Professional Documents
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Subject Stilton Lane Preliminary Dam Break Assessment Job no. 21/14678
As part of the comprehensive planning in preparation for future northward extension of underground
mining at Tahmoor Colliery, the consequences of failure of Dam GG37a, should they occur as a result of
subsidence, have been appraised by way of a dam break assessment.
A “first-pass” preliminary investigation to determine a way forward, in the context of risk identification, has
been conducted so that the requirement for a more refined investigation could be determined. A
comprehensive dam break assessment has not been conducted since it is not necessary at this stage in
order to develop the way forward.
1 Methodology
The dam-break assessment has been undertaken through estimation of the peak flow rate of discharge
from a full depth notch (break) through the dam embankment under a sunny day dam break, as well as
estimation of the resulting hydraulic conditions (extents, levels and velocities) in the downstream
waterway extending downstream to the confluence with Myrtle Creek.
Given the relatively small size of the dam wall, a failure time in the order of 10 minutes was
considered to be reasonable. Failure times were estimated based on formulas summarised in
Wahl (2004) and are shown in Table 2.
Comparison with the peak discharge -vs- storage and peak discharge -vs- height data sets that are
available in Wahl (1998). Based on analysis of these two data sets, it was inferred that a peak flow
rate in the order of 100 to 200 m 3/s would be reasonable.
Method assumptions and input parameters – given that the dam storage volume is small relative to
the wall height, it is likely that methods that consider both storage and wall height would be more
accurate. In particular, methods that consider only wall height are likely to overestimate the peak flow
rate.
The following estimates shown in Table 2 were excluded from further assessment, as detailed below:
Froelich – as the predicted failure time was not considered to be appropriate for earth dams
SCS, and Singh & Snorrason (wall height method) – as the peak flow estimates of these methods are
significantly outside the data presented in Wahl (1998) and are based on wall height only.
Costa (Upper estimate) – as the peak flow estimate is significantly outside the data presented in
Wahl (1998) and it is an upper estimate.
The results from the remaining methods were assessed and the minimum, mean and maximum peak
flow rate from these remaining methods is shown in Table 3 with these flow rates considered in the
hydraulic assessment of the downstream waterway.
Immediately downstream of Dam GG37a is Dam GG38d. In the event of failure of the upstream dam, it is
possible that the breach outflows from the dam will fail the downstream dam and the combined peak flow
rate should then be considered. Given the preliminary nature of the assessment, it has been assumed
that Dam GG38d does not fail during the sunny day failure of Dam GG37a, as instructed.
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discussed in Section 1.1, the peak flow rate estimated by the MacDonald Langridge-Monopolis method
was adopted.
The developed model was a steady-state model. That is, a peak flow rate was input into the model rather
than an inflow hydrograph. Therefore, the effects of storage in the floodplain on flow attenuation was not
considered.
The model extended from the downstream face of the dam down to Myrtle Creek, with the model
centreline and cross sections developed based on available ALS survey. Cross sectional data was
exported to HECRAS using the 12D software package and the 12D-HECRAS interface tool.
Bank station values relating to Manning’s n roughness co-efficient were estimated based on aerial
imagery with Manning’s n values estimated as shown in Table 1. A normal flow depth was selected as
the downstream boundary condition at Myrtle Creek, given that the assessment is for a sunny day dam
break.
Floodlines were developed by exporting the flood levels from HECRAS to 12D and mapping the
intersection of the water surface with the ground surface.
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2 Results
Table 2 presents the estimated peak flow rate resulting from the sunny day dam break for a number of
estimation methods, as well as the failure time estimation where available.
Table 2 Dam Breach Peak Flow Rates and Failure Times – Sunny Day Failure
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Table 3 shows the adopted peak flow rates for the downstream hydraulic assessment.
shows the flood extent results from the hydraulic assessment for the adopted peak flow range. It also
shows the location and river station of modelled cross-sections which can be compared with the
information presented in Table 4 to show flood levels, depths and average velocities over each cross
section.
It should be noted that there is the potential for floodwaters to be discharged from the catchment along
Remembrance Drive to the west of the waterway. However, it is likely that in this case flows would be
primarily conveyed over the road and discharged to Myrtle Creek without conveyance through building
areas.
