ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DINDOY P vs. BINDOY (CASE BRIEF)

FACTS:
On May 6, 1930, Donato Bindoy offered some tuba to Tibay, Faustino Pacas' wife. She refused and Bindoy threatened to injure
her if she did not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife and attempted to take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. The
disturbance attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam. In the course of the struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself
from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest,
who was then behind Bindoy. The trial court held that Bindoy was guilty of the crime of homicide. Bindoy appealed, alleging that
the death of Omamdam was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.

ISSUE:
WON the crime of which Bindoy was found guilty of can be mitigated on the ground of accident.

HELD:
Yes. Decision is reversed. Bindoy is acquitted according to Article 8, No. 8 of the Revised Penal Code

RATIO:
1. There is no evidence to show that Bindoy deliberately and intentionally killed Omamdam. No evidence that Omamdam took
part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. No evidence that Bindoy was aware of Omamdam's presence.
No evidence that there was disagreement or ill feelings between Bindoy & Omamdam. On the contrary, they were nephew &
uncle, & were on good terms with each other.
2. The witness for the defense corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling for the
possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former had pulled so violently that it flew towards Omamdam, who
was therefore hit in the chest, without Bindoy's seeing him, because Omamdam had passed behind him. The testimony of this
witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
3. If, in the struggle, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he
would be liable for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the
wrongful act done is different from that which he intended. This is not the case here. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas. He was
only trying to defend his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him. His conduct was perfectly
lawful
ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY

PEOPLE v. INOGENTES MOLDES

HULL, J.:

Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Leyte of the crime of homicide. On the night of the 3d of April in the
barrio of Maya, municipality of Abuyog, Province of Leyte, there was a dance in a private house, and the deceased was the
master of ceremonies at that dance. The appellant insisted on dancing out of turn and was reproved by the deceased. Appellant
then went to the porch of the house and with his bolo began cutting down the decorations. He descended into the yard of the
house and challenged everyone to a fight. Not attracting sufficient attention, he began chopping at the bamboo trees and
repeated his challenge for a fight.

The deceased, unarmed, started down the stairs, speaking to him in a friendly manner, and as deceased had about reached the
ground, appellant struck at him with his bolo, inflicting a wound on his left arm, which was described by the sanitary inspector on
post mortem examination as follows:

"A long incised wound located on the lower portion of the left arm directed inwards downwards and extending as low as the
anticubitai fossa and cutting the inferior part of the biceps muscle, and the branches of the brachial artery. It measured 3 inches
long, 21/2 inches wide and 1 1/2 inches deep."

As deceased fell to the ground, appellant inflicted a slight wound in the back and ran away from the scene of action.

The wound was seen and treated the next morning by the sanitary inspector of Abuyog, but the deceased remained in the care
of a local "curandero". This treatment failed to stop the hemorrhage, and the deceased died on the 15th of April, 1934.

The theory of the defense was that appellant was behaving at the dance, that the deceased was the aggressor, that he struck
him on the dance floor with a cane, and that when appellant ran from the house, deceased followed him about 200 yards until
they came to a creek and appellant could not retreat any further, and that when being attacked by the deceased with a cane and
a bolo, he succeeded in wrenching the bolo from the hands of the deceased and in self-defense inflicted the wound.

While there is testimony to the above effect, the witnesses for the defense were not believed by the trial court, and the testimony
to that effect does not read as clear and convincing as does that of the witnesses for the prosecution.

The attorney de oficio urges that appellant did not intend to commit as serious a wound as was inflicted but struck only in the
dark and in self-defense.

It is clear that there is no element of self-defense in the case and that appellant was the aggressor. When one resorts to the use
of a lethal weapon and strikes another with the force that must have been used in this case, it must be presumed that he realizes
the natural consequences of his act.

It is also contended by the attorney for the appellant that if the deceased had secured proper surgical treatment, the wound
would not have been fatal. In the outlying barrio in which this assault took place, proper modern surgical service is not available.

The general rule is "* * * that he who inflicts the injury is not relieved of responsibility if the wound inflicted is dangerous, that is,
calculated to destroy or endanger life, even though the immediate cause of the death was erroneous or unskillful medical or
surgical treatment * * *." (29 C. J., 1081, and the numerous cases there cited.)

Ruling Case Law is in strict accord with Corpus Juris.

"* * * The principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application, and lies at the foundation of all criminal
jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own
acts. If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a
consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes co-
operated in producing the fatal result. Indeed, it may be said that neglect of the wound or its unskillful and improper treatment,
which were of themselves consequences of the criminal act, which might naturally follow in any case, must in law be deemed to
have been among those which were in contemplation of the guilty party, and for which he is to be held responsible. But, however
this may be, the rule surely seems to have its foundation in a wise and practical policy. A different doctrine would tend to give
immunity to crime and to take away from human life a salutary and essential safeguard. Amid the conflicting theories of medical
ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY
men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of
homicide to raise a doubt as to the immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the
highest crime might escape conviction and punishment.* * * " (13 R. C. L., 751, 762; 22 L. R. A., New Series, 841.)

This court in the case of United States vs. Escalona (12 Phil., 54), following a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, adopted
the same rule.

Therefore this contention of appellant must be held to be without merit.

During the trial, counsel for the defense asked several questions as to the character and habits of the deceased, but the court
sustained the objections of the fiscal as to the propriety of such questions. Appellant urges that this was prejudicial error. That
such questions were relevant to the issue then in question is not obvious. It is not necessary to pass upon the merits of this
contention, as such questions were not insisted upon at the trial, and no exception was taken to the rulings of the court.

Fixing the period of confinement at six years and on day of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of
reclusion temporal, the judgment appealed from as thus modified is affirmed. No expression as to costs. So ordered.
ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY

PEOPLE VS. BUYCO

Facts:

First class private of the Military Police... fire several shots with a Thompson submachinegun against Irineo Gellangala, Apolonio
Ikoy, and Napoleon Zambales, hitting them on different parts of their bodies and as a result Irineo Gellangala and Apolonio Ikoy
died instantaneously and Napoleon Zambales died a few days later.

The trial court, presided over by his Honor, Judge Jose

Quisumbing, after due trial, rendered judgment on May 8, 1946, finding the following facts as proven... that during a dance on the
occasion of the feast of the patron saint of barrio... there was a verbal brawl followed by a fist fight between Cornelio Soliman
and an unknown individual who later resulted to be a resident of Iloilo City... accused Meliton Buyco, now appellant, who was on
patrol with his six companions, fired in the air two discharges from his Thompson submachinegun; that Eusebio Davila, who saw
Meliton Buyco fire, approached the latter end... prohibited him from firing again to avoid personal injury among those present;
that Meliton Buyco replied that Davila leave him alone because he was an agent of the law;

Meliton Buyco fired another shot aimed at a group of persons, among them Pedro Sambales and his son Napoleon

Zambales, and a bullet of this last shot bit Napoleon Zambales, who died after six days in St. Paul's Hospital, City of Iloilo; that
Eusebio Davila tried to place Meliton Buyco under arrest but the latter threatened him with his Thompson submachinegun, and
when Eusebio Davila... attempted to succor the three wounded persons, Meliton Buyco warned him to withdraw from the spot,
and in view of this attitude on the part of the accused, Eusebio Davila desisted from his purpose through fear that he might be
another victim of Meliton Buyco.

The defense, through the testimony of the appellant Meliton Buyco and of his companions, the MP soldier Enrique Bernales and
Corporal Braulio Taleon, and Lt. Jose M. F. Pelo, and the musician Antonio Herradura, attempted to prove that on the night in
question Corporal Braulio

Taleon, the appellant Meliton Buyco, and Pvt. Enrique Bernales, and four other companions, arrived at barrio Trapiche from their
station in Guimbal, near the auditorium where a dance was being held; that the jeep used by them developed engine trouble, and
while they were fixing... it, they heard that a fight was going on inside the auditorium causing public disorder which the municipal
policemen under the command of Chief Eusebio Davila could not pacify; that the accused Meliton Buyco, followed by Cpl.
Braulio Taleon and Private Enrique Barnales, entered... the auditorium, intervened in the fight to pacify the combatants, but were
unsuccessful; that one of the combatants hurled... that one of the combatants hurled... the accused admits the killing and his
counsel frankly asserts in his brief (p. 7) that his client, acting in defense of the person of Corporal Taleon "directed a burst of TG
(Thompson Gun) shots to Taleon's assailant".

