Tauniño Jillandro G.

Neri

De Borja vs. De Borja

Facts:

Francisco de Borja was first married to Josefa Tangco. Upon her death, Francisco filed a petition for the probate
of her will. Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator, their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed co-
administrator. While a widower, Francisco had a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. When Francisco died, Jose then
became the sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. Tasiana also instituted testate
proceedings in CFI where she was appointed special administratrix. Because of the numerous suits and counter-suits
plaguing the relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco, Jose and Tasiana entered
into a compromise agreement to put an end to all the litigation. In the compromise agreement, it was stipulated, among
others, that Jose obligates himself to pay Tasiana P800,000.00 as full and complete payment and settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco.

The genuineness and due execution of the compromise agreement is not disputed, however, its validity is
attacked by Tasiana, arguing that, among others, the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first
probating the will of Francisco de Borja. She relies on the decision in Guevara vs. Guevara, wherein the court held that
the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of
intestacy when the decedent left a will is against the law and public policy. It is noteworthy that the will of Francisco de
Borja having been submitted to the court and still pending probate when the compromise agreement was made and thus,
it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.

Issue: Whether or not the compromise is valid

Held: Yes.

The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to the case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of
the terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically
stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco —
shall be considered as full — complete payment — settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late
Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa Tangco, ... and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her
favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or
purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or otherwise.

There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before
the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all
her individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no
stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a decedent's estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777) there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately
adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the
transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order
of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be
dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that
the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.

It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana
Ongsingco was his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness
or valid disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and
would exist even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as
established in the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.

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 Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse
of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was
binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without previous authority of the
Court to enter into the same.

In Relation to Succession:

Even if there was no prior probate of the will of Francisco de Borja, still the compromise agreement is valid for
the reason that, the agreement stipulated the payment of P800,000 in exchange for Tasiana’s hereditary share in the
estate of Francisco and Josefa. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that the hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is
transmitted immediately after the death of the predecessor, there is no bar to a successor—herein Tasiana—to dispose of
her hereditary share immediately after such death. This is notwithstanding that the actual extent of her share is yet
undetermined until liquidation of the estate.

Further, there had been no attempt to settle or liquidate the estate of Francisco before the probate of the will.
The contract entered into merely was for the conveyance to Tasiana any and all her individual share and interest, actual
or eventual, in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.

Alejandrino vs. CA
Facts:

Late spouses Jacinto Alejandrino and Enrica Labunos left their six children (Marcelino, Gregorio, Ciriaco,
Mauricia, Laurencia and Abundio) a 219 sq. meter lot. Instead of being divided among the children with each child
having a share of 36.50 sq. meter each in accordance with the procedures, petitioner Mauricia purchased some of her
siblings’ (Gregorio’s, Ciriaco, and Abundio’s) share giving her a total of 97.43 sq. meters. Licerio Nique, respondent,
also bought portions of the property from Laurencia, Abundio and Marcelino totaling 121.67 sq. meters of the property.
Laurencia, the alleged seller to Nique, questioned the sale in an action for quieting of title and damages against Nique.
The court ruled in favor of the latter. Laurencia appealed but later withdrew the same. Nique, the respondent, filed a
motion for the segregation of the purchased 146 sq. meter portion of the property, which the court granted. Mauricia,
petitioner, now assails the validity of the segregation.

Issue: Whether or not, as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may validly sell specific portions thereof to a
third party.

Held: Yes.

Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully
settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. In the instant
case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However, because the
property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property could
be identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the Civil Code providing
that an alienation of a co-owned property "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to (the seller) in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership,

The legality of Laurencia's alienation of portions of the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was settled in Civil
Case No. CEB-7038. The decision in that case had become final and executory with Laurencia's withdrawal of her
appeal. When private respondent filed a motion for the segregation of the portions of the property that were adjudged in
his favor, private respondent was in effect calling for the partition of the property. However, under the law, partition of
the estate of a decedent may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary
action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third person
designated by the testator.

The trial court may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for quieting of title. As there is no
pending administration proceedings, the property of the Alejandrino spouses can only be partitioned by the heirs
themselves in an extrajudicial settlement of estate. However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered
before the trial court and it became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to private respondent.

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Petitioner Mauricia does not deny the fact of the execution of the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate. She only
questions its validity on account of the absence of notarization of the document and the non-publication thereof.

By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the co-ownership, he expresses his
intention to "put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs." Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the
overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property regardless of the form it takes. In effect, Laurencia
expressed her intention to terminate the co-owner by selling her share to private respondent.

In Relation to the Law on Succession:

Prior to the estate being fully settled and partitioned, the right of an heir over the property of the decedent
remains inchoate. The law allows the co-owners to exercise rights of ownership over his inchoate right, this being part of
his hereditary rights. Of course, as the property is not yet partitioned, selling one’s pro indiviso share means that there is
no particular portion to be identified as of yet and delineated. Thus, what will be sold will be limited to the portion, which
may be allotted to the seller in the division only upon the termination of the co-ownership. Partition of the estate of a
decedent may only be effected by the following: 1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, 2) by the court in an ordinary
action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, 3) by the testator himself, and 4) by the third person
designated by the testator. Partition may be any overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right over the property,
whatever form it takes. In this case, Laurencia expresses her intention to put an end to the co-ownership upon her sale
of her inchoate right to Nique.

Bailon-Casilao vs. CA
Facts:

The parcel of land involved in this case is in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabrina Bernabe, Nenita and
Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share. Rosalia and Gaudencia sold their portions of the land
to Donato Delgado. Rosalia, without the consent of the other co-owners, sold the remainder of the land to Ponancia V.
Aresgado de Lanuza who also later bought from Donato Delgado the other half of the land, thereby acquiring the entire
land. Lanuza sold the parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr. Petitioners filed a case for recovery of property and damages
against Afable. Afable claimed that the had acquired the land in question through prescription and contended that the
petitioners were guilty of laches. The lower court declared Celestino Afable, a co-owner of the land having validly bought
2/6 respective undivided shares of Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon.

Issue: Whether or not the sale by one or more co-owners of the entire property held in common withought the consent
of all the co-owners is valid.

Held: Yes.

As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect
only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because under Art. 493,
the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his
grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and
Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which
culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed
parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the
enjoyment thereof.

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights
of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common
from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property
as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it
As to the action for petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked.

In the light of the attendant circumstances, defendant-appellee's defense of prescription is a vain proposition.
Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, '(n)o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-

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owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.' In Budiong v.
Bondoc, this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible or cannot
be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-
owner or co- heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."

Furthermore, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the Torrens System, the express provision of Act
No. 496 that '(n)o title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession' is squarely applicable. Consequently, prescription will not lie in favor of Afable as against the
petitioners who remain the registered owners of the disputed parcel of land.

In Relation to the Law on Succession:

Preceding partition, a co-owner is entitled to exercise his rights of ownership over his inchoate right over the
estate of the decedent. However, when a co-owner disposes of the entire property without the prior consent of the other
co-owners, the sale is not necessarily deemed null and void. Only the rights of the co-owner who sold his inchoate rights
are transferred, thus, the buyer is now considered a co-owner of the property. Neither prescription nor laches will lie
against the non-consenting co-owners, as they are the registered owners thereof. The proper action that must be brought
is for the Division of the property.

Hacbang vs. Alo

Facts:

Bishop Sofronio Hacbang died leaving several properties behind. His parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang and
his siblings survived him. Bishop Sofronio left a will leaving half of his properties to his parents and devised the other
half to his sister Dolores. The will was submitted for probate but this was however archived. The Register of Deeds
appears to have issued a Transfer Certificate of Title to Basilio Alo, the son of Dolores. Petitioners, Dolores L. Hacbang
with Bernardo Hacbang (descendants of Bishop Sofronio’s siblings), filed a petition to cancel the TCT, arguing that the
subject property was not adjudicated and the settlement proceedings were archived and dismissed, therefore all the
properties passed on to and became part of the estate of Bishop Sofronio’s parents.

Issue: Whether or not the ownership of properties passes to the heirs even without the completion of probate of the will.

Held: Yes.

Bishop Sofronio died in 1937 before the enactment of the Civil Code in 1949. Therefore, the correct applicable
laws to the settlement of his estate are the 1889 Spanish Civil Code and the 1901 Code of Civil Procedure.
In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at the precise moment of
the death of the decedent. The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a moment's interruption.
This provision was later on translated and adopted as Article 777 of our Civil Code. As a consequence of this principle,
ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at the precise moment of death - not at the time the heirs are declared,
nor at the time of the partition, nor at the distribution of the properties. There is no interruption between the end of the
decedent's ownership and the start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.

For intestate heirs, this means that they are immediately entitled to their hereditary shares in the estate even
though they may not be entitled to any particular properties yet. For legatees and devisees granted specific properties,
this means that they acquire ownership over the legacies and devises at that immediate moment without prejudice to the
legitimes of compulsory heirs.

Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He left half of his
properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The admission of his will to probate
is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic validity. Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's
freedom to dispose of his estate, whether under the Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil Code. Our jurisdiction
accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate succession has always been preferred over
intestacy. As much as possible, a testator's will is treated and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions
operative. Hence, there is no basis to apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.

