M.Ü.

ilAHiYAT FAKÜLTESi VAKFI YAYlNLARI Nu: 271

900. VEFAT YILINDA

• A A A

IMAM GAZZALI

Milletlerarası Tartışmalı ilmi Toplantı

07 - 09 Ekim 20 ı ı İstanbul

İstanbul 2012
 YAHYA en-NAHVİ VE GAZZALI: YARATILIŞIN DELİLLERİ
ÜZERİNE

Doç. Dr. Said el-BOUSKLAOUl

Mohamed I Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, Oujda, Morocco (Fas)

Başta Tehôfiitü '1-felôsife olmak üzere Ebıi Hômid el-Gazzôli'nin eserlerin-

de altıncı asrın İskenderiye 'li filozofiı Yahya en-Nahvf'nin (Philoponus) izlerini
araştırmak ve iddia edilen etkinin ne derecede olduğunu ele almak bu makalenin
başlıca hedefleridil: Beyhaki 'nin Telimme/ii Sivôni '1-hikme. adlı eserinde naklet-
tiği "Huccetii '1-İs/ôm Gazzôlf"nin -rahmetullahi aley/ı- Tehöfiitü '1-fe/ôsife eserin-
den en fazla çıkarılabilecek şey Yahya en-Nahvf'nin bazı sözleridir", şeklindeki
ifadeleriyle başlayıp, yaratılışla alôka/ı argumanlarma ve filozofların alemin
ezeliyeti konusundaki argiimanlarım çiiriitmesi iizerine yoğunlaşacağız. Gerçek-
ten Yahya en-Nahvi'nin yaratılış konusunda/d argilman/arı miisliiman kelômcılar
ve Meşşôt felsefeci/er tarafindan iyi bilinmekteydi ve miitekellimim tarafindan
kabul edilip yeniden formülleştirilirken, felôsife tarafindan çiiriitiilmekteydile1:
Gazzôlf de felsefecilerin o/emin ezeliyeti konusundaki görüşlerini çiiriitiirken bu
argiimanlarm bazılarm ı, ancak sıklıkla farklı şekillerde, kullanmaktadu: Bununla
birlikte Philopomıs 'un zamanda sonsuz sayıda hale.fiyetin imkansızlığı konusım­
da Gazzôli Yahya en-Nahvi tarafindan sımu/an örneklerin neredeyse aymlanm
tekrar etmektedil: Biz de bu argiimam Philoponus tarafindan ilk defa formüle
edildiği üç şekli ile detaylı olarak ele alacağız: Sonsuz olan

1) Bir uçtan bir uca aşılamaz,

2) Arttırılamaz,

3) Çoğalhlamaz. Dolayısıyla bizim tartışmamız pasaj/ann, ibôrelerin ve iki

felsefecin in örneklerinin mukayesesi üzerine odaklanacaktu:

***·
 360 900. VEFATYILINDA IMAM GAZZALİ

YAf.{Y A AL-NAI;IWİ AND AL-GHAZALİ ON THE PROOFS OF

CREATION

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to follow the traces of the sixth~century Ale-
} xandrian Christian philosopher Ya(ıya al-Nabwf (John Philoponus) in the text of
Abii Ham id ai-Ghazalf (d. lll 1), chiefly in his Talıafut al-faliisifah (lncoherence
ofthe Philosophers) and to illustrate the extent to which Pbiloponus' main proofs
of creation were reproduced by al-GhazaU. It is wortb s tating that Philoponus was
known among the ancients with his arguments and counter arguments against the
philosophers mainly Proclus andAristotle on the issue ofthe etemity of the world
1
to which he devoted three works • We know that these works were translated,
2
partially or totally, into Arabic • SimiJarly, al-Ghazali was known in the Islamic
world for the same refutations of the argumeots provided by the philosophers who
taught that the world is etemaL lt is perhaps for this reason that it is often taken
for granted that aJ-GhazaiT reproduced Philoponus's proofs in his Tahiifut (wit-
hout providing any serious evidence that Abü Ham id had indeed in his hand one
or more ofYaJ:ıya al-NaJ:ıwl's books). It is alsa wortb reminding that al-Baybaql
' stated in his Tatimmat Siwan al-lfikma that "the most of what is adduced by hıyjat
al-Islöm (the proof ofis lam) al-Ghazali, may Allah have mercy on him, in Tahafut
al-falösifah is a report of Yabyii al-Na/:ıwi's words"[my translation]. 3 Many sub-
sequeot allusions have been made to this supposed influence ofYalJya al-NaJ:ıw1.4
An autbor may think that "it can be inferred that al-Ghazall read Philoponus in

Against Proclııs oıı the Eternity ofthe World; Agaiııst Aristotle. on the Eternity ofthe World;
De Contengencia Mıındi. .
2 1havestudied this topic in an articleentitled "Mu'allaf!t Yatıyll ai-NaJ:ıwT li al'arabiyyit"(YaJ:ıyli
ai-Natıwi's works in Arabic], Journal ofFacıılty ofLetters, Rabat (forthcoming). Cf. Also H.
Davidson, "John Pbiloponus asa Source ofMedievaJ lslamic and Jewisb Proofs ofCreation".
Journal oftlıeAmerican Orieııtal Society, VoL 89, N. 2 ( 1969), pp. 357-391; Proofsfor Eternity.
Creation and tlıe E.Tistence of Gad in Medieval /slomic and J~vislı Plıilosoplry, Ox.ford
University Press, 1987;. S. Pines, 'An Arabic Summary of a Lost Work of John Philopoous,'
lsrael Oriemal Shtdies, Vol n, 1972, pp. 320-352; Gerard Troupeau. 'Un Epitome Arabe du
"De Contingentia Mundi" de Jean Pbilopon' in : Amiqııite Paiemıe et Clıretiemıe, Memorial
Andte-Jean Fesrugiere, ed. par E. Luccbesi et R. D. Saffrey, Gen~ve 1984, pp. n-88.
3 ai-BayhaqT, Tatimmat Siıviin al-lfikma, ed. Rafiq al'ajam, Baynıt: Dar al-fılcr al-lubnliıü,
1994, p. 47.
4 Most ofthem restate al-Bayhaqi.
 IV. OTURtiM 361

