FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST G.R. No. 157314 evening of April 4, 1988 as it then had an overdraft of P428.57.
f April 4, 1988 as it then had an overdraft of P428.57. As a consequence of the
COMPANY, NOW BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Petitioner,
- versus -
THEMISTOCLES PACILAN, JR.,
Respondent. July 29, 2005
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by Far East Bank and Trust
Company (now Bank of the Philippines Islands) seeking the reversal of the
Decision[1] dated August 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 36627
which ordered it, together with its branch accountant, Roger Villadelgado, to pay
respondent Themistocles Pacilan, Jr.[2] the total sum of P100,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages. The assailed decision affirmed with modification that of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54, in Civil Case No. 4908.
Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside is the Resolution dated January 17, 2003 of
the appellate court, denying petitioner banks motion for reconsideration.
The case stemmed from the following undisputed facts:
Respondent Pacilan opened a current account with petitioner banks Bacolod Branch on
May 23, 1980. His account was denominated as Current Account No. 53208 (0052-00407-
4). The respondent had since then issued several postdated checks to different payees
drawn against the said account. Sometime in March 1988, the respondent issued Check
No. 2434886 in the amount of P680.00 and the same was presented for payment to
petitioner bank on April 4, 1988.
Upon its presentment on the said date, Check No. 2434886 was dishonored by
petitioner bank. The next day, or on April 5, 1988, the respondent deposited to his current
account the amount of P800.00. The said amount was accepted by petitioner bank; hence,
increasing the balance of the respondents deposit to P1,051.43.
Subsequently, when the respondent verified with petitioner bank about the
dishonor of Check No. 2434866, he discovered that his current account was closed on the
ground that it was improperly handled. The records of petitioner bank disclosed that
between the period of March 30,
1988 and April 5, 1988, the respondent issued four checks, to wit: Check No. 2480416
for P6,000.00; Check No. 2480419 for P50.00; Check No. 2434880 for P680.00 and;
Check No. 2434886 for P680.00, or a total amount of P7,410.00. At the time, however, the
respondents current account with petitioner bank only had a deposit of P6,981.43. Thus,
the total amount of the checks presented for payment on April 4, 1988 exceeded the
balance of the respondents deposit in his account. For this reason, petitioner bank, through
its branch accountant, Villadelgado, closed the respondents current account effective the
overdraft, Check No. 2434886 was dishonored.
On April 18, 1988, the respondent wrote to petitioner bank complaining that the
closure of his account was unjustified. When he did not receive a reply from petitioner
bank, the respondent filed with the RTC of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54, a
complaint for damages against petitioner bank and Villadelgado. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 4908. The respondent, as complainant therein, alleged that the closure
of his current account by petitioner bank was unjustified because on the first banking hour
of April 5, 1988, he already deposited an amount sufficient to fund his checks. The
respondent pointed out that Check No. 2434886, in particular, was delivered to petitioner
bank at the close of banking hours on April 4, 1988 and, following normal banking
procedure, it
(petitioner bank) had until the last clearing hour of the following day, or on April 5, 1988, to
honor the check or return it, if not funded. In disregard of this banking procedure and
practice, however, petitioner bank hastily closed the respondents current account and
dishonored his Check No. 2434886.
The respondent further alleged that prior to the closure of his current account, he had
issued several other postdated checks. The petitioner banks act of closing his current
account allegedly preempted the deposits that he intended to make to fund those checks.
Further, the petitioner banks act exposed him to criminal prosecution for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.
According to the respondent, the indecent haste that attended the closure of his account
was patently malicious and intended to embarrass him. He claimed that he is a Cashier of
Prudential Bank and Trust Company, whose branch office is located just across that of
petitioner bank, and a prominent and respected leader both in the civic and banking
communities. The alleged malicious acts of petitioner bank besmirched the respondents
reputation and caused him social humiliation, wounded feelings, insurmountable worries
and sleepless nights entitling him to an award of damages.
In their answer, petitioner bank and Villadelgado maintained that the respondents current
account was subject to petitioner banks Rules and Regulations Governing the
Establishment and Operation of Regular Demand
Deposits which provide that the Bank reserves the right to close an account if the depositor
frequently draws checks against insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits and that the
Bank reserves the right at any time to return checks of the depositor which are drawn
against insufficient funds or for any reason.[3]
They showed that the respondent had improperly and irregularly handled his current
account. For example, in 1986, the respondents account was overdrawn 156 times, in
1987, 117 times and in 1988, 26 times. In all these instances, the account was overdrawn
due to the issuance of checks against insufficient funds. The respondent had also signed
several checks with a different signature from the specimen on file for dubious reasons.
1
When the respondent made the deposit on April 5, 1988, it was obviously to cover for
issuances made the previous day against an insufficiently funded account. When his
Check No. 2434886 was presented for payment on April 4, 1988, he had already incurred
an overdraft; hence, petitioner bank rightfully dishonored the same for insufficiency of
funds.
After due proceedings, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the respondent as it
ordered the petitioner bank and Villadelgado, jointly and severally, to pay the respondent
the amounts of P100,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
and costs of suit. In so ruling, the court a quo also cited petitioner banks rules and
regulations which state that a charge of P10.00 shall be levied against the depositor for
any check that is taken up as a returned item due to insufficiency of funds on the date of
receipt from the clearing office even if said check is honored and/or covered by sufficient
deposit the following banking day. The same rules and regulations also provide that a
check returned for insufficiency of funds for any reason of similar import may be
subsequently recleared for one more time only, subject to the same charges.
According to the court a quo, following these rules and regulations, the respondent, as
depositor, had the right to put up sufficient funds for a check that was taken as a returned
item for insufficient funds the day following the receipt of said check from the clearing
office. In fact, the said check could still be recleared for one more time. In previous
instances, petitioner bank notified the respondent when he incurred an overdraft and he
would then deposit sufficient funds the following day to cover the overdraft. Petitioner bank
thus acted unjustifiably when it immediately closed the respondents account on April 4,
1988 and deprived him of the opportunity to reclear his check or deposit sufficient funds
therefor the following day.
As a result of the closure of his current account, several of the respondents checks were
subsequently dishonored and because of this, the respondent was humiliated,
embarrassed and lost his credit standing in the business community. The court a
quo further ratiocinated that even granting arguendo that petitioner bank had the right to
close the respondents account, the manner which attended the closure constituted an
abuse of the
said right. Citing Article 19 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which states that [e]very
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith and Article 20 thereof
which states that [e]very person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same, the court a quo adjudged petitioner bank
of acting in bad faith. It held that, under the foregoing circumstances, the respondent is
entitled to an award of moral and exemplary damages.
The decretal portion of the court a quos decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Ordering the defendants [petitioner bank and Villadelgado],
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff [the respondent] the sum
of P100,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the
sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages plus costs and
expenses of the suit; and
3. Dismissing [the] defendants counterclaim for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated August 30, 2002, affirming with
modification the decision of the court a quo.
The appellate court substantially affirmed the factual findings of the court a quo as it held
that petitioner bank unjustifiably closed the respondents account notwithstanding that its
own rules and regulations
allow that a check returned for insufficiency of funds or any reason of similar import, may
be subsequently recleared for one more time, subject to standard charges. Like the court a
quo, the appellate court observed that in several instances in previous years, petitioner
bank would inform the respondent when he incurred an overdraft and allowed him to make
a timely deposit to fund the checks that were initially dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
However, on April 4, 1988, petitioner bank immediately closed the respondents account
without even notifying him that he had incurred an overdraft. Even when they had already
closed his account on April 4, 1988, petitioner bank still accepted the deposit that the
respondent made on April 5, 1988, supposedly to cover his checks.
Echoing the reasoning of the court a quo, the CA declared that even as it may be
conceded that petitioner bank had reserved the right to close an account for repeated
overdrafts by the respondent, the exercise of that right must never be despotic or arbitrary.
That petitioner bank chose to close the account outright and return the check, even after
accepting a deposit sufficient to cover the said check, is contrary to its duty to handle the
respondents account with utmost fidelity. The exercise of the right is not absolute and good
faith, at least, is required. The manner by which petitioner bank closed the account of the
respondent runs afoul of Article 19 of the Civil Code which enjoins every person, in the
exercise of his rights, to give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The CA concluded that petitioner banks precipitate and imprudent closure of the
respondents account had caused him, a respected officer of several civic and banking
associations, serious anxiety and humiliation. It had, likewise, tainted his credit standing.
Consequently, the award of damages is warranted. The CA, however, reduced the amount
of damages awarded by the court a quo as it found the same to be excessive:
2
 We, however, find excessive the amount of damages awarded by
the RTC. In our view the reduced amount of P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages are in order. Awards for
damages are not meant to enrich the plaintiff-appellee [the respondent] at
the expense of defendants-appellants [the petitioners], but to obviate the
moral suffering he has undergone. The award is aimed at the restoration,
within limits possible, of the status quo ante, and should be proportionate
to the suffering inflicted.[5]
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED,
subject to the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
reduced to P75,000.00 and the award of exemplary damages reduced
to P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioner bank sought the reconsideration of the said decision but in the assailed
Resolution dated January 17, 2003, the appellate court denied its motion. Hence, the
recourse to this Court.
Petitioner bank maintains that, in closing the account of the respondent in the evening of
April 4, 1988, it acted in good faith and in accordance with the rules and regulations
governing the operation of a
regular demand deposit which reserves to the bank the right to close an account if the
depositor frequently draws checks against insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits.
The same rules and regulations also provide that the depositor is not entitled, as a matter
of right, to overdraw on this deposit and the bank reserves the right at any time to return
checks of the depositor which are drawn against insufficient funds or for any reason.
It cites the numerous instances that the respondent had overdrawn his account and those
instances where he deliberately signed checks using a signature different from the
specimen on file. Based on these facts, petitioner bank was constrained to close the
respondents account for improper and irregular handling and returned his Check No.
2434886 which was presented to the bank for payment on April 4, 1988.
Petitioner bank further posits that there is no law or rule which gives the respondent a legal
right to make good his check or to deposit the corresponding amount to cover said check
within 24 hours after the same is dishonored or returned by the bank for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. It vigorously denies having violated Article 19 of the Civil
Code as it insists that it acted in good faith and in accordance with the pertinent banking
rules and regulations.
