G.R. No.

L-1809 January 23, 1948

NARCISO ALVAREZ Y CORTES, petitioner,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Almacen and Almacen for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Ramon L. Avanceña for
respondent.

FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by the petitioner against the Director of Prisons on
the ground that he is being illegally detained in the New Bilibid Prisons, notwithstanding the
fact that the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the recommendation of the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence, granted the petitioner on December 23, 1946, absolute
pardon of the crime of murder which he committed and of which he was convicted and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua on June 5, 1945, by the Court of First Instance of Manila in
criminal case no. 70022.
The Director of Prisons, in his return, which according to section 13, Rule 102, is
considered prima facie evidence of the cause of the restraint, alleges that the petitioner, while
serving the sentence of reclusion perpetua for the crime of murder above mentioned, escaped
from prison on October 21, 1945, and for said evasion he was prosecuted and sentenced on
March 22, 1946, by the Court of First Instance of Manila in case no. 73820, to three (3) years,
six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional; that on April 8, 1946, the
petitioner again escaped and evaded the service of the same sentence, and for the second
evasion he was prosecuted and sentenced on August 20, 1946, to two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional in case No. 14862 by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal; and that on May 24, 1946, the petitioner was prosecuted for illegal
possession of firearm, convicted and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila, in
case No. 74312, to six (6) months of imprisonment, and to pay a fine of three hundred pesos
(P300), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Under the commitment orders issued by the respective Courts of First Instance in said cases
Nos. 73820, 14862, and 74312, the petitioner is confined in the New Bilibid Prisons to serve
a total of six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of imprisonment,
commencing with the date of his pardon of the crime of murder above mentioned.
The petitioner could have successfully set up the defense of double jeopardy in case No.
14683 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, where he was prosecuted again for the first
evasion of sentence of which he had already been convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Manila in case No. 73820; but petitioner did not set up said defense, and was convicted on
August 8, 1946, by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in case No. 14683 and sentenced two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. And petitioner could also
have successfully alleged the same defense in case No. 74311 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, where he was prosecuted for the second time for the evasion of which the
petitioner had already been convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in case No.
14862; but the petitioner did not set up said defense, and he was convicted on May 16, 1946
by the Court of First Instance of Manila in Criminal Case No. 74311 and sentenced to two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. As the petitioner has not yet
completed the service of the total penalty of six (6) years, four (4) months and twenty (20)
days of imprisonment, to which he was sentenced in cases Nos. 73820, 14862, and 74312, it
is not necessary for us to decide now whether or not he has to serve also the sentences
rendered in the above mentioned cases Nos. 14683 and 74311.
The penalties imposed upon the petitioner for evasions of service of sentence have not been
affected by the absolute pardon granted to him remitting the unserved penalty to which he
was finally sentenced for the crime of murder; because petitioner was convicted of evasions
of service of sentence before the pardon and while he was serving said sentence of conviction
for murder, which was then still in full force.
Petition is therefore denied. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ. concur.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
Petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua on June 5, 1945, by
the Court of First Instance of Manila. He did not appeal. His co-defendants, who had also
been convicted, were acquitted on appeal. Upon recommendation of the Pardon Board,
petitioner was granted and absolute pardon by the President on December 23, 1946. It
appears, however, that prior to his pardon, petitioner twice escaped from jail and that, for
each evasion of sentence, was twice convicted, one by the Court of First Instance of Manila
and another by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In other words, for his first evasion,
petitioner is to serve two separate penalties of his imprisonment, and for the second evasion
another tow separate penalties of imprisonment. In the present habeas corpus proceeding,
petitioner contends that his absolute pardon should have the effect of erasing not only the
sentence for murder but also the penalties for evasion thereof.
Petitioner's double conviction is certainly anomalous, and it is at once logical that two of the
four sentences for evasions are void ab initio and should be so declared herein. If the Court of
First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction over the offenses, its two judgments have to served
by the petitioner. The latter should, however, be relieved from the two convictions rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal which, consequently, had no jurisdiction. If the two
courts had concurrent jurisdiction, only the conviction for each evasion rendered by the court
that first assumed jurisdiction should be upheld. Where one is restrained of his liberty by
virtue of a judgment, the writ of habeas corpus lies if said judgment is absolutely void,
because the court that rendered it had no jurisdiction. (Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden,
44 Off. Gaz., 4326)
It appearing that petitioner has not as yet served at least two of the four sentences above
referred to, the denial of his petition is still in order. I suspect that the President was not
informed of the petitioner's evasions of sentence; otherwise he would undoubtedly have
either refused to grant any pardon or included therein the penalties said evasions. Evidently,
petitioner's remedy is to bring the matter to the attention of the President with a view to
obtaining further executive clemency.

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:

We concur in the decision of denial, but we have to write his opinion to make clear our
position as regards the double sentences rendered against petitioner for each of the two
evasions of sentence for which he was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila and
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal.
We do not agree with the majority's refusal to decide the question whether or not petitioner
should serve the second sentence in the two cases. They are null and should not be served as
if they have not been rendered. There is no dispute that for the first evasion of sentence he
was convicted in two separate criminal proceedings in two different Courts of First Instance
and accordingly, made to suffer two separate penalties. The same thing happened with his
second evasion of sentence. It is obvious that the two second sentences are null and void.
They are violative of the law, because the law forbids double or multiple prosecutions for the
same offense and does not authorize double or multiple punishments for the same violation.
The Constitution expressly provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense." (Article 3, section 1, Item 20.) Our duty is to enforce the
Constitution and the laws, and not to keep silent in the face of violations staring at us in an
official record under our consideration.
No action or omission on our part should open the doors to any doubt that we shall never
countenance any illegality or anything contravening the Constitution.
The way the double sentences were rendered was so unusual as to merit official investigation.
As the situation may give rise to the belief that petitioner is the victim of official persecution,
things must be clarified, so that punishment may be meted out to the guilty person if there is
any. At any rate, measures should be taken so as to avoid the gross miscarriage of justice
evidenced by the two double sentences.
How did it happen that two distinct criminal prosecutions were instituted against petitioner
for each one of two offenses? If they were committed under the jurisdiction of one court, how
was the other court able to exercise jurisdiction over the same offense? Were the prosecuting
officials in one court the same prosecuting officials in the other court? If they were not, were
the prosecuting officials in the second cases aware of the first cases? Who was responsible
for the moves to secure double convictions against petitioner? If the second prosecution and
conviction for the first offense were due to mistake committed in good faith, why was the
mistake repeated with regard to the second offense?
These are some of the questions that should answered. The situation confronting us regarding
the two double convictions should awaken and irritate all those who know how our system of
justice should function and operate and how that system should deserve faith and respect of
the people. The travesty of justice bared by the two double convictions not only requires
correction but imposes upon all officials concerned the imperative duty to take effective
measures to avoid its repetition. The present is bound to the future by the uninterrupted chain
of destiny. If the broken links of today are not repaired, they are likely to cause disaster in the
future. The reasoning power which nature has endowed upon us advises that our actions and
omissions of today necessarily have to project to the future. Our duties are not only for the
present but for the morrow. Let us not allow the errors of the present go uncorrected if we
have to live up to our responsibility before the days that are to come.
RESOLUTION ON A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

March 19, 1948

FERIA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision denying the petitioner's petition
for habeas corpus on the ground that, although the petitioner had been granted pardon by the
Chief Executive which remitted the penalty imposed upon the petitioner in a sentence
rendered by the court for the crime of murder of which he was convicted, such pardon did not
affect or carry with it the remission of the penalty imposed upon him for the offense of
evasion of service of said sentence committed prior to said pardon.
The argument in support of the motion for reconsideration is predicated upon the proposition
that the offense of evasion of service of sentence committed by the petitioner, is not
independent from but dependent upon the sentence or penalty imposed upon him for the
crime of murder for the evasion of which sentence the petitioner was also convicted. In
support of his contention, petitioner quotes our decision in People vs. Jose (42 Off. Gaz.,
697) in which we held that the offense or violation of conditional pardon is not a substantive
offense or independent from the crime for the commission of which the punishment imposed
upon him was remitted by the pardon.
This proposition or contention is untenable, for there is no parity not even analogy between
evasion of service of sentence and violation of conditional pardon.
Evasion of service of sentence or "jail breaking" is an offense defined and penalized as a
crime in this jurisdiction by article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, and is also punished as
such in practically all jurisdictions even those under the common law; because it is an attempt
at least to evade penalty inflicted by the courts upon criminals and thus defeat the purpose of
the law of either reforming or punishing them for having disturbed the public order. When
violation of a conditional pardon is a mere infringement of the terms stipulated in a contract
between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the criminal, to the effect that the
former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with them, he
will be recommitted to prison and serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence if
higher than six years, or prision correccional in its minimum period if less than six years.
In the case of U. S. vs. Ignacio (33 Phil., 202, 204), it was held that "the defendant accepted
the conditional pardon and thereby secured his release from imprisonment. Having accepted
the conditional pardon, he is bound by its terms. The record shows that he has been guilty of
misconduct after his conditional pardon. By such misconduct, he forfeited his pardon and his
right to liberty thereunder. When a pardoned person violates the conditions of his pardon, he
is left in the exact situation in which he was when the pardon was granted, and the original
sentence may be enforced against him. (Ex parte Wells, 18 Howard [U. S.], 307; Ex
parte Hawkins, 61 Ark., 321; 30 L. R. A., 736; 54 Am. St. Rep., 209; Kennedy's Case, 135
Mass., 48; Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal., 29.)"
Violation of conditional pardon is not a public offense in the strict sense of the word, for it
does not cause harm or injury to the right of other person nor does it disturb the public order;
and if it does not cause any harm it is to the violator himself who, for not complying with the
conditions of the pardon, has to served again the unexpired portion of the penalty imposed
upon him for the commission of the offense which was conditionally remitted or pardoned.
While the evasion of service of sentence is a public offense or a wrongful act separate and
independent from any other, and it is not righted or effaced by the pardon or remission of the
penalty imposed in the sentence against the accused for the crime, the service of which the
culprit tried to evade before the pardon.
The penalty for the crime of the murder is different and independent from that for evasion of
service of sentence, and therefore the evader of service of sentence must continue serving the
punitive sentence rendered against him for the offense of evasion, irrespective of the pardon
or remission or penalty for murder. While the punishment for violation of conditional pardon
is the unexpired portion of the penalty for the original offense of which the conditional
pardon has been granted. So where the punitive sentence for the offense for which a prisoner
has been pardoned is no longer good or valid and cannot be enforced, as in the case of People
vs. Jose, supra, the defendant should be released for he cannot be criminally prosecuted and
convicted for violation of the conditional pardon, because no punishment can be imposed
upon him therefor since there is no unexpired portion of the penalty to be served in more or
less modified term.
Motion for reconsideration is therefore denied. .
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

We vote to grant the motion for reconsideration in order that the two illegal judgments for
evasion of service of sentence be declared null and void.
The reasons for this stand were already expressed in our opinion when the decision of this
case was promulgated.
G.R. No. 76872 July 23, 1987
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND
PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres,
presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. We issued the writ and during
the hearing and from the return filed by the respondents through the Solicitor General, and
other pleadings in this case, the following facts emerged:
1. Sometime before 1979 (no more specific date appears in the records before this Court),
petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa (two
counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven (11) years, ten (10)
months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9) months and one (1) day,
and to pay an indemnity of P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases Nos. 68810, 91041 and F-138107).
These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 14773-CR and
17694-CR). The maximum sentence would expire on 2 November 2000.1
2. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the petitioner by the President of
the Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of
the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner
prescribed by law."2 Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
3. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board") resolved to recommend to
the President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making
its recommendation to the President, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in
Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of
Bohol (108 Phil. 356 [1960]). The evidence before the Board showed that on 22 March 1982
and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with twenty counts of estafa in Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756, which cases were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial before
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City). The record before the Board also showed
that on 26 June 1985, petitioner had been convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal
(Quezon City) of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this conviction was
then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The Board also had before it a
letter report dated 14 January 1986 from the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"),
addressed to the Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the NBI showed that a
long list of charges had been brought against the petitioner during the last twenty years for a
wide assortment of crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats, grave
coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, malicious mischief,
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772
(interfering with police functions). Some of these charges were Identified in the NBI report as
having been dismissed. The NBI report did not purport to be a status report on each of the
charges there listed and Identified.
4. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the President of the
Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending cancellation of the
conditional pardon previously granted to petitioner.
5. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner.
6. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the
President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his
sentence.
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment. He claims
that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final
judgment of the twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-
20756 nor of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926.3 Petitioner also contends
that he was not given an opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to
prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights under the due process
clause of the Constitution.
The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or not conviction of a crime by final
judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and
recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
This issue is not novel. It has been raised before this Court three times in the past. This Court
was first faced with this issue in Tesoro Director of Prison.4 Tesoro, who had been convicted
of the crime of falsification of public documents, was granted a parole by the then Governor-
General. One of the conditions of the parole required the parolee "not [to] commit any other
crime and [to] conduct himself in an orderly manner."5 Two years after the grant of parole,
Tesoro was charged before the Justice of the Peace Court of San Juan, Rizal, with the crime
of adultery said to have been committed with the wife of Tesoro's brother-in-law. The fiscal
filed with the Court of First Instance the corresponding information which, however, was
dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant. The complainant then went before the
Board of Indeterminate Sentence and charged Tesoro with violation of the conditions of his
parole. After investigation by the parole officer, and on the basis of his report, the Board
recommended to the President of the Philippines the arrest and recommitment of the
petitioner. Tesoro contended, among other things, that a "judicial pronouncement to the effect
that he has committed a crime" is necessary before he could properly be adjudged as having
violated his conditional parole.
Addressing this point, this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Moran, held that the
determination of whether the conditions of Tesoro's parole had been breached rested
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Governor-General and that such determination
would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to place his liberty on parole
upon the judgment of the power that had granted it, we held that "he [could not] invoke the
aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was
ordered."6 Thus, this Court held that by accepting the terms under which the parole had been
granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed that the Governor-General's determination (rather than
that of the regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his parole by
committing adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon
him. In reaching this conclusion, this Court relied upon Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code which empowered the Governor-General
to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or
unconditional; to suspend sentences without parole, remit fines, and order the discharge of
any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and
to authorize the arrest and recommitment of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail
to comply with the condition or conditions, of his pardon, parole or suspension of sentence.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons,7 the petitioner had been convicted of the crime of frustrated
murder. After serving a little more than two years of his sentence, he was given a conditional
pardon by the President of the Philippines, "the condition being that he shall not again violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippines and that, should this condition be violated, he shall be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law."8 Eight years after the grant of his
conditional pardon, Sales was convicted of estafa and sentenced to three months and eleven
days of arresto mayor. He was thereupon recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired
portion of his original sentence. Sales raised before this Court two principal contentions.
Firstly, he argued that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code had been repealed
by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. He contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in
any case repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution (Article III [1], 1935
Constitution). This Court, through Mr. Justice Ozaeta speaking for the majority, rejected both
contentions of Sales.
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code did not repeal Section 64 (i)
Revised Administrative Code. It was pointed out that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, which was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal Code, expressly preserved
the authority conferred upon the President by Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159
and Section 64 (i) could stand together and that the proceeding under one provision did not
necessarily preclude action under the other. Sales held, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was not
repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of due process. This Court in effect held that since
the petitioner was a convict "who had already been seized in a constitutional was been
confronted by his accusers and the witnesses against him-, been convicted of crime and been
sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally entitled to another judicial
determination of whether he had breached the condition of his parole by committing a
subsequent offense. Thus:
[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)] supervenes to avoid the necessity for any action by the courts
in the premises. The executive clemency under it is extended upon the conditions named in it,
and he accepts it upon those conditions. One of these is that the governor may withdraw his
grace in a certain contingency, and another is that the governor shall himself determine when
that contingency has arisen. It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the
premises, had expressly contracted and agreed, that, whenever the governor should conclude
that he had violated the conditions of his parole, an executive order for his arrest and
remandment to prison should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him. 9
In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol,10 the petitioner had been convicted of the crime
of inciting to sedition. While serving his sentence, he was granted by the President a
conditional pardon "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines."11 Espuelas accepted the conditional pardon and was released from confinement.
Sometime thereafter, he was convicted by the Justice of the Peace Court in Tagbilaran,
Bohol, of the crime of usurpation of authority. He appealed to the Court of First Instance.
Upon motion of the provincial fiscal, the Court of First Instance dismissed the case
provisionally, an important prosecution witness not having been available on the day set for
trial. A few months later, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the
President ordered his recommitment to prison to serve the unexpired period of his original
sentence.
The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the continuing force and effect of Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. This Court, quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day in court and been
afforded the opportunity to defend himself during his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition,
with which he was charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence and
confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally pardoned it was a generous
exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by
the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to determine
whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other
department of the Government [has] such power been intrusted. 12
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may be summed up in the
following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional
pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict
may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and
conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well understood rules and doctrine on
this matter.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not the prosecution of the
parolee for a subsequent offense in the regular course of administration of the criminal
law. What is involved is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his
undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines" for
purposes of reimposition upon him of the remitted portion of his original sentence. The
consequences that we here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of the
conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon, like the petitioner herein, who
is recommitted must of course be convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent
crime or crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent
offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code
defines a distinct, substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having
violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment
before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.1avvphi1
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who
is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two
options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code;
or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the
penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such
pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., is on leave.
Narvasa, J., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
The petitioner challenges his recommitment, claiming he has not violated the condition of his
pardon "that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." The
government bases its stand on the case of Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol, 108 Phil.
353, where it was held, in connection with a similar condition, that mere commission of a
crime, as determined by the President, was sufficient to justify recommitment. Conviction
was considered not necessary.
I would grant the petition.
There is no question that the petitioner is facing a long list of criminal charges, but that
certainly is not the issue. The point is that, as many as such charges may be, none of them so
far has resulted in a final conviction, without which he cannot be recommitted under the
condition of his pardon.
Mere accusation is not synonymous with guilt. (People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59). A prima
facie case only justifies the filing of the corresponding information, but proof beyond
reasonable doubt is still necessary for conviction. Manifestly, an allegation merely accuses
the defendant of a crime: it is the conviction that makes him a criminal. In other words, a
person is considered to have committed a crime only if he is convicted thereof, and this is
done not by his accuser but by the judge.
That this conviction must be pronounced by the judge and no other is too obvious a
proposition to be disputed. The executive can only allege the commission of crime and
thereafter try to prove it through indubitable evidence. If the prosecution succeeds, the court
will then affirm the allegation of commission in a judgment of conviction.
The current doctrine holds that, by virtue of Section 64(i) of the Revised Administrative
Code, the President may in his judgment determine whether the condition of the pardon has
been violated. I agree that the authority is validly conferred as long as the condition does not
involve the commission of a crime but, say, merely requires good behavior from the
pardonee. But insofar as it allows the President to determine in his judgment whether or not a
crime has been committed, I regard the authority as an encroachment on judicial functions.
Dissenting from the majority opinion in the case of Tesoro v. Director of Prisons, 68 Phil.
154, Justice Pedro Concepcion declared:
I am of the opinion that the "commission" of a crime may only be determined upon the
"conviction" of the accused. It is not sufficient that a person be charged with having
committed a crime in order to consider that he is convicted thereof. His innocence is a legal
presumption which is overcome only by his conviction after he is duly and legally
prosecuted. And the courts of justice are the only branch of the government which has
exclusive jurisdiction under the law to make a pronouncement on the conviction of an
accused.
Black defines "commission" as "doing or preparation; the performance of an act." (Groves v.
State, 116 Ga. 516). "Conviction," on the other hand, is "the result of a criminal trial which
ends in a judgment or sentence that the prisoner is guilty as charged." Continuing, he says,
"in ordinary parlance, the meaning of the word conviction is the finding by the jury of
a verdict that the accused is guilty. But, in legal parlance, it often denotes the final
judgment of the court." (Blaufus v. People, 69 N.Y., 109, 28 A-Rep. 148; Marino v. Hibbard,
243 Mass. 90). To convict is "to condemn after a judicial investigation " (p. 403). A convict
is "one who has been finally condemned by a court, one who has been adjudged guilty of a
crime or misdemeanor." (Molineur v. Collins, 177 N.Y., 395). Emphasis is mine.
In the instant case, the government does not deny that the petitioner has not been finally
convicted of any of the offenses imputed to him. There are several convictions by the lower
court, to be sure, but all of them are on appeal. From the judicial viewpoint, therefore, the
petitioner has, since accepting his conditional pardon not violated any of the penal laws of the
Philippines as to be subject to recommitment.
In the landmark case of United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 100, it was remarked that "a
conditional pardon is in force and substance a contract between the executive power of the
State and the person for whom it is granted." Once accepted, therefore, the stipulated
condition binds not only the pardonee, who must observe the same, but the State as well,
which can recommit the pardonee only if the condition is violated. Stated otherwise, the
condition is a limitation not only of the pardonee's conduct but also of the President's power
of recommitment, which can be exercised only if the condition is not observed.
Even if considered "an act of grace," declared this Court in Infante v. Provincial Warden of
Negros Occidental, 32 Phil. 311, "there is general agreement that limitations upon its
operation should be strictly construed (46 C.J. 1202) so that, where a conditional pardon is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, it is to be construed most favorably to the grantee
(39 Am. Jur. 564). "
I am for the reversal of Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol and the immediate release of
the petitioner on the ground that he has not violated the condition of his pardon.
Paras, J., dissents.
G.R. No. L-46437 May 23, 1939
EUFEMIO P. TESORO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent-appellee.
Antonio Barredo y Padagas for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Kapunan, Jr. for appellee.

