations; Novation; In S.C. Megaworld Construction and Development Corporation
v. Parada, 705 SCRA 584 (2013), the Court held that to constitute novation by substitution of debtor,
the former debtor must be expressly released from the obligation and the third person or new debtor
must assume the former’s place in the contractual relations. Moreover, the Court ruled that the “fact
that the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who has assumed the obligation, will result
merely in the addition of debtors and not novation.” At its core, novation is never presumed, and the
animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express agreement of the parties, or by
their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken. Here, the intent to novate was not
satisfactorily proven by respondent. At best, petitioner only manifested her desire to shoulder the debt
of her parents, which, as above discussed, does not amount to novation. Thus, the courts a quo erred in
holding petitioner liable for the debts obtained by her deceased parents on account of novation by
substitution of the debtor.
****
490
418. Puncia vs. Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc., 795 SCRA 32, June 28, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Damages ; Nominal Damages ;
1. Same; Damages; Nominal Damages; Considering that Toyota had dismissed Puncia for a just cause,
albeit failed to comply with the proper procedural requirements, the former should pay the latter nominal
damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Consolidation of Cases; At the outset, the Court notes that
consolidation of cases is a procedure sanctioned by the Rules of Court for actions which involve a common
question of law or fact before the court. It is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how
cases in its docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with
economy while providing justice to the parties. The rationale for consolidation is to have all cases, which are
intimately related, acted upon by one branch of the court to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions being
rendered and in effect, prevent confusion, unnecessary costs, and delay. It is an action sought to avoid multiplicity
of suits; guard against oppression and abuse; clear congested dockets; and to simplify the work of the trial court
in order to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.
3. Same; Same; Same; In order to determine whether consolidation is proper, the test is to check whether the
cases involve the resolution of common questions of law, related facts, or the same parties. Consolidation is
proper whenever the subject matter involved and the relief demanded in the different suits make it expedient for
the court to determine all of the issues involved and adjudicate the rights of the parties by hearing the suits
together. However, it must be stressed that an essential requisite of consolidation is that the several actions which
should be pending before the court, arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues,
and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence. As succinctly stated in the rules, consolidation is
allowed when there are similar actions which are pending before the court — for there is nothing to consolidate
when a matter has already been resolved and the very purpose of consolidation, to avoid conflicting decisions
and multiplicity of suits, rendered futile.
4. Same; Same; Same; It should be emphasized that the consolidation of cases is aimed to simplify the
proceedings as it contributes to the swift dispensation of justice. As such, it is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court and the latter’s action in consolidation will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of
discretion tantamount to an evasion of a positive duty or a refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, which is
absent in this case.
5. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Due Process; It is settled that “for a dismissal to be valid,
the rule is that the employer must comply with both substantive and procedural due process requirements.
Substantive due process requires that the dismissal must be pursuant to either a just or an authorized cause under
Articles 297, 298 or 299 (formerly Articles 282, 283, and 284) of the Labor Code. Procedural due process, on
the other hand, mandates that the employer must observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing before a
dismissal can be effected.” Thus, to determine the validity of Puncia’s dismissal, there is a need to discuss
whether there was indeed just cause for his termination.
6. Same; Same; Gross Inefficiency; In the instant case, records reveal that as a Marketing Professional for
Toyota, Puncia had a monthly sales quota of seven (7) vehicles from March 2011 to June 2011. As he was having
trouble complying with said quota, Toyota even extended him a modicum of leniency by lowering his monthly
sales quota to just three (3) vehicles for the months of July and August 2011; but even then, he still failed to
comply. In that six (6)-month span, Puncia miserably failed in satisfying his monthly sales quota, only selling a
measly five (5) vehicles out of the 34 he was required to sell over the course of said period. Verily, Puncia’s
repeated failure to perform his duties — i.e., reaching his monthly sales quota — for such a period of time falls
under the concept of gross inefficiency. In this regard, case law instructs that “gross inefficiency” is analogous
to “gross neglect of duty,” a just cause of dismissal under Article 297 of the Labor Code, for both involve specific
acts of omission on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to his business.
7. Same; Same; A reading of the Notice of Termination shows that Puncia was dismissed not for the ground
stated in the Notice to Explain, but for gross insubordination on account of his nonappearance in the scheduled
October 17, 2011 hearing without justifiable reason. In other words, while Toyota afforded Puncia the
opportunity to refute the charge of gross inefficiency against him, the latter was completely deprived of the same
when he was dismissed for gross insubordination — a completely different ground from what was stated in the
Notice to Explain. As such, Puncia’s right to procedural due process was violated.
****
491
419. Ambray vs. Tsourous, 795 SCRA 627, July 05, 2016
Syllabi Class :RemLaw; Evidence; Testimony at a Former Proceeding; Hearsay Evidence Rule;
1. Same; Same; Testimony at a Former Proceeding; Hearsay Evidence Rule; Notably, the
admissibility of Estela’s former testimony in the present case finds basis in Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence or the “rule on former testimony” which provides: Section 47. Testimony or
deposition at a former proceeding.—The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to
testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-
examine him. Case law holds that for the said rule to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case
or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same
interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different
causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in
the present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the
former case. The reasons for the admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial or proceeding are the
necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. However, before the former testimony can be
introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper predicate therefor, i.e., the party must
establish the basis for the admission of testimony in the realm of admissible evidence.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; At the outset, it should
be pointed out that, as a general rule, a reexamination of factual findings cannot be done by the SC
acting on a petition for review on certiorari because it is not a trier of facts and only reviews questions
of law. This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. Finding a confluence of certain exceptions in this case, the general rule that only legal
issues may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court does not
apply, and the Court retains the authority to pass upon the evidence presented and draw conclusions
therefrom.
3. Forgery; Burden of Proof; As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear,
positive and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who
alleges forgery has the burden to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which
is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The fact of forgery
can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and
genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized to have been forged.
4. Remedial Law; Evidence; Handwritings; Manner of Proving Genuineness of Handwritings.-
—Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in
the following manner: (1) by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because
he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted
or treated as genuine by the party, against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge. Corollary thereto, jurisprudence states that the presumption of validity and
regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the
testimony of a witness who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal
knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at
best.
****
492
420. Logarta vs. Mangahis, 795 SCRA 644, July 05, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Land Registration ; Property Registration Decree ;
1. Same; Land Registration; Property Registration Decree; Thus, the prevailing rule is that voluntary
instruments such as contracts of sale, contracts to sell, and conditional sales are registered by
presenting the owner’s duplicate copy of the title for annotation, pursuant to Sections 51 to 53 of PD
1529. The reason for requiring the production of the owner’s duplicate certificate in the registration of
a voluntary instrument is that, being a willful act of the registered owner, it is to be presumed that he
is interested in registering the instrument and would willingly surrender, present or produce his
duplicate certificate of title to the Register of Deeds in order to accomplish such registration. The
exception to this rule is when the registered owner refuses or fails to surrender his duplicate copy of
the title, in which case the claimant may file with the Register of Deeds a statement setting forth his
adverse claim.
2. Civil Law; Property; Adverse Claims; An adverse claim is a type of involuntary dealing designed to
protect the interest of a person over a piece of real property by apprising third persons that there is a
controversy over the ownership of the land. It seeks to preserve and protect the right of the adverse
claimant during the pendency of the controversy, where registration of such interest or right is not
otherwise provided for by the Property Registration Decree. An adverse claim serves as a notice to
third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
3. Same; Same; Same; Before a notice of adverse claim is registered, it must be shown that there is no
other provision in law for the registration of the claimant’s alleged right in the property. In Register of
Deeds of Quezon City v. Nicandro, 1 SCRA 1334 (1961), the Court held that where the basis of the
adverse claim was a perfected contract of sale which is specifically governed by Section 57 of the Land
Registration Act, or Act No. 496, the filing of an adverse claim was held ineffective for the purpose of
protecting the vendee’s right. Similarly, in L. P. Leviste & Company, Inc. v. Noblejas, 89 SCRA 520
(1979), the Court emphasized that if the basis of the adverse claim is a perfected contract of sale, the
proper procedure is to register the vendee’s right as prescribed by Sections 51 and 52 of PD 1529, and
not under Section 70 which is ineffective for the purpose of protecting the vendee’s right since it does
not have the effect of a conveyance.
****
493
421. Century Properties, Inc. vs. Babiano, 795 SCRA 671, July 05, 2016
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a general rule, a party who has not appealed cannot
obtain any affirmative relief other than the one granted in the appealed decision. However,
jurisprudence admits an exception to the said rule, such as when strict adherence thereto shall result
in the impairment of the substantive rights of the parties concerned. In Global Resource for Outsourced
Workers (GROW), Inc. v. Velasco, 678 SCRA 751 (2012): Indeed, a party who has failed to appeal from
a judgment is deemed to have acquiesced to it and can no longer obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than what was already granted under said judgment. However, when strict
adherence to such technical rule will impair a substantive right, such as that of an illegally dismissed
employee to monetary compensation as provided by law, then equity dictates that the Court set aside
the rule to pave the way for a full and just adjudication of the case.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; Interpretation of Contracts; Article 1370 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]f
the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.” In Norton Resources and Development Corporation
v. All Asia Bank Corporation, 605 SCRA 370 (2009), the Court had the opportunity to thoroughly
discuss the said rule as follows: The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and
unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The
intention of the parties must be gathered from that language, and from that language alone. Stated
differently, where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be
taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to
show that the words should be understood in a different sense. Courts cannot make for the parties better
or more equitable agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, or rewrite contracts
because they operate harshly or inequitably as to one of the parties, or alter them for the benefit of one
party and to the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve one of the parties from the terms
which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he did not.
3. Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; Control Test; Anent the nature of Concepcion’s
engagement, based on case law, the presence of the following elements evince the existence of an
employer-employee relationship: (a) the power to hire, i.e., the selection and engagement of the
employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control
the employee’s conduct, or the so called “control test.” The control test is commonly regarded as the
most important indicator of the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship. Under this
test, an employer-employee relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed
reserves the right to control not only the end achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in
reaching that end.
4. Same; Same; The existence of employer-employee relations could not be negated by the mere
expedient of repudiating it in a contract.-
—While the employment agreement of Concepcion was denominated as a “Contract of Agency for
Project Director,” it should be stressed that the existence of employer-employee relations could not be
negated by the mere expedient of repudiating it in a contract. In the case of Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd. v. NLRC (4th Division), 287 SCRA 476 (1998), it was ruled that one’s employment status is defined
and prescribed by law, and not by what the parties say it should be, viz.: It is axiomatic that the existence
of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in the management
contract and providing therein that the “employee” is an independent contractor when the terms of the
agreement clearly show otherwise. For, the employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by
law and not by what the parties say it should be. In determining the status of the management contract,
the “four-fold test” on employment earlier mentioned has to be applied. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) Therefore, the CA correctly ruled that since there exists an employer-employee relationship
between Concepcion and CPI, the labor tribunals correctly assumed jurisdiction over her money
claims.
****
494
422. Tom vs. Rodriguez, 797 SCRA 60, July 13, 2016
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Corporations ;
1. Mercantile Law; Corporations; The Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction on the ground
that a corporation can only exercise its powers and transact its business through its board of directors
and through its officers and agents when authorized by a board resolution or its bylaws. As held in AF
Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dieselman Freight Services, Co., 373 SCRA 385 (2002): Section 23 of
the Corporation Code expressly provides that the corporate powers of all corporations shall be
exercised by the board of directors. Just as a natural person may authorize another to do certain acts
in his behalf, so may the board of directors of a corporation validly delegate some of its functions to
individual officers or agents appointed by it. Thus, contracts or acts of a corporation must be made
either by the board of directors or by a corporate agent duly authorized by the board. Absent such valid
delegation/authorization, the rule is that the declarations of an individual director relating to the affairs
of the corporation, but not in the course of, or connected with, the performance of authorized duties of
such director, are held not binding on the corporation. As the provisions of the MOA are in direct
contravention of the foregoing precepts, which the Court had earlier espoused in the July 6, 2015
Decision, its execution cannot in any way affect, change, or render the Court’s previous disquisitions
moot and academic. In fact, the MOA is, clearly and in all respects, contrary to law. Therefore, the writ
of preliminary injunction must stand.
****
495
423. People vs. Cenido, 797 SCRA 102, July 18, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinguishment of Criminal Liability ; Death of the Accused ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In People v. Amistoso, 704 SCRA 369 (2013), the Court explained that the death
of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as his civil
liability ex delicto. Consequently, Remedios’s death on March 7, 2014 renders the Court’s July 7, 2014
Resolution irrelevant and ineffectual as to her, and is therefore set aside. Accordingly, the criminal
case against Remedios is dismissed.
2. Criminal Law; Extinguishment of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused; On April 11, 2014,
the Court received a Letter dated April 10, 2014 from the Correctional Institution for Women informing
the Court of the death of one of the accused-appellants in this case, Remedios, on March 7, 2014. In a
Resolution dated September 9, 2015, the Court required the Superintendent of the Correctional
Institution for Women to furnish the Court with a certified true copy of Remedios’s death certificate
and, in compliance thereto, the same was submitted by Officer-In-Charge Elsa Aquino-Alabado on
February 11, 2016. As Remedios’s death transpired before the promulgation of the Court’s July 7, 2014
Resolution in this case, i.e., when her appeal before the Court was still pending resolution, her criminal
liability is totally extinguished in view of the provisions of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
****
496
424. Bautista vs. Doniego, Jr., 797 SCRA 724, July 20, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ; Petition for Review on Certiorari ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; For appellate
jurisdiction to attach, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the petitioner must have
invoked the jurisdiction of the CA within the time for doing so; (b) he must have filed his petition for
review within the reglementary period; (c) he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and (d) the
other parties must have perfected their appeals in due time. In this regard, the Rules of Court require
that in an appeal by way of a petition for review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner
upon the timely filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. To perfect the
appeal, the party has to file the petition for review and to pay the docket fees within the prescribed
period. The law and its intent are clear and unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and
the payment of the docket fees. Consequently, without the petition, the CA cannot be said to have
acquired jurisdiction over the case.
****
497
425. International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. vs. Greenpeace
Southeast Asia (Philippines), 798 SCRA 250, July 26, 2016
Syllabi Class :Judicial Review ;
1. Judicial Review; I reserve opinion on whether the “exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest” can be a ground for ruling on a case despite it becoming moot and
academic. In my view, a more becoming appreciation of the judiciary’s role in the entire constitutional
order should always give pause to go beyond the issues crystallized by an actual case with a real,
present controversy. Going beyond the parameters of a live case may be an invitation to participate in
the crafting of policies properly addressed to the other departments and organs of government. I am of
the belief that the judiciary should take an attitude of principled restraint.
2. Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual,
ongoing controversies. The requirement of the existence of a “case” or an “actual controversy” for the
proper exercise of the power of judicial review proceeds from Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution: Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied) Accordingly, the
Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In other words,
when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
3. Actions; Moot and Academic; Words and Phrases; An action is considered “moot” when it no
longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead
or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial
intervention unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the
court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events. Nevertheless,
case law states that the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest
are involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. Thus, jurisprudence recognizes these four instances as exceptions to the mootness principle.
4. Same; Same; Jurisprudence in this jurisdiction has set no hard-and-fast rule in determining whether
a case involves paramount public interest in relation to the mootness principle. However, a survey of
cases would show that, as a common guidepost for application, there should be some perceivable benefit
to the public which demands the Court to proceed with the resolution of otherwise moot questions.
5. Genetically Modified Organisms; Bt Talong; At this juncture, it is important to understand that the
completion and termination of the field tests do not mean that herein petitioners may inevitably proceed
to commercially propagate Bt talong. There are three (3) stages before genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) may become commercially available under DAO 08-2002 and each stage is distinct, such that
“[subsequent stages can only proceed if the prior stage/s [is/]are completed and clearance is given to
engage in the next regulatory stage.” Specifically, before a genetically modified organism is allowed
to be propagated under DAO 08-2002: (a) a permit for propagation must be secured from the BPI; (b)
it can be shown that based on the field testing conducted in the Philippines, the regulated article will
not pose any significant risks to the environment; (c) food and/or feed safety studies show that the
regulated article will not pose any significant risks to human and animal health; and (d) if the regulated
article is a pest-protected plant, its transformation event has been duly registered with the FPA.
6. Judicial Review; Actual Case or Controversy; It would appear to be more beneficial to the public
to stay a verdict on the safeness of Bt talong-
— or genetically modified organisms (GMOs) for that matter — until an actual and justiciable case
properly presents itself before the Supreme Court (SC).—As the matter never went beyond the field
testing phase, none of the foregoing tasks related to propagation were pursued or the requirements
therefor complied with. Thus, there are no guaranteed after-effects to the already concluded Bt talong
field trials that demand an adjudication from which the public may perceivably benefit. Any future
threat to the right of herein respondents or the public in general to a healthful and balanced ecology is
498
therefore more imagined than real. In fact, it would appear to be more beneficial to the public to stay
a verdict on the safeness of Bt talong — or GMOs, for that matter — until an actual and justiciable
case properly presents itself before the Court. In his Concurring Opinion on the main, Associate Justice
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) had aptly pointed out that “the findings [resulting from the Bt
talong field trials] should be the material to provide more rigorous scientific analysis of the various
claims made in relation to Bt talong.” True enough, the concluded field tests — like those in these cases
— would yield data that may prove useful for future studies and analyses. If at all, resolving the petition
for Writ of Kalikasan would unnecessarily arrest the results of further research and testing on Bt talong,
and even GMOs in general, and hence, tend to hinder scientific advancement on the subject matter.
7. Writs of Kalikasan; It is clear that no benefit would be derived by the public in assessing the merits
of field trials whose parameters are not only unique to the specific type of Bt talong tested, but are now,
in fact, rendered obsolete by the supervening change in the regulatory framework applied to GMO field
testing. To be sure, DAO 08-2002 has already been superseded by Joint Department Circular No. 1,
Series of 2016 (JDC 01-2016), issued by the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), the DA,
the DENR, the Department of Health (DOH), and the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG), which provides a substantially different regulatory framework from that under DAO 08-2002
as will be detailed below. Thus, to resolve respondents’ petition for Writ of Kalikasan on its merits,
would be tantamount to an unnecessary scholarly exercise for the Court to assess alleged violations of
health and environmental rights that arose from a past test case whose bearings do not find any — if
not minimal — relevance to cases operating under today’s regulatory framework.
8. Judicial Review; Capable of Repetition; More obviously, the supersession of DAO 08-2002 by JDC
01-2016 clearly prevents this case from being one capable of repetition so as to warrant review despite
its mootness. To contextualize, JDC 01-2016 states that: Section 1. Applicability.—This Joint
Department Circular shall apply to the research, development, handling and use, transboundary
movement, release into the environment, and management of genetically modified plant and plant
products derived from the use of modern technology, included under “regulated articles.” As earlier
adverted to, with the issuance of JDC 01-2016, a new regulatory framework in the conduct of field
testing now applies.
9. Genetically Modified Organisms; JDC 01-2016 also prescribes additional qualifications for the
members of the Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP), the pool of scientists that evaluates the
risk assessment submitted by the applicant for field trial, commercial propagation, or direct use of
regulated articles. Aside from not being an official, staff or employee of the DA or any of its attached
agencies, JDC 01-2016 requires that members of the STRP: (a) must not be directly or indirectly
employed or engaged by a company or institution with pending applications for permits under JDC 01-
2016; (b) must possess technical expertise in food and nutrition, toxicology, ecology, crop protection,
environmental science, molecular biology and biotechnology, genetics, plant breeding, or animal
nutrition; and (c) must be well-respected in the scientific community.
10. Judicial Review; Capable of Repetition; Based on the foregoing, it is apparent that the regulatory
framework now applicable in conducting risk assessment in matters involving the research,
development, handling, movement, and release into the environment of genetically modified plant and
plant products derived from the use of modern biotechnology is substantially different from that which
was applied to the subject field trials. In this regard, it cannot be said that the present case is one
capable of repetition yet evading review. The essence of cases capable of repetition yet evading review
was succinctly explained by the Court in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 (2013), where the
constitutionality of the Executive Department’s lump-sum, discretionary funds under the 2013 General
Appropriations Act, known as the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), was assailed. In that
case, the Court rejected the view that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and academic
by the reforms undertaken by the Executive Department and former President Benigno Simeon S.
Aquino III’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF.”
11. Same; Same; At this point, the Court discerns that there are two (2) factors to be considered before
a case is deemed one capable of repetition yet evading review: (1) the challenged action was in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action. Here, respondents
cannot claim that the duration of the subject field tests was too short to be fully litigated. It must be
499
emphasized that the Biosafety Permits for the subject field tests were issued on March 16, 2010 and
June 28, 2010, and were valid for two (2) years. However, as aptly pointed out by Justice Leonen,
respondents filed their petition for Writ of Kalikasan only on April 26, 2012 — just a few months before
the Biosafety Permits expired and when the field testing activities were already over. Obviously,
therefore, the cessation of the subject field tests before the case could be resolved was due to
respondents’ own inaction.
12. Same; Separation of Powers; While the provisions of DAO 08-2002 were averred to be inadequate
to protect (a) the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology since “said
regulation failed, among others, to anticipate ‘the public implications caused by the importation of
GMOs in the Philippines’”; and (b) “the people from the potential harm these genetically modified
plants and genetically-modified organisms may cause human health and the environment, [and] thus,
x x x fall short of Constitutional compliance,” respondents merely prayed for its amendment, as well as
that of the NBF, to define or incorporate “an independent, transparent, and comprehensive scientific
and socio-economic risk assessment, public information, consultation, and participation, and providing
for their effective implementation, in accord with international safety standards[.]” This attempt to
assail the constitutionality of the public information and consultation requirements under DAO 08-
2002 and the NBF constitutes a collateral attack on the said provisions of law that runs afoul of the
well-settled rule that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be collaterally attacked as constitutionality
issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally. Verily, the policy of the courts is to avoid ruling
on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a
clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary, in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers.
This means that the measure had first been carefully studied by the executive department and found to
be in accord with the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved.
****
500
426. Grace Park International Corp. vs. Eastwest Banking Corp., 798 SCRA 644, July 27, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Forum Shopping ; Identity of Causes of Action ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Identity of Causes of Action; With respect to the second and third requisites of
forum shopping, “[h]ornbook is the rule that identity of causes of action does not mean absolute
identity; otherwise, a party could easily escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of
the action or the relief sought. The test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the
facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both,
the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent
action. Hence, a party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting
his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice
litigated between the same parties or their privies. Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining
whether two suits relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence
would support and sustain both the first and second causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in
one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also fundamental is the test of
determining whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the first
complaint.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases; At the outset, it must be
emphasized that “[forum shopping] is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial
remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same
issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of
obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. What is important in determining
whether [forum shopping] exists is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who
asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions
being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues.”
3. Same; Same; Same; Elements of. ----- In Heirs of Marcelo Sotto v. Palicte, 716 SCRA 175 (2014),
the Court held that “[t]he test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of
litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res judicata in the other.
Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements are present, namely: (a) identity of parties,
or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration.”
4. Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; Litis Pendentia; In reference to the foregoing, litis pendentia is
a Latin term, which literally means “a pending suit” and is variously referred to in some decisions as
lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the
situation where two (2) actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so
that one (1) of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity
of suits.
5. Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Identity of Parties; Anent the first requisite of forum shopping,
“[t]here is identity of parties where the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between
them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action, litigating
for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. Absolute identity of parties is not
required, shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this principle. Thus, it is
enough that there is a community of interest between a party in the first case and a party in the second
case even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case.”
****
501
427. Medina vs. Koike, 798 SCRA 733, July 27, 2016
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Well-entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier
of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these
matters are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard,
it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be brought to
the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
2. Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Divorce; Article 26 of the Family Code-
— which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner —
allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained
abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.—At the outset, it bears stressing that
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However,
Article 26 of the Family Code — which addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner — allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision
reads: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between
a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
3. Same; Same; Same; The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution
of the marriage. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010), the Court had the occasion to rule
that: The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as
a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country.” This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
4. Same; Same; Same; In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), it was pointed out that in order for
a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown
that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree
and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Since our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the
existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a reevaluation
of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question
of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review.
****
502
428. Torrefiel vs. Beauty Lane Phils., Inc., 799 SCRA 470, August 03, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Two-Notice Rule ;
1. Same; Same; Two-Notice Rule; Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that two (2) written
notices are required before termination of employment can be legally effected, namely: (1) the notice
which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and
(2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.
2. Remedial Law; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It should be pointed out that only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court
is not a trier of facts and does not routinely reexamine the evidence presented by the contending parties.
3. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; Illegal Dismissals; Burden of Proof; It is settled that in
employee termination disputes such as the present case, the employer bears the burden of proving that
the employee’s dismissal was for a lawful cause. Equipoise is not enough and the employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.
4. Same; Same; Loss of Trust and Confidence; It should be pointed out that while Torrefiel was
essentially a salesman, he did not occupy a position of trust and confidence, the loss of which is a just
cause for dismissal. To recall, there are two (2) classes of positions of trust: the first class consists of
managerial employees or those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management
policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or
effectively recommend such managerial actions; the second class consists of cashiers, auditors,
property custodians, and the like who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly
handle significant amounts of money or property.
5. Same; Same; Same; At any rate, even assuming that he regularly handled significant amounts of
money or property, he cannot be dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence considering
that the basis therefor has not been established. It is settled that for dismissal based on such ground to
be valid, the act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach of
trust and founded on clearly established facts which was not the case here.
****
503
429. CIR vs. Goodyear Philippines, Inc., 799 SCRA 489, August 03, 2016
Syllabi Class :RP-US Tax Treaty ;
1. RP-US Tax Treaty; Under Article 11(5) of the RP-US Tax Treaty, the term “dividends” should be
understood according to the taxation law of the State in which the corporation making the distribution
is a resident, which, in this case, pertains to respondent, a resident of the Philippines. Accordingly,
attention should be drawn to the statutory definition of what constitutes “dividends,” pursuant to
Section 73(A) of the Tax Code which provides that “[t]he term ‘dividends’ x x x means any distribution
made by a corporation to its shareholders out of its earnings or profits and payable to its shareholders,
whether in money or in other property.”
2. Taxation; Tax Refund; Section 229 of the Tax Code states that judicial claims for refund must be
filed within two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty, providing further that the same
may not be maintained until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (CIR).
3. Same; Same; The primary purpose of filing an administrative claim was to serve as a notice of
warning to the CIR that court action would follow unless the tax or penalty alleged to have been
collected erroneously or illegally is refunded. To clarify, Section 229 of the Tax Code — [then Section
306 of the old Tax Code] — however does not mean that the taxpayer must await the final resolution of
its administrative claim for refund, since doing so would be tantamount to the taxpayer’s forfeiture of
its right to seek judicial recourse should the two (2)-year prescriptive period expire without the
appropriate judicial claim being filed.
****
504
430. People vs. Egagamao, 799 SCRA 507, August 03, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinction of Criminal Liability ;
1. Same; Same; Upon Egagamao’s death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it
is on the criminal action.
2. Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Under Article 89(1) of the RPC, the consequences
of Egagamao’s death are as follows: Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal
liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before
final judgment.
****
505
431. Tatlonghari vs. Bangko Kabayan-Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc., 799 SCRA 516, August 03, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Amendment of Pleadings ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; Jurisprudence states that bona fide amendments to pleadings should be allowed
in the interest of justice so that every case may, so far as possible, be determined on its real facts and
the multiplicity of suits thus be prevented. Hence, as long as it does not appear that the motion for leave
was made with bad faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are justified to grant leave and
allow the filing of an amended pleading.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Amendment of Pleadings; Our rules of procedure allow a party in
a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once
and before a responsive pleading is served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within
ten days after it is served). Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court.
****
506
432. Nuezca vs. Villagarcia, 799 SCRA 542, August 08, 2016
Syllabi Class :Practice of Law ; Attorneys ;
1. Same; Same; Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language
and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but
not offensive.
2. Practice of Law; Attorneys; The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high
standards of legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability.
****
507
433. Holcim Philippines, Inc. vs. Obra, 799 SCRA 607, August 08, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ; Reinstatement ; Backwages ;
1. Same; Same; Reinstatement; Backwages; In Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. v. Pionilla, 704
SCRA 362 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) ordered the reinstatement of the employee without
backwages on account of the following: (a) the fact that the dismissal of the employee would be too
harsh a penalty; and (b) that the employer was in good faith in terminating the employee.-
—Meanwhile, anent the propriety of awarding back wages, the Court observes that respondent’s
transgression — even if not deserving of the ultimate penalty of dismissal — warrants the denial of the
said award following the parameters in Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. v. Pionilla, 704 SCRA 362
(2013). In that case, the Court ordered the reinstatement of the employee without backwages on account
of the following: (a) the fact that the dismissal of the employee would be too harsh a penalty; and (b)
that the employer was in good faith in terminating the employee.
2. Labor Law; Termination of Employment; There is no question that the employer has the inherent
right to discipline, including that of dismissing its employees for just causes. This right is, however,
subject to reasonable regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. Accordingly, the finding
that an employee violated company rules and regulations is subject to scrutiny by the Court to determine
if the dismissal is justified and, if so, whether the penalty imposed is commensurate to the gravity of his
offense.
3. Same; Same; Time and again, the Court has held that infractions committed by an employee should
merit only the corresponding penalty demanded by the circumstance. The penalty must be
commensurate with the act, conduct or omission imputed to the employee.
4. Same; Same; Misconduct; Words and Phrases; Misconduct is an improper or wrong conduct, or a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. To constitute a valid
cause for dismissal within the text and meaning of Article 282 (now Article 297) of the Labor Code, the
employee’s misconduct must be serious, i.e., of such grave and aggravated character and not merely
trivial or unimportant, as in this case where the item which respondent tried to take out was practically
of no value to petitioner.