The... from... law must be applied to the facts. In the mind and eyes of the law in... such cases, even though the motive might
have been successfully concealed from the human perception of others, and might be known only to the agent and to his God,
still there it was impelling the agent to the criminal transgression. The defense would have us deem it strange... that the appellant
should have willfully killed the three victims above named. But truth is at times stranger than fiction, and under the established
facts the actual case is one of those instances.

The trial judge found and held that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged;

Issues:

The trial judge found and held that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged which said agent is criminally liable, pursuant to
article 4, paragraph1, of the Revised Penal Code

Although the wrongful act be committed against a person other than the one whom it was intended to injure, this fact does not
excuse the offender from criminal liability for the voluntary commission of a wrongful act or misdemeanor, according to paragraph
3 of Article 1 of the Penal Code" (Now art. 4 of Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:
ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The evidence discloses, as found by the same judge, that Apolonio Ikoy and Irineo Gellangala died from bullets discharged by
the same shot which was aimed at the former. It will be remembered that the shot was fired from a submachine gun and, as
already staged, it appears... that the appellant so fixed the mechanism of his submachine gun that a single pull at the trigger
would fire several bullets automatically in succession.

article 48 of our Revised Penal Code, gives an example of the first case mentioned therein of a single act constituting two or
more grave or less grave felonies as follows; A person fires a gun against another with intention to kill the latter, and not only kills
him but also a third person who... was beside the victim: here, he says, we have a single act, a single shot, which produces two
homicides

Although the wrongful act be committed against a person other than the one whom it was intended to injure, this fact does not
excuse the offender from criminal liability for the voluntary commission of a wrongful act or misdemeanor, according to paragraph
3 of Article1 of the Penal Code" (Now art. 4 of Revised Penal Code.

Under... art, 249, in relation to article 4, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, the instant defendant must be held to have
thereby committed the crime of homicide

All acts punishable by the law are presumed to be voluntary in the absence of proof to the contrary. With respect to crimes of
personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for... all the consequences thereof.

Principles:

As said in the Ricafort case, supra. " * * * In this, as in almost every crime apparently without motive, the motives which might
exist are innumerable motives unknown perhaps to the relatives of the deceased who testified at the trial and not even disclosed
to the... three who cooperated in a certain measure in the crime

In the McMann case, supra. the court said; "The question of motive is of course very important in cases where there is doubt as
to whether the defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but in this case, where it is proved beyond all doubt that
the defendant was... the one who caused the death of McKay, it is not so important to know the exact reason for the deed". In the
case at bar the accused admits having caused the death of the victims, aside from the evidence against him.
ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAGALONA

Facts:

On May 25, 1994,... while the spouses Arimbuyutan and their children, namely, Rommel, Rosendo, Jr., Rosalie, Rosemarie,
Regina, Ruby, Roldan and Resty, were sleeping in their hut, there was an explosion beneath the floor. Said explosion killed
Resty and injured

Rosario, Roldan, Rosemarie and Rosalie.

based on the sworn statements of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., Bienvenido Sabater and Adelina Mendoza, the suspect was
appellant Cirilo Magalona alias William.

While he was taking coffee, Sabater saw a person, named William, pass by in front of his hut and the hut of Rosendo
Arimbuyutan, Sr. He also saw William hiding behind the acacia tree in front of his hut, which was about five (5) to six (6) meters
away. Said acacia tree was... between his hut and the hut of Arimbuyutan. Then he saw an explosion under the floor of the hut of
Arimbuyutan and saw William running towards the direction of the "flood control. "

Adelina Mendoza... testified that... appellant knocked at her door and conversed with her. He told her that he was... very angry at
Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr. and that he would return and kill him.

The trial court held that the testimony of Avelina Mendoza showed that appellant had a motive to harm complainant Rosendo
Arimbuyutan, Sr.

It also ruled that the testimony of Bienvenido Sabater established that appellant was responsible for the... explosion

Issues:

Whether or not the court erred in convicting Magalona.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED CIRILO MAGALONA.

Ruling:

the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

is hereby AFFIRMED

Even if appellant, in detonating a hand grenade under the hut of Rosendo Arimbuyutan, Sr., intended to kill Rosendo, but instead
killed his son, Resty, and seriously injured other family members, appellant is liable for all the consequences of his unlawful act.
Where such... unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence.[74]

Where malice or intention to cause injury exists, the act should be qualified by the felony it has produced.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court

Principles:

Where such... unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence.[74]

Where malice or intention to cause injury exists, the act should be qualified by the felony it has produced.
ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. OPERO

G.R. No. L-48796 June 11, 1981

Lessons Applicable:

Laws Applicable: Art. 4

FACTS:

• April 27, 1978 4 am: Salvador Oliver, a GSIS security guard assigned to the House International Hotel at Ongpin Street,
Binondo, Manila, was informed by Demetrio Barcing, another security guard, that he picked up a 3 year-old girl loitering at the
second floor of the building. Rafael Ordona, a janitor, told Oliver that the girl is from Room 314 so Oliver called up Room 314
and when nobody answered, he and Barcing brought the girl to Room 314. When nobody answered Oliver’s knock, he pushed
the door open and smelled foul odor from the room. He covered his nose with a handkerchief and they entered the room where
they saw Liew Soon Ping dead faced down on the bed with both feet tied, her body is bloated and a towel covered her
mouth. Oliver called up the homicide division of the Manila Police. They saw a small baby crying and trying to get out of a crib
near the bed of the dead person.
• They called her wife, Dr. Hong, who was in Cebu. He came back immediately and found their personal effects worth P30,221
to be missing.
• Diego Opero, Asteria Avila and , Milagros Villegas were picked up by the Samar P.C. and some of the missing articles.
o Diego Opero: He and Lacsinto subdued the victim by assaulting her, tying up her hands and feet stabbing her and stuffing
her mouth with a piece of pandesal.
o Milagros Villegas: Identified the stolen clothes which were given to her by Opero
o Asteria Avila: she was not a party
• Dr. Angelo Singian finding that the cause of death is the pandesal
• RTC: Diego Opero for robbery with homicide together with Reynaldo Lacsinto and Milagros Villegas (accessory). Asteria Avila
was acquitted.
• Only Diego Opero appealed
o He never intended to kill the deceased, his intention being merely to rob her, for if indeed he had the intention to kill her, he
could have easily done so with the knife, and therefore, his liability should be only for robbery

ISSUE:

W/N Diego Opero should only be liable for robbery.

HELD:

NO. judgment appealed from being in accordance with law and the evidence, except as to the nonappreciation of the mitigating
circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, which nevertheless does not call for the
modification of the penalty of death as imposed by the lower court, is hereby affirmed.

• The intention is to prevent the deceased from making an outcry, and so a "pandesal" was stuffed into her mouth, the
mitigating circumstance of not having intended to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated. The stuffing of the "pandesal" in
the mouth would not have produced asphyxiation had it not slid into the neckline. According to Dr. Singian, the movements of the
victim that caused the "pandesal" to slide into the neckline were, however, attributable to them for if they did not hogtie her, she
could have easily removed the "pandesal" from her mouth and avoided death by asphyxiation.
• What is important and decisive is that death results by reason or on the occasion of the robbery
• Art. 49 applied only to cases when the crime committed befalls a different person from the one intended to be the victim
o Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended - In cases in
which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the accused
intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.
• There still remains one aggravating circumstance to consider, after either one of the two aggravating circumstances present,
that of superior strength and dwelling, is offset by the mitigating circumstance aforesaid. The higher of the imposable penalty for
the crime committed, which is reclusion perpetua to death, should therefore be the proper penalty to be imposed on appellant.US
vs VALDEZ
ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY

US VS. CALIXTO VALDEZ

G.R No. L-16486 22 March 1921

FACTS:

Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused,
Calixto Valdez and six others among who was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. During their work, the accused began to
abuse the men with offensive words. Gargantel complained, saying that it would be better if he would not insult them. The
accused took this as a display of insubordination, thus, he moved towards Gargantel, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab
him. At the instant when the accused had attained to within a few feet of Gargantel, the latter, evidently believing himself in great
and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more.

As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by drowning, as a consequence of having thrown himself into the
water and upon seeing himself threatened and attacked by the accused. The Judgment rendered against the accused. Having
been convicted as the author of the homicide, the accused alleged on appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting
serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated homicide.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Venancio Gargantel.

