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Relationship Between Physical

Protection and Fire Protection Systems
in Nuclear Power Plants

Cafiibano, J.A.; Fernandez Moreno, S. and Rodriguez, C.E.

Presentado en 40th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management,

Phoenix, EE. UU., 25-29 Julio 1999
 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHYSICAL PROTECTION AND
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Canibano, J.A.; Fernandez Moreno, S. and Rodriguez, C.E.

Nuclear Regulatory Authority

Argentina

ABSTRACT

Several safety and operative systems coexist in Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) aimed at
achieving different tasks and objectives. The effectiveness of those systems depends on their
design and relationship. Such is the case of the relationship between physical protection and
fire protection systems. Their relation should be designed in such a way to assure at least the
fulfillment of their respective objectives.

In accordance with the INFCIRC/225, the objectives of a physical protection system are to:

• minimize the possibilities of the unauthorized removal of nuclear material, and/or

• minimize the possibilities of sabotage.

The "Nuclear Regulatory Authority" (ARN) performs all the nuclear regulatory activities in
Argentina. To this aim, the ARN has established a regulatory framework for all nuclear activities
including physical protection. Its Standard AR 10.13.1 ("Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials
and Installations") has the goal of establishing criteria and methods to prevent the commission
of intentional events that may lead to severe radiological consequences or the unauthorized
removal of nuclear materials.

These objectives are mainly achieved through the application of detection, delay, and response
elements.

In accordance with the Safety Guide N° 50-SG-D2 (Rev.1) the objectives of a Fire Protection
System (FPS) are:

• preventing fires from the beginning

• detecting and extinguishing quickly those fires which do start, thus limiting the damage;
and
• to prevent the spread of those fires that have not been extinguished to minimize their
effect on essential plant functions.

These objectives can be obtained, inter alia, through physical separation, detection and
extinguishing.

This paper shows the experience of the ARN on improving the relation between the above-
mentioned systems. In addition, it explains how they can be balanced in such a way that a
reciprocal maximum benefit is obtained.

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OBJECTIVES

The main objectives of a State physical protection system should be:

• to establish conditions that minimize the possibilities for unauthorized removal of

nuclear material or sabotage; and

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 • to provide information and technical assistance in support of rapid and comprehensive
measures by the State to locate and recover missing nuclear material and to cooperate
with safety authorities in minimizing the radiological consequences of sabotage.

The IAEA objectives are the following:

• to provide a set of recommendations on requirements for the physical protection of

nuclear material in use, storage and of nuclear facilities. The recommendations are
provided for consideration by the competent authorities in the States. Such
recommendations provide guidance but are not mandatory upon a State and do not
infringe the sovereign rights of States; and

• to be in a position to give advice to States authorities in respect of the physical

protection systems at the request of the State. The intensity and the form of assistance
required are, however, matters to be agreed upon between the State and the Agency.

It should be noted that the Agency has no responsibility either for the provision of a State's
physical protection system or for the supervision, control, or implementation of such a system.
Assistance by the Agency will be provided only when so requested by the State.

In the National Regulatory System the rule AR.10.13.1 defines Physical Protection as a set of
measures to prevent and avoid, with reasonable assurance, intentional acts with the purpose of:

• The unauthorized removal or undue dispersion of protected material or

• The sabotage or mere intrusion to a significant installation where it were reasonably

possible to generate accidents with severe radiological consequences.

OBJECTIVES OF THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS

Protection from fires and fire explosion is essential in the overall design of a NPP as it forms a
crucial part of the safety considerations namely the protection of safety systems and other items
important to safety. Overall, fire safety can be subdivided into different activities relating to the
preparation and the prevention of fire, its detection, and suppression. Therefore planning for fire
protection shall be an integral part at the design stage. Fire protection shall continue to be a
good planned, administratively controlled program, implemented throughout the life of the plant,
including the decommissioning phase.

In all the cases, an adequate degree of fire protection should be provided in NPPs. This should
be achieved by a defense in depth concept in the layout that should include as main objectives,
the following:

• preventing fires from starting

• detecting and extinguishing quickly those fires which do start, thus limiting the
damages; and

• preventing the spread of those fires that have not been extinguished to minimize their
effects on essential plant functions.

The first objective requires that the design and operation of the plant were such that the
probability that a fire starts is minimized. The second objective is related to the early detection
and extinguishing of fires by a combination of automatic and/or manual fire fighting techniques,
and therefore relies upon active techniques. For the implementation of the third objective,
particular emphasis shall be given to the use of passive barriers against fire and physical
separation, including the especial fire stops. These fire stops will be the last defense line if the
two first objectives are not met.

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In Argentina, the fire protection framework for NPPs is the Standard AR 3.2.3. It establishes the
criteria safety against fires and explosions due to fires that may affect the radiological and
nuclear safety in a NPP. This rule is applicable during the design and the operation stages.

PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM

The designer of any system must have a clear idea of its ultimate objectives to ensure its
quality. The ultimate objective of a physical protection system is to prevent the accomplishment
of unauthorized overt or covered actions. When a physical protection system is implemented
into a nuclear facility, its objective is to prevent radiological sabotage and theft of nuclear
material present within the facility. Theft and sabotage at the facility may be prevented in two
ways: by deterring the adversary or by defeating the adversary.

Deterrence occurs by implementing a physical protection system that is seen by potential

adversaries as too difficult to defeat; it makes the facility an unattractive target. Defeating the
adversary refers to the actions taken by the protective or response force to prevent he from
accomplishing his goal once he actually begins a malevolent action against the facility. The
physical protection system must perform several functions. It is essential to consider the system
functions in detail, since a thorough understanding of the definition of these functions and the
assessment of each one effectiveness is required to evaluate the system as a whole.

The primary PPS functions are:

• Detection

Intrusion sensing

Alarm communication

Alarm assessment

• Delay

• Response

• Interruption

Communication

Deployment

• Neutralization

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM

In accordance with the aforementioned the objectives of the Fire Protection System involves
three main branches:

• prevention

• structural protection

• extinguishing

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The methodology used in Argentina to reach these objectives includes several steps. The most
important are:

• determining the most sensitive areas according to the fire risk analyses

• compartmentalizing, taking into account the escape routes, surfaces quality, quantity of
materials and limits, etc.

• boundaries design of each fire sector

• detection and extinguishing design

• defining particular procedures and requirements.

DETECTION AND ALARM

a) From the Physical Protection System perspective

Detection is the discovery of an adversary action. It includes sensing of covert or uncovered

actions. In order to discover an adversary action, the following events need to occur:

• a sensor reacts to an abnormal occurrence and initiates an alarm.

• the information from the sensor and assessment subsystem is reported and displayed.

• a person assesses information and judges the alarm valid or invalid. If assessed to be
nuisance alarm, detection has not occurred. Detection without assessment is not
considered detection.

b) From the Fire Protection System viewpoint

A NPP shall have a sustained capability for early detection and effective extinguishing of fire in
order to protect important items of safety. The fire extinguishing capability consists of fixed fire
extinguishing systems and manual fire facilities.

In the design of fire detection and extinguishing systems, it is important to consider the reliability
of the system and of individual components to perform their required function at any time. For
fire detection systems, this reliability may be affected by, for example, a reduction in sensitivity
of the sensing devices leading to the non-detection or late detection of a fire, or the spurious
operation of an alarm system when no smoke or fire hazard exists. The reliability of fire
extinguishing system may be affected by the blockage of sprinkler head or the unauthorized
closure of supply valves.

Each fire compartment shall be equipped with a fire detection and alarm system specifically
engineered and selected for fire risks in that area.

The detection system shall annunciate by audible and visual alarm in the control room. Local
audible and visual alarms, as appropriate, shall also be provided in areas normally manned at
other specific locations.

c) Conclusion

Both PPS and FPS, require detection and alarm devices. From the operative point of view, the
main difference between these devices is that the FPS mostly shot automatically a fire
extinguish agent while the PPS needs the human being evaluation of the signal. However, a
correct and coordinated design of both systems, may result in an adequate complementation.
This will offer a positive contribution not only for the FPS but also for the PPS (e.g. CCTV).

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These subsystems may work together, but the correct evaluation of a chief is necessary to lead
the firefighter brigades when a fire starts.

Moreover, the manual activation of a fixed fire extinguishing system (as the high expansion
foam one) may be used as a disposable material barrier.