MORAN, J.:
On October 10, 1934, petitioner, Eufemio P. Tesoro, was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Manila of the crime of falsification of a public document and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of from two (2) to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21)
days, to pay a fine of one hundred pesos (100), or undergo subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. This penalty was to expire on October 28, 1937. On November 14, 1935, the then
Governor-General Frank Murphy granted the petitioner a parole, which the latter accepted,
subject to the following conditions:
1. That he will live in the City of Manila and will not change his residence without first
obtaining the consent of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence;
2. That he will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner;
3. That he will report, during the period of his parole, to the Executive Secretary of the Board
of Indeterminate Sentence, during the first year, once a month, and thereafter, once every
three months.
Should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence imposed shall again be in full
force and effect.
On December 3, 1937, petitioner was charged in the justice of the peace court of San Juan,
Rizal, with the crime of adultery alleged to have been committed with one Concordia Dairo,
wife of petitioner's brother-in-law, Jose Nagar. To the complaint were attached the affidavits
of the complainant Jose Nagar, of Luz Nagar and of Epimaco Nagar. The case was thereafter
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the provincial fiscal filed the
corresponding information which, however, was dismissed for non-appearance of the
complainant.
Sometime in the month of February, 1938, the same Jose Nagar lodged a complaint with
Board of Indeterminate Sentence, and upon the same facts supporting the criminal action
aforementioned, charged the petitioner with violation of the conditions of his parole. On
February 3, 1938, petitioner was summoned to appear before the board for a hearing on the
aforecited complaint, but petitioner asked for postponement until the day following. On
February 4, 1938, petitioner addressed a letter to the board denying the charge of illicit
relations with the complainant's wife the included therewith the supposed retraction of
Epimaco Nagar of what the latter had stated in his former affidavit. On the same date Simeon
Figalang, a parole officer assigned to investigate the case, submitted his report to the board,
and, on the strength thereof and papers supporting it, the acting chairman of the board
addressed a communication to the President of the Philippines, recommending the arrest and
reincarceration of the petitioner. And on February 19, 1938, the President issued the
following order:
To any lawful officer:
Whereas, Eufemio P. Tesoro, convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime
of falsification of an official document, and sentenced to an indeterminate term of from 2
years to 3 years, 6 months and 21 days' imprisonment, plus P100 fine, was granted pardon on
parole by His Excellency, the Governor-General, on November 14, 1935, under certain
conditions, one of which provides that he will not commit any other crime and will conduct
himself in an orderly manner, and
Whereas, said Eufemio P. Tesoro has violated this condition in that, in the latter part of
September, 1937, and continuously thereafter, he betrayed the confidence of his brother-in-
law, Jose Nagar, by maintaining adulterous relations with the latter's wife, under the
following circumstances: Upon the death on September 18, 1937, of parolee Tesoro's wife
(sister of Jose Nagar) and in order to mitigate the grief of the bereaved family and to help in
the keeping of the house and caring of the children of said parolee, Jose Nagar and his wife
came to live with the parolee in San Juan, Rizal; but taking advantage of the frequent
absences of Jose Nagar from the house, parolee Tesoro made advances to Jose Nagar's wife,
Concordia Dairo, succeeded in having illicit relations with her and even went to the extent of
taking away the woman from her legitimate husband, after the couple had moved from his
home, and he is now living with her in adultery.
Therefore, by virtue of the authority conferred upon me by section 64 (i) of the
Administrative Code, you are hereby ordered to arrest parolee Eufemio P. Tesoro and to
commit him to the custody of the Director of Prisons, Manila, who is hereby authorized to
confine said person for the service of the unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for
which he was originally committed to prison.
By virtue of this order, the petitioner was arrested and recommitted to the custody of the
Director of Prisons. Thereupon, petitioner sued for a writ of habeas corpus against the
Director of Prisons, and upon denial thereof by the trial court, took the present appeal.
Section 63 (i) of the Administrative Code, by virtue of which the petitioner was granted
parole, gives the Governor-General the following powers and duties:
To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional or
unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of
any convicted person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to
authorize the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to
comply with the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence.
Paragraph 6, section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution of the Philippines, provides as
follows:
The President shall have the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon
such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose.
He shall have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of the National Assembly.
Appellant contends that section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, above quoted, in so far as
it confers upon the Chief Executive the power to grant and revoke paroles, has been impliedly
repealed by the aforecited constitutional provision, as the latter omitted to specify such power
in connection with the powers granted therein to the President of the Philippines. This
contention is untenable. The power to pardon given the President by the Constitution, "upon
such conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may deem proper to impose,"
includes the power to grant and revoke paroles. (20 R.C.L., 577; 46 C.J. 1205.) If the
omission of the power of parole in the Constitution is to be construed as a denial thereof to
the President, the effect would be to discharge unconditionally parolees, who, before the
adoption of the Constitution, have been released conditionally by the Chief Executive. That
such effect was never intended by the Constitutional Convention is obviously beyond
question.
Appellant also contends that the Board of Indeterminate Sentence has no legal authority to
investigate the conduct of the petitioner, and recommend the revocation of his parole. By the
terms of his parole, petitioner agreed to report the executive secretary of the board once a
month during the first year of his parole, and, thereafter, once every three months. By his
consent to this condition, petitioner has placed himself under the supervision of the board.
The duty to report on the part of the petitioner implies a corresponding power on the part of
the board to inquire into his conduct, and a fortiori to make recommendations to the President
by whose authority it was acting. Besides, the power to revoke paroles necessarily carries
with it the power to investigate and to inquire into the conduct of the parolees, if such power
of revocation is to be rational and intelligent. In the exercise of this incidental power of
inquiry and investigation, the President of the Philippines is not precluded by law or by the
Constitution from making use of any agency of the government, or even of any individual, to
secure the necessary assistance. When, therefore, the President chose to intrust his power of
inquiry upon the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, a government agency created precisely for
the concern of persons released on parole, he acted both upon legal authority and good
judgment.
Appellant further contends that judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has committed a
crime is necessary before he can be properly adjudged as having violated his conditional
parole. Under condition No. 2 of his parole, petitioner agreed that he "will not commit any
other crime and will conduct himself in an orderly manner." (Emphasis ours.) It was,
therefore, the mere commission, not his conviction by court, of any other crime, that was
necessary in order that the petitioner may be deemed to have violated his parole. And under
section 64 (i) of the Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the
arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with
the condition, or conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." (Emphasis
ours.)
Appellant impugns the findings of the President regarding the violation of the conditional
parole. He claims that, according to the weight of the evidence, the violation took place, not
"in the latter part of September, 1937," as found by the President, but after October 28, 1937,
the date when the parole was supposed to expire. But that as it may, where, as in the instant
case, the determination of the violation of the conditional parole rests exclusively in the
sound judgment of the Chief Executive, the courts will not interfere, by way of review, with
any of his findings. The petitioner herein having consented to place his liberty on parole upon
the judgment of the power that has granted it, he cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however
erroneous the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
Besides, even conceding that the petitioner's violation of the parole took place after October
28, 1937, when his maximum penalty was to have expired, we still find no error in the order
of the arrest and recommitment. It is the petitioner's contention that, upon the expiration of
his maximum term of imprisonment, his conditional parole also expires, and, therefore, his
liberty becomes absolute subject to no conditions contained in his parole. In other words, he
holds the view that the period during which he was out on parole should be counted as
service of his original sentence. We do not subscribe to this contention.
In People vs. Tapel (35 Off. Gaz., 1603), we said:
When a conditional pardon is violated, the prisoner is placed in the same state in which he
was at the time the pardon was granted. He may be rearrested and recommitted to prisons
(See U.S. vs. Ignacio [1916}, 33 Phil., 202, 204; U.S. vs. Villalon [1917], 37 Phil., 322.) And
the rule is well-settled that, in requiring the convict to undergo so much of the punishment
imposed by his original sentence as he had not suffered at the time of his release, the court
should not consider the time during which the convict was at large by virtue of the pardon as
time served on the original sentence. (20 R.C.L., p. 570; State vs. Horne [1906], 52 Fla., 125;
42 So., 388; 7 L.R.A. [N.S.}, 719, 725. Vide, also, Ex parte Bell [1879], Miss., 282.)
This rule applies, by analogy, to conditional parole. (46 C.J., 1209.)
The foregoing discussion brings us to the last contention of the appellant as to the duration of
the penalty he has yet to serve after his recommitment. Act No. 1561 provided that a convict
released on parole and who, thereafter, violates its conditions, shall serve the full sentence of
the court as though no parole has ever been granted him, the time between the parole and the
subsequent arrest not being considered as part of the term of his sentence in computing the
period of his subsequent confinement. But this Act has been repealed by the Administrative
Code, and section 64 (i) thereof omitted such provision. Act No. 4103, section 8, provides
that any prisoner released on parole who violates any condition thereof, shall, upon re-arrest
and confinement, serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which
he was originally committed to prison. This Act is not, however, applicable to the present
case, as the petitioner was paroled not under the provision thereof, but by virtue of section 64
(i) of the Administrative Code. There is, thus, no statutory provision squarely governing the
case with respect to the duration of the petitioner's confinement after his recommitment. In
the absence of such statutory provision, the terms of the parole shall govern. From the
express terms of the parole that "should any of the conditions stated be violated, the sentence
imposed shall again be in full force and effect," it is evident that the petitioner herein should
serve the unexpired portion of the penalty originally imposed upon him by the court.
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., concurring in the result.
I concur in the result, but withhold my assent to the statement, unnecessarily made in my
opinion that Act No. 4103 — as amended by Act No. 4225 — is inapplicable to the present
case.
CONCEPCION, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result, but I dissent with respect to the interpretation given by the majority to
the second condition of the appellant's parole. Said the decision: "Under condition No. 2 of
his parole, petitioner agreed that he 'will not commit any other crime and will conduct himself
in an orderly manner.' (Emphasis ours.) It was, therefore, the mere commission, not his
conviction by court, of any other crime, that was necessary in order that the petitioner may be
deemed to have violated his parole."
I am of the opinion that the "commission" of a crime may only be determined upon the
"conviction" of the accused. It is not sufficient that a person be charged with having
committed a crime in order to consider that he is convicted thereof. His innocence is a legal
presumption which is overcome only by his conviction after he is duly and legally
prosecuted. And the courts of justice are the only branch of the government which has
exclusive jurisdiction under the law to make a pronouncement on the conviction of an
accused.
In the present case, however, a judicial pronouncement can not be required regarding the
commission of the crime imputed to the appellant because the information for adultery
lodged against him was dismissed for failure of the complaining witness to appear.
In these circumstances and as an exception to the general rule, the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence was justified in conducting the investigation of the crime complained of and in
recommending to the President of the Philippines the arrest and recommitment of the
appellant for violation of his conditional pardon, for it is not just that by the omission or
negligence of a witness who fails to appear in court, the violation of the pardon granted
conditionally to the appellant should be left unpunished.
G.R. No. L-28232 February 6, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., defendants. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO
PINEDA, JR., alias "BOY," EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO and ROGELIO
CAÑAL Y SEVILLA, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for
plaintiff-appellee.
Baizas, Alberto and Associates, Andreciano F. Caballero and Lota, Paraiso, Garcia and
Dueñas for defendant-appellant Jaime G. Jose.
Mabanag, Eliger and Associates for defendant-appellant Basilio Pineda, Jr.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for defendant-appellant Edgardo P. Aquino.
Antonio Coronel Law Office and Roberto J. Ignacio for defendant-appellant Rogelio S.
Canial.

PER CURIAM:
The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below, reads as follows:
The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR.
Alias "BOY," EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias "EDDIE" and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y
SEVILLA alias "ROGER," as principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y
ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of Forcible
Abduction with rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with lewd design, forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant against her will,
and did, then and there take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to the Swanky
Hotel in Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by means of force and intimidation,
and with the use of a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant
against her will, to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under
the provisions of the civil code.
That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE GUION y
ENVOLTARIO without taking a direct part in the execution of the offense either by forcing,
inducing the principal accused to execute, or cooperating in its execution by an indispensable
act, did, then and there cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts, that is, by cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the principal accused in
sequestering the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then
under the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and Jessie
Guion y Envoltario, thus supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the
offense.
That the aforestated offense has been attended by the following aggravating circumstances:
1. Use of a motor vehicle.
2. Night time sought purposely to facilitate the commission of the crime and to make its
discovery difficult;
3. Abuse of superior strength;
4. That means were employed or circumstances brought about which added ignominy to the
natural effects of the act; and
5. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing
other wrong not necessary for the commission.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr. pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-
quoted amended complaint; however, in an order dated July 11, 1967, the court reserved
judgment "until such time as the prosecution shall have concluded presenting all of its
evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances listed in the complaint." Upon the other
hand, the rest of the defendants went to trial on their respective pleas of not guilty. After the
merits, the court below rendered its decision on October 2, 1967, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Cañal, Eduardo Aquino and
Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with
rape as described under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby
sentences each of them to the death penalty to be executed at a date to be set and in the
manner provided for by law; and each to indemnify the complainant in the amount of ten
thousand pesos. On the ground that the prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case
against the accomplices Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion y
Envoltario, the Motion to Dismiss filed for and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case
dismissed against the aforementioned accused.
Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which Jaime Jose identified by pointing
to it from the window of the courtroom and pictures of which were submitted and marked as
Exhibits "M" and "M-1," and which Jaime Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to him,
pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires the confiscation and forfeiture
of the proceeds or instruments of the crime, the Court hereby orders its confiscation.
This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo
Aquino, and Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards Rogelio Cañal. However, for
practical purposes all of them shall hereafter be referred to as appellants.
The complainant, Magdalena "Maggie" de la Riva, was, at the time of the incident, 25 years
old and single; she graduated from high school in 1958 at Maryknoll College and finished the
secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa's College. Movie actress by profession, she was
receiving P8,000.00 per picture. It was part of her work to perform in radio broadcasts and
television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per month in permanent shows, P300.00 per
month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00 to P200.00 per appearance as guest in
other shows.
So it was that at about 4:30 o'clock in the morning of June 26, 1967, Miss De la Riva,
homeward bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay City, was driving her bantam
car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who was also at the front seat. Her house was
at No. 48, 12th Street, New Manila, Quezon City. She was already near her destination when
a Pontiac two-door convertible car with four men aboard (later identified as the four
appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it. She stepped on her brakes to avoid a
collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at which moment she
was already in front of her house gate; but because the driver of the other car (Basilio Pineda,
Jr.) also accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time. This
prompted Miss De la Riva, who was justifiably annoyed, to ask: "Ano ba?" Forthwith, Pineda
stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her.
The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she tooted the horn of her car
continuously. Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva's car and grabbed the
lady's left arm. The girl held on tenaciously to her car's steering wheel and, together with her
maid, started to scream. Her strength, however, proved no match to that of Pineda, who
succeeded in pulling her out of her car. Seeing her mistress' predicament, the maid jumped
out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva's right arm in an effort to free her from
Pineda's grip. The latter, however, was able to drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac
convertible car, whose motor was all the while running.
When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very near the Pontiac car, the
three men inside started to assist their friend: one of them held her by the neck, while the two
others held her arms and legs. All three were now pulling Miss De la Riva inside the car.
Before she was completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver's seat and sped away
in the direction of Broadway Street. The maid was left behind.
The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat;
Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated beside him. Miss De la
Riva entreated the appellants to release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive
and impolite language that the appellants and threats that the appellants would finish her with
their Thompson and throw acid at her face if she did not keep quiet. In the meantime, the two
men seated on each side of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her body: Jose put one
arm around the complainant and forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his arms on
her thighs and lifted her skirt. The girl tried to resist them. She continuously implored her
captors to release her, telling them that she was the only breadwinner in the family and that
her mother was alone at home and needed her company because her father was already dead.
Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la Riva's father, Aquino remarked that the situation
was much better than he thought since no one could take revenge against them. By now Miss
De la Riva was beginning to realize the futility of her pleas. She made the sign of the cross
and started to pray. The appellants became angry and cursed her. Every now and then Aquino
would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would exchange
knowing glances with Cañal and Jose.
The car reached a dead-end street. Pineda turned the car around and headed towards Victoria
Street. Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Street, Shaw Boulevard, thence
to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. When the car reached Makati, Aquino took a handkerchief
from his pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded Miss De la Riva. The latter was told
not to shout or else she would be stabbed or shot with a Thompson. Not long after, the car
came to a stop at the Swanky Hotel in Pasay City The blindfolded lady was led out of the car
to one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel.
Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed. Her blindfold was removed. She
saw Pineda and Aquino standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal sitting beside her, all of
them smiling meaningfully. Pineda told the complainant: "Magburlesque ka para sa amin."
The other three expressed their approval and ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe. The
complainant ignored the command. One of the appellants suggested putting off the light so
that the complainant would not be ashamed. The idea, however, was rejected by the others,
who said that it would be more pleasurable for them if the light was on. Miss De la Riva was
told to remove her stocking in order, according to them, to make the proceedings more
exciting. Reluctantly, she did as directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned
task that the appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the acid.
They started pushing Miss De la Riva around. One of them pulled down the zipper of her
dress; another unhooked her brassiere. She held on tightly to her dress to prevent it from
being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain: her dress, together with her brassiere, fell on
the floor.
The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who were kneeling in front
of her and feasting their eyes on her private parts. This ordeal lasted for about ten minutes,
during which the complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or thrice to turn around.
Then Pineda picked up her clothes and left the room with his other companions. The
complainant tried to look for a blanket with which to cover herself, but she could not find
one.
Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing himself. Miss De la Riva, who was
sitting on the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to ask his friends
to release her. Instead of answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the
bed. Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each other; and because the complainant was
putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed her and hit her several times on the stomach and other
parts of the body. The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but her attacker was able to force
them open. Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant. He then left the
room.
The other three took their turns. Aquino entered the room next. A struggle ensued between
him and Miss De la Riva during which he hit, her on different parts of the body. Like Jose,
Aquino succeeded in abusing the complainant. The girl was now in a state of shock. Aquino
called the others into the room. They poured water on her face and slapped her to revive her.
Afterwards, three of the accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the complainant After
some struggle during which Pineda hit her, the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire
on the latter. When the complainant went into a state of shock for the second time, the three
other men went into the room again poured water on the complainant's face and slapped her
several times. The complainant heard them say that they had to revive her so she would know
what was happening. Jose, Aquino and Pineda then left the room. It was now appellant
Canal's turn. There was a struggle between him and Miss De la Riva. Like the other three
appellants before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and succeeded in
forcing his carnal lust on her.
Mention must be made of the fact that while each of mention must be made the four
appellants was struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside the room, just
behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and telling her to give in because she
could not, after all, escape what with their presence.
After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage, they gave Miss De la Riva her
clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her stockings, and to wash her face and comb her
hair, to give the impression that nothing had happened to her. They told her to tell her mother
that she was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess, and that when the group found out that
she was a movie actress, she was released without being harmed. She was warned not to
inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they would simply post bail and
later hunt her up and disfigure her face with acid. The appellants then blindfolded Miss De la
Riva again and led her down from the hotel room. Because she was stumbling, she had to be
carried into the car. Inside the car, a appellant Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it
in that position during the trip, to prevent her from being seen by others.
Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of where to drop Miss De la
Riva. They finally decided on a spot in front of the Free Press Building not far from Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue near Channel 5 to make it appear, according to them, that the
complainant had just come from the studio. Pineda asked Jose to alight and call a taxicab, but
to choose one which did not come from a well-known company. Jose did as requested, letting
several taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab. After they warned again Miss De la
Riva not to inform anyone of what had happened to her, appellant Canal accompanied her to
the taxicab. The time was a little past 6:00 o'clock. When Miss De la Riva was already inside
the cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried. She kept
asking the driver if a car was following them; and each time the driver answered her in the
negative.
It was 6:30 o'clock — or some two hours after the abduction — when Miss De la Riva
reached home. Her mother, her brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers,
policemen and reporters, were at the house. Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran
toward her and said, "Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped. All four of them raped me." The
mother brought her daughter upstairs. Upon her mother's instruction, the complainant
immediately took a bath and a douche. The older woman also instructed her daughter to
douche himself two or three times daily with a strong solution to prevent infection and
pregnancy. The family doctor, who was afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for
external physical injuries. The doctor was not, however, told about the sexual assaults.
Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt.
Dimla, to the De la Riva residence when the latter received from a mobile patrol a report of
the snatching. When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her harrowing experience, Pat.
Pascual attempted to question her, but Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation
until she could be ready for it. At that time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what
to do.
On the afternoon of June 28, 1967, the complainant family gathered to discuss what steps, if
any, should be taken. After some agonizing moments, a decision was reached: the authorities
had to be informed. Thus, early on the morning of June 29, 1967, or on the fourth day after
the incident, Miss De la Riva, accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by
some members of the family, went to the Quezon City Police Department Headquarters, filed
a complaint and executed a statement (Exh. "B") wherein she narrated the incident and gave
descriptions of the four men who abused her. In the afternoon of the same day, the
complainant submitted herself ito a medico-internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI
Chief Medico-Legal Officer.
During the physical examination of the complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat.
Pascual was also at the NBI office. There he received a telephone call from the police
headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects had been apprehended. That evening, the
complainant and Pat. Pascual proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified
appellant Jaime Jose from among a group of persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police
of Quezon City as one of the four men he abducted and raped her. She executed another
statement (Exh. "B-1") wherein she made a formal identification of Jose and related the role
played by him.
At about 9:00 o'clock of the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh. "I")
before Pat. Marcos G. Viñas. In his statement, which was duly sworn. Jose admitted that he
knew about, and was involved in, the June 26 incident. He named the other line appellants as
his companions. Jose stated, among other things, that upon the initiative of Pineda, he and the
other three waited for Miss De la Riva to come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave
chase to the complainant's car; that it was Pineda who blindfolded her and that only Pineda
and Aquino criminally assaulted the complainant.
After Exh, "I" was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Vinas with a picture of
appellant Edgardo Aquino. The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who declared in her
sworn statement (Exh. "B-3") that the man in the picture was one of her abductors and
rapists. The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in another sworn statement (Exh. "I-l"),
identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.
After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into the hands of the authorities:
Pineda and Cañal on July 1, 1967, in Lipa City, and Aquino on July 5, 1967, in the province
of Batangas. On the evening of July 1, 1967. Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda and Cañal as
among the four persons who abducted and raped her. She picked them out from among
several person in the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City. Later in the same evening,
Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. B-2)wherein she made the same
identification of the two appellants from among a group of persons in the Office of the Chief
of the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Cañal had tattoo marks on his right hip. After
the identification, one of the policemen took appellant Cañal downstairs and undressed him,
and he saw, imprinted on the said appellant's right hip, the words "Bahala na Gang."
Appellant Cañal and Pineda executed and swore to separate statements on the day of their
arrest. In his statement (Exh. "G"), appellant Cañal confirmed the information previously
given by Jose that the four of them waited for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS
Studio, and that they had planned to abduct and rape her. Appellant Cañal admitted that all
four of them participated in the commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that
insofar as he was concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he
would release her. Pineda executed a statement (Exh. "J") stating that he and his other three
companions wept to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la Riva was there,
they made plans to wait for her and to follow her. He admitted that his group followed her car
and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel. He would make it appear, however, that
the complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him.
In his medical report (Exh. "K"), Dr. Brion noted the presence of multiple contusions and
bruises on different parts of the complainant's body, as well as of genital injuries. On the
witness stand the doctor was shown several photographs of the complainant taken in his
presence and under his supervision. With the aid of the photographs and the medical reports,
the doctor explained to the court that he found contusions or bruises on the complainant's
chest, shoulders, arms and fore-arms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee and legs. He
also declared that when he was examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight
tenderness around the neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sites of the extragenital physical
injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or tenderness on the
part of the subject. The injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could have been caused blows
administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the hand, and could have been inflicted on the
subject while she was being raped. It was the doctor's opinion that they could have been
sustained on or about June 26, 1967. In connection with the genital examination, the doctor
declared that he found injuries on the subject's genitalia which could have been produced by
sexual intercourse committed on June 26, 1967. He said that he failed to find spermatozoa.
He explained, however, that spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse
of three days from the last intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject might
have douched herself.
The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Cañal) took the witness stand.
We quote hereunder the portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the
defense:
Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone to the Ulog Cocktail Lounge
somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in the evening of June
25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early morning of the next day. At the
cocktail lounge they had listened to the music while enjoying some drinks. Between them
they had consumed a whole bottle of whisky, so much so that at least Aquino became drunk,
according to his own testimony. They had been joined at their table by a certain Frankie
whom they met only that night. Come time to go home, their new acquaintance asked to be
dropped at his home in Cubao. The five men piled into the red-bodied, black topped two-door
convertible Plymouth (Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and with Pineda at the wheel repaired to
Cubao After dislodging their new friend, Pineda steered the car to España Extension to bring
Aquino to his home in Mayon Street. But somewhere in España Extension before the
Rotonda a small car whizzed to them almost hitting them. They saw that the driver was a
woman. Pineda gave chase and coming abreast of the small car he shouted, "Putang ina mo,
kamuntik na kaming mamatay." The woman continued on her way. Now Pineda saying "let
us teach her a lesson," sped after her and when she swerved ostensibly to enter a gate, Pineda
stopped his car behind being hurriedly got down, striding to the small car, opened the door
and started dragging the girl out. Both Jose and Aquino confirm the presence of another
woman inside the girl's car, who helped the girl struggle to get free from Pineda's grip; and
that the struggle lasted about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl
into the red convertible. All the three accused insist they did nothing to aid Pineda: but they
also admit that they did nothing to stop him.
Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and around the area just to scare the
girl who was in truth so scared that she begged them to let her be and return her to her home.
She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could net do anything as the "boss" was
Pineda. Aquino heard her plead with Jose "do you not have a sister yourself?" but did not
bear the other plea 'do you not have a mother?' Then Pineda stopped at the corner of the street
where he had forcibly snatched the girl presumably to return her, but then suddenly changing
his mind he said, 'why don't you do a strip tease for us. I'll pay you P1,000.00 and the girl
taunted, 'are you kidding?': that after a little while she consented to do the performance as
long as it would not last too long and provided the spectators were limited to the four of
them.
Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he and Maggie alighted first, but
not before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief from one of them to cover her face as she
went up the Hotel. The three followed, and when they saw the pair enter a room, they quickly
caught up. All the three accused testify that as soon as they got into the room, Maggie de la
Riva asked the boys to close the windows before she. undressed in front of them. They
themselves also removed their clothing. Two of them removed their pants retaining their
briefs, while Boy Pineda and Cañal stripped to the skin "because it was hot." The three
accused declared that they saw Boy Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him
promise her that he would pay the balance of P900.00 later. Whereupon, the show which
lasted about 10 minutes began with the naked girl walking back and forth the room about 4 to
5 times. This accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three accused (Jaime
Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal) left the room to wait in the car for Boy Pineda and
Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of payment of the balance.
Three minutes later Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. Now, the question of
how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is testified to by the accused that it was
Maggie's idea that they should drop her near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she
had just come from her work.
Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29 along Buendia Avenue.
Aquino testifies how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem. He did not have the
P900.00 with which to pay Maggie the balance of her "show" and he was afraid that if he did
not pay, Maggie would have her goons after him. He wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa
City where he had relatives and where he could help raise the money. Aquino readily obliged,
and to make the company complete they invited Cañal to join them. They used another car of
Jaime Jose, different from the one they had used the day before. At Lipa, Aquino detached
himself from his compassions and proceeded alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his
relatives. In the meantime his two companions had remained in the City and had, according
to Canal, gone to live in a house very close to the municipal hall building. They later moved
to another house where the PC and Quezon City police posse found and arrested them.
Aquino was the last to be apprehended, when having read in the newspapers that he was
wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the governor of Batangas.
The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is anchored, defies one's
credulity and reason, and had utterly to counteract the evidence for the prosecution,
particularly the complainant's testimony and Dr. Brion's medical report and testimony. We
quote with approval the able dissertion of the trial judge on this point:
As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused advance the proposition that nothing
happened in Swanky Hotel except a strip-tease exhibition which the complaint agreed to do
for them for fee of P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance to be paid "later." The flaw in
this connection lies in its utter inverisimilitude. The Court cannot believe that any woman
exists, even one habitual engaged in this kind of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has
not been proven to be) who would consent (and as easily and promptly as defense claims) to
do a performance, not even for all money in the worlds after the rough handling she
experienced from these wolves in men's clothing who now hungered for a show. There is no
fury to match a woman stirred to indignation. A woman's pride is far stronger than her yen
for money, and her revenge much more keen. The Court cannot believe that after the
rudeness and meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short an interval of time
forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy their immoral curiosity about her. The
woman in her would urge her to turn the men's hankering as a weapon of revenge by denying
them their pleasure.
Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is again something beyond even
the wildest expectations. Assuming that the woman whom the accused had abducted was in
this kind of trade assuming that the price offered was to her satisfaction, whom woman would
be willing to perform first and be paid later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie
de la Riva should have consent to do a striptease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00
and the balance to be paid God knows when. Since when are exposition of the flesh paid on
the installment basis? By the very precautious nature of their pitiful calling, women who sell
their attractions are usually very shrewed and it is to be expected that they could
demand full payment before curtain call. How was Maggie to collect later when she did not
even know who these man were, where they lived, whether they could be trusted with a
promise to pay later (!) whether she could ever find them again? If there is anything that had
struck the Court about the complaint, it is her courage, her intelligence and her alertness.
Only a stupid woman, and a most stupid one that, could have been persuaded to do what the
defense want this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.
Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have mentioned this circumstances during
their interview with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the person who
negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino) or even their counsel. One cannot escape
the very strong suspicion that this story is a last ditch, desperate attempt to save the day for
the accused. It truly underscores the hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more
clearly their guilt.
Then there is the incident of the men's stripping themselves. Why was there need for this?
The Court realizes that in its desperate need of an explanation for Maggie's positive
identification of Cañal as the man with the tattoo mark on his right buttock, the defense
concocted the sickeningly incident story that the four men removed their underclothing in the
presence of a woman simply "because it was hot." What kind of men were these who were so
devoid of any sense of decency that they thought nothing of adding insult to injury by not
only inducing a woman a strip before them, but for forcing her to perform before
a naked audience? And then they have gall to argue that "nothing" happened. For males of
cold and phlegmatic blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men of torrid
regions like ours where quick passions and hot tempers are the rule rather than the exception!
All of these consideration set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the
defense has not been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of prosecution
which, if unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing. The result of the physical
(external and internal) examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the
afternoon of June 29, the pertinent findings of which quoted earlier in this decision, establish
beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de la Riva was examined she bore on her body
traces of physical and sexual assault.
The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is either one of the following: (1) the
insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left behind in the hotel room
the bruises and the sexual attack could have taken place then. But then, the defense itself says
that these two persons rejoined the three after three or four minutes! It is physically
impossible, in such a short time, for Boy Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her
all of these injuries; (2) it was suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have
inflicted all of those injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the accused. The
examining physician rules out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much
stretch of the imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what purpose?
Was P900.00 which she had failed to collect worth that much self-torture? And what about all
the shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as she eventually did) expose herself to?
If she really had not been raped would she have gone thru all of these tribulation?
A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she has much more to lose in the
notoriety the case will reap her, her honor and that of her family, than in the redress she
demands (Canastre 82-480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA O.G. 338; CA
55 O.G. 7666; Galamito, L-6302, August 25, 1954); (3) it could also be argued that the
contusions and bruises could have been inflicted on Maggie during her struggle with Pineda
when the latter pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car. The telltale injuries,
however, discount this possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and traumas
were located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been cause by
any struggle save by those of a woman trying to resists the brutal and bestial attack on her
honor.
In their Memorandum the accused contend that Maggie's sole and uncorroborated testimony
should not be rated any credence at all as against the concerted declaration of the the accused.
In the first place, it is not correct to say that Maggie's declaration was uncorroborated — she
has for corroboration nothing less than the written extra-judicial statements of Jose and
Canal. But even assuming that Maggie stood alone in her statements, the cases cited by the
accused in their Memorandum notwithstanding which the Court does not consider in point
anyway, jurisprudence has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital element in
gauging the weight of evidence. What is more important is which of the declarations is the
more credible, the more logical, the more reasonable, the more prone to be biased or polluted.
(Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No. 25523, April 24, 1959). Besides, it should be
borne in maid that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a man is at his worst the
testimony of the offended party most often is the only one available to prove directly its
commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses would in certain cases place a
serious doubt as to the probability of its commission, so trial courts of justice are most often
placed in a position of having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in
regards conclusive, logical and probable (Landicho, VIII ACR 530).
We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in their briefs.
1. Appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the abduction of
Miss De la Riva. They point to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author
thereof, but they generously contend that even as to him the act was purged at any taint of
criminality by the complainant's subsequent consent to perform a striptease show for a fee, a
circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of the element of lewd design. This
line of defense has evidently leg no to stand on. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that
all the appellants participated in the forcible abduction. Miss De la Riva declared on the
witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that they helped one another in dragging
her into the car against her will; that she did not know them personally; that while inside the
car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body, the former forcing
his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and raising her skirt; that meaningful and
knowing glances were in the meanwhile being exchanged among the four; and that all of
them later took turns in ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel. This testimony, whose evidentiary
weight has not in the least been overthrown by the defense, more than suffices to establish the
crimes charged in the amended complaint. In the light thereof, appellants' protestation that
they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as absolutely without factual basis.
2. The commission of rape by each of the appellants has, as held by the court below, likewise
been clearly established. Jose, Aquino and Canal contend that the absence of semen in the
complainant's vagina disproves the fact of rape. The contention is untenable. Dr. Brion of the
NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not usually found in the vagina after
three days from the last intercourse, especially if the subject has douched herself within that
period. In the present case, the examination was conducted on the fourth day after the
incident, and the complainant had douched herself to avoid infection and pregnancy.
Furthermore, the absence of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the
important consideration being, not the emission of semen, but penetration
(People vs Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino's suggestion that the abrasions on the cervix
were caused by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen
her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel. It is difficult to imagine that any
sane woman, who is single and earning as much Miss Dela Riva did, would inflict injuries on
her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed instrument in order to strike
back at four strangers who allegedly would not pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a
striptease act. Besides, Dr. Brion testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the
genital organ would not result in the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.
3. Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably establish the commission of
successive rapes by the four appellants. Upon Miss De la Riva's arrival at her house in the
morning of June 26, 1967, she immediately told her mother, " Mommy Mommy, I have been
raped. All four of them raped me." This utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands
strong probative value, considering that it was made by the complainant to her mother who,
in cases of this nature was the most logical person in whom a daughter would confide the
truth. Aquino and Canal would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva stated to the
reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not abused. Her statement to the press is
understandable. At that time the complainant, who had not yet consulted her family on a
matter which concerned her reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not
then in a position to reveal publicly what had happened to her. This is one reason why the
complainant did not immediately inform the authorities of the tragedy that befell her. Another
reason is that she was threatened with disfiguration. And there were, of course, the traumas
found by Dr. Brion on different parts of the complainant's body. Could they, too, have been
self-inflicted? Or, as suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda
alone, when the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were left in
the hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they came out to join them in what
they would picture to be a cordial atmosphere, the complainant even allegedly suggesting that
she be dropped on a spot where people would reasonably presume her to have come from a
studio? Equally important is the complainant's public disclosure of her tragedy, which led to
the examination of her private parts and lay her open to risks of future public ridicule and
diminution of popularity and earnings as a movie actress.
4. Jose and Canal seek the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of
evidence on the grounds that they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and that
the incriminating details therein were supplied by the police investigators. We are not
convinced that the statements were involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein were
concocted by the authorities. The statements were given in the presence of several people and
subscribed and sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon City, to whom neither of the
aforesaid appellants intimated the use of inordinate methods by the police. They are replete
with details which could hardly be known to the police; and although it is suggested that the
authorities could have secured such details from their various informers, no evidence at all
was presented to establish the truth of such allegation. While in their statements Jose and
Canal admitted having waited — together with the two other appellants — for Miss De la
Riva at the ABS Studio, each of them attempted in the same statements to exculpate himself:
appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally abused the complainant; while
appellant Canal would make it appear that the complainant willingly allowed him to have
sexual intercourse with her. Had the statements been prepared by the authorities, they would
hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed to exculpate the affiants. It is
significant, too, that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their friends or
relatives of the alleged use of force and intimidation by the police. Dr. Mariano Nario of the
Quezon City Police Department, who examined appellant Canal after the latter made his
statement, found no trace of injury on any part of the said appellant's body in spite of the
claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned with a cigarette
lighter. In the circumstances, and considering, further, that the police officers who took down
their statements categorically denied on the witness stand that the two appellants were
tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them or by anyone other than the
affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the trial court's well-considered
conclusion that the statements were voluntarily given. However, even disregarding the in-
custody statements of Jose and Canal, We find that the mass of evidence for the prosecution
on record will suffice to secure the conviction of the two.
The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise being questioned by Jose on the
other ground that he was not assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogations. He cites
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Messiah vs. U.S. (377 U.S. 201),
Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S. 478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384 U.S. 436).
The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is Article III (Bill of Rights),
Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel ..." While the said provision is identical to that in
the Constitution of the United States, in this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was
interpreted by this Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a
similar provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of July 1,
1902) to mean proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to rendition of the
judgment. Implementing the said constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1,
Rule 115 of the Rules of Court that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be
entitled ... (b) to be present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the
proceedings, that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment." The only
instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment, if he so requests, are
during the second stage of the preliminary investigation (Rule 112, Section 11) and after the
arrest (Rule 113, Section 18). The rule in the United States need not be unquestioningly
adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no binding effect here, but also because
in interpreting a provision of the Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the
adoption thereof should be considered. And even there the said rule is not yet quite settled, as
can be deduced from the absence of unanimity in the voting by the members of the United
States Supreme Court in all the three above-cited cases.
5. Appellant Pineda claims that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in
gross miscarriage of justice. He contends that because the charge against him and his co-
appellants is a capital offense and the amended complaint cited aggravating circumstances,
which, if proved, would raise the penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his
presence during all stages of the trial. The contention is untenable. While a plea of guilty is
mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the
information, including the aggravating circumstances, and it matters not that the offense is
capital, for the admission (plea of guilty) covers both the crime and its attendant
circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308,
May 29, 1964, citing People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29, 1961, and People vs. Parete, L-
15515, April 29, 1961). Because of the aforesaid legal effect of Pineda's plea of guilty, it was
not incumbent upon the trial court to receive his evidence, much less to require his presence
in court. It would be different had appellant Pineda requested the court to allow him to prove
mitigating circumstances, for then it would be the better part of discretion on the part of the
trial court to grant his request. (Cf. People vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The
case of U.S. vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not in point, for there this Court
ordered a new trial because it found for a fact that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, "did
not intend to admit that he committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances"
mentioned in the information. We are not in a position to make a similar finding here. The
transcript of the proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda's counsel, Atty. Lota
prefaced his client's plea of guilty with the statement that .
I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in plain simple language of the contents
of aggravating circumstances and apprised him of the penalty he would get, and we have
given said accused time to think. After a while I consulted him — for three times — and his
decision was still the same.
Three days after the arraignment, the same counsel stated in court that he had always been
averse to Pineda's idea of pleading guilty, because "I know the circumstances called for the
imposition of the maximum penalty considering the aggravating circumstances," but that he
acceded to his client's wish only after the fiscal had stated that he would recommend to the
court the imposition of life imprisonment on his client. To be sure, any such recommendation
does not bind the Court. The situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in
U.S. vs. Agcaoili, supra.
6. Two of the appellants — Jose and Cañal — bewail the enormous publicity that attended
the case from the start of investigation to the trial. In spite of the said publicity, however, it
appears that the court a quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing. For one thing, three
of the seven (7) original accused were acquitted. For another thing, Jose himself admits in his
brief that the Trial Judge "had not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the
press, unmindful of the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial."
We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired together to commit the
crimes imputed to them in the amended information quoted at the beginning of this decision.
There is no doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front of her
house in Quezon City, was a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to
commit the various and the successive acts of rape upon her person. It bears noting, however,
that even while the first act of rape was being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had
already been consummated, so that each of the three succeeding (crimes of the same nature
can not legally be considered as still connected with the abduction — in other words, they
should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible abduction and,
therefore, the former can no longer be complexed with the latter.
What kind of rape was committed? Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, under paragraph 3, Article 335, as amended by Republic Act
No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as follows:
ART. 335. When and how rape committed.—Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty
shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the
occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death.
As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the first of the
crimes committed, the latter is definitely the more serious; hence, pursuant the provision of
Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum
period. Consequently, the appellants should suffer the extreme penalty of death. In this
regard, there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating circumstances,
for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be imposed.
Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for the purpose of determining the
proper penalty to be imposed in each of the other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us
to make a definite finding in this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes
was attended with the following aggravating circumstances: (a) nighttime, appellants having
purposely sought such circumstance to facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of
superior strength, the crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with
one another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy, since the
appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about
ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a circumstance which tended to make the
effects of the crime more humiliating; and (d) use of a motor vehicle. With respect to
appellants Jose, Aquino and Ca_¤_al, none of these aggravating circumstances has been
offset by any mitigating circumstance. Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least
affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that there would still be
three aggravating circumstances remaining. As a result, appellants should likewise be made
to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple crimes of rape. (Art. 63,
par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)
In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are offenses committed, the trial court
applied by analogy Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the maximum
duration of all the penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than
threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon
the appellant, which should not exceed forty years." The said court is of the opinion that since
a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the ends of justice would be served, and society
and the victim would be vindicated just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on
each of the appellants.
We cannot agree with the trial court. Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only be taken
into account in connection with the service of the sentence imposed, not in the imposition of
the penalty (People vs. Escares, 55 Off. Gaz., 623). In holding that only one death penalty
should be imposed because man has only one life, the trial court ignored the principle
enunciated in the very case it cited, namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this Court,
in affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused guilty of two murders and one
homicide and imposed upon him two death sentences for the murders and a prison term for
the homicide. In not applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the case of Balaba is
different from the present case, for while in the former case the accused was found to have
committed three distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex. As We
have explained earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved. There is,
therefore, no substantial difference between the two cases insofar as the basic philosophy
involved is concerned, for the fact remains that in the case of Balaba this Court did not
hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the accused by the trial court. In People
vs. Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on each of the six
accused three death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes of murder, We said that
"since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is
attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts
committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the
appropriate penalties prescribed by law." In the said case (which was promulgated after the
decision of the court a quo had been handed down) We had occasion to discuss at length the
legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:
The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an
exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough, that a death convict, like all mortals,
has only one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological attribute of man,
it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical and futile because
after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death penalties will
naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of
death penalties suffers from four basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing
multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and service
of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served
simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.
The imposition of a penalty and the service of a sentence are two distinct, though related,
concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties is determined by the nature,
gravity and number of offenses charged and proved, whereas service of sentence is
determined by the severity and character of the penalty or penalties imposed. In the
imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself with the
possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency
subject to varied factors like the successful escape of the convict, grant of executive
clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper
penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged
and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed
simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two moves of
serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that
two or more penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so
permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not
only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.
The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical
importance. The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible badge of
his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of
only one death sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable.
Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real dimensions, the possibility
of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the
imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as deterrent to an improvident
grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such a convict, the
proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency
or leniency in his behalf.
Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to
pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is almost absolute) deems it proper to
commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect
is that the convict has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If
only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life imprisonment, the convict
will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the existence of conspiracy among them and
of our finding as regards the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the
presence of aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the
premises.
————
Before Us is a petition for intervention filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation
asking for reversal of that portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the
confiscation of the car used by the appellants in abducting the complainant. The aforesaid car
is a 1965 two-door Pontiac sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777,
Plate No. H-33284, File No. 11584171, alleged by the intervenor to be in the custody of
Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon City Police Department. The car is registered in the
name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.
On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of an appellant Jaime G. Jose, bought the car
from the Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously executed a chattel mortgage
thereon to secure payment of the purchase price of P13,200, which was stipulated to be
payable in 24 monthly installments of P550 beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. The
mortgage was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission and inscribed in the
Chattel Mortgage Registry. The mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration
certificate. On April 17, 1967, for value received and with notice to Mrs. Gomez, the
Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel
mortgage, to the intervenor. The assignment was duly registered with the Land
Transportation Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.
Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of which the intervenor filed
on July 5, 1967, an action for replevin against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First
Instance of Manila) as a preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. On July 7,
1967, the court issued an order for the seizure of the car. The sheriff, however, could not
enforce the writ of replevin because the car was not in Mrs. Gomez' possession, the same
having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G. Jose, together with the other appellants in
this case, in the abduction of Miss De la Riva, as a result of which the car was seized by the
Quezon City police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to surrender
it to the sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in the trial of the criminal
case.
During the pendency of that criminal case in the court below, or on July 26, 1967, the
intervenor filed with the said court a petition for intervention. The said petition was not,
however, acted upon. On October 2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present
case ordering the car's confiscation as an instrument of the crime. Although not notified of
the said decision, the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of
the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on October 31, 1967, on the ground that
the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the automatic elevation thereof to
this Court. The intervenor then filed a petition for relief from judgement, but the same was
also denied.
On February 5, 1968, judgement was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to
deliver the car to the intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could be foreclosed, or,
in the alternative, to pay the intervenor the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per
annum from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney's fees, and the costs of suit. The
judgment became final and executory. Attempts to execute the judgment against the
properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing; the writ of execution was returned by the sheriff
unsatisfied. On July 26, 1968, the present petition for intervention was filed with this Court,
which allowed the intervenor to file a brief. In his brief the Solicitor General contends,
among others, that the court a quo having found that appellant Jose is the owner of the car,
the order of confiscation is correct.
Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in
the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, must be considered as the lawful owner
thereof; that the only basis of the court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to
appellant Jose were the latter's statements during the trial of the criminal case to that effect;
that the said statement were not, however, intended to be, nor could constitute, a claim of
ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but were made simply in answer to questions
propounded in court for the sole purpose of establishing the identity of the defendant who
furnished the car used by the appellants in the commission of the crime; that the chattel
mortgage on the car and its assignment in the favor of the intervenor were made several
months before the date of commission of the crimes charged, which circumstance forecloses
the possibility of collusion to prevent the State from confiscating the car; that the final
judgement in the replevin case can only be executed by delivering the possession of the car to
the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and the Article 45 of the Revised Penal
Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the commission of
the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense
of this Court that the order of the court below for confiscation of the car in question should be
set aside and that the said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as
decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil
Case No. 69993.
————
Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court received a formal manifestation on
the part of the Solicitor General to the effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein appellants,
died in prison on December 28, 1970. As a result of this development, this case is hereby
dismissed as to him alone, and only insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-
fourth (1/4) of the costs declared de oficio.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as follows: appellants Jaime
G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise convicted
of three (3) other crimes of rape. As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced
to four (4) death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant
of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of 40,000.00; and each shall
pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.
Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is concerned, the order of the court a
quo for its confiscation is hereby set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby
ordered to deliver its possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation in
accordance with the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No.
69993 thereof.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. 39085 September 27, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
ANTONIO YABUT, defendant-appellant.
Felipe S. Abeleda for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, convicting the
appellant of the crime of murder and assessing the death penalty.
The appellant, Yabut, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of
murder upon the following information:
That on or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the
accused Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, in said city,
did then and there, with intent to kill, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously,
assault, beat and use personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another prisoner also serving
sentence in Bilibid, by then and there hitting the said Sabas Aseo suddenly and unexpectedly
from behind with a wooden club, without any just cause, thereby fracturing the skull of said
Sabas Aseo and inflicting upon him various other physical injuries on different parts of the
body which caused the death of the latter about twenty-four (24) hours thereafter.
That at the time of the commission of this offense, the said Antonio Yabut was a recidivist,
he having previously been convicted twice of the crime of homicide and once of serious
physical injuries, by virtue of final sentences rendered by competent tribunals.
Upon arraignment, the accused plead not guilty. The court below made the following findings
of fact which, from an independent examination of the entire testimony, we are convinced,
are supported by the evidence beyond reasonable doubt:
La brigada de presos, conocida como Brigada 8-A Carcel, el 1.º de agosto de 1932, estaba
compuesta de unos 150 o mas penados, de largas condenas, al mando del preso Jose
Villafuerte, como Chief Squad Leader, y del preso Vicente santos, como su auxiliar. forman
parte de esta brigada el occiso Sabas Aseo, o Asayo, el acusado Antonio Yabut y los presos
llamados Apolonio Saulo, Isaias Carreon, Melecio Castro, Mateo Bailon y los moros Taladie
y Hasan.
Entre siete y media y ocho de la noche de la fecha de autos, estando ya cerrado el pabellon de
la brigada, pues se aproximaba la hora del descanso y silencio dentro de la prision, mientras
el jefe bastonero Villafuerte se hallaba sentado sobre su mesa dentro de la brigada, vio al
preso Carreon cerca de el, y en aquel instante el acusado Yabut, dirigiendose a Carreon, le
dijo que, si no cobrada a uno que la debia, el (Yabut) le abofetearia. El jefe bastonero
Villafuerte trato de imponer silencio y dijo a los que hablaban que se apaciguaran; pero, entre
tanto, el preso Carreon se encaro con el otro preso Saulo cobrandole dos cajetillas de
cigarillos de diez centimos cada una que le debia. Saulo contesto que ya le pagaria, pero
Carreon, por toda contestacion, pego en la cara a saulo y este quedo desvanecido. En vista de
esto, el jefe bastonero se dirigio a su cama para sacar la porra que estaba autorizado a llevar.
Simultaneamente Villafuerte vio que el preso Yabut pegaba con un palo (Exhibit C) al otro
preso Sabas Aseo, o Asayo, primeramente en la nuca y despues en la cabeza, mientras estaba
de espaldas el agregido Sabas, quien, al recibir el golpe en la nuca, se inclino hacia delante,
como si se agachara, y en ese momento el acusado Yabut dio un paso hacia delante y con el
palo de madera que portaba dio otro golpe en la cabeza a Sabas Aseo, quien cayo al suelo.
El jefe bastonero Villafuerte se acerco al agresor Yabut para desarmarle, pero este le dijo:
"No te acerques; de otro modo, moriras." No obstante la actitud amenazadora de Yabut,
Villafuerte se acerco y Yabut quiso darle un golpe que iba dirigido a la cabeza, pero
Villafuerte lo pudo desviar pcon la porra que Ilevaba. Los dos lucharon y Ilegaron a abrazarse
hasta que se le deslizo a Villafuerte la porra que llevaba. Continuaron luchando ambos y el
acusado Yabut llego a soltar el palo Exhibit C con que acometia a Villafuerte y habia
malherido al preso Sabas Aseo. Despues de aquello, Yabut consiguio zafarse de Villafuerte y
se dirigio al otro extremo de la brigada, escondiendose dentro del baño y alli fue cogido
inmediatamente despues del suceso por el preso Proceso Carangdang, que desempenaba el
cargo de sargento de los policias de la prision.
We reject, as unworthy of belief, the testimony of Yabut that it was Villafuerte, not he, who
gave the fatal blow to the deceased Aseo. The testimonies of Santiago Estrada, resident
physician of the Bureau of Prisons and Dr. Pablo Anzures of the Medico Legal Department of
the University of the Philippines, clearly establish that the death of Aseo was caused by
subdural and cerebral hemorrhages following the fracture of the skull resulting from the blow
on the head of Aseo. They further confirm the testimony of the four eyewitnesses that the
deceased was struck from behind.
On appeal to this court, the appellant advances the following assignments of error:
1. The lower court erred in applying article 160 of the Revised Penal Code.
2. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence of the defense are contradictory and not
corroborated.
3. The lower court erred in holding that the crime of murder was established by appreciating
the qualifying circumstance of alevosia.
4. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder beyond
reasonable doubt.
In connection with the first assignment of error, we quote article 160 of the Revised Penal
Code, in the Spanish text, which is decisive:
Comision de un nuevo delito durante el tiempo de la condena por otro anterior — Pena. —
Los que comentieren algun delito despues de haber sino condenados por sentencia firme no
empezada a cumpir, o durante el tiempo de su condena, seran castigados con la pena señalada
por la ley para el nuevo delito, en su grado maximo, sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la regla
5.a del articulo 62.
El penado conprendidoen este articulo se no fuere un delincuente habitual sera indultado a los
setenta años, si hubiere ya cumplido la condena primitiva, o cuando llegare a cumplirla
despues de la edad sobredicha, a no ser que por su conducta a por otras circunstancias no
fuere digno de la gracia.
The English translation of article 160 is as follows:
Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another previous
offense — Penalty. — Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who shall
commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve
such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be
pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have already served out his original sentence,
or when he shall complete it after reaching said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other
circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.
The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the English
translation of the headnote of article 160 and would have us accept his deduction from the
headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new crime which is committed by a
person already serving sentence is different from the crime for which he is serving sentence.
Inasmuch as the appellant was serving sentence for the crime of homicide, the appellant
contends the court below erred in applying article 160 in the present case which was a
prosecution for murder (involving homicide). While we do not concede that the appellant is
warranted in drawing the deduction mentioned from the English translation of the caption of
article 160, it is clear that no such deduction could be drawn from the caption. Apart from
this, however, there is no warrant whatever for such a deduction (and we do not understand
the appellant to assert it) from the text itself of article 160. The language is plain and
unambiguous. There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said article
applies only in cases where the new offense is different in character from the former offense
for which the defendant is serving the penalty.
It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and unambiguous,
there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or headings or epigraphs
of a section of interpretation of the text, especially where such epigraphs or headings of
sections are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that
follows. (Cf. In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156, 166.) A mere glance at the titles to the
articles of the Revised Penal code will reveal that they were not intended by the Legislature
to be used as anything more than catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way the
subject matter of each article. Being nothing more than a convenient index to the contents of
the articles of the Code, they cannot, in any event have the effect of modifying or limiting the
unambiguous words of the text. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create
doubt.
The remaining assignments of error relate to the evidence. We have come to the conclusion,
after a thorough examination of the record, that the findings of the court below are amply
sustained by the evidence, except upon the fact of the existence of treachery (alevosia). As
some members of the court entertain a reasonable doubt that the existence of treachery
(alevosia) was established, it results that the penalty assessed by the court below must be
modified. We find the defendant guilty of homicide and, applying article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code in connection with article 160 of the same, we sentence the defendant- appellant
to the maximum degree of reclusion temporal, that is to say, to twenty years of confinement
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Sabas Aseo (alias Sabas Asayo), in the sum of
P1,000. Costs de oficio.
Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-38176 January 22, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARTURO ALICIA and VICTOR BANGAYAN defendants-appellants.