HELD:

The Supreme Court disallowed the appeal of the accused, enunciated the following doctrine:
“ That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very
grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery , occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the
circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his
adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to
do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined
resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very serious situation
narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit
any error of law, as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused.”

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio Gargantel, and he was properly
convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no
intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed. ( Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)
 ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY

PEOPLE VS CASTROMERO
TOPIC:THIS CASE IS WITH REGARD TO ARTICLE 4 Par. 1 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
"crime is different from that which was intended"

Case of People of the R.P. vs. Castromero

G.R.No. 118992 09October1997

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused Celerino Castromero was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Serious Physical
Injuries sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. That on the February 26, 1993 at about 2am in the province of batangas
philippines,the accused armed with a balisong wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge w/ the offended party
Josephine Baon against her will and consent and as a consequence thereof she suffered serious physical injuries, by jumping
down through the 2nd floor window of her house.
Castromero and Baon are relatives. Josephine Baon's husband is the second-cousin of Castromero. They were neighbors wherein
their houses are located a mere 50 meters apart. During the incident Castromero's penis due to their movement sideways was
able to touch Baon's private parts. When Baon, noticed that Castromero was no longer holding the knife she tried to escape by
pushing him off and jumping through the 2nd flr window. Upon falling down she yelled for help wherein her inlaws came out to help
her and bring her to the hospital, as she was experiencing intense pain.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Was Rape committed in this case?
- In determining if rape was consummated or merely attempted, we observe that there was NO complete of perfect penetration
of the complainant's organ.
- To consummate rape, perfect or complete penetration of the complainant's private organ is NOT essential. Even the slightest or
mere touching of the lips of the female organ, or labia of the pudendum, is sufficient.
- In people vs. Dela Pena (233 SCRA 573) held that the mere touching of the external genitalia of the penis capable of
consummating a sexual act constitutes carnal knowledge.
- For this case Rape was consummated, because sexual assault was perpetrated by force and intimidation
HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED APPELANT CASTROMERO IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF RAPE WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES.
ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY

PEOPLE VS. JUAN QUIANZON

Facts:

On February 1, 1934, a novena for the suffrage of the soul of a deceased person was being held in the house of Victorina Cacpal
in a barrio, near the poblacidn, of the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with the usual attendance of relatives and friends. The
incident that led... to the filing of these charges took place between 3 and 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Andres Aribuabo, one of the
persons present, went to ask for food of Juan Quianzon, then in the kitchen, who, to all appearances, had the victuals in his care.
Aribuabo was a sexagenarian and so... was Quianzon. It was the second or third time that Aribuabo approached Quianzon with
the same purpose whereupon the latter, greatly peeved, took hold of a firebrand and applied it to the neck of the man who so
pestered him. Aribuabo ran to the place where the people were... gathered exclaiming that he was wounded and was dying.
Raising his shirt, he showed to those present a wound in his abdomen below the navel. Aribuabo died as a result of this wound
on the tenth day after the incident.

victim's statement immediately after receiving the wound, naming the... accused as the author of the aggression, and the
admission forthwith made by the accused that he had applied a firebrand to Aribuabo's neck and had wounded him, besides,
with a bamboo spit

"wound of the deceased was very serious and it was difficult... to determine whether he could survive or not."

Issues:

It is contended by the defense that even granting that it was the accused who inflicted the wound which resulted in Aribuabo's
death, he should not be convicted of homicide but only of serious physical injuries because said wound was not necessarily fatal
and the deceased would... have survived it had he not twice removed the drainage which Dr. Mendoza had placed to control or
isolate the infection.

The possibility, admitted by said physician, that... the patient might" have survived said wound had he not removed the drainage,
does not mean that that act of the patient was the real cause of his death. Even without said act the fatal consequence could
have followed, and the fact that the patient had so acted in a paroxysm of... pain does not alter the juridical consequences of the
punishable act of the accused.

Ruling:

"One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes mediately or
immediately to the death of such other. The fact that other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of
responsibility.

accused is wrong in imputing the natural consequences of his criminal act to an act of his victim.

Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstances of lack of instruction and of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should be taken into consideration in favor of the appellant, without any aggravating circumstances adverse to him

Principles:

when a person dies in consequence of an internal hemorrhage brought on by moving about against the doctor's orders, not
because of carelessness or a desire to... increase the criminal liability of his assailant, but because of his nervous condition due
to the wound inflicted by said assailant, the crime is homicide and not merely slight physical injuries, simply because the doctor
was of the opinion that the wound might have healed,in... seven days... one who inflicts an injury on another will be held
responsible for his death, although it may appear that the deceased might have recovered if he had... taken proper care of
himself, or submitted to a surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the
death, or that death was immediately caused by a surgical operation rendered necessary by the condition of the wound.

The... principle on which this rule is founded is one of universal application, and lies at the foundation of all criminal
jurisprudence. It is, that every person is to be held to contemplate and to be responsible for the natural consequences of his own
acts.
ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant

G.R. No. 102207.

September 2, 1994

FACTS:

Rogelio Bayotas, accused and charged with Rape, died on February 4, 1992 due to cardio respiratory arrest. The Solicitor General
then submitted a comment stating that the death of the accused does not excuse him from his civil liability (supported by the
Supreme Court’s decision in People vs Sendaydiego). On the other hand, the counsel of the accused claimed that in the Supreme
Court’s decision in People vs Castillo, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before the final judgement is rendered.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability.

RULING:

The Court decided on this case through stating the cases of Castillo and Sendaydiego. In the Castillo case, the Court said that civil
liability is extinguished only when death of the accused occurred before the final judgement. Judge Kapunan further stated that
civil liability is extinguished because there will be “no party defendant” in the case. There will be no civil liability if criminal liability
does not exist. Further, the Court stated “it is, thus, evident that… the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability
depends on whether the same can be predicated on the sources of obligations other than delict.

In the Sendaydiego case, the Court issued Resolution of July 8, 1977 where it states that civil liability will only survive if death
came after the final judgement of the CFI of Pangasinan. However, Article 30 of the Civil Code could not possibly lend support to
the ruling in Sendaydiego. Civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal.
The Court also gave a summary on which cases should civil liability be extinguished, to wit:

Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely
thereon. Therefore, Bayotas’s death extinguished his criminal and civil liability based solely on the act complained of.
ARTICLE 4, Paragraph 1 – CRIMINAL LIABILITY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant,
G.R. No. 74433
September 14, 1987
153 SCRA 735
1. Legal Issue
Shall the accused suffer the penalty of arresto mayor subject by his criminal liability?
2. Legal Facts
That on or about 15th day of July 1984 in the city of Tacloban Leyte Philippines, the accused Francisco Abarca went to the
bus station and travel to Dolores Eastern Samar to fetch his daughter in the morning. Unfortunately, the trip was delayed at 2
pm because of his failure to catch the trip plus the engine trouble which causes him to proceed at his father’s house, and then
later went home. When he reaches home the accused caught his wife in the act of sexual intercourse with Khingsley Koh in the
meantime his wife and Koh notice him, that makes her wife push her paramour and got his revolver. Abarca peeping above the
built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away to look for a firearm at the PC soldier’s house to where he got the M-16 rifle.
The accused lost his wife and Koh in vicinity at his house and immediately proceeded to a mahjong house where he caught the
victim aimed and shoot Koh with several bullets on his different parts of his body causing Mr. Khingsley Koh’s instantaneous
death. By that time, Arnold and Lina Amparado had inflicted multiple wounds due to stray bullets causing Mr. Amparado’s one
and one-half month loss of working capacity including his serious hospitalization and the latter’s wife who had slighter physical
injuries from the incident. The RTC hereby sentenced Abarca to death for Murder with double Frustrated Murder and must
indemnify the Amparado Spouses and Heirs of Kho.
3. Holding
The Supreme Court modified the appealed decision of destierro to arresto mayor from the lower court sentencing four
months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor indemnifying Amparado spouses for expenses and damages.
4. Reasoning

The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing an
offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. The accused-
appellant is totally free from any responsibility performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim but he cannot be entirely
without fault. It appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words which is not enough of a precaution to
absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. The acts of execution which should have produced the crimes of
murders as a consequence, nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will; nonetheless, the Court
finds negligence on his part. He is liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365 that is less serious physical injuries
through simple imprudence or negligence. For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses impose upon the
accused-appellant arresto mayor in its medium and maximum period to being the graver penalty.