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Table 4 Flood Level, Depth and Velocity Results
Min
River Channel Maximum Flow Average Velocity
Station Elvn (m) Water Surface Level (m) Depth (m) (m/s)
751 239.8 241.3 241.8 242.2 1.5 2.0 2.4 3.5 2.9 3.3
692 239.8 241.4 241.6 241.8 1.6 1.8 2.1 1.0 1.2 1.6
675 239.2 241.3 241.3 241.5 2.1 2.1 2.3 1.4 2.0 2.7
652 236.4 237.6 238.0 238.5 1.2 1.5 2.1 7.5 6.8 6.3
587 234.8 236.5 236.7 236.9 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.6 3.2
509 232.4 234.6 234.8 235.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 2.1 2.4 2.8
411 231.4 233.0 233.2 233.5 1.6 1.8 2.1 2.6 2.8 3.2
278 229.0 231.3 231.3 231.6 2.3 2.3 2.6 0.9 1.2 1.5
260 230.1 231.0 231.1 231.6 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.9 1.9 1.5
232 228.0 229.8 230.4 230.8 1.8 2.4 2.7 3.3 2.2 2.6
146 226.3 228.1 228.4 228.9 1.8 2.1 2.5 2.1 2.4 2.7
48 224.0 226.3 226.7 227.4 2.3 2.7 3.4 3.0 3.0 2.9
On the southern side of Remembrance Drive this includes the houses at 2415 Remembrance Drive,
2413 Remembrance Drive and 2411 Remembrance Drive, as well as the open space areas in other lots.
On the northern side of remembrance drive this includes the house at 2410 Remembrance Drive.
Several buildings in the property adjacent to Dam GG38d (155 Stilton Lane) are inundated. These
buildings appear to be greenhouses for plant cultivation.
The modelled flood velocity in these areas is shown in Table 4, as is the range of water depths. The
dwellings listed above are near channel stations chainage 278 to 232 – which has been shaded blue in
Table 4 for convenience. For the analysis as described, the estimated mean depth of dam break water
flow is 2.4m, with an estimated maximum of 2.7m. This depth of water, flowing at 1.5 to 2.5m/sec is not
expected to be acceptable to the residents.
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The modelled flood water across Remembrance Drive has a mean depth of 1.0m, a maximum depth
estimate of 1.4m, and flood velocity estimates of 1.9 to 1.5m/sec. The depth of flood water over
Remembrance Drive in this scenario is also not likely to be acceptable to road authorities.
It is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that the outcomes from this first pass analysis, notwithstanding its
reservations, identify that unacceptable conditions would exist in the event of dam break at Dam GG37a.
It would also be reasonable to suggest that consequential failure of the downstream Dam GG38d would
increase the estimated water depths in the situation of cascading dam failure.
It seems clear that the first pass appraisal demonstrates that issues exist in a dam break scenario that
would require intervention, as the analysis stands.
The first action would be to confirm building floor levels for the four identified dwellings.
On the expectation that the floor levels are unlikely to raise the dwellings sufficiently to remove the
hazard, the following next steps appear worth consideration:
refinement of the hydraulic modelling to improve the flood depth estimates, particularly in regard to
the drawdown of the storage volume in the dam which in reality is unlikely to maintain the steady
state conditions assumed in the modelling. The estimate of the depth of flooding is expected to be
less in a more refined analysis;
implementation of management options.
Management options may not be without their challenges. One management option which has been
mentioned is draining the dam during mining. By way of early comment, this could bring with it a legacy
of dam embankment instability issues as a consequence of the likely adverse clay soil characteristics
that are endemic to the area (reactive and dispersive clays). Clearly, the embankment materials would
require appraisal geotechnically in consideration of such an option. Further, in a management context,
the ability for the dam to re-fill quickly in the event of various intensity rainfall events, which would negate
the defensive measure, also would need to be appraised.
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4 Limitations
The assessment was a “first-pass” preliminary investigation to determine a way forward in the context of
risk identification and recommendation of further investigations or measures and was not a
comprehensive dam break assessment. The following limitations of the assessment should be noted:
The storage volume of Dam GG37a is small compared to most available data relating to dam failures
and therefore estimates of dam breach geometry and peak outflows cannot be estimated with
certainty. Therefore, detailed hydrodynamic modelling of dam breaching has not been undertaken.
The assessment considers only the sunny day dam break scenario.
Failure of the downstream dam GG38d due to the failure of dam GG37a is possible and has not been
assessed.
Dam bathymetry data was not available and was assumed based on available information.
HECRAS modelling of the downstream waterway was for steady state conditions and did not include
the effects of flow attenuation in the floodplain.
5 References
Allen (1994), ANCOLD Bulletin 97.
Department of Water Resources, Dam Safety Committee of New South Wales (1988), General
Guidelines for Determining Flooding conditions Resulting from the Failure of Small Dams.
MacDonald Langridge-Monopolis (1984), Breaching Characteristics of Dam Failures.
Queensland Department of Energy and Water Supply (2012), Guidelines for Failure Impact Assessment
of Water Dams.
Wahl (2004), Uncertainty of Predictions of Embankment Dam Breach Parameters.
Wahl (1998), Prediction of Embankment Dam Breach Parameters.
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