LUNG CENTER OF THE PHIL v.

ORTIGAS
FACTS: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity established by virtue of PD No. 1823, seeks exemption
from real property taxes when the City Assessor issued Tax Declarations for the land and the hospital
building. Petitioner predicted on its claim that it is a charitable institution. The request was denied, and
a petition hereafter filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA) for
reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. Petitioner alleged that as a charitable institution, is
exempted from real property taxes under Sec 28(3) Art VI of the Constitution. QC-LBAA dismissed the
petition and the decision was likewise affirmed on appeal by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals
of Quezon City. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the CBAA.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is exempted from real property taxes.
RULING: Partly No. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.
The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the property taxes only. This
provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) of RA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the
exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is a charitable institution and; its real
properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, the portions
occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to
private entities are not exempt from such taxes.
Province of Abra v. Hernando
Facts: The provincial assessor made a tax assessment on the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued. The bishop claims tax exemption from real estate tax, through an action for declaratory relief.
A summary judgment was made granting the exemption without hearing the side of the Province of
Abra.
Issue: Whether the properties of the Bishop of Bangued are tax-exempt.
Held: The 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions differ in language as to the exemption of religious property
from taxes as tehy should not only be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious
purposes. Herein, the judge accepted at its face the allegation of the Bishop instead of demonstrating
that there is compliance with the constitutional provision that allows an exemption. There was an
allegation of lack of jurisdiction and of lack of cause of action, which should have compelled the judge to
accord a hearing to the province rather than deciding the case immediately in favor of the Bishop.
Exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted, it must be strictly
construed against the taxpayer. There must be proof of the actual and direct use of the lands, buildings,
and improvements for religious (or charitable) purposes to be exempted from taxation. The case was
remanded to the lower court for a trial on merits.
Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College
Facts: Minors Nenita Julia V. Daluz and Julienne Vida Suzara, along with several others, took pictures of
themselves in their underwear, smoking cigarettes and drinking hard liquor. A third minor, Angela Tan,
uploaded them onto Facebook. A computer teacher at minors’ school, Mylene Rheza T. Escuedro,
discovered the pictures. The photos were reported to the Discipline in Charge and the girls were found
to have violated the Student Handbook. The students were sent to the Principal’s office where they
were chastised and verbally abused. They were also banned from commencement. Angela’s mother
filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages asking that the school be denied from prohibiting the girls
from attending commencement. A TRO was granted allowing the girls to attend graduation and the
Plaintiffs filed a writ of habeas data alleging an invasion of their children’s privacy by the Defendant. The
Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for habeas data because “petitioners failed to prove the
existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy.”
Issue: whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the
life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in the case.
Held: A writ of habeas data protects an individual’s right against invasion of informational privacy, and a
nexus between the right to privacy and the right to life, liberty or security must be proven. The right to
privacy is not violated when a third party downloads images from an individual’s Facebook page that are
accessible by “friends” of the individual or by the public at large. If someone posts something on
Facebook and does not limit who can see that information, there is no expectation of privacy. The
photos in the case at hand were all viewable by the friends of the girls or by the general public.
Therefore, the Court ruled that the Defendants did not violate the minors’ privacy rights by viewing and
copying the pictures on the minors’ Facebook pages.
Genuino vs Delima
Facts: The case is a consolidated case of Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition against former DOJ
Secretary Delima for her issuance of DOJ circular no. 41. Series of 2010, known as the “Consolidated
Rules and Regulations Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders (HDO),
Watchlist Orders (WLO) and Allow Departure Orders (ADO)”. The Petitioners questions the
constitutionality of this DOJ circular on the ground that it infringes the constitutional right to travel. The
petitioners in these consolidated cases are former President Arroyo and her husband, and Efraim and
Erwin Genuino. Former DOJ Secretary De lima issued HDO and WLO against petitioners on the ground
that criminal charges of plunder, qualified theft and violation of the Omnibus Election Code were filed
against them. Petitioners, particularly Spouses Arroyo, file temporary restraining order against the
issued HDO and WLO of DOJ seeking relief and grant from court to allow them to travel so that former
president Arroyo may seek medical treatment abroad. The court granted relief sought on a condition
that petition will file a bond of PhP2M, an undertaking that petitioners shall report to Philippine
consulate in the countries they are to visit (Germany, Singapore, USA, Italy, Spain and Austria) and shall
appoint a representative to receive on their behalf subpoena, orders and other legal processes.
