15

GOVERNMENT

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh

Facts of the case: Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during the Japanese occupation, with
the Court of First Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila and the American occupation,
Judge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by
General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the
courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese).

The court resolved three issues:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid
and remained valid even after the American occupation;
2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared that “all
laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts;
3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur’s proclamation, those courts could
continue hearing the cases pending before them.

Ratio: Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government
are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and
deriving their authority from the laws of war.
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the
conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a state of insurrection and
war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration
of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come
out with a proclamation abrogating them.
The second question, the court said, hinges on the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other
government” and whether or not he intended it to annul all other judgments and judicial proceedings of
courts during the Japanese military occupation.
IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto
governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it
could not have been MacArthur’s intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of
international law.
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law
of nations if any other possible construction remains.”
Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief
done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not
intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.”
Annulling judgments of courts made during the Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and violate
international law, therefore what MacArthur said should not be construed to mean that judicial
proceedings are included in the phrase “processes of any other governments.”
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the
occupant, they become his and derive their force from him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did
not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan.
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, “law once established continues until changed by
some competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY.” Until, of
course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and
courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and
conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it follows that the same courts may
continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them
are repealed by the said government.
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DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him
to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case no. 3012.

Summary of ratio:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto government are valid and civil laws continue even during
occupation unless repealed.
2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial
proceedings because such a construction would violate the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending before it.
***3 kinds of de facto government: one established through rebellion (govt gets possession and control
through force or the voice of the majority and maintains itself against the will of the rightful
government)
through occupation (established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of
the enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government of paramount force)
through insurrection (established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who
rise in insurrection against the parent state)
 17

Lawyers’ League for Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano, petitioner vs.
President Corazon Aquino, et al, defendant

Facts: On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing
that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3
was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that
the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.” Petitioners alleged that the
Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.

Issues: Whether or not the petitioners have a personality to sue. Whether or not the government
of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Discussions:
In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favourable action.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people that
made the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its
legitimacy.

Rulings: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The
holding that petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a
cause of action.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of
the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure
government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government.
 18

Villavicencio v. Lukban

Facts : One hundred and seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without
their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were
forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble
attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown
by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary
and that these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy
acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

ISSUE : WON Mayor Lukban has the right to deport women with ill repute.

HELD : Law defines power. No official, no matter how high, is above the law. Lukban committed
a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public
officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his
residence Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the
same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Thei rchoice of profession
should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable
but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of
the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao
without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even
consenting to being transported to Mindanao. For this, Lukban etal must be severely punished