PER CURIAM:
Before the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, the accused, Arturo Alicia and
Victor Bangayan, were charged with the crimes of Murder and of Multiple Frustrated Murder
(Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1391-Rizal) committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of May, 1972, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused,
while then confined at the said institution, each armed with improvised deadly weapons,
conspiring, confederating and acting together and mutually helping one another, with
treachery, evident premeditation and deliberate intent to kill – did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab:
1. Pedro Madjos, No. 76970-P
2. Felipe Macerin, No. 53421-P
3. Victorio Sansanan, No. 58203-P
4. Sulficio Sulina, No. 79723-P
all prisoners serving final sentences in the same institution while then unarmed and unable to
defend themselves from the attack launched by the accused thereby inflicting upon Pedro
Madjos a stab wound which directly cause his death and simultaneously inflicting
upon Felipe Macerin, Victorio Sansanan and Sulficio Sulina stab wounds in the different
parts of their bodies, the accused having performed all the acts of execution which would
produce the offense of murder, but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of their will, that is by the timely arrival of prison guards which deterred the
accused from inflicting further injuries on their victims and the timely and able assistance of
the NBP Hospital Staff in treating the injured.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, the accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge. The
trial court ordered a mandatory presentation of the prosecution's evidence. Trial followed and
on January 28, 1974, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Victor Bangayan and Arturo Alicia, GUILTY, beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of
DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the victim, the amount of P10,000.00 jointly and
severally; to pay moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00 and another P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages, jointly and severally; and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.
Likewise, finding the accused, Victor Bangayan and Arturo Alicia, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, of the crime of Multiple Frustrated Murder, as defined under Article 250 of
the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences each one
of them to suffer the penalty of TEN (10) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS AND FOUR (4) MONTHS of prision mayor as
maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the offended parties in the amount of P5,000.00 as moral
damages and another P5,000.00, as exemplary damages, jointly and severally: and to pay
their proportionate shares of the costs.
xxx xxx xxx
The case is now before Us on automatic review pursuant to Rule 122, Section 9 of the Rules
of Court.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Dr. Argente Alejandro, Tolentino Avelina,
Francisco Cometa, Jr., Sulficio Sulina, Loneida Panopio and Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr..
Dr. Argente Alejandro, a physician employed in the Bureau of Prisons Hospital, testified that
he treated Felipe Macerin who sustained two lacerated wounds (two inches right midaxillary
line and one-third inch around the right elbow just above the distal portion all over the bone),
both of which could have been caused by an improvised weapon usually used by prisoners in
Muntinlupa; that he sutured the wounds and gave the victim an IPS anti-tetanus syrup and
antibiotic five per cent dextrose and water; that Felipe Macerin had already been admitted to
the hospital for treatment of siptomiasis when these injuries were inflicted upon him; and that
the injuries of Macerin had been cured and he recovered, but sixteen days after the stabbing
incident he died of Maxonia (the doctor's certificate of the NBP Hospital shows that the cause
of his death is "Carcinoma-Liver").
He further testified that aside from Felipe Macerin, he also treated Sulficio Sulina and
Victorio Sansanan for injuries resulting from the stabbing incident at Ward 3 of the NBP
Hospital; that Sulficio Sulina sustained four (4) lacerated wounds (one inch subcostal left
parasternal line; one inch supra clavicular region right; two inches right elbow; and two
inches hyposgastrion); that he conducted an exploratory operation, suturing his urinary
bladder which was penetrated in the distal part of the elum and part of the dentary column;
that the injuries of the internal organs of Sulina would have been fatal without surgical
intervention and that they could have been caused by an improvised weapon used by
prisoners; that Sulficio Sulina recovered from his injuries and was discharged on June 24,
1972; and that Victorio Sansanan was treated by him for a superficial lacerated wound (one-
half of an inch at the back lever of the dentary parasipital area) which was not fatal.
Furthermore, he testified that another prisoner, Pedro Madjos died in the hospital and his
cadaver was forwarded to the Muntinlupa Board of Investigation for autopsy; that he
examined the cadaver and saw one wound which is 1.5 cms., one foot long from the axillary
line, which caused his death as it penetrated the heart.
Tolentino Avelina, an investigator in the Investigation Section of the New Bilibid Prisons,
declared that he investigated a stabbing incident which transpired on May 2, 1972 inside
Ward 3 of the New Bilibid Prisons Hospital wherein Pedro Madjos Felipe Macerin, Victorio
Sansanan and Sulficio Sulina were attacked and stabbed by other prison inmates, and that
said investigation was reduced in writing (Exhibit "B"). He declared that when he arrived at
the office before 8:00 o'clock in the morning on said date, he was informed of the stabbing
incident so he immediately proceeded to Ward 3 of the NBP Hospital to investigate and
determine who the victims were and their assailants. In the court of his investigation he took
written statements from appellant Arturo Alicia on May 2, 1972 (E exhibit "C") wherein the
latter admitted before him that he (Alicia) was the one who stabbed Pedro Madjos, Victorio
Sansanan and Felipe Macerin (Exhibit "C-2") with an improvised weapon (Exhibit "D"), and
from Victorio Sansanan on July 1, 1972 (Exhibit "E"), one of the victims in that incident,
wherein Sansanan Identified his assailant as Arturo Alicia. Sulficio Sulina executed a written
statement on June 19, 1972 (Exhibit "F"), pointing to Victor Bangayan (Exhibit "F-2") as his
assailant.
Francisco Cometa, Jr., a prison guard in the Investigation Section of the Bureau of Prisons,
testified that he investigated prisoner Victor Bangayan on May 2, 1972, in connection with
the stabbing incident at the NBP Hospital and reduced the investigation in writing (Exhibit
"I"); that in that statement, Bangayan admitted that he was one of those who attacked the
victims (Exhibit "I-2") and that he used an improvised deadly weapon (Exhibit "I-3"); that
appellants explained that they attacked and stabbed their victims because the latter were
members of the rival Batang City Jail Gang, and were planning to attack them and other
members of the Commando Gang.
Sulficio Sulina, one of the victims and an inmate in the New Bilibid Prisons, testified that on
May 2, 1972, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, while confined in the hospital, he was
stabbed five times by appellant Victor Bangayan.
Leonida Panopio, a resident physician, testified that on May 2, 1972, she learned about a
stabbing incident where the victims were Madjos, Macerin, Sansanan and Sulina, and about
the death of Madjos, and that she accordingly prepared a death report (Exhibit "A-4").
Mariano Cueva, Jr., a physician and medicolegal officer of the NBI, testified that he
personally conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Pedro Madjos and his post-mortem
findings are embodied in his Necropsy Report No. N-72-845 (Exhibit "L"); that according to
his findings, the stab would found on the left side of the abdomen of the late Pedro Madjos
was 14 cms. from the center line and 17 cms. above the hipbone, 1-½ inches in width,
penetrating the body of the left, about 15 cms., involving vital structures and causing serious
or severe hemorrhage which caused his death; that the external characteristic of the wound
indicates that the stabbing instrument was sharp, pointed with double edges, like a dagger, a
double edged balisong, a knife or any similar stabbing instrument; that from the direction of
the wounds, it appears that the assailant was in front of the victim when he attacked him; that
the death could have occurred several minutes or an hour after the injury was inflicted; and
that it is possible that the attack was sudden and unexpected in view of the absence of any
sign that the victim attempted to parry the blow.
During the trial, the appellants testified in their behalves.
Appellant Victor Bangayan, an inmate of the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal,
testified that he is presently confined at the New Bilibid Prisons, serving sentence for the
crime of robbery holdup and at the same time awaiting the outcome of his appeal from a
judgment of conviction in a murder case wherein he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death (G.R. No. L-36234, submitted for decision with this tribunal). He declared that when
the incident took place, he was confined at the NBP Hospital due to swollen jaw and
recuperating from fever. He claimed that he stabbed Madjos because they quarreled in a
gambling game wherein the latter cheated him After he stabbed the victim he surrendered
voluntarily to the prison authorities and voluntarily gave his statement to the investigators.
Arturo Alicia, also an inmate of the New Bilibid Prisons, testified that he is serving sentence
for the crime of robbery he committed in Manila; that on May 2, 1972, he had a drinking
spree with his companions, using alcohol which they bought from a hospital attendant; that
after drinking he went to his "tarima"; that all he knew was that he stabbed Pedro Madjos but
he had no intention of killing him; that on the date of the incident he was confined in the
hospital because he was vomiting blood; that he also stabbed Victorio Sansanan and Felipe
Macerin; and that after the incident he surrendered to the authorities and voluntarily gave his
statement to them.
It has been sufficiently established by the evidence that in the early morning of May 2, 1972,
Pedro Madjos, Felipe Macerin, Victorio Sansanan and Sulficio Sulina, all persons serving
sentences for one reason or another and confined in Ward 3 of the prison hospital, were
attacked and stabbed by appellants who were armed with improvised pointed instruments.
This resulted in the death of Pedro Madjos and the infliction of numerous stab wounds on the
persons of Macerin, Sansanan and Sulina injuries which could have caused their death were it
not for the timely arrival of prison guards and for the medical assistance rendered to them by
the prison hospital personnel. Macerin was about to plug in an electric iron when he was
stabbed by prisoner Arturo Alicia. Pedro Madjos was massaging the body of Victorio
Sansanan, who was then suffering from asthma, when he and Victorio were stabbed by
Arturo Alicia. Sulficio Sulina was stabbed by Victor Bangayan while he was asleep on a mat
laid on the cement floor of Ward 3, adjacent to the attendant's table. Appellants admitted to
the investigators that they stabbed the victims because of the reported plan of the latter to
attack them the following day. Hence, in the evening of May 1, 1972, appellants Alicia and
Bangayan decided to attack the members of the Batang City Jail Gang early the following
morning.
In her brief, counsel de oficio for the appellants, Atty. Eugenia Banzon Jose contends that
appellants acted in selfdefense in view of the imminent attack upon them by the rival gang
that none of the elements which would qualify the crime as murder had been proven; that the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism should not have been applied, and on the contrary,
appellants should have been given the benefit of the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty.
To begin with, a plea of guilty admits all the material allegations of the Information,
including the attendant circumstances qualifying and/or aggravating the crime. Prescinding
from the foregoing, self-defense is an affirmative allegation which the accused must prove
with sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence. 1 Here, no such evidence has been
presented. To support the claim that the offense was not qualified by treachery, the counsel
de oficio makes capital of the testimony of Dr. Cueva to the effect that when Pedro Madjos
was stabbed, his assailant was in front of him, hence the attack on the victim was face to face.
But the same witness, Dr. Cueva, also testified that it was possible that the attack was sudden
and unexpected because of the absence of any sign that the victim attempted to parry the
stabbing thrust, and appellants admitted that to insure the success of their ploy they suddenly
attacked their victims during the early dawn of May 2, 1972. As a matter of fact, Sulficio
Sulina was still sleeping on the floor when he was stabbed five times by appellant Victor
Bangayan.
The existence of the qualifying circumstance of premeditation is shown by the fact that as
early as the evening of May 1, 1972, appellants agreed to attack their victims, which plan
they executed in the early morning of the following day. From the time they agreed on their
plan until dawn of the next day when the plan was implemented, sufficient time had elapsed
to allow appellants to meditate and reflect upon their plan and the possible consequences of
their act. This decision on the. part of appellants to attack their victims, was, therefore, the
result of meditation, calculation or reflection. 2
Appellants' counsel de oficio makes much ado about the fact that the trial court questioned
appellants as to the fact of their previous conviction. This, she contends, violated the
constitutional rights of the appellants against self-incrimination.
The trial court's question as to the nature of the offense for the commission of which
appellants were serving sentence did not call for incriminating answers. The fact that
appellants, at the time of the commission of the crime, were prisoners in the New Bilibid
Prisons serving sentence by final judgment is not disputed. The status of appellants as such
appears in their extrajudicial confessions (Exhibits "C" and "1") which were submitted in
evidence. Since the Information alleges that appellants committed the afore-mentioned crime
"while then confined" in the New Bilibid Prisons, and the evidence of the prosecution shows
that they were inmates of the New Bilibid Prisons serving sentence by virtue of final
judgment, it was proper for the trial court to inquire as to the nature of the offense for which
they were serving sentence.
The lower court correctly found the existence of the special aggravating circumstance of
quasi-recidivism, defined under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty imposed for another
previous offense. — Penalty. — Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62, any person who
shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to
serve such sentence, or while serving the same, sham be punished by the maximum period of
the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Quasi-recidivism is a special aggravating circumstance which imposes the maximum of the
penalty for the new offense. It makes no difference, for the purpose of the effect of quasi-
recidivism under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, whether the crime for which an
accused is serving sentence at the time of the commission of the offense charged, falls under
the said Code or under special law. 3 Quasi-recidivism is punished with more severity than
recidivism proper because the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, as any other
aggravating circumstance, may be offset by a mitigating circumstance present in the
commission of the crime, whereas, in a case of quasi-recidivism the maximum degree of the
penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed should always be imposed irrespective of
the presence of any mitigating circumstance.
In the case at bar, both appellants Arturo Alicia and Victor Bangayan were serving sentence
for robbery by virtue of final judgment when they committed the new felony. The existence
of quasi-recidivism renders moot the argument Of appellants' counsel that the trial court
failed to consider certain mitigating circumstances which should have entitled the appellants
to a lower penalty. Although the counsel de oficio of appellants is correct in her statement
that after the commission of the crime appellants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
and executed statements admitting their participation, and that both pleaded guilty to the
Offense, those circumstances notwithstanding, the imposition of the supreme penalty is in
order. 4 However, for lack of votes, the penalty to be meted the appellants must be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that the appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The indemnity of P1,000.00 in the murder case is hereby raised to P12,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando C.J., Antonio, Santa Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., votes for reclusion perpetua.
Concepcion Jr., J., votes for life imprisonment.
Fernandez, J., concurs in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente Abad
Santos.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
As the two accused conspired to assault the four victims, they are guilty of four separate
crimes: murder, two frustrated murders and the attempted murder (People vs. Peralta, L-
19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 769, 779). For the killing of Pedro Madjos, which was
murder, the death penalty was properly imposed. The assaults on Felipe Macerin and Sulficio
Sulina were properly characterized as frustrated murders. The assault on Victorio Sansanan,
which resulted in the infliction of a superficial lacerated wound that was not fatal was only
attempted murder. Four penalties should have been imposed on the accused But because they
did not appeal only the death penalty is under automatic review. I concur in that part of the
lower court's decision imposing the death penalty.
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment finding the two appellants herein, Arturo Alicia and Victor
Bangayan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder committed on the person
of Pedro Madjos and sentencing them to the extreme penalty of death and the payment of
indemnity of P12,000 and damages, P5,000 moral and P5,000 exemplary jointly and
severally and their respective proportionate part of the costs. I am morally convinced the
evidence on record justifies such judgment.
But as there were three other victims who separately or individually suffered injuries as a
result of the concerted action, premeditated and treacherously perpetrated on them by both of
said appellants, I find myself unable to agree with the affirmance of the trial court's sentence
finding them guilty only of multiple frustrated murder, with one single penalty for each of
them under Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code. I do not find it to be in conformity with
the facts and the law to disregard the obvious circumstances that, as Justice Aquino points
out, each of the separate assaults on each of the victims constituted a distinct offense in itself
and should be penalized accordingly. Thus, there were also two frustrated murders with
Felipe Macerin and Sulficio Sulina as vice and a case of attempted murder of Victorio
Sansanan committed on the same occasion. In other words, in addition to the death penalty
that each of the appellants should suffer for the killing of Madjos, they should also be
separately sentenced each to the penalties for the frustrated murders of Macerin and Sulina
also separately, and in addition, for the attempted murder of Sansanan.
In connection with the observation of Justice Aquino that this case is on review by Us only as
to the death penalty, hence We cannot impose the other penalties I have discussed, it is my
considered view that it is of no consequence juridically speaking that appellants did not
expressly appeal from the portion of the judgment regarding the other offenses. There might
have been some confusion in the minds of the defense counsel in regard to this point because
of the mandatory automatic review of the death sentence that caused such omission to make
the necessary appeal. It is to my mind an act of simple justice devoid of technicalities of
procedure to consider this automatic review as including already the appeal of the other
adverse parts of the judgment against them, regardless of whether or not they have separately
appealed from them. I am persuaded that considering the circumstance that the offenses under
discussion were committed on the same occasion, this procedure I have explained is in
consonance with the reasons that underlie Section 17(1) of the Judiciary Act which provides
as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts as herein provided, in —
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished arose out
of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same
occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused
are charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly
or separately;
It would be tragic and a grave injustice if, for instance, the evidence before Us were not
sufficiently convincing as to the guilt of the appellant's of the other offenses and for the
reason alone that they did not separately appeal, we would leave the unappealed judgment
regarding them uncorrected. Such a result would not only be unfair, it would be absurd.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
1. No treachery — The attack on the victims was committed in the early morning while the
victims were lying and confined in Ward 3 of the prison hospital floor together with the
accused. Considering that there were four (4) victims and the presence of the guard in the
said ward, treachery indicate that the four victims could not easily be overpowered by the two
assailants and that the guards could frustrate their criminal design as in fact the timely arrival
of the prison guards, in the language of the information, "deterred the accused from inflicting
further injuries on the victims."
2. No evident premeditation, because only a few hours transpired between the decision to
commit the crime in the evening of May 1, 1972, and the actual commission of the same at
about 5:00 o'clock the following morning. There was no time for reflection and persistence in
the decision to commit the act since between the previous night and 5:00 o'clock the
following morning, certainly the accused were sleeping, during which time they could not
possibly have deliberated on the consequences of their intended crime.
3. Lack of intent to kill the victims, mitigates the offense. This was affirmed by the accused
Arturo Alicia, who stated that on May 2, 1972, he had a drinking spree with his companions
using the alcohol he bought from the hospital attendant; that he had no intention to kill the
deceased and that on the date of the incident, he was confined in the hospital because he was
vomiting blood, which testimony has not been rebutted by the State, If both appellants were
also confined in the hospital their ailment must have sapped them of the required strength to
successfully assault the victims.
The dehumanizing prison conditions mentioned by Justice Abad Santos in his concurring and
dissenting opinion might have also provoked the appellants to act the way they did.
4. Consequently, for the death of prisoner Pedro Madjos, appellants should be convicted only
of simple homicide, aggravated by quasi-recidivism but mitigated by damage exceeding
intent, voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of guilty.
From the evidence, the injuries inflicted on prisoner Felipe Macerin and Sulficio Sulina were
cured after ten (10) days but before the expiration of thirty (30) days. Hence, appellants
should only be convicted of less serious physical injuries under paragraph 1, Article 265 of
the Revised Penal Code, likewise aggravated by quasi-recidivism but mitigated by voluntary
surrender and voluntary plea of guilty.
For the superficial wound inflicted on prisoner Victoria Sansanan, appellants could be
convicted only of slight physical injuries under paragraph I of Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, also qualified by quasi-recidivism but mitigated by voluntary surrender and
voluntary plea of guilty.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the finding of guilt but not in the imposition of the death penalty on Arturo Alicia
and Victor Bangayan. My vote is for reclusion perpetua on compassionate grounds which I
shall shortly explain But before I do so and at the risk of appearing immodest I should like to
state some of my credentials which are relevant to this opinion.
I became a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole in January, 1962 and its chairman in
August, 1970 when I was appointed Secretary of Justice until I assumed my present position
in January, 1979. As Secretary, later Minister of Justice, I had supervision and control over
the Bureau of Prisons.
It is the practice of the Board of Pardons and Parole to interview prisoners eligible or
applying for pardon or parole. For this purpose the Board goes to the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa every week and on occasions to the penal colonies, namely: lwahig, San Ramon,
Davao and Sablayan. So the members of the Board are thoroughly familiar with the
conditions in the prisons system.
The crime committed by Arturo and Victor in May, 1972, was only one of a series of gang
fights in the National Penitentiary. They were spawned by the miserable and inhuman
conditions which obtained at the New Bilibid Prison before and during that time. There was
then over-crowding resulting in a filthy environment. Neglect of the prisons system was the
rule under the Old Society for the financial priorities were the over-staffing of offices and the
pork barrel. Since human an beings were made to five like animals, it was not surprising that
they behaved like animals. Hence, the crime committed by Arturo and Victor can be said to
be the result of the conditions of their confinement due to the lack of affirmative action on the
part of their government. For compassionate reasons I consider their living conditions as an
analogous mitigating circumstance. Hence my vote for life imprisonment.
Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:

As the two accused conspired to assault the four victims, they are guilty of four separate
crimes: murder, two frustrated murders and the attempted murder (People vs. Peralta, L-
19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 769, 779). For the killing of Pedro Madjos, which was
murder, the death penalty was properly imposed. The assaults on Felipe Macerin and Sulficio
Sulina were properly characterized as frustrated murders. The assault on Victorio Sansanan,
which resulted in the infliction of a superficial lacerated wound that was not fatal was only
attempted murder. Four penalties should have been imposed on the accused But because they
did not appeal only the death penalty is under automatic review. I concur in that part of the
lower court's decision imposing the death penalty.
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment finding the two appellants herein, Arturo Alicia and Victor
Bangayan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder committed on the person
of Pedro Madjos and sentencing them to the extreme penalty of death and the payment of
indemnity of P12,000 and damages, P5,000 moral and P5,000 exemplary jointly and
severally and their respective proportionate part of the costs. I am morally convinced the
evidence on record justifies such judgment.
But as there were three other victims who separately or individually suffered injuries as a
result of the concerted action, premeditated and treacherously perpetrated on them by both of
said appellants, I find myself unable to agree with the affirmance of the trial court's sentence
finding them guilty only of multiple frustrated murder, with one single penalty for each of
them under Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code. I do not find it to be in conformity with
the facts and the law to disregard the obvious circumstances that, as Justice Aquino points
out, each of the separate assaults on each of the victims constituted a distinct offense in itself
and should be penalized accordingly. Thus, there were also two frustrated murders with
Felipe Macerin and Sulficio Sulina as vice and a case of attempted murder of Victorio
Sansanan committed on the same occasion. In other words, in addition to the death penalty
that each of the appellants should suffer for the killing of Madjos, they should also be
separately sentenced each to the penalties for the frustrated murders of Macerin and Sulina
also separately, and in addition, for the attempted murder of Sansanan.
In connection with the observation of Justice Aquino that this case is on review by Us only as
to the death penalty, hence We cannot impose the other penalties I have discussed, it is my
considered view that it is of no consequence juridically speaking that appellants did not
expressly appeal from the portion of the judgment regarding the other offenses. There might
have been some confusion in the minds of the defense counsel in regard to this point because
of the mandatory automatic review of the death sentence that caused such omission to make
the necessary appeal. It is to my mind an act of simple justice devoid of technicalities of
procedure to consider this automatic review as including already the appeal of the other
adverse parts of the judgment against them, regardless of whether or not they have separately
appealed from them. I am persuaded that considering the circumstance that the offenses under
discussion were committed on the same occasion, this procedure I have explained is in
consonance with the reasons that underlie Section 17(1) of the Judiciary Act which provides
as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts as herein provided, in —
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished arose out
of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same
occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused
are charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly
or separately;
It would be tragic and a grave injustice if, for instance, the evidence before Us were not
sufficiently convincing as to the guilt of the appellant's of the other offenses and for the
reason alone that they did not separately appeal, we would leave the unappealed judgment
regarding them uncorrected. Such a result would not only be unfair, it would be absurd.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
1. No treachery — The attack on the victims was committed in the early morning while the
victims were lying and confined in Ward 3 of the prison hospital floor together with the
accused. Considering that there were four (4) victims and the presence of the guard in the
said ward, treachery indicate that the four victims could not easily be overpowered by the two
assailants and that the guards could frustrate their criminal design as in fact the timely arrival
of the prison guards, in the language of the information, "deterred the accused from inflicting
further injuries on the victims."
2. No evident premeditation, because only a few hours transpired between the decision to
commit the crime in the evening of May 1, 1972, and the actual commission of the same at
about 5:00 o'clock the following morning. There was no time for reflection and persistence in
the decision to commit the act since between the previous night and 5:00 o'clock the
following morning, certainly the accused were sleeping, during which time they could not
possibly have deliberated on the consequences of their intended crime.
3. Lack of intent to kill the victims, mitigates the offense. This was affirmed by the accused
Arturo Alicia, who stated that on May 2, 1972, he had a drinking spree with his companions
using the alcohol he bought from the hospital attendant; that he had no intention to kill the
deceased and that on the date of the incident, he was confined in the hospital because he was
vomiting blood, which testimony has not been rebutted by the State, If both appellants were
also confined in the hospital their ailment must have sapped them of the required strength to
successfully assault the victims.
The dehumanizing prison conditions mentioned by Justice Abad Santos in his concurring and
dissenting opinion might have also provoked the appellants to act the way they did.
4. Consequently, for the death of prisoner Pedro Madjos, appellants should be convicted only
of simple homicide, aggravated by quasi-recidivism but mitigated by damage exceeding
intent, voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of guilty.
From the evidence, the injuries inflicted on prisoner Felipe Macerin and Sulficio Sulina were
cured after ten (10) days but before the expiration of thirty (30) days. Hence, appellants
should only be convicted of less serious physical injuries under paragraph 1, Article 265 of
the Revised Penal Code, likewise aggravated by quasi-recidivism but mitigated by voluntary
surrender and voluntary plea of guilty.
For the superficial wound inflicted on prisoner Victoria Sansanan, appellants could be
convicted only of slight physical injuries under paragraph I of Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, also qualified by quasi-recidivism but mitigated by voluntary surrender and
voluntary plea of guilty.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the finding of guilt but not in the imposition of the death penalty on Arturo Alicia
and Victor Bangayan. My vote is for reclusion perpetua on compassionate grounds which I
shall shortly explain But before I do so and at the risk of appearing immodest I should like to
state some of my credentials which are relevant to this opinion.
I became a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole in January, 1962 and its chairman in
August, 1970 when I was appointed Secretary of Justice until I assumed my present position
in January, 1979. As Secretary, later Minister of Justice, I had supervision and control over
the Bureau of Prisons.
It is the practice of the Board of Pardons and Parole to interview prisoners eligible or
applying for pardon or parole. For this purpose the Board goes to the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa every week and on occasions to the penal colonies, namely: lwahig, San Ramon,
Davao and Sablayan. So the members of the Board are thoroughly familiar with the
conditions in the prisons system.
The crime committed by Arturo and Victor in May, 1972, was only one of a series of gang
fights in the National Penitentiary. They were spawned by the miserable and inhuman
conditions which obtained at the New Bilibid Prison before and during that time. There was
then over-crowding resulting in a filthy environment. Neglect of the prisons system was the
rule under the Old Society for the financial priorities were the over-staffing of offices and the
pork barrel. Since human an beings were made to five like animals, it was not surprising that
they behaved like animals. Hence, the crime committed by Arturo and Victor can be said to
be the result of the conditions of their confinement due to the lack of affirmative action on the
part of their government. For compassionate reasons I consider their living conditions as an
analogous mitigating circumstance. Hence my vote for life imprisonment.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
As the two accused conspired to assault the four victims, they are guilty of four separate
crimes: murder, two frustrated murders and the attempted murder (People vs. Peralta, L-
19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 769, 779). For the killing of Pedro Madjos, which was
murder, the death penalty was properly imposed. The assaults on Felipe Macerin and Sulficio
Sulina were properly characterized as frustrated murders. The assault on Victorio Sansanan,
which resulted in the infliction of a superficial lacerated wound that was not fatal was only
attempted murder. Four penalties should have been imposed on the accused But because they
did not appeal only the death penalty is under automatic review. I concur in that part of the
lower court's decision imposing the death penalty.
BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment finding the two appellants herein, Arturo Alicia and Victor
Bangayan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder committed on the person
of Pedro Madjos and sentencing them to the extreme penalty of death and the payment of
indemnity of P12,000 and damages, P5,000 moral and P5,000 exemplary jointly and
severally and their respective proportionate part of the costs. I am morally convinced the
evidence on record justifies such judgment.
But as there were three other victims who separately or individually suffered injuries as a
result of the concerted action, premeditated and treacherously perpetrated on them by both of
said appellants, I find myself unable to agree with the affirmance of the trial court's sentence
finding them guilty only of multiple frustrated murder, with one single penalty for each of
them under Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code. I do not find it to be in conformity with
the facts and the law to disregard the obvious circumstances that, as Justice Aquino points
out, each of the separate assaults on each of the victims constituted a distinct offense in itself
and should be penalized accordingly. Thus, there were also two frustrated murders with
Felipe Macerin and Sulficio Sulina as vice and a case of attempted murder of Victorio
Sansanan committed on the same occasion. In other words, in addition to the death penalty
that each of the appellants should suffer for the killing of Madjos, they should also be
separately sentenced each to the penalties for the frustrated murders of Macerin and Sulina
also separately, and in addition, for the attempted murder of Sansanan.
In connection with the observation of Justice Aquino that this case is on review by Us only as
to the death penalty, hence We cannot impose the other penalties I have discussed, it is my
considered view that it is of no consequence juridically speaking that appellants did not
expressly appeal from the portion of the judgment regarding the other offenses. There might
have been some confusion in the minds of the defense counsel in regard to this point because
of the mandatory automatic review of the death sentence that caused such omission to make
the necessary appeal. It is to my mind an act of simple justice devoid of technicalities of
procedure to consider this automatic review as including already the appeal of the other
adverse parts of the judgment against them, regardless of whether or not they have separately
appealed from them. I am persuaded that considering the circumstance that the offenses under
discussion were committed on the same occasion, this procedure I have explained is in
consonance with the reasons that underlie Section 17(l) of the Judiciary Act which provides
as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts as herein provided, in –
(1) all criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished arose out
of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same
occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused
are charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, or whether they have been tried jointly
or separately;
It would be tragic and a grave injustice if, for instance, th0e evidence before Us were not
sufficiently convincing as to the guilt of the appellant's of the other offenses and for the
reason alone that they did not separately appeal, we would leave the unappealed judgment
regarding them uncorrected. Such a result would not only be unfair, it would be absurd.
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
1. No treachery – The attack on the victims was committed in the early morning while the
victims were lying and confined in Ward 3 of the prison hospital floor together with the
accused. Considering that there were four (4) victims and the presence of the guard in the
said ward, treachery indicate that the four victims could not easily be overpowered by the two
assailants and that the guards could frustrate their criminal design as in fact the timely arrival
of the prison guards, in the language of the information, "deterred the accused from inflicting
further injuries on the victims."
2. No evident premeditation, because only a few hours transpired between the decision to
commit the crime in the evening of May 1, 1972, and the actual commission of the same at
about 5:00 o'clock the following morning. There was no time for reflection and persistence in
the decision to commit the act since between the previous night and 5:00 o'clock the
following morning, certainly the accused were sleeping, during which time they could not
possibly have deliberated on the consequences of their intended crime.
3. Lack of intent to kill the victims, mitigates the offense. This was affirmed by the accused
Arturo Alicia, who stated that on May 2, 1972, he had a drinking spree with his companions
using the alcohol he bought from the hospital attendant; that he had no intention to kill the
deceased and that on the date of the incident, he was confined in the hospital because he was
vomiting blood, which testimony has not been rebutted by the State, If both appellants were
also confined in the hospital their ailment must have sapped them of the required strength to
successfully assault the victims.
The dehumanizing prison conditions mentioned by Justice Abad Santos in his concurring and
dissenting opinion might have also provoked the appellants to act the way they did.
4. Consequently, for the death of prisoner Pedro Madjos, appellants should be convicted only
of simple homicide, aggravated by quasi-recidivism but mitigated by damage exceeding
intent, voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of guilty.
From the evidence, the injuries inflicted on prisoner Felipe Macerin and Sulficio Sulina were
cured after ten (10) days but before the expiration of thirty (30) days. Hence, appellants
should only be convicted of less serious physical injuries under paragraph 1, Article 265 of
the Revised Penal Code, likewise aggravated by quasi- recidivism but mitigated by voluntary
surrender and voluntary plea of guilty.
For the superficial wound inflicted on prisoner Victoria Sansanan, appellants could be
convicted only of slight physical injuries under paragraph I of Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code, also qualified by quasi-recidivism but mitigated by voluntary surrender and
voluntary plea of guilty.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the finding of guilt but not in the imposition of the death penalty on Arturo Alicia
and Victor Bangayan. My vote is for reclusion perpetua on compassionate grounds which I
shall shortly explain But before I do so and at the risk of appearing immodest I should like to
state some of my credentials which are relevant to this opinion.
I became a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole in January, 1962 and its chairman in
August, 1970 when I was appointed Secretary of Justice until I assumed my present position
in January, 1979. As Secretary, later Minister of Justice, I had supervision and control over
the Bureau of Prisons.
It is the practice of the Board of Pardons and Parole to interview prisoners eligible or
applying for pardon or parole. For this purpose the Board goes to the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa every week and on occasions to the penal colonies, namely: lwahig, San Ramon,
Davao and Sablayan. So the members of the Board are thoroughly familiar with the
conditions in the prisons system.
The crime committed by Arturo and Victor in May, 1972, was only one of a series of gang
fights in the National Penitentiary. They were spawned by the miserable and inhuman
conditions which obtained at the New Bilibid Prison before and during that time. There was
then over-crowding resulting in a filthy environment. Neglect of the prisons system was the
rule under the Old Society for the financial priorities were the over-staffing of offices and the
pork barrel. Since human an beings were made to five like animals, it was not surprising that
they behaved like animals. Hence, the crime committed by Arturo and Victor can be said to
be the result of the conditions of their confinement due to the lack of affirmative action on the
part of their government. For compassionate reasons I consider their living conditions as an
analogous mitigating circumstance. Hence my vote for life imprisonment.
G.R. No. L-38624 July 25, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
CONRADO BAUTISTA and GERARDO ABUHIN, defendants and appellants.
Natividad Maravilla Dato as Counsel de Oficio for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo C.
Nakar, Jr., and Celia Lipana-Reyes for appellee.

PER CURIAM:
Mandatory review of the death penalty imposed by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal
in its decision in case "CC-VII-847-Rizal" for Murder, entitled "People vs. Conrado Bautista
and Gerardo Abuhin", the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin, GUILTY,
beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of Murder, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences each one of them to suffer
the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the heirs of the offended party the amount of
P12,000.00; to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages; and another P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.
Prisoners George Daeng, No, 56088-P; Rolando Castillo, No. 31087-C (these two already
sentenced previously); Conrado Bautista, No. 71055-P; Gerardo Abuhin, No. 61409-P who
are serving sentence by virtue of final judgment, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa,
Rizal, were accused of Murder, committed as follows: .
That on or about December 13, 1970, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa, Rizal,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused while then
confined at the said institution, conspiring, confederating and acting together and each armed
with improvised deadly weapons, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and would therewith one Basilio Beltran, No. 71495-P, another convicted prisoner
serving final sentence in the same institution, then in the process of serving the accused
breakfast, inflicting upon him multiple stab wounds while then unarmed and unable to defend
himself from the attack launched by the accused, as a result of which the said Basilio Beltran
died instantly.
That the offense when committed by the accused was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and obvious ungratefulness.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Both accused Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin were arraigned on March 10, 1973, and
they pleaded not guilty, after which the case went to trial on the merits. The evidence for the
prosecution established the following facts:
That on or about 6:15 in the morning of December 13, 1970, a stabbing incident took place
near the door of 8-C (cell house) at building 8; that the victim in said stabbing incident was
Basilio Beltran who was also a prisoner in the New Bilibid Prison with the rank of IC (Inmate
Cadet); that on said date and time, while prison guard Armando Miranda, assigned keeper at
Building 8 was then opening the door of 8-C, where members of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik
Gang were confined, with him were IC Basilio Beltran and Domingo Mallari, both confined
at dormitory 8-A-2, who were then carrying bread ration for breakfast of the Sigue-Sigue
Sputnik Gang at 8-C, when all of a sudden, the four accused, two of whom were already
sentenced, and two of whom were Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin, rushed out from
their cell and attacked and stabbed to death prisoner Basilio Beltran, while Domingo Mallari
sneaked away from the attackers; that the victim, Basilio Beltran, was facing the accused,
standing, carrying the breakfast ration for the occupants of 8-C when he was almost
simultaneously stabbed by his attackers as a result of which he sustained multiple stab
wounds, numbering 12 in all, on the different parts of his body; that the weapons used in
stabbing the victim were matalas or improvised deadly instruments; and an icepick which is
improvised also; that the accused were investigated by the investigators and they admitted
having killed the victim because of an alleged threat by the inmates cadets that they would
kill any member of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang everytime that the IC delivered their
ration, so that they moved ahead of the IC by taking that opportunity.
Their defenses of denial and alibi based on testimonial evidence of the accused, and their
claim that their written statements admitting the crime were extracted from them by force and
intimidation, consisted of:
The accused Conrado Bautista was placed on the witness stand and he testified that he was 28
years old, married and a woodcarver by Occupation and formerly residing at 2504 Cagayan
St., Sta. Ana, Manila, but now an inmate of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinglupa, Rizal, after
having been convicted by final judgment for the crane of Robbery. In the course of the direct
examination by counsel de oficio, Atty. Leonora M. Cabasal, accused Bautista intimated to
his counsel that he be allowed to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and that he be
allowed to substitute it with a plea of guilty. He was asked by his counsel, if he realized the
gravity of the offense that he has committed and he manifested that he realized the same; that
he realized the fact and he is aware that he would be penalized in accordance with law; that
he is determined to change his life because he wanted to be free, after serving his sentence.
However, during the cross examination of the prosecution when he was asked if he helped the
other accused, namely: Gerardo Abuhin, Rolando Castillo and George Daeng, in stabbing the
victim, Basilio Beltran, he answered in the negative, alleging that he was inside the bartolina
in that morning of December 13, 1970, when the victim was stabbed to death, and he only
admitted as a participant in the killing of the victim because Boy Coro (a Alfredo Mariano
poked him with an improvised weapon; that this Boy Coro according to him was the leader of
the Sputnik Gang and he was very powerful because Boy Coro was the one giving orders and
they were mere followers; that the statement he allegedly signed was not really his own
statement but that of the investigator who forced him to sign the same through force and
intimidation and maltreatment, but he did not file any charge against said investigator
according because according him he does not know anything about filing charges. With this
manifestation of the accused Conrado Bautista, the counsel de oficio moved that the former
plea of not guilty of said accused be allowed to remain on record, which was granted by the
Court, there being no objection on the part of the prosecution. So also, the defense of the
accused Gerardo Abuhin that he was lying down on his cell when he suddenly heard a
commotion and he stook up and took his weapon, when he saw many people coming out and
he heard someone shouting, "everybody must come out"; that what was stated in his
statement was not the real happening, because it was only his gawa-gawa, knowing that
Sarmiento and Coro were very powerful in their cell and if he would not follow, something
might be done against him; that it was not true that his co-accused Bautista was involved in
the stabbing and his conscience would not forgive him to implicate a man who was not really
a participant in that riot; that he was not able to add in his statement that Bautista was not
guilty because he was not asked about it and it did not occur to his mind to exculpate him in
the course of his giving a statement to the investigator; and that it would be against his
conscience if he would let Bautista suffer for anything that he did not commit; that he was
intimidated by investigator de las Alas into giving an extrajudicial confession and out of fear
he signed the same.
We have gone to great lengths in closely scrutinizing the evidence presented in this case, and
no amount of deeper probing can convince Us that the trial court committed any reversible
error in basing its judgment of conviction "on the testimonies of the prosecution eye
witnesses corroborating the statements in the extrajudicial confessions of the accused" (Exh.
"C-4"; Exh. "C-5").
An examination of the corroborated sworn statements of accused Rolando Castillo (already
sentenced on a plea of guilty, September 15, 1973) Exh. "C-1"; of Prison guard Armando
Miranda, Exhibit "C-2"; of accused George Daeng (already sentenced on a plea of guilty,
September 1, 1973), Exh. "C-3"; of accused Conrado Bautista, Exh. "C-4" of accused
Gerardo Abuhin, Exh. "C-5"; and of prisoner (inmate cadet) Domingo Mallari, Exh. "D",
shows that on the morning of December 13, 1970, at around 6:15 A.M., while prison guard
Armando Miranda accompanied by Inmate Cadets Basilio Beltran (victim) and Domingo
Mallari who carried bread and coffee, were about to give food to the prisoners in "Brigada 8-
C" under the stairs of "Brigada 8-A-2", located at New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal,
four prisoners, accused Rolando Castillo, George Daeng, Conrado Bautista, and Gerardo
Abuhin, all armed with "matalas" (improvised deadly weapons) suddenly pushed the cell
door and rushed out. While one of the four (Rolando Castillo) suddenly pointed his weapon at
prison guard Miranda, the other three simultaneously attacked and stabbed inmate cadet
Basilio Beltran; that accused Rolando Castillo joined the three others in stabbing the already
prostrate victim; and the attack happened so suddenly that it did not take half a minute for the
four accused to kill the victim. The other inmate cadet, Domingo Mallari, was able to get
away and give the alarm. Witness Domingo Mallari in his sworn statement Exh. "D" was able
to identify by their appearance, not by name, the four accused (Castillo, Abuhin, Bautista and
Daeng) out of ten prisoners in a line-up, as the prisoners who stabbed the victim. This same
witness stated that it was accused Conrado Bautista who first stabbed the victim.
We noticed from the sworn statements that they were all taken during the investigation
immediately conducted on the very day of the crime, December 13, 1970, except that of
prison guard Armando Miranda which was taken on December 15, 1970. The sworn
statement (Exh. "C-1") of accused Castillo given before PG Investigator, IS Ignacio J. Ferrer,
was taken in the presence of prison guard-investigator Jesus B. Tomagan, Chief Investigator
Benedicto R. Planta and Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos. The sworn statement
(Exh. "C-3") of accused George Daeng given before P.F. Jesus B. Tomagan was taken in the
presence of Security Officer B.R. Planta, P.G. Ignacio Ferrer and Administrative Officer
Exequiel A. Santos. The sworn statement (Exh. "C-4") of accused Conrado Bautista given
before P.G. Jesus B. Tomagan was taken in the presence of Chief Investigator Benedicto R.
Planta, Investigator Ignacio Ferrer and Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos. The sworn
statement (Exh. "C-5") of accused Gerardo Abuhin given before P. G. Abraham de las Alas
was taken in the presence of P. G. Ignacio J. Ferrer, P. G. Jesus B. Tomagan and
Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos.
The alleged threat and intimidation used in assailing the voluntariness of the extrajudicial
confessions of the four accused, being general in nature, becomes hardly credible in the face
of the overwhelming established facts and circumstances, as for instance (1) the judicial plea
of guilty of accused Castillo and Daeng (both of whom were already sentenced); (2) the very
apparently disinterested and truthful narrations of prison guard Miranda and inmate cadet
Mallari who were eye-witnesses to the crime and who positively identified the four accused
as the persons who stabbed the victim, there being no other prisoners who at that moment of
the crime could have participated in it; (3) the manifestly spontaneous narrations of the
circumstances that happened during the crime appearing in the sworn statements that were
executed on the very day the crime was committed, when those who participated and who
witnessed the crime did not have sufficient time to fabricate evidence and distort the truth; (4)
the fact that it would be difficult to presume that those disinterested investigators who were
present when the accused gave their sworn statements would subvert the ends of justice and
falsify the truth by utilizing force and intimidation on the accused, there being no indication
nor evidence that they have a motive or grudge against the accused; (5) and the fact that those
officials of the Bureau of Prisons were merely doing their duties in the regular course of
official business when they conducted the investigation to shed light on the crime committed.
The narration of the crime contained in the sworn statement of prisoner Domingo Mallari
(Exh. "D") who was an eyewitness to the crime substantially coincides with his testimony in
court in all material aspects and he was able to identify the four accused (Castillo, Abuhin,
Daeng, Bautista) when asked to do so during the trial (pp. 7-25 t.s.n. Hearing on August 25,
1973). The four improvised deadly weapons used by the accused in killing the victim were all
recovered and identified (pp. 3-8; 14-15, t.s.n. Hearing of September 1,
1973.).1äwphï1.ñët Prison guard Armando Miranda's testimony in court clearly corroborated
all his narrations contained in his sworn statement Exh. "C-2", pointing out without doubt
that the accused Bautista, Abuhin, Castillo and Daeng were the prisoners who rushed out of
their cell and stabbed the victim, Beltran, in the early morning of December 13, 1970 (t.s.n.
pp. 2-11, Hearing of April 28, 1973).
Accused Abuhin in his testimony in open court admitted that he participated in the killing and
stabbed twice, although he said he did so because he was hit and wounded by a knife thrown
from above (p. 5 t.s.n. Hearing of November 29, 1973). He declared that he gave his sworn
statement, Exh. "C-5", voluntarily Cpp. 6-7 t.s.n. Hearing of November 29, 1973). Accused
Bautista admitted in open court that the signature appearing on Exhibit "C-4" (his sworn
statement) is his (p. 7 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13, 1973). He claimed that he was
maltreated by investigator Ferrer to extract from him the confession contained in his sworn
statement. Yet he could not explain why notwithstanding the supposed injuries inflicted on
him, he could sign the sworn statement calmly without signs of nervousness or trembling; he
was not treated for his supposed injuries, was never hospitalized for them, and never reported
the supposed maltreatment to Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos whom he treated
like a father (pp. 7-9 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13, 1973).
Accused Bautista's very weak alibi was that on the morning of December 13, 1970, when the
crime was committed he was sleeping in his cell (pp. 9-10 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13,
1973). Witness Antonio Juaningco, another prisoner, tried to substantiate Bautista's alibi by
testifying that on the morning of December 13, 1970, accused Bautista was with him sleeping
in cell no. 9 and went out because they were awakened by a commotion and then saw the
victim Beltran already dead (p. 21 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13,
1973).1äwphï1.ñët Accused Abuhin when recalled to the witness stand did a complete
somersault on his previous testimony implicating Bautista when he stated that on that
occasion he did not see Bautista (p. 28 t.s.n. Hearing of December 13, 1973). The trial court
did not commit any mistake in not giving credit to the alibi of accused Bautista, for aside
from its inherent weakness as a defense, unsupported as it is by credible evidence, his alibi
cannot stand against the positive identification made by prison guard Miranda, witness
Mallari, and the very damaging sworn statements of his co-accused Castillo and Daeng both
of whom, by their plea of guilty, had been previously sentenced for the same crime with
which Bautista is charged. We consider of little significance the belated testimony of Castillo,
after he was convicted and sentenced, that Bautista was not a participant in the crime (pp. 2-6
t.s.n. Hearing of January 21, 1974). We are more inclined to give more credence to his sworn
statement (Exh. "C-1") given on the very date of the crime, considering that Castillo had
pleaded guilty to the crime of murder and he has nothing more to lose in subsequently
repudiating his previous narration of the crime implicating his co-accused Bautista. It is
likewise considered of no moment that another witness, prisoner Benito Balagtas, testified
that when the crime was committed in the early morning of December 13, 1970, accused
Bautista was sleeping in cell no. 13 (p. 4 t.s.n. Hearing of March 8, 1974).1äwphï1.ñët It is
very significant that while defense witness Antonio Juaningco testified that on the morning of
December 13, 1970, accused Bautista was with him sleeping in cell no. 9, this defense
witness Balagtas in turn testified that accused Bautista was sleeping in cell no. 13 on the very
same occasion. What a tragedy for the accused and a significant victory for truth that even the
very witnesses presented to establish an alibi for accused Bautista contradicted themselves on
a very material point. Neither do We give credence to the testimony of witness Ricardo Felix,
another prisoner, that on the morning of December 13, 1970, immediately after the killing of
victim Beltran, he saw prisoner Daeng, Boy Coro and Rolando Castillo "poking a knife to
Bautista" and threatening said Bautista to admit the crime.
We consider it an exercise in futility to discuss further the alleged errors committed by the
trial court in considering as generic aggravating circumstances the presence of obvious
ungratefulness and evident premeditation so as to impose the maximum penalty of death,
because Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code succintly provides that "any person who shall
commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, ..., or while serving the same,
shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new
felony". In passing, however, it may be stated that the consideration of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances is for the purpose of fixing the proper penalty within the
minimum, medium or maximum as provided by law, but We have no choice here other than
to impose the maximum because by mandate of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code a
person convicted of a crime while serving sentence for a previous crime shall get the
maximum of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony (murder), which is death,
without further regard of the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, or the
complete absence thereof.
The trial court correctly considered the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the
commission of the crime of murder. It was conclusively proven that the accused in a sudden,
concerted and unprovoked act, all of them being armed with improvised deadly weapons,
stabbed the victim to death after pushing their cell door open, threatening and throwing off-
guard Miranda when the victim who was holding in both hands the bread and coffee intended
for the breakfast of the assailants was not in a position to defend himself from the unexpected
assault.
As to the existence of evident premeditation, it was established by the following
circumstances: (1) the sudden concerted attack, perpetrated and calculated to throw off guard
the intended victim as he was in the act of giving food to the assailants, which attack
necessarily must have been planned; (2) that all of the accused were armed with improvised
deadly weapons which they were not supposed to possess and which they must have secretly
prepared for a long time for committing the crime; and (3) the admission on the part of the
accused in their sworn statements that they killed the victim by "attacking first" because they
had heard that the members of the rival gang would liquidate them, leading to the conclusion
that the accused must have planned how to counteract the supposed attack of the rival gang
by literally beating the latter to the draw.
The aggravating circumstance of obvious ungratefulness was present as the victim was
suddenly attacked while in the act of giving the assailants their bread and coffee for breakfast.
Instead of being grateful to the victim, at least by doing him no harm, they took advantage of
his helplessness when his two arms were used for carrying their food, thus preventing him
from defending himself from the sudden attack.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the requirements of
moral certainty in the evaluation of evidence have been more than adequately met. We have
no other alternative than to affirm the penalty of death imposed by the trial court, and all
other parts of the judgment.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma,
Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
[No. 3906-R. January 17, 1950] The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and appellee, vs.
Kong Leon alias Kim Huy, defendant and appellant.
1. Criminal Law; Counterfeiting of Foreign Coin; Act Punishable ALTHOUGH THE SAID
COIN IS WITHDRAWN FROM CntCULAtion; Art. 163, Revised Penal Code; Reason for
the Law. — If under articles 296 and 297 if the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 from which the
law punishing the fabrication and uttering of counterfeit coins (article 163, Revised Penal
Code) is evidently derived, the fabrication of a local (Spanish) coin withdrawn FEBRUARY,
1952 OFFICIAL GAZETTE from circulation is punishable, it stands to reason that the
counterfeiting of foreign coin, even if withdrawn from circulation in the foreign country of its
origin, should also be punishable, because the reason for punishing the fabrication of a local
coin withdrawn from circulation is not alone the harm caused to the public by the fact that it
may go into circulation, but the danger that a counterfeiter produces by his stay in the
country, and the possibility that he may later apply his trade to making of coins in actual
circulation. (See 4 Viada, pp. 23-26.)
2. Id.; Id.; Evidence; Judicial Notice of Acts of U. S. Congress Relating to Currency. — Since
article 163, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code punishes the fabrication or utterance of
counterfeited coin, which is "currency of a foreign country", the legal duty of the court to
enforce and apply the said penal provision in a case for counterfeiting U. S. gold dollar coins,
gives it the corresponding authority and obligation to take judicial notice of the acts of the
Congress of the United States and the executive orders and departmental regulations relating
to the currency of said country. The principle has already been laid down by our Supreme
Court in the case of U. S. vs. Clemente, 24, Phil., 178, with respect to municipal ordinances,
and we believe that its application to a foreign law, instead of a municipal ordinance, is the
same, for, paraphrasing the decision of our Supreme Couz-t in that case, the law of the United
States on its currency became a part of the general law (article 163, paragraph 3, Revised
Penal Code), which our courts of justice are bound to apply and enforce.
3. Foreign Laws; U. S. Gold Reserve Act of 1934; Efff,ct of the Law. — A study of the
provisions of the United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934 discloses that their effect is to
withdraw United States gold coins from circulation, although there is no intent to outlaw their
use and possession under rules and regulations that may be promulgated therefor. (United
States Statutes at Large, Vol. 48, Part 1, pp. 337-340; Farber vs. United States, 114, Fed., (2d)
5, 7, 8.) APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Natividad, J. The
facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Leonardo G. Marquez for appellant. Assistant
Solicitor General Ruperto Kapiman, Jr. and Solicitor Adolf o BriUantes for appellee.
Labrador, The accused-appellant herein is a goldsmith with a shop at No. 622 Bambang
Street, City of Manila, established after liberation and long before April 27, 1947. Prior to
this date the police had received information from Moro Arais Mansu that appellant was
selling illegally fabricated United States gold dollar coins. So on that day the police, headed
by Lt. Vicente Verzosa and duly provided with a search warrant, proceeded to search
appellant's shop and person. Before the search Lieutenant Verzosa had sent ahead Moro
Mansu to pretend buying dollar coins from appellant. In fact, when the police reached
appellant's place at about half past four in the afternoon of April 27, . 666 OFFICIAL
GAZETTE VOL. 48, No. 2 , ___ . 1947, Moro Arais Mansu was in the kitchen of appellant's
place talking with the latter. The place searched was a veritable goldsmith shop. One work
table was in public view, and another was in a small room which had a shingle with the
following inscription: "Fitting Room." This room was originally occupied by a Chinese tailor,
who had gone to China three months before. After he left, the room was occupied by a
Filipino tailor, but who was no longer using the room or the place outside, although there
were manikins still outside of said fitting room. As the police searched the shop, they found
goldsmith tools on the table inside the fitting room (t. s. n., p. 20) , namely, a balance, a box
containing a hammer, file etc., a hand saw, a piece of metal, a small bottle, a small bottle of
mercury, an anvil, a hand vise, one set of weights, galvanized iron tubes, a jeweler's anvil, a
blower, some Filipino coins, and a box with pieces of gold with false stones (Exhibits A, B,
C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, and O). The search was not made of No. 622 Bambang
Street alone, but also of No. 566, because the police suspected that it was in this store and
through its keepers that the appellant effected the sales of his illegally fabricated coins.
Nothing material, however, was found in these premises, and the store owners or keepers,
although brought to the police station for investigation, were not indicted. Among the articles
found in the table inside the "Fitting Room," aside from the goldsmith implements already set
forth above as Exhibits A to O, the police also found a gold foil (Exhibit P), a gold nagget
(Exhibit G), 15 onecentavo pieces (Exhibit R), a French gold coin, ten fivedollar American
gold coins with pins and one without pin (Exhibit T), one unfinished five-dollar coin (Exhibit
U), 2 unfinished ten-dollar U. S. gold coins (Exhibit V). According to Lieutenant Verzosa, he
also searched the person of the appellant and found in the latter's pocket eight pieces of
twenty-dollar U. S. gold coins wrapped in paper (Exhibit W). All of these articles were seized
by the police and brought to the station, with the appellant and the two Chinamen at 566
Bambang. At the police station appellant was subjected to questioning, through Justo Chan
Lu Cuy, a Chinese interpreter, a member of the police department of the city. The questions
propounded to appellant through said interpreter and his answer thereto were taken down in
writing. After the investigation the appellant signed the statement in the presence of the
police and the interpreter, both of whom signed as witnesses. This statement was presented at
the trial as Exhibit Y, and in it appellant expressly admits having fabricated the eight pieces
of finished dollar coins, the unfinished five-dollar and the two unfinished tenFebruary, 1952
OFFICIAL GAZETTE 667 dollar pieces (Yaon walong pirasong dollar na yari, dalawang (10
dollar) na hindi pa yari at isang pirasong (5- dollar) na hindi pa yari, ay gawa ko). The gold
pieces, naggets, and coins were referred to a chemist of the Manila Police Department. He
found that most of the gold dollar coins were genuine, but the unfinished coin marked Exhibit
U, the two unfinished tendollar gold coins marked Exhibit V, and the eight twentydollar coins
wrapped in paper and marked Exhibit W were all counterfeit, not being legitimate coins of
the United States as they seem to be. According to the chemist, genuine gold coins are
produced by impression, but the said coins (marked Exhibits U, V, and W, and identified as
Exhibits 4, 5, and 2, respectively, in the Chemist's Report) were not so fabricated, but by the
use of molds and then filed away, marks of filing at the edges were seen through the use of
stereoscope. He also determined their gold content by their specific gravity, and he found that
they were only 16 to 17 karats, whereas genuine U. S. gold dollars are 18 karats. Appellant
admitted that the goldsmith parapharnelia were his, and that the genuine coins also belonged
to him, and that they were taken from the drawers of his table. But he denied ownership of
the unfinished gold coins, Exhibits U and V, or of the eight pieces of finished twentydollar U.
S. gold coins, or that the latter were found in his person. He claimed that he occupied only a
space of one by three meters square in front of the store, and that he never went inside the
fitting room. In support of his claim that the eight gold coins were not found in his person,
Detective Benito Maloles, one of those who accompanied Lieutenant Verzosa in the search,
declared that when the latter searched the person of appellant, he was in front, and that the
eight pieces were not then found in appellant's person. Another witness corroborated his
testimony in this respect, one Romy Lacorte, the wife of a Chinaman who was living near the
appellant's shop. On the basis of the above evidence the Court of First Instance of Manila
declared appellant guilty of a violation of article 163, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentenced him to an indeterminate sentence of not less than two (2) months of
arresto mayor, nor more than one (1) year, one (1) month, and eleven (11) days of prision
correctional, to the accessory penalties provided by law, to a fine of P500, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Against this judgment appellant has
prosecuted this appeal, assigning the following errors in his brief : "1. The lower court erred
in entertaining and admitting in evidence appellant's written admission of guilt, marked as
affidavit Y, over and above the objection interposed by counsel for the defense. "2. The lower
court erred in finding that (1) Exhibit W was found in the pocket of appellant and (2) that
Exhibits U, V, and other coins were found in the tailor's fitting room at 622 Bambang Street,
Manila; which finding was based upon the uncorroborated, intrinsically weak and doubtful
testimony of Lieutenant Verzoza. "3. The lower court erred in finding and holding that the
five coins in question hereby belonged to appellant; that he manufactured some of them; that
said coins were sold by him in a store at 622 Bambang Street, Manila. "4. The lower court
erred in not holding that the disputed coins were not proven to be counterfeit, beyond
reasonable doubt. "5. The lower court erred in not holding that appellant can not be held
liable and punishable under the legal provision relied upon, paragraph 3, article 163 of the
Revised Penal Code; and in not dismissing outright this case. "6. The lower court erred in not
acquitting the appellant upon ground of reasonable doubt on the question of facts, and/or in
not dismissing this case outright of the question of law." The claim made in appellant's first
assignment to the effect that appellant's written statement, Exhibit Y, was improperly
admitted because it is hearsay, is without merit. Said statement was made and was signed by
appellant himself, in answer to questions propounded to him, and constitutes a confession as
defined in section 14 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. The interpreter is not the one who
made the statements ; it was appellant himself, through interpretation. The case of U. S. vs.
Chu Chia, 6 Phil., 260, refers to a supposed confession made to an interpreter, which is
testified to by another witness, not the interpreter. It is evident that in this case the testimony
is hearsay. Appellant's statement, however, is in writing and is signed by him; it certainly is
not hearsay, but his own confession. In appellant's second assignment of error it is claimed
that the testimony of Lieutenant Verzosa that he found the eight pieces of ten-dollar gold
coins, Exhibit W, should not be believed because it is contradicted by those of the witnesses
for the defense, and because it is immoral to admit the same, the transaction relating thereto
having been induced by said lieutenant, and that his testimony as to the others, Exhibits U
and V, should neither be believed under the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus. It is
not true that there is nothing in the record to corroborate Lieutenant Verzosa's testimony that
he found the eight pieces of gold coins in appellant's pocket ; in the confession of the
appellant, Exhibit Y, he expressly admits that he made them (sui?ra) . On the other hand, the
testimony of Detective Maloles is not clear. Thus he said: The Fiscal: Q. And the eight pieces
of 10-dollar U. S. gold coins which, you said were found in a box outside the tailor fitting
room? — A. There is misunderstanding, because it is not eight pieces that were found in the
room but two pieces were found outside at 566 Bambang in the boxes of Kong Leong.
February, 1952 TCIAL GAZETTE 669 "Q. What were those found in a box outside? — A. In
the drawer. "Q. What were those? — A. The eight pieces of gold; two pieces were taken from
outside." (T. s. n., pp. 40-41, session of June 15, 1948.) So that Detective Maloles believes
that the eight ten-dollar gold coins were taken from appellant's shop. Assuming, therefore,
that Lieutenant Verzosa's testimony is incorrect, in so far as the place where the eight ten-
dollar pieces were found, that does not mean that they were not found in the possession of
appellant, as the latter had admitted and Detective Maloles asserted. The discrepancy is
immaterial because appellant had possession and control thereof anyway. The contention that
Lieutenant Verzosa's testimony is immoral under the principle contained in People vs.
Abella, 46 Phil., 857, does not lie in the case at bar. Lieutenant Verzosa had ordered Moro
Arais Mansu to pretend to buy U. S. gold coins from the appellant, not to induce appellant to
counterfeit them and then sell them to him. Moro Arais Mansu was supposed to buy
legitimate coins, and appellant was expected to bring out his counterfeit coins instead. There
was, therefore, no inducement to commit an offense. It was a simple trick to catch the
appellant in flagrante. In appellant's third assignment of error it is argued that there was no
proof that he owned the fitting room, or that he manufactured the gold coins in question.
Lieutenant Verzosa testified that all the goldsmith implements were found on a table in the
fitting room (t. s. n., pp. 15, 20). At the time of the investigation appellant admitted the room
to be his (Ibid., p. 15). He also admits ownership of the implements found on the table in this
room, and they could not have been anybody else's because the tailor was no longer
occupying the room, and because the implements were those of a goldsmith and not of a
tailor. No one in said premises was a goldsmith but appellant. To our mind the above
circumstantial evidence proves beyond peradventure of a doubt that the room was appellant's
and the parapharnelia found therein, together with the unfinished coins, Exhibits U and V,
also found therein, are his. Neither can the argument that there was no proof that the fake
coins were fabricated by appellant be given any weight whatever. Again, the circumstantial
evidence proves the fact beyond any dispute. Appellant was a goldsmith by profession. He
had a shop and all the implements and materials used in the trade. The making of coins is
something entirely within the scope of his knowledge and ability. The counterfeit coins were
found in his working table. He admitted having made them in his statement before the police
(Exhibit Y). All these 26571 12 670 OFFICIAL GAZETTE VOL. 48, No. 2 also constitute
proof beyond reasonable doubt that he made the counterfeit coins. It is not necessary that
somebody testify to having seen appellant fabricating coins. The above circumstances, in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation on his part as to how he came into possession of the
coins, show beyond doubt that he did fabricate them, in the same manner that the unexplained
possession of recently stolen articles proves that thereof. The fifth assignment of error raises
the legal contention that gold coins have ceased to be a currency of the United States by the
operation of the provisions of the United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934, and that the
appellant may not, therefore, be considered guilty of a violation of article 163, paragraph 3,
of the Revised Penal Code. The learned judge of the trial court held that the provisions of the
said Act of the Congress of the United States, known as the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 (G. R.
6976, Public, No. 87), only withdraw gold coins from circulation temporarily, but did not
declare them as illegal or valueless, or no longer currency or legal tender. The Solicitor
General, in support of the judgment of conviction, argues that only the circulation of gold
coins was suspended, as may be seen from the title of the Act. No evidence was admitted in
the course of the trial in the court below as to the United States statute in question, and
ordinarily we may not take judicial cognizance thereof. In view of the fact, however, that
article 163, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code punishes the fabrication or utterance of
counterfeited coin, which is "currency of a foreign country," our legal duty to enforce and
apply the said penal provision gives us the corresponding authority and obligation to take
judicial notice of the acts of the Congress of the United States and the executive orders and
departmental regulations relating to the currency of said country. The use of the term "foreign
currency" in the penal statute, in order to be applied and enforced in this jurisdiction, requires
us to know the laws of the foreign country to determine what the currency is. The principle
has already been laid down by our Supreme Court in the case of U. S. vs. Clemente, 24 Phil.,
178, with respect to municipal ordinances, and we believe that its application to a* foreign
law, instead of a municipal ordinance, is the same, for, paraphrasing the decision of our
Supreme Court in that case, the law of the United States on its currency became a part of the
general law (article 163), paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code) , which our courts of justice are
bound to apply and enforce. A study of the provisions of the United States Gold Reserve Act
of 1934 discloses that their effect is to withdraw United States gold coins from circulation,
although February, 1952 OFFICIAL GAZETTE 671 there is no intent to outlaw their use and
possession under rules and regulations that may be promulgated therefor. This may be
inferred from the following provisions of the said Act: AN ACT TO PROTECT THE
CURRENCY SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES, TO PROVIDE FOR THE BETTER
USE OF THE MONETARY GOLD STOCK OF THE UNITED STATES, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. <
People vs. Tin Ching Ting G.R. No. L-4620
People vs. Lera CA-G.R. No. 16990 –R
People vs. Go Po, G.R. No. 42697
G.R. No. L-22032 March 4, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
CAMOLO DIGORO alias PANONDIONGAN, defendant and appellant.
Mamintal Tamano for the defendant and appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for the plaintiff and appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
An information charging Counterfeiting of Treasury and Bank Notes under Article 166 of the
Revised Penal Code was filed in the Court of First Instance of Lanao on June 3, 1959 against
Camolo Digoro alias Panondiongan, Hadji Solaiman Digoro and Macasasab Dalomangcob.
Amended informations charging the same offense were filed on June 5, 1959 and August 13,
1959. On August 14, 1959, upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, on March 20, 1961, the case was provisionally dismissed, upon the Provincial
Fiscal's motion, in regard to the accused Hadji Solaiman Digoro and Macasasab
Dalomangcob. On that date, however, an amended information was filed against Camolo
Digoro alias Panondiongan. It was captioned "For: Illegal Possession of Counterfeit Treasury
and Bank Notes".
As follows is the body of said amended information:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses CAMOLO DIGORO alias PANONDIONGAN of
the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF COUNTERFEIT TREASURY AND BANK
NOTES, committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1959 and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipal
District of Taraka, Province of Lanao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to possess, have in his possession, custody and control, 100-peso bill, 20-peso bill,
10-peso bill, 5-peso bill, 2-peso bill and 1-Peso bill denominations in resemblance or
similitude to a genuine treasury or bank notes issued by the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines, to wit:
1. 26 pieces 20-peso bill with serial No. AC 665154
2. 3 pieces 1-peso bill half face
3. 5 pieces 2-peso bill half face
4. 6 pieces 5-peso bill one half face
5. 5 pieces 10-peso bill one half face
6. 24 pieces 20-peso bill one half face
7. 4 pieces 20-peso bill one half face
8. 1 piece 1-peso bill with serial No. DUI76494
9. 2 pieces 100-peso bill with serial No. F00933623
10. 2 pieces 10-peso bill reverse bill with VICTORY printed
11. 1 piece 20-peso bill with serial No. AD828751
12. 1 piece 20-peso bill with serial No. 66 SN FO2555823
13. 6 pieces 20-peso bill with serial No. SN AC 665154
14. 5 pieces 1-peso bill one half face
15. 1 piece 20-peso bill with serial No. F02555823
16. 1 piece 20-peso bill one half face
17. 8 pieces 20-peso bill with serial No. SN BA910645
18. 1 piece 10-peso bill
19. 68 pieces 20-peso bill
20. 83 pieces 20-peso bill with serial No. AC665154
21. 1 piece 20-peso bill with serial No. V 177393
Contrary to and in violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.
A plea of not guilty was entered thereto by the accused, with the assistance of counsel, on the
same day. A decision was thereupon rendered sentencing the accused to suffer imprisonment
of not more than ten (10) years and one (1) day and not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day, and to pay the costs.
From said judgment the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the
amended information to which he pleaded guilty, does not charge an offense. Said appeal was
thereafter certified to this Court, by resolution of the Court of Appeals dated September 11,
1963, as involving questions purely of law.
Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone without anything more, is not a criminal
offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code the
possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. From the provision of
the law the foregoing is clear:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of
credit.—Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding
articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any
of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
It follows that an information, as in this case, alleging possession of false treasury and bank
notes without alleging intent to use the same but only "intent to possess" them, charges no
offense. A plea of guilty to such an information, therefore, does not warrant conviction of the
accused. It is well recognized that a plea of guilty is an admission only of the material
allegations of the information but not that the facts thus alleged constitute an offense (People
vs. Fortuno, 73 Phil. 407).
From the allegations in the information to which the accused pleaded guilty, intent to use
cannot be clearly inferred. It is true it was stated that the accused possessed the false treasury
and bank notes "unlawfully and feloniously ... Contrary to and in violation of Article 168 of
the Revised Penal Code". Such statements, however, are not allegations of facts but
mere conclusions that the facts alleged constitute the offense sought to be charged.
Furthermore, the information alleged "intent to possess" instead of intent to use. Such
allegation precludes clear inference of intent to use, in the absence of express allegation of
the latter, since intent to use entails intent to part with the possession.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed is hereby set aside and the case is remanded for new
prosecution under an appropriate and valid information. Costs de oficio. So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
[ CA-No. 50, Apr 13, 1946 ]
PEOPLE v. NICASIO BARRAQUIA
76 Phil. 490

PERFECTO, J.:
Appellant is accused of illegal possession and use of a false bank note of ten-peso
denomination. The lower court found him guilty and, appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction, he being illiterate, sentenced him to suffer one year
of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P50, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, to suffer the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs.
On March 21, 1941, at about 3:50 p.m. appellant went to the post office of Calamba, Laguna,
for the purpose of changing a ten-peso bank note, Exhibit A. The postmaster told the accused
that the note was false and placed it near the window, and thereupon sent for a policeman to
arrest the accused. The accused waited for the policeman to arrive at the post office. He
admitted to the policeman that the note was his, and the policeman took him to the municipal
building where he was investigated by the chief of police. At the investigation, accused
explained that the bank note was passed to him in a game of cara y cruz in the barrio of
Mamatid, Cabuyao, Laguna, the night previous.
Three witnesses testified for the prosecution.
1. Vicente C. Reventar, cashier of the provincial treasury of Laguna, testified that : he had
experience in handling bank notes of ten-peso denomination; he can distinguish a counterfeit
from a genuine one; in his opinion, Exhibit A is a counterfeit because the printing is
somewhat blurred and the paper is very oily. (T.s.n., pp. 1, 2.)
2. Maximo Pascasio testified that: he is the postmaster of Calamba; on March 21, 1941,
accused went to his office to change a bank note of ten-peso denomination; he did not change
it because he saw that it was not genuine; he ordered that a policeman be called; accused
admitted to the policeman that he is the owner of the bank note, and the policeman brought
him for investigation to the municipal building; the policeman arrived after seven minutes;
when he told accused that the bank note was a counterfeit, the accused kept silent; accused
had occasion to go away before the arrival of the policeman, but he preferred to remain;
accused followed the policeman to the municipal building without offering any resistance.
(T.s.n., pp. 3 to 5.)
3. Jose M. Elefaño testified that: he is the chief of police of Calamba; he investigated the
accused who told him that he received the bank note in a game of cara y cruz in the barrio of
Mamatid, Cabuyao, the night before; accused could not identify the persons with whom he
played the game, many persons took part in the game, but the witness did not make any
investigation because it took place in Mamatid, within the municipal jurisdiction of Cabuyao.
(T.s.n., pp. 6 to 8.)
Upon his own testimony accused appears to be an illiterate laborer, who does not know how
to read or write. He testified that he happened to know that the bill in question was a
counterfeit only when the postmaster of Calamba informed him so, but for himself he cannot
distinguish a counterfeit note from a genuine one; and that if he had known that Exhibit A
was a counterfeit, he would not have gone to the post office of Calamba to have it changed.
Upon the evidence in this case, we cannot find enough ground to declare appellant guilty of
the crime charged in the information. The only evidence presented by the prosecution to the
effect that the bank note in question was a counterfeit is the testimony of cashier Vicente C.
Reventar of the provincial treasury of Laguna who stated that the printing of the bill is
somewhat blurred and the paper is very oily. We do not believe that these two circumstances
may be considered as enough basis for declaring the bill in question as falsified. The fact that
the printing is somewhat blurred may be attributed to the overuse of an old printed matter.
That the bank bill is oily is not an evidence of counterfeit bill, because any bank note may
become oily by impregnation with an oily liquid. According to the decision of the lower
court, the bill Exhibit A bears No. D462691D. No evidence has been presented that this
number does not check with the genuine one issued with the same number. There is no
evidence as to the kind of bank note Exhibit A was, and we are not in a position to determine
what it was or to determine that the two circumstances mentioned by witness Reventar may
really be considered evidence of falsification, because Exhibit A has disappeared and could
not be submitted to us for our examination.
The facts brought out in this case do not prove conclusively either that the lost Exhibit A is a
counterfeited bank note or that, if it really is, appellant had knowledge of the fact before the
postmaster of Calamba called a policeman to put him under custody.
For all the foregoing, the appellant is acquitted of the crime charged in the information, with
costs de oficio.
Ozaeta, De Joya, Hilado, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 1934. April 29, 1905. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN DE LEON, ET AL., Defendants-

Appellants.

Antonio V . Herrero, for Appellants.

Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. COUNTERFEITING; UTTERING. — To sustain a conviction of the crime of uttering a
counterfeit bank note, as defined and penalized in article 292 of the Penal Code, it must
affirmatively appear that the accused knew that the note was counterfeit at the time it was
uttered.

DECISION
CARSON, J. :
Juan de Leon and Albino de Leon, the accused in this case, were found guilty in the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac of the crime of uttering a counterfeit bank note, as defined and
penalized in article 292 of the Penal Code, and sentenced to two years and five months of
presidio correccional and a fine of 625 pesetas and the payment of the costs of the
proceedings.

The case comes, to this court upon the appeal of Albino de Leon, no appeal having been
entered on behalf of his coaccused, Juan de Leon. It appears that the accused were brothers,
and that Juan de Leon having paid a debt with a counterfeit 50-peso note of the Spanish-
Filipino Bank, and the creditor having expressed some doubt as to the genuineness of the
note, the said Albino de Leon assured him that the said note was good, and promised that if it
should prove to be counterfeit he himself would make good the loss. It was further shown
that the note was in fact counterfeit and that the said Albino de Leon refused to make good
the amount as he had promised.

The crime with which the appellant was charged is defined and penalized in article 292 of the
Penal Code, and in order that it may exist must be shown affirmatively that the note in
question was uttered knowing it to be counterfeit.

It was not proven that Albino de Leon was aware that the note in question was counterfeit
when he aided his brother in uttering it, and guilty knowledge of this fact being an essential
element of the crime with which he was charged, he should not have been convicted either as
principal or accomplice.

The sentence appealed from should therefore be reversed in so far as it affects the said Albino
de Leon, with the costs of this appeal and one-half the costs of the proceedings in the trial
court de oficio. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.

[ GR Nos. 43250, Aug 22, 1935 ]
PEOPLE v. MANUEL VALDES VACANI
61 Phil. 796

DIAZ, J.:
Manuel Valdes Vacani was charged with and convicted of unlawful possession of a revolver,
marked LLC & X, caliber .32, with five bullets, in violation of section 2692 in connection
with section 878 of the Revised Administrative Code, in criminal case No. 47899 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila (G. R. No. 43250); and of unlawful possession of 192
counterfeit 5-peso bills, in violation of article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, in criminal case
No. 47900 of said court (G. R. No. 43251). In the first case he was sentenced to pay a fine of
P50 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs of the suit; and in the
second, to an indeterminate penalty of from eight years and one day to eleven years and four
months of prision mayor, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay a fine of
P2,000, also with the costs of the suit. He appealed from said two judgments and in his brief
he now contends that the lower court committed the alleged errors stated therein as follows:

"The court a quo erred in holding that the accused Manuel Valdes Vacani had the revolver,
Exhibit A, with the five bullets, Exhibit B, in his possession and under his control, with
animus possidendi, and in convicting said accused of unlawful possession of a firearm,
instead of acquitting him with costs de oficio.

"The court a quo erred in holding that the accused Manuel Valdes Vacani had the 192
counterfeit bank notes, Exhibit C, in his possession and under his control, with animus
possidendi, and with intent of using and circulating them, knowing that said bills were
counterfeit, and-in convicting him by virtue thereof of the crime defined in article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code, instead of acquitting him with costs de oficio."
By agreement and upon petition of the prosecution and the defense, the two cases in question
were tried jointly in the lower court, and the judgments appealed from were rendered in the
same decision.

According to the evidence for the prosecution, consisting of the testimony of policemen
Fortunato Mercado and Anacleto Bustamante and of the objects and documents of record as
Exhibits A (a revolver), B (five bullets), C (192 counterfeit bills), D (cans, pieces of wood,
pieces of paper), E (printing press), and F (appellant's statement in the afternoon of his
arrest), appellant was caught at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of May 25, 1934, in his house
situated at No. 1061 Dart Street, in possession of a revolver with the marks and caliber above
stated and with five bullets, and 192 counterfeit bills which were an imitation of 5-peso
certificates of deposit issued by the Treasury of the Philippine Islands.

The appellant did not deny, but on the contrary, admitted that all said articles had been found
in his possession, but alleged and attempted to prove in his defense that they were not his and
that they had been brought to his house in a package on the night of May 24, 1934, by an
unknown young man who told him that they were sent by one Paco Ponce. He affirmed that
said young man also handed him a note reading, more or less, as follows: "Friend Valdes (or
Mr. Valdes). I am sending you this package with the request that you keep it for me until I
come to see you. I also request you not to open it"; that immediately after the note and the
package were turned over to him, said young man left in a taxi under the pretext that he was
in a great hurry; that as soon as the young man was gone, he opened the package and found
that it contained the revolver (Exhibit A), with its five cartridges (Exhibit B), and the 192
bills in question (Exhibit C); that he immediately tried to locate said Ponce from among the
three persons whom he knew bore the same name and from whom he suspected said package
had come; that not having found him on the night he received the package or the following
morning, he then decided to report the matter to the constabulary through Lieutenant Simeon
Garcia who, according to him, was his friend with office in the Bureau of Public Works at
Port Area; and that as he failed to find said lieutenant therein, he left the latter a note, Exhibit
1, which reads as follows:

"5/25/34

"Lieutenant Simeon L. Garcia.

"My Dear Lieutenant: This is the second time this morning that I come to your office because
I find it necessary to talk to you about certain prohibited articles which have accidentally
come to my possession. It is 11 o'clock in the morning and I cannot wait for you any longer
as I also 'have other important things to do, and so I request you to wait for me here this
afternoon between two-thirty and three, when I shall come back.

"Yours affectionately,

"M. Valdes"
The appellant also alleged and attempted to prove that when the policemen, who went to his
house showed him the search warrant, with which they were provided, he forthwith told them
that he had the counterfeit bills which they were looking for and that he proceeded to deliver
the bills immediately to them together with the revolver, Exhibit A.

None of the defenses set up by the appellant may be given credit for the following reasons:

Policeman Mercado who had received orders to watch the house of the appellant and to
observe his movements from the latter part of April, 1934, testified that at about noon of May
25, 1934, he saw the appellant arrive at his house and enter his room carrying a revolver in
his belt and in one hand a package which he placed on the table; that a moment later said
policeman saw him examine against the light a bill of the nature of the counterfeit bills
forming part of Exhibit C; that when Mercado and other policemen, whom he had telephoned
right away about what he had seen a few moments before, went to the appellants house with
the corresponding search warrant, said appellant told them that he no longer had the
counterfeit bills which they were searching for because they had been taken away by the
same person who had brought them there the night before; that this notwithstanding, when
they /insisted on searching the house anyway, the appellant whispered to his wife what she
should do, as she was seen to go downstairs and to return immediately to the appellant, not
having succeeded in entering the closet where it seemed she wanted to go, because one of the
policemen had gone there before her and taken the revolver, Exhibit A, with its bullets, from
under her clothing, the appellant telling them later that it was all he had; that upon seeing that
they were not satisfied with such excuse, as they were more determined to search the entire
house, he delivered to them the package of bills, Exhibit C, concealed in a straw hat hanging
on a wall of his room, again telling them that he had nothing more; that in addition to the
things voluntarily delivered to them by the appellant, they found the printing press, Exhibit E,
and the cans of paint, pieces of wood and pieces of paper, Exhibit D. All of this in addition to
the circumstance that the appellant's testimony during the trial greatly differs from his
statement at the police station in the afternoon of his arrest, shows that he had the revolver
and the counterfeit bills in question in his possession, not as he claimed, but with intent to
keep and later use them for his benefit.

It should be borne in mind that when the facts were yet very recent and fresh in the mind of
the appellant, as they had taken place only a few hours before he made his statement, Exhibit
F, he affirmed in said document that although he had wondered why said Paco Ponce sent
him the package in question, he did nothing to locate him or to bring said package to the
authorities until the following day. However, testifying in his favor during the trial, he said
that the first step taken by him upon knowing that the package contained articles forbidden by
law was to look for Paco Ponce in the house where he knew Ponce resided (Zurbaran Street),
but as he did not find him therein because the doors were locked, he left things as they were
until the following day.

It should also be borne in mind that in his statement to the police, Exhibit F, appellant stated
several times that he intended to deliver the package containing the revolver and the
counterfeit bills to the police, but, testifying during the trial, he changed front stating that he
decided not to report the matter to the police because he suspected some members thereof,
having formerly charged him with unlawful possession of counterfeit bills, but to the
constabulary with the aid of his friend, Lieutenant Simeon L. Garcia.

If to all this are added the circumstance that the appellant did not keep the note sent him by
said Paco Ponce in spite of having discovered later that said package contained articles
prohibited by law; the other circumstance that, according to his own testimony, his first
intention was to locate Paco Ponce beforehand in order to tell him to destroy said articles
because he did not want to prejudice him; and the additional and more important
circumstance that he told nothing to the policemen about the note which he had left in
Lieutenant Garcia's office, which shows that said note is merely a fabricated evidence, there
is stronger reason to believe that the accused had all said articles in his possession for an
unlawful purpose. If this is not so, why did he have the printing press, inks and the pieces of
paper, Exhibit D?

The excuse given by the appellant to the policemen in the same afternoon of his arrest that his
state of mind on the night he received the package containing the revolver and the counterfeit
bills was such that he knew not what to do, for which reason he had to leave things as they
were until the following day, is childish. The fact that the appellant wrote the letter, Exhibit 1,
to Lieutenant Simeon L. Garcia and left it in the latter's office, has all the earmarks of a pure
invention calculated to prepare for himself a good defense; because when his statement was
taken at the police station he made no mention of having gone to said lieutenant's office or to
the Bureau of Public Works, which incident he should not have forgotten, being much more
important than all the other incidents referred to in his statement, Exhibit F. It is probable that
the appellant, knowing that Lieutenant Garcia was not in his office, went-there to leave the
letter in question in order to prepare beforehand a good means of defense in case he should be
prosecuted, a thing certainly not unusual in a man with the qualities of the appellant, who is
educated and intelligent, and furthermore has already had the experience of having bean
prosecuted once, although unsuccessfully, for the same crime of unlawful possession of
counterfeit bills; inasmuch as the very context and nature of the letter in question, which
contains accurate data of the number of times and the hours when the writer thereof was in
the office of said officer for the purpose of seeing him in connection with certain prohibited
articles which, according to him, had accidentally come to his possession, indicate that he has
prepared it for said purpose; and this is all the more clear because he did not make said letter
a secret, having left it open, and without envelope, notwithstanding the fact that it refers to
things that might seriously prejudice him, as if purposely to invite whoever might see said!
note to read it and be informed of its contents. The testimony of Lieutenant Garcia discloses
that he was in the province in the morning of May 25, 1934, for which reason he was
informed of said letter only about the early part of the following month.

The fact that the appellant at first denied to the policemen who conducted the search in his
house that he had counterfeit bills in his possession, telling them, upon being shown the
judicial warrant with which they were provided, that he only had a revolver, when he very
well knew that they had not gone there in search of any weapon, shows no other than his
intention to conceal the bills, Exhibit C; as he might have then thought it preferable to suffer
a light penalty for unlawful possession of a firearm to losing said bills; and he might have
also thought that with said stratagem he could perhaps mislead the policemen and induce
them to leave his house without conducting any search and thus retain the bills in question,

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that none of the alleged errors
assigned by the appellant as committed by the lower court is tenable, and that said appellant
is, in fact guilty of the two crimes with which he was charged in cases Nos. 47899 and 47900
of the Court of First Instance of Manila (G. R. Nos. 43250 and 43251).

The penalties imposed upon him in said two cases are in accordance with law, wherefore the
two appealed judgments are affirmed in all their parts, with costs to the appellant. So ordered.

Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Recto, JJ., concur.