The petition is impressed with merit.
A perusal of the respective decisions of the court a quo and the appellate court
show that the award of damages in the respondents favor was anchored mainly on Article
19 of the Civil Code which, quoted anew below, reads:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right
or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.[7] Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision.[8] The law always
presumes good faith and any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of
another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill-motive.[9] Good
faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another.[10] Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of
the nature of fraud.[11] Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It
implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad
motive.[12]
Undoubtedly, petitioner bank has the right to close the account of the respondent
based on the following provisions of its Rules and Regulations Governing the
Establishment and Operation of Regular Demand Deposits:
10) The Bank reserves the right to close an account if the depositor
frequently draws checks against insufficient funds and/or uncollected
deposits.
12)
However, it is clearly understood that the depositor is not entitled, as
a matter of right, to overdraw on this deposit and the bank reserves
the right at any time to return checks of the depositor which are
drawn against insufficient funds or for any other reason.
The facts, as found by the court a quo and the appellate court, do not establish
that, in the exercise of this right, petitioner bank committed an abuse thereof. Specifically,
the second and third elements for abuse of rights are not attendant in the present case.
The evidence presented by petitioner bank negates the existence of bad faith or malice on
its part in closing the respondents account on April 4, 1988 because on the said date the
same was already overdrawn. The respondent issued four checks, all due on April 4, 1988,
amounting to P7,410.00 when the balance of his current account deposit was
only P6,981.43. Thus, he incurred an overdraft of P428.57 which resulted in the dishonor
3
of his Check No. 2434886. Further, petitioner bank showed that in 1986, the current causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
account of the respondent was overdrawn 156 times due to his issuance of checks against premise that the individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there
insufficient funds.[13] In 1987, the said account was overdrawn 117 times for the same must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that
breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty
reason.[14] Again, in 1988, 26 times.[15] There were also several instances when the should be the proximate cause of the injury.[17]
respondent issued checks deliberately using a signature different from his specimen
signature on file with petitioner bank.[16] All these circumstances taken together justified the Whatever damages the respondent may have suffered as a consequence, e.g., dishonor of
petitioner banks closure of the respondents account on April 4, 1988 for improper handling. his other insufficiently funded checks, would have to be borne by him alone. It was the
respondents repeated improper
It is observed that nowhere under its rules and regulations is petitioner bank
required to notify the respondent, or any depositor for that matter, of the closure of the and irregular handling of his account which constrained petitioner bank to close the same
account for frequently drawing checks against insufficient funds. No malice or bad faith in accordance with the rules and regulations governing its depositors current accounts. The
could be imputed on petitioner bank for so acting since the records bear out that the respondents case is clearly one of damnum absque injuria.
respondent had indeed been improperly and irregularly handling his account not just a few
times but hundreds of times. Under the circumstances, petitioner bank could not be faulted WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2002
for exercising its right in accordance with the express rules and regulations governing the and Resolution dated January 17, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36627
current accounts of its depositors. Upon the opening of his account, the respondent had are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
agreed to be bound by these terms and conditions.
SO ORDERED
Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the deposit made by the respondent the day
following the closure of his account constitutes bad faith or malice on the part of petitioner
bank. The same could be characterized as simple negligence by its personnel. Said act, by
itself, is not constitutive of bad faith.
The respondent had thus failed to discharge his burden of proving bad faith on the
part of petitioner bank or that it was motivated by ill-will or spite in closing his account on CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC., SABINO R. January 18, 2008
April 4, 1988 and in inadvertently accepting his deposit on April 5, 1988. DAPAT, RUBEN D. ALMENDRAS, JULIUS
Z. NERI, DOUGLAS L. LUYM, CESAR T.
Further, it has not been shown that these acts were done by petitioner bank with LIBI, RAMONTITO* E. GARCIA and JOSE
the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring the respondent. It is conceded that the B. SALA,
respondent may have suffered damages as a result of the closure of his current account. Petitioners,
However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. The Court had the
occasion to explain the distinction between damages and injury in this wise:
-versus-
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, RICARDO F. ELIZAGAQUE,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or Respondent.
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria. For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated January 31,
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the 2003 and Resolution dated October 2, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries 71506.
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person The facts are:

4

Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), petitioner, is a domestic corporation operating as
a non-profit and non-stock private membership club, having its principal place of business
in Banilad, Cebu City. Petitioners herein are members of its Board of Directors.
Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary
member of CCCI, designated respondent Ricardo F. Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President
and Operations Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary
member. The designation was thereafter approved by the CCCIs Board of Directors.
In 1996, respondent filed with CCCI an application for proprietary membership. The
application was indorsed by CCCIs two (2) proprietary members, namely: Edmundo T.
Misa and Silvano Ludo.
As the price of a proprietary share was around the P5 million range, Benito
Unchuan, then president of CCCI, offered to sell respondent a share for only P3.5
million. Respondent, however, purchased the share of a certain Dr. Butalid for only P3
million. Consequently, on September 6, 1996, CCCI issued Proprietary Ownership
Certificate No. 1446 to respondent.
During the meetings dated April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of
Directors, action on respondents application for proprietary membership was deferred. In
another Board meeting held on July 30, 1997, respondents application was voted
upon. Subsequently, or on August 1, 1997, respondent received a letter from Julius Z. Neri,
CCCIs corporate secretary, informing him that the Board disapproved his application for
proprietary membership.
On August 6, 1997, Edmundo T. Misa, on behalf of respondent, wrote CCCI a
letter of reconsideration. As CCCI did not answer, respondent, on October 7, 1997, wrote
another letter of reconsideration. Still, CCCI kept silent. On November 5, 1997, respondent
again sent CCCI a letter inquiring whether any member of the Board objected to his
application. Again, CCCI did not reply.
Consequently, on December 23, 1998, respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 71, Pasig City a complaint for damages against petitioners, docketed
as Civil Case No. 67190.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 14, 2001 in favor of
respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:
1. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the
amount of P2,340,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages.
2. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the
amount of P5,000,000.00 as moral damages.
3. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the
amount of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. Ordering defendants to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff the
amount of P1,000,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees and P80,000.00
as litigation expenses.
5. Costs of suit.
Counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On appeal by petitioners, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated January 31, 2003,
affirmed the trial courts Decision with modification, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision
dated February 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
71, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 67190 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION as follows:
1. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff-appellee the amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff-appellee the amount of P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Ordering defendants-appellants to pay, jointly and severally,
plaintiff-appellee the mount of P500,000.00 as attorneys fees
and P50,000.00 as litigation expenses; and
4. Costs of the suit.
5
 The counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On March 3, 2003, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and motion for leave to set
the motion for oral arguments. In its Resolution[4] dated October 2, 2003, the appellate
court denied the motions for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue for our resolution is whether in disapproving respondents application for
proprietary membership with CCCI, petitioners are liable to respondent for damages, and if
so, whether their liability is joint and several.
Petitioners contend, inter alia, that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding exorbitant
damages to respondent despite the lack of evidence that they acted in bad faith in
disapproving the latters application; and in disregarding their defense of damnum absque
injuria.
For his part, respondent maintains that the petition lacks merit, hence, should be denied.
CCCIs Articles of Incorporation provide in part:
SEVENTH: That this is a non-stock corporation and membership
therein as well as the right of participation in its assets shall be limited to
qualified persons who are duly accredited owners of Proprietary
Ownership Certificates issued by the corporation in accordance with its
By-Laws.
Corollary, Section 3, Article 1 of CCCIs Amended By-Laws provides:
SECTION 3. HOW MEMBERS ARE ELECTED The procedure for
the admission of new members of the Club shall be as follows:
(a) Any proprietary member, seconded by another voting
proprietary member, shall submit to the Secretary a written proposal for
the admission of a candidate to the Eligible-for-Membership List;
(b) Such proposal shall be posted by the Secretary for a period of
thirty (30) days on the Club bulletin board during which time any member
may interpose objections to the admission of the applicant by
communicating the same to the Board of Directors;
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, if no
objections have been filed or if there are, the Board considers the
objections unmeritorious, the candidate shall be qualified for inclusion in
the Eligible-for-Membership List;
(d) Once included in the Eligible-for-Membership List and after the
candidate shall have acquired in his name a valid POC duly recorded in
the books of the corporation as his own, he shall become a Proprietary
Member, upon a non-refundable admission fee of P1,000.00, provided that
admission fees will only be collected once from any person.
On March 1, 1978, Section 3(c) was amended to read as follows:
(c) After the expiration of the aforesaid thirty (30) days, the Board
may, by unanimous vote of all directors present at a regular or
special meeting, approve the inclusion of the candidate in the Eligible-for-
Membership List.
As shown by the records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as the black
ball system of voting wherein each member will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball
represents conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a black ball means
disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c), as amended, cited above, a unanimous vote of the
directors is required. When respondents application for proprietary membership was voted
upon during the Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box contained one (1) black
ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity, his application was disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its Articles of Incorporation, has the
right to approve or disapprove an application for proprietary membership.But such right
should not be exercised arbitrarily. Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code on the Chapter on
Human Relations provide restrictions, thus:
6
 Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
In GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona,[5] we expounded Article 19 and correlated it with Article 21,
thus:
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.But while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would be proper. (Emphasis in the original)
In rejecting respondents application for proprietary membership, we find
that petitioners violated the rules governing human relations, the basic principles to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of social
order. The trial court and the Court of Appeals aptly held that petitioners committed fraud
and evident bad faith in disapproving respondents applications. This is contrary to morals,
good custom or public policy. Hence, petitioners are liable for damages pursuant to Article
19 in relation to Article 21 of the same Code.
It bears stressing that the amendment to Section 3(c) of CCCIs Amended By-Laws
requiring the unanimous vote of the directors present at a special or regular meeting
was not printed on the application form respondent filled and submitted to CCCI. What
was printed thereon was the original provision of Section 3(c) which was silent on the
required number of votes needed for admission of an applicant as a proprietary member.
Petitioners explained that the amendment was not printed on the application form
due to economic reasons. We find this excuse flimsy and unconvincing. Such amendment,
aside from being extremely significant, was introduced way back in 1978 or almost twenty
(20) years before respondent filed his application. We cannot fathom why such a
prestigious and exclusive golf country club, like the CCCI, whose members are all affluent,
did not have enough money to cause the printing of an updated application form.
It is thus clear that respondent was left groping in the dark wondering why his
application was disapproved. He was not even informed that a unanimous vote of the
Board members was required. When he sent a letter for reconsideration and an inquiry
whether there was an objection to his application, petitioners apparently ignored
him. Certainly, respondent did not deserve this kind of treatment. Having been designated
by San Miguel Corporation as a special non-proprietary member of CCCI, he should have
been treated by petitioners with courtesy and civility. At the very least, they should have
informed him why his application was disapproved.
The exercise of a right, though legal by itself, must nonetheless be in accordance
with the proper norm. When the right is exercised arbitrarily, unjustly or excessively and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible.[6] It bears reiterating that the trial court and the Court of Appeals held
that petitioners disapproval of respondents application is characterized by bad faith.
As to petitioners reliance on the principle of damnum absque injuria or damage
without injury, suffice it to state that the same is misplaced. In Amonoy v.
Gutierrez,[7] we held that this principle does not apply when there is an abuse of a
persons right, as in this case.
As to the appellate courts award to respondent of moral damages, we find the
same in order. Under Article 2219 of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be
recovered, among others, in acts and actions referred to in Article 21. We believe
respondents testimony that he suffered mental anguish, social humiliation and wounded
feelings as a result of the arbitrary denial of his application. However, the amount
of P2,000,000.00 is excessive. While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what
would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, the same should not be
palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty
to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.[8] Taking
into consideration the attending circumstances here, we hold that an award to respondent
of P50,000.00, instead of P2,000,000.00, as moral damages is reasonable.
7
Anent the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 allows it by way of example or
correction for the public good. Nonetheless, since exemplary damages are imposed not to
enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions,[9] we reduce the amount from P1,000,000.00
to P25,000.00 only.
On the matter of attorneys fees and litigation expenses, Article 2208 of the same Code
provides, among others, that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered in
cases when exemplary damages are awarded and where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered, as in this
case. In any event, however, such award must be reasonable, just and equitable. Thus,
we reduce the amount of attorneys fees (P500,000.00) and litigation expenses
(P50,000.00) to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
Lastly, petitioners argument that they could not be held jointly and severally liable for
damages because only one (1) voted for the disapproval of respondents application lacks
merit.
Section 31 of the Corporation Code provides:
SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. Directors or
trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful
acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad
faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, or trustees
shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom
suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other
persons. (Emphasis ours)
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71506 are AFFIRMED with modification in the sense
that (a) the award of moral damages is reduced from P2,000,000.00 to P50,000.00; (b) the
award of exemplary damages is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P25,000.00; and (c) the
award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses is reduced from P500,000.00
and P50,000.00 to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 160689 March 26, 2014
RAUL H. SESBREÑO, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN I. COROMINA (SUBSTITUTED BY ANITA
COROMINA, ELIZABETH COROMINA and ROSIEMARIE COROMINA), VICENTE E.
GARCIA (SUBSTITUTED BY EDGAR JOHN GARCIA), FELIPE CONSTANTINO,
RONALD ARCILLA, NORBETO ABELLANA, DEMETRIO BALICHA, ANGELITA
LHUILLIER, JOSE E. GARCIA, AND VISA YAN ELECTRIC COMPANY
(VECO), Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul H. Sesbreño founded on
abuse of rights. Sesbreño accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team
dispatched by the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check his electric meter with
conducting an unreasonable search in his residential premises. But the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Cebu City rendered judgment on August 19, 1994 dismissing
the claim;1 and the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal on March 10, 2003.2
Hence, this appeal by Sesbreño.
Antecedents
At the time material to the petition, VECO was a public utility corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines. VECO engaged in the sale and distribution of
electricity within Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreño was one of VECO’s customers under the
metered service contract they had entered into on March 2, 1982. 3 Respondent Vicente E.
Garcia was VECO’s President, General Manager and Chairman of its Board of Directors.
Respondent Jose E. Garcia was VECO’s Vice-President, Treasurer and a Member of its
Board of Directors. Respondent Angelita Lhuillier was another Member of VECO’s Board of
Directors. Respondent Juan Coromina was VECO’s Assistant Treasurer, while respondent
Norberto Abellana was the Head of VECO’s Billing Section whose main function was to
compute back billings of customers found to have violated their contracts.
To ensure that its electric meters were properly functioning, and that none of it meters had
been tampered with, VECO employed respondents Engr. Felipe Constantino and Ronald
Arcilla as violation of contract (VOC) inspectors. 4 Respondent Sgt. Demetrio Balicha, who
belonged to the 341st Constabulary Company, Cebu Metropolitan Command, Camp
Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City, accompanied and escorted the VOC inspectors during their
8
inspection of the households of its customers on May 11, 1989 pursuant to a mission order
issued to him.5
The CA summarized the antecedent facts as follows:
x x x. Reduced to its essentials, however, the facts of this case are actually simple enough,
although the voluminous records might indicate otherwise. It all has to do with an incident
that occurred at around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 11, 1989. On that day, the
Violation of Contracts (VOC) Team of defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and
their PC escort, Balicha, conducted a routine inspection of the houses at La Paloma
Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including that of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, for illegal
connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring connections, and
meter installations. After Bebe Baledio, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked the
gate, they inspected the electric meter and found that it had been turned upside down.
Defendant-appellant Arcilla took photographs of the upturned electric meter. With Chuchie
Garcia, Peter Sesbreño and one of the maids present, they removed said meter and
replaced it with a new one. At that time, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño was in his office and
no one called to inform him of the inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received
Chuchie Garcia’s permission to enter the house itself to examine the kind and number of
appliances and light fixtures in the household and determine its electrical load. Afterwards,
Chuchie Garcia signed the Inspection Division Report, which showed the condition of the
electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team inspected it, with notice that it would
be subjected to a laboratory test. She also signed a Load Survey Sheet that showed the
electrical load of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.
But according to plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño there was nothing routine or proper at all with
what the VOC Team did on May 11, 1989 in his house. Their entry to his house and the
surrounding premises was effected without his permission and over the objections of his
maids. They threatened, forced or coerced their way into his house. They unscrewed the
electric meter, turned it upside down and took photographs thereof. They then replaced it
with a new electric meter. They searched the house and its rooms without his permission
or a search warrant. They forced a visitor to sign two documents, making her appear to be
his representative or agent. Afterwards, he found that some of his personal effects were
missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched the house. 6
Judgment of the RTC
On August 19, 1994, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. 7 It did not
accord credence to the testimonies of Sesbreño’s witnesses, Bebe Baledio, his
housemaid, and Roberto Lopez, a part-time salesman, due to inconsistencies on material
points in their respective testimonies. It observed that Baledio could not make up her mind
as to whether Sesbreño’s children were in the house when the VOC inspection team
detached and replaced the electric meter. Likewise, it considered unbelievable that Lopez
should hear the exchanges between Constantino, Arcilla and Balicha, on one hand, and
Baledio, on the other, considering that Lopez could not even hear the conversation
between two persons six feet away from where he was seated during the simulation done
in court, the same distance he supposedly had from the gate of Sesbreño’s house during
the incident. It pointed out that Lopez’s presence at the gate during the incident was even
contradicted by his own testimony indicating that an elderly woman had opened the gate
for the VECO personnel, because it was Baledio, a lady in her 20s, who had repeatedly
stated on her direct and cross examinations that she had let the VECO personnel in. It
concluded that for Lopez to do nothing at all upon seeing a person being threatened by
another in the manner he described was simply contrary to human experience.
In contrast, the RTC believed the evidence of the respondents showing that the VOC
inspection team had found the electric meter in Sesbreño’s residence turned upside down
to prevent the accurate registering of the electricity consumption of the household, causing
them to detach and replace the meter. It held as unbelievable that the team forcibly
entered the house through threats and intimidation; that they themselves turned the electric
meter upside down in order to incriminate him for theft of electricity, because the fact that
the team and Sesbreño had not known each other before then rendered it unlikely for the
team to fabricate charges against him; and that Sesbreño’s non-presentation of Chuchie
Garcia left her allegation of her being forced to sign the two documents by the team
unsubstantiated.
Decision of the CA
Sesbreño appealed, but the CA affirmed the RTC on March 10, 2003,8 holding thusly:
x x x. plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s account is simply too implausible or far-fetched to be
believed. For one thing, the inspection on his household was just one of many others that
the VOC Team had conducted in that subdivision. Yet, none but plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño complained of the alleged acts of the VOC Team. Considering that there is no
proof that they also perpetrated the same illegal acts on other customers in the guise of
conducting a Violation of Contracts inspection, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño likewise failed
to show why he alone was singled out. It is also difficult to believe that the VOC Team
would be brazen enough to want to antagonize a person such as plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño. There is no evidence that the VOC Team harbored any evil motive or grudge
against plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño, who is a total stranger to them. Until he came along,
they did not have any prior criminal records to speak of, or at least, no evidence thereof
was presented. It is equally difficult to believe that their superiors would authorize or
condone their alleged illegal acts. Especially so since there is no indication that prior to the
incident on May 11, 1989, there was already bad blood or animosity between plaintiff-
appellant Sesbreño and defendant appellees to warrant such a malevolent response. In
fact, since availing of defendant-appellee VECO’s power services, the relationship between
them appears to have been uneventful.
It becomes all the more apparent that the charges stemming from the May 11, 1989
incident were fabricated when taken together with the lower court’s evaluation of the
alleged theft of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño’s personal effects. It stated that on August 8,
1989, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño wrote the barangay captain of Punta Princesa and
accused Chuchie Garcia and Victoria Villarta alias Victoria Rocamora of theft of some of
9
his things that earlier he claimed had been stolen by members of the VOC Team. When he
was confronted with these facts, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño further claimed that the items
allegedly stolen by Chuchie Garcia were part of the loot taken by defendants-appellees
Constantino and Arcilla. Yet not once did plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño or any of his
witnesses mention that a conspiracy existed between these people. Clearly, much like his
other allegations, it is nothing more than an afterthought by plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño.