5. Same; Same; Illegal Dismissal; As a general rule, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to: (a)
reinstatement (or separation pay, if reinstatement is not viable); and (b) payment of full backwages.
6. Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Strained Relations; Separation Pay; It is settled that the doctrine
on “strained relations” cannot be applied indiscriminately since every labor dispute almost invariably
results in “strained relations”; otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some
hostility is engendered between the parties as a result of their disagreement. It is imperative, therefore,
that strained relations be demonstrated as a fact and adequately supported by substantial evidence
showing that the relationship between the employer and the employee is indeed strained as a necessary
consequence of the judicial controversy.
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508
434. Dongga-as vs. Cruz-Angeles, 799 SCRA 624, August 09, 2016
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Suspension from Practice of Law ;
1. Same; Suspension from Practice of Law; Anent the proper penalty for Attys. Cruz-Angeles and
Paler, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs, failed
to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, and at the same time committed acts of
misrepresentation and deceit against their clients, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
2. Attorneys; Case law exhorts that, “once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound
to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and
devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable.”
3. Same; It bears stressing that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and
prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship
imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from
his client. Thus, a lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client,
as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in
violation of the trust reposed in him by his client.
4. Same; It is every lawyer’s duty to maintain the high regard to the profession by staying true to his
oath and keeping his actions beyond reproach. It must be reiterated that as an officer of the court, it is
a lawyer’s sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice; as acts and/or omissions
emanating from lawyers which tend to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of
the government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus, all lawyers should be bound
not only to safeguard the good name of the legal profession, but also to keep inviolable the honor,
prestige, and reputation of the judiciary.
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509
435. People vs. Manago, 801 SCRA 103, August 17, 2016
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Warrantless Searches and Seizures ;
1. Same; Same; It is well to clarify, however, that routine inspections do not give police officers carte
blanche discretion to conduct warrantless searches in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle
is stopped and subjected to an extensive search — as opposed to a mere routine inspection — such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
2. Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates
that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated
upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes “unreasonable”
within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable
searches and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained
and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
3. Same; Warrantless Searches and Seizures; Searches and Seizures; One of the recognized
exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made
— the process cannot be reversed.
4. Same; Same; Three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected.-
—There are three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected. These are: (a) an
arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge
of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which
had just been committed; and (c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
5. Same; Same; A variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setup of
military or police checkpoints — as in this case — which, based on jurisprudence, are not illegal per
se for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists.
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510
436. Gargallo vs. Dohle Seafront Crewing (Manila), Inc., 801 SCRA 135, August 17, 2016
1. Attorney’s fees; As a rule, the mere fact of having been forced to litigate to protect one’s interest
does not amount to a compelling legal reason to justify an award of attorney’s fees in the claimant’s
favor. Verily, jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that attorney’s fees may be awarded to a
claimant who is compelled to litigate with third persons or incur expenses to protect his interest by
reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought only when there
is sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of the latter in refusing to pay.
2. Republic Act No. 8042; Corporate Liabilities; Overseas Filipino Workers; Section 10 of RA No.
8042, as amended, expressly provides for joint and solidary liability of corporate directors and officers
with the recruitment/placement agency for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to
Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs). While a corporate director, trustee, or officer who entered into
contracts in behalf of the corporation generally cannot be held personally liable for the liabilities of
the latter, in deference to the separate and distinct legal personality of a corporation from the persons
composing it, personal liability of such corporate director, trustee, or officer, along (although not
necessarily) with the corporation, may validly attach when he is made by a specific provision of law
personally answerable for his corporate action, as in this case.
3. Same; Same; Same; Section 10 of RA 8042, as amended, and the pertinent POEA Rules are deemed
incorporated in petitioner’s employment contract with respondents. These provisions are in line with
the State’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating the workers’ plight, and are meant to
assure OFWs immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Thus, as the law provides,
corporate directors and officers are themselves solidarily liable with the recruitment/placement agency
for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to OFWs.
4. Overseas Filipino Workers; Social Security System; The Court cannot subscribe to respondents’
contention that entitlement to income benefit is applicable only to land-based employees compulsorily
registered with the Social Security System (SSS), considering that the 2010 POEA-SEC accords upon
the manning agency/foreign principal the duty to cover Filipino seafarers under the SSS and other
social protection government agencies.
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511
437. HSY Marketing Ltd. Co. vs. Villastique, 801 SCRA 163, August 17, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Service Incentive Leave ;
1. Same; Same; “Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who has served
‘within 12 months, whether continuous or broken, reckoned from the date the employee started working,
including authorized absences and paid regular holidays unless the working days in the establishment
as a matter of practice or policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months,
in which case said period shall be considered as one [(1)] year.’ It is also commutable to its money
equivalent if not used or exhausted at the end of the year. In other words, an employee who has served
for one (1) year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or he may collect its monetary value.”
2. Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; Case law instructs that the issue of whether or not
an employer-employee relationship exists in a given case is essentially a question of fact. It is settled
that the Court is not a trier of facts, and this rule applies with greater force in labor cases. Generally,
it may only look into factual issues in labor cases when the factual findings of the LA, the NLRC, and
the CA are conflicting.
3. Same; Illegal Dismissals; Termination of Employment; Other than the latter’s unsubstantiated
allegation of having been verbally terminated from his work, no substantial evidence was presented to
show that he was indeed dismissed or was prevented from returning to his work. In the absence of any
showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioner had dismissed respondent, the latter’s claim
of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained, as such supposition would be self-serving, conjectural, and of
no probative value.
4. Same; Same; Same; Abandonment; Petitioner’s claims of respondent’s voluntary resignation
and/or abandonment deserve scant consideration, considering petitioner’s failure to discharge the
burden of proving the deliberate and unjustified refusal of respondent to resume his employment without
any intention of returning. It was incumbent upon petitioner to ascertain respondent’s interest or
noninterest in the continuance of his employment, but to no avail.
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Reinstatement; Hence, since there is no dismissal or abandonment to
speak of, the appropriate course of action is to reinstate the employee (in this case, herein respondent)
without, however, the payment of backwages.
6. Same; Same; Same; Separation Pay; Properly speaking, liability for the payment of separation pay
is but a legal consequence of illegal dismissal where reinstatement is no longer viable or feasible. As a
relief granted in lieu of reinstatement, it goes without saying that an award of separation pay is
inconsistent with a finding that there was no illegal dismissal. This is because an employee who had
not been dismissed, much less illegally dismissed, cannot be reinstated.
7. Same; Service Incentive Leave; The Court has already held that company drivers who are under the
control and supervision of management officers — like respondent herein — are regular employees
entitled to benefits including service incentive leave pay.
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512
438. People vs. Bagamano, 801 SCRA 209, August 17, 2016
Syllabi Class :Rape ; Moral Damages ; Civil Indemnity ; Exemplary Damages ;
1. Rape; Moral Damages; Civil Indemnity, Exemplary Damages; The Court finds it necessary to
modify the amount of exemplary damages awarded to AAA in order to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence. Hence, accused appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amount of P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Meanwhile, the awards of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages
are affirmed.
2. Criminal Procedure; Appeals; It must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire
case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that
the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and
renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the
penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
3. Same; Information; It must be stressed that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him to ensure that his due process rights
are observed. Thus, every indictment must embody the essential elements of the crime charged with
reasonable particularity as to the name of the accused, the time and place of commission of the offense,
and the circumstances thereof. Hence, to consider matters not specifically alleged in the Information,
even if proven in trial, would be tantamount to the deprivation of the accused’s right to be informed of
the charge lodged against him.
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513
439. Sagun vs. ANZ Global Services & Operations(Mnl), Inc., 801 SCRA 243, August 22, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ;
1. Same; Same; In a contract with a suspensive condition, if the condition does not happen, the
obligation does not come into effect. Thus, until and unless petitioner complied with the satisfactory
background check, there exists no obligation on the part of ANZ to recognize and fully accord him the
rights under the employment contract.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. There is no contract
unless the following essential requisites concur: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain
which is the subject matter of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation which is established.
3. Same; Same; In general, contracts undergo three distinct stages. These are negotiation, perfection
or birth, and consummation. Negotiation begins from the time the prospective contracting parties
manifest their interest in the contract and ends at the moment of their agreement. Thereafter, perfection
or birth of the contract takes place when the parties agree upon the essential elements of the contract.
Finally, consummation occurs when the parties fulfill or perform the terms agreed upon in the contract,
culminating in the extinguishment thereof.
4. Same; Same; An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the moment the parties
come to agree upon its terms and conditions, and thereafter, concur in the essential elements thereof.
In this relation, the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions
as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy.
5. Same; Same; In the realm of civil law, a condition is defined as “every future and uncertain event
upon which an obligation or provision is made to depend. It is a future and uncertain event upon which
the acquisition or resolution of rights is made to depend by those who execute the juridical act.”
Jurisprudence states that when a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its effectivity shall take
place only if and when the event which constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled.
6. Same; Same; While a contract may be perfected in the manner of operation described above, the
efficacy of the obligations created thereby may be held in suspense pending the fulfillment of particular
conditions agreed upon. In other words, a perfected contract may exist, although the obligations arising
therefrom — if premised upon a suspensive condition — would yet to be put into effect.
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514
440. Almojuela vs. Republic, 801 SCRA 399, August 24, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Correction of Entry ; Civil Registry ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In sum, the failure to strictly comply with the above discussed requirements of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for correction of an entry in the civil registrar involving substantial and
controversial alterations renders the entire proceedings therein null and void.
2. Remedial Law; Correction of Entry; Civil Registry; Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the
procedure for the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry through an appropriate
adversary proceeding. An adversary proceeding is defined as one “having opposing parties; contested,
as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.”
3. Same; Same; Same; A reading of Sections 4 and 5 shows that the Rule mandates two (2) sets of
notices to potential oppositors: one given to persons named in the petition, and another given to other
persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties. Consequently, the petition for a substantial correction of an entry in the civil registry should
implead as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any
interest that would be affected thereby.
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515
441. Reyes vs. Heirs of Benjamin Malance, 801 SCRA 485, August 24, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Contracts ; Antichresis ;
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Antichresis; Elements of a contract of antichresis.-
—Antichresis involves an express agreement between parties whereby: (a) the creditor will have
possession of the debtor’s real property given as security; (b) such creditor will apply the fruits of the
said property to the interest owed by the debtor, if any, then to the principal amount; (c) the creditor
retains enjoyment of such property until the debtor has totally paid what he owes; and (d) should the
obligation be duly paid, then the contract is automatically extinguished proceeding from the accessory
character of the agreement.
2. Remedial Law; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It should be mentioned that the remedy of appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only questions of law, not of fact. While
it is not the function of the Court to reexamine, winnow and weigh anew the respective sets of evidence
of the parties, there are, however, recognized exceptions, among which is when the inference drawn
from the facts was manifestly mistaken, as in this case.
3. Notary Public; Notarized Documents; Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary
public have in their favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence. However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed
only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular.
4. Same; Same; A defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and reduce it to
a private document. Consequently, when there is a defect in the notarization of a document, the clear
and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with,
and the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence.
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516
442. Corpuz vs. Rivera, 801 SCRA 572, August 30, 2016
Syllabi Class :Courts ; Court Personnel ;
1. Courts; Court Personnel; It is well to reiterate that “those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of
justice, and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the
Judiciary and the people’s confidence in it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the
service and it had never and will never tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms
of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice
system.”
2. Administrative Law; Misconduct; Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. To
warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important, weighty, momentous,
and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and
must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer’s official
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the
duties of the office.
3. Courts; Court Personnel; In admittedly engaging in her unauthorized business, Rivera fell short of
the standard required of Judiciary employees, let alone public servants in general. Her money-lending
activities — which were done even during office hours and within the court premises — surely put the
integrity of her office under suspicion, as it gave the impression that she took advantage of her position
and abused the confidence reposed in her in doing her business.
4. Administrative Law; Simple Misconduct; Under Section 46(D), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple misconduct is a less grave offense which merits the
penalty of suspension for a period ranging from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the
first offense and dismissal from service for the second offense.
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517
443. Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman vs. Castillo, 801 SCRA 586,
August 30, 2016
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Grave Misconduct ;
1. Same; Same; The Court finds respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct which is classified as a grave
offense punishable by dismissal even for first time offenders, with all the accessory penalties. By
jurisprudence, the Court has additionally imposed the forfeiture of all other benefits, except accrued
leave credits, salaries and allowances earned up to the time of dismissal.
2. Ombudsman; As a general rule, factual findings of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported
by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight, especially when affirmed by the CA.
In this case, except as to the legal conclusion on what administrative offense was committed by
respondent, the OMB and the CA are one in finding that respondent committed a misconduct.
3. Administrative Law; Misconduct; Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful
conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It is intentional wrongdoing or
deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior and to constitute an administrative offense,
the misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties
of a public officer.
4. Same; Grave Misconduct; In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the
elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must
be manifest. Without any of these elements, the transgression of an established rule is properly
characterized merely as simple misconduct.
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518
444. Reyes vs. Nieva, 802 SCRA 196, September 06, 2016
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Good Moral Character ; Sexual Harassment ; Watching Pornographic
Materials ; Penalties ; Suspension from Practice of Law ;
1. Same; Good Moral Character; Sexual Harassment; Watching Pornographic
Materials; Penalties;Suspension from Practice of Law; Jurisprudence provides that in similar
administrative cases where the lawyer exhibited immoral conduct, the Court meted penalties ranging
from reprimand to disbarment. In Advincula v. Macabata, 517 SCRA 600 (2007), the lawyer was
reprimanded for his distasteful act of suddenly turning the head of his female client towards him and
kissing her on the lips. In De Leon v. Pedreña, 708 SCRA 13 (2013), the lawyer was suspended from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for rubbing the female complainant’s right leg with his
hand, trying to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand, grabbing her hand and forcibly placed it
on his crotch area, and pressing his finger against her private part. While in Guevarra v. Eala, 529
SCRA 1 (2007), and Valdez v. Dabon, Jr., 775 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court meted the extreme penalty of
disbarment on the erring lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs. Here, respondent exhibited his
immoral behavior through his habitual watching of pornographic materials while in the office and his
acts of sexual harassment against complainant. Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court
deems it proper to impose upon respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Good Moral Character; Good moral character is a trait that every
practicing lawyer is required to possess. It may be defined as “what a person really is, as distinguished
from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality.” Such requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes, namely:
(a) to protect the public; (b) to protect the public image of lawyers; (c) to protect prospective clients;
and (d) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.
3. Same; Same; Same; Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon
admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in
this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for
any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
4. Same; Same; Same; The Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP) where he was engaged
at that time as Acting Corporate Secretary — but also because it shrouds the legal profession in a
negative light.—Without a doubt, it has been established that respondent habitually watches
pornographic materials in his office-issued laptop while inside the office premises, during office hours,
and with the knowledge and full view of his staff. Obviously, the Court cannot countenance such
audacious display of depravity on respondent’s part not only because his obscene habit tarnishes the
reputation of the government agency he works for — the CAAP where he was engaged at that time as
Acting Corporate Secretary — but also because it shrouds the legal profession in a negative light. As a
lawyer in the government service, respondent is expected to perform and discharge his duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence, and skill, and with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. However, his aforesaid habit miserably fails to showcase these standards, and
instead, displays sheer unprofessionalism and utter lack of respect to the government position he was
entrusted to hold. His flimsy excuse that he only does so by himself and that he would immediately close
his laptop whenever anyone would pass by or come near his table is of no moment, because the lewdness
of his actions, within the setting of this case, remains. The legal profession — much more an engagement
in the public service should always be held in high esteem, and those who belong within its ranks should
be unwavering exemplars of integrity and professionalism. As keepers of the public faith, lawyers, such
as respondent, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution. Indeed, those who have taken the oath to assist in the dispensation
of justice should be more possessed of the consciousness and the will to overcome the weakness of the
flesh, as respondent in this case.
5. Administrative Proceedings; Evidence; Substantial Evidence; Based on a survey of cases, the recent
ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco, 793 SCRA 309 (2016), which was promulgated just this June
15, 2016. In the said case, it was pronounced that: In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof
519
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is that mere
allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and
speculation likewise cannot be given credence. (Emphasis supplied) Accordingly, this more recent
pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any further confusion on the proper evidentiary
threshold to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers.
6. Attorneys; The evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence — as opposed to preponderance of
evidence — is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending
this type of cases. As case law elucidates, “[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice
by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.”
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520
445. People vs. Lintag, 802 SCRA 257, September 06, 2016
1. Same; Same; Same; An examination of the records, however, reveals that as indicated in the PNP
Crime Laboratory’s receiving stamp on the request for laboratory examination, it was SPO3 Valdez —
and not SPO2 Gonzales — who delivered such request and presumably, the seized plastic sachets as
well, to Forensic Chemical Officer PI Mariano. This immediately puts into question how SPO3 Valdez
came into possession of the seized items, which was neither explained by the prosecution through the
presentation of testimonial or documentary evidence, nor sufficiently addressed by the courts a quo.
Thus, absent any adequate explanation on the matter, there arises a substantial gap in the chain of
custody of the plastic sachets seized from Lintag. Undoubtedly, this compromises the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti of the crime charged. It is settled that in criminal prosecutions
involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime
calls for the necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in
which, the acquittal of the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, as in
this case.
—Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165 reads in part: Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled
Precursors and Essential Chemicals.—The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker
in any of such transactions. x x x. x x x x To secure a conviction under the aforesaid provision, the
prosecution must establish the concurrence of the following elements: (a) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
Material for such conviction is proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the
presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. “As the dangerous drug itself forms an integral and
key part of the corpus delicti of the crime, it is therefore essential that the identity of the prohibited drug
be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must be able to account for each link in
the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the
time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti.”
3. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; In view of the importance of ensuring that the dangerous drug
seized from an accused is the same as that presented in court as evidence against him, Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 provides for a “chain of custody rule,” or a standard protocol which the police
officers must adhere to in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized contraband.
In People of the Philippines v. Sumili, 750 SCRA 143 (2015), the Court explained that, while strict
adherence to the said rule is desired, any deviation from the same is acceptable so long as there is
ample justification for the same and that the evidentiary value of the seized contraband is preserved,
viz.: To expand, Section 21 of RA 9165 provides the “chain of custody rule” outlining the procedure
that the apprehending officers should follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve its
integrity and evidentiary value. It requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending team that has initial
custody over the seized drugs immediately conduct an inventory and take photographs of the same in
the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or of the accused’s or the
person’s representative or counsel, a representative from the media, the Department of Justice, and any
elected public official who shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and (b) the seized drugs be turned
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its confiscation for examination purposes.
While the “chain of custody rule” demands utmost compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 as well as jurisprudence nevertheless
provide that noncompliance with the requirements of this rule will not automatically render the seizure
and custody of the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such non-
compliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Hence, any
divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items. ****
521
446. Sindac vs. People, 802 SCRA 270, September 06, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Constitutional Law ; Search Warrants ; Searches
Incidental to a Lawful Arrest ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As a consequence of the Sindac’s unlawful arrest, it follows that
there could be no valid search incidental to a lawful arrest which had yielded the plastic sachet
containing 0.04 gram of shabu from Sindac. Notably, while it is true that Sindac: (a) failed to question
the legality of the warrantless arrest against him before arraignment; and (b) actively participated in
the trial of the case, it must nevertheless be clarified that the foregoing constitutes a waiver ONLY as
to any question concerning any defects in his arrest, AND NOT with regard to the inadmissibility of the
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
3. Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Search Warrants; Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes
“unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Searches Incidental to a Lawful Arrest; One of the recognized
exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made
— the process cannot be reversed. A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With
respect to the latter, the parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should — as a general rule — be complied with: Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113,
two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section
5(b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had
committed it. In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an
offense is essential. Under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the officer
himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5(b) of the same, he knows for a fact that a crime has just
been committed.
6. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; —Neither has the prosecution established that the conditions set
forth in Section 5(b), Rule 113 — that is, that an offense had in fact just been committed and the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it — have
been complied with. From the circumstances above discussed, it is fairly suspect that PO3 Peñamora
522
had personal knowledge that a crime had been committed by Sindac. According to jurisprudence, “the
arresting officer’s determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or
raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested,” which, however do not obtain in this case.
7. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is settled that “reliable information” alone-
— even if it was a product of well-executed surveillance operations — is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest.—It is, in fact, quite perceivable that PO3 Peñamora and PO1 Asis had proceeded
to apprehend Sindac solely on account of information retrieved from previous surveillance operations
conducted on Sindac’s alleged drug dealing activities. Advancing to a warrantless arrest based only on
such information, absent circumstances that would lead to the arresting officer’s “personal knowledge”
as described in case law, unfortunately, skews from the exacting requirements of Section 5, Rule 113.
It is settled that “reliable information” alone — even if it was a product of well-executed surveillance
operations — is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. It is further required that the accused
performs some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense, which, as already discussed, is missing in the instant case.
****
523
447. Egger vs. Duran, 802 SCRA 571, September 14, 2016
Syllabi Class :Attorney-Client Relationship ;
1. Same; The Court sustains the IBP’s recommendation ordering respondent to return the amount of
P100,000.00 he received from complainant as legal fees. It is well to note that “while the Court has
previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the
respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains
applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance, when the claim
involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement.” Hence, since respondent received the aforesaid
amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.
2. Attorney-Client Relationship; A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in January
2014, complainant and Reposo had already forged a lawyer-client relationship with respondent,
considering that the latter agreed to file a petition for annulment of marriage in their behalf, and in
connection therewith, received the aggregate amount of P100,000.00 representing legal fees. Case law
instructs that a lawyer-client relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement to handle
a client’s case and accepts money representing legal fees from the latter, as in this case. Respondent’s
contention that he only has a lawyer-client relationship with Reposo but not with her husband, the
complainant, is belied by the letter dated April 25, 2014 signed by no less than Reposo herself which
shows that she and complainant jointly sought the services of respondent to work on their annulment
case, but had to eventually withdraw therefrom on account of respondent’s failure to render any actual
legal service despite their agreement and payment of legal fees amounting to P100,000.00.
3. Same; Once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with
competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts
it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed upon him.
4. Same; Respondent admittedly breached this duty when he failed to prepare, much less file, the
appropriate pleading to initiate complainant and Reposo’s case before the proper court. Respondent’s
additional contention that his failure to file the petition was due to complainant and Reposo’s failure
to remit the full acceptance fee of P150,000.00 is not an excuse to abandon his client’s cause
considering that his duty to safeguard his client’s interests commences from his retainer until his
effective discharge from the case or the final disposition of the entire subject matter of litigation. To
reiterate, respondent’s act of agreeing to handle complainant’s case, coupled with his acceptance of
the partial payment of P100,000.00, already established an attorney-client relationship that gave rise
to his duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Indubitably, respondent’s neglect of a legal matter entrusted
him by complainant and Reposo constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable.
5. Same; The relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer
a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a
lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case,
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional
ethics.
6. Same; Case law provides that in similar instances where lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and
at the same time failed to return the latter’s money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed
upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.
****
524
448. Onstott vs. Upper Tagpos Neighborhood Assn, Inc., 803 SCRA 280, September 14, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Legal Interest ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Legal Interest; Words and Phrases; “Legal interest” is defined as interest in property or a
claim cognizable at law, equivalent to that of a legal owner who has legal title to the property. It must
be one that is actual and material, direct and immediate, not simply contingent or expectant. Moreover,
although the taxable person who has actual and beneficial use and possession of a property may be
charged with the payment of unpaid realty tax due thereon, such assumption of liability does not clothe
the said person with the legal title or interest over the property.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon
the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is acquired
either through the service of summons upon them or through their voluntary appearance in court and
their submission to its authority.
3. Same; Same; Same; In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy Hong Pi, 588 SCRA
612 (2009), it was ruled that “[a]s a general proposition, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion
to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is
considered voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept
of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among
others, the court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) Special appearance operates as an exception
to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in
instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for
resolution.”
4. Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Property Relations; Article 160 of the New Civil Code
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. However, the party who invokes this
presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. Proof
of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this presumption must first prove the said time
element. Needless to say, the presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and
does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
Moreover, this presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong, clear and
convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses.
****
525
449. Felicilda vs. Uy, 803 SCRA 296, September 14, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Employer-Employee Relationship ; Control Test ;
1. Same; Same; Control Test; The presence of the element of control, which is the most important
element to determine the existence or absence of employment relationship, can be safely deduced from
the fact that: (a) respondent owned the trucks that were assigned to petitioner; (b) the cargoes loaded
in the said trucks were exclusively for respondent’s clients; and (c) the schedule and route to be followed
by petitioner were exclusively determined by respondent. The latter’s claim that petitioner was
permitted to render service to other companies was not substantiated and there was no showing that he
indeed worked as truck driver for other companies. Given all these considerations, while petitioner was
free to carry out his duties as truck driver, it cannot be pretended that respondent, nonetheless,
exercised control over the means and methods by which the former was to accomplish his work. To
reiterate, the power of control refers merely to the existence of the power. It is not essential for the
employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee, as it is sufficient that the
former has a right to wield the power, as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; At the outset, it should
be mentioned that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is generally limited to reviewing errors of law and does not extend to a
reevaluation of the sufficiency of evidence upon which the courts a quo had based its determination.
This rule, however, is not ironclad and a departure therefrom may be warranted where the findings of
fact of the LA and the NLRC, on the one hand, and the CA, on the other, are contradictory, as in this
case. There is therefore a need to review the records to determine whether the CA, in the exercise of its
certiorari jurisdiction, erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that
respondent was not illegally dismissed.
4. Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; To ascertain the existence of an employer-
employee relationship, jurisprudence has invariably adhered to the four (4)-fold test, to wit: (1) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the power to control the employee’s conduct, or the so-called “control test.”-
—To ascertain the existence of an employer-employee relationship, jurisprudence has invariably
adhered to the four-fold test, to wit: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment
of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employee’s conduct, or the so-
called “control test.” Verily, the power of the employer to control the work of the employee is
considered the most significant determinant of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. This
is the so-called “control test,” and is premised on whether the person for whom the services are
performed reserves the right to control both the end achieved and the manner and means used to achieve
that end. It must, however, be stressed that the “control test” merely calls for the existence of the right
to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof. To be clear, the test does not require that the
employer actually supervises the performance of duties by the employee.
****
526
450. Bulauitan vs. People, 803 SCRA 367, September 19, 2016
Syllabi Class :Constitutional Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Searches and Seizures ;
1. Same; Same; Same; A search under the strength of a warrant is required to be witnessed by the
lawful occupant of the premises sought to be searched. It must be stressed that it is only upon their
absence that their presence may be replaced by two (2) persons of sufficient age and discretion residing
in the same locality. In People v. Go, 411 SCRA 81 (2003), the Court held that a departure from the
said mandatory rule — by preventing the lawful occupant or a member of his family from actually
witnessing the search and choosing two (2) other witnesses observe the search — violates the spirit and
letter of the law, and thus, taints the search with the vice of unreasonableness, rendering the seized
articles inadmissible due to the application of the exclusionary rule.
3. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Searches and Seizures; Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a
judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure
becomes “unreasonable” within the meaning of the said constitutional provision. To protect the people
from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides
that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of
such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. It must, however, be clarified that a search warrant issued in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give the authorities
limitless discretion in implementing the same as the same Rules provide parameters in the proper
conduct of a search. Section 8, Rule 126 of the aforesaid Rules, states that: SEC. 8. Search of house,
room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses.—No search of a house, room or any other
premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality.
****
527
451. Coca-Cola Femsa Philippines, Inc. vs. Bacolod Sales Force Union-Congress of Independent
Organization-ALU, 804 SCRA 139, September 21, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ; Petition for Review ; Voluntary
Arbitrators ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review; Voluntary Arbitrators;
—Case law holds that the proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrators’ or a Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators’ decision or award is to appeal the award or decision before the CA under Rule
43 of the Rules on questions of fact, of law, mixed questions of fact and law, or a mistake of judgment.
However, in several cases, the Court allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari from the VA’s
judgment to the CA under Rule 65 of the same Rules, where the VA was averred to have acted without
or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
2. Labor Law; Arbitration; In the context of labor law, arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute
to an impartial third person for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by
such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding.
However, in view of the nature of their functions, voluntary arbitrators act in a quasi-judicial capacity;
hence, their judgments or final orders which are declared final by law are not so exempt from judicial
review when so warranted. “Any agreement stipulating that ‘the decision of the arbitrator shall be final
and unappealable’ and ‘that no further judicial recourse if either party disagrees with the whole or any
part of the arbitrator’s award may be availed of’ cannot be held to preclude in proper cases the power
of judicial review which is inherent in courts.”
****
528
452. Manila Doctors College vs. Olores, 804 SCRA 482, October 03, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Separation Pay ;
1. Same; Separation Pay; The Court deems inconsequential petitioners’ submissions that respondent
had claimed separation pay during the execution proceedings at the NLRC level and had also alleged
strained relations (and therefore, intimated separation pay) in his pleadings. The Court had previously
ruled in Pfizer, Inc. that the circumstance that the employee opted for separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement as manifested in her counsel’s letter had no legal effect, not only because there was no
genuine compliance by the employer of the reinstatement order but also because the employer chose
not to act on said claim. The same observations are made in this case. As aptly pointed out by the CA,
there was “apparent apathy” on the part of petitioners towards the reinstatement order issued by LA
Amansec during the pendency of their appeal therefrom. Hence, for failure of the petitioners to comply
with said order, the CA correctly declared respondent to be entitled to the payment of his accrued
salaries during the period of the appeal until the reversal of the December 8, 2010 Decision of LA
Amansec. The NLRC’s Decision dated December 26, 2012, which deleted the said award on the notion
that the same had no more basis in view of the eventual ruling declaring respondent’s dismissal to be
legal, failed to take into account the provisions of the Labor Code and existing jurisprudence on the
immediately executory nature of reinstatement, as well as the consequences of noncompliance.
Palpably, this smacks of grave abuse of discretion as properly found by the CA. As jurisprudence
conveys, there is “grave abuse of discretion x x x when a lower court or tribunal patently violates x x x
the law or existing jurisprudence.”
2. Labor Law; Reinstatement; Under Article 223 (now Article 229) of the Labor Code, “the decision
of the [LA] reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is
concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted
back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at
the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall
not stay the execution for reinstatement x x x.” Verily, the employer is duty-bound to reinstate the
employee, failing which, the employer is liable instead to pay the dismissed employee’s salary.
However, in the event that the LA’s decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employer’s duty to
reinstate the dismissed employee is effectively terminated. This means that an employer is no longer
obliged to keep the employee in the actual service or in the payroll. The employee, in turn, is not
required to return the wages that he had received prior to the reversal of the LA’s decision.
Notwithstanding the reversal of the finding of illegal dismissal, an employer, who, despite the LA’s
order of reinstatement, did not reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal up to the
reversal by a higher tribunal may still be held liable for the accrued wages of the employee, i.e., the
unpaid salary accruing up to the time of the reversal. By way of exception, an employee may be barred
from collecting the accrued wages if shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal
was without fault on the part of the employer.
****
529
453. Buenviaje vs. Salonga, 805 SCRA 369, October 05, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Damages ; Attorney’s Fees ;
1. Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; As to attorney’s fees, the general rule is that the same cannot be
recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to
litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.
Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his
rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be
reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of
his cause.
2. Civil Law; Obligations; Reciprocal Obligations; Specific performance and “rescission” (more
accurately referred to as resolution) are alternative remedies available to a party who is aggrieved by
a counterparty’s breach of a reciprocal obligation. This is provided for in Article 1191 of the Civil
Code, which partly reads: Art. 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in
case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may
choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of damages in
either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become
impossible.
3. Same; Same; Specific Performance; Words and Phrases; Specific performance is defined as “[t]he
remedy of requiring exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or
according to the precise terms agreed upon.” It pertains to “[t]he actual accomplishment of a contract
by a party bound to fulfill it.”
4. Same; Same; Rescission; Resolution under Article 1191 of the Civil Code will not be permitted for
a slight or casual breach, but o Resolution is defined as the “unmaking of a contract for a legally
sufficient reason x x x.” “[Resolution] does not merely terminate the contract and release the parties
from further obligations to each other, but abrogates the contract from its inception and restores the
parties to their original positions as if no contract has been made. Consequently, mutual restitution,
which entails the return of the benefits that each party may have received as a result of the contract, is
thus required.” Notably, resolution under Article 1191 of the Civil Code “will not be permitted for a
slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the
very object of the parties in making the agreement. Ultimately, the question of whether a breach of
contract is substantial depends upon the attending circumstances.”
5. Same; Contracts; Principle of Relativity of Contracts; In this case, it is undisputed that Sps. Salonga
were not parties to the above mentioned contract. Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, it is a basic
principle in civil law on relativity of contracts, that contracts can only bind the parties who had entered
into it and it cannot favor or prejudice third persons. Contracts take effect only between the parties,
their successors in interest, heirs and assigns. Thus, absent any privity of contract as to them, there is
no basis to hold Sps. Salonga liable for any of the obligations stated under the said contract to sell. At
this juncture, it should be further made clear that the imputation of joint or solidary liability against a
particular person — such as that insistently claimed against Sps. Salonga by Buenviaje — first
presupposes the existence of that person’s obligation. On the active side, the joint or solidary nature of
an obligation is an aspect of demandability; it pertains to the extent of a creditor’s entitlement to
demand fulfillment against any or all of his debtors under one particular obligation. Based on case law,
a solidary obligation is one in which each of the debtors is liable for the entire obligation, and each of
the creditors is entitled to demand the satisfaction of the whole obligation from any or all of the debtors.
On the other hand, a joint obligation is one in which each debtors is liable only for a proportionate
part of the debt, and the creditor is entitled to demand only a proportionate part of the credit from each
debtor.
6. Same; Partnership; There is no perceptible legal basis to hold them solidarily liable under Articles
1822 and 1824 of the Civil Code. These provisions, which are found under Section 3, Chapter 2, Title
IX, Book IV of the Civil Code on Partnership, respectively state: Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful
act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the partnership or with
the authority of his copartners, loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the
partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the
530
partner so acting or omitting to act. x x x x Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the
partnership for everything chargeable to the partnership under Articles 1822 and 1823. Evidently, the
foregoing legal provisions pertain to the obligations of a copartner in the event that the partnership to
which he belongs is held liable. In this case, Buenviaje never dealt with any partnership constituted by
and between Jebson and Sps. Salonga. As previously mentioned, the subject CTS, which was the source
of the obligations relative to the completion and delivery of Unit 5, solely devolved upon the person of
Jebson. As there was no partnership privy to any obligation to which Buenviaje is a creditor, Articles
1822 and 1824 of the Civil Code do not apply.
7. Same; Contracts; Rescission; Words and Phrases;
Pursuant to Articles 1177 and 1313 of the Civil Code, creditors are given remedies whenever their
debtors perform acts or omissions or enter into contracts that tend to defraud the former of what is due
them. Such remedy comes in the form of rescission under Articles 1381(3) in relation to Articles 1383
and 1384 of the Civil Code. Rescission (as contemplated in Articles 1380 to 1389 of the Civil Code) is
a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties and even to third persons, to secure the reparation
of damages caused to them by a contract, even if this should be valid, by restoration of things to their
condition at the moment prior to the celebration of the contract. It implies a contract, which even if
initially valid, produces a lesion or a pecuniary damage to someone. In the rescission by reason of
lesion or economic prejudice, the cause of action is subordinated to the existence of that prejudice,
because it is the raison d’être as well as the measure of the right to rescind. Hence, where the defendant
makes good the damages caused, the action cannot be maintained or continued, as expressly provided
in Articles 1383 and 1384.
8. Same; Damages; Moral Damages; In order that moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil
Code may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and
the like. In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., 419 SCRA 118 (2004), the Court explained: While no proof of
pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
being left to the discretion of the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily
show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendant’s acts. This
is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an
award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
the wrongdoer. In Francisco v. GSIS, the Court held that there must be clear testimony on the anguish
and other forms of mental suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to
his/her social humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded. In
Cocoland Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that
“additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil
Code, these being, x x x social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc., that resulted
therefrom.”
****
531
454. Sy-Vargas vs. The Estate of Rolando Ogsos, Sr., 805 SCRA 438, October 05, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Docket Fees ; Counterclaims ;
1. Same; Same; Docket Fees; Counterclaims; Verily, respondents’ reliance on the findings of the
courts a quo, albeit erroneous, exhibits their good faith in not paying the docket fees, much more their
intention not to defraud the government. Thus, the counterclaim should not be dismissed for non-
payment of docket fees. Instead, the docket fees required shall constitute a judgment lien on the
monetary awards in respondents’ favor. In Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v.
Alonzo-Legasto, 487 SCRA 339 (2006), citing Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the Court held
that in instances where a litigant’s nonpayment of docket fees was made in good faith and without any
intention of defrauding the government, the clerk of court of the court a quo should be ordered to assess
the amount of deficient docket fees due from such litigant, which will constitute a judgment lien on the
amount awarded to him, and enforce such lien, as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Period; The CA failed to take into consideration that March 29,
2014 fell on a Saturday. In these situations, Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 1. How to compute time.—In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the
last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place
where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day. Since March 29, 2014 fell on a
Saturday, petitioner and Kathryn were completely justified in filing their motion for reconsideration on
the next working day: Monday, March 31, 2014. Accordingly, the CA should not have considered it
filed out of time, and instead, resolved such motion on the merits. In such an instance, court procedure
dictates that the instant case be remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits. However, when there
is already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may be had — as in this case — the
Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in
the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of justice. In view of the foregoing — as well as
the fact that petitioner prayed for the resolution of the substantive issues on the merits — the Court
finds it appropriate to resolve the substantive issues of this case.
3. Same; Same; Counterclaims; Docket Fees; Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is
determinative of whether or not the counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule in
permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound
to pay the prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect to compulsory
counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
4. Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In general, a counterclaim is any claim which a defending
party may have against an opposing party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable
by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim
is barred if not set up in the same action. On the other hand, a counterclaim is permissive if it does not
arise out of or is not necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim. It is
essentially an independent claim that may be filed separately in another case.
5. Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Docket Fees; Counterclaims; Permissive Counterclaims In view of the
finding that the counterclaim is permissive, and not compulsory as held by the courts a quo, respondents
are required to pay docket fees. However, it must be clarified that respondents’ failure to pay the
required docket fees, per se, should not necessarily lead to the dismissal of their counterclaim. It has
long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees, its nonpayment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading does not
automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a reasonable period; and
(b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the government.
****
532
455. Dumanlag vs. Intong, 805 SCRA 489, October 10, 2016
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Penalties ; Disbarment ; Suspension ;
1. Same; Penalties; Disbarment; Suspension; It has been stressed that the determination of whether
an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion. The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading range from reprimand,
warning with fine, suspension, and, in grave cases, disbarment. In the present case, the Court finds too
harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months. After all, respondent did file his mandatory conference brief
before the IBP where he cited the Resolution dated July 19, 2010 of the Court, requiring him to file his
comment to the complaint. He also attended the mandatory conference/hearing scheduled by the IBP,
although he failed to file his position paper despite the directive to do so. Under the circumstances, and
considering that this appears to be respondent’s first infraction, the Court finds it proper to reprimand
him with warning that commission of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.
This is consistent with the ruling in the recent case of Andres v. Nambi, 752 SCRA 110 (2015), where
respondent therein was found to have ignored the Court’s resolution directing him to file comment, and
to have failed to attend the mandatory conference before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline despite
notice, as well as to file his position paper. Since it was also his first infraction, respondent therein was
merely reprimanded by the Court, as in this case.
2. Attorneys; It has been consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is
innocent of the charges against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he
is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath. Thus, in disbarment proceedings,
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers,
the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
However, in this case, complainant failed to discharge the burden of proving his accusations of gross
misconduct on the part of the respondent.
3. Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; Complainant’s allegation of force and compulsion
accompanying the letter dated February 8, 2010 is negated by the very words used therein. Respondent
described said letter in the opening paragraph as a “letter request for [complainant’s] presence.” He
then went on to close the letter with “[h]oping for your [(complainant’s)] preferential and positive
action on this matter” and “[m]y highest esteem.” As aptly pointed out by Commissioner Villanueva in
his Report and Recommendation, the letter was “carefully worded, done in a respectful manner.” There
was absolutely nothing on the face of the letter that would justify complainant’s indignation against any
discourtesy or discrimination against him. The letter was a mere invitation for complainant to attend a
settlement and pre-litigation conference, which respondent, as a lawyer, is obligated to pursue. Under
Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), “[a] lawyer shall encourage his
clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.” There was nothing
wrong, therefore, with respondent’s efforts to set up a conference between complainant and his clients.
4. Same; Legal Ethics; Respondent cannot, however, escape accountability for his repetitive disregard
of the resolutions of the Court requiring him to file his comment to the complaint and to pay the fine
imposed upon him for his failure to do so. As correctly pointed out by Commissioner Villanueva, the
Court issued three resolutions dated July 19, 2010, March 9, 2011, and September 28, 2011, requiring
respondent to file his comment, to show cause for his failure to file, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 for
such failure. But all three were left unheeded. Respondent ought to know that orders of the court are
“not mere requests but directives which should have been complied with promptly and completely.”
“He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the legal profession ‘to obey the laws and
the legal orders of the duly constituted legal authorities.’ x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer
who is called upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in complying
with court directives as an officer of the court,” pursuant to Canon 11 of the CPR, which mandates that
“[a] lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers x x x.”
****
533
456. National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms (NASECORE) vs. MERALCO,
805 SCRA 501, October 10, 2016
Syllabi Class :Rate-fixing ; Public Utilities ;
1. Same; Same; Because of the variances in its premises and assumptions, the ERC’s shift from the
RORB to the PBR methodology should therefore be deemed as a supervening circumstance that
rendered inconsequential this Court’s provisional approval of the rate increases applied for by
MERALCO in Lualhati which was made under the context of the now-defunct RORB system.
Accordingly, the issue of whether or not the ERC should have first took into account the findings in the
COA audit before approving MERALCO’s applications in ERC Case Nos. 2008-004 RC and 2008-018
RC as directed in Lualhati has become moot and academic. In Carpio v. CA, 692 SCRA 162 (2013), it
was explained that “[a] case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use,” as the aforesaid issue raised in this
case. For all these reasons, the petition is therefore denied.
2. Administrative Regulations; The rule is settled that “[a]dministrative regulations enacted by
administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce have
the force of law x x x and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside
with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.” As such, they “cannot be attacked
collaterally. Unless [such] rule is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of its validity
stands.”
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; The general rule is
that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised.-
—The resolution of the instant petition would nonetheless entail a determination of factual matters
which is proscribed in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The general
rule is that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. In this case,
petitioners contest the reasonableness of the rates approved by the ERC inasmuch as it granted
MERALCO’s application for the approval of its ARR and determination of its MAP covering the
regulatory period of 2007-2011. In support of their protest, petitioners presented factual data which
purportedly show MERALCO’s strong financial position for the last 21 years (1987-2007), considering
that it had actually earned a total of P88,960.00 for every P1,000.00 investment, which translates to a
gain of 8,896% on their actual investments. For its part, MERALCO contests petitioners’ “misleading
assertions,” clarifying that petitioners incorrectly assumed that the original value of the common shares
issued is the only investment of the investors, and further maintained that when net income earned
throughout the years are retained by a company as accumulated in the Retained Earnings account and
are used for the company’s continuing operations, it is considered a reinvestment, and therefore should
be an addition to the investors’ investment in the company.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Case law provides that the test of whether a question is one of law or
of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.-
—Case law provides that the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation
given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question
of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. As applied in this case, in order to assess the reasonableness
of the rates approved by the ERC, there is a glaring need to scrutinize the veracity of the adverse
allegations of both parties, which, in turn, necessitates an examination of the evidence in support
thereof. Therefore, the issue on reasonableness posed in the petition inevitably treads the territory of
questions of fact, which is generally proscribed from review in a Rule 45 petition, as in this case.
5. Rate-fixing; Public Utilities; Administrative Agencies; It must be stressed that since rate-fixing calls
for a technical examination and a specialized review of specific details which the courts are ill-equipped
to enter, such matters are primarily entrusted to the administrative or regulating authority. Hence, the
factual findings of administrative officials and agencies that have acquired expertise in the performance
of their official duties and the exercise of their primary jurisdiction are generally accorded not only
respect but, at times, even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Absent any of
534
the exceptions laid down by jurisprudence, such factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies, especially
when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court.
6. Same; Same; As determined by the ERC, which was affirmed by the CA, petitioners failed to
sufficiently show that the rates approved in the proceedings below were unreasonable as they claimed
to be. As pointed out by the CA, MERALCO’s rate applications were approved only after the ERC
conducted the necessary proceedings, received evidence in support of the applications and, thereafter,
made an independent evaluation of the same. Thus, the CA cannot be faulted in sustaining the
reasonableness of the rates approved by the ERC. In Ynchausti Steamship Co. v. Public Utility
Commissioner, 42 Phil. 621 (1922), this Court articulated that “[t]here is a legal presumption that the
fixed rates are reasonable, and it must be conceded that the fixing of rates by the Government, through
its authorized agents, involves the exercise of reasonable discretion and unless there is an abuse of that
discretion, the courts will not interfere.”
7. Same; Same; It is well to point out that Lualhati is traced from ERC Case Nos. 2001-646 and 2001-
900, which cover MERALCO’s application for rate increase when the ERC was still adopting the RORB
methodology in its rate-setting function. In other words, the need of a COA audit, under the auspices of
the Lualhati ruling, pertained to MERALCO’s rates when it was still under the RORB system. During
the pendency of this case, the ERC shifted to the PBR methodology, which premises and assumptions
are conceptually different from that followed in the RORB. In particular, under the RORB methodology,
power rates were set to recover the cost of service prudently incurred, i.e., historical costs, plus a
reasonable rate of return. This means that actual and reasonable costs were used for a prescribed test
year to determine the revenue requirement, with the use of the test year assuming that the past
relationship among revenue, costs, and net investment during said test year will continue into the future.
On the other hand, the PBR methodology deviates from the use of historical costs, and instead, uses
projections of operating and capital expenditures to meet projected demand, thereby enabling the
regulated entities to invest in facilities to meet customer requirements and prescribed service levels.
This methodology also features a performance incentive scheme which provides incentives and
penalties to the utility to compel it to be more efficient and reliable, while maintaining reasonable rates
and improving the quality of service to achieve pre-determined target levels.
****
535
457. People vs. Layag, 806 SCRA 190, October 17, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Civil Liability ; Separate Civil Actions ;
1. Same; Civil Liability; Separate Civil Actions; Upon Layag’s death pending appeal of his conviction,
the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused;
the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that Layag’s civil
liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts;
in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of Layag, as may be warranted
by law and procedural rules.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgments;
The Court is constrained to reopen the case despite the finality of the August 3, 2015 Resolution. In
Bigler v. People, 785 SCRA 479 (2016), the Court explained that it has the power to relax the doctrine
of immutability of judgment if, inter alia, there exists a special or compelling circumstance warranting
the same, viz.: Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether
it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this
principle must immediately be struck down. Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a
hard and fast rule as the court has the power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the
demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor, or property; (b) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) the lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the other party will not
be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
3. Criminal Law; Criminal Liability; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Under prevailing law and
jurisprudence, Layag’s death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal
cases against him. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit: Article 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment.
****
536
458. Magsano vs. Pangasinan Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., 806 SCRA 197, October 17, 2016
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Co-ownership ; Estoppel ;
1. Same; Same; Estoppel; In Estoque v. Pajimula, 24 SCRA 59 (1968), a specific portion of a co-owned
property was sold, albeit a specific portion of a land that was owned in common. I believe that this is no
different from the situation of Susana who sold the entire co-owned property, that is, a specific parcel of
land when she only had an undivided interest therein. Stated differently, the rationale for not recognizing
the effectivity of the disposition over a specific portion equally applies to the disposition by a co-owner of
the entire co-owned or undivided property that is more than the undivided share rightfully pertaining to the
disposing co-owner. Estoque characterizes the contract entered into by the disposing co-owner as
“ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the deed.” This
characterization makes room for a subsequent ratification of the contract by the other co-owners or
validation in case the disposing co-owner acquires subsequently the undivided interests of the other co-
owners. Such subsequent ratification or acquisition will validate and make the contract fully effective.
Estoque was a decision rendered by this Court En Banc, and has not been expressly overturned; hence, it
remains a sound case law, which I believe should be the controlling jurisprudence. Even if Article 493 is
inapplicable in this case, I concur in the conclusion that the validity of the mortgage executed by Susana
binds her undivided interest in the subject conjugal property based on the principle of estoppel. Under
Article 1431 of the Civil Code, “[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Preliminarily, the rule
is settled that the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court contemplates only
questions of law, not of fact. While it is not the function of the Court to reexamine, winnow and weigh anew
the respective sets of evidence of the parties, there are, however, recognized exceptions, one of which is
when the inference drawn from the facts was manifestly mistaken, as in this case.
3. Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Certificate of Title; While the rule is that every person dealing
with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the
law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property,
where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, as in this case, the purchaser
must go beyond the certificate of title and make inquiries concerning the actual possessor. As this Court
explained in the case of Sps. Mathay v. CA, 295 SCRA 556 (1998): Although it is a recognized principle
that a person dealing [with] a registered land need not go beyond its certificate of title, it is also a
firmly settled rule that where there are circumstances which would put a party on guard and prompt
him to investigate or inspect the property being sold to him, such as the presence of occupants/tenants
thereon, it is, of course, expected from the purchaser of a valued piece of land to inquire first into the
status or nature of possession of the occupants, i.e., whether or not the occupants possess the land en
concepto de dueño, in concept of owner. As is the common practice in the real estate industry, an ocular
inspection of the premises involved is a safeguard a cautious and prudent purchaser usually takes.
Should he find out that the land he intends to buy is occupied by anybody else other than the seller who,
as in this case, is not in actual possession, it would then be incumbent upon the purchaser to verify the
extent of the occupant’s possessory rights. The failure of a prospective buyer to take such precautionary
steps would mean negligence on his part and would thereby preclude him from claiming or invoking
the rights of a “purchaser in good faith.”
4. Civil Law; Co-ownership; In sustaining the validity of the mortgage on the subject conjugal property
insofar as the aliquot or pro indiviso share or interest of Susana is concerned, the ponencia relies on
Article 493 of the Civil Code. I believe this is inaccurate. Article 493 provides: ART. 493. Each co-
owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he
may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to
the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. This article recognizes the absolute ownership by a co-owner of his
aliquot or undivided share and his right to alienate, assign or mortgage and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment. However, the co-owner’s right to alienate is limited to only his undivided share
and does not in any way affect any definite portion of the thing owned in common since before partition
a co-owner will not know what portion of the property will actually belong to him. ****
537
459. People vs. Goco, 806 SCRA 240, October 17, 2016
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Dangerous Drugs Act ; Chain of Custody Rule ; Marking ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Marking; Verily, marking the drugs or other related items immediately upon
seizure from the accused is crucial in proving the chain of custody as it is the starting point in the
custodial link. The marking upon seizure serves a twin purpose, first is to give the succeeding handlers
of the specimen a reference, and second to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other
similar or related evidence from the moment of seizure until their disposition at the end of criminal
proceedings, thereby obviating switching, “planting,” or contamination of evidence. The police
officers’ failure to mark the seized items may lead to the acquittal of the accused based on reasonable
doubt.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in
criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct,
cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision
of the penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must establish the following: (a) the identities of the buyer, seller, object, and
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. What remains material for
conviction is proof that the transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti. On the other hand, in order to convict an accused for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a
dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
4. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) mirror the
content of Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 but adds that the said inventory and photography
may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of
warrantless seizure, and that noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA No. 9165-
— under justifiable grounds — will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team.—In this relation, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of
custody rule, outlining the procedure that police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in
order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory and photograph the
seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of
the same. The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) mirror the content of Section 21 of RA 9165
but adds that the said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or
office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that noncompliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 — under justifiable grounds — will not render void and invalid
the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team.
5. Same; Same; Same; As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with the
procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR. However, their failure to do so does not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable ground
for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.
6. Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the moment of seizure, to receipt
of the same by the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping, and finally to the presentation of the drugs or
chemicals in court for destruction. The chain of custody requirement is strictly applied when the
538
evidence sought to be presented is not distinctive and not readily identifiable, or when its condition at
the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same
standard applies to evidence susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination, and substitution or
exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration, or tampering
dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. One of the physical
characteristics of shabu is that it is fungible in nature, and similar in appearance to substances used by
people in their daily activities. As it is not readily distinguishable from other substances, and from other
samples of shabu, the chain of custody requirement must be strictly complied with in order to render it
improbable that the seized items are exchanged with another, or contaminated, or tampered with.
7. Same; Same; Same; In order to fulfill the chain of custody requirement, the prosecution must identify
the persons who handled the seized items from seizure up until their presentation in court as evidence.
To do so, the prosecution must present testimonies about every link in the chain, in such a way that
every person who touched the illegal drugs would describe how and from whom they were received,
where they were and what happened to them while in his or her possession, the condition in which he
or she received them, and their condition upon delivery. The witnesses must describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there was no change in the condition of the illegal drugs and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possessed the said items. Also, crucial in proving the chain of custody
is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the
accused.
****
539
460. Toyota Pasig, Inc. vs. De Peralta, 807 SCRA 120, November 07, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Presumptions ;
1. Same; Presumptions; In fact, during the proceedings before the LA, petitioner was even given the
opportunity to submit pertinent company records to rebut respondent’s claims but opted not to do so,
thus, constraining the LA to direct respondent to submit her own computations. It is well-settled that
the failure of employers to submit the necessary documents that are in their possession gives rise to the
presumption that the presentation thereof is prejudicial to its cause.
2. Labor Law; Wages; In this case, respondent’s monetary claims, such as commissions, tax rebates
for achieved monthly targets, and success share/profit sharing, are given to her as incentives or forms
of encouragement in order for her to put extra effort in performing her duties as an ISE. Clearly, such
claims fall within the ambit of the general term “commissions” which in turn, fall within the definition
of wages pursuant to prevailing law and jurisprudence.
3. Same; Burden of Proof; The allegation of nonpayment of monetary benefits places the burden on
the employer, to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty that it paid said benefits and that the
employee actually received such payment or that the employee was not entitled thereto.
****
540
461. Sta. Isabel vs. Perla Compañia de Seguros, Inc., 807 SCRA 162, November 07, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Willful Disobedience ;
1. Same; Willful Disobedience; Willful disobedience or insubordination, as a just cause for the
dismissal of an employee, necessitates the concurrence of at least two (2) requisites, namely: (a) the
employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful, that is, characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and (b) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee,
and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Petition for Review on Certiorari; To justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-
judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes
a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, done in a despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, the character of which being so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
3. Labor Law; Appeals; Grave Abuse of Discretion; In labor disputes, grave abuse of discretion may
be ascribed to the NLRC when, inter alia, its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.
****
541
462. Quebral vs. Angbus Construction, Inc., 807 SCRA 176, November 07, 2016
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Project Employees ;
1. Same; Project Employees; It is clear that the submission of the termination report to the DOLE “may
be considered” only as an indicator of project employment. By the provision’s tenor, the submission of
this report, by and of itself, is therefore not conclusive to confirm the status of the terminated employees
as project employees, especially in this case where there is a glaring absence of evidence to prove that
petitioners were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking, and that they were informed of
the duration and scope of their supposed project engagement, which are, in fact, attendant to the first
two (2) indicators of project employment in the same DOLE issuance above cited.
2. Remedial Law; Petition for Review on Certiorari; In a Rule 45 review, the Court examines the
correctness of the CA’s Decision in contrast with the review of jurisdictional errors under Rule 65.
Furthermore, Rule 45 limits the review to questions of law.
3. Labor Law; Appeals; Grave Abuse of Discretion; In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be
ascribed to the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence,
which refers to that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.
4. Remedial Law; Petition for Review on Certiorari; On the procedural aspect, the Court notes that
the issue of the timeliness of the filing of the appeal is a factual issue that requires a review of the
evidence presented on when the appeal was actually filed. Thus, it is generally not covered by a Rule
45 review.
5. Same; Civil Procedure; Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court provides that where pleadings are
filed by registered mail, the date of mailing as shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the
registry receipt shall be considered as the date of filing. Based on this provision, the date of filing is
determinable from two sources: (1) from the post office stamp on the envelope or (2) from the registry
receipt, either of which may suffice to prove the timeliness of the filing of the pleadings.
6. Same; Same; The Court previously ruled that if the date stamped on one is earlier than the other,
the former may be accepted as the date of filing. This presupposes, however, that the envelope or
registry receipt and the dates appearing thereon are duly authenticated before the tribunal where they
are presented. When the photocopy of a registry receipt bears an earlier date but is not authenticated,
the Court held that the later date stamped on the envelope shall be considered as the date of filing.
7. Labor Law; Project Employees; A project-based employee is assigned to a project which begins and
ends at determined or determinable times. Unlike regular employees who may only be dismissed for
just and/or authorized causes under the Labor Code, the services of employees who are hired as project-
based employees may be lawfully terminated at the completion of the project.
8. Same; Same; To safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word “project” to
preclude them from attaining regular status, jurisprudence provides that employers claiming that their
workers are project-based employees have the burden to prove that these two requisites concur: (a) the
employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b) the duration and scope
of which were specified at the time they were engaged for such project.
9. Same; Same; The Court previously ruled that although the absence of a written contract does not by
itself grant regular status to the employees, it is evidence that they were informed of the duration and
scope of their work and their status as project employees at the start of their engagement. When no
other evidence is offered, the absence of employment contracts raises a serious question of whether the
employees were sufficiently apprised at the start of their employment of their status as project
employees.
10. Same; Section 11, Rule X, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Rules)
requires the employer to keep all employment records in the main or branch office where the employees
are assigned. It also prohibits the keeping of employees’ records elsewhere.
****
542
463. Buenaflor Car Services, Inc. vs. David, Jr., 807 SCRA 191, November 07, 2016
1. Same; Case law states that “labor suits require only substantial evidence to prove the validity of the
dismissal.” Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that enough substantial evidence exist to
support petitioner’s claim that respondent was involved in the aforediscussed scheme to defraud the
company, and hence, guilty of serious misconduct and/or willful breach of trust which are just causes
for his termination.
2. Labor Law; Burden of Proof; Fundamental is the rule that an employee can be dismissed from
employment only for a valid cause. The burden of proof rests on the employer to prove that the dismissal
was valid, failing in which, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.
3. Same; Termination of Employment; Serious Misconduct; Misconduct is defined as an improper or
wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.
For serious misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the concurrence of the following elements is
required: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s
duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it
must have been performed with wrongful intent.
4. Same; Same; Loss of Trust and Confidence; For loss of trust to be a ground for dismissal, the
employee must be holding a position of trust and confidence, and there must be an act that would justify
the loss of trust and confidence. While loss of trust and confidence should be genuine, it does not require
proof beyond reasonable doubt, it being sufficient that there is some basis for the misconduct and that
the nature of the employee’s participation therein rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position.
5. Same; National Labor Relations Commission; The NLRC should not have bound itself by the
technical rules of procedure as it is allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules in deciding labor
cases. The NLRC Rules of Procedure state that “[t]he rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of
law or procedure x x x.”
****
543
464. Camaso vs. TSM Shipping (Phils.), Inc., 807 SCRA 204, November 07, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Docket Fees ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The failure to pay the required docket fees per se should not necessarily lead
to the dismissal of a case. It has long been settled that while the court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees, its nonpayment at the time of filing of the
initiatory pleading does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within
a reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud the
government.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Docket Fees;
—Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed before the CA, such
as a petition for certiorari, the payment of the corresponding docket fees is required, and that the
failure to comply with the same shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of such action.
****
544
465. Curammeng vs. People, 808 SCRA 613, November 14, 2016
Syllabi Class :Liberal Interpretation ;
1. Same; Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a
litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with
the procedure prescribed. Corollarily, the rule, which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client,
may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in the outright deprivation of the
client’s liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires.
2. Petition for Review; Appeals of cases decided by the RTCs in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
are taken by filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Section 2, thereof, provides
that such petitions shall be accompanied by, inter alia, material portions of the record which would
support the allegations of said petitions as well as a certification of non-forum shopping.
3. Appeals; The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; It must be stressed that
since a petition for review is a form of appeal, noncompliance with the foregoing rule may render the
same dismissible. This is in furtherance of the well-settled rule that “the right to appeal is not a natural
right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. A party who seeks to avail of the right must, therefore,
comply with the requirements of the rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost.”
4. Liberal Interpretation; Nevertheless, if a rigid application of the rules of procedure will tend to
obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in light of the prevailing circumstances of the
case, such as where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the Court
may relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
****
545
466. Gamboa vs. People, 808 SCRA 624, November 14, 2016
1. Same; Same; Same; Case law states that, the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA
9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality;
or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. For indeed, however,
noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of our campaign against illegal drugs may be, it is still
a governmental action that must always be executed within the boundaries of law.
2. Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases
opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and
appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs; In this case,
Gamboa was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA
9165. In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified
as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.
4. Same; Same; Chain of Custody Rule; Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody
rule, outlining the procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to
preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized
items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and
the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination.
5. Same; Same; Same; The saving clause in Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 applies only where the prosecution has recognized
the procedural lapses on the part of the police officers or Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) agents, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds; after which, the prosecution
must show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved.-
—As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section
21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR. However, their failure to do so does not ipso facto render the
seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid if: (a) there is justifiable ground for
noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
The aforementioned saving clause in Section 21, Article II of the IRR of RA 9165 applies only where
the prosecution has recognized the procedural lapses on the part of the police officers or PDEA agents,
and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds; after which, the prosecution must show that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved.
6. Same; Same; Same; When police officers do not turn over dangerous drugs to the laboratory within
twenty-four (24) hours from seizure, they must identify its custodian, and the latter must be called to
testify. The custodian must state the security measures in place to ensure that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items were preserved, which did not take place in this case.
****
546
467. Evangelista vs. Andolong III, 809 SCRA 271, November 16, 2016
Syllabi Class :Damages ; Temperate Damages ;
1. Damages; Temperate Damages; Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court is convinced that
Nanito should have received remittances representing net profits from respondents, albeit he failed to
prove the exact amount he should receive from the latter. In Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation v.
DMC-Construction Resources, Inc., 743 SCRA 33 (2014), the Court allowed the recovery of temperate
damages in instances where it has been established that some pecuniary loss has been suffered, but its
amount cannot be proven with certainty.
2. Evidence; Burden of Proof; In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the
burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Also, parties must rely on the strength of their
own evidence, not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. This principle equally
holds true, even if the defendant was not given the opportunity to present evidence because of a default
order.
3. Same; Preponderance of Evidence; “Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of
the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term ‘greater
weight of the evidence’ or ‘greater weight of the credible evidence.’ Preponderance of evidence is a
phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.”
4. Same; Respondents’ failure to present the documents in their possession-
— whether such failure was intentional or not — raises the presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced.—Respondents opted not to shed light on the issues at hand
as they, unwittingly or otherwise, waived their right to present evidence in this case. In this light, the
Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the respondents’ failure to present the documents in
their possession — whether such failure was intentional or not — raises the presumption that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced.
****
547
468. Belo-Henares vs. Guevarra, 811 SCRA 392, December 01, 2016
1. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good character
being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such
privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or
misconduct, the reference is not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, which — albeit unrelated
to the actual practice of their profession — would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.” Accordingly, the Court finds that
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, as originally
recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
2. Social Media; Facebook; Words and Phrases; Facebook is currently the most popular social media
site, having surpassed one (1) billion registered accounts and with 1.71 billion monthly active users.
Social media are web-based platforms that enable online interaction and facilitate users to generate
and share content. There are various classifications of social media platforms and one can be classified
under the “social networking sites” such as Facebook. Facebook is a “voluntary social network to
which members subscribe and submit information. x x x It has a worldwide forum enabling friends to
share information such as thoughts, links, and photographs, with one another.” Users register at this
site, create a personal profile or an open book of who they are, add other users as friends, and exchange
messages, including automatic notifications when they update their profile. A user can post a statement,
a photo, or a video on Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone, depending on the user’s privacy
settings.
3. Same; Same; Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking
activity-— in this case, Facebook — it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep
certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.—To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed
with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile, as well as
information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court of Johannesburg, Republic
of South Africa recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but with the
cautionary advice that although Facebook, as stated in its policies, “makes every effort to protect a
user’s information, these privacy settings are however not foolproof.” Consequently, before one can
have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity — in this case, Facebook
— it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize
in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these
privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.
4. Same; Same;
Restricting the privacy of one’s Facebook posts to “Friends” does not guarantee absolute protection
from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one’s circle of friends. The user’s own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post
or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Under the
circumstances, therefore, respondent’s claim of violation of right to privacy is negated.
5. Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; The constitutional right of freedom of expression may not
be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring
them into disrepute.-
—Time and again, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute. While the freedom of expression and the right of speech and of the press are
among the most zealously protected rights in the Constitution, every person exercising them, as the
Civil Code stresses, is obliged to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
548
faith. As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies
or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute. A punctilious
scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice
tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a “quack
doctor,” “Reyna ng Kaplastikan,” “Reyna ng Payola,” and “Reyna ng Kapalpakan,” and insinuating
that she has been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to
besmirch the name and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal
negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured (“binaboy”) his client
Norcio, labeling BMGI a “Frankenstein Factory,” and calling out a boycott of BMGI’s services all
these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He
even threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa — which is contrary
to one’s obligation “to act with justice.”
6. Same; Same; By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI,
respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times,
be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an
officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely;
he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by
hurling insults and maligning complainant’s and BMGI’s reputation.
7. Same; Same; That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public
personage who is exposed to criticism does not justify respondent’s disrespectful language. It is the
cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. In this case, respondent’s remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for
which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned.
****
549
469. Ayson vs. Fil-Estate Properties, Inc., 811 SCRA 520, December 01, 2016
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Verily, the finding of
Fil-Estate and Fairways’ bad faith as well as their liability for moral damages, exemplary damages,
and attorney’s fees, are all factual matters which are not within the ambit of the instant petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In this regard, it has long been settled that
factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed
on appeal, save for certain exceptions, which Fil-Estate and Fairways failed to show in this case — at
least regarding this issue.
****
550
470. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 812 SCRA 537, December 06, 2016
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Probable Cause ;
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; I submit that the issues raised by the parties
are ripe for adjudication and easily verifiable by the submissions of the parties. To wait for trial will
only unnecessarily prolong the disposition of the case. On this note, Sec. 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that a judge “may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause.” As borne by the records, the Ombudsman initially found
probable cause to charge petitioners Relampagos, et al. for sixteen (16) counts of violation of Sec. 3(e),
RA 3019 on account of Luy’s testimony that petitioners are Napoles’ contact in the DBM. Yet, even Luy
himself twice admitted during the September 12, 2013 Senate Blue Ribbon Committee that petitioners
did not receive any part of the PDAF.
2. Administrative Cases; Public Officers; The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and
Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA’s audit is clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect
covering the charges of Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 against them. Hence,
the incidents related to it should have no effect on the filing of the latter. In Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan,
547 SCRA 658 (2008), this Court explained that: [T]here are three kinds of remedies that are available
against a public officer for impropriety in the performance of his powers and the discharge of his duties:
(1) civil, (2) criminal, and (3) administrative [and that] [t]hese remedies may be invoked separately,
alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three
kinds of remedies. x x x x It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are distinct from each
other. The settled rule is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative
matters, such that the first two will not inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily,
administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.
3. Same; Same; As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, “an audit disallowance may not
necessarily result in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions or criminal prosecution of the responsible
persons. Conversely, therefore, an administrative or criminal case may prosper even without an audit
disallowance. Verily, Rule XIII, Section 6 is consistent with the ruling in [Reyna v. Commission on
Audit, 642 SCRA 210 (2011)] that a proceeding involving an audit disallowance is distinct and separate
from a preliminary investigation or a disciplinary complaint.” In fine, the Ombudsman did not gravely
abuse its discretion in promulgating its March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied Cambe’s motion to
suspend proceedings. Perforce, Cambe’s petition in G.R. Nos. 212014-15 is dismissed. That being said,
the Court now proceeds to resolve the main substantive issue anent the presence of probable cause
against all petitioners.
4. Ombudsman; Policy of Non-interference; Time and again, this Court’s consistent policy has been
to maintain noninterference in the Ombudsman’s determination of the existence of probable cause,
provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is based not
only in respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the 1987 Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.
5. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; In determining the elements of the crime
charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, “only facts sufficient to support a prima
facie case against the [accused] are required, not absolute certainty.” In this case, the petitioners were
charged with the crimes of Plunder and/or violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. Plunder, defined and
penalized under Section 2 of RA 7080, as amended, has the following elements: (a) that the offender is
a public officer, who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) that he amasses, accumulates
or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts described in
Section 1(d) thereof; and (c) that the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). On the other hand, the
elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are: (a) that the accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy
with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
551
functions. In determining probable cause therefor, only a showing of the ostensible presence of these
elements is required.
6. Same; Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; It should be borne in mind that probable cause is
determined during the context of a preliminary investigation which is “merely an inquisitorial mode of
discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the person charged should be held responsible for it.” It “is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the prosecution’s evidence.” Therefore, “the validity and merits of a party’s
defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated
during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.” Accordingly, “owing to the initiatory
nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course
of its proceedings.” In this light, and as will be elaborated upon below, this Court has ruled that
“probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for
crediting the hearsay,” and that even an invocation of the rule on res inter alios acta at this stage of
the proceedings is improper.
7. Priority Development Assistance Fund; At the forefront are the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself
requesting the implementing agencies (IAs) to release his PDAF funds to the identified Janet Lim
Napoles (JLN)-controlled Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), as well as other documents that
made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the Memorandum of Agreements (MOAs) executed by
the legislator’s office, the IA, and the chosen NGO.-
—The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on record. At
the forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla
himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the identified JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as
other documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the
legislator’s office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. All these documents — even those not actually signed
by Sen. Revilla — directly implicate him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued
under the authority of his Office as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa
(Belgica), 710 SCRA 1 (2013), this Court observed that “the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators — to participate in the post-enactment
phases of project implementation.” “At its core, legislators may it be through project lists, prior
consultations or program menus — have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to
identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations.”
It is through this mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically
dictate the entire expenditure of the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years.
8. Same; Forgery; Anent Sen. Revilla’s claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented
were forged, it must be emphasized that “the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery]
should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the reality that the authenticity of a
questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or
dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on
the judge who must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. [As such], Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
explicitly authorizes the court, by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine.” Accordingly, Sen. Revilla’s evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported
handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores) and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A.
Pagui, (Pagui) cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings. Besides, the Ombudsman
aptly observed that Azores and Pagui admittedly used mere photocopies of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) documents in their handwriting analyses. In Heirs of Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, 300 SCRA 565 (1998), this Court ruled that “[w]ithout the original document containing the
alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison which would establish forgery,”
and that “[a] comparison based on a mere [photo] copy or reproduction of the document under
controversy cannot produce reliable results.” Furthermore, it may not be amiss to state that the
credibility of Azores and Pagui as handwriting experts has yet to be tested. They still have to
authenticate their findings and be subjected to cross-examination. Without a doubt, the prosecution
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should also be given a chance to properly contest Azores and Pagui’s findings with evidence of its own.
It could all too well present its own handwriting experts during trial to rebut such findings.
9. Same; Same; The Ombudsman’s own factual finding on the absence of forgery, at least for the
purpose of determining probable cause, should be regarded with utmost respect.-
—It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen.
Revilla’s signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint
Resolution: “[a]t all events, the Special Panel members, after a prima facie comparison with their
naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and the original signatures
of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures,
which bear the same style and flourish, were written by one and the same hands.” Verily, the
Ombudsman’s own factual finding on the absence of forgery, at least for the purpose of determining
probable cause, should be regarded with utmost respect. “[F]indings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence,” as in this case. The
Ombudsman’s finding on the absence of forgery further gains credence in light of the July 20, 2011
Letter signed by Sen. Revilla submitted to the COA (Confirmation Letter). The letter evinces on its face
that Sen. Revilla had confirmed the authenticity of his and Cambe’s signatures appearing on the PDAF
documents: After going through these documents and initial examination, it appears that the signatures
and/or initials on these documents are my signatures or that of my authorized representative.
10. Same; Same; Luy’s testimony therefore explicates that although the whistleblowers would
sometimes forge the legislators’ signatures, such were made with the approval of Napoles based on her
prior agreement with the said legislators. It is not difficult to discern that this authorization allows for
a more expedient processing of PDAF funds since the documents required for their release need not
pass through the legislator’s respective offices. It is also apparent that this grant of authority gives the
legislators room for plausible deniability: the forging of signatures may serve as a security measure for
legislators to disclaim their participation in the event of discovery. Therefore, Luy’s testimony
completely makes sense as to why the legislators would agree to authorize Napoles and her staff to
forge their signatures. As such, even if it is assumed that the signatures were forged, it does not mean
that the legislators did not authorize such forgery.
11. Same; Conspiracy; It is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal
knowledge of the conspiracy since they were employees of Janet Lim Napoles (JLN) Corporation-
— the epicenter of the entire Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) operation — and in their
respective capacities, were individually tasked by Napoles to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate
the financial transactions, follow up the release of the Notices of Cash Allocation (NCAs) with the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds
deposited in the Non-Governmental Organizations’ (NGOs’) accounts.—The testimonies of the
whistleblowers — which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman — are, in fact, the most
integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner workings of
the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the
Senators, only the Offices of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile), and Sen. Jinggoy,
Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with Napoles in the plunder of their
PDAF. Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the
conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation — the epicenter of the entire PDAF
operation — and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by Napoles to prepare the
pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the
DBM, and/or facilitate the withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs’ accounts.
12. Same; Same; Preliminary Investigation; Evidence; Sen. Revilla opposes the admission of the
whistleblowers’ testimonies based on the res inter alios acta rule. However, in Reyes v. Ombudsman,
787 SCRA 354 (2016), citing Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), this Court had unanimously
ruled that the testimonies of the same whistleblowers against Jo Christine and John Christopher
Napoles, children of Janet Napoles who were also charged with the embezzlement of the PDAF, are
admissible in evidence, considering that technical rules of evidence are not binding on the fiscal during
preliminary investigation. This Court was unequivocal in declaring that the objection on res inter alios
acta should falter: Neither can the Napoles siblings discount the testimonies of the whistleblowers based
on their invocation of the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence,
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which states that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another, unless the admission is by a conspirator under the parameters of Section 30 of the same Rule.
To be sure, the foregoing rule constitutes a technical rule on evidence which should not be rigidly
applied in the course of preliminary investigation proceedings. In Estrada, the Court sanctioned the
Ombudsman’s appreciation of hearsay evidence, which would otherwise be inadmissible under
technical rules on evidence, during the preliminary investigation “as long as there is substantial basis
for crediting the hearsay.” This is because “such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.” Applying the same logic, and with the similar
observation that there lies substantial basis for crediting the testimonies of the whistleblowers herein,
the objection interposed by the Napoles siblings under the evidentiary res inter alios acta rule should
falter. Ultimately, as case law edifies, “[t]he technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal
who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation,” as in this case.
13. Remedial Law; Evidence; Independently Relevant Statements; Under the doctrine of
independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have
been made is relevant.-
—In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply during preliminary
investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers’ statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on
independently relevant statements. “Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements,
regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay
rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.” Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the
whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his co-accused
in the present controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam.
Therefore, the statements made by whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy, who were employees of JLN
Corporation and privy to the financial transactions of Napoles concerning, among others, Sen. Revilla’s
PDAF, should be given consideration as they are directly, if not circumstantially, relevant to the issue
at hand. To add, the prosecution also presented Luy’s ledger entries which corroborate his testimony
that Sen. Revilla dealt with Napoles and received PDAF kickbacks. Luy’s records disclose that the
kickbacks amounted to “at least P224,512,500.00: P10,000,000.00 for 2006; P61,000,000.00 for 2007;
P80,000,000.00 for 2008; P40,000,000.00 for 2009; and P33,512,500.00 for 2010.”
14. Same; Same; Witnesses; Relatedly, it should be clarified that the fact that Luy did not personally
know Sen. Revilla or that none of the whistleblowers personally saw anyone handing/delivering money
to Sen. Revilla does not mean that they did not personally know of his involvement. Because of their
functions in JLN Corporation as above stated, it is evident that they had personal knowledge of the fact
that Napoles named Sen. Revilla as one of the select-legislators she transacted with. More significantly,
they personally processed the PDAF funds and documents connected with Sen. Revilla’s Office, which
lasted for a considerable amount of time, i.e., four (4) years [2006-2010 as charged]. As such, their
testimonies should not be completely disregarded as hearsay.
15. Probable Cause; In any case, this Court has resolved that “probable cause can be established with
hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.” The substantial basis
for crediting the whistleblowers’ testimonies, even if so regarded as hearsay, rests on their key functions
in JLN Corporation as above mentioned, as well as the collective evidence gathered by the prosecution
tending to support the same conclusion that Sen. Revilla and his alleged coconspirators acted in concert
to pillage his PDAF funds.
16. Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Affidavits of Co-respondents; There is no
law or rule requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of
his corespondents.-
—This Court would like to dispel the notion that due process rights were violated when Sen. Revilla
was denied copies of the counter-affidavits of his corespondents in the preliminary investigation
proceedings before the Ombudsman as he argues in G.R. Nos. 212427-28. This matter was already
resolved in the similar case of Estrada, where this Court said: Both the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating officer
to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of his supporting
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witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies
of the affidavits of his [corespondents]. The right of the respondent is only “to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant,” as expressly stated in Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. This Court has unequivocally ruled in Paderanga that “Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right
to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where
the fiscal sets a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.” Moreover,
Section 4 (a, b and c), of Rule II of the Ombudsman’s Rule of Procedure, read together, only require
the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and
his supporting witnesses. There is no law or rule requiring the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with copies of the affidavits of his corespondents. In any event, the Ombudsman in this case
went beyond its legal duty and eventually granted Sen. Revilla’s requests to be furnished with said
counter-affidavits, and even afforded him the opportunity to comment thereto. Thus, there is more
reason to decline his flawed claims of denial of due process. Case law state that the touchstone of due
process is the opportunity to be heard, which was undeniably afforded to Sen. Revilla in this case.
17. Same; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Taking together all of the above stated pieces
of evidence, the COA and FIO reports tend to prima facie establish that irregularities had indeed
attended the disbursement of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF and that he had a hand in such anomalous releases,
being the head of Office which unquestionably exercised operational control thereof. As the
Ombudsman correctly observed, “[t]he PDAF was allocated to him by virtue of his position as a
Senator, and therefore he exercise[d] control in the selection of his priority projects and programs. He
indorsed [Napoles’] Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in consideration for the remittance of
kickbacks and commissions from Napoles. Compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects
turned out to be ‘ghost projects,’ and that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into the pockets of
Napoles and her cohorts, [there is probable cause to show that] Revilla thus unjustly enriched himself
at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.” Hence, he should stand trial for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. For the same
reasons, it is apparent that ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at least P50,000,000.00 (i.e.,
P224,512,500.00) were amassed, accumulated or acquired through a combination or series of overt
acts stated in Section 1 of the Plunder Law. Therefore, Sen. Revilla should likewise stand trial for
Plunder. Besides, case law holds that once the trial court finds probable cause, which results in the
issuance of a warrant of arrest (as the Sandiganbayan in this case, with respect to Sen. Revilla and his
co-petitioners), any question on the prosecution’s conduct of preliminary investigation becomes moot.
18. Priority Development Assistance Fund; Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to
have received Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) money for himself and for Sen. Revilla.-
—There is no dispute that Cambe was Sen. Revilla’s trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such
authority, he also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla’s office, including the
allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe’s signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF documents,
such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla’s PDAF funds allocated for certain projects
to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Moreover, Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to
have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla. As recounted by Luy, Cambe was the one
who would go to Napoles’s office and receive cash from the latter in the aggregate amount of
P224,512,500.00 representing Sen. Revilla’s “commissions” or “kickbacks” coming from the PDAF
scam. The cash would come either from Luy’s vault or from Napoles herself. In simple terms, Cambe
allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles.
19. Same; Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in
the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as
the mastermind of the entire PDAF scam. As outlined by the Ombudsman, Napoles would approach
legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, and “offer to ‘acquire’ his x x x PDAF allocation in exchange for a
‘commission’ or kickback amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF.” Once Napoles was
informed of the availability of Sen Revilla’s PDAF, she and/or her staff would prepare listings of the
available projects specifically indicating the IAs which would carry out the same. After the listings are
released by Sen. Revilla’s Office, Napoles would then give a down payment from her own pockets for
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delivery to Sen. Revilla, or in case of his unavailability, to Cambe who would receive the same on Sen.
Revilla’s behalf. Once the SARO and/or the Notices of Cash Allocation (NCA) regarding said project
is released, Napoles would then deliver the promised “kickbacks” to Sen. Revilla. Thereafter, Sen.
Revilla and/or Cambe would endorse Napoles’ NGOs to undertake the PDAF-funded projects, all of
which turned out to be “ghost” or “inexistent”; thus, allowing Napoles and her cohorts to pocket the
PDAF allocation.
20. Criminal Law; Plunder; Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents,
whistleblowers’ testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well as the field
verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause against
Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy
with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities, was significantly involved in the aforedescribed
modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla’s PDAF amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in “kickbacks.”
In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles for violations of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to illegally divert PDAF Funds to “ghost” projects caused undue
prejudice to the government.
21. Same; Same; Conspiracy; It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in the
aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they
are found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same.-
—That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section
3(e) of RA 3019 because the offenders in those crimes are public officers is a complete misconception.
It has been long-settled that while the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers,
private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to have conspired with said
officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. In this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert
with public officers in the systematic pillaging of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly
indicted her as a coconspirator for the aforementioned crimes.
22. Same; Same; Whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly named De Asis as one of those who
prepared money to be given to the lawmaker. Said whistleblowers even declared that De Asis, among
others, received the checks issued by the implementing agencies (IAs) to the Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) and deposited the same in the bank; and that, after the money is withdrawn
from the bank, he was also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet Napoles’ house.-
—Records show that De Asis was designated as the President/Incorporator of KPMFI which was one
of the many NGOs controlled by Napoles that was used in the embezzlement of Sen. Revilla’s PDAF
allocations. Moreover, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas explicitly named De Asis as one of those who
prepared money to be given to the lawmaker. Said whistleblowers even declared that De Asis, among
others, received the checks issued by the IAs to the NGOs and deposited the same in the bank; and that,
after the money is withdrawn from the bank, he was also one of those tasked to bring the money to Janet
Napoles’ house. Indeed, the foregoing prove to be well-grounded bases to believe that, in all
probability, De Asis conspired with the other co-accused to commit the crimes charged.
23. Priority Development Assistance Fund; As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman,
whistleblowers Luy and Suñas narrated that over the course of the perpetuation of the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, they, along with the other staff of Napoles-
— which includes Lim would prepare, and thereafter deliver, the kickbacks intended for Sen. Revilla.—
As correctly pointed out by the Ombudsman, whistleblowers Luy and Suñas narrated that over the
course of the perpetuation of the PDAF scam, they, along with the other staff of Napoles — which
includes Lim — would prepare, and thereafter deliver, the kickbacks intended for Sen. Revilla. The
preparation and delivery of kickbacks to the legislator and/or his trusted staff are indeed overt acts that
relate to his involvement in the PDAF scheme. To note, even if it is assumed that Lim only prepared the
money and did not deliver the same as he claims, the act of preparation is still connected to the common
objective of the conspiracy. Accordingly, this establishes the existence of probable cause against him
for the crime charged.
24. Same; As pointed out by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, some of the Special Allotment
Release Orders (SAROs) and Notices of Cash Allocation (NCAs) issued in the perpetuation of the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam were issued by the Office of Relampagos as
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Department of Budget and Management (DBM) Undersecretary, where Nuñez, Paule, and Bare are all
working-
— a finding that they themselves did not dispute.—As pointed out by the Ombudsman and the
Sandiganbayan, some of the SAROs and NCAs issued in the perpetuation of the PDAF scam were issued
by the Office of Relampagos as DBM Undersecretary, where Nuñez, Paule, and Bare are all working
— a finding that they themselves did not dispute. More significantly: (a) whistleblower Luy positively
identified Relampagos, et al. as Napoles’ “contact persons” in the DBM; and (b) the COA Report found
irregularities in their issuances of the aforesaid SAROs and NCAs. Ostensibly, these circumstances
show Relampagos, et al.’s manifest partiality and bad faith in favor of Napoles and her cohorts that
evidently caused undue prejudice to the Government. Thus, they must stand trial for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019.
25. Forgery; Hearsay Evidence; The Supreme Court (SC) cannot tag key documentary evidence as
forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings; otherwise, it would defy
established principles and norms followed during preliminary investigation.-
—In this case, the Ombudsman (and the Sandiganbayan as to Relampagos, et al.) did not err in finding
probable cause against all the petitioners. Their findings are fully supported by the evidence on record
and no semblance of misapprehension taints the same. Moreover, this Court cannot tag key
documentary evidence as forgeries and bar testimonies as hearsay at this stage of the proceedings;
otherwise, it would defy established principles and norms followed during preliminary investigation.
Jurisprudence teaches us that “[i]n dealing with probable cause[,] at the very name implies, we deal
with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is
accordingly correlative to what must be proved.” Overall, based on the foregoing disquisitions, the
standard of probable cause was adequately hurdled by the prosecution in this case. As such, no grave
abuse of discretion was committed by the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan in the proceedings a
quo. All the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were charged.
26. Ombudsman; Principle of Non-interference; View that the courts do not usually interfere with the
Ombudsman in the determination as to the existence of probable cause.-
—As the ponencia points out, the courts do not usually interfere with the Ombudsman in the
determination as to the existence of probable cause. In other words, the Ombudsman possesses ample
latitude to determine the propriety of filing a criminal charge against a person. Nonetheless, it must be
emphasized that the Ombudsman’s broad authority is circumscribed by the need of an upright conduct
of a preliminary investigation. This balancing rule is intended to guarantee the right of every person
from “the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a
formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt has been passed” and to guard the State
against the “burden of unnecessary expense and effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding
trials arising from false, frivolous or groundless charges.”
27. Remedial Law; Evidence; View that ruling in favor of the complainants, the Ombudsman
sweepingly concluded that Revilla conspired with Napoles and her cohorts to amass ill-gotten wealth
at the expense of the State.-
—The majority sustained the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to indict Revilla for Plunder and
violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019, for supposedly amassing ill-gotten wealth by allegedly
misappropriating, or supposedly receiving commission for allowing the misappropriation of the PDAF
in conspiracy with and/or by giving unwarranted benefit to Napoles and her cohorts. As I have
previously stated, I cannot concur with the majority opinion. A look at the evidence that the
complainants had presented demonstrates that there is nary any competent and relevant evidence that
can constitute as basis for the finding of probable cause against Revilla. Ruling in favor of the
complainants, the Ombudsman sweepingly concluded that Revilla conspired with Napoles and her
cohorts to amass ill-gotten wealth at the expense of the State.
28. Priority Development Assistance Fund; View that the pieces of evidence relied upon by the
Ombudsman do not provide sufficient basis for even a prima facie finding of probable cause to
believe that Revilla negotiated and agreed with Napoles on: (i) the list of projects to be chosen by the
lawmaker; (ii) the corresponding implementing agencies (IA) that would implement the project; (iii)
the project cost; (iv) the Napoles-controlled Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that would
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implement the project; and (v) the amount of commission or kickback which the lawmaker would
receive in exchange for endorsing the NGO.-
—Notably, the pieces of evidence relied upon by the Ombudsman do not provide sufficient basis for
even a prima facie finding of probable cause to believe that Revilla negotiated and agreed with Napoles
on: (i) the list of projects to be chosen by the lawmaker; (ii) the corresponding IA that would implement
the project; (iii) the project cost; (iv) the Napoles-controlled NGO that would implement the project;
and (v) the amount of commission or kickback which the lawmaker would receive in exchange for
endorsing the NGO. Indeed, the Ombudsman’s affirmation of these allegations stands on mere
inferences and presumptions. What is certain is that the Ombudsman surmised Revilla’s involvement
with the PDAF scam from the following: (1) his purported signatures appearing in several documents
endorsing the NGOs affiliated with Napoles; (2) the testimonies of the so-called “whistleblowers” and
(3) the Counter-Affidavits of some of Revilla’s corespondents. As will be discussed, these are neither
relevant nor competent, and do not constitute sufficient bases to sustain the finding of probable cause
to subject Revilla to continuous prosecution.
29. Same; View that the Ombudsman ought to have exercised caution especially since the
“whistleblowers” no less admitted to forging the lawmakers’ endorsements of Napoles’ Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to the corresponding implementing agencies (IAs) along with all
other Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Documents.-
—As Revilla maintained all along, his involvement/participation in the release of his PDAF was limited
only to the identification and selection of projects or programs listed in the the GAA and communicating
such selection to the Chair of the Senate Committee on Finance and the Senate President. Any
endorsement made by him does not and cannot sway these IAs to act per his will and contrary to legal
requirements. It is, therefore, perplexing that Revilla’s involvement in the PDAF scam is hinged on
apparently worthless “endorsements” of Napoles-controlled NGOs. Further, the Ombudsman ought to
have exercised caution especially since the “whistleblowers” no less admitted to forging the
lawmakers’ endorsements of Napoles’ NGOs to the IAs along with all other PDAF Documents. Suñas
testified that they prepared these endorsement letters, upon which Revilla is now being indicted.
30. Same; In fact, even a cursory glance at some of the PDAF Documents questioned by Revilla reveals
a forgery so obvious as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary person. A prime
example is the “endorsement” letter addressed to Gondelina Amata of the NLDC dated October 23,
2009, supposedly signed by Revilla. Compared to the standard signatures submitted by Revilla, the
signature contained therein lacks the cursive flourishes of his true signatures and instead contains
sharp and blunt strokes. Similarly noticeable is the variance of the letterheads used in these various
endorsement letters, with some containing supposed bar codes of Revilla’s office, others simply a
number.
31. Same; Handwriting Experts; At the very least, the Azores and Pagui findings should have impelled
the Ombudsman to consider the veracity of the signatures on the PDAF documents given that these
experts’ findings uniformly detail discrepancies between the signatures in the PDAF documents and
Revilla’s admitted genuine specimens of writing. That the Ombudsman failed to even require NBI
handwriting experts to study the questioned signatures renders the immediate dismissal of the two
handwriting expert’s certifications highly suspect. Where the genuineness of the documents is crucial
to the respondents’ defense, it is more prudent, as stressed in People v. Agresor, 320 SCRA 302 (1999),
to allow the opinion of handwriting experts.
32. Criminal Law; Plunder; Probable Cause; Being uncontroverted and, in fact, confirmed by the
complainants’ witnesses, I submit that this forgery of Revilla’s signatures and the falsification of the
PDAF Documents should have dissuaded the Ombudsman from filing the Informations against Revilla.
Certainly, the finding of probable cause to indict a person for plunder cannot be based on admittedly
falsified documents. While probable cause falls below proof beyond reasonable doubt in the hierarchy
of quanta of evidence, it must nonetheless be supported by sufficient, credible and competent evidence,
i.e., there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and
cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged.
33. Remedial Law; Evidence; Extrajudicial Confessions; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule; Absent any
credible proof of Revilla’s actual link or participation in the alleged scheme to divert his PDAF to
Napoles’ NGOs, the Ombudsman should likewise not have accepted hook, line, and sinker any testimony
558
of a participant in the supposed conspiracy. It is basic that an extrajudicial confession binds only the
confessant or declarant and is inadmissible against his or her co-accused. This basic postulate, an
extension of the res inter alios acta rule, is embodied in Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
34. Same; Same; As discussed above, besides the admittedly falsified and forged PDAF documents,
there is no concrete proof showing that Revilla pulled off any “overt act” in furtherance of the supposed
conspiracy with Napoles. Other than saying that without Revilla, the scheme would have supposedly
failed, the Ombudsman has been unable to point to concrete set of facts to support her conclusion as to
the complicity of Revilla to the conspiracy in question. Thus, the conclusion reached by the Ombudsman
falls short of the threshold requirement that conspiracy itself must be proved as positively as the
commission of the felony itself. The quantum of evidence required is as should be, as conspiracy is a
“facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.” For this reason,
I submit that the testimonies of Revilla’s corespondents cannot be taken against him. Yet, the
Ombudsman repeatedly and freely cited the previously withheld counter-affidavits of Revilla’s co-
respondents in finding probable cause to indict him for Plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019.
35. Same; Same; Audio Evidence; Electronic Evidence; View that Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence provides that an audio evidence, such as a telephone conversation, is admissible
only if it is presented, explained, or authenticated.-
—A closer look of Cunanan’s testimony, which was a critical part of the Ombudsman’s Resolutions,
bares the infirmity of his claim. While he could have easily asked for a written confirmation of the
authorization given by Revilla to Cambe, Cunanan himself admitted that he, instead, supposedly sought
verification over the telephone. Yet, an audio recording of the alleged telephone conversation was not
presented or even mentioned. Not even a transcript of the alleged telephone conversation was attached
to Cunanan’s Counter-Affidavit. Section 1, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides that
an audio evidence, such as a telephone conversation, is admissible only if it is presented, explained, or
authenticated.
36. Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC) had previously declared that the
person with whom the witness was conversing on the telephone must first be reliably identified before
the telephone conversation can be admitted in evidence and given probative value.-
—Given that no audio evidence of the telephone conversation was presented, much less “identified,
explained or authenticated,” the occurrence of the alleged telephone conversation is rendered highly
suspect, if not improbable, and any testimony thereon is inadmissible and of no probative value. But
granting, arguendo, that Cunanan did call Revilla’s office, it still begs the question of how he could
have recognized or confirmed the identity of the person he was speaking with over the phone and not
face-to-face. There is no indication, and Cunanan never even hinted, that he was closely familiar with
Revilla’s voice that he can easily recognize it over the phone in a single conversation. This Court had
previously declared that the person with whom the witness was conversing on the telephone must first
be reliably identified before the telephone conversation can be admitted in evidence and given probative
value.
37. Criminal Law; Plunder; Probable Cause; View that the Ombudsman should not have found
probable cause to indict Revilla given that: there is nothing but falsified documents, hearsay testimonies
and declarations barred by the res inter alios acta that support the complaints.-
—For this and for the fact that there is absolutely nothing competent and relevant that can sway a
reasonable man to believe that Revilla had participated in the PDAF scheme, I vote for the reversal of
the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to indict Revilla for plunder and violation of Section 3(e)
of RA 3019 on account of grave abuse of discretion. It must not be forgotten that the crimes involved in
these clases are Plunder and violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019 — two grave charges that can strip a
man of his good name and liberty, as in this case. The Ombudsman should not have found probable
cause to indict Revilla given that there is nothing but falsified documents, hearsay testimonies and
declarations barred by the res inter alios acta that support the complaints. Worse, the Ombudsman
violated the due process protection of the Constitution in citing affidavits and testimonies not previously
furnished Revilla. Without doubt, the Assailed Resolutions, insofar as it found probable cause against
Revilla, were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
559
38. Same; Same; Interestingly, the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution of the respondent Ombudsman did
not once mention the examination report of Atty. Pagui, nor did it squarely address the allegation of
forgery. It immediately dismissed the argument by saying: Forgery is not presumed; it must be proved
by clear, positive, and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
Further, as gathered from the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution, the fact of Cambe, acting on his own
as a public officer, amassing or acquiring ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00) through any of the means provided under the plunder law or acting in violation of
RA 3019 has not been demonstrated.
39. Remedial Law; Evidence; Res Inter Alios Acta Rule; View that the requisites to bring a given set
of facts under the exception to the res inter alios acta rule were not met in the present case.-
—The exception to the res inter alios acta rule, as earlier indicated, in Section 30 of Rule 130 provides:
Section 30. Admission by conspirator.—The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the coconspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. People v. Cachuela, 698 SCRA
161 (2013), succinctly dwells on the application the rule and its exception, thus: At any rate, Nabilgas’
extrajudicial confession is inadmissiblin evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter alios
acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is
not admissible against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them. An
exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to
the conspiracy, and during its existence, may he given in evidence against the coconspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission
of a conspirator may be received against his or her coconspirators, it is necessary that: (a) the
conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates to the
common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy. This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no other piece
of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove that Nabilgas conspired with
the appellants in committing the crime charged. Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as
distinctly and conclusively as the crime itself Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to
insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime. The requisites to bring a given set of
facts under the exception to the res inter alios acta rule were not met in the present case.
40. Judicial Review; View that considering the apparent whimsical and capricious approach thus taken
by the Ombudsman, I submit that the Supreme Court (SC) should have exercised its power of judicial
review.-
—Considering the apparent whimsical and capricious approach thus taken by the Ombudsman, I submit
that this Court should have exercised its power of judicial review. Tolerating the practice of establishing
probable cause based on forged or questionable documents would expose the criminal justice system
to malicious prosecution. It will create a dangerous precedent. It will encourage unscrupulous
individuals to file trumped up charges based on fictitious, spurious, or manipulated documents.
Malicious lawsuits designed to harass the innocent will proliferate, in clear violation of their rights
enshrined by no less than the Constitution. This, I cannot allow.
41. Criminal Law; Plunder; Priority Development Assistance Fund; View that while I submit that the
Court can accord merit to Napoles’ assertion respecting the undue reliance of the Ombudsman on
inadmissible evidence, such as the statements and ledgers submitted by Luy, I concur with the majority
that the Ombudsman’s finding as to the existence of probable cause to charge Napoles is substantiated.-
—While I submit that the Court can accord merit to Napoles’ assertion respecting the undue reliance
of the Ombudsman on inadmissible evidence, such as the statements and ledgers submitted by Luy, I
concur with the majority that the Ombudsman’s finding as to the existence of probable cause to charge
Napoles is substantiated. Her argument that no evidence was presented to show her affiliation to the
NGOs and the implementation of the PDAF-financed projects holds no water. Save for her bare denials,
Napoles did not submit any contrary evidence which would support her claim. On the contrary, the
Ombudsman, through the efforts of the FIO and the NBI, was able to secure the statements of Napoles’
former employees, to independently establish how she set up NGOs and colluded with people in and out
560
of the government to acquire the proceeds of the PDAF of various legislators. Notably, an employee,
Mary Arlene Baltazar, categorically testified having been instructed by Napoles to forge the signatures
of directors in her NGO, as well as the signatures of listed beneficiaries in the PDAF-funded projects,
and to shred documents related to the PDAF scheme. Counter-affidavits of the public officers from the
implementing agencies involved also admitted having coordinated with Napoles in processing the
projects.
42. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; View that a cursory reading of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Field Investigation Office (FIO) complaints would show substantial
compliance with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on sufficiency of complaint and information.-
—A cursory reading of the NBI and FIO complaints would show substantial compliance with the above
provision. All the accused were specifically named, the designation of the offenses charged clearly
indicated, and the acts allegedly constituting the offenses and where they were committed enumerated.
Considering the offenses charged, it was correctly indicated that the State is the offended party. As for
the date of when the offenses were committed, it is sufficient if, as here, the approximate period of
commission, i.e., span of four years starting from and ending on, is provided, the exact date of the
commission of the crime not being an element in either Plunder or violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
43. Criminal Law; Conspiracy; View that De Asis, as Napoles’ employee, possesses knowledge of facts
and circumstances, which can put one wary of his employer’s nature of business. Possessing this
knowledge while continuously participating in the illegal scheme, even if instructed by his employer, is
tantamount to acquiescence in the illegal act, thus belying his bona fide claim.-
—The Ombudsman aptly pointed out the inconsistency of De Asis’ acts with the principle of good faith.
Routinely withdrawing and delivering huge sums of cash for Napoles and producing fictitious list of
beneficiaries and liquidation reports would make a reasonable person doubt the legitimacy of his
employer’s business. De Asis, as Napoles’ employee, possesses knowledge of facts and circumstances,
which can put one wary of his employer’s nature of business. Possessing this knowledge while
continuously participating in the illegal scheme, even if instructed by his employer, is tantamount to
acquiescence in the illegal act, thus belying his bona fide claim.
44. Same; Same; Principal by Indispensable Cooperation; —While preparation or segregation and
the actual delivery are separate acts, they are interconnected with a common objective. It is immaterial,
thus, whether Lim only prepared or segregated the money, actually delivered it or both. The fact is,
there is probable cause to believe that he performed a role in the consummation of the crime of Plunder.
Further, evidence shows that there is probable cause to believe that Lim cooperated in order to divert
the PDAF to their own pockets. By rendering assistance in the delivery of money, Lim is deemed to have
conspired in the illegal transaction. Under these circumstances, Lim is as much liable as the principal
because of his overt and indispensable cooperation in perpetuating the scam. At this juncture, it is
necessary to state that Revilla is not the only named public officer involved in this issue. There are
others against whom the Ombudsman found probable cause. Thus, Lim, being a private individual, may
be charged with Plunder, there being probable cause to believe that he acted in concert with some
public officers.
****
561
471. Heirs of Pablo Feliciano, Jr. vs. LBP, 814 SCRA 289, January 11, 2017
Syllabi Class :Agrarian Reform Law; Just Compensation ; RTC ; Special Agrarian Courts ;
1. Same; Same; Regional Trial Court; Special Agrarian Courts; In LBP v. Kho, 793 SCRA 651 (2016),
the Court had succinctly explained the “cut-off rule” in the application of Republic Act (RA) 9700: It
is significant to stress, however, that DAR AO No. 1, Series of 2010 which was issued in line with
Section 31 of RA 9700 empowering the DAR to provide the necessary rules and regulations for its
implementation, became effective only subsequent to July 1, 2009. Consequently, it cannot be applied
in the determination of just compensation for the subject land where the claim folders were undisputedly
received by the LBP prior to July 1, 2009, and, as such, should be valued in accordance with Section
17 of RA 6657 prior to its further amendment by RA 9700 pursuant to the cut-off date set under DAR
AO 2, Series of 2009 (cut-off rule). Notably, DAR AO 1, Series of 2010 did not expressly or impliedly
repeal the cut-off rule set under DAR AO 2, Series of 2009, having made no reference to any cut-off
date with respect to land valuation for previously acquired lands under PD No. 27 and EO No. 228
wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners. Consequently, the application of DAR AO 1,
Series of 2010 should be, thus, limited to those where the claim folders were received on or subsequent
to July 1, 2009. Following the above dictum, since the claim folder covering the subject land was
received by the LBP on December 2, 1997, or prior to July 1, 2009, the RTC should have computed just
compensation using pertinent DAR regulations applying Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment
by RA 9700 instead of adopting the new DAR issuance. While the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian
Court (SAC), is not strictly bound by the different formula created by the DAR since the valuation of
property or the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is vested with
the courts, and not with administrative agencies, it must explain and justify in clear terms the reason
for any deviation from the prescribed factors and the applicable formula.
2. Agrarian Reform; Just Compensation; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; Case law states
that when the acquisition process under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27 is still incomplete-
— such as in this case, where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled — just
compensation should be determined and the process be concluded under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,
otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988.”—Case law states
that when the acquisition process under PD 27 is still incomplete — such as in this case, where the just
compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled — just compensation should be determined and
the process be concluded under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.”
3. Same; Same; For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, or the time when
the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when the title is transferred
in the name of the beneficiaries. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 6657, as amended, i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like
properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner’s
sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g) the
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers, and by the government
to the property, and (h) the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any, must be equally considered.
****
562
472. Jebsens Maritime, Inc. vs. Rapiz, 814 SCRA 303, January 11, 2017
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Seafarers ; Disability Benefits ; POEA-Standard Employment Contract ;
1. Same; Same; Same; POEA-Standard Employment Contract; It bears noting that as per
respondent’s contract with Jebsens, his employment is covered by the 2010 POEA-SEC. It is well-settled
that the POEA-SEC is the law between the parties and, as such, its provisions bind both of them. Under
Section 20(A)(6) of the 2010 POEA-SEC, the determination of the proper disability benefits to be given
to a seafarer shall depend on the grading system provided by Section 32 of the said contract, regardless
of the actual number of days that the seafarer underwent treatment.
2. Labor Law; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; In Elburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr.,
764 SCRA 431 (2015), the Court further clarified that for the company-designated physician to avail of
the extended 240-day period, he must first perform some significant act to justify an extension (e.g., that
the illness still requires medical attendance beyond the initial 120 days but not to exceed 240 days);
otherwise, the seafarer’s disability shall be conclusively presumed to be permanent and total.
Accordingly, the Court laid down the following guidelines that shall govern seafarers’ claims for
permanent and total disability benefits: 1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical
assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer
reported to him; 2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period
of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total;
3. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with
a sufficient justification (e.g., seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was
uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer
has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient justification to extend the
period; and 4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended
period of 240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any
justification.
****
563
473. Republic vs. Susi, 814 SCRA 397, January 16, 2017
1. Same; Same; Same; In cases where the LRA challenges the authenticity of the applicant’s purported
owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the reconstitution petition should be treated as falling under Section
3(f) of RA 26, and the trial court should require compliance with the requisites under Sections 12 and 13 of
RA 26. In particular, the reconstitution petition and the published and posted notice of hearing in
compliance with the October 13, 2005 Order failed to show that notices were sent to the other occupants,
possessors, and persons who may have an interest in, or who have buildings or improvements on the land
covered by the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted, as well as the owners of adjoining properties.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases underscoring the indispensability of actual and personal notice of the
date of hearing of the reconstitution petition to actual owners and possessors of the land involved in order
to vest the trial court with jurisdiction thereon. If no notice of the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is
served on a possessor or one having interest in the property involved, he is deprived of his day in court and
the order of reconstitution is null and void.
2. Civil Law; Estoppel; It is well to emphasize that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors of its officials or agents, absent any showing that it had dealt capriciously or dishonorably with its
citizens. Thus, whether or not the OSG’s motion to vacate was the proper remedy under the Rules of Court
(Rules) does not bar the Republic from assailing the propriety of the reconstitution ordered by the RTC
which it claimed to have acted without jurisdiction in hearing and, thereafter, resolving the case. Moreover,
it bears to emphasize that even assuming that no opposition was filed by the Republic or a private party, the
person seeking reconstitution is not relieved of his burden of proving not only the loss or destruction of the
title sought to be reconstituted, but that also at that time, she was the registered owner thereof. As such, the
Republic is not estopped from assailing the decision granting the petition if, on the basis of the law and the
evidence on record, such petition has no merit.
3. Same; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; The judicial reconstitution of a Torrens title
under RA 26 means the restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed Torrens
certificate attesting the title of a person to registered land. The purpose of the reconstitution is to enable,
after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the reproduction of the lost or destroyed Torrens
certificate in the same form and in exactly the same way it was at the time of the loss or destruction.
4. Same; Same; Same; RA 26 provides two procedures and sets of requirements in the reconstitution of
lost or destroyed certificates of title depending on the source of the petition for reconstitution. Section 10 in
relation to Section 9 provides the procedure and requirements for sources falling under Sections 2(a), 2(b),
3(a), 3(b), and 4(a). On the other hand, Sections 12 and 13 lay down the procedure and requirements for
sources falling under Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and 3(f). Thus, before the court can
properly act, assume, and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution
prayed for, petitioner must observe the above procedures and requirements prescribed by the law. In
numerous cases, the Court has held that the noncompliance with the prescribed procedure and requirements
deprives the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case and, consequently, all
its proceedings are rendered null and void. The rationale underlying this rule concerns the nature of the
conferment in the trial court of the authority to undertake reconstitution proceedings. In all cases where the
authority to proceed is conferred by a statute and the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, the
same must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void. As such, the court upon which
the reconstitution petition is filed is duty-bound to examine thoroughly the same, and review the record and
the legal provisions laying down the germane jurisdictional requirements.
5. Same; Same; Same;Records show that as early as January 16, 2006, the LRA, in a Manifestation dated
December 5, 2005, had already called the court’s attention to its Report dated March 1, 1995 in the previous
reconstitution petition before Branch 88, expressing serious doubts on the authenticity of Susi’s duplicate title,
and informing it of the existence of other titles over the subject land. It is well to point out that trial courts hearing
reconstitution petitions under RA 26 are duty-bound to take into account the LRA’s report. Notably, both the
RTC and the CA overlooked the fact that while the petition for reconstitution before Branch 77 was filed on the
basis of Susi’s purported owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 118999 bearing Serial No. 1121955, Susi’s prior
reconstitution petitions, as stated in the LRA’s Report, were anchored on an owner’s duplicate certificate bearing
a different serial number, i.e., Serial No. 1775634. Indeed, a perusal of the said certificates of title, which were
attached to the Republic’s motion for reconsideration of the CA’s Decision dated February 13, 2014, reveals
that save for the serial number, all the entries therein are the same. The Court notes that Susi did not refute the
existence of the said certificates bearing different serial numbers in her comment to the said motion. ****
564
474. Republic vs. Galeno, 815 SCRA 191, January 23, 2017
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Evidence ;
1. Same; Same; Case law states that the “absence of opposition from government agencies is of no
controlling significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
officials or agents. Neither is the Republic barred from assailing the decision granting the petition for
reconstitution [or correction of title, as in this case] if, on the basis of the law and the evidence on
record, such petition has no merit.” Moreover, “in civil cases, the party having the burden of proof
must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s.”
2. Remedial Law; Evidence; Hearsay Evidence Rule; The contents of the certifications are hearsay
because respondent’s sole witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barraca, was incompetent to testify
on the veracity of their contents, as she did not prepare any of the certifications nor was she a public
officer of the concerned government agencies. Notably, while it is true that the public prosecutor who
represented petitioner interposed no objection to the admission of the foregoing evidence in the
proceedings in the court below, it should be borne in mind that “hearsay evidence, whether objected to
or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule,” which do not, however, obtain in this case. Verily, while
respondent’s documentary evidence may have been admitted due to the opposing party’s lack of
objection, it does not, however, mean that they should be accorded any probative weight.
****
565
475. Ramos vs. People, 815 SCRA 226, January 23, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Aggravating Circumstances ; Use of Unlicensed Firearm ;
1. Same; Same; Same; In this case, while it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five (5) gunshot
wounds which led to his demise, it is unclear from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers
were able to recover the firearm used as a murder weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such
firearm was recovered, whether or not such firearm was licensed. The Court notes that the disquisitions
of the courts a quo were silent regarding this matter. As the Information alleged that accused-appellants
used an unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando, the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this allegation.
Having failed in this respect, the Court cannot simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as
an aggravating circumstance.
3. Criminal Law; Murder; Elements of.- To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following
elements must be established: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
4. Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Use of Unlicensed Firearm; Under Section 1 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 8294, “[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use
of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.”-
—Under Section 1 of RA No. 8294, “[i]f homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.” There
are two (2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject firearm;
and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license
or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged
in the Information lies with the prosecution.
****
566
476. Nestlé Philippines, Inc. vs. Puedan, Jr., 816 SCRA 243, January 30, 2017
Syllabi Class :Due Process ; Administrative Due Process ;
1. Same; Same; Assuming arguendo that NPI was somehow deprived of due process by either of the
labor tribunals, such defect was cured by: (a) NPI’s filing of its motion for reconsideration before the
NLRC; (b) the NLRC’s subsequent issuance of its Resolution dated August 30, 2013 wherein the
tribunal considered all of NPI’s arguments as contained in its motion; and (c) NPI’s subsequent
elevation of the case to the CA. In Gonzales v. Civil Service Commission, 490 SCRA 741 (2006), the
Court reiterated the rule that “[a]ny seeming defect in [the] observance [of due process] is cured by
the filing of a motion for reconsideration,” and that “denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked by a party who [was] afforded the opportunity to be heard x x x.” Similarly, in Autencio v.
Mañara, 449 SCRA 46 (2005), it was held that defects in procedural due process may be cured when
the party has been afforded the opportunity to appeal or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
2. Labor Disputes; Grave Abuse of Discretion; To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
3. Due Process; Administrative Due Process; The observance of fairness in the conduct of any
investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard,
and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in
the former a formal or trial type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are
not strictly applied.
****
567
477. Ubas, Sr. vs. Chan, 816 SCRA 659, February 06, 2017
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Negotiable Instruments Law ; Complete and Delivered Instruments ;
1. Mercantile Law; Negotiable Instruments Law; Complete and Delivered Instruments; Respondent’s
defense that the subject checks were lost and, thus, were not actually issued to petitioner is a factual
matter already passed upon by the RTC. As aptly pointed out by the trial court, it would have been
contrary to human nature and experience for petitioner to send respondent a demand letter detailing
the particulars of the said checks if he indeed unlawfully obtained the same. In fact, it is glaring that
respondent did not present Engr. Merelos, the project engineer who had purportedly lost the checks, to
personally testify on the circumstances surrounding the checks’ loss. Further, Unimasters’ comptroller,
Murillo, testified during trial that “she came to know that the lost checks were deposited in the account
of [petitioner as] she was informed by the [o]ffice[r]-in-charge of the drawee bank, the Far East Bank
of Tacloban, City Branch.” However, there was no showing that Unimasters and/or respondent
commenced any action against petitioner to assert its interest over a significant sum of P1,500,000.00
relative to the checks that were supposedly lost/stolen. Clearly, this paucity of action under said
circumstances is again, inconsistent with ordinary human nature and experience. Thus, absent any
cogent reason to the contrary, the Court defers to the RTC’s findings of fact on this matter. In Madrigal
v. CA, 456 SCRA 247 (2005), it was explained that: The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. The Supreme Court is not a
trier of facts. It leaves these matters to the lower court, which [has] more opportunity and facilities to
examine these matters. This same Court has declared that it is the policy of the Court to defer to the
factual findings of the trial judge, who has the advantage of directly observing the witnesses on the
stand and to determine their demeanor whether they are telling or distorting the truth. Besides, Section
16 of the NIL provides that when an instrument is no longer in the possession of the person who signed
it and it is complete in its terms, “a valid and intentional delivery by him is presumed until the contrary
is proved,” as in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Words and Phrases; Cause of action is defined
as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence
of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this case, petitioner’s cause of
action is anchored on his claim that respondent personally entered into a contract with him for the
delivery of construction materials amounting to P1,500,000.00, which was, however, left unpaid. He
also avers that respondent is guilty of fraud in the performance of said obligation because the subject
checks issued to him by respondent were dishonored on the ground of stop payment. As proof, petitioner
offered in evidence, among others, the demand letter he sent to respondent detailing the serial numbers
of the checks that were issued by the latter, including the dates and amounts thereof. He also offered
the dishonored checks which were in his possession.
3. Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Where the plaintiff-creditor possesses and submits in evidence
an instrument showing the indebtedness, a presumption that the credit has not been satisfied arises in
[his] favor.- Jurisprudence holds that “in a suit for a recovery of sum of money, as here, the plaintiff-
creditor [(petitioner in this case)] has the burden of proof to show that defendant [(respondent in this
case)] had not paid [him] the amount of the contracted loan. However, it has also been long
established that where the plaintiff-creditor possesses and submits in evidence an instrument showing
the indebtedness, a presumption that the credit has not been satisfied arises in [his] favor. Thus, the
defendant is, in appropriate instances, required to overcome the said presumption and present
evidence to prove the fact of payment so that no judgment will be entered against him.” This
presumption stems from Section 24 of the NIL, which provides that: Section 24. Presumption of
Consideration.—Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for a
valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party
thereto for value.
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568
478. Re: Complaint of Aero Engr. Darwin A. Reci Against Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
Marquez and Deputy Court Administrator Thelma C. Bahia Relative to Criminal Case No. 05-
236956, 817 SCRA 14,February 07, 2017
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Substantial Evidence ;
1. Same; Substantial Evidence; It is settled that the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual
liable for the aforesaid offenses is substantial evidence, or “that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.” Substantial evidence does not
necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but such kind of relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly
accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs.
2. Administrative Law; Dereliction of Duty; Dereliction of duty may be classified as gross or simple
neglect of duty or negligence. Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence “refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, or by acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to the
consequences, insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care that even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to give to their own property.” It denotes a flagrant and
culpable refusal or unwillingness of a person to perform a duty. In cases involving public officials,
gross negligence occurs when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. In contrast, simple neglect of
duty means the failure of an employee or official to give proper attention to a task expected of him or
her, signifying a “disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference.”
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569
479. Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario, 818 SCRA 83, February 15, 2017
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Family Law ; Marriages ; Annulment of Marriage ; Psychological
Incapacity ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
themselves; a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent
sufficient evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the context of Article 36, the Court is
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
2. Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity; The policy
of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution, and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable
and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity as
a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental — not merely
physical — incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided
under Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. In other words, it must be a malady that
is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
3. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Expert Opinions; An expert opinion is not absolutely necessary
and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence
shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can
be duly established. The evidence need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse,
but can come from persons intimately related to the spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could
clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse’s condition at or about the time of the marriage. In
other words, the Republic v. Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), guidelines continue to apply but its
application calls for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity. To be clear, however, the totality of the evidence must
still establish the characteristics that Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), laid down: gravity,
incurability, and juridical antecedence.
4. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In sum, Dr. Tayag’s assessment, even when taken together with
the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose’s immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the
level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties’ marriage. To
reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or
“neglect” in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the
other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person — an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage — which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity.
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570
480. Arabani, Jr. vs. Arabani, 818 SCRA 245, February 21, 2017
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Judges ; Sexual Harassment ;
1. Same; Judges; Sexual Harassment; The distasteful act by Judge Arabani of making a drawing of a
vagina and a penis, and thereafter showing it to an employee of the court of which he is an officer
constitutes sexual harassment. It is an act that constitutes a physical behavior of a sexual nature; a
gesture with lewd insinuation. To the Court’s mind, Judge Arabani deliberately utilized this form of
expression, i.e., drawing, to maliciously convey to Sheldalyn his sexual desires over her; hence, his
conduct cannot be classified as a mere display of sexually offensive pictures, materials or graffiti under
Section 53(C)(4), Rule X of CSC Resolution No. 01-0940, such as one who is caught watching or
reading pornographic materials. Rather, Judge Arabani’s behavior should be classified as an
analogous case (Section 53[B][5]) of verbal abuse with sexual overtones under Section 53(B)(4) of the
same issuance, which thus, qualifies the same as a less grave offense.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Dishonesty; Daily Time Records; Dishonesty is defined as
the “disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness, lack of integrity.” As correctly
ruled by the OCA, Abduraji and Rahim are guilty of dishonesty by committing irregularities in the
punching of Rahim’s bundy card/DTR on three (3) occasions, i.e., on the subject incidents. The
punching of a court employee’s DTR is a personal act of the holder which cannot and should not be
delegated to anyone else. Moreover, every court employee has the duty to truthfully and accurately
indicate the time of his arrival at and departure from the office. Thus, case law holds that falsification
of DTRs is an act of dishonesty and is reflective of respondent’s fitness to continue in office and of the
level of discipline and morale in the service, rendering him administratively liable in accordance with
Section 4, Rule XVII of the Civil Service Rules.
