LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 1 of 35

1. WORK STOPPAGE AS ILLEGAL STRIKE

Southern Tagalog, Imus, Cavite. This was later amended on
September 17, 1999 on the following grounds: (a) unfair labor practice
SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION, Donrico for the company’s refusal to bargain in good faith; and (b) interference
V. Sebastian, Eulogio G. Batino, Samuel A. Atanque, Manolo C. with the exercise of their right to self- organization.

Zabaljauregui, Dionisio Tenorio, Edwin P. Rellores, Luis B.

Natividad, Myrna Petingco, Feliciano Tolentino, Rodolfo A.
Amante, Jr., Cipriano C. Bello, and Ronaldo T. Espino, Efren Galan,
and Jun Carmelito Santos, petitioners, vs. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS
PHILS., INC.,respondent. [G.R. Nos. 164302-03. January 24, 2007.]
and shop stewards, individually filed applications for leave of absence
FACTS: Petitioner Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union
(Union) is the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
regular daily paid workers and the monthly paid non- commission-
earning employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.
(Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant. Individual
petitioners Donrico V. Sebastian, Eulogio G. Batino, Samuel A.
A mass action organised by the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola
was set in front of the Company’s premises on September 21, 1999.
The Union members, officers and members of the Board of Directors,
for September 21, 1999. Certain that its operations in the plant would
come to a complete stop since there were no sufficient trained
contractual employees who would take over, the Company
disapproved all leave applications and notified the applicants
accordingly. A day before the mass action, some Union members wore
gears, red tag cloths stating "YES KAMI SA STRIKE" as headgears
and on the different parts of their uniform, shoulders and chests.

Atanque, Manolo C. Zabaljauregui, Dionisio Tenorio, Edwin P. Rellores,

Luis B. Natividad, Myrna Petingco, Feliciano Tolentino, Rodolfo A.
Amante, Jr., Cipriano C. Bello, and Ronaldo T. Espino, Efren Galan,
and Jun Carmelito Santos are Union officers, directors, and shop
stewards.
the Union o cers and members held a picket along the front perimeter
The Union and the Company entered in a three-year CBA from July 1,
1996 to June 30, 1999. When the said CBA expired, the Union
informed the Company of its desire to renegotiate its terms and CBA
meetings ensued. During the CBA meetings, the Union insisted the
following: (a) representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-
Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings; (b)
their wages be based on their work shift rates. On the other hand, the
The Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union, allowing it "to
conduct a mass protest action within the perimeter of the Coca-Cola
plant on September 21, 1999 from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon." 7 Thus,
of the plant on September 21, 1999. All of the 14 personnel of the
Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71
production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the
three bottling lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines
were operated during the night shift with cumulative downtime of five
(5) hours due to lack of manning, complement and skills requirement.
The volume of production for the day was short by 60,000 physical
case[s] versus budget.

Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not
members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a "Petition to Declare Strike
employees of the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered Illegal" alleging, inter alia, the following: there was a deadlock in the
labor organization. Thus, an impasse ensued.
CBA negotiations between the Union and Company, as a result of
which a Notice of Strike was filed by the Union; pending resolution of
Later on, the Union and its officers filed a Notice of Strike with the the Notice of Strike, the Union members led applications for leave on
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) Regional Office in September 21, 1999 which were disapproved because operations in
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
the plant may be disrupted; on September 20, 1999, one day prior to
the mass leave, the Union staged a protest action by wearing red arm
bands denouncing the alleged anti-labor practices of the company; on
September 21, 1999, without observing the requirements mandated by
law, the Union picketed the premises of the Company in clear violation
of Article 262 of the Labor Code; because of the slowdown in the
work, the Company suffered losses amounting to P2,733,366.29; the
mass/protest action conducted on September 21, 1999 was clearly a
strike; since the Union did not observe the requirements mandated by
law, i.e., strike vote, cooling-off period and reporting requirements, the
strike was therefore illegal; the Union also violated the provision of the
CBA on the grievance machinery; there being a direct violation of the
CBA, the Union's action constituted an unfair labor practice; and the
officers who knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts
during the strike should be declared to have lost their employment
status.
DOLE within the required time. Consequently, for knowingly
The Union filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss and/or to Suspend
Proceedings alleging therein that the mass action conducted by its
officers and members on September 21, 1999 was not a strike but just
a valid exercise of their right to picket, which is part of the right of free
expression as guaranteed by the Constitution; several thousands of
workers nationwide had launched similar mass protest actions to
demonstrate their continuing indignation over the ill effects of martial
rule in the Philippines. It pointed out that even the officers and
members of the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola had similarly
organized mass protest actions. The Union insisted that officers and
members led their applications for leave for September 21, 1999
knowing fully well that there were no bottling operations scheduled on
September 21 and 22, 1999; they even secured a Mayor's permit for
the purpose. The workers, including the petitioners, merely marched to
and fro at the side of the highway near one of the gates of the Sta.
Rosa Plant, the loading bay for public vehicles. After 3 hours, everyone
returned to work according to their respective shifting schedules. The
Union averred that the petition led by the Company was designed to
Page 2 of 35
harass and its o cers and members in order to weaken the Union's
position in the on-going collective bargaining negotiations.
LA RULING: Granting the petition of the Company. The LA declared
that the September 21, 1999 mass leave was actually a strike under
Article 212 of the Labor Code for the following reasons: based on the
reports submitted by the Production and Engineering Department of
the Company, there was a temporary work stoppage/slowdown in the
company; 16 out of the usual three (3) lines for production for the day
shift, only one line operated by probationary employees was functional
and there was a cumulative downtime of five (5) hours attributed to the
lack of manning complement and skills requirement. According to the
Labor Arbiter, the strike conducted by the Union was illegal since there
was no showing that the Union conducted a strike vote, observed the
prescribed cooling-off period, much less, submitted a strike vote to the
participating in the illegal strike, the individual petitioners were
considered to have lost their employment status.
NLRC RULING: Affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with the
modi cation that Union Treasurer Charlita M. Abrigo, who was on
bereavement leave at the time, should be excluded from the list of
those who participated in the illegal strike.
CA RULING: In favor of the Company, rendered judgment dismissing
the Union's petition for lack of merit. It also declared that petitioners, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 74860, were guilty of forum shopping.
PETITIONERS’ CONTENTION: The Union maintain that the
September 21, 1999 mass protest action was not a strike but a picket,
a valid exercise of their constitutional right to free expression and
assembly.23 It was a peaceful mass protest action to dramatize their
legitimate grievances against respondent. They did not intend to have
a work stoppage since they knew beforehand that no bottling
operations were scheduled on September 21, 1999 pursuant to the
Logistics Planning Services Mega Manila Production Plan dated
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
September 15, 1999.24 Thus, they applied for leaves of absences for
September 21, 1999 which, however, were not approved. They also
obtained a mayor's permit to hold the picket near the highway, and
they faithfully complied with the conditions set therein. The protesting
workers were merely marching to and fro at the side of the highway or
the loading bay near one of the gates of the Company plant, certainly
not blocking in any way the ingress or egress from the Company's
premises. Their request to hold their activity was for four (4) hours,
which was reduced to three (3) hours. Thereafter, they all went back to
work. The bottling operations of the Company was not stopped, even
temporarily. Since petitioner Union did not intend to go on strike, there
was no need to observe the mandatory legal requirements for the
conduct of a strike. In addition, they also point out that members
belonging to the IBM-KMU at the San Fernando Coca-Cola bottling
plant staged simultaneous walkout from their work assignments for
two consecutive days, on October 7 and 8, 1999. However, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE) declared that the walkout
was considered a mass action, not a strike, and the officers of the
IBM-KMU were only meted a three-day suspension. Respondent
accepted the decision of the SOLE and no longer appealed the
decision. Petitioners insist that this should, likewise, apply in the
resolution of the issue of whether petitioners staged a strike or not,
and whether the penalty of dismissal from the employment with the
respondent is just and equitable. Petitioners also insist that they were
denied the right to due process because the decision of the Labor
Arbiter was implemented even while their appeal was pending in the
NLRC. The decision of the Labor Arbiter against them was to become
final and executory only until after the NLRC shall have resolved their
appeal with finality. On the third issue, petitioners aver that even
assuming that they had indeed staged a strike, the penalty of dismissal
is too harsh. They insist that they acted in good faith. Besides, under
Article 264 of the Labor Code, the dismissal of the Union officers who
participated in an illegal strike is discretionary on the employer.
Moreover, six (6) of the petitioners were shop stewards who were mere
members of the Union and not officers thereof.
Page 3 of 35
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTiON: The Company further avers that the
law offers no discretion as to the proper penalty that should be
imposed against a Union official participating in an illegal strike.
Contrary to the contention of petitioners, shop stewards are also Union
officers.
ISSUE: Whether the Union officials and members committed work
stoppage which constitutes as illegal strike?
RULING: YES, the Union officials and members committed work
stoppage which constitutes as illegal strike. The Union informed
the Company of their intention to stage a strike (as evidenced by
the Notice of Strike and Amended Notice of Strike) 106 members
of petitioner Union, whose respective applications for leave of
absence on September 21, 1999 were disapproved, opted not to
report for work on said date, and gathered in front of the company
premises to hold a mass protest action. Petitioners deliberately
absented themselves and instead wore red ribbons, carried
placards with slogans such as: "YES KAMI SA STRIKE,"
"PROTESTA KAMI," "SAHOD, KARAPATAN NG MANGGAGAWA
IPAGLABAN," "CBA-'WAG BABOYIN," "STOP UNION BUSTING."
They marched to and fro in front of the company's premises
during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted
activity which already affected the company's operations. The
mass concerted activity constituted a strike. Most importantly, the
said strike did not comply with the requirements of Article 263 (F)
in relation to Article 264 of the Labor Code. Lastly, the strike
staged by the Union was, further, in violation of the CBA which
stipulated under Section 1, Article VI - here, it is not disputed that
the Union had not referred their issues to the grievance machinery
as a prior step. Instead, they chose to go on strike right away,
thereby bypassing the required grievance procedure dictated by
the CBA. 
The ruling of the CA that petitioners staged a strike on September 21,
1999, and not merely a picket is correct.

LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
Article 212 (o) of the Labor Code defines strike as a temporary
stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of
an industrial or labor dispute. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, the
Court ruled that "the fact that the conventional term ‘strike' was not
used by the striking employees to describe their common course of
action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not
its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.” The term "strike"
encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also
slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or
sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar activities. 
to oppress or destroy the employer. 38
Picketing involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of
the employer, usually accompanied by the display of placards and
other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute. As
applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the stationing of one or
more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose of
pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion. 
of strike led with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof,
A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms
or conditions of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, xing, maintaining, changing or arranging the
terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. 
mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith renders the
That there was a labor dispute between the parties, in this case, is not
an issue. 
The bare fact that petitioners were given a Mayor's permit is not
conclusive evidence that their action/activity did not amount to a
strike. The Mayor's description of what activities petitioners were
allowed to conduct is inconsequential. To repeat, what is de nitive of
whether the action staged by petitioners is a strike and not merely a
picket is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the situation.
A strike is the most powerful of the economic weapons of workers
which they unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable
Page 4 of 35
sharing of the joint product of labor and capital. It is a weapon that can
either breathe life to or destroy the Union and its members in their
struggle with management for a more equitable due to their labors. 37
The decision to declare a strike must therefore rest on a rational basis,
free from emotionalism, envisaged by the tempers and tantrums of a
few hot heads, and nally focused on the legitimate interests of the
Union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public welfare,
and, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The
right to strike as a means of attainment of social justice is never meant
Since strikes cause disparity effects not only on the relationship
between labor and management but also on the general peace and
progress of society, the law has provided limitations on the right to
strike. For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites
provided by Art. 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice
or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by
a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at
least seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are
strike illegal. 39 It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored
the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike. We
quote, with approval, the ruling of the CA which affirmed the decisions
of the NLRC and of the Labor Arbiter:
Since it becomes undisputed that the mass action was indeed a strike,
the next issue is to determine whether the same was legal or not.
Records reveal that the said strike did not comply with the
requirements of Article 263 (F) in relation to Article 264 of the Labor
Code, which specifically provides, thus:
ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS xxx xxx xxx
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 5 of 35
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired
total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by by the employer during such lawful strike.

secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A

decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the xxx xxx xxx

board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners

in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that Applying the aforecited mandatory requirements to the case at bench,
purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute the Labor Arbiter found, thus:

based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike

In the present case, there is no evidence on record to show
or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may at its own initiative or
that respondents had complied with the above mandatory
upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the
requirements of law for a

secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish
the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven days before the
valid strike. Particularly, there is no showing that respondents had
intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein
observed the prescribed cooling-off period, conducted a strike vote,
provided.

much less submitted a

ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES

strike vote report to the Department of Labor within the required time.
This being the case, respondents' strike on September 21, 1999 is
(a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout
illegal. In the recent case

without rst having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of

this Book or without rst having led the notice required in the preceding
of CCBPI Postmix Workers Union vs. NLRC, 2999 (sic) SCRA 410, the
article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote rst having been
Supreme Court had said: "It bears stressing that the strike
obtained and reported to the Ministry.

requirements under Article 264

No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction

and 265 of the Labor Code are mandatory requisites, without which,
by the President or the Minister or after certi cation or submission of
the strike will be considered illegal. The evidence (sic) intention of the
the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
law in requiring the strike

pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or

lockout.
notice and strike-vote report as mandatory requirements is to
reasonably regulate the right to strike which is essential to the
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a
attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. Verily,
consequence or an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement
substantial compliance with a mandatory provision will not suffice.
with full backwages. Any union o cer who knowingly participates in an
Strict adherence to the mandate of the law is required.

illegal strike and any worker or union o cer who knowingly participates
in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to HcSETI

have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of

a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute su cient ground for
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
Aside from the above infirmity, the strike staged by the Union was,
further, in violation of the CBA which stipulated under Section 1, Article
VI, thereof that,
SECTION 1. The UNION agrees that there shall be no strike, walkout,
stoppage or slowdown of work, boycott, secondary boycott, refusal to
handle any merchandise, picketing, sitdown strikes of any kind,
sympathetic or general strike, or any other interference with any of the
operations of the COMPANY during the term of this Agreement, so
long as the grievance procedure for which provision is made herein is
followed by the COMPANY.
Angel) and midwives (Erma Yballe and Eleuteria Cortez) by petitioner
Here, it is not disputed that respondents had not referred their issues
to the grievance machinery as a prior step. Instead, they chose to go
on strike right away, thereby bypassing the required grievance
procedure dictated by the CBA. 
Christ in the Philippines (UCCP). The National Federation of Labor
 



Page 6 of 35
2. EFFECT OF ILLEGAL STRIKE TO UNION MEMBERS AND
OFFICERS
VISAYAS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER (VCMC), Formerly
known as METRO CEBU COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
(MCCH), petitioner, vs. ERMA YBALLE, NELIA ANGEL, ELEUTERIA
CORTEZ and EVELYN ONG, respondents. [G.R. No. 196156. January
15, 2014.]
FACTS: Respondents were hired as staff nurses (Evelyn Ong and Nelia
Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC), formerly the Metro Cebu
Community Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI). MCCHI is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation which operates the Metro Cebu Community Hospital
(MCCH), a tertiary medical institution owned by the United Church of
(NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees of MCCHI, while its associate, the Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa MCCH (NAMA-MCCH-NFL) is a Union in which Yballe et
al were members and officials. When the CBA between MCCH and
NFL ended, NAMA-MCCH-NFL expressed its desire to renew the CBA
and submitted a proposal to MCCH. However this was not accepted
since this proposal was not referred first to NFL and it was an
unregistered labor organization. On March 13, 1996, NAMA-MCCH-
NFL led a Notice of Strike but the same was deemed not led for want
of legal personality on the part of the filer. The National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) Region 7 office likewise denied their
motion for reconsideration on March 25, 1996. Despite such
rebuff, Nava and her group still conducted a strike vote on April 2,
1996 during which an overwhelming majority of union members
approved the strike.
Meanwhile, the scheduled investigations did not push through
because the striking union members insisted on attending the same
only as a group. MCCHI again sent notices informing them that their
refusal to submit to investigation is deemed a waiver of their right to
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
explain their side and management shall proceed to impose proper
disciplinary action under the circumstances. On March 30, 1996,
MCCHI sent termination letters to union leaders and other members
who participated in the strike and picketing activities. On April 8, 1996,
it also issued a cease-and-desist order to the rest of the striking
employees stressing that the wildcat concerted activities spearheaded
by the Nava group is illegal without a valid Notice of Strike and
warning them that non-compliance will compel management to
impose disciplinary actions against them. For their continued picketing
activities despite the said warning, more than 100 striking employees
were dismissed effective April 12 and 19, 1996.
dismissal and declaring the termination of the following as an offshoot
Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass actions. The
means of ingress to and egress from the hospital were blocked so that
vehicles carrying patients and employees were barred from entering
the premises. Placards were placed at the hospital's entrance gate
stating: "Please proceed to another hospital" and "we are on protest."
Employees and patients reported acts of intimidation and harassment
perpetrated by union leaders and members. With the intensi ed
atmosphere of violence and animosity within the hospital premises as
a result of continued protest activities by union members, MCCHI
suffered heavy losses due to low patient admission rates. The
hospital's suppliers also refused to make further deliveries on credit.
NLRC RULING: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS the LA’s decision-
With the volatile situation adversely affecting hospital operations and
the condition of con ned patients, MCCHI led a petition for injunction
in the NLRC (Cebu City) on July 9, 1996 (Injunction Case No.
V-0006-96). A temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued on July
16, 1996. MCCHI presented 12 witnesses (hospital employees and
patients), including a security guard who was stabbed by an identi ed
sympathizer while in the company of Nava's group. MCCHI's petition
was granted and a permanent injunction was issued on September 18,
1996 enjoining the Nava group from committing illegal acts mentioned
in Art. 264 of the Labor Code.
premises, blocked vehicles carrying patients to the hospital premises
Page 7 of 35
On August 27, 1996, the City Government of Cebu ordered the
demolition of the structures and obstructions put up by the picketing
employees of MCCHI along the sidewalk, having determined the same
as a public nuisance or nuisance per se.
Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice were filed by the terminated employees against MCCHI, Rev.
Iyoy, UCCP and members of the Board of Trustees of MCCHI. 
LA RULING: Dismissing the claim of unfair labor practice and illegal
of the illegal strike: Perla Nava, Catalina Alsado, Albina Bañez, Hannah
Bongcaras, Ernesto Canen, Jesusa Gerona and Guillerma Remocaldo
but directing the respondent Metro Cebu Community Hospital to pay
the herein complainants separation pay in the sum of THREE MILLION
EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN and [40]/
100 (P3,085,897.40). The LA also ruled that MCCHI and its
administrators were not guilty of unfair labor practice. He likewise
upheld the termination of complainants union officers who conducted
the illegal strike. The rest of the complainants were found to have been
illegally dismissed
declaring all the complainants to have been validly dismissed.
Necessarily, the award of separation pay and attorney's fees are
hereby Deleted. In deleting the award of separation pay and attorney's
fees, the NLRC emphasized that respondents and their co-
complainants are guilty of insubordination, having persisted in their
illegal concerted activities even after MCCHI had sent them individual
notices that the strike was illegal as it was led by NAMA-MCCH-NFL
which is not a legitimate labor organization. It held that under the
circumstances where the striking employees harassed, threatened and
prevented non-striking employees and doctors from entering hospital
and caused anxiety to recuperating patients by displaying placards
along the corridors of the hospital, and the resulting decrease in
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 8 of 35
hospital admission, refusal of suppliers to make further deliveries due belies respondents' belated attempt to distance themselves from the
to fears of violence erupting as a result of picketing, and diminished Nava group who led the illegal strike; and (3) respondents did not, in
income due to low admission rates, it would be unfair to saddle their motion for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision dated March 12,
MCCHI with the burden of paying separation pay to complainants who 2003, make any denial of their participation in the illegal strike but even
were validly dismissed. ca
justi ed their resort thereto due to the prevailing labor dispute.

CA RULING: AFFIRMING the Decision of the National Labor Relations ISSUE: Whether Yballe and the others who participated in the strike
Commission (NLRC) — Fourth Division dated March 14, 2001 in NLRC are entitled to be reinstated and to be paid in full of their back wages?

Case No. V-001042-99,WITH MODIFICATIONS to the effect that (1) the
petitioners, except the union officers, shall be awarded separation pay
equivalent to one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, and (2) RULING: NO, Yballe and the others who participated in the strike
petitioner Cecilia Sabas shall be awarded overtime pay amounting to are illegally dismissed from work, but they are no longer entitled to
sixty-three (63) hours.
be reinstated and to be paid in full of their back wages. 

RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTIONS: Yballe maintain that there was no
iota of evidence presented by petitioner that they took part in the
illegal strike conducted by the Nava group or committed illegal acts
like the blocking of ingress and egress in the hospital premises. They
claim that they were never involved in work stoppage but instead were
locked out by petitioner as they were unable to resume work because
hospital security personnel prevented them from entering the hospital
upon petitioner's instructions. Claiming that they have consistently
manifested their non-participation in the illegal strike before the
regional arbitration branch, NLRC and the CA, respondents argue that
there is absolutely no reason to delete the awards of back wages and
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
complainants of [sic] a strike action." When the case was elevated to
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS: VCMC contends that respondents
have surreptitiously changed their position from admitting in their
We are not persuaded by respondents' attempt to dissociate
themselves from the Nava group who filed the illegal strike. In their
motion for reconsideration  filed before the NLRC, respondents no
longer denied having participated in the strike but simply argued that
no termination of employment in connection with the strike "staged by
complainants" cannot be legally sustained because MCCHI "did not le
a complaint or petition to declare the strike of complainants illegal or
declare that illegal acts were committed in the conduct of the strike."
Respondents further assailed the NLRC's nding that they were guilty of
insubordination since "the proximate cause of the acts of complainants
was the prevailing labor dispute and the consequent resort by
the CA, respondents shifted course and again insisted that they did
not participate in the strike nor receive the March 15, 1996 individual
notices sent by petitioner to the striking employees. EDATSC

pleadings before the NLRC their participation in the illegal strike to that
of mere wearing of arm bands and alleged non-receipt of the notices in
their appeal before the CA. They stress the established facts on record
that: (1) respondents signed the March 18, 1996 collective reply of the
union o cers and members to the notices sent by petitioner regarding
their illegal concerted activities, thus proving that they received the
said notices; (2) acknowledged Perla Nava as their union leader which
Respondents' inconsistent posture cannot be sanctioned. While there
was indeed no evidence of any illegal act committed by respondents
during the strike, the Labor Arbiter and NLRC were one in  finding that
respondents actively supported the concerted protest activities, signed
the collective reply of union members manifesting that they launched
the mass actions to protest management's refusal to negotiate a new
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
CBA, refused to appear in the investigations scheduled by petitioner
because it was the union's stand that they would only attend these
investigations as a group, and failed to heed petitioner’s  final directive
for them to desist from further taking part in the illegal strike. The CA,
on the other hand, found that respondents' participation in the strike
was limited to the wearing of armbands. Since an ordinary striking
worker cannot be dismissed for such mere participation in the illegal
strike, the CA correctly ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed.
However, the CA erred in awarding respondents full back wages and
ordering their reinstatement despite the prevailing circumstances.
inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained relations between the
As a general rule, back wages are granted to indemnify a dismissed
employee for his loss of earnings during the whole period that he is out
of his job. Considering that an illegally dismissed employee is not
deemed to have left his employment, he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrue to him from the employment. 37 The grant of
back wages to him is in furtherance and effectuation of the public
objectives of the Labor Code, and is in the nature of a command to the
employer to make a public reparation for his illegal dismissal of the
employee in violation of the Labor Code.
apparently recovered from its huge losses, and with many of the
Are respondents then entitled to back wages? This Court, inG & S
Transport Corporation v. Infante, ruled in the negative:
appropriate relief. . . . 
With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair day's wage for a fair
day's labor" remains as the basic factor in determining the award
thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no
wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready
to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or
otherwise illegally prevented from working. . . . In Philippine Marine O
cers' Guild v. Compañia Maritima , as a rmed in Philippine Diamond
Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the Court
stressed that for this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be
legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar. (Emphasis
supplied)
Page 9 of 35
The alternative relief for union members who were dismissed for
having participated in an illegal strike is the payment of separation pay
in lieu of reinstatement under the following circumstances: (a) when
reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the passage of a
long period of time or because of the realities of the situation;(b)
reinstatement is inimical to the employer's interest; (c) reinstatement is
no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve the best interests
of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers'
continued employment;(f) facts that make execution unjust or
employer and employee. 
In the Decision dated December 7, 2011, we held that the grant of
separation pay to complainants is the appropriate relief under the
circumstances, thus: DaESIC
Considering that 15 years had lapsed from the onset of this labor
dispute, and in view of strained relations that ensued, in addition to the
reality of replacements already hired by the hospital which had
petitioners either employed elsewhere, already old and sickly, or
otherwise incapacitated, separation pay without back wages is the
In fine, we sustain the CA in ruling that respondents who are mere
union members were illegally dismissed for participating in the illegal
strike conducted by the Nava group. However, we set aside the order
for their reinstatement and payment of full back wages. 
 

LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
3. ACTUAL PARTICIPATION IN ILLEGAL STRIKE NECESSARY TO
DISMISS EMPLOYEES 
before the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. Ibanez in fact
CHUAYUCO STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION AND/OR
EDWIN CHUA, petitioners, vs. BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA
SA CHUAYUCO STEELMANUFACTURING CORPORATION, respond
ent. [G.R. No. 167347. January 31, 2007.]
the Strike Illegal, alleging that, aside from the fact that it was based on
FACTS: Respondent Buklod ng Manggagawa sa Chuayuco Steel
Manufacturing Corporation, a legitimate labor organization, is the
recognized bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of petitioner
Chuayuco Steel Manufacturing Corporation (the corporation) of which
its co-petitioner Edwin Chua is the President. In a special election of
officers conducted by respondent on May 10, 1999, Camilo L. Lenizo
(Lenizo) emerged as president. A copy of the result of the election was
served upon the corporation which, however, refused to recognize the
newly elected officers in light of the alleged existence of an intra-union
conflict between the factions of Lenizo and Romeo Ibanez (Ibanez),
former acting union president. The Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) Regional Director later issued an order directing
the corporation to recognize the newly elected officers as the
authorized representatives of Buklod. The order was upheld by the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) by Resolution dated October 16,
2000. Ibanez's faction sought a reconsideration of the resolution but
was denied on March 20, 2001. In the meantime, as Buklod's
collective bargaining agreement expired on November 30, 2000,
Lenizo's group submitted collective bargaining proposals which the
corporation did not heed.
On January 26, 2001, Buklod filed a notice of strike with the National
Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB) R-IV grounded on unfair labor
practice, union interference, refusal to bargain, discrimination and non-
remittance of funds held in trust. Chuayuco filed a "Motion to Dismiss"
the Notice, arguing that it could not enter into negotiations with
Page 10 of 35
respondent because of an intra-union conflict between the factions of
Ibanez and Lenizo. Ibanez later informed Chuayuco of his intention to
question the above- mentioned BLR's October 16, 2000 decision
 filed a petition which was, however, eventually dismissed by the
appellate court. On April 25, 2001, Buklod staged a strike.
On May 9, 2001, Chuayuco filed before the NLRC a Petition to Declare
an intra-union dispute, Buklod employed unlawful means in staging the
strike including padlocking and putting up several structures and large
stones before the gate to the premises of the corporation, thus
preventing free ingress and egress. On the basis of an ocular
inspection report that there was no free ingress to or egress from the
corporation premises, the NLRC issued on May 17, 2001 a temporary
restraining order in favor of Chuayuco. A writ of preliminary injunction
was subsequently issued through Order dated June 11, 2001.
LA RULING: Declared the strike illegal and the "individual respondents
who led and took active parts in the subject concerted mass action . . .
as having consequentially lost their employment status." 
NLRC RULING: Affirmed the LA ruling.
CA RULING: Affirmed the LA ruling with modifications - ordering the
reinstatement of the therein named union members of Buklod.
ISSUE: Whether the actual participation of some union members in the
illegal strike are deemed to have lost their employment status?
RULING: YES, the actual participation of some union members in
the illegal strike are deemed to have lost their employment status,
they can no longer be reinstated. Aside from obstructing free
ingress to and egress from petitioner's premises, respondent's
members also committed illegal acts which were intended to
intimidate and harass petitioner and its non-striking
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
employees. Even assuming then that the purpose for which the
strike was staged was valid, the means employed were far from
legitimate, rendering it illegal. Thus, a union officer may be
declared to have lost his employment status if he knowingly
participates in an illegal strike, whereas a union member may be
similarly faulted if he knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during the strike. Substantial evidence, which is that
level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion, suffices to prove participation
in the commission of illegal acts.
The Court of Appeals, NLRC and Labor Arbiter were in fact unanimous
in nding the strike staged by respondent illegal because of commission
of acts proscribed under Article 264 (e) of the Labor Code, reading: (e)
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence,
coercion or intimidation orobstruct the free ingress to or egress from
the employer's premises for lawful purposes, orobstruct public
thoroughfares. (Emphasis supplied)
and their counsels were served copies of the said Order. 4 MHEA led a
Clearly, the following members of respondent were shown to have
participated in the commission of illegal acts, hence, deemed to have
lost their employment status: Warlon Jimenez, Rommel Manuguid,
Christopher Siatriz, Perlito Bentor, Feliciano Amalin, Roger Hecole,
Eddie Tayco, Joelito Talisik, Edgar Dayo, Rodolfo Maniaol, Jr.,
Bernardo Caluza, and Armando Antolin. In any event, except for
Rommel Manuguid and Feliciano Amalin, the employees named in the
immediately preceding paragraph had tendered their resignation, along
with Glenn M. Mira ores, Emilio G. Lee, Ramil Q. Guerrero, Carlito C.
Arroyo, Eric G. Ayson, Eldy C. Balbalore, Rommel N. Hecole, Ceferino
T. Lopez, Vicente M. Monsalve, Donaldo P. Nuyles, Elvis C. Ocampo,
and Erwin L. Regana. 38In light of petitioner's manifestation 39 and
admission that Salvador Amar, Sonny Magsombol and Bernardo
Baquit did not join the strike and have remained employed with it, the
order for their reinstatement is improper, hence, must be deleted. Only
Ronilo A. Adia, Arnel Q. Fabillar, Eugenio M. Marinas, Jr., and Vicente
A. Penillos then must be reinstated.
company officers, non-striking employees, customers and suppliers. In
Page 11 of 35
 
4. NATURE OF THE NOTICE OF RETURN TO WORK ORDER
MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and its
members, petitioners, vs. MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, respond
ent. [G.R. No. 154591. March 5, 2007.]
FACTS: On 11 November 1999, the MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) in its National
Capital Region office against Manila Hotel on the grounds of unfair
labor practices. 2 Upon the petition of Manila Hotel, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment (SOLE) certified the labor dispute to the NLRC
for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code
on 24 November 1999. Specifically, the Order enjoined any strike or
lockout and the parties were ordered to cease and desist from
committing any acts that may exacerbate the situation.3 The parties
Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 November 1999 assailing the
validity of said Order. The case was set for mandatory conference on 8
February 2000 before Presiding Commissioner Rogelio I. Rayala.
During the conference, the parties were advised of the certification
order, which prohibited them from taking any action that would
exacerbate the situation. At the instance of the MHEA officers, the
hearing of the case was reset to 29 February 2000 due to the absence
of the counsel for MHEA. On 10 February 2000, the MHEA conducted
a strike despite the clear terms of the Order issued by the SOLE on 24
November 1999, and despite the repeated reminders thereof.  On the
same day, Commissioner Rayala called for a mandatory conference. 
After the strike was conducted, both parties filed various motions and
pleadings before the NLRC. Manila Hotel led a complaint with Prayer
for Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order on 11 February
2000, alleging that MHEA conducted an illegal strike, blocked all
ingress and egress of the hotel premises, harassed and intimidated
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 12 of 35
addition, it sought a declaration that the strike was illegal and that, striking workers to peacefully picket in a designated area outside the
consequently, the striking employees lost their employment.
hotel. Manila Hotel moved for the Reconsideration of the said Order on
the ground that the picket, which they were ordered to respect, was an
The NLRC issued an Order dated 11 February 2000 directing the unlawful activity.

striking workers to return to work immediately and the hotel to accept

them back under the same terms and conditions of employment. The
NLRC further instructed the parties to submit proof of compliance with
the instant order immediately after the lapse of twenty-four hours. The
parties, through their counsels, received the said Order before 4:00 pm
of the same day. In their Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside
Order dated 14 February 2000, and Motion for Reconsideration dated
11 April 2000, MHEA admitted that a copy of the order was served on
the picket lines at 5:00 pm of 11 February 2000.
Commissioners thus convened and agreed to resolve the case per
Pending the resolution of its motion, MHEA led a Motion to Inhibit,
dated 10 March 2000, seeking to inhibit Commissioner Rayala, who
voluntarily inhibited himself. Likewise, the MHEA, through a
Supplemental Motion, dated 22 March 2000, sought the inhibition of all
the members of the First Division of the NLRC.19 Commissioner
Veloso also voluntarily inhibited himself. On 31 March 2000, the case
was re-ra ed to the members of the Second and Third Divisions. The
curiam.

The NLRC received a copy of the Compliance led by Manila Hotel on

14 February 2000, manifesting that only six striking employees
complied with the return-to-work Order and were reinstated. The other
striking employees had openly defied the said Order. 12
determined that only the union officers were deemed to have lost their
In response to the NLRC's return-to-work order, dated 11 February
2000, the MHEA  filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Set
Aside Order on 14 February 2000. It alleged that the Motion for
Reconsideration, dated 29 November 1999, questioning the validity of
the Order of the SOLE, dated 24 November 1999, which certi ed the
case to the NLRC, was still pending with the SOLE. The said motion
NLRC RULING: ruled that the 10 February 2000 strike held by MHEA
was illegal for its defiance of the return-to-work order. However, it
employment. It ruled that there was no evidence showing who among
the striking employees were actually notified of the return-to-work
order, and therefore, such employees have not forfeited their
employment. But in view of the antagonism on both sides, the NLRC
awarded a severance pay equivalent to one-month salary to the
returning union members for every year of service, instead of ordering
Manila Hotel to reinstate them.

had prevented the said Order of the SOLE from becoming nal and
executory. Thus, it alleged that the NLRC had not acquired jurisdiction On 6 July 2000, Manila Hotel led a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
over the labor dispute pending the resolution of the Motion for before the Court of Appeals to assail the Decision dated 5 April 2000,
Reconsideration led before the SOLE. 13 On 17 February 2000, the and the Resolution dated 17 May 2000, both issued by the NLRC.

NLRC denied MHEA's Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside

Order.
CA RULING: Assailed Decision is MODIFIED in that both the
incumbent officers and members of the Union involved in the illegal
The NLRC also issued another Order on 17 February 2000, ordering strike are declared to have lost their employment status. The award of
MHEA to refrain from putting up a blockade or barricade or any mode severance compensation to the striking members of the union is
of preventing the free ingress to and egress from the hotel. consequently DELETED.

Parenthetically, it also ordered Manila Hotel to respect the right of the

LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
ISSUE: Whether the defiance of the assumption order or a return-to
work order by a striking employee either a union officer or member is
an illegal act and therefore a valid ground for loss of employment
status?
and one of the de luxe hotels operating in Metro Manila catering
RULING: YES, the defiance of the assumption order or a return-to
work order by a striking employee either a union officer or
member is an illegal act and therefore a valid ground for loss of
employment status. Returning to work in this situation is not a
matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker
must return to his job together with his co-workers so the
operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue
serving the public and promoting its interest.45 This extraordinary
authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a
peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without
jeopardizing national interests. Regardless therefore of their
motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must
cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or
undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an
assumption and/or certi cation order is issued. They cannot, for
instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor
practices on the part of the company, to justify their action. In the
present case, nothing in the records shows that Manila Hotel was
guilty of an illegal lockout. It readmitted the six (6) employees who
complied with the return-to-work order. MHEA made a vague
reference to striking employees who complied with the return- to-
work order, but were nevertheless refused re-admittance by
Manila Hotel. 63 However, they failed to even identify these
employees. There is no allegation that MHEA led any case for
illegal lock-out against Manila Hotel. What is clearly shown by the
records is that the strike or picketing was still being conducted on
28 February 2000, way after the 24- hour deadline set by the
NLRC.
they were apprised of the assumption order of the SOLE wherein they
The assumption of jurisdiction by the SOLE over labor disputes
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
Page 13 of 35
indispensable to the national interest is in the nature of a police power
measure. In this case, the SOLE sufficiently justified the assumption
order, thus: The Hotel is engaged in the hotel and restaurant business
mostly to foreign tourist groups and businessmen. It serves as venue
for local and international conventions and conferences. The Hotel
provides employment to more than 700 employees as well as
conducts business with entities dependent on its continued operation.
It also provides substantial contribution to the government coffers in
the form of foreign exchange earnings and tax payments.
Undoubtedly, a work stoppage thereat will adversely affect the Hotel,
its employees, the industry, and the economy as a whole.
At this critical time when efforts of the present administration are
seriously focused on preserving the economic gains achieved and
ensuring that existing jobs are maintained, it is the utmost concern of
this O ce to avoid work disruption that might result to the rm's closure
particularly so when an alternative mechanism obtains to resolve the
parties' differences. 41
The allegation that the strikers relied on their honest belief that the ling
of a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, issued by the SOLE on
24 November 1999, entitled them to participate in a strike, cannot be
sustained. In the case of St. Scholastica's College v. Torres, 43 the
Court reiterated the rule that a return-to-work order is immediately
executory notwithstanding the ling of a motion for reconsideration. It
must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any
petition questioning its validity.
MHEA claims that the Court should consider as a mitigating
circumstance the fact that they held the strike three months after ling
their notice of strike. Such detail is irrelevant. What is crucial is that
were enjoined from carrying out a strike. They were again reminded to
refrain from conducting a strike during the mandatory conference on 8
February 2000. Pending the proceedings for compulsory arbitration
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
and for no apparent reason, they staged the strike two days later and
refused to obey the return-to-work order issued on 11 February 2000.
facts. 54 During the same hearing, the Presiding Commissioner
MHEA alleges that the union members were not served a copy of the
assumption order issued by SOLE.48 Such allegation is absurd
considering that MHEA repeatedly alluded in its Motion for
Reconsideration dated 29 November 1999 to the assumption order,
which they now deny having received. The records also state that
petitioners and their counsels received a copy of the order on 24
November 1999 and 26 November 1999, respectively. On 8 February
2000, two days before the strike was undertaken, MHEA o cers had
attended a mandatory conference before the NLRC wherein they were
advised not to take any action to exacerbate the situation. They had
even moved for the postponement of the hearing to 29 February 2000
due to the absence of their counsel. It is only too obvious that MHEA
conducted the 10 February 2000 strike knowing fully that an
assumption order had been issued.
the order of the SOLE results in the loss of employment status. It only
They, likewise, imply that they were not served a copy of the return-to-
work order. 49 Such allegation loses credence because MHEA, in its
Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Set Aside Order dated 14 February
2000, and Motion for Reconsideration dated 11 April 2000, admitted
that a copy of the return-to-work order was served on the picket lines.
Records show that their counsel was likewise served a copy thereof
during the 11 February 2000 conference and that he refused to
acknowledge receipt.50 During the 16 February 2000 conference,
MHEA's counsel stated that the reason that some of the strikers were
unable to return to work was the fact that the picket lines were
violently dispersed a few hours after the twenty-four hour period
expired. 51 This implies that during the twenty-four hour period that
they were allowed to be fully reinstated, they failed to report to work.
MHEA, likewise, assails the Decision of the NLRC for having been
determined without conducting any preliminary hearings nor requiring
the submission of position papers.53 Again, the records belie these
statements. During the mandatory conference held on 8 March 2000,
Page 14 of 35
the parties had in fact identified the issues and made stipulations of
required both parties to le their position papers. 55 The parties,
however, failed to present evidence or le the position papers after they
had been given ample opportunity to do so.
MHEA propounds the theory56 that both parties had acted in pari
delicto and, therefore, the dismissal of its members who participated in
the illegal strike, was unwarranted, citing as its precedents Philippine
Airlines Inc. v. Brillantes 57 and Philippines Interfashion Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission. 58 In both cases, the undisputed nding
that the employer was guilty of an illegal lockout while the union
conducted an illegal strike, caused the Court to order the
reinstatement of the employees who participated in the illegal strike.
InPhilippine Airlines Inc. v. Brillantes, 59 the Court emphasized the
unequivocal rule that participating in a strike undertaken in de ance of
made an exception of the said case because the records clearly
established that the employer, Philippine Airlines, Inc., terminated the
employment of 183 union o cers and members, in violation of the order
issued by the SOLE. 60 I n Philippines Interfashion Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Commission, the return-to-work order was not issued
pursuant to an assumption or certification order. 61 More importantly,
the employees complied with the return-to- work order and reported
back for work within one day after receiving the same. Despite such
compliance, the employer refused to reinstate 114 employees, and,
thus, such refusal on the part of the employer amounted to an illegal
lockout.  




LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
5. STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE OF
STRIKE, STRIKE VOTE AND COOLING OFF PERIOD ON THE
LEGALITY OF STRIKE
March 31, 1993 for the non-representational (economic) aspect, and
THE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION
EMPLOYEES UNION, MA. DALISAY P. DELA CHICA, MARVILON B.
MILITANTE, DAVID Z. ATANACIO, JR., CARMINA C. RIVERA,
MARIO T. FERMIN(†), ISABELO E. MOLO, RUSSEL M. PALMA,
IMELDA G. HERNANDEZ, VICENTE M. LLACUNA, JOSEFINA A.
ORTIGUERRO, MA. ASUNCION G. KIMSENG, MIGUEL R. SISON,
RAUL P. GERONIMO, MARILOU E. CADENA, ANA N. TAMONTE,
AVELINO Q. RELUCIO, JORALYN R. GONGORA, CORAZON E.
ALBOS, ANABELLA J. GONZALES, MA. CORAZON Q. BALTAZAR,
MARIA LUZ I. JIMENEZ, ELVIRA A. ORLINA, SAMUEL B.
ELLARMA, ROSARIO A. FLORES, EDITHA L. BROQUEZA,
REBECCA T. FAJARDO, MA. VICTORIA C. LUNA, MA. THERESA G.
GALANG, BENIGNO V. AMION, GERARDO J. DE LEON, ROWENA T.
OCAMPO, MALOU P. DIZON, RUBEN DE C. ATIENZA, MELO E.
GABA, HERNAN B. CAMPOSANTO, NELIA D.M. DERIADA, LOLITO
L. HILIS, GRACE C. MABUNAY, FE ESPERANZA C. GERONG,
MANUEL E. HERRERA, JOSELITO J. GONZAGA, ULDARICO D.
PEDIDA, ROSALINA JULIET B. LOQUELLANO, MARCIAL F.
GONZAGA, MERCEDES R. PAULE, JOSE TEODORO A. MOTUS,
BLANCHE D. MOTUS, DAISY M. FAGUTAO, ANTONIO A. DEL
ROSARIO, EMMANUEL JUSTIN S. GREY, FRANCISCA DEL
MUNDO, JULIETA A. CRUZ, RODRIGO J. DURANO, CATALINA R.
YEE, MENANDRO CALIGAGAN, MAIDA M. SACRO MILITANTE,
LEONILA M. PEREZ, and EMMA MATEO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE HONGKONG &
SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, LTD., respondents. [G.R.
No. 156635. January 11, 2016.]
in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission
FACTS: Petitioner Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation
Employees Union (Union) was the duly recognized collective
bargaining agent of the rank-and- le employees of respondent
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). A collective
Page 15 of 35
bargaining agreement (CBA) governed the relations between the Union
and its members, on one hand, and HSBC effective April 1, 1990 until
effective April 1, 1990 until March 31, 1995 for the representational
aspect.5 The CBA included a salary structure of the employees
comprising of grade levels, entry level pay rates and the individual
pays depending on the length of service. 6 CAIHTE
On January 18, 1993, HSBC announced its implementation of a job
evaluation program (JEP) retroactive to January 1, 1993. The JEP
consisted of a job designation per grade level with the accompanying
salary scale providing for the minimum and maximum pay the
employee could receive per salary level. 7 By letter dated January 20,
1993, 8 the Union demanded the suspension of the JEP, which it
labeled as an unfair labor practice (ULP). In another letter dated
January 22, 1993, the Union informed HSBC that it would exercise its
right to concerted action. On the same day of January 22, 1993, the
Union members started picketing during breaktime while wearing black
hats and black bands on their arms and other appendages. 9 In its
letter dated January 25, 1993, HSBC responded by insisting that the
JEP was an express recognition of its obligation under the CBA.10 The
Union's concerted activities persisted for 11 months,11
notwithstanding that both sides had meanwhile started the re-
negotiation of the economic provisions of their CBA 12 on March 5,
1993. 13 The continued concerted actions impelled HSBC to suspend
the negotiations on March 19, 1993,14 and to issue memoranda,
warnings and reprimands to remind the members of the Union to
comply with HSBC's Code of Conduct.
Due to the sustained concerted actions, HSBC led a complaint for ULP
(NLRC), docketed as NLRC- NCR Case No. 00-04-02481-93. The
Labor Arbiter's decision was appealed to the NLRC whose disposition
to remand the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings was in
turn assailed. Ultimately, in G.R. No. 125038 entitled The Hongkong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 16 of 35
Relations Commission and The Hongkong & Shanghai Banking returned to work. Due to the continuing concerted actions, HSBC
Corporation, Ltd., the Court af rmed the disposition of the NLRC, and terminated the individual petitioners on December 27, 1993. 23 The
directed the remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter for further latter, undeterred, and angered by their separation from work,
proceedings. 15
continued their concerted activities.

The Union conducted a strike vote on December 19, 1993 after HSBC LA RULING: declared the strike illegal for failure of the Union to le the
accorded regular status to Patrick King, the rst person hired under the notice of strike with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE);
JEP. The majority of the members of the Union voted in favor of a to observe the cooling-off period; and to submit the results of the
strike. 16 The following day, the Union served its letter on HSBC in strike vote to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
protest of the continued implementation of the JEP, and insisted that pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor Code. He concluded that because
HSBC's modification of the salary structure under the JEP constituted of the illegality of the strike the Union members and officers were
ULP.
deemed to have lost their employment status.

On December 22, 1993, at around 12:30 p.m., the Union's of cers and NLRC RULING: modified the ruling of LA, and pronounced the
members walked out and gathered outside the premises of HSBC's of dismissal of the 18 Union members unlawful for failure of HSBC to
ces on Ayala Avenue, Makati and Ortigas Center, Pasig. 17 According accord procedural due process to them

to HSBC, the Union members blocked the entry and exit points of the
bank premises, preventing the bank of cers, including the chief
executive of cer, from entering and/or leaving the premises. 18 This
prompted HSBC to resort to a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of
its of cials and employees thus prevented from leaving the premises,
whom it airlifted on December 24, 1993 to enable them to leave the
bank premises. 19
cause but without prior notice of his termination, is entitled to full
On December 24, 1993, HSBC led its complaint to declare the strike
illegal. 20 The HSBC also petitioned for injunction (with prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of prohibitory injunction) in the
NLRC, which issued the TRO on January 6, 1994, and the writ of
preliminary injunction on January 31, 1994. 21 On November 22, 2001,
the Court upheld the actions taken in that case in The Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union v. National Labor
CA RULING: deleted the award of indemnity, but ordered HSBC to pay
backwages to the 18 employees in accordance with Serrano v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 28 to wit: In Ruben Serrano v.
NLRC and Isetann Department Store . . ., the Court ruled that an
employee who is dismissed, whether or not for just or authorized
backwages from the time he was terminated until the decision in his
case becomes nal, when the dismissal was for cause; and in case the
dismissal was without just or valid cause, the backwages shall be
computed from the time of his dismissal until his actual reinstatement.
In the case at bar, where the requirement of notice and hearing was not
complied with, the aforecited doctrine laid down in the Serrano case
applies. On motion for reconsideration, the CA reiterated its judgment,
and denied HSBC's motion to delete the award of backwages.

Relations Commission and The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking

Corporation Limited. 22
PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS: HSBC UNION argue that they were
illegally dismissed; that the CA erred in selectively applying the twin
In the meantime, HSBC issued return-to-work notices to the striking notice requirement; that in the case of the Union of cers, there must be
employees on December 22, 1993. Only 25 employees complied and a prior showing that they had participated in the illegal strike before
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
they could be terminated from employment, but that HSBC did not
make such showing, as, in fact, petitioners Carmina C. Rivera and
Mario T. Fermin were on leave during the period of the strike; 33 that
they could not be dismissed on the ground of insubordination or
abandonment in view of participation in a concerted action being a
guaranteed right; that their participation in the concerted activities out
of their sincere belief that HSBC had committed ULP in implementing
the JEP constituted good faith to be appreciated in their favor; that
their actions merited only their suspension at most, not the extreme
penalty of dismissal; and that the prevailing rule that non-compliance
with the procedural requirements under the Labor Code before staging
a strike would invalidate the strike should be revisited because the
amendment under Batas Pambansa Blg. 227 indicated the legislative
intent to ease the restriction on the right to strike.
organization on that basis, the employer must show that the of cer
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTIONS: HSBC counters that the appeal
raises factual issues already settled by the CA, NLRC, and the LA,
rendering such issues inappropriate for determination in this appeal;
that it was not liable for illegal dismissal because the petitioners had
willfully staged their illegal strike without prior compliance with Article
263 of the Labor Code; 34 that the procedural requirements of Article
263 of the Labor Code were mandatory and indispensable
conformably with Article 264 35 of the Labor Code, which, in relation
to Article 263 (c), (d) and (f), expressly made such non-compliance a
prohibited activity; that for this reason Article 264 penalized the Union
of cers who had participated in the illegal strike with loss of their
employment status; 36 that good faith could not be accorded to the
petitioners because aside from the non-compliance with the
mandatory procedure, they did not present proof to show that the
strike had been held for a lawful purpose, or that the JEP had
amounted to ULP, or that they had made a sincere effort to settle the
disagreement; 37 and that as far as the 18 employees were concerned,
they were entitled only to nominal damages, not backwages, following
the ruling in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission 38 that
Page 17 of 35
meanwhile modified the doctrine in Serrano v. National Labor Relations
Commission. 39
ISSUE: Whether the HSBC union complied with the requirements
under Article 263 in order to make their strike valid?
RULING: NO, the HSBC union was not able to comply with the
requirements under Article 263 rendering the strike as illegal. A
strike staged without compliance with the requirements of Article
263 1 of the Labor Code is illegal, and may cause the termination
of the employment of the participating union of cers and
members. However, the liability for the illegal strike is individual,
not collective. To warrant the termination of an officer of the labor
knowingly participated in the illegal strike. An ordinary striking
employee cannot be terminated based solely on his participation
in the illegal strike, for the employer must further show that the
employee committed illegal acts during the strike.
Non-compliance with Article 263 of the Labor Code renders a labor
strike illegal
The procedural requirements for a valid strike are, therefore, the
following, to wit: (1) a notice of strike led with the DOLE at least 30
days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of ULP; (2) a
strike vote approved by the majority of the total union membership in
the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose; and (3) a notice of the results of the voting at
least seven days before the intended strike given to the DOLE. These
requirements are mandatory, such that non-compliance therewith by
the union will render the strike illegal. 41
According to the CA, the petitioners neither led the notice of strike with
the DOLE, nor observed the cooling-off period, nor submitted the
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
result of the strike vote. Moreover, although the strike vote was
conducted, the same was done by open, not secret, balloting, 42 in
blatant violation of Article 263 and Section 7, Rule XIII of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code. 43 It is not amiss to observe that
the evident intention of the requirements for the strike-notice and the
strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike for the
attainment of the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the
law. 44 As such, the petitioners committed a prohibited activity under
Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, and rendered their strike illegal.
records. We agree with HSBC, for all the af davits 46 and testimonies
We underscore that the language of the law itself unmistakably bears
out the mandatory character of the limitations it has prescribed, to wit:
violence and intimidation committed by the petitioners during their
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. — (a) No labor organization or employer
shall declare a strike or lockout without rst having bargained
collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without rst
having led the notice required in the preceding Article or without the
necessary strike or lockout vote rst having been obtained and reported
to the [Department] . (emphasis supplied)
and employees; and at one point to lease an helicopter to extract its
xxx xxx xxx
of 1993.
Accordingly, the petitioners' plea for the revisit of the doctrine to the
effect that the compliance with Article 263 was mandatory was entirely
unwarranted. It is signi cant to remind that the doctrine has not been
established by judicial declaration but by congressional enactment.
Verba legis non est recedendum. The words of a statute, when they are
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, must be given their literal meaning
and must be applied without interpretation. 45 Had the legislators'
intention been to relax this restriction on the right of labor to engage in
concerted activities, they would have stated so plainly and
unequivocally.
thoroughfares. 53 The employment of prohibited means in carrying out
Page 18 of 35
Commission of unlawful acts during the strike further rendered the
same illegal
The strike was far from orderly and peaceful. HSBC's claim that from
the time when the strike was commenced on December 22, 1993 the
petitioners had on several instances obstructed the ingress into and
egress from its of ces in Makati and in Pasig was not competently
disputed, and should thus be accorded credence in the light of the
of its witnesses, 47 as well as the photographs 48 and the video
recordings 49 reviewed by LA Pati depicted the acts of obstruction,
picketing. It was undeniable that such acts of the strikers forced
HSBC's of cers to resort to unusual means of gaining access into its
premises at one point. The situation during the strike actually went out
of hand because of the petitioners' illegal conduct, compelling HSBC
to secure an injunction from the NLRC as well as to le its petition for
habeas corpus in the proper court in the interest of its trapped of cers
employees and of cers from its premises on the eve of Christmas Day
For sure, the petitioners could not justify their illegal strike by invoking
the constitutional right of labor to concerted actions. Although the
Constitution recognized and promoted their right to strike, they should
still exercise the right within the bounds of law. 52 Those bounds had
been well-de ned and well-known. Speci cally, Article 264 (e) of the
Labor Code expressly enjoined the striking workers engaged in
picketing from committing any act of violence, coercion or intimidation,
or from obstructing the free ingress into or egress from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes, or from obstructing public
concerted actions injurious to the right to property of others could only
render their strike illegal. Moreover, their strike was rendered unlawful
because their picketing which constituted an obstruction to the free
use of the employer's property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 19 of 35
property, when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and defeated by the directive of HSBC for them to report back to work. Any
coercion as to constitute nuisance, should be regulated. 54 In ne, the worker who joined the strike did so precisely to assert or improve the
strike, even if justi ed as to its ends, could become illegal because of terms and conditions of his work. 75 Otherwise, the mere expediency
the means employed, especially when the means came within the of issuing the return to work memorandum could suf ce to sti e the
prohibitions under Article 264 (e) of the Labor Code. 55
constitutional right of labor to concerted actions. Such practice would
vest in the employer the functions of a strike breaker, 76 which is
  
prohibited under Article 264 (c) of the Labor Code.

Good faith did not avail because of the patent violation of Article 263  

of the Labor Code

Non-compliance with due process resulted in illegal dismissal; the

The petitioners' disregard of the procedural requirements for employer's liability depended on the availing circumstances

conducting a valid strike negated their claim of good faith. For their
claim to be upheld, it was not enough for them to believe that their While Article 264 authorizes the termination of the union of cers and
employer was guilty of ULP, for they must also suf ciently show that employees, it does not remove from the employees their right to due
the strike was undertaken with a modicum of obeisance to the process. Regardless of their actions during the strike, the employees
restrictions on their exercise of the right to strike prior to and during its remain entitled to an opportunity to explain their conduct and why they
execution as prescribed by the law. They did not establish their should not be penalized. In Suico v. National Labor Relations
compliance with the requirements speci cally for the holding of the Commission, 81 we have reiterated the need for the employers to
strike vote and the giving of the strike notice.
comply with the twin-notice requirement despite the cause for the
termination arising from the commission of the acts prohibited by
 
Article 264, thus: Art. 277(b) in relation to Art. 264(a) and (e) recognizes
the right to due process of all workers, without distinction as to the
The finding on the illegal strike did not justify the wholesale termination cause of their termination. Where no distinction is given, none is
of the strikers from employment
construed. Hence, the foregoing standards of due process apply to the
termination of employment of Suico, et al. even if the cause therefor
We declare the illegality of the termination of the employment of the 18
was their supposed involvement in strike-related violence prohibited
members of the Union for failure of HSBC to prove that they had
under Art. 264 (a) and (e). Consequently, failure of the employer to
committed illegal acts during the strike. We also declare that Daisy
accord due process to its employees prior to their termination results
Fagutao was unlawfully dismissed because HSBC did not adduce
in illegal dismissal.

substantial evidence establishing her presence and her commission of

unlawful acts during the strike. We clarify that the 18 employees,
including Fagutao and Union of cer Fermin, were illegally dismissed
because of lack of any valid ground to dismiss them, and for 

deprivation of procedural due process. We hold that said employees'
right to exercise their right to concerted activities should not be
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
6. PAYROLL REINSTATEMENT IN LIEU OF ACTUAL REINSTATEMENT
UPON ASSUMPTION OF JURISDICTION
Hotel's Grooming Standards.
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL RESTAURANT
AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF) DUSIT HOTEL
NIKKO CHAPTER, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS (Former Eighth Division), THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS INC.,
owner and operator of DUSIT HOTEL NIKKO and/or CHIYUKI
FUJIMOTO, and ESPERANZA V. ALVEZ, respondents. [G.R. No.
163942. November 11, 2008.]
members, preventively suspending them and charging them with the
FACTS: The Union is the certi ed bargaining agent of the regular rank-
and- le employees of Dusit Hotel Nikko (Hotel), a ve star service
establishment owned and operated by Philippine Hoteliers, Inc.
located in Makati City. Chiyuki Fuijimoto and Esperanza V. Alvez are
impleaded in their o cial capacities as the Hotel's General Manager
and Director of Human Resources, respectively. aSIHcT
which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01- 019-02. In the meantime,
On October 24, 2000, the Union submitted its Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) negotiation proposals to the Hotel. As negotiations
ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and
conditions. Due to the bargaining deadlock, the Union, on December
20, 2001, led a Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining
deadlock with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB),
which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-12-369-01. Thereafter,
conciliation hearings were conducted which proved unsuccessful.
Consequently, a Strike Vote 8 was conducted by the Union on January
14, 2002 on which it was decided that the Union would wage a strike.
picket, the Union o cials and members unlawfully blocked the ingress
Soon thereafter, in the afternoon of January 17, 2002, the Union held a
general assembly at its o ce located in the Hotel's basement, where
some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads.
The next day, or on January 18, 2002, more male Union members
came to work sporting the same hair style. The Hotel prevented these
Page 20 of 35
workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the
In view of the Hotel's action, the Union staged a picket outside the
Hotel premises. Later, other workers were also prevented from entering
the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this reason the Hotel
experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to
temporarily cease operations in three restaurants.
Subsequently, on January 20, 2002, the Hotel issued notices to Union
following offenses: (1) violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2)
illegal picket; (3) unfair labor practice; (4) violation of the Hotel's
Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike; and (6) commission of illegal
acts during the illegal strike. The next day, the Union led with the
NCMB a second Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor practice
and violation of Article 248 (a) of the Labor Code on illegal lockout,
the Union o cers and members submitted their explanations to the
charges alleged by the Hotel, while they continued to stage a picket
just inside the Hotel's compound.
On January 26, 2002, the Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine
(29) Union o cers and sixty-one (61) members; and suspended eighty-
one (81) employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15 days,
four (4) employees for 10 days, and three (3) employees for ve days.
On the same day, the Union declared a strike. Starting that day, the
Union engaged in picketing the premises of the Hotel. During the
and egress of the Hotel premises. SaTAED
Consequently, on January 31, 2002, the Union led its third Notice of
Strike with the NCMB which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-
NS-01-050-02, this time on the ground of unfair labor practice and
union-busting.

LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ORDER: assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute and certi ed the case to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration, which was docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02.
the Union officers and members.
WHEREFORE, in order to have a complete determination of the
bargaining deadlock and the other incidents of the dispute, this O ce
hereby consolidates the two Notices of Strike — NCMB-NCR-
NS-12-369-01 and NCMB-NCR-NS-01-019- 02 — and CERTIFIES the
entire labor dispute covered by these Notices and the intervening
events, to the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION for
compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code,
as amended, under the following terms:
May 6, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 -> which denied due
xxx xxx xxx
moved to reconsider the Decision, but the CA was unconvinced and
d. the Hotel is given the option, in lieu of actual reinstatement, to
merely reinstate the dismissed or suspended workers in thepayroll in
light of the special circumstances attendant to their reinstatement;
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: According to the Union, there is no
NLRC RULING: issued its October 9, 2002 Decision in NLRC NCR CC
No. 000215-02, in which it ordered the Hotel and the Union to execute
a CBA within 30 days from the receipt of the decision. The NLRC also
held that the January 18, 2002 concerted action was an illegal strike in
which illegal acts were committed by the Union; and that the strike
violated the "No Strike, No Lockout" provision of the CBA, which
thereby caused the dismissal of 29 Union o cers and 61 Union
members. The NLRC ordered the Hotel to grant the 61 dismissed
Union members nancial assistance in the amount of 1/2 month's pay
for every year of service or their retirement bene ts under their
retirement plan whichever was higher. The NLRC explained that the
strike which occurred on January 18, 2002 was illegal because it failed
to comply with the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period 10 and the
seven-day strike ban, 11 as the strike occurred only 29 days after the
submission of the notice of strike on December 20, 2001 and only four
days after the submission of the strike vote on January 14, 2002. The
NLRC also ruled that even if the Union had complied with the temporal
Page 21 of 35
requirements mandated by law, the strike would nonetheless be
declared illegal because it was attended by illegal acts committed by
CA RULINGS: January 19, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 ->
 which dismissed the Union's petition and a rmed the rulings of the
NLRC. The CA ratiocinated that the Union failed to demonstrate that
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and capriciously
exercised its judgment or exercised its power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner.
course to and consequently dismissed the Union's petition. The Union
denied the motion for reconsideration in its November 25, 2004
Resolution.
legal basis for allowing payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual or
physical reinstatement. As argued, Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code is
clear on this point.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: The Hotel, on the other hand, claims
that the issue is now moot and any decision would be impossible to
execute in view of the Decision of the NLRC which upheld the
dismissal of the Union officers and members.
ISSUE: Whether the Secretary of Labor’s order of payroll reinstatement
of employees who participated in the picket is binding to the Hotel?
RULING: YES, the Secretary of Labor’s order of payroll
reinstatement of employees who participated in the picket is
binding to the Hotel, being a labor dispute, the Secretary of Labor
assumed jurisdiction over the case and certified the same to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
We held in University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. v. Secretary of
Labor: With respect to the Secretary's Order allowing payroll
reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the individual
respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders issued by
her o ce, the same is usually not allowed. Article 263 (g) of the Labor
Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return
to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same
terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The
phrase "under the same terms and conditions" makes it clear that the
Page 22 of 35
strikes, there is mutual antagonism, enmity, and animosity between the
union and the management. Payroll reinstatement, most especially in
this case, would have been the only avenue where further incidents
and damages could be avoided. Public o cials entrusted with speci c
jurisdictions enjoy great con dence from this Court. The Secretary
surely meant only to ensure industrial peace as she assumed
jurisdiction over the labor dispute. In this case, we are not ready to
substitute our own ndings in the absence of a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion on her part.

norm is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the idea that any
work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be  

detrimental to the national interest. 



Thus, it was settled that in assumption of jurisdiction cases, the
Secretary should impose actual reinstatement in accordance with the
intent and spirit of Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code. As with most rules, 

however, this one is subject to exceptions. We held in Manila Diamond
Hotel Employees' Union v. Court of Appealsthat payroll reinstatement
is a departure from the rule, and special circumstances which make
actual reinstatement impracticable must be shown.14 In one case,
payroll reinstatement was allowed where the employees previously
occupied confidential positions, because their actual reinstatement,
the Court said, would be impracticable and would only serve to
exacerbate the situation. 15 In another case, this Court held that the
NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it allowed payroll
reinstatement as an option in lieu of actual reinstatement for teachers
who were to be reinstated in the middle of the rst term. 16 We held that
the NLRC was merely trying its best to work out a satisfactory ad hoc
solution to a festering and serious problem. The peculiar
circumstances in the present case validate the Secretary's decision to
order payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement. It is
obviously impracticable for the Hotel to actually reinstate the
employees who shaved their heads or cropped their hair because this
was exactly the reason they were prevented from working in the rst
place. Further, as with most labor disputes which have resulted in
LABOR RELATIONS
7. APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA IN CASES OF ILLEGAL STRIKE,
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES, VIOLATION OF LABOR STANDARDS
CASES
Case #1: CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE
STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 23 of 35
2001, Club Filipino, Inc. submitted to CLUFEA the second part of its
counterproposal, which CLUFEA countered with an improved offer.
Club Filipino, Inc., however, refused CLUFEA's improved offer. On May
26, 2001, CLUFEA staged a strike on the ground of bargaining
deadlock. 