SEGREGATION

a) From the Physical Protection Systems perspective

Protection in depth means that, to accomplish his goal, an adversary should be required to
avoid or defeat a number of protective devices in sequence. For example, an adversary might
have to penetrate three separate barriers before gaining entry to a reactor control room. The
times to penetrate each of these barriers may not necessarily be equal, and the effectiveness of
each may be quite different, but each will require a separate and distinct act by the adversary as
he moves along his path. The effect produced on the adversary by a system that provides
protection in depth will be:

• to increase uncertainty about the system;

• to require more extensive preparations before attacking the system; and

• to create additional steps where the adversary may fail or abort his mission

In the discussion of the defense in depth concept for fire protection, it was noted that the system
should prevent the spread of those fires that have not been extinguished, thus minimizing their
effect on essential plant function. In conclusion:

• both systems require criteria about segregation. The PPS needs segregation in such a
way that one includes another as layers (e.g. sector inside another one). The FPS
requires the segregation according with the quantities and qualities of material inside
each one and taking into account the emergency exits routes.

• it is very convenient to reach a highest degree of coincidence in these criteria. The

boundaries of each zone are built with retardant materials against fire and adversaries.
The retardant qualities are functions of the kind of material and, specially, of the
thickness of the boundaries. It is convenient to join these characteristics, the delay, and
the fire resistance, to get to the desired result.

An example of the above mentioned was implemented in ATUCHA I NPP which was
constructed 25 years ago. This approach was implemented in the emergency diesel house
itself. In this NPP fire stops were not included as part of the initial layout. However, when the
decision to build the fire stops was taken, specific elements of the physical protection system
were added. These are, for instance, perimeter boundaries, sensors, CCTV, access control, etc,
achieving by this a safety integrated system that includes both Physical Protection Systems and
Physical Protection System against Fire.

ACCESS CONTROL AGAINST EVACUATION

a) For the physical protection systems point of view

An effective physical protection system requires that any malevolent act committed by an
adversary must be detected so that the response element can interrupt and neutralize the
adversary attack before his goal can be achieved. The objective should be the arrival of
adequately armed response forces rapidly enough to prevent the unauthorized removal of
nuclear material or sabotage. Since it is usually not feasible to maintain a sufficient protective

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force to provide immediate protection for all sensitive material or equipment, some type of
adversary delay is needed. After an adversary has been detected, barriers, activated materials,
or both will prevent him from completing the malevolent act or delay him until an adequate
response force can arrive.

The role of barriers is simply to increase the adversary task time following detection by
introducing impediments along any path the adversary may choose, thereby providing the
needed time for the response force to arrive and react. Some barriers might deter or, if the
adversary is unable to complete penetration, even defeat some threats. Since the degree to
which the barriers are able to fulfill these two roles is uncertain, they can be considered only as
obstacles to delay adversaries who are well equipped and determined.

b) For Fire Protection Systems perspective

Adequate personnel emergency exit routes shall be provided, taking into account the
requirements of national building codes, fire protection regulations and accident prevention
rules, as well as consideration of nuclear safety requirements. In this sense, the Argentine
standard requires emergency exit routes guaranteeing a safe and fast evacuation. Taking into
account the aforementioned, the best solution for these opposite options should be a balanced
system. It will allow an adequate access control and an easy evacuation in case of emergency.
The devices should be complemented with routine and emergency procedures that include free
access for the emergency response team without decreasing the security level.

FINAL REMARKS

The effectiveness of PPS and FPS depends on their design and relationship; the latter should
be conceived in a way to assure at least the fulfillment of their own objectives. In this regard, it
is highly recommended that the development of the physical protection system bear in mind the
requirements of the fire and viceversa, early in the design of a NPP. In doing this, both systems
goals will be achieved without causing any detrimental effect. Moreover, the suggested
approach will also allow the strengthening of both systems.

REFERENCES

[1] IAEA Safety Guide N° 50-SG-D2 (Rev.1).

[2] INFCIRC/225, Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Installations.

[3] National Standard A.R. 3.2.3 - Fire Protection at Nuclear Power Plants.

[4] National Standard A.R. 10.13.1 - Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Installations.

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