Arabic translation from the fact that Maimonides, in the I 2th century, said that
John the Grammarian, meaning Philoponus, had been translated into Arabic'"';
for another: "since Proclus and Philoponus' books were widely known in the Isla-
mic world, it is very natural that al-Ghazaii knew Proclus' proofs and Philoponus'
6
refutations", and yet for anotber there is no doubt that al-Ghazaii was "familiar
7
with Philoponus' works about creation of the world from nothing".
The main question then is: to wbat extent was ai-Gbazali intluenced by
Yal:ıya ai-Nai:ıwi? And tberefore did he have direct access to Philoponus' work?
As far as I know, there is no single work exclusively devoted to this question.
Al-Gbazali's arguments for the eternity of the world as discussed in Talıöfut al-
falösifah are well studied by many scholars. Michael Marmura, for example,
discusses the metapbysics underlying ai-Ghazall's arguments, but not in re la tion
8
with Philoponus' arguments. Only the work of H. Wolfson andA. H. David-
son9 may be said to provide an outstanding study of the influence of John Phi-
loponus' proofs of creation on Medieval Muslim and Jewish thinkers, among
wbom there is al-Ghazali. l will demonstrate, in my talk, that there is no evideoce
that ai-Ghazali drew directly from YaJ:ıya ai-Na}Jwi, but he certainly made use of
some of Philoponus' arguments as they were widely used by the Mutak.alJimün
and Falasifa within the lslamic tradition, in a slight different way. I will begin
by a glimpse at Philoponus' main arguments of creation in lslamic theology;
then I will move to some first evidence concerning Philoponus' flfst and second
arguments in ai-GhaziHi's text, and briefly focus on the contrast between Against
Proclus and Tahöfut; and finally I will discuss the striking similarities between
the two pbilosophers with respect to Philoponus' third argument and some other
issues actually reproduced not only by al-Ghazali but also by al-Mutakallimün
before him and those who came after.

S Richard P. Aulie, "aJ-Gha.zzaJrs Contra Aristolle: An Unforeseen Ovemıre to Science in

Eleventh-Cennıry Bagbdad", PSCF 45 (March 1994): 26-46.

6 A. Badawi, "ai-Ghazzaii and his Greek sources" (in Arabic) in: Abii Hiimid ai-Giıazziififi al-
dilcrö ol-mi 'awiyy6t al-tiisi'a, Damascius, 1971 , p. 224.
7 Katie J. Nolan, "Aristotle and the Abrahamic Faiths on the Eıemity of the World", UCLA
JOURNAL ıooı FaJI 2009, http://www.sscneı.ucla.edulhistory/undergrad/paıljoumal2002/
oolan.pdf.
8 H. Wolfson, Tlıe Plıilosoplry oftlıe Ka/om, Harvard University Press, 1976.
9 Cf. H. Davidson, "John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval lslamic and Jewish Proofs of
Creation", Journal oftlıe American Oriemal Society, Vol. 89, N. 2 ( 1969), pp. 357-391; Proofs
for Etcrnity, Creation and tlıe Existence of God in Medievallslamic and Jeıvislı Plıilosoplıy,
Oxford University Press, 1987.
 362 900. VEFAT YILINDA tMAM GAZZALİ

ı. Pblloponus' arguments of creation in Islamic theology

There is a very extensive literature of refutations of the arguments of the

eternity of the world in the period that separates Yal)ya al-Nal)wT in the sixth
century and al-Ghazali in the eleventh century. Many works in Arabic were
i devoted to this topic, yet the most known philosophical book is ai-GhazalT's
· Tahafitt al-falösifah. It goes without saying that Philoponus' proofs of ere-
}ation were well known to the theologians and philosophers in the Islami c
;
, world, widely accepted by the Mutakallimün and the platooic philosophers
and refuted by the peripatetic pbilosophers. As it was stated above, Wolfson
and Davidson have already demonstrated the extensive use of Philoponus'
proofs by Muslim and Jewish theologians. I will focus on three main proofs of
creation provided by Philoponus and known to Muslims: the argument from
the fınitude of the power of the body, the argument from composition, and the
argument from time.

The argument from the finitude of the power of the body appears in his
De Contengencia Mundi in the following passage: "If the world is a fınite
10

body (an Aristotelian premise)[ ... ]and every power of every fınite body is finite
(another Aristotelian premise) [ ... ] it follows necessarily that the world(. .. ] is
,generated, it comes to be after it does not exist" (a non-Aristotelian conclusion)
11 12
.(my translation]. The Christian peripatetic philosopher Ibn Siwar reformu-
' lated it in the following syllogism(s): "every body is fınite, and the world is a
body, then the world is finite; and every finite body has a finite power, then its
power is finite; and the powers of eternal things are fınites, then the world is not
13
etemal"(my translation).