Judgments affirmed.
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO
QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON and defendant-appellant.
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,
vs.
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. *
Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.
Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in
1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan
Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with
Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial
vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend
"ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is
supposed to be signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the
governor's representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a
certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the
expenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not
signed presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works
projects.
Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It
is signed by the provincial engineer.
Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and
funds being available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer.
Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated
February 28, 1969, reads:
I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount of
sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in check,
provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.
This is signed by the auditor.
Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in
the provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below
and is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial
treasurer signs two part of the voucher.
Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor.
As accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution
by Juan Samson, a point which is disputed by him):
Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of Pangasinan the
sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in full payment of the above
stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid by Check No. .................................
CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers
below the stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences
the payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for
lumber and hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad
at the Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The
voucher makes reference to invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.
The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply
Co The alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is
forged.
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the
company to the provincial government
(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue
voucher (RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and
hardware ma the signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior
civil engineer; Rodolfo P. Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting
provincial engineer, and Ricardo B. Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office.
These four office denied that their signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their
genuine signatures.
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words
"Approved: For and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of
Equipment", is not the imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.
(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18,
1969, containing a description and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is
fake because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the
company's invoice No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1).
Oropilla denied that his alleged signature on Exhibit B is his signature.
(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged.
Those documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax
is due on the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the
samples of lumber allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D
and E). Narciso P. Martinez, a district forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and E
are his signatures.
(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his
signature on the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10).
The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.
Other five forged voucher. — Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments
of certain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials
supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are
the following:
(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of P14,571.81 for
number and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at the
Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P5,187.28 'or lumber
and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Panganiban bridge at the
UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)
(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of P6,290.60 for lumber
and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at the Umingan-
Guimba Road (Exh. Q).
(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 for lumber
and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Casabar bridge at the Binalonan-
San Manuel Road (Exh. R).
(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 for lumber
and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Baracbac bridge at the Umingan-
Guimba Road (Exh. S).
As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that
their signatures in the said five vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-
carried the said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office
the papers supporting the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those
supporting papers could not be presented in evidence.
Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co.,
testified that the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never
delivered by his company to the provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in
the said vouchers were cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The
projected repairs of the bridges were fictitious.
The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber
and hardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake
official receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-
7) bearing the serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to
transactions with the provincial government.
Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee
of the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with
the provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply
Co. He represented that firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial
auditor, provincial engineer and provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those
provincial officials and the employees of their offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).
The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were hand-
carried by Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the
provincial engineer's office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a
laborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls,
recorded Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear
on the upper lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the
provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him,
Samson brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office
for processing and for the latter's signature (Exh. WW).
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He
asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).
Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the
voucher After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's
office where the amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash
(instead of by check) as representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He
received the payments on March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as
shown on the face of the vouchers.
The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are
admittedly authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant.
Sendaydiego's defense is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures
therein of the provincial office concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-
audited and approved by the auditor.
Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing
that he received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the
lumber and hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the
provincial s treasurer 's office (Exh. 6-12 — Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's
signatures are genuine.
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with
malversation through falsification in three docketed as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969
in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.
2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871 dated
April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of P5,187.28, P6,290.60,
P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-33253.
3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29, 1969 in
the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254.
After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and
Samnson guilty of malversation through falsification of public or official documents
imposing each of the following penalties:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and
twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and twenty-one days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to indemnify solidarity the
provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P29,748.90
and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount; and
(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and
twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and twenty-one days of reclusion
temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to indemnify solidarity the provincial
government of Pangasinan in the same amount.
Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed.
Death extinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing
Sendaydiego's appeal read s follows:
The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment
of conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final and executory
extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the personal or
imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties (Art. 89[1],
Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego
because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23
(should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action
in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the
Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the
criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107
Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in
the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed
although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank
vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no
criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil
liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had issued an order of
attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487 and in the brief for said
appellant, there is no specific assignment of error affecting the civil liability fixed by the trial
court.) and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days
of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator
will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is
concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's brief, he
had a wife and ten children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar,
Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased).
The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto the
following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability
which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate
would be liable.
Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not
necessary to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition
of reclusion perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no
complex crime of malversation through falsification committed by negligence.
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private
prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the
accused to proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-
interest.
Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the
prosecution of the case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up
to the termination of the trial on July 29, 1970.
At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor
inquired whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private
prosecutor in representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora
replied that there was a board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.
The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that
he had authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).
Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private
prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of
Criminal Case No. 23350).
After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal
of Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused
all dated November 4, 1969.
At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial
fiscal and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal
moved "that the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination
subject to our (the fiscal's) control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7
tsn).
At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be
authorized to examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The trial
court granted the motion (155 tsn).
The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant
fiscal were present together with the private prosecutor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the
rule that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal" and that "the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule
110, Rules of Court; sec. 1683, Revised Administrative Code).
The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could
have been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which
attended the proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as
to its impartiality. The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable
probative value of the documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive
factor on which the trial court anchored the judgment of conviction.
Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the
propriety of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion
perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not complex.
The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's
conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation
through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers,
evinced "malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the
assistant provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his
initial to paragraph 3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that
unusual procedure because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers,
approached Rosete after he (Samson) had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson
told Rosete to initial the voucher because it was areglado na (already settled) since the
treasurer had already signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3, 1969).
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial
court erred in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his
initial in them. After the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only
ministerial (75 tsn July 3, 1969).
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the
amounts covered thereby should be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of the
symbol "A-1-1" placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number".
The bookkeeper was in. instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he
(Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment should be made
in cas. There were instances when the treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors
other than Juan Samson.
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where
the cashier was summoned to make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh.
EE). As noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the
treasurer's office when that was a ministerial chore of the cashier.
The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the
Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the
vouchers for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments were
received, was blank. The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments
or to require the exhibition of Samson's residence certificate.
Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers
would have been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the
payments had been made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would
have returned them to the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any
payments at all. The trial court said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion
with Samson.
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between
the provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that the amounts covered by the vouchers
were paid to Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to
by Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer.
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the
payments were made. However, Ulanday died before the preliminary investigation was
started. On May 27, 1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the
provincial , stating that he paid to Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of
Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh. 13).
Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the
treasurers inner office because his table was near the main door of the treasurers office or was
about fifteen meters away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the
treasurers office because the cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when
the cashier came out of the treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).
Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation
is a crime which can be committed by means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is
the same). This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by
the prosecution show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in
signing the six questioned vouchers.
The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the
auditor, then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that
contention because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as
its evidence against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an
accomplice, whereas, the treasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor based his defense
on the undeniable fact that the treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and
payment" before they were passed upon by the auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by
the treasurer's certification which the auditor apparently assumed to have been made in good
faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.
We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an
unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal
liability was established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his
estate for the amounts malversed was duly substantial.
Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court
erred in disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his
signature; in finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in
relying on circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.
As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited
himself "in fairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza"
because he had conducted the preliminary investigation.
Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced
by the fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried
the case and convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not
show that he had already prejudged their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a
preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found
probable cause and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding
information. The rule assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation,
could impartially try the case on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that
they would invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the preliminary investigation.
The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation
and then tries the case on the merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts
a preliminary investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior
court after terminating the preliminary investigation is not obligated (por delivadeza) to
remand the case to the Court of First Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try
the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834;
People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption is that the inferior court can try the case
without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.
Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the
Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are
not his signatures.
Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures
(exemplars) of Samson have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the
questioned signatures and the exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and the
same person (Exh. 20).
After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and
contentions of the parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by
the trial court) there are radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures.
But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or
in implying that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof.
The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found
in his residence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried
Construction Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname
Samson is encircled.
On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the
provincial government are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned
signatures terminate in angular and horizontal strokes.
Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious
transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from his
signature in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts
of the Carried Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers
were received by him (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have
two forms of signature (186 tsn July 16, 1970).
Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as
and when necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of
Experts, pp. 4th Ed., 1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).
Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers
were Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).
Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the
vouchers were written by only one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the
supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to
the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's
office for payment. He actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances,
Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it
(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged
documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may
be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with
the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453;
People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60
Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged
document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of
Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December
27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).
Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial
government and another form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the
deviousness of the falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the
certification in the first voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to
Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers,
Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).
As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the
trial court made absolutely no finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and
Sendaydiego, is not correct.
We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that
Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or
fraud" on the part of Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and
Sendaydiego when the proceeds of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner
office, instead of in the cashier's office (p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The
trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash shows "his collission
with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).
Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds
of the vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based on very
strong circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the
vouchers).
Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid
under the six vouchers "was really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are
genuine (although he contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no
proof that the amounts covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in
the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the
assistant manager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials
shown in the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the
carried Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned over to the company the
proceeds of the six vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company from
Sendaydiego. The six vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious
sales of construction materials.
Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after
Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from
Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.
The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is
based on a shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is not
correct.
Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his
exculpation on his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in
the provincial engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had
approved the vouchers. The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the
payments of the proceeds of the vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier,
Carried Construction Co.
On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he
received the said amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's office.
These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the
inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their
processing in the offices of the provicial government the construction materials described in
the six vouchers and denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.
The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts
(Exh. K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good
faith or having committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved.
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the
provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by means of the six vouchers
which have some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which
were intrinsically fake.
Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation
through falsification of public documents were committed in this case. That assumption is
wrong.
The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification
and malversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act
constitutes two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to
commit malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if
the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification
and malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva,
58 Phil. 671; People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).
In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the
municipal treasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931
that some persons worked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In
that way, the two amounts covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated
and taken from the municipal funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said
street project and the persons mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any labor.
It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a
complex crime because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the
malversations. Each falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses
which must be punished separately.
The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four
distinct penalties were imposed.
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the
road and bridge could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher.
The falsification was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.
The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a
single criminal impulse.
Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers
constitutes six separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate
crimes of malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the
said twelve offenses.
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in
possession of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies from
the provincial treasurer.
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the
provincial treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private
person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also
guilty of malversation (People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S.
vs. Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil.
457).
Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of
parricide or qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied
theft but only of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason of
paragraph 3, article 62 of the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).
Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1)
of the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
a fine of not more than P5,000.
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by
vouchers Nos. 11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article
of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayorminimum and medium.
For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by
vouchers Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article
217 is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.
For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty
provided in paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion temporal medium and maximum.
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to
the imprisonment penalty.
In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no
modifying circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an
indeterminate sentence.
WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and
six crimes of malversation.
In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties:
For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as
minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccionalmedium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
three thousand pesos.
For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-33252).
For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254).
For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q),
Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium,
as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a
fine of P6,290.60, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal
Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium,
as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a
fine of P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal
Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum;
to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount
(Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a
fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal
Case No. 23350, L-33253).
In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in
article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677),
meaning that the maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate
sentence of twelve (12) years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him,
or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).
The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par.
of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530
and 69 Phil. 58).
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23.
Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised
Penal Code). Samson should pay one-half of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
While I concur in the judgment finding the accused-appellant Juan Samson guilty of six
separate crimes each of falsification and malversation as elucidated in the very well studied
and ably prepared main opinion of our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Aquino, and
while I further agree that said appellant and the estate of the deceased Licerio P. Sendaydiego
are lointtv and solidarity liable to the Province of Pangasinan for the amounts stated ir. the
dispositive portion of the decision herein, I have my own legal basis for holding that the
estate of Sendaydiego is indeed liable for the, said amount&
To start with, I find it difficult to share the view that "notwithstanding the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego (he died during the pendency of this appeal) insofar as
his liability is concerned, ... Sendaydiego's appeal will (nevertheless) be resolved only for the
purpose of showing his liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate is
liable." It seems to me that there is some degree of irreconcilable incontency in dismissing a
case, thereby acquitting the accused therein of criminal liability because of death or any other
cause not amounting to a finding that he had not committed the act complaint of and at the
same nine holding that he or his estate has in civil liability based on his criminal liability. It is
to me clearly obvious that the dismiss of an appml due to death of the appellant, from a
judgment of conviction by a trial court does not result in the affirmance of sruch conviction
contrary to the general rule when an appeal in a case is dismissed but, on the contrary, it
amounts to an acquittal of the appellant based on the constitutionally mandated presumption
of innocence in his favor that can be overcome only by a finding of guilt, something that his
death prevents the court from making. In a sense, the death of an accused-appellant has the
effect of his total absolution by God from any earthly responsibility for the offense as such, a
divine act of clemency no human court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. It is an
inherent inalienable human right of every individual not to be subject to imputation of
criminal liability in any sense, unless his guilt of the crime charged against him has been duly
proven beyond reasonable doubt in a duly held criminal proceeding. The intervention of
death of the accused in any case is an injunction by fate itself that no criminal liability
whatsoever should be imposed on him, not only because from the very nature of the situation,
it is impossible to do so but also because it would be a juridical absurdity to contemplate such
a legal concept. In short, death ex-anguishes the crime, and, corollarily, all its consequences.
Indeed, it is but logical to hold that the civil liability resulting from criminal liability under
Artide 100 of the Revised Penal Code would have no basis unless criminal responsibih"ly is
fixed or exists. It has been said that civil liabilitv under this provision "is rooted in the
criminal liability". 1 In this connection and adjectively, Section 1 of Rule 111 stipulates that
"when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, etc." But it must be
emphasized that these legal precepts refer exclusively to the civil liability consequent of the
offense in its juridical essence as a crime, it being elementary on our legal system that the
same act my give rise to civil responsibility independent of that resulting from the
commission of the act as a crime.
Thus it is entirely possible for one to be fee from civil ability directly rooted in the act viewed
as a violation of the penal law and still be liable civilly for it considered otherwise as an
infringement of a right based on a created by contract or by laws other than the criminal law.
A consistent host of jurisprudence, too to the bench and bar to need particular citation hem
exists upholding the right of a party aggrieved by an act in nature to indemnity, restitution or
reparation, notwithstanding the absence or failure of the usual prosecution, in view of the
provisions of the pertinent articles of the Civil Code on Human Relations and Section 2 of
Rule III. Stated the same act or got Of facts can be the subject of obligations arise at the same
time thru the different modes contemplated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code providing that
"obligations arise from (1) lave, (2) contracts; (3) quasi-contracts; (4) acts or omissions
punished by law, and (5) quasi-delicts." Thus, that an act or omission is punished by law,
thereby making the actor civilly liable therefor, does not exclude simultaneous liability of the
for the same act viewed also as one giving rise to an obligation under the another law, and/or
under a contract, quasi-contract or quasi-delict, with the sole qualification that the aggrieved
party cannot recover damages more than once for the same act or omission. (See Art. 2177,
Civil Code.)
I am confident that the points I have just discussed are beyond debate. And as I see it my
learned colleagues in the majority and I are agreed that in the light of the legal Principles I
have stated, there can be no doubt that the estate of Sendaydiego could be held liable for the
acts of the d that can be proven to have damaged the Province of Pangasinan in spite of the of
Sendaydiego's appeal by reason of his death. Our possible disagreement relates only to the
procedural aspect of the matter.
The main opinion justifies the imposition of civil liability upon said estate within this appeal
proceedings, thereby sing with the filing of a separate civil action for the In my view, the
dismissal of Sendaydiego's appeal amounts, as I have said to his acquittal This acquittal to
my mind is different juridically from one based on liable doubt bemuse as I have only
intimated earlier, it is a total absolution by fate itself which carries with it y, exemption from
or extinction of the civil liability as if the Court had hold that the act from which the civil
(action) might arise did not exist (Section 2 (e), Rule 111.) But this is not to say that the state
is already exonerated altogether from another kind of civil liability for indemnity, restitution
or reparation, for under the unbroken line of precedents I have already referred to, the
pertinent provisions on Human Relations of the Civil Code, particularly Article 30, come into
play, for under this cited provision, the total absolution of Sendaydiego based on his death
becomes virtually immaterial, since ths provision contemplates prosecution of the civil
liability arising from a criminal offense without the need of any criminal proceeding to prove
the commission of the crime as such, that is, without having to prove the criminal liability of
the defendant so long as his act causign damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven
by a preponderance of evidence. This article provides, "when a seperate civil action is
brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings, are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence
shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of."
My reading of the existing jurisprudence is that the civil liability not based on the act as
crime has to be prosecuted in a te civil action and not within the same criminal proceedings
wherein the accused has been acquitted or the case against him is terminated with exonerative
consequence. If there is any jurisprudence to the contrary, it is still isolated and is not binding
precedent. Worse, in my opinion, it is based on what I consider to be the erroneous premise
that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not mean literally what it says. Textually, this article
states:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall
so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Definitely and unequivocally, what it authorizes is that "a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted." It does not say that the civil action joined with the
criminal action, as provided for in Section 1 of Rule 111, shall survive and be the one
continued. I reiterate that what is left to the offended party after the death of an accused
before conviction is the right to institute a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission pursuant to Articles 29 and 30 of the Civil Code and Sections 2 and 3 (c) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court.
All these notwithstanding, for the purposes of the instant case, I am willing to take the
position that since the point I am pressing on is more or less procedural or remedial in nature,
and perhaps, the failure of the parties concerned to seriously object to the procedure pursued
in the main opinion could be a sufficient excuse for not following what I feel is the proper
way of dealing with the civil liability incurred by the estate of the deceased Sendaydiego,
hence my concurrence, in the qualified sense implicit in this separate opinion, in the
dispositive portion of the decision herein.
May I add here that the foregoing reasons explain why I have always insisted that when
appeals in criminal cases before us have to be dismissed by reason of the death of the
appellant, it is not proper to qualify such dismissal as limited to that of the criminal liability
of the appellant. It is my humble view that the dismissal should be unqualified and that the
offended parties concerned should be left to pursue their remedies, if they so desire, in the
appropriate separate civil action contemplated both in the Civil Code and in Rule 111, as
explained above. I admit this view might entail the institution of what is virtually a repetitive
proceeding, but I cannot see any way of avoiding what the unequivocal language of the
pertinent legal provisions mandate, unless I make myself a party to judicial legislation, which
I believe it is not constitutionally permissible for me to do, no matter how practical the
procedure might be.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
While I concur in the judgment finding the accused-appellant Juan Samson guilty of six
separate crimes each of falsification and malversation as elucidated in the very well studied
and ably prepared main opinion of our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Aquino, and
while I further agree that said appellant and the estate of the deceased Licerio P. Sendaydiego
are lointtv and solidarity liable to the Province of Pangasinan for the amounts stated ir. the
dispositive portion of the decision herein, I have my own legal basis for holding that the
estate of Sendaydiego is indeed liable for the, said amount&
To start with, I find it difficult to share the view that "notwithstanding the dismissal of the
appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego (he died during the pendency of this appeal) insofar as
his liability is concerned, ... Sendaydiego's appeal will (nevertheless) be resolved only for the
purpose of showing his liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate is
liable." It seems to me that there is some degree of irreconcilable incontency in dismissing a
case, thereby acquitting the accused therein of criminal liability because of death or any other
cause not amounting to a finding that he had not committed the act complaint of and at the
same nine holding that he or his estate has in civil liability based on his criminal liability. It is
to me clearly obvious that the dismiss of an appml due to death of the appellant, from a
judgment of conviction by a trial court does not result in the affirmance of sruch conviction
contrary to the general rule when an appeal in a case is dismissed but, on the contrary, it
amounts to an acquittal of the appellant based on the constitutionally mandated presumption
of innocence in his favor that can be overcome only by a finding of guilt, something that his
death prevents the court from making. In a sense, the death of an accused-appellant has the
effect of his total absolution by God from any earthly responsibility for the offense as such, a
divine act of clemency no human court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. It is an
inherent inalienable human right of every individual not to be subject to imputation of
criminal liability in any sense, unless his guilt of the crime charged against him has been duly
proven beyond reasonable doubt in a duly held criminal proceeding. The intervention of
death of the accused in any case is an injunction by fate itself that no criminal liability
whatsoever should be imposed on him, not only because from the very nature of the situation,
it is impossible to do so but also because it would be a juridical absurdity to contemplate such
a legal concept. In short, death ex-anguishes the crime, and, corollarily, all its consequences.
Indeed, it is but logical to hold that the civil liability resulting from criminal liability under
Artide 100 of the Revised Penal Code would have no basis unless criminal responsibih"ly is
fixed or exists. It has been said that civil liabilitv under this provision "is rooted in the
criminal liability". 1 In this connection and adjectively, Section 1 of Rule 111 stipulates that
"when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, etc." But it must be
emphasized that these legal precepts refer exclusively to the civil liability consequent of the
offense in its juridical essence as a crime, it being elementary on our legal system that the
same act my give rise to civil responsibility independent of that resulting from the
commission of the act as a crime.
Thus it is entirely possible for one to be fee from civil ability directly rooted in the act viewed
as a violation of the penal law and still be liable civilly for it considered otherwise as an
infringement of a right based on a created by contract or by laws other than the criminal law.
A consistent host of jurisprudence, too to the bench and bar to need particular citation hem
exists upholding the right of a party aggrieved by an act in nature to indemnity, restitution or
reparation, notwithstanding the absence or failure of the usual prosecution, in view of the
provisions of the pertinent articles of the Civil Code on Human Relations and Section 2 of
Rule III. Stated the same act or got Of facts can be the subject of obligations arise at the same
time thru the different modes contemplated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code providing that
"obligations arise from (1) lave, (2) contracts; (3) quasi-contracts; (4) acts or omissions
punished by law, and (5) quasi-delicts." Thus, that an act or omission is punished by law,
thereby making the actor civilly liable therefor, does not exclude simultaneous liability of the
for the same act viewed also as one giving rise to an obligation under the another law, and/or
under a contract, quasi-contract or quasi-delict, with the sole qualification that the aggrieved
party cannot recover damages more than once for the same act or omission. (See Art. 2177,
Civil Code.)
I am confident that the points I have just discussed are beyond debate. And as I see it my
learned colleagues in the majority and I are agreed that in the light of the legal Principles I
have stated, there can be no doubt that the estate of Sendaydiego could be held liable for the
acts of the d that can be proven to have damaged the Province of Pangasinan in spite of the of
Sendaydiego's appeal by reason of his death. Our possible disagreement relates only to the
procedural aspect of the matter.
The main opinion justifies the imposition of civil liability upon said estate within this appeal
proceedings, thereby sing with the filing of a separate civil action for the In my view, the
dismissal of Sendaydiego's appeal amounts, as I have said to his acquittal This acquittal to
my mind is different juridically from one based on liable doubt bemuse as I have only
intimated earlier, it is a total absolution by fate itself which carries with it y, exemption from
or extinction of the civil liability as if the Court had hold that the act from which the civil
(action) might arise did not exist (Section 2 (e), Rule 111.) But this is not to say that the state
is already exonerated altogether from another kind of civil liability for indemnity, restitution
or reparation, for under the unbroken line of precedents I have already referred to, the
pertinent provisions on Human Relations of the Civil Code, particularly Article 30, come into
play, for under this cited provision, the total absolution of Sendaydiego based on his death
becomes virtually immaterial, since ths provision contemplates prosecution of the civil
liability arising from a criminal offense without the need of any criminal proceeding to prove
the commission of the crime as such, that is, without having to prove the criminal liability of
the defendant so long as his act causign damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven
by a preponderance of evidence. This article provides, "when a seperate civil action is
brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings, are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence
shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of."
My reading of the existing jurisprudence is that the civil liability not based on the act as
crime has to be prosecuted in a te civil action and not within the same criminal proceedings
wherein the accused has been acquitted or the case against him is terminated with exonerative
consequence. If there is any jurisprudence to the contrary, it is still isolated and is not binding
precedent. Worse, in my opinion, it is based on what I consider to be the erroneous premise
that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not mean literally what it says. Textually, this article
states:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall
so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Definitely and unequivocally, what it authorizes is that "a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted." It does not say that the civil action joined with the
criminal action, as provided for in Section 1 of Rule 111, shall survive and be the one
continued. I reiterate that what is left to the offended party after the death of an accused
before conviction is the right to institute a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission pursuant to Articles 29 and 30 of the Civil Code and Sections 2 and 3 (c) of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court.
All these notwithstanding, for the purposes of the instant case, I am willing to take the
position that since the point I am pressing on is more or less procedural or remedial in nature,
and perhaps, the failure of the parties concerned to seriously object to the procedure pursued
in the main opinion could be a sufficient excuse for not following what I feel is the proper
way of dealing with the civil liability incurred by the estate of the deceased Sendaydiego,
hence my concurrence, in the qualified sense implicit in this separate opinion, in the
dispositive portion of the decision herein.
May I add here that the foregoing reasons explain why I have always insisted that when
appeals in criminal cases before us have to be dismissed by reason of the death of the
appellant, it is not proper to qualify such dismissal as limited to that of the criminal liability
of the appellant. It is my humble view that the dismissal should be unqualified and that the
offended parties concerned should be left to pursue their remedies, if they so desire, in the
appropriate separate civil action contemplated both in the Civil Code and in Rule 111, as
explained above. I admit this view might entail the institution of what is virtually a repetitive
proceeding, but I cannot see any way of avoiding what the unequivocal language of the
pertinent legal provisions mandate, unless I make myself a party to judicial legislation, which
I believe it is not constitutionally permissible for me to do, no matter how practical the
procedure might be.
People vs. Padilla, CA, 36 O.G. 2404
People vs. Casals, et al., CA-G.R. No. 12455-R
People vs. Galano, CA, 54 O.G. 5899
US vs. Solito, 36 Phil. 785

JOHNSON, J.:
The important question presented by this appeal is whether or not the defendant is guilty of
forging, uttering and passing an altered obligation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands with intent to defraud, in violation of the provisions of Act No. 1754. The complaint
alleged that the said Mariano Solito, on or about the 15th day of May, 1915, in the
Municipality of Dumaguete, in the Province of Oriental Negros, with intent to defraud, did
falsely forge, utter and pass an obligation of the Government of the Philippine Islands, to wit,
Treasury Warrant No. 428426, drawn by the Insular Auditor on the Insular Treasury in favor
of Alvah D. Riley in the sum of P687.53, and by said forgery did secure the payment to
himself of the said sum of P687.53; said acts committed within the jurisdiction of this court,
to the prejudice of the Government of the Philippine Islands in the sum of P687.53, and
contrary to the statute in such case made and provided.
Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arrested, arraigned, tried, found guilty of the
crime charged in the complaint, and sentenced by the Honorable Carter D. Johnston, judge, to
be imprisoned for a period of one year and one day, to pay a fine of P687.53, to pay the costs,
and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with the provisions
of the law. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court.
From an examination of the record the following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
That the defendant Mariano Solito was, at the time mentioned in the complaint,
correspondence clerk and acting chief clerk in the office of the division superintendent of
schools in the municipality of Dumaguete; that, as such clerk, he was intrusted with the care
of the correspondence of said office, and was authorized to open letters of an official
character addressed to the office; that it was the custom of the Director of Education to
forward to the division superintendents of schools checks for the reimbursement for travel
expenses and for the payment of the salary of employees; that on the 19th day of April, 1915,
said Treasury Warrant No. 428426 was issued to the said Alvah D. Riley for the sum of
P687.53 by the Auditor of the Philippine Islands directed to the Treasurer of the Philippine
Islands for payment; that on the same day (April 19th, 1915) said warrant was sent to the
Director of Education; that said warrant was sent to Alvah D. Riley, through the division
superintendent of schools, by the Acting Director of Education on April 29, 1915; that the
defendant herein presented said warrant to the municipal treasurer for payment, bearing the
indorsement of Alvah D. Riley, early in the month of May, 1915, and received the amount of
money called for (P687.53) from said municipal treasurer; that Alvah D. Riley never had in
his possession said warrant, nor had he ever seen the same, until after the defendant had
presented it for payment to the said municipal treasurer; that he did not indorse the same by
writing his name on the back thereof; that his signature which appears upon the back of said
warrant was not his signature; that he did not write his name thereon; that the said division
superintendent of schools did not receive said warrant and had never seen it until after the
defendant herein had received the money thereon; that there is no proof in the record showing
that any person or persons had in his possession said warrant after it left the hands of the
Acting Director of Education until it was presented by the defendant to the said treasurer
indorsed as above indicated; that, at the time the defendant presented said warrant to the
municipal treasurer for payment, he also presented a note purported to have been written and
signed by Riley, in which the latter requested the said treasurer to cash the warrant. Riley
denies absolutely that he gave to the defendant said note. The note was, in our opinion, a
forgery. Riley never signed it nor authorized it.
While the record does not contain positive proof that the defendant did, in fact, write the
name of Alvah D. Riley upon the back of said warrant, in view of all the facts and
circumstances the conclusion is irresistible that he did. The record further shows beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did pass and utter said warrant after the same had been
altered by said forged indorsement; and did, at the time mentioned in the complaint, without
the authority of its owner, collect the amount due thereon with intent to defraud.
The questions are: Do these acts of the defendant fall under any of the provisions of Act No.
1754? Is the defendant punishable under any of said provisions?
Said warrant was a check issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands and, therefore,
an obligation of the Government of the Philippine Islands as defined by section 1 of Act No.
1754. It was originally made payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to his order. When it was
indorsed as above indicated, it became a check or warrant payable to bearer. The
indorsement made a material alteration in said warrant. The indorsement changed said check
from one payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to one to whom he ordered it paid, to one payable to
bearer. The indorsement by the defendant had the effect of erasing the phrase "or order" upon
the face of the warrant.
Whenever the holder of a check, without the consent of the maker, changes its terms so as to
make it payable to bearer by erasing or changing the words "or order" after the payee's name,
he thereby makes a material change in said document. (McCauley vs. Gordon, 64 Ga., 222;
37 Am. Rep., 68; 2 C. J., 1206; Needles vs. Shaffer, 60 Iowa, 65.) Changing the phrase "or
order" to "bearer" is a material alteration. While the instrument was payable to Alvah D.
Riley, or order, it was negotiable by the indorsement of Alvah D. Riley only. The change
made it payable; to "bearer" and it was thereafter negotiable and transferable by delivery
simply. In construing the effect of the indorsement we must not only look to said
indorsement, but to the face of the document also, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or
not the indorsement operated to alter the terms or conditions of the original contract.
(Johnston vs. May, 76 Ind., 293; Farmers' Bank of Kentucky vs. Ewing, 78 Ky., 264;
Morris vs. Cain, 39 La. Ann., 712.)
The defendant having passed and uttered an altered obligation of the Government of the
Philippine Islands with intent to defraud, he is punishable under article 4 of Act No. 1754.
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Carson, Araullo, Street, and Malcolm, JJ., concur.