All in all, the allegations against defendants-appellees appear to be nothing more than a
put-on to save face. For the simple truth is that the inspection exposed plaintiff-appellant
Sesbreño as a likely cheat and thief.
xxxx
Neither is this Court swayed by the testimonies of Baledio and Lopez.1âwphi1 The lower
court rightly described their testimonies as fraught by discrepancies and inconsistencies on
material points and even called Lopez a perjured witness. On the other hand, it is odd that
plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño chose not to present the witness whose testimony was very
crucial. But even though Chuchie Garcia never testified, her absence speaks volumes.
Whereas plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño claimed that the VOC Team forced her to sign two
documents that made her appear to be his authorized agent or representative, the latter
claimed otherwise and that she also gave them permission to enter and search the house.
The person most qualified to refute the VOC Team’s claim is Chuchie Garcia herself. It is
axiomatic that he who asserts a fact or claim must prove it. He cannot transfer that burden
to the person against whom he asserts such fact or claim. When certain evidence is
suppressed, the presumption is that it will adversely affect the cause of the party
suppressing it, should it come to light. x x x9
Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,10 Sesbreño appealed.
Issue
Was Sesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights?
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
Sesbreño’s main contention is that the inspection of his residence by the VOC team was
an unreasonable search for being carried out without a warrant and for being allegedly
done with malice or bad faith.
Before dealing with the contention, we have to note that two distinct portions of Sesbreño’s
residence were inspected by the VOS team – the garage where the electric meter was
installed, and the main premises where the four bedrooms, living rooms, dining room and
kitchen were located.
Anent the inspection of the garage where the meter was installed, the respondents assert
that the VOC team had the continuing authority from Sesbreño as the consumer to enter
his premises at all reasonable hours to conduct an inspection of the meter without being
liable for trespass to dwelling. The authority emanated from paragraph 9 of the metered
service contract entered into between VECO and each of its consumers, which provided as
follows:
9. The CONSUMER agrees to allow properly authorized employees or representatives of
the COMPANY to enter his premises at all reasonable hours without being liable to
trespass to dwelling for the purpose of inspecting, installing, reading, removing, testing,
replacing or otherwise disposing of its property, and/or removing the COMPANY’S property
in the event of the termination of the contract for any cause.11
Sesbreño contends, however, that paragraph 9 did not give Constantino, Arcilla and
Balicha the blanket authority to enter at will because the only property VECO owned in his
premises was the meter; hence, Constantino and Arcilla should enter only the garage. He
denies that they had the right to enter the main portion of the house and inspect the
various rooms and the appliances therein because those were not the properties of VECO.
He posits that Balicha, who was not an employee of VECO, had no authority whatsoever to
enter his house and conduct a search. He concludes that their search was unreasonable,
and entitled him to damages in light of their admission that they had entered and inspected
his premises without a search warrant.12
We do not accept Sesbreño’s conclusion.1avvphi1 Paragraph 9 clothed the entire VOC
team with unquestioned authority to enter the garage to inspect the meter. The members of
the team obviously met the conditions imposed by paragraph 9 for an authorized entry.
Firstly, their entry had the objective of conducting the routine inspection of the
meter.13Secondly, the entry and inspection were confined to the garage where the meter
was installed.14 Thirdly, the entry was effected at around 4 o’clock p.m., a reasonable
hour.15 And, fourthly, the persons who inspected the meter were duly authorized for the
purpose by VECO.
Although Balicha was not himself an employee of VECO, 16 his participation was to render
police assistance to ensure the personal security of Constantino and Arcilla during the
inspection, rendering him a necessary part of the team as an authorized representative.
Under the circumstances, he was authorized to enter considering that paragraph 9
expressly extended such authority to "properly authorized employees or representatives" of
VECO.
It is true, as Sesbreño urges, that paragraph 9 did not cover the entry into the main
premises of the residence. Did this necessarily mean that any entry by the VOS team into
the main premises required a search warrant to be first secured?
Sesbreño insists so, citing Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the clause
guaranteeing the right of every individual against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:
10
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
He states that a violation of this constitutional guaranty rendered VECO and its VOS team
liable to him for damages by virtue of Article 32 (9) of the Civil Code, which pertinently
provides:
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secured in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
x x x x.
Sesbreño’s insistence has no legal and factual basis.
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is intended as a
restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement. It is to be
invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power.
The Court has made this clear in its pronouncements, including that made in People v.
Marti,17 viz:
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private
purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right
against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as
to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.18
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the main premises only after
finding the meter of Sesbreño turned upside down, hanging and its disc not rotating. Their
doing so would enable them to determine the unbilled electricity consumed by his
household. The circumstances justified their decision, and their inspection of the main
premises was a continuation of the authorized entry. There was no question then that their
ability to determine the unbilled electricity called for them to see for themselves the usage
of electricity inside. Not being agents of the State, they did not have to first obtain a search
warrant to do so.
Balicha’s presence participation in the entry did not make the inspection a search by an
agent of the State within the ambit of the guaranty. As already mentioned, Balicha was part
of the team by virtue of his mission order authorizing him to assist and escort the team
during its routine inspection.19 Consequently, the entry into the main premises of the house
by the VOC team did not constitute a violation of the guaranty.
Our holding could be different had Sesbreño persuasively demonstrated the intervention of
malice or bad faith on the part of Constantino and Arcilla during their inspection of the main
premises, or any excessiveness committed by them in the course of the inspection. But
Sesbreño did not. On the other hand, the CA correctly observed that the inspection did not
zero in on Sesbreño’s residence because the other houses within the area were similarly
subjected to the routine inspection.20 This, we think, eliminated any notion of malice or bad
faith.
Clearly, Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were not
guilty of abuse of rights. To stress, the concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person
should not use his right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to another who
suffers injury. The rationale for the concept is to present some basic principles to be
followed for the rightful relationship between human beings and the stability of social
order.21Moreover, according to a commentator,22 "the exercise of right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others[;] [i]t
cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another."
Article 19 of the Civil Code23 sets the standards to be observed in the exercise of one’s
rights and in the performance of one’s duties, namely: (a) to act with justice; (b) to give
everyone his due; and (c) to observe honesty and good faith. The law thereby recognizes
the primordial limitation on all rights – that in the exercise of the rights, the standards under
Article 19 must be observed.24
Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may arise should there be an abuse of
rights, like when the act is performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that liability
may attach under the concept of abuse of rights, the following elements must be present,
to wit: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in bad faith, and (c)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.25 There is no hard and fast rule that
can be applied to ascertain whether or not the principle of abuse of rights is to be invoked.
The resolution of the issue depends on the circumstances of each case.
Sesbreño asserts that he did not authorize Baledio or Chuchie Garcia to let anyone enter
his residence in his absence; and that Baledio herself confirmed that the members of the
VOC team had intimidated her into letting them in.
The assertion of Sesbreño is improper for consideration in this appeal.1âwphi1 The RTC
and the CA unanimously found the testimonies of Sesbreño’s witnesses implausible
because of inconsistencies on material points; and even declared that the non-presentation
11
of Garcia as a witness was odd if not suspect. Considering that such findings related to the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, the Court cannot review and undo them
now because it is not a trier of facts, and is not also tasked to analyze or weigh evidence
all over again.26 Verily, a review that may tend to supplant the findings of the trial court that
had the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses themselves
should be undertaken by the Court with prudent hesitation. Only when Sesbreño could
make a clear showing of abuse in their appreciation of the evidence and records by the trial
and the appellate courts should the Court do the unusual review of the factual findings of
the trial and appellate courts.27 Alas, that showing was not made here.
Nor should the Court hold that Sesbreño was denied due process by the refusal of the trial
judge to inhibit from the case. Although the trial judge had issued an order for his voluntary
inhibition, he still rendered the judgment in the end in compliance with the instruction of the
Executive Judge, whose exercise of her administrative authority on the matter of the
inhibition should be respected.28 In this connection, we find to be apt the following
observation of the CA, to wit:
x x x. Both Judge Paredes and Judge Priscila Agana serve the Regional Trial Court and
are therefore of co-equal rank. The latter has no authority to reverse or modify the orders
of Judge Paredes. But in ordering Judge Paredes to continue hearing the case, Judge
Agana did not violate their co-equal status or unilaterally increased her jurisdiction. It is
merely part of her administrative responsibilities as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, of which Judge Paredes is also a member.29
Lastly, the Court finds nothing wrong if the writer of the decision in the CA refused to inhibit
from participating in the resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed by Sesbrefio. The
motion for her inhibition was grounded on suspicion of her bias and prejudice, 30 but
suspicion of bias and prejudice were not enough grounds for inhibition. 31
Suffice it to say that the records are bereft of any indication that even suggested that the
Associate Justices of the CA who participated in the promulgation of the decision were
tainted with bias against him.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the pet1t1on for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the
decision promulgated on March 10, 2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 127449. March 31, 2005] NOEL BUENAVENTURA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was
filed by petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After
respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court, amended his petition by stating
that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the
allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.[1]
On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A.
Buenaventura and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4,
1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5
million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest
from the date of this decision plus attorneys fees of P100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00,
plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,]
particularly the plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far
East Bank [and] Trust Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty
percent (50%) of the net amount of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89
together with 12% interest per annum from the date of this decision and one-
half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park and
Provident Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh
Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification
as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his
mother, the herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden
family name Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of
properties.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was
pending in the appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly
12
support pendente lite of their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition
thereto, praying that it be denied or that such incident be set for oral argument. [3]
On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the
support pendente lite to P20,000.[4] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning
the said Resolution.[5]
On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing
petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial courts decision. [6] Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision,
petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which
increased the monthly support for the son.[7] Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to
question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari[8] and the Petition
for Certiorari[9] were ordered consolidated by this Court.[10]
In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals
decided the case not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT
OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST
FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES
OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL
AND LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-
APPELLEE ONE-HALF OR P1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS
RECEIVED FROM THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST
THEREON FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID
RETIREMENT BENEFITS ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL,
AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF
STOCK WITH THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF
COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL
BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN
HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES; AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES
MINOR CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS
ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS
TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.[11]
In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED
TO SET RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES
SON FOR HEARING.[12]
THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS
MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT
PRESENT PRICES.[13]
IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT,
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES
SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS
THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000
INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS TOO MINIMAL.[14]
LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT
AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT.[15]
With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the
testimonies not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of
the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into
marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy
parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that
he was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his
first priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but
also to his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work
such that in times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving
defendantappellee and their son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and
their son as proved by his reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation;
that the aforementioned caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together
but also after and throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising
from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may
not be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme
Court where damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital
obligations were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may be
made.
13
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary
damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its
discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for.
We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.[16]
The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the
Civil Code, which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219[17] of the Civil Code
enumerates the cases in which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article
21 as one of the instances. It must be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must
willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a need that the act is willful and hence
done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages, therefore, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which the moral damages
were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages would
have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner,
Noel Buenaventura. Article 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .[18]
The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the
marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity
or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts
considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is
contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence
beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time
considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically
incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was
negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of
entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the
same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a
consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner
purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was
not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages
was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of
exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages
are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[19]
With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial court
explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs
act or omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation
to protect her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable that
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. (par. 11) [20]
The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified,
the award of attorneys fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully
justified.[21]
The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his
psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his
marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate,
since both are grounded on petitioners psychological incapacity, which as explained above
is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage.
Hence, neither can be a ground for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore,
since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of
attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
14
 Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the
shares of stock in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the
trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the
conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The
Honorable Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso
facto a judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive
legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family
Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the
following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of
what are the parties conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each
spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked
first as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received
separation/retirement package from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which
after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount of P3,675,335.79
and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown
debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay,
under Art. 129 of the Family Code The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties
shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife,
unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or
unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this
Code. In this particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between the
parties, nor had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes
share in the conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the
plaintiff of his one-half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No.
S-35680 of the Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as
stipulated in their Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court
in its Partial Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of
any and all demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some
concession in favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the
process of liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse
with whom their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done
was one-half (1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim
anymore for past unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as
his presumptive legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the
conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share
of the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their
conjugal partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry,
work or profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the
Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding
shares of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident
Group of Companies.[22]
The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to
give one-half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company
and half of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies to the defendant-appellee as the latters share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise
Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties
had agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps
were taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement
benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his
retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from
plaintiffappellants service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was
married to defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with
the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group
of Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married
to defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal
partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.[23]
15
 Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the
provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing
for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case
may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is
declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,[24] this Court expounded
on the consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and
specified the applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in
previous cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the
property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant
share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in
the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage,
i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the
fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article
144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-
ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the
co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of
the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place
upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties'
common property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which
had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with
authority to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible
error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under
the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family
Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid
and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to
the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first
paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
Article 43, relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally,
to void marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow recognizes the philosophy
and an old doctrine that void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no
judicial decree is necessary to establish their nullity. In now requiring for purposes of
remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final judgment of the previously contracted void
marriage, the present law aims to do away with any continuing uncertainty on the status of
the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the provisions of Article 43, in relation to
Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of the termination of a subsequent
16
marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage to be made
applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also
meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between spouses in valid
and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between common-law
spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the ordinary
rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family
Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious, that the
provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title V,
Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property regime
of the spouses.[25]
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the
parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property
of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned in common by the parties
herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be sustained, but on the basis of
co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh
Buenaventura, it is now moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27,
2005[26]and has, therefore, attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would
also now be moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously
stated, has attained the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its
Resolution dated December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R.
No. 127449), are hereby MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent
one-half of the retirement benefits of petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-
half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of
Companies is sustained but on the basis of the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The rest
of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of
Appeals Resolutions of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the
support pendente lite in favor of the parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT
and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JEROME CASTRO, G.R. No. 180832
Petitioner,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
July 23, 2008
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] emanated from the complaint for grave oral
defamation[2] filed by Albert P. Tan against petitioner Jerome Castro.
The facts follow.
On November 11, 2002, Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tans son,
Justin Albert (then a Grade 12 student), for violating the terms of his disciplinary
probation.[3] Upon Tans request, RIS reconsidered its decision but imposed non-
appealable conditions such as excluding Justin Albert from participating in the graduation
ceremonies.
Aggrieved, Tan filed a complaint in the Department of Education (Dep-Ed) for
violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private Schools, Education Act of 1982 and Article
19 of the Civil Code[4] against RIS. He alleged that the dismissal of his son was undertaken
with malice, bad faith and evident premeditation. After investigation, the Dep-Ed found that
RIS code violation point system allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable
sanctions (which had no basis in fact and in law). The system therefore violated due
process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified it. [5]
Meanwhile, on November 20, 2002, the Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin
Albert without any condition.[6] Thus, he was able to graduate from RIS and participate in
the commencement ceremonies held on March 30, 2003.
After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at RIS.
In the course of their conversation, Tan intimated that he was contemplating a suit against
the officers of RIS in their personal capacities, including petitioner who was the assistant
headmaster.
Ching telephoned petitioner sometime the first week of April and told him that Tan
was planning to sue the officers of RIS in their personal capacities. Before they hung up,
petitioner told Ching:
Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan], thats dangerous.
Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner said talking to him was
dangerous.
Insulted, Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Mandaluyong City against petitioner on August 21, 2003.
17
On November 3, 2003, petitioner was charged with grave oral defamation in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60[7] under the following
Information:
That on or about the 13th day of March, 2003 in the City of
Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named [petitioner], with deliberate intent of bringing
ATTY. ALBERT P. TAN, into discredit, dishonor, disrepute and contempt,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously speak and utter the
following words to Ms. Bernice C. Ching:
OK, YOU TOO, YOU TAKE CARE AND BE CAREFUL
TALKING TO [TAN], THATS DANGEROUS.
and other words of similar import of a serious and insulting nature.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.
The prosecution essentially tried to establish that petitioner depicted Tan as a
dangerous person. Ching testified that petitioner warned her that talking to Tan was
dangerous. Tan, on the other hand, testified that petitioners statement shocked him as it
portrayed him as someone capable of committing undesirable acts. He added that
petitioner probably took offense because of the complaint he filed against RIS in the Dep-
Ed.
For his defense, petitioner denied harboring ill-feelings against Tan despite the
latters complaint against RIS in the Dep-Ed. Although he admitted conversing with Ching
(whom he considered as a close acquaintance) on the telephone a few days after RIS
2003 commencement exercises, petitioner asserted that he never said or insinuated that
Tan or talking to Tan was dangerous. On cross-examination, however, he did not
categorically deny the veracity of Chings statement.
The MeTC found that Chings statements in her affidavit and in open court were
consistent and that she did not have any motive to fabricate a false statement. Petitioner,
on the other hand, harbored personal resentment, aversion and ill-will against Tan since
the Dep-Ed compelled RIS to readmit his son. Thus, the MeTC was convinced that
petitioner told Ching talking to Tan was dangerous and that he uttered the statement with
the intention to insult Tan and tarnish his social and professional reputation.
In a decision dated December 27, 2005, the MeTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of grave oral defamation:[8]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused,
Jerome Castro GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave
Oral Defamation, sentencing him therefore, in accordance to Article 358(1)
of the Revised Penal Code and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 1 month and 1 day of arresto
mayor as minimum to 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor as maximum.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed the factual findings of the MeTC.
However, in view of the animosity between the parties, it found petitioner guilty only of
slight oral defamation. But because Tan filed his complaint in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City only on August 21, 2003 (or almost five months from
discovery), the RTC ruled that prescription had already set in; it therefore acquitted
petitioner on that ground. [9]
On April 19, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the decision of the RTC.[10] It contended
that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it downgraded petitioners offense
to slight oral defamation. The RTC allegedly misappreciated the antecedents which
provoked petitioner to utter the allegedly defamatory statement against Tan.
The CA found that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
misapprehended the totality of the circumstances and found petitioner guilty only of slight
oral defamation. Thus, the CA reinstated the MeTC decision.[11]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. [12] Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner basically contends that the CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition
for certiorari inasmuch as the OSG raised errors of judgment (i.e., that the RTC
misappreciated the evidence presented by the parties) but failed to prove that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion. Thus, double jeopardy attached when the RTC
acquitted him.
We grant the petition.
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. [13] This
constitutional mandate is echoed in Section 7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or in information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
18
 xxxxxxxxx
Under this provision, double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a
competent court (3) after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when
the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused.[14] Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the
trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy.[15]
The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or,
as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,[16] when there was mistrial. In such instances, the
OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the State was
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.[17]
The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court
with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason,
void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.
In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTCs finding on the nature of petitioners
statement, that is, whether it constituted grave or slight oral defamation. The OSG
premised its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the RTCs erroneous evaluation and
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.
What the OSG therefore questioned were errors of judgment (or those involving
misappreciation of evidence or errors of law). However, a court, in a petition for certiorari,
cannot review the public respondents evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings.[18] Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari
can only correct errors of jurisdiction (or those involving the commission of grave abuse of
discretion).[19]
Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking
cognizance of its petition and, worse, in reviewing the factual findings of the RTC. [20] We
therefore reinstate the RTC decision so as not to offend the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy.
At most, petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil
Code[21]:
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
xxxxxxxxx
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
xxxxxxxxx
Petitioner is reminded that, as an educator, he is supposed to be a role model for
the youth. As such, he should always act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 29, 2007 decision
and December 5, 2007 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98649
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The November 20, 2006 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 is REINSTATED. Petitioner Jerome Castro
is ACQUITTED of slight oral defamation as defined and penalized in Article 358 of the
Revised Penal Code.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as
private respondents), respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition seeks to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which
afirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who
was then the President of the West Visayas College liable for damages under Article 27 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines for failure to graduate a student with honors.
The facts are not disputed.
An organization named Student Leadership Club was formed by some students of the
West Visayas College. They elected the late Violets Delmo as the treasurer. In that
capacity, Delmo extended loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the
school. "the petitioner claims that the said act of extending loans was against school rules
and regulations. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School, sent a letter to Delmo
informing her that she was being dropped from the membership of the club and that she
would not be a candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus,
appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.