1O lt appears in the first pages of the fırst argument in Agalnst Proclus, repeated in Agaiııst
A.rlstatle and reproduced in De Conliııgentla Mımdi.
ll Philoponus, fi o/-da/ölat 'a/ö lıodaılı al'ö/onı (De Collfe11gencia Mımdi), in O. Troupeau, 'Un
Epitome Arabe du u De Contingentia Mımdt' de Jean Philopon,'op. cit., p. 79. He states:
,J\S \:.ı..... (...]ıJWI .:ıfo_,:,\~.J [...]t.J$ .,_.ı::.. .ı_,.c; .ı::.. r-"=' js ,J\S.J (...]1.,.>1::.. ~ ıJWI,J\S üJ"

·"~ıJ.:.ıl~
12 Disciple ofYahyalbn 'Adi disciple of al-Farabi.
13 Ibn Siwar, inA. Badawi, ol-ajlaüniyyôt a/-Mulıdatlıat 'indo al- 'orab, Kuwaiı: 1977, p. 246.
According to Ibn Siwar, this argument is more accepted than the kalarn argument because
it is based on essential things and the Mutakallimün's 'false' argument "is derived from ac-
cidents". But Ibn Siwar was not aware that this arguınent too, ascribed to ai-Mutakallimün,
was presuınably derived from anoıher argument of Philoponus himself, i. e. the argument of
composition as Herben Davidson has well illustrated.
 IV.OTIJRUM 363

The argument from composition appears in two forms "composition of matter

14
and form" and "composition offinite parts". In the fust one, Philoponus confirms
that "the nature of matter is such tb at matter cannot retain any form indefinitely.
15
TI1erefore nothing composed of matter and form can be indestructible". Philopo-
ous' second type of the argument from "composition offinite parts" was repeated in
16 17
rnany and different statements: "that which consists of finite [parts] is finite".

Philopoous' third argument which is much known in the kalarn tradition in-
depeodently, or as part, of tbe argument from accidents, is the argument of the
impossibility of an infinite succession of time. Philoponus provided three inter-
18
conoected forms of this argument:
19
A) The argument that the infinite cannot be traversed ; It is not possible to

14 The argument of composition of matter and form appears in Plıilponus 'AgoitısT Arislot/e and in
De Contengencio Mundi in at least n.vo fonnulations: in the fırst he confınns that "the nanıre
of matter is such that matter cannot retain any form indefinitely. Therefore, nothing composed
of matter and form can be indestructible", and while demonsırıuing that the power of the uni-
verse is finite, Ya_tıyii aJ-Na.tıwi argues in the second: "The heavens are composite. Wbatever
is composlte contains the grounds of its dissolution and therefore does not contain infinite
power"; Simplicius, Commellloıy on tlıe Physics, p. 1331, Cf. H. Davidson, "John 'Philoponus
asa Source ofMedievaJ lslamic and Jewish Proofs ofCreation", p. 362.
15 !dem.
16 lt appears in Agahıst Proclus as foUows: "tbe number of men or plan ts or of individuals of any
other kind that have come to be is finite, since each of them has had its existence in a finite
time, it would al so be necessary for the whole of time i o be fınite; for what that whi ch consists
of fınite (parts) is finite", Agoinst Proc/us on the Eternity of tlıe World, 1-5, ıranslated by
Michael Share, Duckworth: 2004, p. 24. In the second chapter 'maqiila' of De Comengencia
Mundi (fi lıadot al- 'ii/am) an argumenı from finite parts, and thus from generated parts, is
provided as follows: all things that are composed from fınite parts are finite and thus they
are generated. Philoponus presents it in the following syllogism: the world is composed from
individuals that are generated and corrupıed and the duration of each ofthem is finite; then the
world is composed from durations of this finite individuals; and what is composed from things
wlıicb each of lbem is finite in itself it is necessary fınite too; lben the world is not etemaL
17 Agoinst Proclus, 1-5, p. 24.
18 Which are repeated in many places of his aforementioned three trearises devoted to the que-
tion. 11ıree supporting arguments that are very closer to each other could be discemed and at
least two oftbem appears in al-IGncWs demonsıration on the crearion of the world.
19 lı reproduces an Aristotelian aıgumeot and reorients it against its original conclusion: everything
that is infinite cannot be traversed. Aristotle, PITysics, VUJ, 8,263a,7: "it is impossible to ıraver­
se distances intinite in number," meaning th.at an infi.nite number cannot be counted. And, in De
Coelo, I, 5, 272a, 3: 'ibe infinite cannot be traversed." In his Agoftıst Proclııs, Ya.tıyii ai-Na}.ıwi'
affinns that the traversing of the infi.nite is impossible; i. e. to "counting it olfunit by unit [...] even
 364 900. VEFAT YIUNDA İMAM GAZZAIJ

traverse the i.nfin.ite "for the infinite is by its nature uotraverseable; otherwise it wo-
uld not b~ infin.ite". He gave an example, wh.ich became weU laıown to Mustims, of
"successive generations of [human] race, advancing individual by individual, have
desc~nded through an i.nfin.ite number of individuals to those that ex.ist oo\1/'; tben,
20

. if it were infini te, the in:finite would become lraverseable, whicb is impossible. For the
1
21
. generations of the race have reached down to each of us, thenit is finite in number.
} . b) The argument that an infinite cannot be increased22: the infinite is one
' and undivided; otherwise "many infini te things would be the same thing, which is
impossible. He gave many examples Like Socrates, the infini te number of species,
and the mavement of the spheres: "if the world had no beginning and the number
of men living before, say, Socrates was infinite; and those living from Socrates
until the present time have been added to it, there will be something greater than
the infınite, which is impossible".
23

c) The third form of this argument, that an infınite cannot be multiplied, is

explained by the example of the unequal periods of the spheres' revolution. This
argument is very connected with the form er one. "If the motion of the heavens is
without a beginning" and the spheres "do not move with equal periods of revo-
lution", then "it is necessary that the sphere of Satum" (which revolves once in
thirty years) "has rotated with an infinite number of revolutions, and the sphere
of Jupiter (which revolves once in twelve years) with nearly three times more
revolutions than that. The revolutions of the sun (which revolves once ina year)
will be thirty times greater in number than the ones of Satum, the revolutions of
the moon (which revolves ooce ina month) 360 times, and the revolutioos of the
sphere of the fixed stars (whicb revolves once in one day) more than ten thousand
24
times greater". The result is that the infinite will be multiplied, which is impos-