3. Same; Same; Same; Falsification of Official Documents; Under Section 22, Rule XIV of the Civil
Service Rules, falsification of official documents (such as DTRs) and dishonesty are both grave offenses
for which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first time offenders. Nonetheless, while it is the
Court’s duty to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those
who are undesirable, it also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy,
taking in mind that the objective for discipline is not their punishment, but the improvement of the public
service, and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the government.
4. Same; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; Mitigating Circumstances;
Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service grants the
disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper
penalty. Among the circumstances jurisprudentially held as mitigating include, among others, the
erring individual’s admission of guilt, remorse, high performance rating, and the fact that the infraction
complained of is his/her first offense. Thus, in several cases involving first time offenders, as Abduraji
and Rahim in this case, the Court has reduced the imposable penalty of dismissal to suspension of six
(6) months without pay. Following judicial precedents, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by
the OCA, and accordingly suspends Abduraji and Rahim for a period of six (6) months without pay.
5. Same; Court Personnel; Insubordination; Words and Phrases; Insubordination is defined as a
refusal to obey some order, which a superior officer is entitled to give and have obeyed, and imports a
willful or intentional disregard of the lawful and reasonable instructions of the Judge. In this case, the
Court finds to be likewise well-taken the OCA’s recommendation for the dropping of the said charges
against Abduraji and Rahim considering the perceived absence of intent on their part to deliberately
defy Judge Arabani’s authority as the head of office. However, they should be reprimanded for their
failure to comply with Judge Arabani’s memorandum requiring them to explain the subject incidents in
writing, which constitutes a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations, a light offense
punishable with reprimand for the first offense.
6. Same; Same; Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations; Penalties; Reprimand;
Violation of reasonable office rules and regulations is only a light offense punishable with reprimand
for the first offense. Nonetheless, in addition to such noncompliance, Rodrigo likewise failed to secure
the signature of Judge Arabani on his bundy cards for the months of March to September 2010 when
they are required to be certified correct by the Presiding Judge. Rodrigo’s avowed reason for his failure
to leave his bundy cards on the designated rack having been found to be unjustified, the forfeiture of
his entire salary for the said months should have been in order, if not for the Certification dated October
571
5, 2010 issued by Mirad, Clerk II/Timekeeper of the 4th SCC of Maimbung, Sulu, certifying the number
of absences incurred by Rodrigo for the months of April through September 2010, which Judge Arabani
submitted, thus, impliedly admitting that Rodrigo was present on the working days not so indicated
therein.
7. Same; Vacation Leave; The grant of vacation leave (VL) shall be at the discretion of the head of
department/agency.-
—The failure of Rodrigo to specify the number of working days of leave applied for and the inclusive
dates in his leave application filed on April 12, 2010, which merely indicated the type of leave as “SPL
[special privilege leave] & VL” (vacation leave), is not a mere formal defect that may be remedied by
the expedience of subsequently stating the specific dates of leave. It must be pointed out that leave of
absence for any reason other than illness of an official or employee or of any member of his immediate
family must be contingent upon the needs of the service. Hence, the grant of vacation leave shall be at
the discretion of the head of department/agency.
8. Same; Same; While the mere failure to file a leave of absence in advance does not ipso facto render
an employee administratively liable, the unauthorized leave of absence becomes punishable if the
absence is frequent or habitual.-
—While the mere failure to file a leave of absence in advance does not ipso facto render an employee
administratively liable, the unauthorized leave of absence becomes punishable if the absence is frequent
or habitual. An officer or employee in the civil service shall be considered habitually absent if he incurs
unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave credit under the Leave law at
least three (3) months in a semester or at least three (3) consecutive months during the year.
9. Same; Court Personnel; Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates
that court personnel shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their
office during working hours. Court personnel should strictly observe the prescribed office hours and
the efficient use of every moment thereof to inspire public respect for the justice system. Thus, court
officials and employees are at all times behooved to strictly observe official time because the image of
a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women
who work thereat, from the judge to the last and lowest of its employees. Loafing results in inefficiency
and nonperformance of duty, and adversely affects the prompt delivery of justice.
10. Same; Penalties; Frequent Unauthorized Absences; Section 23(q), Rule XIV of the Civil Service
Rules punishes “[f]requent unauthorized absences, loafing or frequent unauthorized absences from
duty during regular office hours” with suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for
the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense. Records are bereft of showing, however, that
Rodrigo had been previously found guilty of such offense. Consequently, the Court deems it proper to
impose upon him the penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension. The OCA’s recommendation
for the forfeiture of salary for the months of February (sic; not the month complained of) and March,
2010 must be, therefore, modified accordingly.
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572
481. Yap-Paras vs. Paras, 820 SCRA 116, March 13, 2017
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Practice of Law ; Penalties ;
1. Same; Same; Penalties; Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, prevailing case law
shows that the Court consistently imposed an additional suspension of six (6) months on lawyers who
continue practicing law despite their suspension. Thus, an additional suspension of six (6) months on
respondent due to his unauthorized practice of law is proper. The Court is mindful, however, that
suspension can no longer be imposed on respondent considering that just recently, respondent had
already been disbarred from the practice of law and his name had been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys
in Paras v. Paras, 804 SCRA 189 (2016). In Sanchez v. Torres, 741 SCRA 620 (2014), the Court ruled
that the penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had been
previously disbarred. Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the lawyer’s administrative liability for
recording purposes in the lawyer’s personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court held that respondent
therein should be suspended from the practice of law, although the said penalty can no longer be
imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the same manner, the Court imposes upon respondent
herein the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, although the
said penalty can no longer be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment, but nonetheless should be
adjudged for recording purposes. That being said, the issue anent the propriety of lifting his suspension
is already moot and academic.
2. Attorneys; Formal Investigation; Generally, the IBP’s formal investigation is a mandatory
requirement which may not be dispensed with, except for valid and compelling reasons, as it is essential
to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues raised. Absent a valid fact-finding
investigation, the Court usually remands the administrative case to the IBP for further proceedings.
However, in light of the foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent’s own admission that he
resumed practicing law even without a Court order lifting his suspension, the Court finds a compelling
reason to resolve the matters raised before it even without the IBP’s factual findings and
recommendation thereon.
3. Same; Practice of Law; According to jurisprudence, the “practice of law embraces any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or
procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience.” During the suspension period
and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing law. It must be stressed,
however, that a lawyer’s suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period.
The lawyer must submit the required documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the
suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law. In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out
that respondent’s suspension period became effective on May 23, 2001 and lasted for one (1) year, or
until May 22, 2002. Thereafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting of his suspension. However,
soon after this filing and without waiting for a Court order approving the same, respondent admitted
to accepting new clients and cases, and even working on an amicable settlement for his client with the
Department of Agrarian Reform. Indubitably, respondent engaged in the practice of law without waiting
for the Court order lifting the suspension order against him, and thus, he must be held administratively
liable therefor.
4. Same; Same; Disbarment; Suspension from Practice of Law; Willful Disobedience; Under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and
willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do so — acts which respondent is guilty of in
this case — are grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law, to wit: Section 27.
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
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573
482. People vs. Alejandro, 820 SCRA 189, March 13, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Rape ; Qualified Rape ;
1. Same; Same; Qualified Rape; On a related matter, since the Information in Crim. Case No. 73-
SD(96) was allowed to be amended to include Alejandro as a co-accused and that accused-appellants
were convicted of such charge, the Court deems it proper to upgrade the conviction in said case from
Simple Rape to Qualified Rape. As adverted to earlier, Article 335 of the RPC states that if the rape is
committed under certain circumstances, such as when it was committed by two (2) or more persons, the
crime will be Qualified Rape, as in this instance. Notably, this will no longer affect Alejandro as he had
already withdrawn his appeal prior to the promulgation of this decision.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In criminal cases, “an appeal throws the entire case
wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties
raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite
the proper provision of the penal law.”
3. Criminal Law; Homicide; Elements of.- —To successfully prosecute the crime of homicide, the
following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the
accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) that the accused had the intention
to kill, which is presumed; and (4) that the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. Moreover, the offender is said to have
performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the
death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance.
4. Same; Rape; Elements of.-
—The elements of Rape are: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b) said carnal
knowledge was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation; or the victim was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim was under twelve (12) years of age or demented.
The provision also states that if the act is committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
(2) or more persons, the crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher penalty.
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574
483. People vs. Macapundag, 820 SCRA 204, March 13, 2017
1. Same; Same; Same; In the present case, the prosecution did not even bother to explain why the
inventory and photograph of the seized evidence were not made either in the place of seizure and arrest
or at the police station, as required by the IRR in case of warrantless arrests, or why the marking of the
seized item was not made at the place of seizure in the presence of Macapundag. It was also silent on
the absence of a representative from the DOJ, the media and an elected public official to witness the
inventory and receive copies of the same. Similarly unexplained was the lack of inventory and
photographs of the seized items. Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by
the police officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
had been compromised. It has been repeated in jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of RA
9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality;
or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in
criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct,
cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. The
appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision
of the penal law.
3. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs; Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-— Macapundag was charged with illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. In order to secure the conviction of
an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove the: (a) identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the
payment. On the other hand, the prosecution must establish the following elements to convict an accused
charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs: (a) the accused was in possession of an item or
object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
4. Same; Same; It is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt.-
—Notably, it is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous drugs, the prosecution has
to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. It must be able to account for each link in the
chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as
evidence of the corpus delicti.
preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall,
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575
484. Commission on Elections vs. Mamalinta, 820 SCRA 286, March 14, 2017
Syllabi Class :Election Law ; Canvassing of Votes ;
1. Election Law; Canvassing of Votes; The Court notes that the CA failed to determine Mamalinta’s
administrative liability on the third act she was accused of committing, i.e., the premature proclamation
of Sinsuat as the winning candidate on the basis of an incomplete canvass of election returns. In Nasser
Immam v. COMELEC, 322 SCRA 866 (2000), the Court ruled that a complete canvass of votes is
necessary in order to reflect the true desire of the electorate, and that a proclamation of winning
candidates on the basis of incomplete canvass is illegal and of no effect.
2. Administrative Law; Misconduct; Dismissal from the Service; Misconduct is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence
by the public officer. To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be grave, serious,
important, weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not
a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance
of the public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional
neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate gross misconduct from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in the former.
3. Same; Simple Neglect of Duty; Gross Neglect of Duty; Words and Phrases; As compared to Simple
Neglect of Duty which is defined as the failure of an employee to give proper attention to a required
task or to discharge a duty due to carelessness or indifference, Gross Neglect of Duty is characterized
by want of even the slightest care, or by conscious indifference to the consequences, or by flagrant and
palpable breach of duty.
4. Same; Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service; Meanwhile, certain acts may be
considered as Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service as long as they tarnish the image and
integrity of the public office and may or may not be characterized by corruption or a willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules. In Encinas v. Agustin, Jr., 696 SCRA 240 (2013), the
Court outlined the following acts that constitute this offense, such as: misappropriation of public funds,
abandonment of office, failure to report back to work without prior notice, failure to keep in safety
public records and property, making false entries in public documents, and falsification of court orders.
5. Same; Dismissal from the Service; Duress; Intimidation; The double proclamation and the
unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing, the Court agrees with the CA that Mamalinta should
not be held administratively liable for the same to warrant her dismissal from the service, as such acts
were committed while under duress and intimidation. In People v. Nuñez, 276 SCRA 9 (1997), the Court
defined duress as follows: Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a defense, must be
present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. To be
available as a defense, the fear must be well-founded, an immediate and actual danger of death or great
bodily harm must be present and the compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity
to accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. It would be a most dangerous rule if a defendant
could shield himself from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from or because of a threat
of a third person.
6. Same; Same; Same; “[D]uress, as a valid defense, should be based on real, imminent or reasonable
fear for one’s own life. It should not be inspired by speculative, fanciful or remote fear. A threat of
future injury is not enough. It must be clearly shown that the compulsion must be of such character as
to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.”
7. Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Administrative Proceedings; The CA did not err in
considering Mamalinta and Mato’s Joint Affidavit — as well as the Minutes of the MBOC dated May
14 and 15, 2004 and the Report dated May 16, 2004 both prepared by Peñafiel — although they were
not formally offered as evidence during the investigation before the COMELEC. As a rule, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. Hence, in proper
cases such as this, the procedural rules may be relaxed for the furtherance of just objectives. Thus, the
CA did not err in taking these documents in consideration.
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576
484. Commission on Elections vs. Mamalinta, 820 SCRA 286, March 14, 2017
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Intra-Corporate Controversies ; Docket Fees ;
1. Same; Same; Docket Fees; Having classified Harvest All, et al.’s action as one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate
docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141 [fees for
all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-
02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Obiter Dictum; Words and Phrases; In Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Santos, 782 SCRA 441 (2016), the Court had the opportunity to define an obiter
dictum and discuss its legal effects as follows: [An obiter dictum] “x x x is a remark made, or opinion
expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and
not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination
of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. It does not embody the
resolution or determination of the court, and is made without argument, or full consideration of the
point. It lacks the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of an opinion with no binding force
for purposes of res judicata.”
3. Same; Same; Intra-Corporate Controversies; Filing Fees; Verily, the deletion of Section 21(k) of
Rule 141 and in lieu thereof, the application of Section 7(a) [fees for actions where the value of the
subject matter can be determined/estimated], 7(b)(1) [fees for actions where the value of the subject
matter cannot be estimated], or 7(b)(3) [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the same
Rule to cases involving intra-corporate controversies for the determination of the correct filing fees, as
the case may be, serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, the amendments concretize the Court’s
recognition that the subject matter of an intra-corporate controversy may or may not be capable of
pecuniary estimation; and on the other hand, they were also made to correct the anomaly created by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter dictum) implying that all intra-
corporate cases involved a subject matter which is deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.
4. Same; Same; Retroactivity of Laws; While the Court is not unaware that the amendments brought
by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016 only came after the filing of the complaint subject of
this case, such amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive effect so as to make them applicable
to the resolution of the instant consolidated petitions as they merely pertained to a procedural rule, i.e.,
Rule 141, and not substantive law. In Tan, Jr. v. CA, 373 SCRA 524 (2002), the Court thoroughly
explained the retroactive effectivity of procedural rules, viz.: The general rule that statutes are
prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws. It has been held that “a
retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws,
or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of
transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies
or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes.” The
general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of
contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending
at the time of their enactment where they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute
which deals with procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions — those which have accrued
or are pending. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense
and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the
retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a
general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that “a
person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to
the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.”
****
577
486. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Mendoza, 821 SCRA 41, March 20, 2017
Syllabi Class :Civil Law ; Quasi-Contracts ; Solutio Indebiti ;
1. Civil Law; Quasi-Contracts; Solutio Indebiti; Records reveal that BPI’s payment of the proceeds of
the subject check was due to a mistaken notion that such check was cleared, when in fact, it was
dishonored due to an alteration in the amount indicated therein. Such payment on the part of BPI to
respondents was clearly made by mistake, giving rise to the quasi-contractual obligation of solutio
indebiti under Article 2154 in relation to Article 2163 of the Civil Code. Not being a loan or forbearance
of money, an interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be imposed on the amount to be refunded
and on the damages and attorney’s fees awarded, if any, computed from the time of demand until its
satisfaction. Consequently, respondents must return to BPI the aforesaid amount, with legal interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of extrajudicial demand — or on June 27, 1997,
the date when BPI informed respondents of the dishonor of the subject check and demanded the return
of its proceeds — until fully paid.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals;
As a general rule, the Court’s jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is limited to the review of pure questions of law. Otherwise stated, a Rule 45 petition does not allow
the review of questions of fact because the Court is not a trier of facts. Case law provides that “there is a
‘question of law’ when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or
circumstances; on the other hand, there is a ‘question of fact’ when the issue raised on appeal pertains to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed error was one of ‘law’
or ‘fact’ is not the appellation given by the parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court
can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise, it is one of fact.” Where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of whether or not the
conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law. However, if the question posed requires
a reevaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances
and their relationship to each other, the issue is factual.
3. Same; Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence; It is settled that in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. Preponderance of evidence is
the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term ‘greater weight of evidence’ or ‘greater weight of credible evidence.’ Succinctly
put, it only requires that evidence be greater or more convincing than the opposing evidence.
4. Same; Same; Witnesses; Aside from his bare testimony, Amado did not present any corroborative
evidence to support his claim that his performance of the aforesaid voluntary acts was subject to BPI’s
presentment of the proper and authenticated proof of the dishonored subject check. Amado’s
unsubstantiated testimony is self-serving at the most, and hence, cannot be relied upon. In fact, the RTC did
not lend any credence to Amado’s testimony in resolving this case. In this regard, it should be borne in mind
that the “findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is
in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the
witness firsthand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under gruelling examination. Absent any
showing that the trial court’s calibration of credibility was flawed, the appellate court is bound by its
assessment,” as in this case.
5. Same; Same; Documentary Evidence; Best Evidence Rule; Anent the subject check, while the Best
Evidence Rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that generally, the original copy of the
document must be presented whenever the content of the document is under inquiry, the rule admits of
certain exceptions, such as “[w]hen the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror.” In order to fall under the aforesaid exception, it is crucial that
the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the
original, or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the
offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.
6. Same; Same;It should be pointed out that respondents did not proffer any objection to the evidence
presented by BPI, as shown by their failure to file their comment or opposition to the latter’s formal offer
of evidence. It is well-settled that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may validly be considered
by the court in arriving at its judgment, as what the RTC did in this case, since it was in a better position to
assess and weigh the evidence presented during the trial. ****
578
487. Dinglasan-Delos Santos vs. Abejon, 821 SCRA 132, March 20, 2017
1. Attorney’s Fees; Attorney’s fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit.-
—Anent the issue on attorney’s fees, the general rule is that the same cannot be recovered as part of
damages because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not
to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification. In this case, the Court
finds no justification for the award of attorney’s fees to either party. Accordingly, any award for
attorney’s fees made by the courts a quo must be deleted.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Pre-trial; At the outset, it must be emphasized that a pretrial is a
procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues raised by the parties and to take the trial
of cases out of the realm of surprise and maneuvering. More significantly, a pretrial has been
institutionalized as the answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Hailed as the most
important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth century, it paves the way for
a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case. It is, thus, mandatory for the trial court to conduct
pretrial in civil cases in order to realize the paramount objective of simplifying, abbreviating, and
expediting trial.
3. Civil Law; Void Contracts; It is settled that “the declaration of nullity of a contract which is void ab
initio operates to restore things to the state and condition in which they were found before the execution
thereof.” Pursuant to this rule, since the Deed of Sale involving the subject land stands to be nullified
in view of the parties’ stipulation to this effect, it is incumbent upon the parties to return what they have
received from said sale. Accordingly, Erlinda and the rest of petitioners (as Pedro’s heirs) are entitled
to the return of the subject land as stipulated during the pretrial. To effect the same, the Register of
Deeds of Makati City should cancel TCT No. 180286 issued in the name of Teresita, and thereafter,
reinstate TCT No. 131753 in the name of Pedro and Erlinda and, restore the same to its previous state
before its cancellation, i.e., with the mortgage executed by the parties annotated thereon. On the other
hand, respondents, as Teresita’s successors-in-interest, are entitled to the refund of the additional
P50,000.00 consideration she paid for such sale. However, it should be clarified that the liability for
the said amount will not fall on all petitioners, but only on Erlinda, as she was the only one among the
petitioners who was involved in the said sale. Pursuant to Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 703 SCRA 439
(2013), the amount of P50,000.00 shall be subjected to legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
4. Same; Builders in Good Faith; The terms builder, planter, or sower in good faith as used in
reference to Article 448 of the Civil Code, refers to one who, not being the owner of the land, builds,
plants, or sows on that land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or
mode of acquisition. “The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.” On the other hand, bad
faith may only be attributed to a landowner when the act of building, planting, or sowing was done with
his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
5. Same; Same; In this relation, Article 453 of the Civil Code provides that where both the landowner
and the builder, planter, or sower acted in bad faith, they shall be treated as if both of them were in
good faith, viz.: Article 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted
or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and
the other shall be the same as though both had acted in good faith. It is understood that there is bad
faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition
on his part.
6. Same; Same;Whenever both the landowner and the builder/planter/sower are in good faith (or in
bad faith, pursuant to the aforecited provision), the landowner is given two (2) options under Article
448 of the Civil Code, namely: (a) he may appropriate the improvements for himself after reimbursing
the buyer (the builder in good faith) the necessary and useful expenses under Articles 546 and 548 of
the Civil Code; or (b) he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than that
of the improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.
****
579
488. Sebastian vs. Cruz, 821 scra 150, March 20, 2017
1. Same; Same; Same; Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner’s duplicate certificate
of title is crucial in clothing the RTC with jurisdiction over the judicial reconstitution proceedings. In
Spouses Paulino v. CA, 725 SCRA 273 (2014), the Court reiterated the rule that when the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title was not actually lost or destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of another
person, the reconstituted title is void because the court that rendered the order of reconstitution had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Void Judgments; Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, the only grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. In case of absence, or lack of
jurisdiction, a court should not take cognizance of the case. Thus, the prevailing rule is that where there
is want of jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment
is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be obtained,
which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out
are void. It is not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never become executory. It also
follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.
3. Civil Law; Land Titles and Deeds; Reconstitution of Titles; Requisites that Must be Complied With
for an Order for Reconstitution to be Issued.
—From the foregoing, it appears that the following requisites must be complied with for an order for
reconstitution to be issued: (a) that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the
documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an
interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost and destroyed; and (e)
that the description, area and boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained
in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes
restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a
person to a piece of land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or
destruction occurred. RA 26 presupposes that the property whose title is sought to be reconstituted has
already been brought under the provisions of the Torrens System.
****
580
489. Navarra vs. People, 821 SCRA 179, March 20, 2017
Syllabi Class :Social Security System ; Mandatory Contributions ;
1. Social Security System; Mandatory Contributions; Prompt remittance of Social Security System
(SSS) contributions under Section 22(a) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8282 is mandatory.-
—A plain reading of the Information reveals that petitioner, as FENICS’s President and Chairman of
the Board of Directors at that time, is charged for violation of Section 22(a), in relation to Section 28(h)
and (f), of RA 8282 for FENICS’s failure and/or refusal to remit its employees’ SSS contributions to the
SSS during the period from July 1997 to June 2000. Section 22(a) of RA 8282 states: Section 22.
Remittance of Contributions.—(a) The contributions imposed in the preceding section shall be remitted
to the SSS within the first ten (10) days of each calendar month following the month for which they are
applicable or within such time as the Commission may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct
and to remit such contributions shall be liable for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to
the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three percent
(3%) per month from the date the contribution falls due until paid. If deemed expedient and advisable
by the Commission, the collection and remittance of contributions shall be made quarterly or semi-
annually in advance, the contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective
employers: Provided, That upon separation of an employee, any contribution so paid in advance but
not due shall be credited or refunded to his employer. x x x x Verily, prompt remittance of SSS
contributions under the aforesaid provision is mandatory. Any divergence from this rule subjects the
employer not only to monetary sanctions, i.e., the payment of penalty of three percent (3%) per month,
but also to criminal prosecution if the employer fails to: (a) register its employees with the SSS; (b)
deduct monthly contributions from the salaries/wages of its employees; or (c) remit to the SSS its
employees’ SSS contributions and/or loan payments after deducting the same from their respective
salaries/wages. In this regard, Section 28(f) of RA 8282 explicitly provides that “[i]f the act or omission
penalized by this Act be committed by an association, partnership, corporation or any other institution,
its managing head, directors or partners shall be liable to the penalties provided in this Act for the
offense.” Notably, the aforesaid punishable acts are considered mala prohibita and, thus, the defenses
of good faith and lack of criminal intent are rendered immaterial.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Preliminarily, the Court notes that petitioner
assails the validity or regularity of the Information filed against him on the ground that it allegedly did
not charge a criminal offense. However, as pointed out by the CA, petitioner never raised such issue
prior to his arraignment. In fact, a reading of the records shows that petitioner only raised the same
after he was convicted by the RTC and the case was already on appeal before the CA. Thus, the CA
correctly ruled that his failure to object to the alleged defect in the Information before entering his plea
amounted to a waiver of such defects, especially since objections as to matters of form or substance in
the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Hence, petitioner can no longer be allowed
to raise this issue before the Court.
****
581
490. People vs. Toukyo, 821 SCRA 190, March 20, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinction of Criminal Liability ; Death of the Accused ;
1. Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused; Upon Toukyo’s death
pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused. Notably, there is no civil liability that arose from this case, there
being no private complainant to begin with.
****
582
491. Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Rowie A. Quimno, Utility Worker I, MCTC of Ipil-
Tungawan- RT Lim, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, 822 SCRA 476, April 17, 2017
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Court Personnel ; Absence Without Official Leave ;
1. Same; Same; Same; A court employee’s continued absence without leave disrupts the normal
functions of the court.-
—Indeed, prolonged unauthorized absence causes inefficiency in the public service. A court employee’s
continued absence without leave disrupts the normal functions of the court. It contravenes the duty of a
public servant to serve with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. The
Court stresses that a court personnel’s conduct is laden with the heavy burden of responsibility to
uphold public accountability and maintain people’s faith in the judiciary.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Absence Without Official Leave; Quimno should be
separated from service or dropped from the rolls in view of his continued absence since February 2016.-
—Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 13,
Series of 2007, states: Section 63. Effect of absences without approved Leave.—An official or employee
who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be
considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or
dropped from the rolls without prior notice. x x x. x x x x (Emphasis supplied) Based on this provision,
Quimno should be separated from service or dropped from the rolls in view of his continued absence
since February 2016.
****
583
492. City of Davao vs. Olanolan, 822 SCRA 481, April 17, 2017
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Special Civil Actions ; Mandamus ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Barangay funds shall be kept in the custody of the city or municipal treasurer,
at the option of the barangay, and any officer of the local government unit whose duty permits or
requires the possession or custody of local government funds shall be accountable and responsible for
the safekeeping thereof in conformity with the provisions of the law. Moreover, “[t]he city or
municipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general supervision over
component barangays to ensure that the said barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions.” Hence, given the COMELEC’s ruling revoking respondent’s election and proclamation
as Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A, which in fact, was later on validated by no less than the Court,
petitioner could not have been faulted for not automatically releasing the funds sought for by respondent
in his mandamus petition.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; Words and Phrases; “Mandamus is defined as
a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it
or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.” In Special People, Inc. Foundation v. Canda, 688 SCRA 403 (2013), the Court
explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued only in
extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy
relief to one who has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.
3. Same; Same; Same; Considering that respondent had no right to the office of Punong Barangay at
the time he filed his mandamus petition on July 26, 2005, during which the SQAO had already been
recalled, he had no valid legal interest to the reliefs prayed for. In fact, it should be pointed out that
respondent’s motion for reconsideration before the Court was altogether denied with finality even prior
to his filing of the mandamus petition, i.e., on June 28, 2005. This means that, for all legal intents and
purposes, respondent could not have even relied on the supposed effectivity of the SQAO during the
pendency of his motion for reconsideration, because at the time he filed his mandamus petition, the
Court’s March 31, 2005 Decision against him had already attained finality. Therefore, stripped of the
technical niceties, the Court finds that respondent had no clear legal right to the performance of the
legal act to be compelled of, which altogether justifies the dismissal of his mandamus petition.
4. Same; Same; Same; Petitioner could not have been compelled by mandamus to release the funds
prayed for by respondent in view of the attending circumstances. It is well-settled that “[m]andamus
only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of
a discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by
the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of
acting officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and
conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.”
****
584
493. MetroBank vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 822 SCRA 496, April 17, 2017
Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Prescriptive Period ;
1. Same; Same; It may be gleaned that final withholding taxes are considered as full and final payment
of the income tax due, and thus, are not subject to any adjustments. Thus, the two (2)-year prescriptive
period commences to run from the time the refund is ascertained, i.e., the date such tax was paid, and
not upon the discovery by the taxpayer of the erroneous or excessive payment of taxes. In the case at
bar, it is undisputed that Metrobank’s final withholding tax liability in March 2001 was remitted to the
BIR on April 25, 2001. As such, it only had until April 25, 2003 to file its administrative and judicial
claims for refund. However, while Metrobank’s administrative claim was filed on December 27, 2002,
its corresponding judicial claim was only filed on September 10, 2003. Therefore, Metrobank’s claim
for refund had clearly prescribed.
2. Taxation; Tax Refunds; Section 204 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides
the CIR with, inter alia, the authority to grant tax refunds. Pertinent portions of which read: Section
204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes.—The
Commissioner may — x x x x (C) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties
imposed without authority, refund the value of internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good
condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or change unused stamps that have been
rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit or refund of taxes or
penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim for credit
or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return
filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
3. Same; Same; A claimant for refund must first file an administrative claim for refund before the CIR,
prior and judicial claim before the CTA. Notably, both the administrative and judicial claims for refund
should be filed within two (2)-year prescriptive period indicated therein, and that the claimant is
allowed to file the latter even without waiting for the resolution of the former in order to prevent the
forfeiture of its claim through prescription. In this regard, case law states that “the primary purpose of
filing an administrative claim [is] to serve as a notice of warning to the CIR that court action would
follow unless the tax or penalty alleged to have been collected erroneously or illegally is refunded. To
clarify, Section 229 of the Tax Code — then Section 306 of the old Tax Code — however does not mean
that the taxpayer must await the final resolution of its administrative claim for refund, since doing so
would be tantamount to the taxpayer’s forfeiture of its right to seek judicial recourse should the two
(2)-year prescriptive period expire without the appropriate judicial claim being filed.”