19
The Director after due investigation, rendered a decison on April 13, 1966 which provided:
Records of the preliminary investigation conducted by one of the legal
officers of this Office disclosed the following: That Violeta Delmo was the
treasurer of the Student Leadership Club, an exclusive student
organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of the Constitution and By-
Laws of the club, it passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to
disburse funds of the Club to student for financial aid and other
humanitarian purposes; that in compliance with said resolution and as
treasurer of the Club, Violeta Delmo extended loans to some officers and
members of the Club upon proper application duly approved by the
majority of the members of the Executive Board; and that upon receiving
the report from Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser of the funds of the Club, that
Office conducted an investigation on the matter and having been
convinced of the guilt of Violets Delmo and the other officers and members
of the Club, that Office rendered the order or decision in question. In
justifying that Office's order or decision, it is contended that approval by
that Office of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club is necessary for its
effectivity and validity and since it was never submitted to that Office, the
Club had no valid constitution and By-Laws and that as a consequence,
Resolution No. 2 which was passed based on the Constitution and By-
Laws- is without any force and effect and the treasurer, Violeta Delmo,
who extended loans to some officers and members of the Club pursuant
thereto are illegal (sic), hence, she and the other students involved are
deemed guilty of misappropriating the funds of the Club. On the other
hand, Raclito Castaneda, Nestor Golez and Violeta Delmo, President,
Secretary and Treasurer of the Club, respectively, testified that the Club
had adopted its Constitution and By-Laws in a meeting held last October
3, 1965, and that pursuant to Article I of said Constitution and By-Laws,
the majority of the members of the Executive Board passed Resolution No.
2, which resolution became the basis for the extension on of loans to some
officers and members of the Club, that the Club honestly believed that its
Constitution and By-Laws has been approved by the superintendent
because the adviser of the Club, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, assured the President
of the Club that he will cause the approval of the Constitution and By-Laws
by the Superintendent; the officers of the Club have been inducted to
office on October 9,1965 by the Superintendent and that the Club had
been likewise allowed to cosponsor the Education Week Celebration.
After a careful study of the records, this Office sustains the action taken by
the Superintendent in penalizing the adviser of the Club as well as the
officers and members thereof by dropping them from membership therein.
However, this Office is convinced that Violets M. Delmo had acted in good
faith, in her capacity as Club Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers
and members of the Student partnership Club. Resolution No. 2
authorizing the Club treasurer to discharge finds to students in need of
financial assistance and other humanitarian purposes had been approved
by the Club adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, with the notation that approval
was given in his capacity as adviser of the Club and extension of the
Superintendent's personality. Aside from misleading the officers and
members of the Club, Mr. Dagoon, had unsatisfactorily explained why he
failed to give the Constitution and By-Laws of the Club to the
Superintendent for approval despite his assurance to the Club president
that he would do so. With this finding of negligence on the part of the Club
adviser, not to mention laxity in the performance of his duties as such, this
Office considers as too severe and unwarranted that portion of the
questioned order stating that Violeta Delmo "shall not be a candidate for
any award or citation from this school or any organization in this school."
Violeta Delmo, it is noted, has been a consistent full scholar of the school
and she alone has maintained her scholarship. The decision in question
would, therefore, set at naught all her sacrifice and frustrate her dreams of
graduating with honors in this year's commencement exercises.
In view of all the foregoing, this Office believes and so holds and hereby
directs that appellant Violeta. M. Delmo, and for that matter all other Club
members or officers involved in this case, be not deprived of any award,
citation or honor from the school, if they are otherwise entitled thereto.
(Rollo, pp. 28-30)
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the Director and all the
records of the case. On the same day, petitioner received a telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner allegedly mistook the
telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back. On the same day, he returned by
mail all the records plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the Director order him to
furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the
Director informing the latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not retained
a copy thereof..
On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the petitioner received another telegram from
the Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due her. As it was impossible
by this time to include Delmo's name in the program as one of the honor students, the
petitioner let her graduate as a plain student instead of being awarded the Latin honor of
Magna Cum Laude.
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a
reconsideration of the latters" decision because he believed that Delmo should not be
allowed to graduate with honors. The Director denied the petitioner's request.
20
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the school to enter into
the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, "Magna Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in flag action for
damages against the petitioner. During the pendency of the action, however, Delmo
passed away, and thus, an Amended and Supplemental Complaint was filed by her
parents as her sole and only heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner and in favor of the
spouses Delmo. The court said:
Let us go to specific badges of the defendants (now petitioners) bad faith.
Per investigation of Violeta Delmo's appeal to Director Vitaliano
Bernardino of the Bureau of Public Schools (Exhibit L it was the defendant
who inducted the officers of the Student Leadership Club on October 9,
1965. In fact the Club was allowed to cosponsor the Education Week
Celebration. (Exh. "L"). If the defendant he not approve of the constitution
and by-laws of the Club, why did he induct the officers into office and allow
the Club to sponsor the Education Week Celebration"? It was through his
own act that the students were misled to do as they did. Coupled with the
defendants tacit recognition of the Club was the assurance of Mr. Jemm
Dagoon, Club Adviser, who made the students believe that he was acting
as an extension of Mr. Ledesma's personality. (Exhibit "L").
Another badge of the defendan'ts want of good faith is the fact that,
although, he kaew as early as April 27,1966 that per on of r Bernardino,
Exhibit "L," he was directed to give honors to Miss Delmo, he kept Id
information to . He told the Court that he knew that the letter of Director
Bernardino directed him not to deprive Miss Delmo the honors due her, but
she (sic) says that he has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exhibit
"L," of Director Bernardino 0, him to give honors to Miss Delmo. (Tsn, Feb.
5, 1974, testimony of Mr. Ledesma, pp. .33-35). It could not be true that he
has not finished reading the letter-decision, Exh. "L," because said letter
consisted of only three pages, and the portion which directed that Miss
Delmo "be not deprived of any award, citation or honor from the school, if
otherwise entitled thereto is found at the last paragraph of the same. How
did he know the last paragraph if he did not read the letter.
Defendants actuations regarding Miss Delmo's cam had been one of bias
and prejudice. When his action would favor him, he was deliberate and
aspect to the utter prejudice and detriment of Miss Delmo. Thus, although,
as early as April 27, 1966, he knew of the exoneration of Miss Delino by
Director Bernardino, he withheld the information from Miss Delmo. This is
eloquently dramatized by Exh. "11" and Exh. "13" On April 29,1966,
Director Bernardino cabled him to furnish Violeta Delmo copy of the
Decision, Exh. "L," but instead of informing Miss Delmo about the decision,
since he said he mailed back the decision on April 28,1966, he sent a
night letter on April 29,1966, to Director Bernardino, informing the latter
that he had returned the decision (Exh. "l3"), together with the record. Why
a night letter when the matter was of utmost urgency to the parties in the
case, because graduation day was only four days ahead? An examination
of the telegrams sent by the defendant shows that he had been sending
ordinary telegram and not night letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit "7"). At least, if
the defendant could not furnish a copy of the decision, (Exh. "L"), to Miss
Delmo, he should have told her about it or that Miss Delmo's honors and
citation in the commencement be announced or indicated. But Mr.
Ledesma is one who cannot admit a mistake. Very ungentlemanly this is
home out by his own testimony despite his knowledge that his decision to
deprive Miss Delmo of honors due to her was overturned by Director
Bernardino, he on his wrong belief. To quote the defendant,1 believed that
she did not deserve those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, 1974, p. 43,Empasized
supplied). Despite the telegram of Director Bernardino which the
defendant received hours before the commencement executory on May 3-
4,1966, he did not obey Director Bernardino because he said in his
testimony that he would be embarrassment . Tan Feb 5,1974, P. 46).
Evidently, he knew only his embarrassment and not that of r Bernardino
whose order was being flagrantly and wantonly disregarded by bim And
certainly, not the least of Miss Delmo's embarrassment. His acts speak
eloquently of ho bad faith and unjust of mindwarped by his delicate
sensitivity for having been challenged by Miss Delmo, a mere student.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally the defendant's behaviour relative to Miss s case smacks of
contemptuous arrogance, oppression and abuse of power. Come to think
of it. He refused to obey the directive of Be o and instead, chose to feign
ignorance of it." (Reward on Appeal, p. 72-76).
The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her
parents for moral damages; P5,000.00 for nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary
damages of P10,000.00 and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of whether or not the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner is
liable for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It
cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought
about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but
21
proper. As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,
Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if
they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongly act or omission."
(People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 (1984).
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss
Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the petitioner to furnish her a copy of the
Director's decision. Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the petitioner's duty to
enforce the said decision. He could have done so considering that he received the decision
on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it back with the records of the case, he
undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only three pages. Moreover, the
petitioner should have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and
inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This, the petitioner likewise failed to do,
and not without the attendant bad faith which the appellate court correctly pointed out in its
decision, to wit:
Third, assuming that defendant could not furnish Miss Delmo of a copy of
the decision, he could have used his discretion and plain common sense
by informing her about it or he could have directed the inclusion of Miss
Delmo's honor in the printed commencement program or announced it
during the commencement exercises.
Fourth, defendant despite receipt of the telegram of Director Benardino
hours before the commencement exercises on May 3-4, 1966, disobeyed
his superior by refusing to give the honors due Miss Delmo with a lame
excuse that he would be embarrassed if he did so, to the prejudice of and
in complete disregard of Miss Delmo's rights.
Fifth, defendant did not even extend the courtesy of meeting Mr. Pacifico
Delmo, father of Miss Delmo, who tried several times to see defendant in
his office thus Mr. Delmo suffered extreme disappointment and
humiliation.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant, being a public officer should have acted with circumspection
and due regard to the rights of Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the
scope of his authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of his
superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for damages in his
personal capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57-58)
Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary damages are also in order. In the same case
of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled:
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name
implies, to provide an example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et
al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).
However, we do not deem it appropriate to award the spouses Delmo
damages in the amount of P10,000.00 in their individual capacity,
separately from and in addition to what they are already entitled to as sole
heirs of the deceased Violeta Delmo. Thus, the decision is modified insofar
as moral damages are awarded to the spouses in their own behalf.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with the slight modification as stated in the preceding paragraph.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas
died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
22
charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that
the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower
court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said
counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and
Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal
liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final
judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative.
This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect
both his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in
part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. —
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law
is plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is
extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled
upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final
judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory
order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89
of the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132
of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su
fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia
firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready
answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza
de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos
y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite.
Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts
it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of
Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal." Prior
thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente,
en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase."
And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before
judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise
exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco
holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed.,
pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the
Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the
term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also
brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that
a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period
for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his
right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel
down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the
Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
23
 judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For
where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not
reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the
criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9,
1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626,
634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236.
Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely
on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty,
the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan,
Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal
liability is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that
criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action
and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous
situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case
where the source thereof — criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was
well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held
criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to
divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme
Court in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the
Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing
the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established,
and considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the
pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-
appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal
Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v.
Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against
him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala
v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled
differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of
one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his
demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention
of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment
extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in
view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep.
Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal
Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code
establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action
still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the
civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the
extinction of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil
liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently,
where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes
the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final
judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the
civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but
from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused
who was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and
21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees
of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded:
"Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal
liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations
remains."
24
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,
notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his
conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the
following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the
dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant
supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal,
"the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-
appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be
substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule
established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil
liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based
thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-
established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and
convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to
the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was
clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already
extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of
Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of
determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977
stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability
survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment
was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which
convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification
and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23
(should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a
separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action
for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People
and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to
be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action
survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals,
L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina,
24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the
deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the
Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his
possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan
arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case
had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his
counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names
and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs
or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil
action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of
Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the
settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action
impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction
due to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the
Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from
a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
25
 pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego.
Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction
over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What
Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In
the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case,
the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is
compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil
action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether
civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the
death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It
allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action
to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate
the filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory
authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil
liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as
it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases,
extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably
signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves
all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the
criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that
when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending
appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and
is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an
inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the
criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under
Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does
not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate
civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such
as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the
resolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his
criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate
would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already
extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded
as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
the Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist
of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies
pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's
conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to
be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
26
 The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action
survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural
law, this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by
Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom
that where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities
had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First
Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue
to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of
the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and
abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil
actions. There is neither authority nor justification for its application in
criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of
criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the
death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that
referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which
in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in
Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims
while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of
personal or real property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what
claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last
illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is
clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration.
Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary
contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2)
allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused.
Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the
death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a
separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by
provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate
civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the
accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor
or administrator. — No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or
debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an
interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions
to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering
damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the
Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of
deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other
than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of
27
the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right
by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained
of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110544 October 17, 1995
REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Mayor of the Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental,
HERMINIGILDO FABURADA, (former Vice-Mayor), SANTOS A. VILLANUEVA,
Incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR R. AGOSTO,
ERENIETA K. MENDOZA MAXIMINO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO,
ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES, and FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG
BAYAN OF JIMALALUD, NEGROS ORIENTAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, (THIRD DIVISION), BARTOLOME BINAOHAN
and DELIA ESTRELLANES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated 17
February 1992 and its orders dated 19 August 1992 and 13 May 1993 in Criminal Case
No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al." denying
petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment.
The present controversy arose from the following antecedents:
On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were
designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral
representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros
Oriental by then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Local Government. Private
respondents Binaohan and Estrellanes took their oath of office on 16 February 1989 and
17 February 1989, respectively.
Subsequently, petitioners filed an undated petition with the Office of the President for
review and recall of said designations. The latter, however, in a letter dated 20 March
1989, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private
respondents as sectoral representatives.
On 4 May 1990, private respondents filed a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 35, docketed as Special Civil Action No. 9661, for
recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed on 23 July 1991.
Thereafter, on 20 June 1991, petitioners filed an action with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as
sectoral representatives, docketed as Civil Case No. 9955 entitled "Reynaldo Tuanda, et
al. versus Secretary of the Department of Local Government, et al."
On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 16936 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Tuanda, et al."
charging petitioners thus:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer of the Special Prosecutor,
hereby accuses REYNALDO V. TUANDA, HERMENEGILDO G.
FABURADA, MANUEL LIM, NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K.
28
 MENDOZA, MAXIMO VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO, and SANTOS
A. VILLANUEVA of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, committed as follows:
That during the period from February 1989 to February
1991 and subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Jimalalud, Negros Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused, all public officers, Mayor
REYNALDO V. TUANDA, Vice-Mayor HERMENEGILDO
G. FABURADA, Sangguniang Members MANUEL LIM,
NICANOR P. AGOSTO, ERENIETA K. MENDOZA,
MAXIMO A. VIERNES, HACUBINA V. SERILLO,
ILUMINADO D. ESTRELLANES and SANTOS A.
VILLANUEVA while in the performance of their official
functions and taking advantage of their public positions,
with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, and conspiring
and confederating with each other did, then and there,
wilfully and unlawfully cause undue injury to Sectoral
Members Bartolome M. Binaohan and Delia T. Estrellanes
by refusing to pay despite demand the amount of NINETY
FIVE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P95,350.00) and ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED PESOS (P108,900.00) representing
respectively their per diems, salaries and other privileges
and benefits, and such undue injury continuing to the
present to the prejudice and damage of Bartolome
Binaohan and Delia Estrellanes.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
On 9 September 1991, petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 16936 on the ground that a prejudicial question
exists in Civil Case No. 9955 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City. 2
On 16 January 1992, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision declaring null and
void ab initio the designations issued by the Department of Local Government to the
private respondents as sectoral representatives for having been done in violation of
Section 146 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. 3
The trial court expounded thus:
The Supreme Court in the case of Johnny D. Supangan Jr. v. Luis T.
Santos, et al., G.R. No. 84663, along with 7 companion cases of similar
import, (G.R. Nos. 05012, 87601, 87602, 87792, 87935, 88072, and
90205) all promulgated on August 24, 1990, ruled that:
B.P. Blg. 337 explicitly required that before the President
(or the Secretary of the Department of Local Government)
may appoint members of the local legislative bodies to
represent the Industrial and Agricultural Labor Sectors,
there must be a determination to be made by the
Sanggunian itself that the said sectors are of sufficient
number in the city or municipality to warrant
representation after consultation with associations and
persons belonging to the sector concerned.
The Supreme Court further ruled —
For that matter, the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Local Government Code even prescribe the time
and manner by which such determination is to be
conducted by the Sanggunian.
Consequently, in cases where the Sanggunian concerned
has not yet determined that the Industrial and Agricultural
Labor Sectors in their particular city or municipality are of
sufficient number to warrant representation, there will
absolutely be no basis for the designation/appointments.
In the process of such inquiry as to the sufficiency in number of the sector
concerned to warrant representation, the Sanggunian is enjoined by law
(B.P. Blg. 337) to consult with associations and persons belonging to the
sector concerned. Consultation with the sector concerned is made a pre-
requisite. This is so considering that those who belong to the said sector
are the ones primarily interested in being represented in the Sanggunian.
In the same aforecited case, the Supreme Court considers such prior
determination by the Sanggunian itself (not by any other person or body)
as a condition sine qua non to a valid appointment or designation.
Since in the present case, there was total absence of the required prior
determination by the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, this Court cannot
help but declare the designations of private defendants as sectoral
representatives null and void.
This verdict is not without precedence. In several similar cases, the
Supreme Court invariably nullified the designations where the
requirements of Sec. 146 (2), B.P. Blg. 337 were not complied with. Just to
cite one case, the Supreme Court ruled:
There is no certification from the Sangguniang Bayan of
Valenzuela that the sectors concerned are of sufficient
number to warrant representation and there was no
29
 consultation whatsoever with the associations and
persons belonging to the Industrial and Agricultural Labor
Sectors. Therefore, the appointment of private
respondents Romeo F. Bularan and Rafael Cortez are null
and void (Romeo Llanado, et al. v. Hon. Luis Santos, et
al., G.R. No. 86394, August 24, 1990). 4
Private respondents appealed the aforestated decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, where the same is currently pending resolution.
Meanwhile, on 17 February 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying
the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners. Said respondent
Sandiganbayan:
Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 9955 of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental, it appears, nevertheless, that the private complainants
have been rendering services on the basis of their respective
appointments as sectoral members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental; and that their said
appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity. Having rendered such
services, the private complainants are entitled to the salaries attached to
their office. Even assuming arguendo that the said Regional Trial Court
shall later decide that the said appointments of the private complainants
are null and void, still the private complainants are entitled to their salaries
and compensation for service they have actually rendered, for the reason
that before such judicial declaration of nullity, the private complainants are
considered at least de facto public officers acting as such on the basis of
apparently valid appointments issued by competent authorities. In other
words, regardless of the decision that may be rendered in Civil Case
No. 9955, the private complainants are entitled to their withheld salaries
for the services they have actually rendered as sectoral representatives of
the said Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, the decision that may be rendered
by the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 9955 would not be
determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused.
WHEREFORE, the subject Petition for the Suspension of Proceedings in
Virtue of Prejudicial Question filed by the accused through counsel, is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned resolution in view of the
decision promulgated by the trial court nullifying the appointments of private respondents
but it was, likewise, denied in an order issued by respondent Sandiganbayan on 19 August
1992 on the justification that the grounds stated in the said motion were a mere rehash of
petitioners' original motion to hold the case in abeyance. 6 The dispositive portion of its
order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the arraignment of the accused
which was scheduled today is cancelled. Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda,
Hermenegildo Faburada, Nicanor P. Agosto, Erenieta K. Mendoza,
Hacubina V. Serillo and Iluminado Estrellanes are, however, hereby
ordered to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from service hereof
why they should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to
appear in court today for arraignment.
In case of an adverse resolution on the motion to quash which is to be filed
by the counsel for the defense, set this case for arraignment, pre-trial and
trial on January 4 & 5, 1993, on all dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in
the morning.
SO ORDERED. 7
On 19 February 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan issued an order holding consideration of
all incidents pending the issuance of an extended resolution. 8
No such resolution, however, was issued and in its assailed order dated 13 May 1992,
respondent Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of petitioners on 30 June 1993. The
dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, considering the absence of the accused from the
scheduled hearing today which We deem to be excusable, reset this case
for arraignment on June 30, 1993 and for trial on the merits on June 30
and July 1 and 2, 1993, on all dates the trial to start at 8:30 o'clock in the
morning.