ifthe cowıter were everlasting" . "I mean the ttav~ing of the infini te by, as it were, cowıting it off
unit by unit-is impossible, even if the cowıter were everlasting"; Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 24.
20 ldem.
21 "for the infini te is by its narure untraverseable ; otherwise it would not be infinite. So if the
infinite is wıttaverseable, but successive generations of(buman] race, advancing individual by
individual, have descended through an infinite number of individuals to those that ex.ist now,
then the infini te has become traverseable, which is impossible. Therefore the number of earlier
individuals is not infinite. for [if it were] the generations of the race would not have reacbed
down to each of us, for it is impossible to traverse the infinite"; Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 24.
22 It reproduces also an Aristotelian principle: the infini te is undivided.
23 Agahıst Proclus, 1-5, pp. 24-25.
24 Pbiloponus, Agalnst Aristotle, translated by Christia.n Wildberg, Duckworth, 1987, p. I46.
 IV. OTURUM 365

sible. Philoponus concludes that "It is not possible that the world is ungenerated
and without a beginning. For in that case the infini te will be traverseable and wiU
exist in actuality, and the infinite will necessarily always be growing and never
stop getting bigger than itself and roany times, not to say an infini te number of
25
times, infinity".

There is no doubt that many of these arguments appear in ai-Mutakallimün

and al-Falasifa, accepted by the MutakaJlilun and al-K.indi (c. 800-870) and refu-
ted by the peripatetic philosopbers. Al-.Kindi reproduces partially the fırst argu-
26
ment but totally the second and the third ones. The argument from accidents,
as demonstrated by Davidson, is a reformulation of philoponus' argument from
composition of matter and form. Plıiloponus argument from the impossibility of
an infinite succession in time is largely reproduced as an independent proof or
as part of the argument from accidents. It is reproduced large Iy and in many for-
mulatioos by the early and Iate Mutakallimün alike. AI-Nap,.am (d. 845) uses all
the three forms of this argument and it is this argument that al-khayy~t (d. 939)
deseribes as the best argument provided by al-Mutakallimün against etemaüsm.
The argument that an infinite cannot be increased is well known since al-Farabi
and fbn Sina as the method of app1ication. The argument from the impossibiliry
of an infini te number appears in lbn I:Iazm (d. 1064) and al-JuwaynT (1 028-85)
who was the fust to ineJude the third argument as fourt11.principle of the argument
from accidents.

Having said this, it is not wrong to expect that al-Ghazali as well will rep-
roduce some of these arguments in his Tahöfut exclusively devoted to refute the
arguments provided by the philosophers.

2. Pbiloponus' arguments in al-Gbazali's text

That ai-GbazaiT never mentioned Yal;lya al-Nal)wi, nor any of his work, is
explicitly clear. He is not an exception in this matter; Philoponus is rarely cited in
Arabic sources, in general, and when his name is cited, it is often confused witb
other Christians Ilke Yahya Ibo Adi. AI-Ghazlill's dealing with Philoponus' proofs
of creation is no exception, too.

25 Philoponus, Agailıst Proclus, 1-5, p. 25.

26 l have srudied this topic in an unpublished paper entitled "Y~ya ai·Nııl)wi and ai·Kindi on the
Proofs of Creation", presented at the 8th Intem~tional Colloquiwn of the SIHSPAI, London:
December 3-5,2010.
 366 900. VEFATYTLINDAtMAM GAZZALi

Indeed, Tbere is no textual ev idence that can support the cia im that Abü
Hamid ~as been directly influenced by Pbiloponus' work. In fact, the evidence
provided by those who claim that al-Ghazii!T drew directly from Pbiloponus,
al-~ayhaqi among the ancients, and recently Abderrahman Badawi and others,
remains undefeoded. Although it is one of the strongest proofs, Philoponus'
fırst argument does not defınitely appear among al-GhaziUi's arguments for-
mulated against the philosophers. It seems that it was generally not known to
al-Mutakllirnün whereas it is formulated by Ibn Siwar and known to the most
27
ofperipatetic philosophers who refute it I ike lbn Rushd. The argument from
composition is provided by al-GhazalT, like every Mutakallim, as part of the
kalarn argurnent from accidents, and it can be said that it is the same for the
argurnent from the impossibility of an infini te time as we shall see later. Thus,
from the two facts that the first argument is neitber adduced by al-Ghazali nor
by any of the Muslim Mutakallimün, and that the second is present as a mere
kalarn proof, we can deduce that the sources of ai-Ghazali's material, in his
arguments formulated against the pbilosophers, are indeed the previous books
ofKalam.
Al-bayhaqi's view seems, as Shlomo Pines had already well noted, to be
28
very exaggerated. In the same way, Badawi considers that all proofs provided
. by ai-Gbazali are a reformulation ofphiloponus' argument from Against Proc/us
. witb no substantial addition; "the difference consists just of formulations, con-
, cepts and the way of argumentation". 29 Hence, ai-Gbazali's first argument, ac-
cording to him, reproduced Philoponus' third argument; the second is the same
as Philoponus' fifth; and the third argument is equivalent to the second proof in
Against Proclus. Tben Badawi adds that it goes for all al-Gbazali's arguments
on the etemity of the world, time and mavement that have the ir equivalents in
Against Proclus mainly the seventb, the eighth and the ninth proofs.30 However,

27 However, al- GhazzlilT, !ike al-K.indi and al-Mutakallimlin, argues from the finitude of the
body of the universe.
28 He states that "al-Bayhaqi perhaps overstates the case...". S. Pines, 'An Arabic Suınınary of a
Los ı Worlc of John Philoponus,' Israe/ Oriental Studies, Vol. ll, 1972, p. 339; not e 266.
29 Badawi, op. ciL, p. 224.
30 BadawT, p. 224.
.:,)ıl<lt J_,i </'J (\ HV <:.- -=..J.,r- ·~..y. ;_,:.; (T TT ..,..) .)t_jAlt \..~J-1! .;Jt .)}Jt ~~~ W<Ş~ J~
~ ;J .liJ •..,.Ür. ~ <T <!!\!ll ..;.,...ıı or ..;.,...ıt .ı...~ ~.ıi <r ..:..~~ J.JJJ> J:--:-t .;1 ıJWt r~
..,-)~\!ll ~IJ .d.I)':IIJ -=..W.I_r':ll.}r- •P)IJ .;L.I)I.J .,;L.;.I_r~ .)ljAli•~J.JI \.. ~ .ş~l u:"'!
~ (f ~b.JI ~~ ~ ._r -.Jl,.)~ r.ic:JI <!6.:,...~ ~b.JI._rr;6.1)1 (~ .:,)ılCJI ~ (T (OT-O\
<.:1\!11 ~1 )ö~ (W-n..,-) Jl_jAll ~ ..!.J\!11 J='.ıliJ .~1 .)t_jAll.l.ıi:- ~ c,Ş~I4:J.&. ;J .ıiJ •..,.Ü/.
 rv.OTIJRUM 367

Badawi does not provide any serio us comparison of passages, formulations and
exampl~s of the two philosophers.

In opposition to what is suggested by BadawT, it seems that al-Ghazali's ar-

gumeots ofcreatioo have oothing to do, in general, with Philoponus' book Against
P1·oclus-except for some general similarities due, on the one hand, to the fact that
Philoponus' argumeots were widely usedin lslamic theology as stated above, and
on the other, to their similar religious and philosophical background (i. e. Monot-
heism and Neo-Platonism).

In the third argument, Proclus asserts that if a cause (the creator) is actual,
"that which is caused willlikewise be actual"; Philoponus, armed with the Aris-
totelian canception ofactuality and potentiality, observes how Proclus "does not
specify with refereoce to which sense of actuality he is hypothesising that the
1
creator is an actual creator"/ However, al-Ghazali's critique of the proof of the
philosophers, especially based on the ash'arite canception of the etemal will,
defends, thus, the idea that "the world was an object of the etemal will at the
32
time when it actualized". In this context abü bamid reproduces the third form
of Philoponus' argument from the impossibility of an infini te sucession in time.
Nevertheless, neither the problem of the etemal will nor the third form of Phi-
loponus' third argurnent, as presented by al-Ghazali, are present in Philoponus

J~IJ Jl!..ll ;,r 'i~ ..:.o~:'JI ._} j>X '-;-'>."I}IJ ~lifo ..:.ol~~~ i;\,AII..:....&J.:.:.I .Jl.J •..,...Ü.r. ~ ;,r
<S_,...JIJ ,JL.;JIJ rlWI ~~i.._#~ ;.r ~)l..i.IJ .)IJ..II ·~;JI w J~ J!.-.)~J .._,sı-..JI ~J i;_,...o.ll Jl
1114,ls- ~P; ;.r .şy-.:.!1 ~ •>;JI L.J ,...._.I:JIJ 4:.-I:JIJ ~UI L..._,.....:. •..,.-li .r. ~ .j 1..>J\l2; 4JS 4li
Badawi, "ai-Ohazz,m and his Greek Sources"(in Arabi c), in Abii Ham id oi-Giıazzö/ifi ol-dikrö
al-Mi 'awiyyo a/-tösi'a li nıilödilıi, the proceeding of a colloquium organised by Higb Council
for Protection ofarts and Social Sciences, Damascius, l961, p. 224.
31 Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 46. Yal;ıyi!. ai-Nal;ıwi argues that "when the house does not actually
exjst notlıing prevents the buiider from acrually existing in capacity. For a man who has the
capacity isa buiider even when he is not building, and likewise a doctor even when he is not
practicing"; lbid, p. 47.
32 "the world came into being because of the etemal will wbich demanded its exisıence
at the time at which it acrually came into existence, and wbich demanded the non exis-
teoce (of the world) to 1ast as long as it lasted, and (demanded) the existeoce to be-
gio where it acrually began"; al-Ghazzali, Ta/ıöfıu al-ja/ösifolı, fa/ösifalı (Jncolıerence
ofthe Plıilosoplıers), translated inıo English by Sabih Ahınad Kamali, Labore: Pakistan
Philosophical Congress, 1963, p. 16; the original version in Arabic of the same book
is always taken into account to compare the two versions. Cf. Tolıafut al-falösifalı, ed.
Maurice Bouyges, Bibliotbeca Arabica Scholasticorum, Serie Arabe, Tome U, Beyrouth:
lmprimerie Catholique, p. 26.
 368 900. VEFAT YILTNDA İMAM GAZZA.Li

third argument nor in any other argument provided in Against Proclus. lnste-
ad, the influence of Against Aristat/e on al-Ghazali's fust argumeot is indirectly
3
observed?

fJ-Gbaziili's second argument that "God is prior to the world in essence not
1
in time", in fact, does not reproduce Philoponus' proof as it is provided in his
·. refutation of the Proclus fıfth proof from time in spite of the appareot similarity
Jbetwe~n the two arguments. the argument refuted is likely the same, and !ike
~ Philoponus, ai-Ghazall.uses the same method but not the same arguments nor the
same concepts. In addition, al-Gbazall's argumentation seems to be more general;
it discusses this argument as the argument of the philosophers in generaiJ.4 where-
as Philoponus dea ls exclusively with Proclus argument, sometimes word by word,··
referring to Plato's Timaeus and its interpretations.

Finally, while Proclus' second argument deals wiıh forms as etemal world
patterns w hi cb necessitate that a copyas well should also be etemal,3s al-Ghaziilr's
third argument from the possibility suggests that if the world "is supposed to have
existed for ever, it will not be an originated thing. Accordingly, the actuality will
not be commeosurate with the possiblity, but incongruent with it''.36 Despite the
broad similarity with Proclus second argument (pattemlcopy and actuallity/possi-
biliy), al-Ghaziiii's objection is very different from Yahya al-NahwT's, not only in
'"formulations, concepts and way of argumentation" as suggested by BadawT but
; aıso in the body of the argument itself.

33 ai-Ohaz.zalr refutes Aristotle and the Muslim Aristotelians, but not directly Proclus. Maııy
themes and arguments caıı be located in the fragıneniS preserved from Agahıst Arlstotle: the
arguınent from the revolution of the spberes; that the celesıial movement isa natural move-
ment; the issue of the void; ... ete. In addition, ai-Ghazzalrs argument, that the number of
people who suppon the idea that the world was generared is greater than the number of those
who support its etemity, reminds us of as imilar statement in Philoponus Agamst Arostotle's.
34 lt should be noted that ai-Ghazzaır does not mention Proclus among the philosophers conce -
ned directely by his refutation.
35 For Proclus, if the pattem of the world were etemal, the world would necessary be etemal. Proclus'
argument is based on aııalogy, the pattem aııd the copy presupposes each other, aııd if one of them
is etemal the other would necessaıy be etemal too. Philoponus aıgues that "even though the Forms
are eıemal, it is not at all necessary that the ir copies (I mean the perceptible substaııces) should also
always exist[...] ifthere isa copy, a pattem must exist; but even ifa pattem exits, though not [me-
rely] asa pattem but because it is also a substaııce, it is not necessary for a copy to exist as well"
He gives the ex.amples of thekingand the ponraitand father and son; Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 38.
36 ai-GhazzalJ, Talıiifut al-falasifah (lncolıerence oftlıe Plıilosophers), translated into English by
SabihAhmad Kamali,op. cit, p. 46; Maurice Bouyges' editioo, op. cit, p. 67.
 lV. OTURUM 369

However, in wbat concems the argument of the impossibility of an infinite

number, besides some other issues as we shaU see, the similarities seem to be
striking between the two philosophers.

3. al-Ghazali's argumeot from the impossibility of ao infini te by s uccession

The most known argument to al-Mutakalimun and al-Ghazali is the ar-

gument from the impossibility of an infinite succession of time. Al-Ghazali
reproduces the second and the third form of this argument and provides two
of philoponus' examples: the spheres' revolutions and the infınite number
of souls.

ln the flfst objecrion to the first argument, al-Ghazali formulated Philoponus

third argument in the foUowing passage:

"How will you disprove your opponents if they say: "The etemity of the
world is impossible. For it leads to the affinnation of spherical revolurions which
are infinite in number, and consist of innumerable un.its. The fact is that these
revolutions can be divided into one-sixth, or one-fourth, or a half. For instance,
the sphere of the Sun completes one revolution in one year, w bile that of Satum
makes one in thirty years. Therefore, the revolurions of Saturo are one-tbirtietb
of those of the Sun. And the revolutions of Jupiter are ooe-twelfth of those of the
Sun, for Jupiter completes one revolution in twelve years"? You maintain that, in
spite of the fact that the revolutions ofSatum are one-thirtieth of the Sun, they are
equally infınite. Nay, you would assert that the revolutioos of the S tellar Sphere,
each ofwbich takes thirty-six thousand years, are as infinite as the East-West mo-
vement of the Sun, which takes only a day and nigbt. If someone says that this is
an impossible thing, and that its impossibility is self-evideot, how will you silence
37
his criticism?".

1n fact, al-Ghazali reproduced the same example provided by Philopoous in

his third form of the argumeot from time and movemeot, ina slight different way.
Since the spheres do not revolve at equal speed and iftheir mavement has no be-
ginning, it necessarily follows that an infini te wiU be multiplied, i.e, for instance,
the revolution of the spbere of the fixed stars (which revolves once in one day) has
rotated more than ten thousaod times greater than Saturo (wbicb revolves once in
thirty years), as have shown above.

37 lbid, p. 20; Bouyges' edition p. 31-32.

370 900. VEFAT YILINDA IMAM GAZZALf

Indeed, similarities are striking betweea the two formulatioos of the same
argumeot of the impossibility of ao infınite by successioa based upoo the exaınple
of the revorution of the celestial spheres. Both Philopoaus and al-Ghazali were on
the position of refuting the idea of the eternity of the world. Many elemeats and
premises ofPbilopoous argument are present in al-Ghazali's argument. They used
the same Aristotelian premisses and arrived at the same non-Aristotelian conclusi-
~n.
(
Except the moon, al-Ghazali mentions all the other four spheres (Satum, Sun,
Jupiter iınd the fix.ed stars) but with a different order. Moreover, both of them,
independently of each other, argue that an infini te movement is impossible, for it
leads "to the affinnation ofspbericaJ revolutions which are infini te io number, and
consist of innumerable units", and, therefore, to an impossible consequen·ce that
an infinite is greater than another.

The second form of the argument is from addition, the infınite cannot be
increased; al-Gbazali provides the exaınple of an iofinite number of souls; be
demonstrates:

"if you assert that the past eveats are existing neither at preseat nor in any
:>ther state, and that the non-existeat cannot be deseribed as limited or unlimited,
then you will have to take a similar view of the human souJs which have departed
from bodies. For, according to you, they do not perish. And the number of souls
~x isting after their separation from the body is ir~finite. A sperm is continually ge-
ıerated from a man, and a man from a sperm, and so on iadefınitely. And this soul
:s by number different from the soul of those who died before, or after, or togetber
.vith, this man. If all the souls were by species one, then, according to you, there
38
Nould exist at any time an unlimited number of souls".