Petitioners complied all the conditions Instead of following the order of the court, DOJ caused for the
refusal to process the petitioners travel documents. Hence, this case.
Issue: Whether or not the issued DOJ circular 41 infringes the constitutional rights of the petitioners to
travel and thus an ultra vires to the constitution.
Ruling of the Court: The constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation; it is
deemed written in every statute and contract. If a law or administrative rule violates any norm of the
constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In this case, the right to travel is a
guarantee of the constitution under the Bill of rights. There are allowable restrictions in the exercise of
this right which are for the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be
provided by law. The ground of the respondent in the issuance of DOJ circular 41 is for the petitioners
to be present during the preliminary investigation of their cases which is outside the allowable
restrictions provided by the constitution, hence, it is an ultra vires and has no effect.
Enrile vs Sandiganbayan
Facts: Year 2014, Sen. Enrile was charged with plunder before the Sandiganbayan for their alleged
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriation under the PDAF. When his warrant was issued,
Sen. Enrile voluntarily surrendered to the CIDG and was later confined and detained at the PNP General
Hospital, he then filed a motion to fix bail where he argued that:
1. He should be allowed to post bail as a matter of right;
2. Although charged with plunder his penalty would only be reclusion temporal considering that
there are two mitigating circumstances, his voluntary surrender and that he is already at the age
of 90;
3. That he is not a flight risk and his medical condition must be seriously considered.
The Sandiganbayan however, denied his motion on the grounds that:
1. He is charged with a capital offense;
2. That it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of his bail because the prosecution have not
 yet presented its evidences.
Sen. Enrile then filed a certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction for denying his motion to fix bail?
Held: Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail and
unwarrantedly disregarded Sen. Enrile’s fragile health and advanced age. Bail is a matter right and is
safeguarded by the constitution, its purpose is to ensure the personal appearance of the accused during
trial or whenever the court requires and at the same time recognizing the guarantee of due process
which is the presumption of his innocence until proven guilty. The Supreme Court further explained that
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged should be allowed
independently of the merits charged, provided his continued incarceration is injurious to his health and
endanger his life. Hence, the Sandiganbayan failed to observe that if Sen. Enrile be granted the right to
bail it will enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and attended, which will then
enable him to attend trial therefore achieving the true purpose of bail.
REPRESENTATIVE LAGMAN, etc. v. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MEDIALDEA, et al.
FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law
in the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
therein. On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the
Martial Law declaration. Lagman contended that the president’s declaration has no sufficient and
factual basis – arguing that acts of terrorism are not equated with rebellion or invasion. Lagman also
contends that the seeming affiliation with ISIS is only mere propaganda, designed to create an
appearance of capability for the Maute group.
ISSUE: WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
HELD: YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration. The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to
the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation. The Court held that the President,
in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists.
The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from
unverified news articles on the internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have
affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence,
twice removed, and are thus without any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than
proving the truth of the matter asserted. The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces
and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts
showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.
Lagman vs Pimentel
FACTS: These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one
year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend
Proclamation No. 216.
HELD: YES. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the extension of
the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the
invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension. Rebellion persists as to satisfy
the first condition for the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate that the
rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its “remnants” have
been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment
and training of new members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and continued
attacks. AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed resistance of the DAESH-
inspired DIWM and their allies. Moreover, The AFP’s data also showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters
(FTFs) are now acting as instructors to the new members of the Dawlah Islamiyah.
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA v. CONGRESS OF PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Petitioners entreat the Court to: (a) declare the refusal of the Congress to convene in joint
session for the purpose of considering Proclamation No. 216 to be in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) issue a writ of mandamus directing the Congress to
convene in joint session for the aforementioned purpose.
ISSUE: WON the Court has authority to compel the Senate and the House of Representatives to convene
in joint session?
HELD: In this particular instance, the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House of
Representatives to convene in joint session absent a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so under the
Constitution and in complete disregard of the separate actions already undertaken by both Houses on
Proclamation No. 216, including their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint session, considering
their respective resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation. In the same vein, there is no cause for the
Court to grant a writ of certiorari. As earlier discussed, under the Court's expanded jurisdiction, a
petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the
government on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by
any branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions.