PART A Psychological Foundations of Child-centered Pedagogy 2 Folk Psychology and Folk Pedagogy DAVID R. OLSON JEROME 8. BRUNER It is never easy to apply theoretical knowledge to practical problems. On the prac- tical art of being a physician, Aristotle wrote in his Nichomachean Ethics: “It is an easy matter to know the effects of honey, wine, hellebore, cautery, and cutting, But to know how, for whom, and when we should apply these as remedies is no less an undertaking than being a physician.” Scientific advances increasingly in- form us of the effects of various treatments but the art of knowing “how, for whom, and when” to apply them remains as difficult as ever. This-is-exactly-the-problem-we-face-in-relating theoretical knowledge-to-prac- tical-contexts-of education. Theoretical knowledge of how children develop con- tinues to grow but,just-how-to-relate-this-knowledge-to-the-practical-contexts in which adults intentionally and systematically intervene to foster this development, in a word, tozeducate, remains-almost-as-mysterious-as-when=stich- efforts firs began:> . ‘Attenipts-f0-specily“the-route-from-what-teachers-eart or should-do==teach, mentor,-monitor, and-criticize—to what-children-do==think-andlearn-remember, generalize-=make-up-a-long-and-less-than-satisfactory-storys We need not recite the unpromising.history-of attempts to formulate general laws-of-Jearnjng whether of rats in mazes or undergraduates in psychology laboratories nor even the at- tempt to construct theories of abilities that would predict what and haw quickly skills would be acquired, in-onder-to-recognize-the-absence-from-such-theories-of those-features most-critical:to-pedagogy—namely, the goals, purposes, beliefs and, intentions-ef both-the-teachers-and-the-learners. It.iscthat.absence which creates the-gap betweentheory-and-prastice. Thus-a-hew-kind-of-theory=is*requined. dieasming-theories that tend.to. ignore what:is-being_learnedyand: bywhom-and-for-what-purposesmustagiveswayatesthe-, origs-thattielearning to-the:priorunderstanding-as-welkas thegoals'andamtentions,10 David R. Olson and Jerome S. Bruner of-the:learner. And ability theories that attempt to predict learning without regard to the goals and intentions of the actor must give way to those indicating how actors exploit what they know in the course of attempting to achieve understood goals.Teaching-and-leartinig-are-no longer “0-be-scen-as-two-activities, causally clinked—one knows X because one was taught X—but- ‘ather-as-one-special do haring-or-comitig-to share beliefs, goals-and-int titionS—in-a-word-as-a ut how do human beings achieve such meetings of mind, especially across the age and experience gaps that separate teachers from children? More particularly, as expressed by teachers, “How do we reach the children?” or as expressed by children, “What are they trying to get at?” This is the classic problem of Other Minds, ‘as it was originally called in philosophy, and its relevance to education has mostly been overlooked until very recently. In the last decade, it has become a topic of passionate interest and intense research among psychologists, particularly those interested in development. dit-is-whut-the-present-chapter-is-about—the_ sappligation-of- this hew-understanding-of-minds-to-the-process.ol-education. To a degree almost entirely overlooked by the antisubjective behaviorists, i cluding the aforementioned learni eorigabout-how-our:ewn inds-of-others-worle, These-theories, rarel de explicit, are Opanipresent-in-practical-and=educational-decisions=-Such A: Fics are-now referred to professionally by the rather condescending name of “fall sychology.” Folk psychologies reflect not only certain wired in human tendencies { (ike seeing people normally as operating under their own control) but they also reflect certain deeply ingrained cultural beliefs about the mind. Hence Wundt (1916), who in- troduced the notion, argued that each distinctive culture in each historical period had a distinctive folk psychology which it was the duty of anthropologically minded psychologists to uncover. But whereas Wundt's experimental psychology was picked up so that Wundt came to be called the father of such psychology, his folk psychology has lain dormant for much of this century:-F¢ revivakof folk-psychol- ogy-that-accompanied—“the-cognitive-revolution’=wi its-interest oncepts, Conscistasiess-anid-intentionality-revived-folk-psychology-as the-studyaf “Tind without-due-attention-to.culture-and-cultural-transmissiow, thatis-our:pedagogy. Not only are we steered in ordinary interaction by our folk psychology, but we are steered in the activity of helping children. learn-about=the-world by--a-body-of -assumptions-that-make-up-what we:may-call.a {folk pedagogy.” “Folk pedagogy is visible in many contexts: Watch any mother, any teacher,cven any baby-sitter with a child and you will be struck at how much of what they do is guided by notions of what children’s minds are like and how one may help them tearn, even though they may not be able to verbalize their pedagogical principles. Further- more, as we shall see, the differences between mothers, like those between teach- ers, arise from their different assumptions about the minds of these children. Their, dolk-pedagogy, we shall-argue,-nefleets-theimfelk-psychology. A consideration of the relations between “folk psychology” and “folk pedagogy” has given rise to a new, perhaps even a revolutionary, insight. In theorizing aboutFolk Psychology and Folk Pedagogy 11 the practice of education in the classroom (or any other setting, for that matter), werfise take imto-account. thefolk_pedagogical-theories.that-those-engaged-ins teaching-and-learning-already_ have, because-any-innovatial pete-with,-replace,-or-otberwise-modify-the-folk-theories-that- already. guide boll teacherscand-pupils: For example, a theorist convinced that children construct their own knowledge will have to confront the established view that knowledge is imparted; the theorist convinced that aptitude for learning is a matter of prior knowledge will have to confront the entrenched view that readiness is a matter of fixed abilities. So the introduction of any innovation will necessarily involve chang- ing the folk psychological and folk pedagogical theories of teachers—and to a surprising extent, of pupils as well. ‘feaching;then;-is-inevitably-based-on-teachers“-notions-about-the nature-of the dearner's mind. Beliefs-and-assumptions. about teaching, whether.in-a-school-orin any-other-context,-are:a:directreflection-of-the-beliefs-and-assumptions:the:teacher cholds-about-the-learner_Later, we will consider the other side of this coin: how learning is affected by the child's notion of the teacher's mind. as when girls come to believe that teachers expect them not to come up with unconventional answers (see Goodnow, this volume, chap. 16}. Of course, like most deep truths, this one is already “well known.” Teachers have always tried to adjust their teaching to the backgrounds, abilities, styles, and interests of the children they teach. That is important, but it is not quite what we are after. Our purpose;-rat mofé-general- ways in-which leariers~minds-are-cenventio and-the-pedagogic-practices-that-follow-from_these-ways-of Nor will we stop there, for we also want to offer some reflections on 1 “conscious- ness raising” in this setting: what can be accomplished by getting teachers (ahd students) to think explicitly about their folk psychological assumptions and to bring them more clearly out of the shadows of tacit knowledge so that children can use them deliberately in the management of their own thinking and learning (see also Marton and Booth, this volume, chap. 24; Pramling, this volume, chap. 25). To see most clearly the affinities between folk psychology and folk pedagogy, we may begin by contrasting our own human species with nonhuman primates.’In our species, children show.an astonishingly strong “predisposition te culture,” sensitivity to and an eagerness to adopt the folkways of those they see around them. They show a striking interest in the activity of their parents and peers and with no prompting at all try to imitate what they observe. On the adult side, as Premack and Premack (this volume, chap. 14) point out, there is a uniquely human “pedagogic disposition”: to exploit this tendency, for adults to demonstrate correct performance for the benefit of the learner. One finds these matching tendencies in all human societies (Rogoff, Matusov, and White, this volume, chap. 18). . This is one of the ways in which humans differ most from other species; con- © trary to widely held beliefs, these imitative and demonstrational dispositions seem. searcely to exist at all in monkeys (Visalberghi and Fragaszy, this volume, chap. 13) nor in our nearest primate kin, the chimpanzee. Not only do adult chimpan- zees not “teach” their young by demonstrating correct performance, the young for their part seem not to imitate the actions of adults either, at least if we use a