And further, he adds:

" if we suppose that every day such an imper~shable thing came in to existence
o last forever, obviously, by this time, there should have accumulated ao i.nfinite

ıs ai-Ghazzali, Ta/ıöfut al-falösifah (lncclıerence of rlıe Plıilosoplıers), English translation, op.

ciı., p. 91; Maurice Bouyges' edition, pp. 136-137. He states:
._...~.:.:~~ ....A.....,y. ~ rı.ı......lıı Jı.,..~ı ~.}~ı Jı...ıı.; Lu •~J>:"Y ..:--,~ ~wı..:.~ı_,...ıı ~~ r=--"'.J .Jii"
ve .J.ı.,.IJ J.ıl.WI ~J":"_,..!lı r5".J.:.&. ._;.iı; ~ ~l,t .JI.I.ı)U ü)..C..JI ~_r.,.ll ..r_,.i:JI ~_H ifl.:.:ll r.J.pJ
._,.._,.i:JI
Y'J .....c;~ ..w ..:..t.. .JL..;j js 2 ~4' .r-J-.)! w.; V" .JL..;l..ı .JL..;j V" w.; J; ı-.1 ~ıı...~ı.J.p~ ~"" ~
~"" ~ ..,.._;:, Jb- js.} ~$_,ll.} ı-S..ı:,.j !..b-lı tr~ js:Jı .J\S" .:ıı.., o.LuJ ~J ~ ..:..t.. V" ~.r-J- ~..w~
.•wı.J.p~
 CV. OTURUM 371

number of such beings. For even if a circular were transitory, stili the appearance
in it of an everlasting being should not be impossible. So by this supposition the
diffıculty is reinforced. It is irrelevant here whether this everlasting thing is the
soul of aman, or ajin, or a devi!, or an angel, oranother being you may suppose.
For the difficulty will arise, wbatever point of view they may have taken. And it
will arise because they have posited spherical revolutions which are infınite in
number". 39 •

There is no doubt that this example is ultimately derived from Pbiloponus.

Nevertheles, the presence ofthese two examples in al-Gbazali does not mean that
he quotes directly from Against Aristotle. Four remarks are worthy of considera-
tion here: First, al-Ghazau reforrnuJated an argument which was widely used and
reproduced in rnany formuJations by the Muslim theologians and philosophers.
It was already stated that it was reformulated by many Muslim theologians like
al-Na.ı?am, Ibn ijazın, and reproduced by ·aı-Juwayni as a fourth principle of the

kalarn prooffrom accidents. Second, al-Ghazali does not produce the full third ar-
gurnent as in Philoponus: the first form of this argument that the iniinite cannot be
traversed does not appear in Tahiifut al-falasifah nor elsewhere in the work of al-
Ghazali. Unlike al-Na.ııam for example, al-Ghazali produces only the second and
the third form. Furthermore, he does not clearly and totally reproduce these two
forrns, but only some Philoponus' examples explaining this argument. And the
two same examples are provided by al-GhazaiT, as we have shown, in a different
formulation. Third, al-Ghazali clearly reproduced the example of the unequal re-
volution of the sp bere and the example of infini te souls in order to demonstrate the
impossibility of an infinite by succession in time. However, while it is clear that
the fırst is derived ultimately from Philoponus, the second is not. The argument
from the number of souls seems to be a Muslim variation of Philoponus' argu-
ment. Instead of the infınite number ofraces (men, fathers, horses and dogs), the
Muslims preferred to use the infini te number of souls just as they preferred the use
of the prophet's bej ra (migration from Mekka to Medina) instead of the example
of Socrates. The second example is derived from a very laıown argument used by

39 Talıöfut al-falasifalı (Jncolıerence af tlıe Plıilosoplıers), English translation, p. 95; Bouyges'

edition, p. 142. He states:

~.;.;ts- .J!.J OJJ..ı.Jli 4J ~~~..:..b~_,. <lb...o ~ .J"YI.)I ~ı ••u.J •..,:. ..!.J.!>- rY- js l,;y.i 1~\.i"
..)l:JI..!ll~c)~.Jl.j~/ ~.J J~~IJ:Ar...u:I11-4!J ~ .;:f-~ ~J ._h 4-:i .)y.-_,.J~
~ ..:.ıJ.J.) ı_,:;ı ~ı ~ '-:-"'~ js- .)s- rJ~ .r.J .;..ı.,~_,..ı ı <r ..:...:.; t. .Jı ..!.ll. Jı .:ı~ .Jı ~ .Jı ..,..)i ..,..-;
. ·•41 ~4'
372 900. VEFATYILINDA lMAM GAZZAIJ
40
al-FarabT, Ibo s-ına and by ai-Mutakallimiin; it is called the method ofapplication.
Fourth, ai-JuwaynT is strongly thougbt to be the source of ai-Gha.zali's two argu-
meots. It seems that these arguments are based on ai-Juwa~'s proof from the
impos~ibility of infı.nite revolutions (among other supposed kalarn sources) but
rot directly on Philoponus' text. The formulation ofthese two argumeots (examp-
41
les), chiefly the second one, reminds us ofai-JuwanT's statement and even ofbis
~ay of ıırgumentation (from the spbere revolution); ai-GhazaiT's formulation and
words are closer to al-Juwayni's statement than to Philoponus's.~2

However, ai-Gbazalı-·s formulation of the argument is stili clearer and more

complete compared with al-Juwayni's. It is worth noting bere that the second
and the third fonn of the argumeot from the impossibility of an infini te successi-
on, unlike ai-GhazaiT, appear clearly, with the same examples, in fbn H.azm who
"contends that over an eternity the number of men, the number of horses and
the total of the two would be infini te, leading once again to the absurdity of one
infınite's being larger than another".~ However, Like al-Na..?+am, al-Kindi, fbn
3

