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Studies in Science Education

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A Review of the Meanings of,

and Arguments for, Integrated
Science
a
Sally A. Brown
a
Department of Education , University of Stirling ,
Scotland
Published online: 26 Mar 2008.
To cite this article: Sally A. Brown (1977) A Review of the Meanings of, and
Arguments for, Integrated Science, Studies in Science Education, 4:1, 31-62, DOI:
10.1080/03057267708559845
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Studies in Science Education, 4(1977), 31-62 31
A Review of the Meanings of, and

Arguments for, Integrated Science
SALLY A. BROWN
Department of Education, University of Stirling, Scotland
The integration of the sciences has been given considerable attention by writers
on science education and curriculum developers over the last decade or two.
Many integrated science curricula have been developed throughout the world
but the meaning of 'integration' and the value of the integrated approach have
not always been made explicit. These programmes display a common distaste
for an organization of science into discrete, unconnected subject disciplines of
the traditional type, but beyond that their characteristics exhibit wide variation.
'Today the label 'unified science' may be applied gener-
ally to any curriculum development effort in which two
or more previously separate science subjects are
combined' (Showalter, 1975).
This paper attempts to examine the various meanings ascribed to 'integrated
science', and to explore the various types of argument that have been used to
establish the value of an integrated approach for late primary and secondary
education.
One purpose of this analysis is to look at the extent to which curriculum
writers have made clear what it is that is to be integrated and how this is to be
done. Anyone who is to teach an integrated course can only be expected to
implement the intentions of the developers if clear indications of the meaning
and purpose of the integration have been provided.
Secondly, in exploring the various reasons why integrated courses are adopted
and the different emphases placed by policy makers, curriculum developers and
teachers on different types of argument, it is hoped to shed some light on the
sorts of factors that may influence the successful implementation of integrated
science.
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been given to Bernstein's (1971)
theoretical construction of the integrated type and collection type of curriculum,
and to his contention that these reflect the social forces that impinge on the
curriculum. One of the criticisms of this scheme (Pring, 1975a) questions the
assumptions that this division into two kinds of curricula is a useful one re-
flecting practice in schools and that the differences between the two types are more
important than the differences within those types. If there is a great variety of
32 Sally A. Brown
practice within integrated curricula, then it may be misleading to assume any

uniformity of the social forces that have shaped the different courses. A third
purpose of this paper is to chart the variation within integrated science and so
provide information relevant to this sort of problem.
THE MEANINGS OF INTEGRATION

'In any knowledge whatsoever there must be some sort of

integration, of seeing otherwise unrelated events as events
of a certain kind, of structuring our experiences by means
of concepts' (Pring, 1971a).
In discussing integration we must be aware of the 'scope' (Blum, 1973) of our
considerations. Are they contained within a traditional school subject discipline,
or across a range of subjects ? Pring sees the meaning of the word integration as
logically implying a 'unity of parts that are in some way transformed'. In other
words the integration of physics, chemistry and biology would provide a
curriculum with something extra and different from that provided by a study of
the three components in parallel. In practice, a much broader interpretation of
the word integration has been used (e.g. Nuffield Foundation, 1973, 1974) and
in addition to the dimension of 'scope' we must add one of 'intensity' (Blum,
1973). Along this dimension we progress from 'co-ordination' (independent
subject programmes taught simultaneously), through 'combination' (with major
units organized round headings taken from the different disciplines), to 'amal-
gamation' (a particular 'issue' forming the unifying principle).
No single classification of knowledge uniquely portrays integrated science. In
various circumstances it may be characterized as a collaboration among, a
blending with, or a fusion of, a number of 'subjects' traditionally taught separ-
ately; or it maybe seen as focussing on the disclosure of a general process of
scientific enquiry; or it may be perceived as a curriculum centred around the
interests of pupils (for which subject boundaries have no relevance); or it may be
a course framed by certain topics, themes or problems that require a multi-
disciplinary approach. However, in any particular curriculum, unless a precise
description of what it is about science that is viewed as unified is provided, it is
very unlikely that the ideas that form the basis of the integrated science course
will be satisfactorily translated into practical recommendations for teaching,
and even less likely that they will be reflected in the classroom.
This paper looks at four broad groups of meanings of integration in science:
(1) as the unity of all knowledge,
(2) as the conceptual unity of the sciences,
(3) as a unified process of scientific enquiry,
(4) as interdisciplinary study.
Each of these categories cover a spectrum of meaning and this variation some-
times appears more significant than the differences between categories. The
A Review of the Meaningsof,and Arguments for, Integrated Science 33
choice of this particular scheme over any other is not related to an underlying
theoretical frame work (unfortunately, no such framework is to hand), but
rather to its convenience in accommodating statements from a number of
curriculum programmes and the use that has been made of similar schemes by
other writers.
While I shall attempt some exemplification from specific integrated science
curricula, my main purpose is to describe and discuss the categories of meanings.

Unity of all knowledge
The meaning of integration that implies the greatest scope is that which claims
the unity of all knowledge. Rutherford and Gardner (1971) suggest that 'As a
matter of faith, rather than as a conclusion based on evidence, most scientists
and, indeed, most individuals, believe that in some sense the natural world is of
a piece'. Such a view would see our present system of describing our universe in
relation to a number of different disciplines as indicative of the limitations of
our present knowledge and procedures, rather than as evidence of any inherent
disunity in knowledge. Indeed, scientists from Aristotle to Einstein have 'believed
in the unity of the universe and tried to discover the unifying laws of nature'
(Blum, 1973). Since no such unifying principles have appeared, some educators
(e.g. Schools' Council Working Paper No. 11, 1967; the Crowther Report, 1959;
and the Newsom Report, 1963) have advocated a 'balance' among the different
kinds of knowledge to ensure a 'total pattern' for the curriculum. These reports,
however, do not provide any criteria that specify what would constitute this
balance or pattern, nor the relationship with a unified framework of knowledge.
The appeal of this holistic view of knowledge is pervasive and 'it is worth
noting that there frequently lies beneath this search for integration an emotional
attachment to unity which might arise from, or might even beget, the belief that
knowledge is essentially one and undivided, and it is this sense of unity which must
be reflected in the curriculum of our schools' (Pring, 1971a).
However, the view of knowledge as a unity may have a more substantial basis;
for example, claims for this might be made in terms of a reductionist theory.
Here it would have to be argued that some discipline had priority and others had
to be reduced in turn to this fundamental form. Thus in hierarchies such as
Comte's we have mathematics as some sort of natural logic in terms of which we
can describe all thefindingsof physics;findingsof chemistry can be deduced from
principles of physics; the characteristics of biological organisms can be seen as
complex physico-chemical systems; psychological characteristics can be seen as
organizations of biological systems; sociological phenomena can be seen as
aggregates of psychological systems; and so on. Such a system may be superficially
attractive but Schwab (1964a) regards it as 'tyrannical and largely unexamined',
particularly when used to determine curriculum sequence in schools. He suggests:
'The doctrine of the unity of science, which insists on a
34 Sally A. Brown
unification of all knowledge, is either dogma or hope but

not a fact. There are no data from which to conclude
decisively that eventually all the disciplines will become
or should become one'.
Popper's (1972) view is that while the reduction of chemistry to physics may well
be demonstrated in the future, this may be less easy for biology in view of the
apparent basic difference between 'living' and 'non-living' material. He criticizes

the view that the possibility of reduction is settled a priori, and insists that it must
be settled by substantial theory.
The unity of all knowledge is not always perceived in such philosophical or
emotional terms as those described so far. One perspective sees enquiry in
science as being one exemplification of a general process of enquiry which is more
or less the same no matter what subject matter it is applied to. This view sees
knowledge as unified insofar as it is all concerned with the solution of problems,
and characterized by the use of generalizable skills, mental processes, hypo-
thesising and testing to achieve those solutions.
Precise descriptions of the nature of this general process of enquiry are rarely
provided; it is normally sketched out in very broad terms. Not infrequently the
meaning of integration in this sense accompanies arguments for a curriculum
that is organized so that the pupil may pursue his own interests and patterns of
enquiry as effectively as possible and unencumbered by the divisions imposed on
him by school subjects. In principle, such programmes cannot be pre-planned
and have made little impact on science curricula beyond the primary school
stage.
It appears, therefore, that while the answer to the question 'What is to be
integrated?' is for some 'All knowledge', the answer to the question 'How is this
to be done?' is more elusive. In practice, curricula integrated in the sense of the
unity of all knowledge are very seldom found.
Unity of the conceptual structures of science
The second, less-global, category of meaning implies a particular view of
science as a field of experience distinct from other such fields, without clearly
distinguishable component disciplines, and characterized by a single conceptual
structure or framework. Schwab (1962a) has argued that such a framework,
which he calls the substantive structure of the discipline, is not inherent in the subject
matter but is imposed by the practitioners and consists of a 'body of concepts —
commitments about the nature of a subject matter functioning as a guide to
enquiry' (p.203). A curriculum integrated on the basis of a unified conceptual
structure of science would, therefore, be expected to identify and display those
concepts (and their inter-relationships) that make up that framework. If this is
not done (and it frequently is not), then it is unlikely that teachers will know in
what sense the writers of the curriculum are viewing the unity of science, and
A Review of the Meanings of, and Arguments for Integrated Science 35
without such knowledge it is improbable that the intentions of the writers will be
translated into classroom practice. Ideally, we would ask for indicators of two
kinds:
(a) philosophical arguments about the structure of scientific knowledge,
and
(b) arguments about the desirable structure of the science curriculum involving
considerations other than the philosophical.

