Divergent Studies Convergent Attitudes

ISBN 951-581-090-6 (book)
ISBN 951-581-091-4 (http://ethesis.helsinki.fi)

© Pilvi Torsti
Cover Design: Piia Aho
Layout: Samuli Simojoki
Published by Kustannus Oy Taifuuni (www.taifuuni.com)

Printed by Yliopistopaino
Helsinki 2003
Contents
FOREWORD................................................................................................................. 9
1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 13
1.1 Task ........................................................................................................ 13
1.2 Relevance................................................................................................. 16
1.3 Structure.................................................................................................. 18
2 NEW OPENINGS IN HISTORY RESEARCH ................................................................ 20
2.1 Conceptual Developments ....................................................................... 22
2.2 Public Presentations of History ................................................................ 27
2.3 Textbook Research .................................................................................. 30
2.4 Reception Research.................................................................................. 34
2.5 This Study and New Openings in History Research................................. 36
3 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL SCOPE..................................................... 39
3.1 Theoretical Choices ................................................................................. 39
3.1.1 Social and Historical Constructivism .................................................. 39
3.1.2 Social Representations ........................................................................ 41
3.2 Phenomena Related to the Presence of History ........................................ 45
3.2.1 History Culture ................................................................................. 47
3.2.2 Historical Consciousness ..................................................................... 50
3.2.3 History Politics .................................................................................. 52
3.2.4 This Research and the Presence of History............................................ 53
3.3 Methodological Pluralism ........................................................................ 54
3.3.1 Combining two Approaches in Theory................................................. 55
3.3.2 Combining two Approaches in Practice ............................................... 57
3.4 Research Material .................................................................................... 60
3.4.1 Youth and History Survey Data.......................................................... 60
3.4.2 Choice of History Textbooks ............................................................... 68
3.4.3 Material on History and the Presence of History in Bosnian Society....... 69
3.4.4 The Choice of Concepts Nation, War and Peace .................................. 72
4 PAST AND PRESENT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA .............................................. 76
4.1 The Origins of Bosnia as a Historical and Geographical Entity................. 76
4.2 World Wars ............................................................................................. 78
4.2.1 WW1: Assassination of the Archduke and the Bosnian Misery ............... 78
4.2.2 WW2: Cruel and Complicated Local Wars.......................................... 80
4.3 The National Question ............................................................................ 89
4.3.1 The Emergence of Ethnic Groups and the Islamisation of Bosnia ........... 89
4.3.2 The National Question in the First Yugoslavia..................................... 91
4.3.3 Tito’s National Politics....................................................................... 93
4.3.4 The National Question at the End of Yugoslavia.................................. 97
4.4 Bosnia in 1990s........................................................................................ 98
4.4.1 The Death of Yugoslavia .................................................................... 98
4.4.2 Devastating War(s) ............................................................................ 99
4.4.3 Bosnia at the Time of the Research .................................................... 105
4.5 Summary: Sensitive Historical Themes in the 1990s............................... 113
5 THE PRESENCE OF HISTORY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ............................... 115
5.1 History Culture in Bosnia ...................................................................... 117
5.1.1 The Destruction and Reconstruction of Physical Symbols ..................... 117
5.1.2 The Division of National Symbols and Language ............................... 123
5.1.3 History Culture and other Cultural Artefacts ..................................... 131
5.2 On Historical Consciousness in Bosnia .................................................. 140
5.3 On History Politics in Bosnia................................................................. 145
5.4 Division of History Teaching ................................................................. 152
5.4.1 History Teaching and the Construction of Yugoslav Identity................ 152
5.4.2 National Division of Schooling 1991–2002 ...................................... 153
5.4.3 Textbook Review and Removal of Objectionable Material................... 157
6 PRESENTATIONS OF WAR, PEACE AND NATION IN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS ........... 159
6.1 Methods and Materials........................................................................... 159
6.1.1 Principles of Qualitative Content Analysis ......................................... 159
6.1.2 Introduction of the Textbooks Analysed.............................................. 162
6.1.3 Poor-quality Pictures and Maps ........................................................ 167
6.1.4 Objectionable Material and the Books Analysed ................................. 169
6.2 Wars as Central Determinants of History ............................................... 170
6.2.1 Historija: Universal Suffering ........................................................... 171
6.2.2 Povijest: Croatian Interpretation in Neutral Style .............................. 177
6.2.3 Istorija and Dodatak: Serb Heroism and Bloc Ideology ....................... 182
6.2.4 Conclusion: Different Representations of Wars ................................... 188
6.3 Peace as a Rare Condition of History ..................................................... 191
6.3.1 Historija: Questioning the UN ......................................................... 191
6.3.2 Povijest: Complicated Negotiations.................................................... 192
6.3.3 Istorija and Dodatak: Blocs versus Non-Alignment ............................ 193
6.3.4 Conclusion: Internationalism and Non-Alliance ................................ 195
6.4 The Presentation of Nation through “us” and “them” ............................ 197
6.4.1 Historija: Concentration on Us......................................................... 198
6.4.2 Povijest: Centrality of Croat–Serb Rivalry ......................................... 211
6.4.3 Istorija: Heroism and Suffering for Yugoslavia ................................... 225
6.4.4 Dodatak: Bosnian Serb Emphasis ..................................................... 236
6.4.5 Conclusion: Historical Stereotypes of ”us” and ”them”......................... 243
6.5 Officially Expressed Social Representations in Bosnian Context ............. 248
6.5.1 Nationally-Divided Representations.................................................. 248
6.5.2 Historical Continuity and Reoccurrence ............................................ 252
6.5.3 Anchoring the Present with the Help of the Past................................. 254
6.5.4 The Power of Textbook Representations............................................. 256
7 REPRESENTATIONS OF WAR, PEACE AND NATION IN THE YOUTH AND HISTORY
SURVEY ................................................................................................................... 259
7.1 Method and Materials............................................................................ 259
7.1.1 Principles of the Bosnian Analysis ..................................................... 259
7.1.2 General Features of the Sample......................................................... 263
7.2 War ....................................................................................................... 264
7.2.1 Who is Fighting and Why? ............................................................... 264
7.2.2 Reasons and Justifications Related to War.......................................... 267
7.2.3 The Historical Significance of Wars .................................................. 271
7.2.4 The Significance of Wars in the Future ............................................. 276
7.2.5 The Role of Hitler............................................................................ 281
7.3 Peace ..................................................................................................... 282
7.3.1 What Secures the Peace? ................................................................... 282
7.3.2 The Importance of Peace .................................................................. 291
7.4 Nation ................................................................................................... 293
7.4.1 What is a Nation? ........................................................................... 294
7.4.2 The Rights and Obligations of ”ours” and ”theirs”.............................. 300
7.4.3 The Historical and Future Significance of Nation.............................. 304
7.4.4 Nation and Europe.......................................................................... 307
7.5 Representations of War, Peace and Nation in the Bosnian Context........ 308
7.5.1 Unlikely and Insignificant Wars between Nations.............................. 309
7.5.2 The Importance of Peace .................................................................. 310
7.5.3 Problematic Nations ........................................................................ 311
7.5.4 Overall Similarity of National Groups .............................................. 313
7.5.5 The Recent Past Explaining the Representations ................................. 315
7.5.6 Significance of the Representations .................................................... 320
8 DIVERGENT STORIES, CONVERGENT ATTITUDES ................................................ 323
8.1 The Power of History Politics ................................................................ 327
8.2 Youth and History as a Method and the Dilemma with other Sources.... 332
8.3 Looking Forward.................................................................................... 334
SOURCES AND LITERATURE ..................................................................................... 337
INDEX ..................................................................................................................... 351
SUMMARY IN ENGLISH ............................................................................................ 357
SUMMARY IN FINNISH ............................................................................................. 358
ANNEXES ................................................................................................................. 359
Annex 1: Youth and History questionnaire................................................... 359
Annex 2: The methods applied in the quantitative analysis ........................... 368
Annex 3: Tables of Youth and History analysis............................................. 375
Tables
Table 1: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches in History Research, p. 56
Table 2: Objectivity and Subjectivity in Qualitative and Quantitative Research,
56
Table 3: The division of the contents of the analysed history textbooks in
number of pages (and as percentages), p. 163
Table 4: The division of the contents common to all of the analysed books in
number of pages (and as percentages), p. 164
Table 5: Pictures and other illustrations in the analysed history textbooks in
number of items and (percentages), p. 168
Table 6: Motives of the pictures and illustrations in the analysed history
textbooks in number of items and (percentages), p. 168
Table 7: Special characteristics of pictures and illustrations in the analysed
history textbooks, p. 169
Table 8: The Representations of Wars in 8th Grade History Textbooks in
Bosnia, p. 189
Table 9: Representations of Peace in 8th-Grade History Textbooks in Bosnia,
p. 195
Table 10: The Representation of Nation through “us” and “them” in 8th Grade
History Textbooks in Bosnia, p. 248
Table 11: Representations of War, Peace and Nation in the Youth and History
survey in Bosnia, p. 314
Figures
Figure 1: Historical Phenomena in the Present, p. 46
Figure 2: Influence of History Textbooks and History Culture on Historical
Consciousness, version 1, p. 257
Consciousness, version 2, p. 258
Maps
Map 1: Ethnic Compositions before the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(1991), p. 108
Map 2: Ethnic Compositions after the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(1998), p. 108
Graphs
Graph 1: Support for the use of military strength in the re-annexation of
Newland, p. 268
Graph 2: Agreement with the right of national groups to wage war to establish
their own state, p. 270
Graph 3: The significance of wars and armed conflicts in changing life up to
today, p. 274
Graph 4: Wars and armed conflicts as the determinants of the change in life in
future, p 277
Graph 5: Expectation of internal conflicts in one’s own country, p. 280
Graph 6: Expectation of Internal Conflicts in Europe, p. 281
Graph 7: The likelihood of the peaceful life of the country in the past, p. 283
Graph 8: The likelihood of the peaceful life in the future of the country, p. 284
Graph 9: The likelihood of the peaceful life in the future of Europe, p. 285
Graph 10: European integration as the way to peace between the nations that
have attempted to destroy each other, p. 287
Graph 11: European integration will solve economic and social crises in
European countries, p. 288
Graph 12: The importance of peace at any cost, p. 291
Graph 13: Concept of Nations: born, grow and die, p. 295
Graph 14: National states should yield sovereignty, p. 296
Graph 15: The importance of ethnic group, my country and religious faith, p.
299
Graph 16: Concentrating on the acknowledgement of our traditions in history
lessons, p. 305
Graph 17: Interest in the history of one’ own country, p. 306
Graph 18: Wars HAVE DONE/WILL DO much in changing life, p. 310
FOREWORD
Foreword
My experiences with adolescents from former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and

Herzegovina date back to 1993 when I started the United World College of the
Adriatic, a school in Italy with close ties to former Yugoslavia and its people. Ever
since, the fate of young people from the region has puzzled me both emotionally
and intellectually.
After struggling as a journalist to find research material addressing the
complicated national division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1997 and 1998, I was
convinced that I should write my master thesis in history on a topic related to
Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the spring of 1999 I read Sirkka Ahonen’s ”The No-
History Generation? The Reception of History and the Construction of Historical
Identity by Young People in the 1990s” [Historiaton sukupolvi? Historian
vastaanotto ja historiallisen identiteetin rakentuminen 1990-luvun nuorison
keskuudessa], which presented the Finnish results of the international Youth and
History research project. I noticed that the research failed to include Bosnia. Two
weeks later I met with professor Ahonen, who strongly supported the idea of
conducting the project in Bosnia. Thus the process culminating in this thesis had
begun.
Between October 1999 and January 2000, I collected the Youth and History
survey in Bosnia. After visiting about 40 schools in different areas dominated by
Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims), I began to understand what the
national division of Bosnia and Herzegovina really implied. While content with the
excited feedback for the Youth and History survey at schools, I felt that
international survey alone could not adduce the dramatic use of history to which
the youth of Bosnia were subjected.
My master thesis, completed in September 2000, exploratively presented the
results of the entire Youth and History survey. Despite my occasional fatigue with
performing the statistical analyses so far removed from the Bosnian environment,
professor Ahonen managed to encourage me to continue with my research.
9
DIVERGENT STORIES, CONVERGENT ATTITUDES
Since late 2000 I have worked as a full time post-graduate student. After careful
consideration, I decided to combine the Youth and History analysis with a study on
history textbooks and the general presence of history in my doctoral dissertation.
From the outset, I considered it vital to complete this work as quickly as possible
due to its current political nature and immediate relevance. Therefore I attempted
to define the scope of the research in such a way as to finish the work in two to
three years provided that the Youth and History material had already been
collected.
When I began, my research seemed to have at least internal political relevance
to Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the research process, however, the problem of
otherness has grown increasingly acute as the post-September 11th atmosphere has
emphasised the divisions between ethnic and religious groups. Due to recent
changes in world politics, I feel that while this study addresses issues important in
today’s world political climate, it appears too narrowly confined to one particular
society. Thus if I were to begin my postgraduate work today, I would choose a
topic that directly and more generally addresses the problem of otherness in a
broader, comparative world political context.
I trust this research is of interest to a wide variety of readers with different
needs. I have therefore written the main chapters to stand as independently as
possible. Those interested in modern Bosnian history may refer to chapter four.
Descriptions of the presence of history in the daily culture of Bosnia and the
national division of schooling appear in chapter five. Chapter six includes an
analysis of history textbooks and chapter seven focuses exclusively on the Youth and
History survey.
All the research material used, save some minor additions relating to history
culture, has been collected by the end of 2002, and the first draft of the final
manuscript was completed by June 2003.
Acknowledgements
Financial support from the Kordelin foundation (2.5 years) and University of
Helsinki (3 months) enabled me to work full-time on completing the thesis. The
graduate School of History at the University of Tampere, and the department of
Social Sciences History at the University of Helsinki provided small travel grants,
and the latter has enabled me to complete the research process while working at the
department. Thank you. In addition, I thank my family for funding the largest part
of the material collection, traveling expenses and all the working facilities during
the research.
In connection to the Youth and History research project, my gratitude goes to
the central project team at the University of Hamburg; the Women to Women
(Žene Ženama) organisation in Sarajevo; professor Gajo Sekulić at the University of
Sarajevo; the European Union Monitoring Mission in Bosnia; professor doctor
Wolfgang Benedek; WUS-Austria in Sarajevo and Banja Luka; Ira Ninić; Danijela
10
FOREWORD
Stanić; Sabina Grubić; and all the schools, pupils and their teachers that
participated in the research.
Working in Bosnia throughout the research required plenty of local assistance.
At various stages of the research, Selma Sakić and Suada Ninić with her family
helped greatly. The personnel in the library of the British Council in Sarajevo gave
invaluable advice. In addition, numerous friends and professionals in Bosnia offered
their help in various situations during the research. Azra Divljak and Quentin
Skinner at the Bosnian Institute in London were of great guidance during the
research work in the library of the Institute. Thank you all.
I express my warm thanks to the expertise and advice of senior education
adviser Claude Kieffer, working first at the Office of the High Representative
(OHR) and then at the Organisation for Stability and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) in Sarajevo during the research. Working with Antonin B. Besse and
David B. Sutcliffe on a United World College project in Bosnia has enabled me to
use the expertise gained through the research in a concrete way. Tony and David, I
am grateful for the shared work that continues.
I consider myself exceptionally lucky for having had two excellent and
committed supervisors. Professor Sirkka Ahonen has been an inspiring supporter
and friend all the way, and I greatly appreciate the time spent together whether in a
small room in Ratakatu, in Berlin, or in a concert listening to the music of
Bregović. Professor Pauli Kettunen has amazed time and again with his talent for
being a highly analytical, scientifically high-class, and supportive supervisor with an
unhierarchical, sympathetic, and warm personality. Sirkka and Pauli, I thank you
both for so much.
Valuable comments and suggestions of the pre-examiners of the thesis, docent
Marko Lehti from the University of Turku and professor doctor Bodo von Borries
from the University of Hamburg, encouraged me to develop the manuscript into its
final form. Stephen Stalter corrected my English. I thank you all.
I thank my friends Tero Erkkilä, Johanna Kantola, Piia Aho and Matias
Möttölä; Tero for his help with statistical analyses and SPSS program throughout
the entire process, Johanna for language checks and numerous scientific discussions,
and Piia for designing a professional cover for this book. Matias Möttölä shared a
cozy study room “Piha” with me, and thereby was present on a daily basis during
the entire process.
My the well-being during working process deservers gratitude of a different
kind. Dear friends, you may not have realised the importance of your daily
presence, the Headlake organisation, the sport & art activities, or the long dinners
especially in times when the research project was in its lonely and endless phase and
you were my only social outlet. My extended family from Rovaniemi to Bosnia and
Herzegovina via Oulu, Ruukki, Lammi and Lauttasaari have expressed
unconditional respect and faith in my work. Thank you all. My parents and
brother, Pipa, Risto and Ilari, I particularly thank for so eagerly sharing the Bosnian
dimension of my life.
11
My companion and husband Samuli, I do not thank you for making it possible
to work intensively and at times far away from home at the cost of our being
together – I continue to take it for granted. Instead I thank you for sharing the
PhD work all the way: for your idea to begin the research, for your intellectual
interest during the research, and for your crucial comments and extensive practical
help while I was completing the research. The pride you have taken in my work on
so many occasions has not gone unnoticed. There is no greater love; this work
would not exist without you.
Finally, I feel privileged to have lived in post-war Bosnia and Sarajevo to
complete this research. As many journalists covering the Bosnian war have stated,
there you meet humans at their worst and best. However, one should attach no
romanticism or heroism to the war for doing so imbues it with value an sich. We
can only hope that the new generation, which this work is largely about, will find
other means to discover its worst and best than the horrifying attack and
destruction that ravaged the multicultural state of Bosnia and Herzegovina from
1992 to 1995. I dedicate this work to Ziba Gačanović and all those her fellow
Bosnians who have not lost their belief in the possibility of human goodness.
Helsinki, November 2003

Pilvi Torsti
12
INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
1.1 Task
A vignette from post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina1 in the autumn of 1999 depicts
pupils ripping and blackening their history textbooks under the supervision of their
teacher. Next to the blackened texts the teacher stamps: “The following passage
contains material for which the truth has not been established, or that may be
offensive or misleading. The material is currently under review.”
***
The political significance of history textbooks and the world views they contain
received attention already after the First World War, when the League of Nation
introduced the idea of regular textbook revisions.2 Interest in the historical
understanding of young people, who study the history textbooks, has grown later.
The response to the Youth and History research project, which explored the
historical consciousness and historically constructed political attitudes of
adolescents in Europe in the mid-1990s, demonstrated the need for such
knowledge in different communities.3 For many countries, this was the first
1
The name ’Bosnia and Herzegovina’ appears in a variety of different written forms, among them ’Bosnia-
Hercegovina’, ’Bosnia-Herzegovina’, ’Bosnia and Hercegovina’, and ’Bosnia and Herzegovina’. In this study I have
used the latter as the official name of the country for that is the version used in the English version of the
constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As synonyms of Bosnia and Herzegovina I use ’Bosnia’ and the abbreviation
BiH, which comes from the name of the country in the local languages (Bosna i Herzegovina). The state of Bosnia
and Herzegovina actually comprises two entities: the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
For these entities, I use the official abbreviations RS and FBiH as well as their full names.
2
Pellens, Karl 1994. The International Dimensions of the Didactics of History. In: Pellens, Karl, Quandt, Siegfried
and Süessmuth, Hans (ed.) 1994. Historical Culture – Historical Communication: International Bibliography. 2nd
Edition. Frankfurt: Verlag Moritz Diesterweg, 46. Pekkala, Leo 1999. Lesser Nations. The Nordic Countries in
English History Textbooks. Rovaniemi: University Press, Lapin yliopistopaino, 29.
3
Angvik, Magne and von Borries, Bodo (ed.)1997. Youth and History, A Comparative European Survey on
Historical Consciousness and Political Attitudes among Adolescents. Volumes A and B. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung,
A21. The Youth and History research project was the first large-scale empirical investigation of the historical
consciousness and political attitudes of adolescents from 27 European countries. In addition, three additional group
samples were separated from the country samples: Arab Israelis, Italian language minority and Scotland.
13
attempt to map history-related ideas and historically constructed values among

youth.
This research focuses on both the views of the history textbooks and the
historically constructed attitudes of youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina a few years
after the devastating war that forced more than half of the population to leave their
homes and caused tremendous material damage.
Bosnian adolescents initially failed to participate in the Youth and History
research. At that time, they went to school as refugees scattered around the world or
in bomb shelters in Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore could not participate.
Four to five years later, however, in the autumn 1999, it appeared reasonable to
attempt to investigate the history-related thinking of young Bosnian Serbs, Croats
and Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims)4 in nationally divided post-war Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Besides the blackening of history textbooks, the absolute national
division into three has largely characterised post-war years in Bosnia. Inside this
country of less than four million people, institutions from the army to the school
system, as well as national symbols, have all been divided. The common national
anthem, the state flag and the unified car licence plate have all resulted from laws
imposed by the international community.5
In this situation, the Youth and History research enabled a comparative study
of the historical thinking of young people who had grown up during the war and
continued to live in the nationally divided society. How do adolescents living in
nationally divided post-war Bosnia and attending nationally segregated schools
evaluate the past, and throught it evaluate the future? How does the thinking of
Croats, Serbs and Bosniacs segregated nationally differ? Or does it differ? How do
the values of Bosnian adolescents compare with those of European youth?
The Youth and History survey data collection in Bosnia and Herzegovina
coincided with the above mentioned process of ripping, blackening and stamping
history textbooks.6 A report about the curricula contents also made me curious
about the actual contents of the textbooks.7 In addition, the majority of the
research and literature related to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which I went through
while preparing the Youth and History research, referred to the central role of
history in the propaganda and rhetoric of Bosnian national groups. Therefore the
understanding of the contents and intensity of the use of history in history
4
I have called the citizens of the state Bosnia and Herzegovina’Bosnians’, who belong to various national groups, In
this study, ’Bosniacs’ refers to Bosnian Muslims, ’Croats’ to Bosnian Croats, and ’Serbs’ to Bosnian Serbs. I use the
term ’Croatians ’ for Croat citizens of the Republic of Croatia. When referring to non-Bosnian Serbs, it has been
clear from the context.
5
In post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, the term “international community” has referred to those international
agencies, NGOs and other organisations working in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It also refers to a general idea of
international community, including such actors as the UN.
6
Chapters five and six present the process in detail.
7
Lenhart, Volker, Kesidou, Anastasia and Stockmann, Stephan 1999. The Curricula of the ”national subjects” in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. A Report to UNESCO. Heidelberg.
14
INTRODUCTION
textbooks, and in the society in general, seemed an essential component of the

research for the contextualisation of the thinking of the youth.
As a result, the presence of history in post-war Bosnia became the second focus
of the research. What are all the forms in which history has been present in post-
war Bosnia and Herzegovina? What presentations do young people learn from the
textbooks they have partly blackened? What is meant when, in regard to history
teaching, a group of history educators in a meeting within the South East European
Stability Pact framework describes Bosnia as ”the most complicated case”?8
Thus the research task has been binary: the use of history in post-war Bosnia
from the perspective of young people, and the historical thinking of the youth
among three Bosnian national groups.
The research task concretised into three analyses. The use of history from the
perspective of the youth is not limited only to school; adolescents participate in
society under the influence of the surrounding cultural and societal reality.
Therefore I considered it important for the research task to include a broader
context. Thus, the first central analysis of the research discusses the presence of
history in post-war Bosnian society in the light of different history-related
phenomena.
The use of history through schooling is the topic of the second central analysis.
It concentrates on the three separate eight-grade history textbooks used by the three
Bosnian national communities in the 1999–2000 school year (the 8th-grade is the
last year of obligatory schooling). The textbooks were considered part of official
history culture and thus, this analysis serves as a case study for the first main
analysis. The analysis of the textbooks focused on the ways of presenting three
socio-historically central concepts in the post-war Bosnian context: war, peace and
nation.9
The third analysis on the historical thinking of the youth was based on the
Youth and History survey which I conducted among the same eight-grade pupils
whose books were under spotlight in the textbook analysis. The analysis
concentrated on the construction of representations of the same three concepts as
the textbook analysis: war, peace and nation.
Because of the nature of the research task, I employed a pluralistic
methodological approach, which combines quantitative and qualitative research
materials and methods. I will present the ideas related to methodological pluralism
in greater detail in chapter three. The materials used and methods applied in this
study will also appear in detail in chapter three and as part of the analyses in
8
Meeting of the Working Group on History and History Teaching in South East Europe. Sarajevo, Bosnia and
Herzegovina. 16-17th December 2001. Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. Working Table 1. Task Force
Education and Youth. Report of the meeting available at http://www.see-educoop.net/graz/calendar/2001-12-16.pdf.
12th May 2003. On Stability Pact, see www.stabilitypact.org.
9
School subjects other than history of course also carry historical meanings and could be analysed as part of history
culture. Language books include certain texts, geography books display certain symbols and, for example, the teams
constructed for football games may have names related to the past. This study, however, analysed the chosen history
textbooks.
15
chapters six and seven. Theoretically the research task is approached from the
perspective of social and historical constructivism The public presentations of
history and history textbooks are considered a means of creating the reality in which
young Bosnians live, and their thinking as reflected in the Youth and History
survey as a way to study some aspects of the socially constructed meanings. The
conclusions related to the presentations of history textbooks and thinking of the
youth will utilise the approach of social representations. The presence of history is
analysed through the concepts of history culture, historical consciousness and
history politics. The theoretical context and concepts used appear in detail in
chapter three.
1.2 Relevance
The relevance of this research is related to the relevance of the entire Youth and
History survey, the first comparative survey in Europe on the historical
consciousness and historically constructed political attitudes among youth. In the
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the comparative nature of the Youth and History
research was fundamental: to compare the national groups of Bosnia with one
another, and the thinking of Bosnian youth to that of 29 country and minority
groups that had participated in the Youth and History project. This was of
particular importance because post-war Bosnian society is easily analysed as a
special case isolated from other countries. From this it follows that any results
drawn from Bosnia tend to be analysed from a certain fixed angle, and conclusions
and interpretations support existing views of the society. Therefore, comparing
Bosnians as a country group to the other country groups of the Youth and History
survey made it possible to place the Bosnian results into a broader context and to
interpret the results from an angle beyond just the Bosnian context.10 In fact, when
compared to other Europeans the thinking related to war and peace among Bosnian
national groups emerged as perhaps among the most unexpected results of the
research.
10
A good example of the importance of comparisons is the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) Youth
2000 report conducted at the same time as the Youth and History survey, but without any comparison possibilities.
In that survey one of the questions asked whether the respondents would be willing to leave their country and move
elsewhere if given a chance. Of approximately 1000 Bosnian respondents between 15 and 35 years of age, 62%
answered yes. The 62% figure appeared publicly not only in Bosnia but also abroad, and in the Bosnian context the
figure was considered proof of the disillusionment of the youth since they all want to leave. Without international
comparison, however, such an interpretation is problematic: would not great numbers of young people in many
countries be willing to go abroad if given the chance? We cannot know, but we can state that only international
comparison could have placed the figure into some kind of context other than the existing assumptions of Bosnia
which hold that future prospects are miserable and that young people want to leave. Human Development Report
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000. Youth. UNDP: Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues. We can note here that
in 2003 a YouGov survey in Britain found that 54% of people in Britain would like to settle in another country. See:
The pull of Provence. Emigration is at a peak, as Britons flood into Europe. The Economist. April 26th-May 2nd
2003, Vol. 367, No 8321, 49.
16
INTRODUCTION
Another aspect of the relevance of the Youth and History survey in Bosnia and
Herzegovina relates to the scientific participation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
international research programs. Conducting the Youth and History research in
Bosnia four to five years later than the original project has contributed to increasing
that participation, which has developed slowly after the war.11
Analysis of the history textbooks and the presence of history outlines what has
taken place in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina in regard to the use of history.
One hopes that the analyses will help to increase the understanding of the “Bosnian
question”12, which remains a political challenge; for instance arranging education in
such a way as not to limit the return of refugees to their pre-war homes remains an
unsolved question. Therefore studies such as this can provide a factual background
for the political discussion and decisions regarding, for example, the educational
policies. In a broader context we can hope to offer ideas as to what should be taken
into account in other conflicts and post-conflict situations in the future, for the
history related debates appear part of the conflicts related to separatism and
religious nationalism. One current example of such tendencies is in India, where
the leading Hindu-minded party has changed history teaching and where heated
debates about the right for certain historical sites continue.13
When I began this study, the only research material available regarding history
teaching in Bosnia was the report on the curricula written for Unesco.14 Since then,
however, several projects have been conducted in Southeast Europe in the field of
history teaching. Even though most have concentrated little on Bosnia and
11
In the late 1990s when I conducted the Youth and History research, Bosnia and Herzegovina had hardly
participated in any international research programs - at least in the field of social sciences and didactics. From 2000
on, despite several research programs concentrating on Southeast Europe, Bosnian parcipation has still remained
modest. An illustrative and relevant example from the point of view of this research is “Clio in the Balkans. The
Politics of History Education” published by the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe. Of
the 41 articles, not one concentrates on Bosnia and the appendix at the end of the book summarising the educational
systems and history teaching does not include Bosnia and Herzegovina. One Bosnian history teacher is mentioned as
having participated in one of the seminars organised as part of the project. This reflects both the lack of research and
scholars and the difficulty of conducting research on these topics in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Koulouri,
Christina (ed.) 2002. Clio in the Balkans. The Politics of History Education. Thessaloniki: the Center for
Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe.
12
Kržišnik-Bukić has noted how the solving of “Bosnian question” and formulating the framework for a programme
of Bosnia requires all kinds of academic research. Kržišnik-Bukić, Vera 2001. The Bosnian Question in Ten Pictures.
Translated by Danijela Valenta and Roselle Angwin. In: Lovrenović, Ivan and Jones, Fransis R. (ed.) 2001. Life at
the Crossroads. Forum Bosnae culture-science-society-politics quaterly review 11/01. Sarajevo: International Forum
Bosnia. 107-119, 119.
13
Lakshmi, Rama 2002. Hindu rewriting of history texts splits India. International Herald Tribune 15th October.
Available at: <www.iht.com/cgi-bin/generic.cgi?template=articleprint.tmplh&ArticleId=73673>.12th May 2003.
Lakshmi, Rama 2003. Indian Court Orders Excavation at Religious Site. The Washington Post 5th March 2003.
Available at: <www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A48124-2003Mar5&
notFound=true>. 14th May 2003.
14
Lenhart, Kesidou and Stockmann 1999.
17
Herzegovina specifically, the projects have produced material relevant to discussions

of history teachers and politicians in Bosnia and Herzegovina.15
Inside academic traditions, I trust that this research will participate in the
current theoretical and methodological development in the field of political and
contemporary history research. The development has increasingly drawn attention
to what has been called as the “history of the second degree” (forms and ways
historical knowledge was and is used in societies, and the consequences thereof), in
addition to more established forms of history research.16 For example, in a recent
special issue of the Journal of Contemporary History, Richard Evans, professor of
modern history at the Cambridge University wrote about the increased significance
of public presentations of history for the work of historians.17
1.3 Structure
First three chapters build the foundation for the entire study. Chapter two attempts
to place this research in the context of previous research relevant to this work.
Chapter three presents theoretical and methodological principles of the research
and the data used, and the concepts applied in the analyses. In particular, defining
the field of history research characterised by the idea of the “presence or use of
history” receives special emphasis.
Chapter four places the research into its historical context. It presents the
interpretations of the history of modern Bosnia up to the present in the light of a
few central themes, and thus builds the framework for the main analyses of the
research.
Chapter five forms the first main analysis of the research. First it concentrates
on the detailed analysis of Bosnian history culture as a form of the presence of
history within Bosnian society. Then the presence of history is also portrayed
through the concepts of historical consciousness and history politics. The end of the
chapter presents the developments in schooling and history teaching in post-war
Bosnia.
Chapter six analyses the history textbooks used in the 8th-grade in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the 1999–2000 school year. The presentations of the concepts war,
peace and nation are concluded based on the approach of social representations.
Chapter seven concentrates on the results of the Youth and History survey. All
the questions of the survey relating to the concepts war, peace and nation are
15
See Koulouri Christina (ed.) 2001. Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe. Thessaloniki: Center for
Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, Koulouri (ed.) 2002, Baranović, Branislava 2001. History
Textbooks in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. Intercultural Education 1/12: 13-26.
16
I have borrowed the expression history of the second degree from Pierre Nora who means by it ”a history that is
interested in memory not as a rememberance but as the overall structure of the past within the present”. Nora 1996,
xxiv. Quoted in: Bryld, Claus, Floris, Lene, Handesten, Lars et.all. 1999. At formidle histories – vilkar, kendetegn,
formål. Roskilde: Universitetsforlag, 48.
17
Evans, Richard J. 2003. Introduction. Redesigning the Past: History in Political Transitions. Journal of
Contemporary History. Special Issue: Redesigning the Past. 1/38: 5-12.
18
INTRODUCTION
analysed comparing the Bosnian national groups and Bosnian sample with the
European sample. The representations of the concepts are concluded at the end of
the chapter with a discussion of their possible significance.
Chapter eight summarises the main results of the research and suggests their
possible consequences for the future. Discussion also includes methodological
remarks and research needs stemming from this work. The chapter closes with
suggestions drawn from the research results.
19
2 New Openings in History Research
This study belongs to the broadened scope which history research has adopted
during the past decades. Generally the recent developments in the field present
merely a continuation of the developments in the discipline since the 1960s. This
chapter shortly presents the development of ”new histories” thereby arriving at the
presentation of research relevant when discussing the context and grounds of this
study. Finally, the chapter concludes by examining this study in the context of the
presented “new histories”.
In the twentieth century, and in particular after the Second World War,
nationalistically-oriented narrative and event-orientated history research evolved
into social-science-oriented forms of history research which emphasised broader
contexts as well as the need for generalisations within history research. The role of
history was not considered central in Western societies in the post-war “loss of
history” spirit. This allowed for historians to concentrate on professional work
inside the universities that focused on knowledge itself rather than on the nation-
and identity-building dimension of history and history education. Criticism of
sources and general objectivity were considered the most important methods, and
systematic social sciences gained an important role in the work of historians.1
Even if many changes in the discipline occurred earlier and as a process
throughout the 20th century, the developments termed ”new history” by Peter
Burke (who uses the term in quotation marks as it has usually referred to the
Annales school of history, born in France in 1929 in connection with the journal of
the same name) relate to the period from the 1960s and through the 1970s and
1980s. During this period reaction against the traditional paradigm in history
research spread worldwide, and ”new histories” characterised by their criticism of
the traditional ”Rankean” view of history, or as Burke puts it ”the common-sense
view of history”, became an important part of the field of history research. As Burke
points out, it is impossible to define these new histories precisely, as their common
1
Iggers, Georg G. 1997. Historiography in the Twentieth Century. From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern
Challenge. Hanover: University Press of New England, 3-6, 140, Ahonen, Sirkka 2000. Historiakulttuuri yhteisön
muistin rakentajana. Historiallinen Aikakauskirja 4/2000, 305.
20
NEW OPENINGS IN HISTORY RESEARCH
thread was their opposition to the “Rankean” tradition.2 In any case, we are talking
about such approaches as women’s history, history from below, oral history, micro
history and so forth. Thus, the scope of historical writing has expanded greatly.