Bishop Sofronio was free to dispose of his estate without prejudice to the legitimes of his compulsory heirs.
Bishop Sofronio's only compulsory heirs were his parents. Their legitime was one-half of Bishop Sofronio's estate.
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Considering that Bishop Sofronio gave his parents half of his estate, then he was free to dispose of the free portion of his
estate in favor of his sister, Dolores Hacbang Alo. Thus, his will was intrinsically valid.

In Relation to the Law of Succession:

Regardless of the archive and non-completion of the probate of the will, it does not follow that the decedent died
intestate. Article 777 of the New Civil Code explicitly provides that successional rights are transmitted from the moment
of death of the decedent. Bishop Sofronio left a will and it was probated thereafter. From the moment of his death, titles
over the properties were vested on the heirs, legatee, and devisee. Further, it is a well-settled principle that our laws prefer
testate succession to intestacy. Thus, it is evident in this case that Bishop Sofronio’s estate was valid for all purposes.

Calalang-Parulan vs. Calalang Garcia

Facts:

Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages in his lifetime. Respondents, children of the first marriage, filed a
complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property asserting ownership over a certain parcel of land against
petitioners, children of the second marriage. The disputed land was alleged by the respondents to be acquired by them
from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs. It was alleged that despite
the first marriage enjoying continuous possession of the land, they failed to register the same and that it was only during
the second marriage that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land. And that further,
Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the land by
concealing the fact that he had 3 children with the first spouse. Pedro Calalang sold the said land to Nora Calalang-
Parulan (child of the second marriage). Pedro later died. Respondents assail the validity of the TCT arguing the sale was
void as Pedro did not obtain consent of the respondents as co-owners of the land.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents were deprived of their shares of the land due to the sale

Held: No.

The court carefully reviewed the records of the case and sustain the finding that pedro Calalang is the sole and
exclusive owner of the disputed property. As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his
property in favor of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984. It is hornbook doctrine
that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that "[t]he rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent."

In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession: The principle of
transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles.
Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed
as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the
legacies of credit and remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935),
and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their respective
inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property,
the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing
evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an in officious donation
inter vivas), the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father
deprived them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.

In Relation to the Laws on Succession:

Article 777 provides that it is only upon death of the decedent that the rights to succession are transmitted to the heirs.
Therefore, his heirs only acquired their respective inheritances and pro-indiviso shares to his entire estate upon the time
of his death. Prior to his death, it is obvious that he may dispose of his properties as he wishes. As sole owner of the
land, Pedro Calalang was within his rights to sell the subject property to Nora Calalang-Parulan. The sale of the
disputed land to Nora Calalang-Parulan precedes Pedro’s death. As such, the disputed land did not form part and
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parcel of the estate of Pedro Calalang. Respondents—children of the second marriage, acquired no right whatsoever
therefor.

Balus vs. Balus

Facts:

Petitioner and respondents are children of Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died. Rufo mortgaged a land
as security for a loan he obtained from a bank. Rufo, however, failed to pay the loan. Thus, the property was foreclosed
and was sold to the Bank as the sole bidder of the public auction. A new title was then issued in the name of the bank.
Thereafter, Rufo died. Petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate allotting 1/3 rd portion
of the disputed land to each of them. It was stated therein that they intended to redeem the same from the bank at the
soonest possible time. 3 years later, the respondents bought the subject property from the bank. A new TCT was issued
in the name of respondents but petitioner continued possession of the subject lot. Respondents filed Complaint for
Recovery of Possession against petitioner. Petitioner insists that because of the Extrajudicial Settlement executed, which
stands as the law between them, it was an understanding that the parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of the
subject property through redemption from the Bank. That because of the repurchase without notification to the petitioner,
this inured to his benefit to give him the right to claim his rightful portion of the property by reimbursing the respondents
the equivalent of his share.

Issue: Whether or not the disputed property forms part of the estate of Rufo Balus

Held: No.

Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the execution of the
Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed part of the estate of their deceased father to which they may lay
claim as his heirs. At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject
property was exclusively owned by petitioner and respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979.
This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on October 28, 1996. Evidence shows
that a Definite Deed of Sale was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption expired.
There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence,
there is no question that the Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.14 In addition, the inheritance
of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as
those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of
the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer
formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited
the subject lot from their father.

Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of the subject lot.
Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the
fact that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as compulsory
heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.

In Relation to the Laws of Succession:

When the bank acquired the disputed land, the petitioner and respondents were no longer co-owners thereof. A
new title was issued in the Bank’s name even before Rufo’s death. It is important to note that inheritance consists of the
property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of death, as well as those, which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession. Therefore, the petitioner and respondent could not inherit the disputed land.
When respondents redeemed the property, they acquired ownership thereto in exclusivity to the petitioner.