Development of such arguments is a complex task. One of the schemes,
developed by educational philosophers, that have attempted to reduce know-
ledge to a small number of general categories might be used as a starting point.
For example Hirst (1967) argues that 'All knowledge is differentiated into a
limited number of logically distinct forms or disciplines', but asserts that:
T o proceed from saying that there is a given structure in
the knowledge we wish to be mastered to saying that this
must be the structure of the curriculum is to be guilty of a
simple logical fallacy . . . the characteristics of the means
must not be taken for the characteristics of the ends. I
see no reason why the curriculum should not be fully
topic-organized provided it is understood that the de-
velopment of understanding involves the mastery of
conceptual structures which are not reflected in the topic-
organization'.
These logical forms of knowledge he distinguishes by a) their use of concepts of a
particular kind, and b) their distinctive types of test that they use for their
objective claims (Hirst and Peters 1970, page 62). Hirst (1965) sees the concepts
of a particular form of knowledge as being related to each other in a limited
number of ways forming a characteristic network of relationships. The decision
on where the dividing line between disciplines is to be found requires examina-
tion of the concepts, the relationships between the concepts (the logical structure),
the procedures used for testing statements emanating from the logical structure,
and the criteria of truth used in testing.
This scheme makes distinctions between physical sciences and human sciences.
Holroyd (1972) and Lawton (1973) both point to ambiguity in the placing of
biology. Is it a physical science concerned with 'abstract theoretical concepts'
but 'employing concepts of what is seen, heard or smelt', and using empirical
tests of observation by the senses ? In which case 'physical science' might be
equivalent to the common-usage 'natural science'. Or does biology fall with the
social sciences into the human sciences, associated with understanding 'our own
and other peoples minds?' The latter are concerned with additional empirical
concepts connected with the intentions of living things (e.g. 'deciding', 'enjoying',
'wanting') and the basis on which we can make objective judgements in this
area are, as yet, inadequately understood.
36 Sally A. Brown
Alternatively, one might follow Phenix (1964), who takes a rather different
perspective from Hirst in classifying human Realms of Meaning. He is concerned
with the need of the individual for understanding and experience over a number
of general areas if he is to function adequately in society. One of these areas or
Realms of Meaning — Empirics — includes both physical science and biological
science (together with psychology and the social sciences). Empirics are con-
cerned with those truths which may be associated with an experimentally verifiable
conceptual framework.
There is no single authoritative answer to the question 'What constitutes a
discipline?', and both of these schemes have been adversely criticised (e.g. see
Pring, 1976b, Chapter 2). Similarly, within any disciplinary area, there is no
unique substantive structure of concepts, and Schwab (1964a) has argued that
scientific knowledge has a distinctly revisionary character by which obsolete
substantive structures are being constantly revised.
One curriculum that has attempted the difficult task of mapping out its con-
ceptual framework for science is the Schools' Council Integrated Science Project.
It has been built around explicit overarching concepts and is
'based on three useful ideas of science: building blocks
(which range from the electron to planets), interactions,
and energy' (Schools' Council, undated).
Unfortunately, two of the three appear too broad to help in delineating what the
developers intended as 'science'. As Pring (1975b) has pointed out, any theoreti-
cal structure must involve building blocks and interactions. Energy, on the other
hand, is an effective integrating idea over afinitearea of knowledge. This reflects
a general problem in charting the conceptual structure of integrated science —
energy is satisfactory, almost everything else lacks clarity. The Conceptually
Oriented Program in Integrated Science (Shamos, 1971) has had a greater
measure of success in this area than many other courses. It has a core of five
conceptual schemes — 'The Structural Units of the Universe', 'Interaction and
Change', 'The Conservation of Energy', 'The Degradation of Energy' and 'The
Statistical View of Nature' — all of which are 'developed concurrently and inter-
woven with one another'. Criticism of over-generality of these elements is
avoided by providing an initial description of each scheme and its boundaries.
The teacher is, therefore, given, at an early stage, the framework around which
the course is to be built. The Australian Science Education Project (1971a) have
also 'set the scene' by making explicit the six themes, representing major con-
cepts of science, on which their curriculum has been developed. Without such
information the teachers cannot know how it is intended that the knowledge of a
unified science is to be structured, and we cannot assume that the structures that
they impose on the curriculum will correspond to those of the curriculum
writers.
Unified process of scientific enquiry

The Schools' Council Integrated Science Project, in addition to perceiving
integration in the conceptual structures of science, was fundamentally concerned
with a particular process scheme (related to Gagné's, 1970, learning hierarchies)
of 'searching for and using patterns to solve problems'. The emphasis here is on
consideration of methodological distinctions and similarities among the sciences
rather than on an epistemological approach.

Many curricula make the assumption that the sciences are characterized by a
general methodology or process of enquiry that transcends the boundaries of the
traditional disciplines. Considerable doubt has been cast on the straightforward
pictures of 'scientific method' or 'unified processes of enquiry in science' that
have been presented to pupils (e.g. Tawney, 1974), yet, as Shulman and Tamir
(1973, p. 1102) point out, the teaching establishment is oblivious to such argu-
ments in its quest for a set of structures of 'science processes, that will be univer-
sally applicable to "science"'. Schwab has repeatedly argued that the syntactic
structure of a discipline ('the pattern of its procedures, its method, how it goes
about using its conceptions to attain its goals': Schwab, 1962a, p. 203) varies
from one subject to another and that
'There are differences among enquiries within science . . .
Each one arises in relation to a specific subject matter and
the essence of each lies in its own substantive conceptions,
its own data and its own questions asked and answered'
(Schwab, 1962b, p. 103).
Nevertheless, we continue to assume that a method exists that is common to all
the sciences, and that distinguishes science from other areas of knowledge.
In very general terms, it is possible to describe the procedures of science; for
example the concept of integration may be based on general agreement among
scientists on:
(1) appropriate language for stating scientific problems
(2) how to collect and analyse data
(3) correct application of logic
(4) use of theory and models
(5) need for verification
(6) need for critical appraisal by colleagues.
(Rutherford and Gardner, 1971).
These methodological issues, it would be argued, are more significant than the
particular facts, laws and theories that comprise the separate sciences. However,
if a curriculum were to be based on such an interpretation it would be necessary
to be explicit about the nature of the 'use' of theory, or the 'verification', or the
'appropriate language'.
For the younger pupil this may be a straight forward matter and Science — A
38 Sally A. Brown
Process Approach (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1971)

'centres upon the idea that what is taught to children
should resemble what scientists do — the "processes" that
they carry out in their scientific activities. Scientists do
observe, and classify, and measure, and infer, and make
hypotheses and perform experiments'.
These procedures can probably be specified without much difficulty in terms of

what this age group does in the science classroom. However, as we move up the
scale of sophistication from primary school pupils to the practising scientist un-
ambiguous specification becomes problematic, and the 'rules' that are specific
to particular modes of enquiry ('chemical', 'biological', 'physics' etc.) begin to
exert an influence.
A curriculum that interprets integration in the scientific enquiry sense will have
to be based on assumptions made about a) the generalizable characteristics of
scientific enquiry, and b) characteristics of enquiry specific to particular areas of
science.
There is no single accepted theory of the nature of enquiry in science. Popper
(1969) in looking at the way the scientist uses his theories and observations
concludes that the distinction between enquiry in science and other enquiry is
that the experiments attempt refutation rather than verification. Kuhn (1962),
however, rejects the idea that science proceeds as a series of conjectures and re-
futations with a single refutation able to cast doubt on established theory, and
presents a scheme of 'normal' and 'revolutionary' science. 'Normal' science he
sees as firmly based on some 'paradigm' i.e. the theories, principles and rules
that currently govern the practice of the scientific community. He suggests that a
time will come when there will be a crisis, the paradigm will be inadequate,
anomalies will lead to a 'scientific revolution' and, finally, to the adoption of a
new paradigm. During this time of crisis, there will be highly creative enquiry
relating to various suggestions for new paradigms, and this he calls 'revolutionary
science'. The patterns of enquiry within such 'normal' and 'revolutionary'
science could follow the two generalizable syntactic structures for normal science
described by Schwab. Thefirstof these, the syntax of stable enquiry, is concerned
with problems arising from the currently accepted theories, principles and
structures of science. This he characterizes by:
(a) formulation of a problem
(b) search for data to suggest possible solutions
(c) reformulation of problem to include solutions
(d) determination of data necessary to solve the problem
(e) plan of experiment to elicit data
(f) execution of experiment and accumulation of desired data
(g) interpretation of data by means of guiding substantive structures of previous
knowledge. (Schwab, 1962b).
A Review of the Meanings of, and Arguments for, Integrated Science 39
Secondly, the syntax of fluid energy, Schwab sees as a response to the demand for
increasing validity of existing structures. This follows no systematic pattern (and
as such would be very difficult to build into the curriculum) but must deal with
perceived inadequacies and weaknesses in the existing conceptual structures,
and produce new or modified ones that can be seen as adequate and feasible.
However, when Schwab (1964b) looks in detail at different areas of science he
concludes that physics and biology exemplify different syntactic structures. He

sees biology as verifying the consequences of a large number of hypotheses i.e.
seeking knowledge in 'bits and pieces'. Physics he views as a verification of the
structure of existing knowledge and as developing broad comprehensive theories
concerning large areas of subject matter. These different goals, will, he suggests,
require different sorts of evidence and so different pathways of enquiry.
Robinson (1969) reports on a study he made of major concepts of methodology
in six philosophic works by three biologists and three physicists. He found:
The biological sciences were considered to utilise pre-
dominantly correlational procedures. Selected sense data
are conceptualized into statements that attempt to ex-
plain the organization, history, and apparent directive-
ness of living systems. Many of the concepts within the
explanatory statements provide sufficient conditions, but
not the necessary conditions demanded by the exact pro-
cedures.'
In contrast the physical sciences were concerned with constructs that are:
'linked logically with other constructs and empirically to
sense data through rules of correspondence . . . the
spontaneity, relative independence and irreductibility of
sense data . . . are brought under methodological control
by the establishment of correspondences between sense
data and constructs and the subjection of constructs to the
demands of metaphysical principles through the circuit of
verification, The circuit of verification includes inductive
and deductive procedures.'
Much of the writing on integrated science implies an underlying, specific model
of scientific enquiry but fails to describe it adequately. For example Jacobson
(1971) suggests that 'there are different modes of enquiry in different sciences'
(p. 69) but argues that 'basic science process skills can be developed from within
a wide range of content fields from meteorology to physiology.' He may be right,
but that will depend on what is different about the modes of enquiry and what
the basic process skills are. He does not describe the modes of enquiry but he
exemplifies the basic science process skills by model formation in solar system
astronomy, genetics, atmospheric physics, electricity and atomic physics. Model
formation is a vague term and one which is applicable to other areas of know-
40 Sally A. Brown
ledge (plastic arts, metaphysics, social sciences). Closer specification is needed —

are we concerned with models in the sense of the 'black-box' hypothesis' (Schwab
1964b) which is inaccessable to immediate observation (e.g. model of matter
incorporating a neutrino), or in the sense of a 'glass-box hypothesis' which poses
a problem that can be answered empirically (e.g. model of the solar system
incorporating a new planet), or in some other sense?
The Scottish Integrated Science Course claims that its concern is to

'expose pupils to . . . the work of the scientist, the appara-
tus at his disposal, the experimental methods he uses, the
different processes of thought by which he arrives at his
conclusions' (Scottish Education Department, 1969, p.
10).
Yet no explicit description of the scientist's methodology is given, and the vast
majority of the recommended topics in the syllabus focus on the collection of
substantive information and not on the practical and theoretical procedures of
science.
If curricula do not specify in some detail the characteristics they are attributing
to scientific enquiry they run the risks of confusion and idiosyncratic interpre-
tation.
Interdisciplinary study
A fourth possible interpretation of integration is that of interdisciplinary enquiry.
We may distinguish integrated science as a blending of subjects and deliberate
synthesis of material, from interdisciplinary science as a collaboration between
subjects and a viewing of a topic or theme from logically different viewpoints
with the learner left to synthesize in any way he pleases (Whitfield, 1971). The
interdisciplinary approach involves no synthesis of established disciplines and so
epistemological arguments about the nature of the concepts and processes of
science are not required. However, it is necessary to specify the basis on which
the subject matter is selected, if we are not to be left with what Whitfield (after
Toynbee) calls 'one damned thing after another'.
In the second part of this paper we shall see that many of the arguments for the
integration of science are unrelated to the structures of scientific knowledge.
They may suggest that science teaching should be directed towards particular
issues of current and practical importance to the pupil. These issues would then
provide the theme or topic which should be the organizational unit in an inter-
disciplinary study. For example the Brazilian Primary Science programme (1971)
states that 'For a large majority, in developing countries topics should be chosen
with an important bearing on their daily life', and it is proposed that 'public
health and food production are of top priority'.
Study of these topics requires a contribution from a number of different
subject areas; indeed it may be seen as a means of demonstrating what sorts of
crosslinks there are among the various distinctive disciplines. In a developing

country, a theme defined by the question 'How can we establish adequate food pro-
duction in order to feed our population ?' might well emphasize the necessity of
utilizing the disparate contributions from different areas of knowledge such as
physics, chemistry and biology in order to solve the practical problems. The
organizing theme does not necessarily have to be a problem. The Australian
Science Education Project (1971s) chose topics in relation to a number of ideas

that were to be developed, for example The ways in which technology has
changed man's environment'.
In both these examples the issue upon which the various disciplines are
brought to bear, originates in the 'outside world', and can be called an extrinsic
focus (Nuffield Foundation, 1974). It is, however, quite possible to have a theme
or question originating within a traditionally distinct area subject, but requiring
information or skills from other subject areas for adequate treatment. This
issue would provide an intrinsic focus.
The latter type of interdisciplinary study has always assumed some importance
within science and no science subject has been completely isolated. In his
philosophical analysis, Hirst has emphasised that each of the forms of know-
ledge borrows from other forms. For example science uses mathematics, but
such knowledge is a toolforscience not an integrated part of it, since the validity
of the knowledge is established by mathematical, and not scientific procedures
and tests. In addition there is no reason to limit our classifications of knowledge
to those of the distinct 'forms'. These 'forms' will provide the fixed reference
points but Hirst sees considerable importance in 'fields' of knowledge such as
geography and engineering. Fields are not distinguished by their particular
conceptual frameworks but by their subject matter. The various 'forms' con-
tribute to the particular theoretical or practical interest of the 'field'.
The importance of the inter-relationships between the different forms of
knowledge has been stressed, but where there are topic-or theme-centred curricula
with contributions from different disciplines, there are great demands on the
knowledge and ability of teachers to bring out the inter-relationships. And 'if
the objectives from the different domains are not being adequately related to the
structures within each of these, little is likely to be achieved.' (Hirst and Peters,
1970). This type of integration rests on the assumption that we can presuppose
knowledge and skills characteristic of a number of different subject areas, and it
presents the daunting tasks (a) of choice of topic which will group together
objectives having a significant educational relationship to each other, and (b) of
providing pupils with the necessary initiation into the distinctive ways of know-
ing and testing of the various disciplines that will enable them to inter-relate the
knowledge and apply it meaningfully to the topic (Whitfield, 1971).
The Scottish Integrated Science scheme (Scottish Education Department,
1969) has achieved some success in this area. The content for the course is not
42 Sally A. Brown
'new' but simply an aggregate of the separate biology, chemistry and physics
courses already in use. Where the contents of these courses can combine to form
a coherent structure this has been done, but where this is not the case they have
been left as separate subjects. So they leave 'Cells and Reproduction', 'Electricity'
and 'Hydrogen, Acids and Alkalis' as biology, physics and chemistry units; but
in a 'Support and Movement' section they develop ideas of support in animals
and plants and information on muscular motion through the study of force,
energy and work, thus using physics to attack biological problems.
Unfortunately, in many science curricula where a theme or topic requiring
the perspectives of a number of subject areas is the integrating element
'It is rarely clear how the subjects become subordinate to
the idea or theme, i.e. how the ideas or themes do them-
selves provide the structure to the pupils' studies in place
of the structure previously provided by particular discip-
lines of enquiry. What very often happens is a juxta-
position of particular components which reflects the
idiosyncratic thoughts of the teacher rather than either
any fruitful tradition of thinking or any studies arising
from the particular interests of the pupil'. (Pring 1976a).
ARGUMENTS FOR AN INTEGRATED SCIENCE CURRICULUM

These arguments are generally in terms of (a) the sorts of outcomes that are
anticipated from such a course, and (b) the sorts of constraints under which the
course must be implemented. The views on the structure of science that have
been described in the first part of this paper have a bearing on the content and
structure of the science curriculum that would be chosen in any particular
situation. However, the decision on whether to adopt 'this' curriculum or 'that'
curriculum will also depend on other factors such as the current demands and
constraints imposed on the education system by society, current theories of
learning and psychological development, and the availability of appropriately
trained teachers. In countries with highly centralised systems, some of the most
important determinants of the curriculum are government policies and financial
support for education, national assessment of pupils, and the views of teachers'
unions and associations. In the United States, where the system is not highly
centralised, the Centre for Unified Science Education has identified 170 different
unified science programmes most of which have been developed locally.
'The reasons given for local development usually involve
several perceived unique characteristics of the local school
situation such as student needs, school facilities and
science teaching staff' (Showalter, 1975).
It is likely then that there are a wide range of reasons why an integrated
course might be chosen in preference to traditional separate science courses.
The choice of an integrated course for any reason implies that certain claims
are being made for it; those claims may be based on empirical evidence, on value
judgments, on substantial logical argument or on myth. It may be important to
be aware of the extent to which a rationale is dependent on any or all of these,
but it is also of interest to see what types of factor are most influential in deter-
mining the curriculum. For this purpose a classification system of arguments
for integrated science (Table 1) has been developed. This is a modification of four
groups of determinants of the structure and content of the curriculum identified
by Schwab, Dunkel and Tyler (Schwab, 1962b). They saw these determinants as
(i) the social milieu (corresponding roughly to the first three categories of Table
1), (ii) learner factors, (iii) teacher factors, and (iv) subject factors, (these last
three correspond roughly to categories 4, 5 and 6 on Table 1).
1. Outcomes demanded by society e.g., provision of scientists, in-

I formed lay population, informed political leadership.
J 2. Resource constraints e.g., accommodation, equipment, time,
teachers.
3. Political constraints e.g., common-core course for all pupils,
national assessment system. I
4. Conditions for effective learning e.g., pupil security, motivation,
interest.
5. Conditions for effective teaching e.g., teachers' interests, com-
petence.
6. Constraints imposed by the subject e.g., unified nature of scientific J
enquiry.
I TABLE 1. Classification of arguments for an Integrated Science J

Curriculum
Arguments in terms of outcome demands made by society

These demands are initiated by the needs of the social structure. They are
largely determined by economic problems (e.g. the need for trained manpower,
the pool of unemployed graduate scientists, distribution of energy resources),
environmental-economic problems (e.g. pollution), political problems (e.g. the
'cold-war') and political ideologies (e.g. equal opportunities for all pupils).
Identification of these demands depends on value judgments by politicians,
economists and administrators about what their requirements are. Like the
problems and ideologies which determine them, these demands are transitory
and provide our instrumental aims for science education at this point in time.
They may be idealistic in the sense that they may not take cognizance of the
44 Sally A. Brown
practicalities of the classroom or the structure of the knowl edge to be imparted,

and they are concerned with training that is useful to society rather than with
providing the pupil with something that is of intrinsic worth to him.
Schwab (1962b) has argued that the current basic demands on science educa-
tion are for:
(i) trained scientists,
(ii) a political leadership informed on scientific matteers,

(iii) a general public informed on scientific mattrs.
More recent writings related to integrated science curricula still seem to reflect
this view. For example, a number of problems of our society are seen as 'science-
based and so society needs administrators who have some knowledge of science'
(Schools' Council Integrated Science Project, 1973, p. 2). Similarly, the Australian
Science Education Project (1971b, pp. 89-90) has as one of its main aims the
development of 'Some understanding of, and concern for, the consequences of
science and technology'. They see the need for the general population to appreciate
that 'The findings of science have led to many technological advances which have
contributed enormously to human welfare and the process of civilization', but
also to be aware that 'The expanding population moving into an increasingly
technological culture magnifies environmental problems'. At the same time, the
development of skills and attitudes characteristic of the effective scientist are
seen as important, together with the idea that Tndivdual scientists have a
responsibility to inform people of the problems associated with technological
advance and the possible consequences to the environment.'
These sorts of reasons are even more important in justifying inter-disciplinary
courses in tertiary education. Interdisciplinarity is 'justified on the grounds that it
provides good general-purpose education' and arguments are 'based on the need
for broadly-educated professional people, managers and administrators who can
cope with complex decision making in modern society' (Nuffield Foundation,
1973).
There are two questions that we might ask about these sorts of arguments.
Firstly, is it right that the outcomes demanded by society should shape school
science courses? Whitfield (1971) has examined three sources of educational
objectives; one of these 'masters' of our system is 'society' and here it is citizen-
ship which is emphasised. He argues that society has infinite variety and, though
the education system must serve society, it would be dangerous to base curricula
on social needs as perceived by some person (or persons). In reviewing the
justifications made for integrated or interdisciplinary studies he observes that
the 'topic' approach is advocated to inter-relate science education with socializa-
tion and moral education through such apparently worthy themes as the 'family',
the 'town', 'housing' or 'VD' but that the precise rationale for choosing 'these'
rather than 'those' topics or themes is seldom given. Adequate consideration of
this issue is, however, well beyond the scope of this paper.
The second question is: what evidence is there to suggest that an integrated
science curriculum is more likely to be able to fulfil these outcome demands than
other courses ? Is it the most effective means of developing pupils' abilities to
deal with social and technological problems, or of preparing future scientists ?
One group of arguments for integrated science have been summarized as
'based on the claim that the process of education should
prepare the student to cope with the world he encounters

. . . to learn how to seek information effectively . . . how to
get answers for themselves about the world they ex-
perience' (Rutherford and Gardner, 1971).
It has also been suggested that integrated science 'may give students a more
complete view of the nature of science as a human enterprise' (Jacobson, 1971).
The superiority of the integrated approach for achieving such outcomes is thus
frequently assumed but whether or not such an assumption is justified is a moot
point.
Many might agree with Kirk (1973) when he says that the strongest argument
for integration is
'that there are many highly controversial issues — race,
sex, pollution, crime, for example — which are basically
interdisciplinary issues',
but he goes on to point out that
'To be dealt with at all adequately they require the
bringing together, or integration, of many different types
evidence — historical, economical, psychological, literary
moral or statistical'.
We cannot assume that there is a generalizable pattern of scientific working or
gathering of evidence that would be best developed in an integrated course and
could then be used to attempt solution of society's problems. Pring (1971b) has
described a thesis with which the integrationist must deal if he does make such
an assumption. This thesis takes the position that 'enquiry' into some problem
is not a general method, it must 'involve the meanings revealed at different levels
within one or other of the disciplines'. These distinct disciplines (which may be
the established school subjects) are characterized by the types of concepts with
which they are concerned, their typical conceptual frameworks, their principles
of verification and 'the use of symbols which already dictate . . . what moves are
correct or at least permissible'. Before enquiry into the problem the pupil must
be 'initiated into the different modes of understanding' and this can only be
achieved by exposure to the individual disciplines (subjects) within the curricu-
lum.
If there is no general 'scientific method' but only an aggregate of methods from
different science subjects, can we argue that an integrated course is the most
effective way to introduce pupils to the ways in which trained scientists work?
46 Sally A. Brown
At the level of secondary education, we can if we assume that the differences in

the methodologies of, say, the biologist and the physicist are too sophisticated
or subtle to be important for school science. If that is the case, it is still necessary
to specify the characteristics of the generalizable methodology that is to be pre-
sented. Fiasca (1970) argues that 'concentration' of processes, skills and prin-
ciples from various science disciplines, through an integrated course can lay
bare the 'epistemology of the working scientist'. Curricula seldom explain what
the epistemology is.
Even if the differences among the methodologies are considered important, it
is still possible to organize an 'integrated' science course on the lines of inter-
disciplinary study, as described in the first part of this paper. At the tertiary level,
particularly where professional training of applied scientists(e.g. engineers,
doctors) is involved, courses are frequently interdisciplinary. In this case, an
engineer may need to be trained in mathematics and sociology in order to deal
with engineering problems, but no assumption is made about the unity of these
subjects with engineering, 'interdisciplinarity comes into play only at the level of
pedagogical practices . . . and this means simply recognizing the multi-dimensional
nature of every situation' (Berger, 1972, p. 73).
An interesting finding from a study based on interviews with the science staff
of 50 secondary schools in Scotland (Brown, Mclntyre, Drever and Davies, 1976)
suggests that teachers are not concerned about these sorts of demands from
society. The integrated course being taught in these schools (Scottish Education
Department, 1969) places considerable emphasis on these sorts of arguments,
but of the 265 statements presented for and against integrated science by the
teachers not one could be placed in this category.
To summarise, it appears that a widespread response to society's demands for
both trained scientists and a scientifically-aware population, has been the
integrated science course. It is clear that a number of the topics relevant to these
demands of society are of an interdisciplinary nature (and so are apparently
appropriate for an integrated curriculum), but in many cases, the question of
how the various necessary skills and methodologies are to be developed has not
been adequately dealt with. Indeed, some would say that these skills and method-
ologies are best developed in single subject courses. The curriculum writers have
not succeeded in establishing the superiority of integrated courses for meeting
society's demands but they have given it considerable attention; in contrast,
many teachers appear to ignore the issue.
Arguments in terms of resource constraints imposed by society

As well as demanding certain outcomes from teaching, society imposes con-
straints on resources of equipment, accommodation, time, technical and other
ancillary services, worksheets and books, and teachers. It does this by the
finance it makes available, by the status it gives the teachers and by the rules it
lays down for the use of the resources.

Integrated curricula can, superficially at least, cope with deficiencies of time
allocation and imbalances between subjects and provide a way of avoiding
unnecessary duplication of learning experiences that are common to the various
disciplines (Whitfield, 1971, p.227; Fiasca, 1970). Some curriculum writers are
very conscious of time limitations.
'For the time allocation which we have accepted, a divi-

sion into three separate subjects would imply less than
two periods per week for each. We consider this an in-
adequate time in which to develop a proper understand-
ing of a subject if it is to be seen as a separate entity'
(Scottish Education Department, 1969, p. 18).
'Many schools find it impossible to allow all pupils to
study all three main sciences to O-level. If the three
Nuffield courses are followed then a minimum of nine
periods per week must be devoted to science. This usually
results in pupils at the age of 13 years having either to
make choices which produce an unbalanced curriculum
or to make irreversible decisions within the sciences . . .
An integrated scheme demanding a maximum allocation
of one-fifth of the timetable would do much to overcome
those practical problems' (Schools' Council, 1973, p. 1).
In general, however, arguments for integration in relation to resources are
sparse in the literature. There is an understandable reluctance to present an
integrated course as a means of papering over the cracks of teacher shortages in
particular areas of science, and since additional materials are frequently required
in a move from separate sciences to integrated science, arguments against
integration may be more appropriate.
In contrast, the Scottish study (Brown, et al., 1976) found that teachers placed
considerable importance on resource constraints. The particular resource prob-
lem of a given school influenced the favour with which integration was viewed
(and evidence of such problems was readily available). In schools which were
short of apparatus, which had problems of distribution, and which had their
laboratories dispersed among different parts of the school, there was a tendency
to view with disfavour the integrated course. It was felt that the course involved
a large number of groups doing the same work at the same time so putting
greater demands on equipment than separate sciences, and requiring single
subject laboratories to be supplied with a much greater range of apparatus. In
schools where there was a shortage or imbalance of staff across the three science
subjects, the teachers perceived the advantages of an integrated course.
48 Sally A. Brown
The previous category of arguments were important to the curriculum

developers but of little concern to the teachers. For this category, the emphasis
may well be reversed.
Arguments in terms of political constraints imposed by society

In addition to the demands and constraints already discussed, any developed
society imposes further control on the curriculum by means of the authority or

power structures within its educational system. The authority structures of the
United Kingdom incorporate at national level the Department of Education and
Science and the Scottish Education Department, the inspectorate, the national
assessment systems, and the teachers' unions; at the local level the policies of
Directors of Education, Education Committees and science advisers; at school
level Head Teachers, their deputies and assistants; and at science department
level Heads of Department and Assistant Heads. Even in the United States, with
a less centralised system, there is pressure exerted on the teacher and pupil from
local and state school boards or examinations, from state and federal education
policies and from parent groups.
Teachers and curriculum writers may argue for a particular curriculum be-
cause they see it as complying with the views of school inspectors, or science
advisers, or Head Teachers. They may justify it in terms of being in line with
current national education policies such as mixed ability classes, a common-core
course, or equal opportunities for all pupils to achieve academic qualifications.
They may see it as the most appropriate foundation for national examination
courses, or they may simply accept that 'this is the syllabus and must be followed'.
The Schools' Council Integrated Science Course is itself directed towards a GCE
'O' level examination and is designed as a suitable foundation for 'A' level. The
Scottish Integrated Science course, designed for a younger age group, sees its
remit as being the production of an 'introductory syllabus . . . to suit the needs of
a common-core course to be taught to unselected classes' (Scottish Education
Department, 1969, p. 9). Beyond this they found
'it was possible to produce a content in physics and
chemistry, identical in wording for both the examination
syllabuses and our integrated course. That biology is not
also identical is only because of the form in which the
biology syllabus was published by the Examination
Board; the biology content of the integrated syllabus is all
drawn from the examination syllabus and is material
agreed as suitable for teaching to first and second year
pupils' (p, 19).
And at the school administration level they consider that 'For the headmaster it
will surely be much easier to timetable one science teacher per set, than it would
be to co-ordinate the efforts of three' (p. 18). The teachers implementing this
curriculum have also emphasized arguments relating to these issues (Brown et al.,
1976). However, though they agreed that the integrated course could be justified
by its suitability for the common-course for mixed ability groups, they presented
more arguments against integration in terms of its inappropriateness as a
foundation for the examination work.
One study of the implementation of this Scottish Integrated Science course in
two secondary schools (Hamilton, 1973) suggests that there is a fundamental

dilemma for the schools in that they are required to present a course that is
appropriate for thefirsttwo years of a four year 'O' grade national examination
course, and at the same time is suitable for the common-core course for mixed
ability classes. Simultaneous introduction of the two types of political con-
straint provides a conflict situation which is very difficult to resolve. Insofar as
the integrated science course is designed as part of the 'O' grade science courses,
pupils will be developing attitudes towards the science subjects which see them
as associated with specialist groups, defined by the syllabus and terminal exam-
ination, and inaccessable, in the long term, to the 'less able' pupils. Insofar as
the course is designed for pupils in mixed ability classes following a common-
core curriculum, it might be expected to aim for development of attitudes that
see science as affecting and involving everyone.
Bernstein (1971) argues that introduction of an integrated curriculum will
disturb the traditional authority structures. In a separate subject curriculum the
established power hierarchy is isolated into the individual science departments.
Junior teachers show allegiance to Heads of Departments through socialization
into strong subject loyalties. The advent of the integrated curriculum will,
Bernstein suggests, undermine this structure. This will be brought about by new
work-based relationships between staff at junior levels in different departments
which will weaken the hierarchies and the 'private property' aspects of the former
individual subjects.
He also argues that boundaries between pupils, and between pupils and staff
will be weakened. The situation in which 'less-able' pupils do not have access to
certain subjects, and 'academic' pupils do not have access to certain other
subjects, will have changed, and all pupils will have a common work task.
Bernstein sees this as the implementation of a particular educational policy
since 'The less rigid social structure of the integrated code makes it a potential
code for egalitarian education'.
Musgrove (1973) looks at the relationship between integration and the
authority structure from a different perspective. The individual subject specializa-
tion is viewed as an instance of 'division of labour' and it is suggested that
'respect for the autonomy of subjects is neither intellectually nor socially
divisive; and that it is a vital defence against centralized autocracy'. The under-
lying reason for integration is seen as a desire for control at the top (that is, above
the level of Head of Department). He sees this as manifested by the power that
50 Sally A. Brown'
primary school Head Teachers wield over their staffs, which he believes to be
closely connected with the integrated nature of the curriculum in the primary
school.
In view of the great variation in the nature of integrated courses, it seems
unlikely that they would all reflect a single authority structure, either 'egalitarian'
or 'control at the top'. Curriculum developers and teachers alike have justified
integrated science by its success in responding to political pressures. However,

these pressures are of many different kinds and their variety is matched by that of
the curricula they generate.
Arguments in terms of the conditions which pupils require for effective learning
Many of the major arguments for integration have been based on its assumed
value in fulfilling certain pupil needs. The concern here is not for the past or
future needs of the pupils, but for those he has while the integrated curriculum is
responsible for his learning. The arguments cover such areas as the pupil's
motivation, security, opportunity to be creative, interest, and achievement
commensurate with levels of ability and development.
It has been suggested that learning will be more effective if pupils are exposed
to the content of the disciplines combined to make a 'coherent whole' thus
'concentrating the learning experiences' (Fiasca, 1970). This is seen as reducing
the chances of the pupil missing any inter-relationships that may exist between
the component disciplines, and as useful in enabling the pupil to make contact
with a large number of specialized fields of knowledge, fields which are becoming
too numerous to be dealt with individually. Furthermore, the quantity of
material that pupils are expected to learn can be kept to a minimum since an
integrated approach can
'start from "scratch" in determining the content of the
program and can use rational as opposed to traditional
arguments for including or rejecting certain "content" '
(Showalter, 1975).
It has also been argued (Whitfield, 1971, p. 227) that an integrated approach
in thematic form 'may provide for greater pupil motivation' in that it can deal
with matters of immediate concern to pupils such as sport, cosmetics, sex, money.
Kirk (1973) criticizes such views as being without empirical support. He sees
them as based on 'hearsay and anecdote', and pupil learning and motivation as
dependent on the effectiveness of the teacher, not on the organization of the
knowledge. However, Shulman and Tamir (1973) suggest that any opinion
about what sort of knowledge is most learnable, most motivating, most readily
retained and transferred to new situations by pupils, is 'tracable to the choice of
psychological theory that has directed the educator's conception of what is to be
taught and learned'. Whatever theory is chosen, any argument for integration
must assume some sort of generalized scientific abilities and transfer of training
across science subject boundaries.
Doubt has been expressed about the extent to which generalizable abilities
exist (e.g. Hirst, 1965, p. 120), but it has also been argued that there is transfer of
complex abilities (such as hypothesis formation and testing) between subjects,
particularly if they are as closely related as the natural sciences; and if this were
not the case 'much educational endeavour cannot be but a waste of time' (Whit-
field, 1971, p. 25).
The Schools' Council Integrated Science Project (1973) has been developed on
the basis of Gagné's (1970) theory of learning. This, Shulman and Tamir suggest,
is concerned with vertical transfer within learning hierarchies. Gagné builds a
simple to complex structure (actually he starts from the complex end) in which
concepts are developed from distinctive facts, and principles are formed from
associations of these concepts; use of these principles then results in some
particular problem-solving capability. His model is concerned with 'intellectual
skills or strategies' and not with 'verbalizable knowledges' (content). While
lateral transfer is not seen as impossible it is, in general, not achieved between
different groups of concepts at the low hierarchy levels but at the high 'problem'
levels.
An alternative theory, (Ausubel, 1968) views transfer in terms of subject-
matter rather than processes. The theory of Meaningful Verbal Learning requires
a framework of advance organizers to which the learner can relate new elements.
This framework of statements is supplied by instruction from the teacher, or, in
Ausubel's terms, has been learned through reception rather than discovery.
Meaningful learning then consists of absorbing the new elements of knowledge
into an established complex of generalizations. Provided the learning task is
intrinsically meaningful, provided it is potentially meaningful for the 'intellectual
capacities, ideational content and experimental background' of the particular
learner, and provided the learner has a set to relate substantive information to
the existing structure then Ausubel is satisfied that
'the outcome should be meaningful and the advantages
of meaningful learning (economy of learning effort, more
stable retention and greater transferability) should accrue
irrespective of whether the content to be internalized, is
presented or discovered, verbal or non-verbal'.
Relating this to science curricula, Ausubel (1963) argues that much can
'be done programmatically, by proper sequential arrange-
ment of materials and by the use of "organizers", to en-
hance the learning of elementary science. Maximum
advantage is taken of the "big ideas" when they are
followed by subsidiary facts, concepts, and generaliza-
tions which can be logically subsumed under them . . .
52 Sally A. Brown
The organizer makes use of established knowledge to in-

crease the familiarity and learnability of new material,
and also takes into account children's existing miscon-
ceptions about and folk lore models of physical and
biological causality'.
A third spproach (Bruner, 1960) sees learning as a process of discovery within
which there is lateral transfer of broad principles and processes from subject to
subject. This view reflects a possible argument for integration (described by
Pring, 1971b) in which the structure of the subjects are seen as 'end points' of
knowledge that have been 'worked out' over the ages, but which do not indicate
the processes by which this was done. An integrated curriculum can allow the
pupil to reach these same knowledge structures by means of his own curiosity
and pattern of enquiry.
Finally, a number of curricula (e.g. Scottish Education Department, 1969)
have rested heavily on the classification of educational objectives by Bloom et al.
(1956) and Krathwohl et al. (1964) both for objectives and testing procedures.
These Taxonomies were developed from an extensive review of the literature on
objectives and have produced outstandingly useful subject-independent check-
lists for curriculum developers. By their very nature they cannot emphasize the
objectives specifically relevant to science and certainly cannot support an
argument for or against integration of science. They provide a structured list of
behaviours observable to the teacher (i.e. testing material) but not a theory of
learning. Since they are based on neither a theory of knowledge nor psychological
theory, nor on the needs of society, they are unlikely to form a useful basis on
which to argue for a particular science curriculum.
Closely related to the arguments for integration in terms of pupils' learning
are those in terms of pupils' level of development. Ausubel (1963) suggests that
for elementary school pupils, the 'general laws and methodological canons' of
science will only have meaning to the pupil if he can relate them to more tangible
experiences. He sees the more abstract principles of scientific enquiry as having
to give way to concrete — empirical explanations (demonstration, practical
experiments). Thus the logical sequence of proceeding from basic concepts
(such as those of physics and chemistry) to complex phenomena (such as those of
biology and geology) cannot be followed because of the level of abstraction of
those basic concepts. The pupil is intellectually more ready for the 'complex'
everyday experience he has (which has no regard for subject boundaries i.e.
integrated) than he is for the 'simple' laws of physics. This belief is shared by the
Australian Science Education Project (1971, pp. 87-88) in relation to secondary
school pupils. This curriculum chose the 'knowledge considered to be most
relevant to children' for its units, and 'selected experiences which could con-
tribute to the growth and are relevant to the stage of development of the children'.
The choices crossed traditional subject boundaries since it was believed 'that for
most junior secondary students the more abstract scientific concepts are less
pertinent to their lives than are some of the more practical aspects'.
Arguments relating to pupils' interest cover two aspects: an intrinsic interest
in the academic subject, and also in the sense of the curriculum being concerned
(in some way that the separate sciences are not) with areas relevant to the
interests of pupils. Whether or not an integrated curriculum is intrinsically more
interesting seems to be argued at the level of personal experience only. Bernstein

(1971), in looking at the relevance to pupils' interests aspect, suggests that while
boundaries between commonsense, everyday knowledge and the knowledge
imparted in the classroom are very strong in a separate subject code, for the
integrated code the boundaries between school knowledge and everyday realities
are broken down. Once again Kirk (1973) argues that the relevance of the
curriculum does not, in fact, depend on how the knowledge is classified (inte-
grated or not) but on how the teacher or curriculum developer chooses to
structure the course or frame the instruction. He does admit, however, that while
individual subjects may choose to be concerned with areas of deep concern to the
pupil, their inherent narrowness may allow only partial insights or partial
explanations of problems.
Finally, among this group of arguments, there are those concerned with the
pupils' feelings of security and the opportunities to build up substantial relation-
ships between pupil and teacher. Such arguments are salient features of rationales
for integrated science curricula designed for early secondary school, i.e. im-
mediately after the pupils' transition from the protected small, one-teacher-per-
class primary school to the large school and the inevitable confrontation with a
large number of new teachers. Teachers (Brown et al., 1976) are also concerned
about this, and feel that pupil security and adequate teacher-pupil relationships
can only be built up on the baisis of contact three times a week rather than once
(as in the case for separate subjects at that stage). There is no evidence to indicate
whether or not contact with one science teacher rather than three is beneficial to
the pupil (he probably meets ten other teachers from other departments), but this
was the teachers' most frequently presented single argument for integration. (It
is also interesting that a frequently presented argument that the teachers made
for separate sciences was the benefit to be gained by the pupil from a variety of
teachers.)
What evidence do we have about whether or not these various benefits do
accrue to those pupils following integrated science courses? The information
appears equivocal. On the one hand, the Centre for Unified Science Education
reports that evaluation studies have shown that unified science courses lead to
pupils' enhanced achievement of scientific literacy, heightened self-perceived
interest in science, fuller perceptions of relationships among the sciences and the
relevance of science to other social concerns, and to larger numbers of pupils
enrolling in science courses and aspiring to science and science-related careers
54 Sally A. Brown
(Showalter, 1975). On the other hand, an extensive literature search reported by

Welch (1975) yielded only seven studies that he could categorize as evaluations
of integrated science programmes and which met 'the tenets of disciplined
inquiry; namely, systematic, objective research founded on a test of evidence'.
Six of these related to the integration of physics and chemistry only. From the
results of these studies Welch concluded that
'The implications are clear. There is virtually no evalua-

tion evidence in these studies to support the integration of
physics and chemistry over the teaching of the courses
separately. It appears to make very little difference using
the criteria of achievement, understanding the processes
of science, or student interest in science'.
Arguments in terms of the conditions that teachers need to teach effectively
'If I am to teach effectively I believe that I must feel that my training and
experience are adequate for the job, that the way the work is organized makes my
teaching as easy and enjoyable as possible, that I am relaxed as I work, that I
have good relationships with the pupils and that my teaching gives me satis-
faction.' If integrated courses can justifiably claim to fulfil any of these or
similar conditions, then we can argue for integrated science in terms of what it
does for the teacher.
In practice, the benefits accruing to the teacher are seldom the primary reasons
for adopting an integrated course. The advantages over three separate sciences,
such as the increased time available for building up teacher-pupil relationships
and assessing pupils reliably, and the reduced time needed for revision at the
start of each lesson, are sometimes pointed out {e.g. Scottish Education Depart-
ment, 1969, p. 18), but are treated as peripheral issues.
Not so for the teachers; for them these are major concerns. Brown et al., (1976)
found that more arguments relating to integration occurred in this category than
in any other. From their experience in teaching integrated science the teachers
emphasized the greater interest for them in teaching science 'as a whole' rather
than repeating the same specialist lesson over and over again, the broadening of
their own scientific knowledge and the closer relationships that they had built
up with their classes. (Showalter, 1975, reports a similar finding i.e. that American
integrated science 'teachers feel that science teaching is more rewarding and they
are motivated to greater involvement in the total science program'). Unfortuna-
tely, arguments against integration were much more numerous. The teachers
stressed their lack of training outside the specialist subject areas, their inability
to teach unfamiliar material well or interestingly, the stress and anxiety, and
their difficulties in trying to assess the potential of pupils in subject areas other
than their own. These responses highlight the problems of integrated science that
arise from hostile attitudes of teachers who have specialised training in separate
science subjects. The success of integrated study is contingent upon 'a willingness
of teachers at present in separate compartments to merge their activities' (Whit-
field, 1971, p. 232).
If the teachers do agree to merge activities, in what ways will they benefit?
Firstly, there is the view (Bernstein, 1971) that sees the integrated code as a means
whereby teachers can enter into social relationships with teachers from other
departments based on a 'shared, co-operative, educational task'. This may make

co-operation with other teachers easier and avoid 'a type of organizational
system which encourages gossip, intrigue and a conspiracy theory of the working
of the organization, as both the administration and the acts of teaching are
invisible to the majority of staff'. However, this more relaxed atmosphere for the
teacher will be a t the expense of some of his privacy in teaching and will be
threatened if the integrating ideologies are not shared by all the staff involved.
Kirk (1973) has argued that social relationships, in this case between teachers,
are independent of the organization (integrated or collection) of the curriculum,
and depend on the personalities and behaviour of the teachers concerned i.e.
'tender-minded democrats' or 'martinets'.
Secondly, there is the notion of 'transfer' between subjects. In the earlier parts
of this paper we have seen that demands are being made that science education
address itself to certain interdisciplinary issues, regardless of the specialist
training of the teachers. If teachers accept (and many do not) that these demands
should be met, then they accept the notion that some transfer of training should
and can take place across traditional science subject boundaries. Can we argue
that teachers are more likely to achieve such transfer in an integrated course than
through parallel separate subject courses ?
According to Stephens (1963) there are five general rules for maximizing
transfer between school subjects: the feature to be transferred should be brought
out, meaningful generalizations should be developed, a variety of experiences
should be provided, practice in application to other fields should be given, and
practice in transfer should be encouraged.
Suppose, for example, the teacher wishes to encourage transfer of the prin-
ciples of model-building encountered in the solution of physics problems to the
solution of biological problems. Firstly, the model-building in the context of the
physics problem will have to be brought into focus to ensure that it will not be
missed by the pupil. Secondly, the teacher will be more likely to help the pupil to
transfer if he gives him the opportunity to recognize a general activity of model-
building than if the experience is limited to one (perhaps rather esoteric) example.
Thirdly, the general activity will be exemplified in a number of areas of physics.
Up to this point the teaching may be equally effective in a pure physics or in an
integrated course. However, the next step, that of giving the pupils practice in
model-building in another field (biology), is probably not appropriate for a
physics course. This may well be considered a task for the biology teacher and,
56 Sally A. Brown
as such, may or may not be carried out. The greater scope of content in an
integrated course will enable the third and fourth steps to fuse, and so impose
fewer restrictions on the teacher's choice of examples. Lastly, the teacher will
organize for a series of successful experiences of transfer, since, for example, it is
expected that the pupil who had practice in transferring the principles of model-
building will be more likely than the pupil who has not had this practice, to
transfer the principle of the conservation of energy to various fields. Logically

we would expect that an individual teacher would have more opportunity to
exemplify transfer when teaching across the broad subject base of an integrated
course than in a separate subject course.
In conclusion, it appears that justifications for integrated science relating to
advantages for teachers have not been extensively developed in curriculum
writings. Nevertheless, they are salient aspects of the views expressed by teachers
themselves and there are a number of features of integrated science that teachers
have found to be beneficial to their teaching. However, disadvantages for teachers
are also evident, and unless the related problems can be dealt with in teachers'
guides or in-service courses, the integrated course structure may be threatened.
Curricula that ignore these issues or imply rebukes in statements such as
'As teachers . . . we still, too often, see ourselves as
chemists or physicists or biologists first and scientists
second. The Working Party has felt, nevertheless, that
the curriculum should be framed for the pupil's benefit
rather than the teacher's convenience' (Scottish Educa-
tion Department, 1969, p. 18).
put at risk the co-operation of specialist teachers.
Arguments for integration in terms of the constraints imposed by the nature of
science
Much of this argument has already been discussed under 'Meanings of
Integration'. Claims have been made that the integrated course will make clear
the unity of the concepts of science, and expose the characteristic methodology
of the scientist. If the implied methodology and conceptual structure can be
adequately described, these are powerful arguments for the integrated approach.
Unfortunately, this is a very difficult task and Eggleston (1974, p. 119) points to
the possibility
'that the struggles for survival, which successive versions
of general science, combined science, and integrated
science have faced might be related to the difficulties of
providing an adequate map [conceptual structure] without
making impossible demands on the navigator'.
A more pragmatic argument is proposed by Jevons (1969). He suggests that
the basis on which we have carved up knowledge in the past has been expediency
rather than epistemology. He sees the decisions that have determined the extent
and intellectual pattern of the traditional subjects as being based on an 'intellect-
ual coherence' i.e. a system of looking at many things in one way. However, he
observes that
'some old course structures are no longer representing
the patterns of coherence that are significant and most
educationally valuable in the present states of the sub-

ject-matter and society' (p. 116).
and a more appropriate form of 'intellectual coherence' may be one of looking at
one thing in several different ways. He does, however, warn that patterns of
integration are not uniquely determined.
'It is not difficult to draw diagrams showing how all the
main topics are derived from one or two key concepts —
matter and energy say — with a lot of lines showing the
total interconnectedness of everything with nearly every-
thing else. Exercises of this kind are certainly interesting
and valuable to teachers, but how much they help students
is debatable . .. and in any case teaching cannot be done
according to such schemes, since time has one dimension
less than a block diagram' (p. 150).
Other justifications for the move towards integration relate not to some
positive aspect of integrated knowledge but simply to criticism levelled against
the traditional subjects. The critics deplore the divisions and attack the premise
that knowledge exists in distinct categories. They see these distinctions as
historical anachronisms and the boundaries between subjects as arbitrarily rather
than logically determined. Moreover, they assume that the premise implies that a
coherent curriculum must be made up of subjects that correspond to the know-
ledge categories, regardless of whether or not they suit our purposes. Some
support for this criticism comes from proponents of one perspective of the
sociology of knowledge who regard the premise as
'a reified philosophy in which objectivity is autonomized
and which does not regard as problematical for the con-
stituency of the object its constitution in the subjective
experience of individuals . . . this epistemology is funda-
mentally dehumanizing. It ignores the intentionally and
expressivity of human action and the entire complex
process of intersubjective negotiation of meanings . . . it
disguises as given a world which has to be continually
interpreted' (Esland, 1971, p. 75).
Hirst (1974) has argued that the critics err in challenging the premise which he
sees as in general sound, 'it is the implication that is mistaken'. He sets out to
demonstrate, by logical means, that knowledge does consist of a number of
58 Sally A. Brown
autonomous forms, but 'What does not follow is that organization of the
curriculum should mirror the fundamental categories of knowledge'. The
sociological undermining of the premise he rejects by saying
'the sociology of the curriculum is the sociology of certain
secondary, non-fundamental organisations of know-
ledge that have developed in schools. The radical diver-
sity of curricular organisations is thus in no sense

evidence for the social variability of fundamental cate-
gories of knowledge'.
In this section, together with the first part of the paper, I have tried to show
that there is no unique model of science from which to argue for integration.
Instead, there are a variety of philosophical and sociological viewpoints from
which one might put forward a case, and these different reasons why one wishes
to integrate will, of course, be reflected as differences in what one attempts to
integrate.
SUMMARY
This paper has attempted to review the various meanings that have been
attributed to 'integration' in school science courses, and to categorize the sorts
of arguments that have been put forward regarding the worth of integrated
science. These curricula may be taken to fall into what Bernstein has called the
'integrated code' i.e. 'Any organization of educational knowledge which involves
a marked attempt to reduce the strength of classification', where classification
refers to the firmness with which the boundaries between subject areas are
marked. The identification of a curriculum as integrated or not will depend,
therefore, on both the characteristics of that curriculum and the strength of
classification of the curriculum it seeks to replace.
The common characteristic of curricula examined in this paper has been that
they seek to replace science taught as separate subjects such as Biology, Chemistry
and Physics; beyond that, there is marked variation in the meanings ascribed to
integration. Four broad groups of meanings have been discussed. Integration as:
(1) the unity of all knowledge,
(2) the conceptual unity of the sciences,
(3) a unified process of scientific enquiry,
(4) interdisciplinary study.
These reflect curriculum developers' various concerns about what it is that
should be integrated: conceptual structures of knowledge, or general processes
of enquiry, or pupils' own enquiry, or strands of knowledge from different areas
required for the solution of social or technological problems, or material from a
number of disciplines if and when such material is useful for the study of an
issue that arises within one of those disciplines.
The intentions relating to how integration is to be achieved are even more
diverse. In general, curricula that are structured around themes or topics re-
quiring an interdisciplinary approach are able to indicate how the integration
should be carried out by specifying content and the rationale for selecting that
content (in practice, the latter is often neglected). Curricula based on ideas of
unified conceptual structures or processes have a more demanding task. There
are no uniquely determined unified structures or processes, and the nature of
the unity that the writers have in mind has to be described before they can
expect their intentions to be implemented by teachers in classrooms. Unfortun-
ately, with some notable exceptions integrated science curricula have largely
failed to provide such descriptions, and teachers have been left with a syllabus
or set of worksheets together with an exhortation to 'make clear to pupils the
unity of science'.
Even if what it is that is to be integrated and how this is to be done, have been
made clear, there may still not be agreement on why there should be a shift to
integrated science. Six different types of justification for such a move have been
identified:
(1) outcome demands by society,
(2) resource constraints imposed by society,
(3) political constraints imposed by society,
(4) the conditions that pupils require for effective learning,
(5) the conditions the teacher needs to teach effectively,
(6) constraints imposed by the nature of science.
There appear to be some differences between teachers on the one hand and
curriculum developers on the other in the emphasis that is placed on the different
types of argument. While both groups are concerned with those of types 3 and 4,
the teachers tend to stress types 2 and 5 and the curriculum developers types 1
and 6. It is possible that this lack of correspondence between the sorts of issues
that seem to be of immediate concern to the teachers, and the terms in which
integrated science is justified in the literature, may endanger the implementation
of some curricula. There are strong arguments that see integrated courses as a
response to perceived 'failures' of separate science courses {e.g. they are more
adequate for dealing with many social or technological problems, reflect better
the structures and processes of science, enable stronger teacher-pupil relation-
ships to be built up, remove boredom for teachers of repetition of specialist
material). However, teachers have also perceived 'virtues' in separate subjects
{e.g. they are appropriate for teachers' training and areas of interest, prepare
pupils for specialist examinations and university courses, are suitable for appara-
tus extant in schools). The successful implementation in the classroom of an
integrated programme will depend heavily on whether or not it is seen by the
teachers to fulfil, more adequately then do other courses, what they view as the
current requirements of science education.
A distinction has been made throughout this paper between integrated science
60 Sally A. Brown
and separate subjects, and this is related to Bernstein's division of curricula into
integrated and collection types (weak and strong classification). However,
whether this distinction is the important one is not at all clear; as we have seen,
the variations within integrated science are substantial. The multiplicity of
reasons why integrated courses have been adopted and of ways in which they
have been implemented, leads one to treat with caution any claim that they, in
contrast with separate subject curricula, reflect uniformity in the social forces
that shape them.
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On: 02 November 2014, At: 09:32

Studies in Science Education

A Review of the Meanings of,

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03057267708559845

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

A Review of the Meanings of, and

Department of Education, University of Stirling, Scotland

practice within integrated curricula, then it may be misleading to assume any

THE MEANINGS OF INTEGRATION

'In any knowledge whatsoever there must be some sort of

curricula, my main purpose is to describe and discuss the categories of meanings.

unification of all knowledge, is either dogma or hope but

apparent basic difference between 'living' and 'non-living' material. He criticizes

considerations other than the philosophical.

Unified process of scientific enquiry

rather than on an epistemological approach.

Process Approach (American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1971)

These procedures can probably be specified without much difficulty in terms of

concludes that physics and biology exemplify different syntactic structures. He

ledge (plastic arts, metaphysics, social sciences). Closer specification is needed —

The Scottish Integrated Science Course claims that its concern is to

crosslinks there are among the various distinctive disciplines. In a developing

Science Education Project (1971s) chose topics in relation to a number of ideas

ARGUMENTS FOR AN INTEGRATED SCIENCE CURRICULUM

1. Outcomes demanded by society e.g., provision of scientists, in-

I TABLE 1. Classification of arguments for an Integrated Science J

Arguments in terms of outcome demands made by society

practicalities of the classroom or the structure of the knowl edge to be imparted,

(ii) a political leadership informed on scientific matteers,

prepare the student to cope with the world he encounters

At the level of secondary education, we can if we assume that the differences in

Arguments in terms of resource constraints imposed by society

lays down for the use of the resources.

'For the time allocation which we have accepted, a divi-

The previous category of arguments were important to the curriculum

Arguments in terms of political constraints imposed by society

society imposes further control on the curriculum by means of the authority or

two secondary schools (Hamilton, 1973) suggests that there is a fundamental

integrated science by its success in responding to political pressures. However,

The organizer makes use of established knowledge to in-

interesting seems to be argued at the level of personal experience only. Bernstein

(Showalter, 1975). On the other hand, an extensive literature search reported by

'The implications are clear. There is virtually no evalua-

departments based on a 'shared, co-operative, educational task'. This may make

transfer the principle of the conservation of energy to various fields. Logically

educationally valuable in the present states of the sub-

sity of curricular organisations is thus in no sense

ESLAND, G. M. (1971) Teaching and learning as the organization of knowledge', in Young,

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