IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE ee agg UA VT PH 52 ROBERT FELTS and LORETTA, BRIGHT FELTS, epTERED_———_ Plaintiffs, v. No. 2018-618 WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, WILLIAMSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, SOUTH WILLIAMSON ATHLETICS, TIFFANY FORKUM, JERRY WALLING, and JOHN DOE, Defendants. MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Comes Defendant Williamson County (County) pursuant to Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and submits the following Memorandum of Law in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. FACTS Plaintiff Robert Felts tripped and fell in the lobby of Heritage Middle School (HMS) on the moming of Saturday, December 9, 2017. (Compl. § 9-10.) Williamson County does not own Heritage Middle School and did not own it at the time of the fall. (SUMF 8.) ‘Video of the HMS lobby that morning shows that another visitor inadvertently rolled up a comer ofa doormat while walking over it at 9:56 am. CST.! (SUMF § 2.) Mr. Felts entered the ' The time stamp on the video uses Pacific Standard Time. Accordingly, the video indicates that this occurred at 7:56 a.m. PST, or 9:56 a.m. CST 1HMS lobby and fell at 10:01 am, CST (8:01 am. PST). (SUMF 3.) Video shows that Mr. Felts entered the lobby and looked to his right and then to his left. (SUMF 4.) He then began walking to his left while looking back to his right, at which point he tripped and fell. (SUMF { 5.) Mr, Felts stepped on the comer of the doormat, which had been inadvertently rolled up by the other visitor minutes earlier, with his right foot and then caught his left foot in the resulting fold, causing him to fall, (SUMF 6.) Mr, Felts was attending a recreational youth basketball game sponsored by Williamson County Parks and Recreation on that Saturday moming when he tripped and fell. (SUMF 7.) STANDARD OF REVIEW ‘Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. A party against whom a claim is asserted “may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof.” Tenn. R. Civ. P, 56.02, Summary judgment is “not a disfavored procedural shortcut but rather an ‘important vehicle for concluding eases that can and should be resolved on legal issues alone.” Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.24 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Bellamy v. Federal Express Corp., 749 $.W.2d 31, 33 (Tenn, 1988) and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). ‘Tenn. Code Ann, § 20-16-101 provides that a party moving for summary judgment who does not bear the burden of proof at trial “shall prevail ... if it [sJubmits affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim; or [demonstrates to the court that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim.” Tenn, Code Amn. § 20-16-101. Presented with such a motion, the adverse party “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading,” but its response must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06, Here, 2summary judgment is appropriate because there is no genuine issue of material fact and Williamson County is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ARGUMENT Williamson County respectfully requests that this Court grant summary judgment in its favor because it is immune under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), Tenn. Code Ann, §§ 29-20-101, ef seq., and under the public duty doctrine, Alternatively, Williamson, County requests that summary judgment be granted in its favor because even in the absence of such immunity, Plaintiffs could not establish the existence of a duty and Plaintifis’ recovery would be barred by the doctrine of comparative fault as a matter of law. 1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED IN WILLIAMSON COUNTY'S FAVOR BECAUSE THE COUNTY RETAINS IMMUNITY UNDER ‘THE GTLA. Williamson County is immune from suit under the GTLA, Atcommon law, municipal entities were generally immune from suit, and the GTLA codifies this general rule, subject to specific, listed exceptions. Ezell v, Cockrell, 902 8.W.2d 394, 399 (Tenn, 1995); Kirby v. Macon Chty., 892 $.W.2d 403, 406 (Tenn, 1994), Because the waivers of immunity prescribed by the GTLA exist in “clear derogation of the common law,” they must be strictly construed and confined to their express terms.” Ezell, 902 S,W.2d at 399 (citing Austin v. Shelby County, 640 S.W.2d 852, 854 (Tenn. Ct, App. 1982) and Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.24 739, 744 (Tenn. 1987). Here, Williamson County is entitled to summary judgment because its immunity is not removed by Tenn, Code Ann, § 29-20-204 where it does not own the property where the injury occurred.