LEON, petitioners, vs. BENJAMIN BAUTISTA, RONIE SUALOG,

JOEL CALIDA, JOHNNY ARINTO, CARLITO PRESENTACION, and On May 31, 2001, Club Filipino, Inc. led before the National Capital
ROBERTO DE GUZMAN, respondents. [G.R. No. 168406. January 14, Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
2015.]
Commission (NLRC) a Petition to Declare [CLUFEA's] Strike Illegal. 10
According to Club Filipino, Inc., CLUFEA failed to le a Notice of Strike
FACTS: Club Filipino Employees Association (CLUFEA) is a union and to conduct a strike vote, in violation of the legal requirements for
representing the employees of Club Filipino, Inc. CLUFEA and Club staging a strike. 11 Worse, CLUFEA's members allegedly committed
Filipino, Inc. entered into previous collective bargaining agreements, illegal acts while on strike, preventing their co-workers from entering
the last of which expired on May 31, 2000. Before CLUFEA and Club and leaving Club Filipino, Inc.'s premises and even cutting off Club
Filipino, Inc.'s last collective bargaining agreement expired and within Filipino, Inc.'s electricity and water supply on the rst day of the strike.
the 60-day freedom period, 2 CLUFEA had made several demands on 12 Club Filipino, Inc. prayed that all of CLUFEA's o cers who
Club Filipino, Inc. to negotiate a new agreement. Club Filipino, Inc., participated in the strike be declared to have lost their employment
however, replied that its Board of Directors could not muster a quorum pursuant to Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. CLUFEA answered Club
to negotiate with CLUFEA. 
Filipino, Inc.'s Petition with the following o cers verifying the Answer:
Benjamin Bautista, President (Bautista); Danilo Caluag, Vice President
CLUFEA then formally submitted its proposals to Club Filipino, Inc.'s (Caluag); Ronie Sualog, Secretary (Sualog); and Joel Calida, Treasurer
negotiating panel sometime in June 2000. Still, Club Filipino, Inc. failed (Calida).

to negotiate, citing as reason the illness of the chairperson of its

negotiating panel. To compel Club Filipino, Inc. to negotiate with it,
CLUFEA led before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) a request for preventive mediation. The negotiating panels of
CLUFEA and Club Filipino, Inc. nally met on April 5, 2001. However,
the meeting ended with the parties' respective panels declaring a
deadlock in negotiation. Thus, on April 6, 2001, CLUFEA led with the
NCMB a Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock. Club
Filipino, Inc. submitted the first part of its counterproposal on April 22,
2001. 
of the union . . . terminated from service." 19 Because of the
On May 4, 2001, CLUFEA conducted a strike vote under the
Department of Labor and Employment's supervision with the majority
of CLUFEA's total union membership voting to strike. On May 11,
LA RULING: decided in favor of Club Filipino, Inc.'s Petition for
declaration of illegal strike. The LA found that CLUFEA's Notice of
Strike did not contain CLUFEA's written proposals and Club Filipino,
Inc.'s counterproposals, in violation of then Rule XXII, Section 4 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter
declared CLUFEA's strike "procedurally in rm" 18 for CLUFEA's failure
to comply with the procedural requirements for staging a strike. The
Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal and considered "all the o cers
retrenchment program Club Filipino, Inc. allegedly launched before the
Labor Arbiter issued his Decision, the dismissed union o cers were
ordered to receive separation pay "similar in terms with those offered
to the employees affected by the retrenchment program of the club."

LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
NLRC RULING: ruled that CLUFEA's Appeal was led by persons
"[having] no legal standing to question the [Labor Arbiter's] decision."
22 Bautista had allegedly resigned from Club Filipino, Inc. on
September 30, 2001, receiving separation bene ts pursuant to Club
Filipino, Inc.'s Employees Retirement Plan. For their part, Caluag,
Sualog, and Calida allegedly misrepresented themselves as CLUFEA's
o cers when they appealed to the NLRC. According to the NLRC,
CLUFEA had already elected a new set of o cers on September 28,
2001. Caluag, Sualog, and Calida, therefore, were no longer CLUFEA's
o cers when they led the Appeal on December 20, 2001. Finding that
CLUFEA no longer wished to appeal the Labor Arbiter's Decision, the
NLRC cited a letter the new o cers of CLUFEA allegedly gave Atty.
Roberto F. De Leon, Club Filipino, Inc.'s President: Nais po naming
ipabatid na ang ginawad na pagpapasya ng NLRC na naging ilegal ang
pagdaos ng pag-aalsa noong Mayo 26, 2001 ay hindi lingid sa aming
kaalaman at kami'y lubos na nalulungkot para doon sa mga kasaping
opisyal na nasangkot at humantong sa ganito ng dahil na rin sa
kanilang kapabayaan, mga padalos-dalos at mapusok na pagkilos na
walang pagkunsulta sa mga miyembro. Ang pamunuan sampu ng
aming mga kasapi ay mariing tinututulan ang ano mang uri ng pag-
aapela upang maisalba ang natitirang miyembro sa tiyak na
kapahamakan kung magpapatuloy and [sic] ganitong uri ng tagisan ng
bawat isa. 25
Lastly, the NLRC found that as of November 23, 2001, CLUFEA had
terminated the services of its legal counsel. 26 Yet, its former legal
counsel led and signed CLUFEA's Memorandum of Appeal to the
NLRC. The Memorandum of Appeal, therefore, was led without
authority of CLUFEA. Thus, in the Decision 27 dated September 30,
2002, the NLRC denied the Appeal led on December 20, 2001 for lack
of merit.
had received separation bene ts from Club Filipino, Inc. Bautista and
CA RULING: Ruled that "a worker ordered dismissed under a
tribunal's decision has every right to question his or her dismissal
especially if he [or she] had not been properly impleaded in the case
Page 24 of 35
and in the decision that decreed his or her dismissal." 32 Being o cers
of CLUFEA, Bautista, et al. had the right to appeal the loss of their
employment with the NLRC. With respect to Arinto, de Guzman, and
Fegalquin, the Court of Appeals further ruled that they were not
granted "the full hearing that the due process requirements of the
Philippine Constitution impose." Arinto, de Guzman, and Fegalquin
participated only during the Motion for Reconsideration stage with the
NLRC. The Labor Arbiter's Decision, therefore, did not bind Arinto, de
Guzman, and Fegalquin.
On the merits, the Court of Appeals held that the Labor Arbiter gravely
abused his discretion in declaring CLUFEA's strike illegal. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the requirements under Rule XXII, Section 4 of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code "[do] not appear to be
absolute." 34 Rule XXII, Section 4 only requires that the proposals and
counterproposals be attached to the Notice of Strike "as far as
practicable.” Since CLUFEA had already led a Notice of Strike when
Club Filipino, Inc. submitted its counterproposals, it was not
practicable for CLUFEA to attach Club Filipino, Inc.'s counterproposals
to the Notice of Strike.
The Court of Appeals found that the Labor Arbiter "disregarded" 36 the
law on the status of employees who participated in an illegal strike.
Under the law, union o cers may be dismissed for participating in an
illegal strike only if they knowingly participated in it. According to the
Court of Appeals, the Labor Arbiter erred in ordering all the o cers of
CLUFEA dismissed from the service without even naming these o cers
and specifying the acts these officers committed that rendered the
strike illegal. The Court of Appeals, however, found that Bautista and
Fegalquin had already resigned during the pendency of the case and
Fegalquin, therefore, "no longer [had] any legal interest [in ling the
petition for certiorari]." 37
As for Presentacion, the Court of Appeals found that he was not an o
cer of CLUFEA and was not dismissed by virtue of the Labor Arbiter's
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
Decision. He, therefore, had no personality to join Bautista, Sualog,
Calida, Arinto, de Guzman, and Fegalquin in ling the Petition for
Certiorari. As for Sualog, Calida, Arinto, and de Guzman, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter's Decision was void. Thus, in the
Decision 38 dated May 31, 2005, the Court of Appeals granted the
Petition for Certiorari with respect to Sualog, Calida, Arinto, and de
Guzman. The Court of Appeals set aside the Labor Arbiter's Decision
for being null and void and ordered the payment of full backwages and
bene ts to them from the time of their dismissal up to the nality of the
Court of Appeals' Decision. In lieu of reinstatement, the Court of
Appeals ordered Club Filipino, Inc. to pay Sualog, Calida, Arinto, and
de Guzman separation pay computed at one (1) month salary per year
of service from the time of their hiring up to the nality of the Decision
less any amount Sualog, Calida, Arinto, and de Guzman may have
received pursuant to the Labor Arbiter's Decision. As for Bautista,
Fegalquin, and Presentation, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
Petition for Certiorari.
SC RESOLUTION: This court agreed with the Court of Appeals'
Decision. This court ruled that CLUFEA could not have attached Club
Filipino, Inc.'s counterproposals in the Notice of Strike since Club
Filipino, Inc. submitted it only after CLUFEA had led the Notice of
Strike. It was, therefore, "not practicable" 45 for CLUFEA to attach
Club Filipino, Inc.'s counterproposal to the Notice of Strike. CLUFEA
did not violate Rule XXII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code.This court sustained the Court of Appeals' nding that
the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his discretion in ordering the
"wholesale dismissal"46 of CLUFEA's o cers. According to this court,
the law requires "'knowledge' [of the illegality of the strike] as
a condition sine qua non before a union o cer can be dismissed . . . for
participating in an illegal strike." 47 However, "[n]owhere in the ruling of
the labor arbiter can [there be found] any discussion of how
respondents, as union officers, knowingly participated in the alleged
illegal strike. Thus, even assuming . . . that the strike was illegal, [the]
automatic dismissal [of CLUFEA's officers] had no basis." Thus, in the
Page 25 of 35
Resolution 49 dated July 13, 2009, this court denied Club Filipino,
Inc.'s Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Club Filipino, Inc. alleged that pending its Petition for declaration of
illegal strike with the NLRC, it implemented a retrenchment program to
minimize its "mounting losses." 72 Among the 76 retrenched
employees were respondents.
Respondents, together with other retrenched employees, led a
Complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC, questioning the validity
of the retrenchment program. In the Decision73 dated October 2,
2002, Labor Arbiter Natividad M. Roma dismissed the Complaint and
found the retrenchment program valid. She ordered that the retrenched
employees, which included respondents, be paid their separation pay.
Labor Arbiter Natividad M. Roma's Decision was a rmed by the NLRC
in the Decision dated February 23, 2004. The NLRC's Decision
became nal and executory on March 27, 2004.
Considering that the NLRC had nally resolved that respondents were
not illegally dismissed and had already ordered that respondents be
paid separation pay under the retrenchment program, Club Filipino,
Inc. argues that the NLRC's Resolution of the issue constituted res
judicata as to bar the Court of Appeals from declaring that
respondents were illegally dismissed and from awarding respondents
separation pay in the illegal strike case.
ISSUE: Whether the NLRC’s Decision on the illegal dismissal case was
res judicata on the illegal strike case.
RULING: NO, the NLRC’s Decision on the illegal dismissal case was
not res judicata on the illegal strike case.
Res judicata "literally means 'a matter adjudged; a thing judicially
acted upon or decided; [or] a thing or matter settled by judgment. "' 82
Res judicata "lays the rule that an existing nal judgment or decree
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 26 of 35
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of The Labor Arbiter's judgment was on the merits. 89 Based on the facts
competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is presented by the parties, the Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner Club
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other Filipino, Inc.'s retrenchment program was valid.

actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent

jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the rst suit." 83
The fourth element of res judicata, however, is absent. Although the
Res judicata has two (2) aspects. The rst is bar by prior judgment that
precludes the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim,
cases have substantially identical parties and subject matter of the
dismissal of respondents, the cause of action for declaration of illegal
strike and the cause of action for illegal dismissal are different.

demand or cause of action. 84 The second aspect is conclusiveness of

judgment, which states that "issues actually and directly resolved in a A cause of action is "the act or omission by which a party violates the
former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the rights of another." 90 Its elements are:

same parties involving a different cause of action.” 

1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under

The elements of res judicata are:
whatever law it arises or is created;

(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not
to violate such right; and

(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties;
3) act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right
of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
 defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
(4) there must be as between the rst and second action identity of recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. 91

parties, subject matter, and causes of action. 86

In an action for declaration of illegal strike, the cause of action is

The first three (3) elements of res judicata are present in this case.
premised on a union or a labor organization's conduct of a strike
without compliance with the statutory requirements. 92

The NLRC's judgment on the illegal dismissal case is already nal with
respondents not having appealed the Decision within the reglementary On the other hand, in an action for illegal dismissal, the cause of action
period.
is premised on an employer's alleged dismissal of an employee
without a just or authorized cause as provided under Articles 282, 283,
The Labor Arbiter, who has the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear,
and 284 of the Labor Code. 93

try, and decide illegal dismissal cases, 87 decided the case. The Labor
Arbiter's Decision was heard on appeal by the NLRC, which has There is no res judicata in the present case. Petitioner Club Filipino,
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Inc. led the illegal strike because members of CLUFEA allegedly
Arbiters. 88
disrupted petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.'s business when they staged a
strike without complying with the requirements of the law. For their
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 27 of 35
part, respondents led the illegal dismissal case to question the validity upon and cannot simply be accepted at face value. Jurisprudence
of petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.'s retrenchment program.
however provides us guidance on when to accept and when to reject
workers' releases and quitclaims. In the present case where the
Although there is no res judicata, the actions have the same subject recipients are responsible union o cers who have regularly acted in
matter. The subject matter of an action is "the matter or thing from behalf of their members in the discharge of their union duties and
which the dispute has arisen." 94 Both the illegal strike and illegal where there is no direct evidence of coercion or vitiation of consent,
dismissal cases involve the dismissal of respondents. In respondents' we believe we can safely conclude that the petitioners Bautista and
action for illegal dismissal, respondents were found to have been Fegalquin fully knew that they entered into when they accepted their
dismissed by virtue of a valid retrenchment program. The NLRC then retirement bene ts and when they executed their quitclaims. The Club
ordered that they be paid separation pay based on the parties' (as well as the NLRC) is therefore correct in their position that these
collective bargaining agreement. IEHSDA
petitioners no longer have any interest that can serve as basis for their
participation in the present petition. 96 (Citations omitted)

In petitioner Club Filipino, Inc.'s action for declaration of illegal strike,

the Labor Arbiter's nding that respondents conducted an illegal strike With respect to respondent Carlito Presentacion who was not a union
resulted in their dismissal. Respondents were ordered to receive o cer and, therefore, could not have been dismissed under the illegal
separation pay "similar in terms with those offered to the employees strike case, the Court of Appeals held that he cannot receive benefits
affected by the retrenchment program of the club." 95 The Court of under Court of Appeals' Decision:

Appeals, however, found that the Labor Arbiter gravely abused his
discretion in declaring the strike illegal. It then reversed the Labor The same is true with respect to petitioner Carlito Presentacion who
Arbiter's Decision and awarded some of the respondents full does not appear to be covered by the assailed Labor Arbiter and
backwages, benefits, and separation pay.
NLRC decisions because he was not a union o cer and was not
dismissed under the assailed decisions, and who had sought redress
Because of the cases' similar subject matter, it was possible that an through a separately-filed case. 97

employee who had already availed of the bene ts under the

retrenchment program would be declared entitled to separation bene For respondents who were not found to have executed a quitclaim
ts under the illegal strike case. This is true especially if the retrenched with respect to the bene ts under the retrenchment program, the Court
employee did not execute a valid quitclaim upon receiving the bene ts of Appeals ruled that any bene ts received "as a result of the decisions
under the retrenchment program.
[of the Labor Arbiter]" 98 must be deducted from the separation pay
received under the illegal strike case. This is with respect to Ronie
Thus, to prevent double compensation, the Court of Appeals ordered Sualog, Joel Calida, Roberto de Guzman, and Johnny Arinto:

that those who already retired and received their bene ts may no
longer claim full backwages, bene ts, and separation pay under the
decision in the illegal strike case. This is with respect to respondents
Benjamin Bautista and Laureno Fegalquin who already executed their
quitclaims. The Court of Appeals said: We agree in theory with the
petitioners' position that workers' releases and quitclaims are frowned
We grant the petition and declare the assailed decision null and void
with respect to petitioners Ronie Sualog, Joel Calida, Roberto de
Guzman and Johnny Arinto as the decision to dismiss them had been
attended by grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 28 of 35
and the NLRC as discussed above. In the exercise of our discretion, Case #2: DELA ROSA LINER, INC. AND/OR ROSAURO DELA
however, we stop short of ordering the reinstatement of these ROSA, SR. AND NORA DELA ROSA, petitioners, vs. CALIXTO B.
petitioners'[sic] in light of their obviously strained relationship with the BORELA AND ESTELO A. AMARILLE,respondents. [G.R.
Club resulting from the strike and in light as well of the restructuring of No. 207286. July 29, 2015.]

the Club's workforce since then. We con ne our order therefore to the
payment of the petitioners' full backwages and bene ts from the time FACTS: On September 23, 2011, respondents Calixto Borela, bus
of their dismissal up the nality of this Decision, and to the payment of driver, and Estelo Amarille, conductor, filed separate complaints 4 (later
petitioners' separation pay computed at one (1) month salary per year consolidated) against petitioners Dela Rosa Liner, Inc., a public
of service from the time they were hired up to the nality of this transport company, Rosauro Dela Rosa, Sr., and Nora Dela Rosa, for
Decision. Any amount they might have received from the Club as a underpayment/non-payment of salaries, holiday pay, overtime pay,
result of the decisions below can be deducted from the payments we service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, sick leave and vacation
hereby find to be due them. 99
leave, night shift differential, illegal deductions, and violation of Wage
Order Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16. In a motion dated October 26, 2011, the
Since the Court of Appeals ordered that any bene t received from the petitioners asked the labor arbiter to dismiss the case for forum
illegal dismissal case be deducted from any bene t receivable under shopping. They alleged that on September 28, 2011, the CA 13th
the Court of Appeals' Decision, there was no "double compensation" Division disposed of a similar case between the parties (CA-G.R. SP
as petitioner Club Filipino, Inc. claims.
No. 118038) after they entered into a compromise agreement 5 which
covered all claims and causes of action they had against each other in
All told, the Decision in the illegal dismissal case was not res judicata relation to the respondents' employment. The respondents opposed
on the illegal strike case. The NLRC correctly executed the Court of the motion, contending that the causes of action in the present case
Appeals' Decision in the illegal strike case.
are different from the causes of action settled in the case the
petitioners cited.

LA RULING: upheld the petitioners' position and dismissed the

 
complaint on grounds of forum shopping. 

  
NLRC RULING: reversed LA Castillon's dismissal order, and reinstated
the complaint.The NLRC held that the respondents could not have


committed forum shopping as there was no identity of causes of
action between the two cases. The first complaint, the NLRC pointed
out, charged the petitioners with illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice; while the second complaint was based on the petitioners'
alleged nonpayment/underpayment of their salaries and monetary
benefits, and violation of several wage orders.

LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their
motion, prompting them to file with the CA a petition for certiorari, for
alleged grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC in: (1) holding that the
respondents did not commit forum shopping when they filed the
second complaint; and (2) disregarding respondents' quitclaim in
relation to the compromise agreement in the first complaint.
agreement, Borela and Amarille received from respondents
CA RULING: denied the petition; it found no grave abuse of discretion
in the NLRC ruling that the respondents did not commit forum
shopping when they filed their second complaint. The NLRC likewise
held that neither was the case barred by res judicata arising from the
CA judgment in the first case. The appeals court explained that the
first case involved the issues of whether respondents had been illegally
dismissed and whether petitioners should be liable for unfair labor
practice. The labor arbiter 8 dismissed the first complaint for lack of
merit in his decision of November 6, 2008. HSAcaE
judicata that would bar the second complaint. They submit that
On the respondents' appeal against the LA ruling in this first case, the
NLRC 6th Division rendered a decision on March 25, 2010, reversing
the dismissal of the complaint. It awarded respondents back wages
(P442,550.00 for Borela and P215,775.00 for Amarille), damages
(P10,000.00 each in moral and exemplary damages for Borela), and
moral and exemplary damages (P25,000.00 each for Amarille), plus
10% attorney's fees for each of them. On the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the NLRC ruling in the first complaint, however, the
NLRC vacated its decision, and in its resolution of September 30,
2010, issued a new ruling that followed the LA's ruling, with
modification. It awarded the respondents financial assistance of
P10,000.00 each, in consideration of their long years of service to the
company.
should be heard on their money claims against the petitioners. HESIcT
The respondents sought relief from the CA through a petition for
certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 118038). Thereafter, the parties settled the
case (involving the first complaint) amicably through the compromise
agreement 10adverted to earlier. Under the terms of this agreement,
"(t)he parties has (sic) agreed to terminate the case now pending
Page 29 of 35
before the Court of Appeals and that both parties further agree that no
further action based on the same grounds be brought against each
other, and this Agreement applies to all claims and damages or losses
either party may have against each other whether those damages or
losses are known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen.” Based on this
P350,000.00 and P150,000.00, respectively, and executed a quitclaim.
Consequently, the CA 13th Division rendered judgment in accordance
with the compromise agreement and ordered an entry of judgment
which was issued on September 28, 2011.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: Dela Rosa Liner ask the Court to
nullify the CA judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 128188 (arising from the
second complaint), contending that the appellate court erred in
upholding the NLRC ruling that there was no forum shopping nor res
"private respondents should be penalized and be dealt w ith more
severely, knowing fully well that the same action had been settled and
they both received a considerable amount for the settlement.
RESPONDENT’S CONTENTION: Borela and Amarille contend that
their second complaint involved two causes of action: (1) their claim for
sick leave, vacation leave, and 13th-month pay under the collective
bargaining agreement of the company; and (2) the petitioners'
noncompliance with wage orders since the year 2000 until the present.
They quote the NLRC's (1st Division) decision of July 31, 2012, 13
almost in its entirety, to support their position that they did not commit
forum shopping in the filing of the second complaint and that they
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error when it affirmed
the NLRC ruling that the second complaint is not barred by
the principle of res judicata?
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 30 of 35
RULING: NO, the CA have not committed reversible error when it Under the circumstances of the case before us, sufficient basis exists
affirmed the NLRC ruling that the second complaint is not barred for the NLRC's and CA's conclusions that there is no identity of causes
by the principle of res judicata. In other words, no grave abuse of of action between the respondents' two complaints against the
discretion could be attributed to the NLRC when it reinstated the petitioners. The first complaint involvedillegal dismissal/suspension,
second complaint.
unfair labor practice with prayer for damages andattorney's fees; while
the second complaint (the subject of the present appeal) involves
Contrary to the petitioners' submission, respondents' second claims for labor standards benefits — the petitioners' alleged violation
complaint (CA-G.R. SP No. 128188), a money claim, is not a of Wage Orders Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16; nonpayment of respondents'
"similar case" to the first complaint (CA-G.R. SP No. 118038). sick and vacation leave pays, 13th-month pay, service incentive leave
Thus, the filing of the second complaint did not constitute forum benefit, overtime pay, and night shift differential.

shopping and the judgment in the first case is not a res judicata
ruling that bars the second complaint.
As the CA correctly held, the same facts or evidence would not
support both actions. To put it simply, the facts or the evidence that
As the CA aptly cited, the elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity would determine whether respondents were illegally dismissed,
of parties; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief illegally suspended, or had been the subject of an unfair labor practice
being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding act by the petitioners are not the same facts or evidence that would
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, support the charge of non-compliance with labor standards benefits
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the and several wage orders. We thus cannot find a basis for petitioners'
action under consideration. 16
claim that "the same action had been settled . . . ." 18

We concur with the CA that forum shopping and res judicata are not
applicable in the present case. There is no identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, and the judgment rendered in the previous
action will not amount to res judicata in the action now under
consideration.
concluded to terminate the illegal dismissal and unfair labor case then
There is also no identity of causes of action in the first complaint and in
the second complaint. In Yap v. Chua, 17 we held that the test to
determine whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain
whether the same evidence would support both actions, or whether
Neither are w e persuaded by petitioners' argument that "The
Compromise Agreement covered all claims and causes of action that
the parties may have against each other in relation to the private
respondents' employment." 19 The compromise agreement had been
pending before the CA. While the parties agreed that no further action
shall be brought by the parties against each other, they pointedly
stated that they referred to actions on the same grounds. The phrase
same grounds can only refer to the grounds raised in the first
complaint and not to any other grounds.

there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two

actions. If the same facts or evidence would support both actions, We likewise cannot accept the compromise agreement's application
then they are considered the same; a judgment in the first case would "to all claims and damages or losses either party may have
be a bar to the subsequent action.
against each other whether those damages or losses are known
or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen." 20

LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 31 of 35

This coverage is too sweeping and effectively excludes any claims by P10,000.00 financial assistance or their labor standards claims,
the respondents against the petitioners, including those that by law particularly the alleged violation of the wage orders, as a factor in their
and jurisprudence cannot be waived without appropriate consideration effort to settle the case amicably. The compromise agreement, it
such as nonpayment or underpayment of overtime pay and wages. should be emphasized, was executed on September 8, 2011, 26 while
caITAC
the labor standards complaint was filed only on September 23, 2011.
27

I n Pampanga Sugar Development, Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial

Relations, et al., 21 the Court reminded the parties that while rights  

may be waived, the waiver must not be contrary to law, public policy,
morals, or good customs; or prejudicial to a third person with a right 

recognized by law. 22 In labor law, respondents' claim for 13th-month
pay, overtime pay, and statutory wages (under Wages Orders 13, 14,


15 and 16), among others, cannot simply be generally waived as they
are granted for workers' protection and welfare; it takes more than a
general waiver to give up workers' rights to these legal entitlements.

Lastly, the petitioners' insinuation, that the respondents are not and
should not be entitled to anything more, because they had already
"received a considerable amount for the settlement" 23 (P350,000.00
for Borela and P150,000.00 for Amarille), should be placed and
understood in its proper context.

We note that in the illegal dismissal case w here the compromise

agreement took place, the NLRC 6th Division (acting on the appeal
from the LA's ruling) awarded Borela P442,550.00 in backwages;
P20,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus 10% attorney's
fees; and to Amarille P215,775.00 in back wages and P50,000.00 in
moral and exemplary damages, plus 10% attorney's fees. 24

Although the NLRC reconsidered these awards and eventually granted

financial assistance of P10,000.00 each to Borela and Amarille,25 it is
reasonable to regard the amounts they received as a fair compromise
in the settlement of the first complaint in relation with the initial NLRC
award, indicated above, before its reconsideration. To be sure, the
parties, especially the respondents, could not have considered the
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 32 of 35
Case #3: NILO S. RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO T. ALISANGCO, (Strike Case), on the grounds of unfair labor practice and union-busting
BENJAMIN T. ANG, VICENTE P. ANG, SILVESTRE D. ARROYO, by PAL.

RUDERICO C. BAQUIRAN, WILFREDO S. CRUZ, EDMUNDO M.

DELOS REYES, JR., VIRGILIO V. ECARMA, ISMAEL F. GALISIM,
TITO F. GARCIA, LIBERATO D. GUTIZA, GLADYS L. JADIE,
LUISITO M. JOSE, PATERNO C. LABUGA, JR., NOEL Y.
LASTIMOSO, DANILO C. MATIAS, BEN T. MATURAN, VIRGILIO N.
OCHARAN, GABRIEL P. PIAMONTE, JR., ARTURO A. SABADO,
The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
assumed jurisdiction over the Strike Case, and issued an Order on
December 23, 1997 prohibiting all actual and impending strikes and
lockouts. On May 25, 1998, the DOLE Secretary issued another Order
reiterating the prohibition against strikes and lockouts.

MANUEL P. SANCHEZ, MARGOT A. CORPUS as the surviving

spouse of the deceased ARNOLD S. CORPUS, and ESTHER  Despite the abovementioned Orders of the DOLE Secretary, ALPAP
VICTORIA A. ALCAÑESES as the surviving spouse of the deceased filed a second Notice of Strike on June 5, 1998 and staged a strike on
EFREN S. ALCAÑESES, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. the same day. The DOLE Secretary immediately called PAL and ALPAP
and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS for conciliation conferences on June 6 and 7, 1998 to amicably settle
COMMISSION,respondents. [G.R. No. 178501. January 11, 2016.]
the dispute between them. After his efforts failed, the DOLE Secretary
issued an Order8 on June 7, 1998 (Return-to-Work Order) ordering the
(Lifted from: https://www.paladinslaw.org/single-post/2017/02/20/ striking employees to return to work within 24 hours from receipt of the
Case-Digest-Rodriguez-et-al-v-PAL-January-11-2016)
order and for PAL management to receive them under the same terms
and conditions prior to the strike.

FACTS: The petitioners in G.R. No. 178501 are 24 former pilots of

Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), namely, Rodriguez, Alisangco, Ang, Ang,
Arroyo, Baquiran, Cruz, Delos Reyes, Ecarma, Galisim, Garcia, Gutiza,
Jadie, Jose, Labuga, Lastimoso, Matias, Maturan, Ocharan, Piamonte,
Sabado, Sanchez, Corpus, and Alcañeses, hereinafter collectively
referred to as Rodriguez, et al., deemed by PAL to have lost their
On June 26, 1998, the members of ALPAP reported for work but PAL
did not accept them on the ground that the 24-hour period for the
strikers to return set by the DOLE Secretary in his Return-to-Work
Order had already lapsed, resulting in the forfeiture of their
employment.

employment status for taking part in the illegal strike in June 1998. The
petitioner in G.R. No. 178510 is PAL, a domestic operating as a Consequently, ALPAP filed with the NLRC on June 29, 1998 a
common carrier transporting passengers and cargo through aircraft. Complaint for illegal lockout against PAL, On August 21, 1998, the
PAL named Rodriguez, et al. and Rodolfo O. Poe (Poe) as respondents Acting Executive Labor Arbiter ordered the consolidation of the Illegal
in its Petition.
Lockout Case with the Strike Case pending before the DOLE
Secretary.

The 1st ALPAP case

The DOLE Secretary issued a Resolution on June 1, 1999 declaring the

On December 9, 1997, the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998 and thereafter illegal for
(ALPAP) filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board being procedurally infirm and in open defiance of the return-to-work
(NCMB) a Notice of Strike, docketed as NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97 order of June 7, 1998 and consequently, the strikers are deemed to
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 33 of 35
have lost their employment status. Likewise, it dismissed the complaint showing that complainants belatedly complied with the Return-to-
for illegal lockout for lack of merit.
Work Order on June 26, 1998; and (b) the photographs showing that
some of complainants were at the strike area or picket line.

After failing to get favorable resolutions on their motions for

reconsideration with DOLE and Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the rules of court with the Court of Appeals, ALPAP elevated
the case to this Court by filing a Petition for Certiorari, (1st ALPAP
case). The Court dismissed the Petition of ALPAP in a minute
Resolution dated April 10, 2002 for failure of ALPAP to show grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court. Said Resolution
dismissing the 1st ALPAP case became final and executory on August
29, 2002. 
rendered with grace abuse of discretion. Dela Cruz subsequently
Meanwhile, 32 ALPAP members, consisting of Rodriguez, et al, Poe,
Dela Cruz, Musong, Peña, Cruz, Noble, Versoza, Hinayon, hereinafter
collectively referred to as complainants - filed with the NLRC on June
7, 1999 a Complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL, docketed as
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision declaring that the complainants
were illegally dismissed. Moreover, the LA opined that the illegal
dismissal case may proceed independently from the Strike and
Lockout Cases.PAL appealed before the NLRC. The NLRC reversed
the decision of the LA declaring all but Jadie legally dismissed.
Aggreived, Rodriguez et al, dela Cruz and Poe filed a Petition for
Certiori with the CA, assailing the NLRC decision for having been
withdrew his petition.The Court of Appeals rendered their decision
favoring Rodriquez et al., and Poe. Finding them illegally dismissed,
the appellate court ordered PAL to pay the complainants separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement. Motions for reconderation filed by both
parties were denied.

NLRC-NCR Case No. 00--06-06290-99 (Illegal Dismissal Case).

Hence, Rodriguez et al & PAL assail before this Court the Decision and
Complainants alleged that they were not participants of the June 5, Resolution of the Court of Appeals by way of separate Petitions for
1998 strike of ALPAP and that they had no obligation to comply with review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.178501 and G.R. No.
the Return-to-Work Order of the DOLE Secretary.They alleged that PAL 178510, respectively.

terminated complainants from employment together with the strikers

who disobeyed the Return-to-Work Order, even though complainants  

had valid reasons for not reporting for work.

The 2nd ALPAP Case

In its Motion to Dismiss and/or Position Paper for Respondent, PAL

averred that the Complaint for illegal dismissal is an offshoot of the In the meantime, during the pendency of the instant Petitions, the
Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases wherein the DOLE Secretary already Court decided on June 6, 2011 Airline Pilots Association of the
adjudged with finality that the striking pilots lost their employment for Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc,docketed as G.R. No. 168382
participating in an illegal strike and/or disobeying the Return-to-Work (2nd ALPAP case). The 2nd ALPAP case arose from events that took
Order. Hence, PAL argued that the Complaint was already barred by place following the finality on August 29, 2002 of the Resolution dated
res judicata.
 April 10, 2002 which dismissed the 1st ALPAP case. On January 13,

 2003,

In addition, PAL presented the following evidence to refute

complainants' allegation that they were not strikers: (a) the logbook
LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests
ALPAP filed before the Office of the DOLE Secretary a Motion in [the
Strike Case], requesting the said office to conduct an appropriate legal
proceeding to determine who among its officers and members should
be reinstated or deemed to have lost their employment with PAL for
their actual participation in the strike conducted in June 1998.
case. Rather, these cases should be resolved in a manner consistent
In a decision dated on June 6, 2011, the Court declared that such
proceeding would entail a reopening of a final judgement which could
not be permitted. Settled in law is that once a decision has acquired
finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable, thus can no longer be
modified in any respect. Moreover, there is no necessity to conduct a
proceeding to determine the participants in the illegal strike or those
who refused to heed the return to work order because the ambiguity
can be cured by reference the body of the decision and the pleadings
filed.
The Decision dated June 6, 2011 of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP
case became final and executory on September 9, 2011.
judicata on the issue of who participated in the illegal strike in June
ISSUE: Whether the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases constitute res judicata
on the issue of the legality of the Rodriguez et al’s dismissal.
was illegal and all ALPAP officers and members who participated
RULING: YES, the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases constitute res
judicata on the issue of the legality of the Rodriguez et al’s
dismissal.
those who actually participated in the illegal strike, such omission
Bearing in mind the final and executory judgments in the 1st and
2nd ALPAP cases, the Court denies the Petition of Rodriguez, et al, in
G.R. No. 178501 and partly grants that of PAL in G.R. No. 178510.
The Court, in the 2nd ALPAP case, acknowledged the illegal dismissal
cases instituted by the individual ALPAP members before the NLRC
following their termination for the strike in June 1998 (which were apart
from the Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases of ALPAP before the DOLE
Page 34 of 35
Secretary) and affirmed the jurisdiction of the NLRC over said illegal
dismissal cases. The Court, though, also expressly pronounced in the
2nd ALPAP case that "the pendency of the foregoing cases should not
and could not affect the character of our disposition over the instant
and in accord with our present disposition for effective enforcement
and Execution of a final judgement.”
The Petitions at bar began with the Illegal Dismissal Case of
Rodriguez, et al. and eight other former pilots of PAL before the NLRC.
Among the Decisions rendered by Labor Arbiter Robles, the NLRC,
and the Court of Appeals herein, it is the one by the NLRC which is
consistent and in accord with the disposition for effective enforcement
and execution of the final judgments in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases.

The 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases which became final and executory on
August 29, 2002 and September 9, 2011, respectively, constitute res
1998 and whose services were validly terminated.
In the 1st ALPAP case, the Court upheld the DOLE Secretary's
Resolution dated June 1, 1999 declaring that the strike of June 5, 1998
therein had lost their employment status. The Court in the 2nd ALPAP
case ruled that even though the dispositive portion of the DOLE
Secretary's Resolution did not specifically enumerate the names of
cannot prevent the effective execution of the decision in the 1st ALPAP
case. The Court referred to the records of the Strike and Illegal
Lockout Cases, particularly, the logbook, which it unequivocally
pronounced as a "crucial and vital piece of evidence." In the words of
the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case, "[t]he logbook with the heading
'Return-To-Work Compliance/Returnees' bears their individual
signature signifying their conformity that they were among those
workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the
deadline imposed by DOLE.,

LABOR RELATIONS STRIKES & LOCKOUTS Digests Page 35 of 35

 equivalent or other employment after the significant lapse of time since
The logbook was similarly submitted as evidence by PAL against the the institution of the Illegal Dismissal Case; and (5) the nature of the
complainants in the Illegal Dismissal Case now on appeal. Rodriguez, business of PAL which requires the continuous operations of its planes
et al., except for Jadie and Baquiran, were signatories in the logbook and, thus, the hiring of new pilots. In lieu of reinstatement, Jadie is
as returnees,44 bound by the Resolution dated June 1, 1999 of the entitled to separation pay.

DOLE Secretary. The significance and weight accorded by the NLRC

to the logbook can no longer be gainsaid considering the declarations
of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case. Moreover, the logbook entries
were corroborated by photographs showing Rodriguez, et al.,
excluding Baquiran, Galisim, Jadie, Wilfredo S. Cruz, and Piamonte,
actually participating in the strike. The objection that the photographs
were not properly authenticated deserves scant consideration as rules
of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before
administrative bodies like the NLRC, where decisions may be reached
on the basis of position papers only. It is also worth noting that those
caught on photographs did not categorically deny being at the strike
area on the time/s and date/s the photographs were taken, but assert
that they were there in lawful exercise of their right while on official
leave or scheduled off-duty, or in the alternative, that they were already
dismissed from service as early as June 7, 1998 and their presence at
the strike area thereafter was already irrelevant.



The Court declared that among the petitioner-complainants Rodriguez,
et al, only Jadie was illegally dismissed by PAL. During the strike, Jadie
was already on maternity leave. Jadie did not join the strike and could
not be reasonably expected to report back for work by June 9, 1998 in
compliance with the Return-to-Work Order. Indeed, Jadie gave birth on
June 24, 1998. However, as both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals
had held, Jadie can no longer be reinstated for the following reasons:
(1) Jadie's former position as Captain of the E-50 aircraft no longer
existed as said aircraft was already returned to its lessors in
accordance with the Amended and Restated Rehabilitation Plan of
PAL; (2) Per ATO certification, Jadie's license expired in 1998; (3) the
animosity between the parties as engendered by the protracted and
heated litigation; (4) the possibility that Jadie had already secured