4. Same; Prescriptive Period; As aptly put in CIR v. TMX Sales, Inc., 205 SCRA 184 (1992), “payment
of quarterly income tax should only be considered [as] mere installments of the annual tax due. These
quarterly tax payments which are computed based on the cumulative figures of gross receipts and
deductions in order to arrive at a net taxable income, should be treated as advances or portions of the
annual income tax due, to be adjusted at the end of the calendar or fiscal year. x x x Consequently, the
two-year prescriptive period x x x should be computed from the time of filing of the Adjustment Return
or Annual Income Tax Return and final payment of income tax.” Verily, since quarterly income tax
payments are treated as mere “advance payments” of the annual corporate income tax, there may arise
certain situations where such “advance payments” would cover more than said corporate taxpayer’s
entire income tax liability for a specific taxable year. Thus, it is only logical to reckon the two (2)-year
prescriptive period from the time the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax Return was
filed, since it is only at that time that it would be possible to determine whether the corporate taxpayer
had paid an amount exceeding its annual income tax liability.
****
585
494. Fuentes vs. People, 822 SCRA 509, April 17, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act ; Nominal Damages ;
1. Same; Same; Nominal Damages; The Sandiganbayan awarded her P200,000.00 as nominal
damages occasioned by Fuentes’s non-issuance of a Business Permit to Triple A. As defined under
Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are “recoverable where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any
kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages
whatsoever have been or can be shown.” In this case, however, it is clear that Valenzuela suffered some
sort of pecuniary loss due to the suspension of Triple A’s ship chandling operations, albeit the amount
thereof was not proven with certainty. Thus, the award of temperate, and not nominal, damages, is
proper.
2. Criminal Law; Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019; Elements of.-
—As may be gleaned above, the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (a) that
the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions (or a
private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury
to any party, including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage,
or preference in the discharge of his functions.
3. Same; Same; Manifest Partiality; Evident Bad Faith; Words and Phrases; There is “manifest
partiality” when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or
person rather than another. On the other hand, “evident bad faith” connotes not only bad judgment but
also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.
4. Same; Same; Bad Faith; As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor’s
prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits pursuant to Sections 16 and 444
(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code as an incident of his power to issue the same, it must
nevertheless be emphasized that: (a) the power to suspend or revoke is premised on the violation of the
conditions specified therein; and (b) the power to refuse issuance is premised on noncompliance with
the prerequisites for said issuance. In the exercise of these powers, the mayor must observe due process
in that it must afford the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard.
5. Same; Same; Damages; Fuentes’ acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit in Valenzuela’s favor,
coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred Triple A from
engaging in its ship chandling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue
injury on the part of Valenzuela. Undeniably, such suspension of Triple A’s ship chandling operations
prevented Valenzuela from engaging in an otherwise lawful endeavor for the year 2002. To make things
worse, Valenzuela was also not issued a Business Permit for the years 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, as
it was only in 2007 that such permit was issued in Triple A’s favor. Under prevailing case law, “[p]roof
of the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the benefit received
is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.”
6. Same; Same; Penalties; As regards the proper penalty to be imposed on Fuentes, Section 9(a) of RA
3019 states that the prescribed penalties for violation of the aforesaid crime includes, inter alia,
imprisonment for a period of six (6) years and one (1) month to fifteen (15) years, and perpetual
disqualification from public office. Thus, the Sandiganbayan correctly sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum,
to ten (10) years and six (6) months, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.
****
586
495. Sumifru (Philippines) Corporation vs. Baya, 822 SCRA 564, April 17, 2017
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Corporations ; Mergers of Corporations ;
1. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Mergers of Corporations; Sumifru’s contention that it should only
be held liable for the period when Baya stayed with DFC as it only merged with the latter and not with
AMSFC is untenable. Section 80 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines clearly states that one of
the effects of a merger is that the surviving company shall inherit not only the assets, but also the
liabilities of the corporation it merged with.
of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely
refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
where there is cessation of work, because ‘continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable
or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay’ and other benefits. Aptly
called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not,
constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by
an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by
him except to forego his continued employment. In Peckson v. Robinsons Supermarket Corp., 700 SCRA
668 (2013), the Court held that the burden is on the employer to prove that the transfer or demotion of
an employee was a valid exercise of management prerogative and was not a mere subterfuge to get rid
of an employee; failing in which, the employer will be found liable for constructive dismissal, viz.: In
case of a constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and demotion
of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity. Particularly,
for a transfer not to be considered a constructive dismissal, the employer must be able to show that
such transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a
demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Failure of the employer
to overcome this burden of proof, the employee’s demotion shall no doubt be tantamount to unlawful
constructive dismissal.
4. Same; Same; Doctrine of Strained Relations; Separation Pay; In light of the underlying
circumstances which led to Baya’s constructive dismissal, it is clear that an atmosphere of animosity
and antagonism now exists between Baya on the one hand, and AMSFC and DFC on the other, which
therefore calls for the application of the doctrine of strained relations. “Under the doctrine of strained
relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement when
the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On one hand, such payment liberates the employee
from what could be a highly oppressive work environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer
from the grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.”
Thus, it is more prudent that Baya be awarded separation pay, instead of being reinstated, as computed
by the CA.
****
587
496. Daplas vs. Department of Finance, 823 SCRA 44, April 17, 2017
Syllabi Class :Gov’t Employees ; SALN ; Simple Negligence ;
1. Same; Same; Same; The Court finds no reason to hold petitioner liable for the charges of Dishonesty
and Grave Misconduct, but declares her guilty, instead, of Simple Negligence in accomplishing her
SALN. Simple Negligence is akin to Simple Neglect of Duty, which is a less grave offense punishable
with suspension without pay for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months, for the first offense.
Since the penalty of suspension can no longer be imposed on account of petitioner’s resignation, and
considering that she readily admitted her omissions which do not appear to have been attended by any
bad faith or fraudulent intent, the Court finds that the penalty of fine in the amount equivalent to one
(1) month and one (1) day of petitioner’s last salary is reasonable and just under the premises.
2. Government Employees; Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth; The requirement of filing
a SALN is enshrined in no less than the 1987 Constitution in order to promote transparency in the civil
service, and operates as a deterrent against government officials bent on enriching themselves through
unlawful means. By mandate of law, i.e., RA 6713, it behooves every government official or employee
to accomplish and submit a sworn statement completely disclosing his or her assets, liabilities, net
worth, and financial and business interests, including those of his/her spouse and unmarried children
under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households, in order to suppress any questionable
accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results from nondisclosure of such matters.
3. Same; Dishonesty; Dishonesty is committed when an individual intentionally makes a false statement
of any material fact, practices or attempts to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his
examination, registration, appointment, or promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition to lie,
cheat, deceive, betray or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; and the lack of fairness and straightforwardness.
4. Same; Misconduct; Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave
misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. Without any of these elements,
the transgression of an established rule is properly characterized as simple misconduct only. Most
importantly, without a nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of
grave misconduct shall necessarily fail.
5. Same; Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth; Dishonesty; Indeed, the failure to file a
truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or employee, and would normally amount
to dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere non-declaration of the required data in the
SALN does not automatically amount to such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to
conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition, a public officer or employee becomes
susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration results in the accumulated wealth becoming
manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and income from other sources, and he/she fails to
properly account or explain these sources of income and acquisitions.
6. Same; Same; Same;—It should be emphasized that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition
of unexplained wealth. Thus, in several cases where the source of the undisclosed wealth was properly
accounted for, the Court deemed the same an “explained wealth” which the law does not penalize.
Consequently, absent any intent to commit a wrong, and having accounted for the source of the
“undisclosed wealth,” as in this case, petitioner cannot be adjudged guilty of the charge of Dishonesty;
but at the most, of mere negligence for having failed to accomplish her SALN properly and accurately.
7. Same; Same; Simple Negligence; Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required by
the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time, and of
the place. In the case of public officials, there is negligence when there is a breach of duty or failure to
perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.
An act done in good faith, which constitutes only an error of judgment and for no ulterior motives
and/or purposes, as in the present case, is merely Simple Negligence. ****
588
497. Dimapilis vs. Commission on Elections, 823 SCRA 451, April 18, 2017
Syllabi Class :Certificate of Candidacy ;
1. Certificate of Candidacy; A person whose CoC had been cancelled is deemed to have not been a
candidate at all because his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus, cannot give rise to a valid
candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. The cancellation of the CoC essentially renders the votes cast
for him or her as stray votes, and are not considered in determining the winner of an election. This
would necessarily invalidate his proclamation and entitle the qualified candidate receiving the highest
number of votes to the position.
2. Election Law; A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the OEC
provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is eligible for the office
he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of his knowledge. To be “eligible”
relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected to an office. Conversely, “ineligibility”
has been defined as a “disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to an office or appointed to a
particular position.” In this relation, a person intending to run for public office must not only possess
the required qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run, but must also possess
none of the grounds for disqualification under the law.
3. Same; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; Under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the 1987
Constitution, the COMELEC has the duty to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election x x x.” The Court had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal
duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to
hold public office, albeit, arising from a criminal conviction. Considering, however, that Section 52(a),
Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service similarly imposes the penalty
of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from
service, the Court sees no reason why the ratiocination enunciated in such earlier criminal case should
not apply here.
4. Same; Same; Same; As petitioner’s disqualification to run for public office pursuant to the final and
executory OMB rulings dismissing him from service now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon
the COMELEC to cancel petitioner’s CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its
Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election. Accordingly, the Court finds no merit to petitioner’s claim of denial of due process because
even though the special circumstance extant herein calls for the outright cancellation of his CoC in the
exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative function, it even allowed him to submit his Verified Answer
cum Memorandum to explain his side, and to file a motion for reconsideration from its resolution.
5. Public Officers; Dismissal from Service; In this case, the OMB rulings dismissing petitioner for
Grave Misconduct had already attained finality on May 28, 2010, which date was even prior to his first
election as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October 2010 Barangay Elections. As
above stated, “[t]he penalty of dismissal [from service] shall carry with it that of cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the
government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.” Although the principal penalty of
dismissal appears to have not been effectively implemented (since petitioner was even able to run and
win for two [2] consecutive elections), the corresponding accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office had already rendered him ineligible to run for any elective
local position. Bearing the same sense as its criminal law counterpart, the term perpetual in this
administrative penalty should likewise connote a lifetime restriction and is not dependent on the term
of any principal penalty. It is undisputable that this accessory penalty sprung from the same final OMB
rulings, and therefore had already attached and consequently, remained effective at the time petitioner
filed his CoC on October 11, 2013 and his later reelection in 2013. Therefore, petitioner could not have
been validly reelected so as to avail of the condonation doctrine, unlike in other cases where the
condonation doctrine was successfully invoked by virtue of reelections which overtook and thus,
rendered moot and academic pending administrative cases.
****
589
498. Bilag vs. Ay-Ay, 824 SCRA 78, April 24, 2017
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Jurisdiction ;
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; RTC Br. 61 has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
5881-R as the plaintiffs therein (herein respondents) seek to quiet title over lands which belong to the
public domain. Necessarily, Civil Case No. 5881-R must be dismissed on this ground. It should be
stressed that the court a quo’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case renders it without
authority and necessarily obviates the resolution of the merits of the case. To reiterate, when a court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action, as any act it
performs without jurisdiction is null and void, and without any binding legal effects. In this light, the
Court finds no further need to discuss the other grounds relied upon by petitioners in this case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Words and Phrases; Jurisprudence has consistently
held that “[j]urisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case.
In order for the court or an adjudicative body to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it
must acquire, among others, jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is the power to hear and determine the general class to which the proceedings in
question belong; it is conferred by law and not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the
parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it exists. Thus, when a court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.” Perforce, it is important that a court or
tribunal should first determine whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject matter presented
before it, considering that any act that it performs without jurisdiction shall be null and void, and
without any binding legal effects.
3. Civil Law; Land Registration; Director of Lands; Since the subject lands are untitled and
unregistered public lands, then petitioners correctly argued that it is the Director of Lands who has the
authority to award their ownership. Thus, the RTC Br. 61 correctly recognized its lack of power or
authority to hear and resolve respondents’ action for quieting of title. In Heirs of Pocdo v. Avila, 719
SCRA 552 (2014), the Court ruled that the trial court therein correctly dismissed an action to quiet title
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for lack of authority to determine who among the parties have
better right over the disputed property, which is admittedly still part of public domain for being within
the Baguio Townsite Reservation.
****
590
499. Bureau of Internal Revenue vs. Lepanto Ceramics, Inc., 824 SCRA 125, April 24, 2017
Syllabi Class :Mercantile Law ; Corporations ; Corporate Rehabilitation ;
1. Same; Same; Same; To clarify, however, creditors of the distressed corporation are not without
remedy as they may still submit their claims to the rehabilitation court for proper consideration so that
they may participate in the proceedings, keeping in mind the general policy of the law “to ensure or
maintain certainty and predictability in commercial affairs, preserve and maximize the value of the
assets of these debtors, recognize creditor rights and respect priority of claims, and ensure equitable
treatment of creditors who are similarly situated.” In other words, the creditors must ventilate their
claims before the rehabilitation court, and any “[a]ttempts to seek legal or other resource against the
distressed corporation shall be sufficient to support a finding of indirect contempt of court.”
2. Mercantile Law; Corporations; Corporate Rehabilitation; Words and Phrases; [C]ase law has
defined corporate rehabilitation as an attempt to conserve and administer the assets of an insolvent
corporation in the hope of its eventual return from financial stress to solvency. It contemplates the
continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its
former position of successful operation and liquidity.
3. Same; Same; Same; Verily, the inherent purpose of rehabilitation is to find ways and means to
minimize the expenses of the distressed corporation during the rehabilitation period by providing the
best possible framework for the corporation to gradually regain or achieve a sustainable operating
form. “[It] enable[s] the company to gain a new lease in life and thereby allow creditors to be paid
[t]heir claims from its earnings. Thus, rehabilitation shall be undertaken when it is shown that the
continued operation of the corporation is economically more feasible and its creditors can recover, by
way of the present value of payments projected in the plan, more, if the corporation continues as a
going concern than if it is immediately liquidated.”
****
591
500. People vs. Culas, 825 SCRA 552, June 05, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinction of Criminal Liability ; Death of the Accused ; Civil Liability
Arising from Crime ;
1. Same; Same; Same; Civil Liability Arising from Crime;Upon accused-appellant’s death pending
appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant
to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto
is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that
accused-appellant’s civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on
sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of
accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
2. Criminal Law; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused; Under prevailing law and
jurisprudence, accused-appellant’s death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders dismissible
the criminal case against him. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability
is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit: Article 89. How criminal liability is totally
extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment.
****
592
501. Olympia-Geronilla vs. Montemayor, Jr., June 05, 2017 A.M. No. P-17-3676
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Simple Neglect of Duty ; Words and Phrases ;
1. Same; Simple Neglect of Duty; Words and Phrases;
—Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure of an employee to give attention to a task expected of
him and signifies a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference, a less grave offense
punishable by suspension from office for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first
offense, and dismissal for the second offense under Section 46(D) of the RRACCS. However, the Court,
in several cases, imposed the penalty of fine in lieu of suspension as an alternative penalty in order to
prevent any undue adverse effect on public service which would ensue if work were otherwise left
unattended by reason of respondent’s suspension. Therefore, the Court imposes on Atty. Centron the
penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
2. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; Engraved in jurisprudence is the rule that the
sheriff’s duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial. Once the writ is placed in his or her hands,
a sheriff is obligated to execute the order of the court strictly to the letter and with reasonable
promptness, taking heed of the prescribed period required by the Rules. In this case, Sheriff
Montemayor’s mandated task was to implement the MCTC’s Decision in favor of complainants.
However, instead of doing so, he substituted his own judgment and acted on his own belief that a specific
portion of the subject property should be excluded from the execution. He refused to demolish the house
of defendant Aceveda and vehemently insisted that the subject property must first be resurveyed, unduly
causing delay in the implementation of the MCTC Decision, to the prejudice of the prevailing parties,
i.e., the complainants. Sheriff Montemayor’s failure to enforce the alias writ of execution and writ of
demolition clearly renders him liable for dereliction of duty. He overstepped his authority and
conveniently overlooked the ministerial nature of a sheriff’s duty in the execution of judgments. Instead
of enforcing the MCTC’s orders, he exercised his discretion and supplanted his own judgment for that
of the court’s. To reiterate, the duty of a sheriff to execute a writ is purely ministerial, and he has no
discretion to delay the execution thereof. Absent any instruction by a court to the contrary, he is
mandated to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness in implementing the writ. If for any
reason, he cannot do so in part or in full, his duty is outlined in Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which, unfortunately, he likewise failed to observe.
3. Same; Same; Same;
—As regards the amount of P15,000.00 that Sheriff Montemayor had admittedly received from
complainants as additional expenses for the cancelled demolition and which he claimed had been
distributed among the Mangyans who voluntarily vacated the premises, the Court concurs with the
OCA’s finding that the said money was beyond the ambit of allowable fees that a sheriff may receive in
the implementation of writs. Moreover, Sheriff Montemayor failed to observe the following procedure
laid down in Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court with respect to sheriff’s expenses: (1) the sheriff
is required to secure the court’s prior approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement
the court process; (2) the requesting party shall deposit such amount with the Clerk of Court and Ex-
Officio Sheriff, who shall disburse the same to the executing sheriff subject to his liquidation within the
same period for rendering a return on the process or writ; and (3) any unspent amount shall be refunded
to the requesting party who made the deposit.
4. Same; Same; Same; Dishonesty; Extortion;
—Indisputably, the sum of P15,000.00 received by Sheriff Montemayor without the approval of the
court cannot be considered as lawful sheriff’s fees. As such, his receipt thereof is tantamount to an
unlawful exaction for which he must be held liable for grave misconduct and dishonesty. A sheriff’s
conduct of unilaterally demanding sums of money from a party-litigant purportedly to defray expenses
of execution, without obtaining the approval of the trial court for such supposed expense and without
rendering an accounting constitutes dishonesty and extortion and falls short of the required standards
of public service. Such conduct threatens the very existence of the system of administration of justice.
5. Same; Grave Misconduct; Dishonesty;
—Grave misconduct and dishonesty are grave offenses each punishable by dismissal on the first offense
under Section 46(A), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS). Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is likewise a grave offense which
593
carries the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, and dismissal on
the second offense. However, as records show that Sheriff Montemayor had been previously meted the
penalty of dismissal, the Court instead imposes on him the penalty of fine in the amount of P40,000.00,
which amount shall be deducted from the monetary value of his accrued credit leaves, if sufficient;
otherwise, he shall pay the amount directly to the Court.
6. Same; Court Personnel; Simple Neglect of Duty;
—Similarly, Atty. Centron should be held administratively liable for her failure to take a more decisive
action against Sheriff Montemayor’s unwarranted refusal to enforce the MCTC’s Decision in favor of
complainants. Although she may have advised and/or reminded him with respect to the performance of
his duties, her apparently lackadaisical attitude in this matter evinces a similar failure on her part to
perform her duty of effectively supervising him. Moreover, instead of taking Sheriff Montemayor’s
stance that a resurvey should be conducted on the subject property based on his groundless belief that
a portion thereof should be excluded from the judgment, she should have firmly reminded him of his
mandated ministerial task of implementing writs promptly and expeditiously, and that he had no
discretion with regard to the merits of the judgment. Atty. Centron’s failure in this respect renders her
administratively liable for simple neglect of duty.
****
594
502. Mitsubishi Corp-Manila Br vs. CIR, June 5, 2017 G.R. No. 175772
Syllabi Class :Taxation ; Tax Refund ;
1. Same; Same; A revenue memorandum circular is an administrative ruling issued by the CIR to
interpret tax laws. It is widely accepted that an interpretation by the executive officers, whose duty is
to enforce the law, is entitled to great respect from the courts. However, such interpretation is not
conclusive and will be disregarded if judicially found to be incorrect. Verily, courts will not tolerate
administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law
they seek to implement, as in this case. Thus, Item B(3) of RMC No. 42-99, an administrative issuance
directing petitioner to claim the refund from NPC, cannot prevail over Sections 204 and 229 of the
NIRC, which provide that claims for refund of erroneously collected taxes must be filed with the CIR.
2. Political Law; Executive Agreements; Exchange of Notes; In this case, it is fairly apparent that the
subject taxes in the amount of P52,612,812.00 was erroneously collected from petitioner, considering
that the obligation to pay the same had already been assumed by the Philippine Government by virtue
of its Exchange of Notes with the Japanese Government. Case law explains that an exchange of notes
is considered as an executive agreement, which is binding on the State even without Senate concurrence.
In Abaya v. Ebdane, 515 SCRA 720 (2007): An “exchange of notes” is a record of a routine agreement
that has many similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two
documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by the representative of the
other. Under the usual procedure, the accepting State repeats the text of the offering State to record its
assent. The signatories of the letters may be government Ministers, diplomats or departmental heads.
The technique of exchange of notes is frequently resorted to, either because of its speedy procedure, or,
sometimes, to avoid the process of legislative approval. It is stated that “treaties, agreements,
conventions, charters, protocols, declarations, memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and
exchange of notes” all refer to “international instruments binding at international law.” x x x x
Significantly, an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which becomes
binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress.
3. Taxation; Exchange of Notes; Tax Assumption Provision; Paragraph 5(2) of the Exchange of Notes
provides for a tax assumption provision whereby: (2) The Government of the Republic of the Philippines
will, itself or through its executing agencies or instrumentalities, assume all fiscal levies or taxes
imposed in the Republic of the Philippines on Japanese firms and nationals operating as suppliers,
contractors or consultants on and/or in connection with any income that may accrue from the supply of
products of Japan and services of Japanese nationals to be provided under the Loan. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied) To “assume” means “[t]o take on, become bound as another is bound, or put
oneself in place of another as to an obligation or liability.” This means that the obligation or liability
remains, although the same is merely passed on to a different person. In this light, the concept of an
assumption is therefore different from an exemption, the latter being the “[f]reedom from a duty,
liability or other requirement” or “[a] privilege given to a judgment debtor by law, allowing the debtor
to retain [a] certain property without liability.” Thus, contrary to the CTA En Banc’s opinion, the
constitutional provisions on tax exemptions would not apply.
4. Same; Same; Same; As explicitly worded, the Philippine Government, through its executing agencies
(i.e., NPC in this case) particularly assumed “all fiscal levies or taxes imposed in the Republic of the
Philippines on Japanese firms and nationals operating as suppliers, contractors or consultants on
and/or in connection with any income that may accrue from the supply of products of Japan and services
of Japanese nationals to be provided under the [OECF] Loan.” The Philippine Government’s
assumption of “all fiscal levies and taxes,” which includes the subject taxes, is clearly a form of
concession given to Japanese suppliers, contractors or consultants in consideration of the OECF Loan,
which proceeds were used for the implementation of the Project. As part of this, NPC entered into the
June 21, 1991 Contract with Mitsubishi Corporation (i.e., petitioner’s head office in Japan) for the
engineering, supply, construction, installation, testing, and commissioning of a steam generator,
auxiliaries, and associated civil works for the Project, which foreign currency portion was funded by
the OECF loans. Thus, in line with the tax assumption provision under the Exchange of Notes, Article
VIII(B)(1) of the Contract states that NPC shall pay any and all forms of taxes that are directly
imposable under the Contract: Article VIII(B)(1) B. FOR ONSHORE PORTION. 1.) [The]
CORPORATION (NPC) shall, subject to the provisions under the Contract [Document] on Taxes, pay
595
any and all forms of taxes which are directly imposable under the Contract including VAT, that may be
imposed by the Philippine Government, or any of its agencies and political subdivisions.
5. Same; Tax Refund; It bears stressing that the CIR had already acknowledged, through its
administrative issuances, that Japanese contractors involved in the Project are not liable for the subject
taxes. In RMC No. 42-99, the CIR interpreted the effect of the tax assumption clause in the Exchange
of Notes on petitioner’s tax liability, to wit: The foregoing provisions of the Exchange of Notes mean
that the Japanese contractors or nationals engaged in EOCF-funded projects in the Philippines shall
not be required to shoulder all fiscal levies or taxes associated with the project. x x x x x x x x x Since
the executing government agencies are mandated to assume the payment of [income taxes] under the
Exchange of Notes, the said Japanese firms or nationals need not pay taxes due thereunder. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied) The CIR subsequently affirmed petitioner’s non-liability for taxes and
entitlement to tax refunds by issuing Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 24-2005 addressed to
specified BIR offices. The RMO provides: Pursuant to the provisions of [RMC] No. 32-99 as amended
by RMC No. 42-99, Japanese contractors and nationals engaged in OECF-funded projects in the
Philippines shall not be required to shoulder the fiscal levies or taxes associated with the project. Thus,
the concerned Japanese contractors are entitled to claim for the refund of all taxes paid and shouldered
by them relative to the conduct of the Project. You are, therefore, directed to expedite/prioritize the
processing of the claims for refund of Japanese contractors and nationals so [as] not to delay and
jeopardize the release of the funds for OECF-funded projects. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Therefore, considering that petitioner paid the subject taxes in the aggregate amount of
P52,612,812.00, which it was not required to pay, the BIR erroneously collected such amount.
Accordingly, petitioner is entitled to its refund.
6. Same; Same; The NIRC vests upon the CIR, being the head of the BIR, the authority to credit or
refund taxes which are erroneously collected by the government. This specific statutory mandate cannot
be overridden by averse interpretations made through mere administrative issuances, such as RMC No.
42-99, which — as argued by the CIR –– shifts to the executing agencies (particularly, NPC in this
case) the power to refund the subject taxes: 3. In cases where income taxes were previously paid directly
by the Japanese contractors or nationals, the corresponding cash refund shall be recovered from the
government executing agencies upon the presentation of proof of payment by the Japanese contractors
or nationals.
****
596
503. Edron Const Corp vs. Provincial Govt of Surigao Del Sur, 826 SCRA 47, June 05, 2017
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Dismissal of Actions ;
1. Same; Same; Dismissal of Actions; A judicious review of the records reveals that respondent’s
Answer with Counterclaim dated January 6, 2009 did not raise as an issue or as a defense petitioners’
non-execution of the sworn statement pertained to in Paragraph 4.3, Article IV of the construction
agreements. In fact, such matter was only raised in its Motion to Dismiss filed more than a year later
after the Answer, or on May 24, 2010, to support the ground relied upon in the said Motion, which is
failure to state a cause of action. However, it must be pointed out that the Motion and the arguments
supporting it can no longer be considered since it was filed out of time as Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court explicitly provides that motions to dismiss should be filed “[w]ithin the time for but before the
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” More importantly, such
matter/defense raised in the motion does not fall within the exceptions laid down in Section 1, Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court. As such, respondent was already precluded from raising such issue/defense. Hence,
the RTC cannot be faulted in: (a) issuing an Order dated August 11, 2010 denying the Motion to
Dismiss; and (b) not including a discussion of said issue/defense in its Decision dated December 28,
2010 and Order dated September 16, 2011.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Waiver of Defenses; Except for the defenses of: (a) lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and/or (d)
prescription, other defenses must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order
to prevent a waiver thereof.-
—Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court reads: Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.—
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court
shall dismiss the claim. It may be gleaned from the said provision that except for the defenses of: (a)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and/or (d)
prescription, other defenses must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to
prevent a waiver thereof. Otherwise stated, if a defendant fails to raise a defense not specifically
excepted in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, such
defense shall be deemed waived, and consequently, defendant is already estopped from relying upon
the same in further proceedings.
****
597
504. RE: LETTER OF LUCENA OFENDOREYES ALLEGING ILLICIT ACTIVITIES OF A
CERTAIN ATTY. CAJAYON INVOLVING CASES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY., 826 SCRA 74, June 06, 2017
Decisions Involving Cases Filed in the CA-CDO to the Highest Bidding Clients.
Syllabi Class :Administrative Proceedings ; Substantial Evidence ;
1. Administrative Proceedings; Substantial Evidence;
—Jurisprudence dictates that in administrative proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving
the allegations in their complaints by substantial evidence. If they fail to show in a satisfactory manner
the facts upon which their claims are based, the respondents are not obliged to prove their exception
or defense. The same goes with administrative cases disciplining for grave offense court employees or
magistrates. The evidence against the respondent should be competent and should be derived from
direct knowledge.
2. Administrative Complaints; Attorneys; Judges; Under the Rules of Court, administrative complaints
both against lawyers and judges of regular and special courts as well as Justices of the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan must be verified and supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations.
****
598
505. Judaya vs. Balbona, 826 SCRA 81, June 06, 2017
Syllabi Class :Court Personnel
1. Court Personnel; Those in the Judiciary serve as sentinels of justice, and any act of impropriety on
their part immeasurably affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the people’s confidence in
it. The Institution demands the best possible individuals in the service and it had never and will never
tolerate nor condone any conduct which would violate the norms of public accountability, and diminish,
or even tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system. As such, the Court will not hesitate
to rid its ranks of undesirables who undermine its efforts towards an effective and efficient
administration of justice, thus tainting its image in the eyes of the public.
2. Government Employees; Resignation; Preliminarily, it is worthy to emphasize that the precipitate
resignation of a government employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from service
does not render moot the administrative case against him. The Court’s pronouncement in Pagano v.
Nazarro, Jr., 533 SCRA 622 (2007), is instructive on this matter, to wit: In [OCA] v. Juan [(478 Phil.
823, 828-829 [2004])], this Court categorically ruled that the precipitate resignation of a government
employee charged with an offense punishable by dismissal from the service does not render moot the
administrative case against him. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when
facing administrative sanction. The resignation of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any
administrative liability to which he or she shall still be answerable. A case becomes moot and academic
only when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served
in passing upon the merits of the case. The instant case is not moot and academic, despite the
petitioner’s separation from government service. Even if the most severe of administrative sanctions —
that of separation from service — may no longer be imposed on the petitioner, there are other penalties
which may be imposed on her if she is later found guilty of administrative offenses charged against her,
namely, the disqualification to hold any government office and the forfeiture of benefits.
3. Same; Dismissal from Service; Grave Misconduct; Misconduct is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the
public officer. To warrant dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave, serious, important,
weighty, momentous, and not trifling. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the
public officer’s official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or
failure to discharge the duties of the office. In order to differentiate [grave] misconduct from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
established rule, must be manifest in the former.
4. Same; Same; Same; Illegal Solicitation; In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that
the acts of soliciting and receiving money from litigants for personal gain constitute Grave Misconduct,
for which the court employee guilty thereof should be held administratively liable, as in this case.
5. Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent, the Court
notes that Grave Misconduct is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal from service for
the first offense. “Corollary thereto, the penalty of dismissal from service carries with it the following
administrative disabilities: (a) cancellation of civil service eligibility; (b) forfeiture of retirement and
other benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any; and (c) perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and -
controlled corporation or government financial institution.” In this instance, since respondent had
earlier resigned, the penalty of dismissal from service could no longer be imposed. Nevertheless, such
penalty should be enforced in its full course by imposing the aforesaid administrative disabilities upon
him.
****
599
506. People vs. Jao, 157, June 07, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Extinction of Criminal Liability ; Death of the Accused Pending
Appeal ;
1. Same; Extinction of Criminal Liability; Death of the Accused Pending Appeal; While Jao’s
criminal liability remains, the same conclusion cannot be made with respect to Catigtig in view of his
supervening death pending appeal. As already adverted to, in a letter dated February 9, 2016, the
Bureau of Corrections informed the CA that Catigtig had already died on August 7, 2015, attaching
thereto a duplicate copy of Catigtig’s Certificate of Death issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar
General. Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, states: Art. 89. How criminal liability is
totally extinguished.—Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment. In People v. Egagamao, 799 SCRA 507 (2016), the Court
eloquently summed up the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his liabilities, as follows:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.” Thus, upon Catigtig’s death pending appeal
of his conviction, his criminal liability is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to
stand as the accused. As such, the criminal cases against him should be dismissed and declared closed
and terminated.
2. Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs; Elements of.-
—For a successful prosecution of the crime of Illegal Delivery of Dangerous Drugs, it must be proven
that the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by
any means; that such delivery is not authorized by law; and that the accused knowingly made the
delivery. Worthy of note is that the delivery may be committed even without consideration. On the other
hand, in the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, the prosecution must prove that the
accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; that such
possession is not authorized by law; and that the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
****
600
507. Festin vs. Zubiri, 827 SCRA 181, June 19, 2017
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Admin case
1. Same; The Court stresses that a lawyer’s primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of
justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede, or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes
this obligation. Indeed, a lawyer must champion his client’s cause with competence and diligence, but
he cannot invoke this as an excuse for his failure to exhibit courtesy and fairness to his fellow lawyers
and to respect legal processes designed to afford due process to all stakeholders.
2. Attorneys; The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board’s resolution is merely
recommendatory regardless of the penalty imposed on the lawyer; The IBP Board’s resolution is
merely recommendatory regardless of the penalty imposed on the lawyer. The amendment stresses the
Court’s authority to discipline a lawyer who transgresses his ethical duties under the CPR. Hence, any
final action on a lawyer’s administrative liability shall be done by the Court based on the entire records
of the case, including the IBP Board’s recommendation, without need for the lawyer-respondent to file
any additional pleading. On this score, respondent’s filing of the present petition for review is
unnecessary. Pursuant to the current rule, the IBP Board’s resolution and the case records were
forwarded to the Court. The latter is then bound to fully consider all documents contained therein,
regardless of any further pleading filed by any party — including respondent’s petition for review,
which the Court shall nonetheless consider if only to completely resolve the merits of this case and
determine respondent’s actual administrative liability.
3. Same; Legal Ethics; Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 1 of the CPR mandates lawyers to
uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the legal processes. Additionally, Canon 8 and Rule
10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR require lawyers to conduct themselves with fairness towards their
professional colleagues, to observe procedural rules, and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; “Manifestation” and “Motion,” Distinguished.-
—A manifestation is usually made merely for the information of the court, unless otherwise indicated.
In a manifestation, the manifesting party makes a statement to inform the court, rather than to contest
or argue. In contrast, a motion is an application for relief from the court other than by a pleading and
must be accompanied by a notice of hearing and proof of service to the other party, unless the motion
is not prejudicial to the rights of the adverse party. Settled is the rule that a motion without notice of
hearing is pro forma or a mere scrap of paper; thus, the court has no reason to consider it and the clerk
has no right to receive it. The reason for the rule is simple: to afford an opportunity for the other party
to agree or object to the motion before the court resolves it. This is in keeping with the principle of due
process.
5. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Respondent should be reminded that a lawyer is ethically bound not only
to serve his client but also the court, his colleagues, and society. His obligation to represent his client
is not without limits, but must be “within the bounds of the law” pursuant to Canon 19 of the CPR.
Accordingly, he is ethically bound to employ only fair and honest means to attain their clients’
objectives.
6. Same; The Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers. In the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion, it may to impose a less severe punishment if such penalty would achieve the
desired end of reforming the errant lawyer. In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court deems that
a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months is sufficient and commensurate
with respondent’s infractions.
****
601
508. Baguio vs. Lacuna, 827 SCRA 195, June 19, 2017
Syllabi Class :Administrative Law ; Simple Neglect of Duty ; Penalties ;
1. Same; Simple Neglect of Duty; Penalties; Section 46(D) of Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that simple neglect of duty is categorized as a less
grave offense punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first
offense, and dismissal from the service for the second offense. While the Court is duty-bound to sternly
wield a corrective hand to discipline its errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable,
the Court also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy. Thus, in several
administrative cases, the Court has restrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence of
mitigating facts, such as, length of service in the judiciary, the acknowledgment of infractions and
feelings of remorse, and family circumstances, among others. In this case, apart from respondent’s long
service in the government, it has been observed during the administrative investigation, and as admitted
by complainant, that the latter’s working habits had greatly improved and had since complied with her
duties.
2. Court Personnel; Stenographers; The duties of a Stenographer are clearly embodied under Section
17, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 17. Stenographer.—It shall be the duty of the
stenographer who has attended a session of a court either in the morning or in the afternoon, to deliver
to the clerk of court, immediately at the close of such morning or afternoon session, all the notes he has
taken, to be attached to the record of the case; and it shall likewise be the duty of the clerk to demand
that the stenographer comply with said duty. The clerk of court shall stamp the date on which such notes
are received by him. When such notes are transcribed the transcript shall be delivered to the clerk, duly
initialed on each page thereof, to be attached to the record of the case. (Emphasis supplied) x x x x
Under the aforecited provision, stenographers are enjoined to immediately deliver to the clerk of court
all the notes taken during the session of the court, which are to be attached to the record of the case. In
this regard, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 24-90 requires stenographers to transcribe
their notes and attach the transcripts to the record of the case within a period of twenty (20) days from
the time they were taken, thus: 2. (a) All stenographers are required to transcribe all stenographic notes
and to attach the transcripts to the record of the case not later than twenty (20) days from the time the
notes are taken.
3. Administrative Law; Court Personnel; Stenographers; Heavy Workload; In the case at bar, it is
undisputed that respondent failed to comply with the twenty (20) day period in the transcription of the
stenographic notes for the Pre-Trial in Criminal Case No. 14405-10, and hence, guilty of violating
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 24-90. The heavy workload proffered by respondent in her
attempt to be exonerated from liability is not an adequate excuse for her to be remiss in the performance
of her duties. To allow otherwise would permit every government employee charged with negligence
and dereliction of duty to resort to the same convenient excuse to evade punishment.
4. Same; Public Officers; It bears stressing that a court stenographer performs a function essential to
the prompt and fair administration of justice. The conduct of every person connected with the
administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, is circumscribed with a heavy
burden of responsibility. All public officers are accountable to the people at all times and must perform
their duties and responsibilities with utmost efficiency and competence. As administration of justice is
a sacred task, the Court condemns any omission or act which would erode public faith in the judiciary.
A public office is a public trust, and a court stenographer, without doubt, violates this trust by failing
to fulfill his duties.
5. Same; Court Personnel; Stenographers; Simple Neglect of Duty; Words and Phrases; While
respondent admitted to incurring delay in the performance of her duties, records show that she
nonetheless completed the same in time for the calendar of cases. Under the circumstances, her failure
to timely transcribe the stenographic notes was correctly found by the Executive Judge to constitute
simple neglect of duty, which is defined as a disregard of, or a failure to give proper attention to a task
expected of an employee, simple neglect of duty signifies carelessness or indifference.
****
602
509. Rizalado vs. Bollozos, 827 SCRA 205, June 19, 2017
Syllabi Class :Administrative Complaints ; Judges ;
1. Same; Same; The Court concurs with the OCA’s opinion in this case that if Guzman, et al. indeed
believed that respondent’s issuances pertaining to G.R. No. 188427 (Civil Case Nos. 92-368 and 92-
409) were tainted with irregularity, they should have availed themselves of the appropriate judicial
remedies and refrained from filing these administrative cases against respondent. It bears to stress that
respondent is legally clothed with judicial discretion in the disposition of cases, which involves the
exercise of judgment. As a judge, he must be allowed reasonable latitude for the operation of his own
individual view of the case, his appreciation of the facts, and his understanding of the applicable law
on the matter. “To hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called
upon to try facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment. It is only where the error is so gross, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad
faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.”
2. Administrative Law; Judges; Bias and Partiality; It is well-settled that “in administrative
proceedings, the burden of proof that respondents committed the acts complained of rests on the
complainant. x x x. Bare allegations of bias and partiality are not enough in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to
dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. There should be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality. Extrinsic evidence is required to
establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error that may be
inferred from the decision or order itself.”
3. Administrative Complaints; Judges; It has been held that “the filing of an administrative complaint
is not the proper remedy for the correction of actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the
norms of propriety, where a sufficient judicial remedy exists.” “The law provides ample judicial
remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or irregularities which may be regarded as normal
in nature (i.e., error in appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of
procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for reconsideration (or after
rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies
against error or irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e., whimsical,
capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.) are[, inter alia,] the special civil actions
of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as
the case may be.” Relative thereto, “disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against judges are
not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or
extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in
the corresponding action or proceeding, are prerequisites for the taking of other measures against the
persons of the judges concerned, whether of civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the
available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality,
that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened,
or closed.”
****
603
510. Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr. vs. Manzano, 827 SCRA 253, June 19, 2017
1. Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; It deserves mentioning that in
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law are
addressed. It is not the Court’s function to analyze or weigh the evidence (which tasks belong to the
trial court as the trier of facts and to the appellate court as the reviewer of facts). The Court is confined
to the review of errors of law that may have been committed in the judgment under review. “The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing
and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive.”
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; It is a fundamental rule that “[t]he acquittal of
the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action
based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal
action that the [prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused, or the] act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.”
3. Criminal Law; Civil Liability; In the fairly recent case of Dy v. People, 800 SCRA 39 (2016), the
Court discussed the concept of civil liability ex delicto in Estafa cases under paragraph 1(b), Article
315 of the RPC (with which Manzano was likewise charged), stating that when the element of
misappropriation or conversion is absent, there can be no Estafa and concomitantly, the civil liability
ex delicto does not exist.
4. Same; Same; Whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that the delivery of any
personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa cannot be
awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil
liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex
delicto is the liability sought to be recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
5. Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; Words and Phrases;A presumption is an assumption of
fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from another fact or group of
facts found or otherwise established in the action. It is an inference of the existence or nonexistence of
a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts. However, a presumption is not
evidence, but merely affects the burden of offering evidence. Under Section 3, Rule 131, disputable
presumptions are satisfactory, if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence, as in this case. Apart from Rafael’s admission, petitioner further admitted that: (a) Moreland
directly paid Metroland the P2,800,000.00 in check although it did not actually see and was unaware
to whom Moreland gave this check; (b) it did not ask Moreland to issue the check for the payment of
the taxes directly in the name of the BIR; (c) it would not have dealt with Manzano had she not been
Metroland’s employee; and (d) it has several lawyers and an accountant at its disposal, and its
representative Rafael is, in fact, in the real estate business and is familiar with brokerage transactions.
****
604
511. Montecillo vs. Gatchalian, 828 SCRA 222, June 28, 2017
Syllabi Class :Attorneys ; Legal Ethics ; Penalties ;
1. Same; Same; Penalties; As regards the proper penalty, recent cases show that in similar instances
where lawyers neglected their clients’ affairs by failing to attend hearings and/or failing to update
clients about court decisions, the Court suspended them from the practice of law for six (6) months. In
Caranza Vda. de Saldivar v. Cabanes, 700 SCRA 734 (2013), a lawyer was suspended for failure to file
a pretrial brief and to attend the scheduled preliminary conference. In Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag,
471 SCRA 111 (2005), a lawyer was likewise suspended for not attending pretrial, failing to inform
clients about the dismissal of their case, and failing to file position papers. In Spouses Aranda v. Elayda,
638 SCRA 336 (2010), a lawyer suffered the same fate when he failed to appear in a scheduled hearing
despite due notice, which resulted in the submission of the case for decision. Consistent with these cases,
the Court agrees with the IBP’s recommendation to suspend respondent from the practice of law for six
(6) months.
2. Attorneys; Legal Ethics; Every lawyer is duty-bound to serve his clients with utmost diligence and
competence, and never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. A lawyer owes fidelity to the clients’
cause and, accordingly is expected to exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs.
Consequently, he is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote
one’s full attention, skill, and competence to the case, whether it is accepted for a fee or for free. The
relevant provisions of the CPR read thus: CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence. Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
3. Same; Same; Jurisprudence provides that the lawyer’s duties of competence and diligence include
not merely reviewing cases or giving sound legal advice, but also consist of properly representing a
client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings and conferences, preparing and filing
the required pleadings, prosecuting handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their
termination without waiting for the client or the court to prod him to do so. A lawyer’s negligence in
fulfilling these duties subjects him to disciplinary action.
4. Same; Same; Code of Professional Responsibility; The Court likewise finds respondent liable for
failing to immediately inform complainants about the trial court’s adverse decision. To emphasize, a
lawyer has an obligation to promptly apprise clients regarding the status of a case as expressed in Rule
18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR: Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. To be clear, a
lawyer need not wait for their clients to ask for information but must advise them without delay about
matters essential for them to avail of legal remedies. In the present case, respondent failed to
immediately notify complainants about the adverse decision of the trial court. Had the complainants
not inquired with the trial court, they would have lost their opportunity to appeal. For this reason,
respondent is also administratively liable for negligence under Rule 18.04 of the CPR.
****
605
512. People vs. Monroyo, 828 SCRA 416, June 28, 2017
Syllabi Class :Criminal Law ; Denials ;
1. Criminal Law; Denials; It should be emphasized that Monroyo only proffered the defense of denial,
which the courts a quo, found to be too shallow and insignificant so as to impel BBB to falsely charge
her uncle and publicly disclose that she was raped. Case law edifies that “[d]enial cannot prevail over
[a] private complainant’s direct, positive and categorical assertion that rings with truth. Denial is
inherently a weak defense which cannot outweigh positive testimony. As between a categorical
statement that has the earmarks of truth on the one hand and bare denial, on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail.”
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Preliminarily, although the three Informations
designated the crime committed only as “Acts of Lasciviousness,” the facts alleged therein pertain not
only to violations of Article 336 of the RPC but also of Section 5(b) of RA 7610, otherwise known as the
“Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.” It is settled that
a designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise on the
accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense. Nevertheless, the erroneous reference
to the law violated does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts
constituting the crime charged. As the Court had ruled, the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the legal
provision alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of
facts in the information. In the present case, the recital of facts in the Informations constitute violations
of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610.
3. Criminal Law; Acts of Lasciviousness; Elements of Article 336. Acts of Lasciviousness.—Any person
who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prisión correccional. Its
elements are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a)
by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age; and (3) that the offended
party is another person of either sex.
4. Same; Child Abuse Law; Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse; The elements under Section
5(b) of RA 7610 are: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2)
the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
(3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. In Quimvel v. People, 823 SCRA 192
(2017), the Court held that the allegation of “force and intimidation” is sufficient to classify the minor
victim as one who is “exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.”
5. Same; Same; Same; Lewd; Words and Phrases; Common to both legal provisions is the element of
lascivious conduct or lewdness. The term “lewd” is commonly defined as something indecent or
obscene. It is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining
a lewd or unchaste design is a mental process that can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such
intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious.
6. Remedial Law; Evidence; Findings of Fact; Verily, AAA’s testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence as there is no proof that she was motivated to falsely accuse Monroyo of the crimes charged.
To this, it may not be amiss to state that in several cases, the Court has observed that no young and
decent girl (like AAA in this case) would fabricate a story of sexual abuse, subject herself to undergo
public trial, with concomitant ridicule and humiliation, if she is not impelled by a sincere desire to put
behind bars the person who assaulted her. Ultimately, the credibility of AAA’s testimony, as well as
Monroyo’s opposite account involves findings of fact which the Court does not generally review. Case
law dictates that factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding
on the Court barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and substance,
of which there are none in this case.
7. Same; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Well-settled is the rule that an appeal in a criminal case opens
the entire case for scrutiny on any question, even one not raised by the parties as errors, and that the
appeal confers the appellate court with full jurisdiction over the case, enabling the court to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the
606
penal law. Thus, given that the circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged and proven in
this case, the Court examines Monroyo’s criminal liability for Qualified Rape as charged.
8. Criminal Law; Qualified Rape; The elements of Qualified Rape under these provisions are: (a) the
victim is a female over twelve (12) years but under eighteen (18) years of age; (b) the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge
of the victim either through force, threat, or intimidation.
9. Remedial Law; Evidence; Credibility of Witnesses; Factual Findings; —As in the Acts of
Lasciviousness cases, the Court defers to the findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA.
Jurisprudentially settled is the principle that if a victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant
inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis
thereof. Putting more emphasis, the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of
the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, as in this
case.
****
607
513. Cariaga vs. Sapigao, 436, June 28, 2017
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Remand of Cases ;
1. Same; Remand of Cases; Verily, the CA erred in completely dismissing Cariaga’s petition before it
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as only the ORSP ruling regarding the
crime of Falsification of Public Documents may be referred to the SOJ, while the ORSP ruling
regarding the crimes of False Certification and Slander by Deed may already be elevated before the
courts. Thus, the CA should have resolved Cariaga’s petition on the merits insofar as the crimes of
False Certification and Slander by Deed are concerned. In such an instance, court procedure dictates
that the instant case be remanded to the CA for resolution on the merits. “However, when there is
already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may be had — as in this case — the
Court may dispense with the time-consuming procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in
the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of justice.” In view of the foregoing — as well
as the fact that Cariaga prayed for a resolution on the merits — the Court finds it appropriate to resolve
the substantive issues of this case.
2. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; The Department of Justice’s (DOJ’s) Department Circular No.
70 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the “2000 NPS Rule on Appeal,” which governs the appeals process in
the National Prosecution Service (NPS), provides that resolutions of, inter alia, the RSP, in cases
subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed by filing a verified petition for
review before the SOJ. However, this procedure was immediately amended by the DOJ’s Department
Circular No. 70-A dated July 10, 2000, entitled “Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors
to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases.” x x x x x x In order to expedite the disposition of appealed cases
governed by Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 (“2000 NPS RULE ON APPEAL”), all
petitions for review of resolutions of Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases cognizable by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, except in the
National Capital Region, shall be filed with the Regional State Prosecutor concerned who shall resolve
such petitions with finality in accordance with the pertinent rules prescribed in the said Department
Circular. The foregoing delegation of authority notwithstanding, the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant
to his power of supervision and control over the entire National Prosecution Service and in the interest
of justice, review the resolutions of the Regional State Prosecutors in appealed cases.
****
608
514. Zaragoza vs. Iloilo Santos Truckers, Inc., 828 SCRA 452, June 28, 2017
Syllabi Class :Interest Rates ;
1. Interest Rates; Considering that all the requisites of a suit for unlawful detainer have been
complied with, petitioner is justified in ejecting respondent from the subject land. Thus, the rulings of
the RTC-Br. 23 and the CA must be reversed and set aside, and accordingly, the MTCC ruling must
be reinstated. However, in light of prevailing jurisprudence, the rental arrearages due to petitioner
shall earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, computed from first demand on May 24,
2011 to June 30, 2013, and six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. The other
amounts awarded by the MTCC, i.e., P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, P50,000.00 as litigation
expenses, and the costs of suit shall likewise earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from
finality of the Decision until fully paid.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Requisites for Bringing an Action for
Unlawful Detainer.- For an unlawful detainer suit to prosper, the plaintiff-lessor must show that: first,
initially, the defendant-lessee legally possessed the leased premises by virtue of a subsisting lease
contract; second, such possession eventually became illegal, either due to the latter’s violation of the
provisions of the said lease contract or the termination thereof; third, the defendant-lessee remained in
possession of the leased premises, thus, effectively depriving the plaintiff-lessor enjoyment thereof; and
fourth, there must be a demand both to pay or to comply and vacate and that the suit is brought within
one (1) year from the last demand.
****
609
515. Belmonte vs. People, 828 SCRA 463, June 28, 2017
Syllabi Class :Remedial Law ; Criminal Procedure ; Findings of Fact ;
1. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Findings of Fact; It should be mentioned that findings of the
trial court which are factual in nature and involve the credibility of witnesses, are accorded respect
when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts or speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
conclusions are made from such findings. This rule finds even more stringent application where the
findings are sustained by the CA, as in this case. After all, as the trier of facts, the RTC has the
opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and manner of testifying and, as such, is a better judge
of their credibility.
—In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must prove the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team shall,
4. Same; Same; Same; It is important to note that while the “chain of custody rule” demands utmost
compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of RA 9165, as well as jurisprudence nevertheless provides that noncompliance with the requirements
of this rule will not automatically render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, so long
as: (a) there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance; and (b) the evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. In other words, any divergence from the prescribed procedure
must be justified and should not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items.
5. Same; Same; Same; By and large, the foregoing sufficiently established the existence of a continuous
chain of custody which preserved the identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the items confiscated
from the accused, notwithstanding the absence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ at
the time of the arrest and the taking of inventory. The absence of media representatives at the time
Ominga prepared the inventory was sufficiently explained by her during her cross-examination when
she testified that when contacted, the media representatives told them that they were still far from the
area and would not be able to arrive on time. As regards the absence of the DOJ representative, Eulogio
Gapasin, the DOJ clerk who signed the inventory, explained that it has been the practice in their office
for him to go to the PDEA office to sign the inventories instead of going to the site of the crime. While
this is not ideal and the Court by no means condones it, the Court is also cognizant of the fact that this
is not the fault of the apprehending officers. Verily, under varied field conditions, the strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In People v. Rebotazo,
698 SCRA 452 (2013), the Court held that so long as this requirement is met, as in this case,
noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 will not render the arrest of the accused illegal
or the items seized or confiscated inadmissible.
****
610
516. Borja vs. Miñoza, 828 SCRA 647, July 03, 2017
Syllabi Class :Labor Law ; Termination of Employment ;
1. Same; Same; In this case, records show that respondents wasted no time in filing a complaint against
petitioners to protest their purported illegal dismissal from employment. As the filing thereof belies
petitioners’ charge of abandonment, the only logical conclusion, therefore, is that respondents had no
such intention to abandon their work. Therefore, since respondents were not dismissed and that they
were not considered to have abandoned their jobs, it is only proper for them to report back to work and
for petitioners to reinstate them to their former positions or substantially-equivalent positions. In this
regard, jurisprudence provides that in instances where there was neither dismissal by the employer nor
abandonment by the employee, the proper remedy is to reinstate the employee to his former position,
but without the award of backwages. However, since reinstatement was already impossible due to
strained relations between the parties, as found by the NLRC, each of them must bear their own loss,
so as to place them on equal footing. At this point, it is well to emphasize that “in a case where the
employee’s failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by a termination, the burden
of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer; each party must bear his own loss.”
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; Well-settled is the
rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court (SC) being bound by the
findings of fact made by the appellate court; Exceptions.-
—Well-settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court being bound by the findings of fact
made by the appellate court. The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that may
have been committed by the lower court. The rule, however, is not without exception. In New City
Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 460 SCRA 220 (2005), the Court recognized the following exceptions to the
general rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there
is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and
(11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain on the part of the employer has become so
unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment, or when there
is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely,
as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. The test of constructive dismissal is
whether a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his job
under the circumstances.
4. Same; Same; Abandonment; To constitute abandonment, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the
failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (b) a clear intention to
sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor
and being manifested by some overt acts.-
—The Court finds that respondents did not go on AWOL, or abandon their employment, as petitioners
claimed. To constitute abandonment, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the failure to report for work
or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (b) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some
overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. The employer has the burden of proof to show a deliberate
and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning.
Abandonment is incompatible with constructive dismissal.
****
611
517. Disciplinary Board, LTO vs. Gutierrez, 828 SCRA 663, July 03, 2017
Syllabi Class:Admin Proceedings ; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service ;
1. Same; Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service; In this case, records show that
the Formal Charge against Gutierrez was issued following the LTO’s issuance of a Show Cause
Memorandum. Under Section 16 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), a Show Cause Memorandum emanating from the disciplining authority or its authorized
representative is sufficient to institute preliminary investigation proceedings, to wit: Section 16. How
conducted.—Within five (5) days from receipt of the complaint sufficient in form and substance, the
person/s complained of shall be required to submit his/her/their counter-affidavit/comment. Where the
complaint is initiated by the disciplining authority, the disciplining authority or his authorized
representative shall issue a show cause memorandum directing the person/s complained of to explain
why no administrative case should be filed against him/her/them. The latter’s failure to submit the
comment/counter-affidavit/explanation shall be considered a waiver thereof and the preliminary
investigation may be completed even without his/her counter-affidavit/comment.
2. Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; Procedural Due Process; “The essence of procedural
due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. In
administrative proceedings, as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. ‘To be heard’ does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard
thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.”
****
612
518. Geñorga vs. Heirs of Julian Meliton, 828 SCRA 673, July 03, 2017
Syllabi Class :Register of Deeds ; Jurisdiction ;
1. Register of Deeds; Jurisdiction; It bears to stress that the function of a Register of Deeds with
reference to the registration of deeds is only ministerial in nature. Thus, the RD-Naga cannot be
expected to retain possession of the subject owner’s duplicate title longer than what is reasonable to
perform its duty. In the absence of a verified and approved subdivision plan and technical description
duly submitted for registration on TCT No. 8027, it must return the same to the presenter, in this case,
petitioner who, as aforesaid, failed to establish a better right to the possession of the said owner’s
duplicate title as against respondents.
2. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Partition; Preliminarily, it is well to point out that the subject
land was an undivided co-owned property when Julian sold different portions thereof to various
persons. However, a perusal of the pertinent deeds of absolute sale reveals that definite portions of the
subject land were eventually sold, and the buyers took possession and introduced improvements
thereon, declared the same in their names, and paid the realty taxes thereon, all without any objection
from respondents who never disputed the sales in favor of the buyers. Consequently, the Court finds
that there is, in this case, a partial factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, which entitles
the buyers to the segregation of their respective portions, and the issuance of new certificates of title in
their names upon compliance with the requirements of law.
3. Civil Law; Land Registration; Property Registration Decree; Register of Deeds;
Section 58 of PD 1529, otherwise known as the “Property Registration Decree,” provides the
procedure for the registration of deeds or conveyances, and the issuance of new certificates of titles
involving only certain portions of a registered land, as in this case. Said provision reads: Section 58.
Procedure Where Conveyance Involves Portion of Land.—If a deed or conveyance is for a part only of
the land described in a certificate of title, the Register of Deeds shall not enter any transfer certificate
to the grantee until a plan of such land showing all the portions or lots into which it has been subdivided
and the corresponding technical descriptions shall have been verified and approved pursuant to Section
50 of this Decree. Meanwhile, such deed may only be annotated by way of memorandum upon the
grantor’s certificate of title, original and duplicate, said memorandum to serve as a notice to third
persons of the fact that certain unsegregated portion of the land described therein has been conveyed,
and every certificate with such memorandum shall be effectual for the purpose of showing the grantee’s
title to the portion conveyed to him, pending the actual issuance of the corresponding certificate in his
name. Upon the approval of the plan and technical descriptions, the original of the plan, together with
a certified copy of the technical descriptions shall be filed with the Register of Deeds for annotation in
the corresponding certificate of title and thereupon said officer shall issue a new certificate of title to
the grantee for the portion conveyed, and at the same time cancel the grantor’s certificate partially with
respect only to said portion conveyed, or, if the grantor so desires, his certificate may be cancelled
totally and a new one issued to him describing therein the remaining portion: Provided, however, that
pending approval of said plan, no further registration or annotation of any subsequent deed or other
voluntary instrument involving the unsegregated portion conveyed shall be effected by the Register of
Deeds, except where such unsegregated portion was purchased from the Government or any of its
instrumentalities. If the land has been subdivided into several lots, designated by numbers or letters,
the Register of Deeds may, if desired by the grantor, instead of cancelling the latter’s certificate and
issuing a new one to the same for the remaining unconveyed lots, enter on said certificate and on its
owner’s duplicate a memorandum of such deed of conveyance and of the issuance of the transfer
certificate to the grantee for the lot or lots thus conveyed, and that the grantor’s certificate is canceled
as to such lot or lots. (Emphases supplied) In this relation, Section 53 of PD 1529 requires the
presentation of the owner’s duplicate title for the annotation of deeds of sale.
****
613

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1. Dimagan vs. Dacworks United, Inc.

, 661 SCRA 438, November 28, 2011

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