H.azm, al-Juwayni and al-Shabrastaıü, al-Ghazali argues from the finitude ofbody
(not the power ofbody) to the finitude oftimejust as in ai-KindT. He states: "what
bad happened to tbese pbilosophers who deny, on the one hand, the possibility of
bodies arraoged above one another in space ad infinitum: but admit, on the other
band, the possibility ofbeing existing before one another in time ad infinitum ı is
~ot this an arbitrary, groundless and unconvincing position?"..ı.ı What Pbiloponus
deseribes as "the most scientific explanation of these things" remains the follo-
wing: s ince the infınite (in magnitude or in number) cannot exist in actuality as

40 Philoponus gave the exampıe of the number of souıs but ina differenı way: God knows prev-
ousıy the number of sou ıs that will paıticipate in bodiıy life in the furure as well as the number
ofheavens' revoıutions.
4ı aı-Juwayni states:

r}-v ..!li~J ~_p.-_,ıı ı.i ...,_iı...:ıı,p ı....,ı.,..'i <t~ 'i.J ~~ı.u.\1 ~4' 'i ..:..~ı.r J_,.:.~ ~ ~1 ~r,.
.;JI i .J.J..ıll J:i ._,...;..c;ı J i..b.WI J.--i t.r J J.zJ .4J ıJN .;JI i ..ı..ı..ıll .j J _,.<ll , /_,.&; ~li •J_,.c,JI JliJ\ı .;~
11 ••• .b-1)1 ;ı,p ..~>-t}tı r ~ .J1 ~ ~4:-~ı ~ ..:..;:;ıt...J 41 ~4' 'i ..:..l..ı.J~ 4:> ıJN

Kirab oi-Jrslıöd, Beyrüth: J?ar al-Kütüb al- 'ilıniyaı, ı 995, p. 16.

42 al-Gbaz:ziiJ uses the same sıatement of al-Juwayni: "~~~~ <t~ 'jJ u...ıı.u.\1 ~4' 'i"as follows :
"La~\.:..~ J""'>' 'jJ ~~ı.u-)1 ~ı,.; 'i11.1t is worth noting thatthe word "gbiiya" [~~] me:lllS aıso in
Arabic "basr" [.,.-].
n Davidson, op. ciL, p. 377-378.
W Tolıöflll ol.jolösifolı, Eng. Transl, p. 92; Bouyges' ed., p. ı 38. aı-Gbazz.ali states:
,Jl....;ltı ~ı J:i ~..:..b .Po"yi.Jjy.J ~4' .d- ...ıı.:ııs:...ı~ı ~ı..;;~ l..411Jj~ ri ~4l..J ..
."..ı J-.>1 'j ~.~~.ı~ 'iji.L. JAJ 4.t4' .d- .)1
 N. OTURUM 373

proved by Aristotle and "agreed to be so by all witbout exception", "it is absolu-

tely necessary that the number ofthings be fınite. And this being so, it is ridicuJo-
4
us to ask why more things do not exist". s

On the other band, there are other similarities that can be illustrated. Accor-
ding to Philoponus as well as to al-Ghazalr, God "brings all things ioto existence
by pure thought al one whenever He wills it. And since God passesses the concepts
ofthings neither more nor less in consequence oftheir being or not being, it would
46
follow that in God's case capacity and activity in no way differ.'' For al-Ghazili
47
too "activity and capacity are the same and one". However while Philoponus
argues from God's knowledge, al-Gbazali demonstrates from God's etemal will.
Both ai-Ghazali and Ya.l).ya al-Na.l).wi point out clearly that God "brings all tbings
into being just by willing them" and they both agree that "no alteration will be
apprehended in God as a result of his producing at one time and not producing a
thing or does not produce it[... ]The will of God is therefore one and simple and
48
is always the same and unchanging." Stili, there aresome differences bet:ween
the two philosophers. It is true that they both assert that "there is no necessity that
49
a thing should exist the moment God thinks of it'', yet in what concems Phi-
loponus, the world was present in God's foreknowledge, not really in the etemal
will of God because "Will brings all things into existence at the instant He wills
them".$0 It is worth noting bere that philoponus' view is closer to the view of the
Mu'atazilites than to the ach'arites like al-Ghazali who is not just refuting the
view of the philosophers without iovolving his ach'arism, as he claims, but he
indeed defends his acb'arite canception of creation that the world was created at
a time it was created by God's eternal will.

Conc.lusion

Finally, the similarities between the two philosopbers do not stand as eviden-
ce that al-Ghazali had read Pbiloponus' work. Al-GhazaJI was indeed influenced
by Yal)ya al-Nal)wi, but indirectly. He does not seem at all to have bad direct
access to Philoponus' text. It is obvious that we cannot infer from the fact that

45 Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 23.

46 lbid, p. 63.
47 •cr
"..~>IJ w J-'IIJ ö~"
48 Against Proclus, 1-5, p. 65.
49 Ibid, p. 64.
50 Ibid, p. 65.
 374 900. VEFAT YILINDAİMAM GAZ.ZA.Li

Philoponus was translated into Arabic that al-Ghazaii formulated his arguments
against the philosophers on the issue of the eteruty of the world as derived from
YaJ:ıya al-NaJ:ıwi. In fact, Philoponus' third argument was widely reproduced in
many_ foı:mulations by the Mutakallimün, among whom we find al-Ghazali him-
1self, and there is no indication that al-GhazalT drew directly from Against Proclus
. or from any other work ofPhilponus. 51
l
i
(

51 A more detailed comparison will be provided in a forthcoming Ara b ic version of this paper.