Give proper notice to the accused and principal counsel, Atty. Alfonso
Briones. Considering that the accused come all the way from Himalalud,
Negros Oriental, no postponement will be allowed.
SO ORDERED. 9
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to
respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors:
A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners' motions for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 16936 in spite of the pendency of a prejudicial issue before the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36769;
30
 B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
refusing to suspend the proceedings that would entail a retrial and
rehearing by it of the basic issue involved, i.e., the validity of the
appointments of private respondents and their entitlement to
compensation which is already pending resolution by the Court of Appeals
in C.A. G.R. CV No. 36769; and
C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners
to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that private respondents
are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due
process. 10
In sum, the only issue in the case at bench is whether or not the legality or validity of
private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives which is pending resolution in
CA-G.R. No. 36769 is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the
criminal case against petitioners.
A prejudicial question is one that must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or before it may proceed (see Art. 36, Civil Code) because a decision on that
point is vital to the eventual judgment in the criminal case. Thus, the resolution of the
prejudicial question is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in said criminal case. 11
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the
court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or
tribunal. 12 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from "the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an
issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case." 13
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions. 14 It has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. 15
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil
case, CA-G.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant
suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against
petitioners.
All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case.
There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the
criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised
on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents'
salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted
precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral
representatives were made in accordance with law.
More importantly, ,the resolution of the civil case will certainly determine if there will still be
any reason to proceed with the criminal action.
Petitioners were criminally charged under the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019,
sec, 3[e]) due to their refusal, allegedly in bad faith and with manifest partiality, to pay
private respondents' salaries as sectoral representatives. This refusal, however, was
anchored on petitioners' assertion that said designations were made in violation of the
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and thus, were null and void. Therefore, should
the Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision declaring null and void private
respondents' designations as sectoral representatives for failure to comply with the
provisions of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337, sec. 146[2]), the charges against
petitioners would no longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on. Petitioners cannot be
accused of bad faith and partiality there being in the first place no obligation on their part to
pay private respondents' claims. Private respondents do not have any legal right to
demand salaries, per diems and other benefits. In other words, the Court of Appeals'
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will ultimately determine whether or not
there is basis to proceed with the criminal case.
Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to
compensation for actual services rendered. 16 We disagree. As found by the trial court and
as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral
representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with
the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26
February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. 17 Hence, private
respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives
has not been established.
Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event
that private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be
considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered.
31
The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following:
1) There must be a de jure office;
2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and
3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. 18
One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There
can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de
facto officer in a de jure office. 19
WHEREFORE, the resolution dated 17 February 1992 and orders dated 19 August 1992
and 13 May 1993 of respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16936 are hereby
SET ASIDE. Respondent Sandiganbayan is enjoined from proceeding with the arraignment
and trial of petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16936 pending final resolution of CA-G.R. CV
No. 36769.
SO ORDERED.
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060
Petitioner,
- versus -
MARIA CHRYSANTINE
L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. September 13, 2010
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an
action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled
to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No.
04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before
the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case
filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3] holding that the pendency of
the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues
in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether
the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in
question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is,
for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC
Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005
and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of
Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the
offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and
did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for
annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondentwould be declared void, it would be immaterial to the
criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the
crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that
all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the
commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
32
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals
decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of
marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal
action. In this case, the Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It
was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on
the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial
and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392
on 7 February 2005.[8] Respondents petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4
November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment
was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met
since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending,
and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.[11]
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide,[12] which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. [13] The
relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case,
since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all
the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will. [16] At
the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No.
04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time
of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and
respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts
to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses
is concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a
criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that
case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences.[18] In fact, the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment
insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.[19]
33
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial
in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case
No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a
prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the
defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil
action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Case
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003, 1 whereby the Court
of Appeals (CA) granted the writ of certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No.
71252 entitled People v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas, Presiding Judge, Branch 59, Regional
Trial Court, Makati City and Rafael Consing, Jr., and set aside the assailed order issued on
November 26, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City deferring
the arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-120 entitled People v. Rafael
Consing, Jr. upon his motion on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in the
civil cases pending between him and the complainant in the trial courts in Pasig City and
Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la
Cruz) various loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans
were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Cavite registered under the name of de la Cruz. 2 In accordance with its option
to purchase the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the
property for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting
the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount
of P18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of the
property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of
Unicapital.3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title
to the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan
Teng, the parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT
No. 687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of P41,377,851.48 as of
April 19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter
ignored the demands.5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) (Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from
proceeding against him for the collection of the P41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had
acted as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of
public document against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office. 6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-
1418) for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing
and De la Cruz an information for estafa through falsification of public document in the
RTC in Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-120), which was assigned to Branch 60 (Makati
criminal case).8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case
on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and
Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion for deferment of
his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the
CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion. 9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the
Makati criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March
18, 2001, the RTC denied the Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal
case via petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
71252,11 dismissing the petition for certiorari and upholding the RTC’s questioned orders,
explaining:
34
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private
respondent may be held liable in the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or
innocence of private respondent Consing in both the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati criminal case, Makati civil
case and Cavite criminal case show that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions
in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) involved are
identical; (4) the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in question
are identical; and (6) the issue of private respondent’s culpability for the questioned
transactions is identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical to or
intimately related to the criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to
the parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed of Sale/ Mortgage involved in the
questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of private
respondent in the Makati case, in view of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not
a party thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power to take judicial notice of an official
act of another judicial authority. It was also a better legal tack to prevent multiplicity of
action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly
invoked to suspend private respondent’s arraignment in the Makati City criminal case,
notwithstanding the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an offshoot, merely, in the Cavite
criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for
damages against Consing (Civil Case No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil
case).13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public document was
filed against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite criminal case). Consing filed a
motion to defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question,
i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the
RTC handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consing’s motion. Later on, it also denied
his motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, Consing commenced in the CA a special civil
action for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his
arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on March 19,
2001, and later promulgated its decision on May 31, 2001, granting Consing’ petition for
certiorari and setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently
enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and
Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this Court (G.R. No. 148193),
praying for the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the
Court granted the petition for review in G.R. No. 148193, and reversed and set aside the
May 31, 2001 decision of the CA,14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No.
SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent
(Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case
No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is
whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount
paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an
agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for
conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in
Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the
respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot
in question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case
for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not
ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of
public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not
be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability
in the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined
by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party.
It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal
property in favor of another party without consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter,
the offended party filed a civil case for termination of management contract, one of the
causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while
the previous chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the
arraignment and trial of the criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil
case was a prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal
35
proceedings could proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case on
the ground that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and
ruled that:
… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of
action based on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant
executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6
"Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and encumbrances"
will not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042
for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even
granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact
remains that both the crime charged in the information in the criminal case and the
eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both the civil and
criminal cases could proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new
Civil Code which provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence." (j) That, therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to
in the instant petition was not made with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of
the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI
is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate
as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for the reconsideration of the
adverse decision of the CA, citing the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that
the Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present a prejudicial question that justified the
suspension of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and claiming that under the
ruling in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial
question that would cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case.
In his opposition to the State’s motion for reconsideration, Consing contended that the
ruling in G.R. No. 148193 was not binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus
Builders, which was different from Unicapital, the complainant in the Makati criminal case.
He added that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 did not yet become final and executory,
and could still be reversed at any time, and thus should not control as a precedent to be
relied upon; and that he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for his mother, and
should not be held personally liable under a contract that had involved property belonging
to his mother as his principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling
in G.R. No. 148193, and held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The transactions in controversy,
the documents involved; the issue of the respondent’s culpability for the questioned
transactions are all identical in all the proceedings; and it deals with the same parties with
the exception of private complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the
Philippines vs. Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held that
"Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and attachment on account of alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is
an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as
a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar." In view of
the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, We are thus amending Our May 20,
2003 decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders dated
November 26, 2001 and March 18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the
hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA denied the motion through the
second assailed resolution of December 11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 was not controlling
in relation to C.A.-G.R. No. 71252, which involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the
complainant in Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits that in arriving at its amended
decision, the CA did not consider the pendency of the Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 99-
1418), which raised a prejudicial question, considering that the resolution of such civil
action would include the issue of whether he had falsified a certificate of title or had willfully
defrauded Unicapital, the resolution of either of which would determine his guilt or
innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Unicapital brought
the Makati civil case as an independent civil action intended to exact civil liability
separately from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully authorized under Section 1(a)
and Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.20 It argues that the CA correctly took
cognizance of the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding in its challenged amended decision
that the Makati civil case, just like the Manila civil case, was an independent civil action
instituted by virtue of Article 33 of the Civil Code; that the Makati civil case did not raise a
prejudicial question that justified the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120; and that as
finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig civil case did not also raise any prejudicial
question, because the sole issue thereat was whether Consing, as the mere agent of his
mother, had any obligation or liability toward Unicapital.
36
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that he filed and Unicapital’s Makati
civil case were not intended to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to
pre-empt such resolution; and that such civil cases could be validly considered
determinative of whether a prejudicial question existed to warrant the suspension of
Criminal Case No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that
warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No.
148193 to the effect that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be
suspended because the Makati civil case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig
civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do considering that the
ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his
case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was
predicated on fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to
the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or
malevolent manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a property which they do
not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title."22 As such, the action was one that could
proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
Code, which states as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be
independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. 23 This was precisely
the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party.
It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
xxxx
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of
the alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI
is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate
as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar. 24
Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No.
148193 to his case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved
different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions Plus Builders
and Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e.,
they were both based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Clearly, the Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the resolution of the
Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consing’s being a mere agent of
his mother who should not be criminally liable for having so acted due to the property
involved having belonged to his mother as principal has also been settled in G.R. No.
148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No.
SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent
(Consing) merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case
No. 99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is
whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount
paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an
agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be
adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for
conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in
Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the
respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public
document.25 (Words in parentheses supplied; bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August 18,
2003; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
37