Iggers has also noted how new histories in recent decades have turned more to the
study of culture in order to understand historical contexts in contrast to the social
science-orientated history which earlier replaced the study of politics with the study
of society.3 The broadening of the scope of historical studies has continued, and
since the late 1980s has also meant greated involvement in contemporary society
and thus closer relations with political and social sciences.4
Immonen describes the latest changes by suggesting that the illusion of one,
common and unified history research disappeared in the second half of the 1980s
and in the early 1990s. The structures of traditional history research were found
outdated, and the new approaches marched to the centre of history research. As a
result, Immonen mentions methodological pluralism; historians have been forced
to tolerate diversity within the field.5 Moreover, history as such has been essential
for constructivist approaches in social and human sciences, thereby broadening the
role of history within research traditions and emphasising the new pluralism.
Among the constructivist-orientated approaches within history research has
been the history of concept or conceptual history, Begriffsgesichte, which as a
tradition has opened possibilities for conceptual analyses also in the field of history.
The tradition has developed mainly in Germany. The massive project conducted by
Otto Brunner, Reinhart Koselleck, and Werner Conze between 1972 and 1990
defined almost 200 historical terms and concepts, published in the eight volumes of
the ”Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland”. The
concepts were defined by presenting their past and present meanings.6
Together with methodological pluralism and the tradition of conceptual
history, increasing interest in topics related to the use of history within history
research in recent decades has created grounds for this research. Cambridge
professor of modern history, Richard Evans, has also recently noted how history has
taken on a stronger moral language than was typical in the more social science-
dominated 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.7 The societal role of history has been in focus
when dealing with topics related to the political uses of history, collective/social
memory, historical consciousness, historical constructions, history culture and so
2
Burke has, however, summarised seven points typical to ”Rankean” view of history: history is essentially concerned
with politics, history is essestially a narrative of events, views are typically those from above, history should be based
on documents, history can explain collectively, history is objective, and history is the territory of professionals. Burke,
Peter (ed.) 1991. New Perspectives on Historical Writing. Cambridge: Polity Press, 3-6.
3
Burke (ed.) 1991, 2-8, Iggers 1997, 6-8.
4
Iggers 1997, 138-139.
5
Immonen, Kari 1996. Historian läsnäolo. Turku: Turun yliopisto, 184-185.
6
For example, the concept of Nation is defined in Brunner, Otto von, Conze, Werner, Koselleck, Reinhart (ed.)
1992. Geschichliche Grundbegriffe: historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. Bd. 7: Verw-
Z. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 141-431.
7
Contemporary History. Special Issue: Redesigning the Past. 1/38, 11.
21
forth. The degree requirements of political history in the the department of social
science history at Helsinki university in 2000 also reflected increasing interest and
emphasis on such topics.8
In the following, I will first discuss theoretical developments in regard to
concepts related to the use of history. Then I will present studies that fall mainly
into the fields of history didactics and societal/contemporary history. Works
mentioned present selected examples of studies that have some relevance or relation
to mine, the presentation is not extensive.
2.1 Conceptual Developments

As part of the ”new histories”, theoretical writing about concepts related to the
understanding of history has intensified. One can find considerably more
theoretical literature on such concepts as ’collective memory’, ’historical
consciousness’, ’history politics’ or ’history culture’ than studies that apply these
concepts to concrete research materials. In recent years, however, there has been a
seemingly growing tendency towards ”testing” or illustrating the conceptualisations
through empirical studies. As the theoretical understanding is necessary for
understanding the empirical applications developed in the context of this study and
more generally, it is important to understand the developments in the theoretical
field of research as well. The theoretical discussions and developments are typically
connected to the practical societal contexts. Therefore, it is important to know the
background of the development of such central concepts as historical consciousness
or collective memory, and to place this research into that context.
Theoretical and methodological discussions among historians in the Western
world intensified after the Second World War. In recent decades, theoretical history
discussions have taken place perhaps most frequently among German scholars while
the social and structural emphasis in history research motivated by Werner Conze
increased already in 1950s, the founding of historical social science occurred in the
1960s and 1970s. Socially-orientated historians focused on critical history science
that would signal the departure of German history research from the tradition of
historicism, and thereby manage to assess the past critically and systematically with
social science methods.9 Since the late 1970s, however, “the return of history”
bolstered the building of new museums, the rewriting of history textbooks, the
publishing of historical books and so forth. This new interest in history and active
political programs related to it sought in the 1980s to improve the negative attitude
towards the national history of Germany and the historical consciousness of
Germans. In history research, this turn has been defined as neo-conservatism. The
8
Hentilä, Seppo 2001. Opetus on tullut yliopistolle jäädäkseen. Missän mennään poliittinen historia? In: Katainen,
Elina (ed.) 2001. Ajankohta 2001. Poliittisen historian vuosikirja 2001. Helsinki: Helsingin ja Turun yliopistot, 18-
19.
9
Hentilä, Seppo 1994. Jaettu Saksa, jaettu historia. Kylmä historiasota 1945-1990. Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen
Seura, 53-69.
22
revaluation of history finally led to the Historikerstreit, (history dispute) among

historians, which focused on the persecution of Jews in the Third Reich and the
attempt to build a new historical identity for Germany.10 Historikerstreit further
emphasised the demand for the conceptualisation of such commonly used terms as
historical consciousness among historians who wanted to challenge the
conservative, nationalistically-orientated attempts in the field of history.
The idea of the concept ’historical consciousness’ already appeared in the
school of Frankfurt and in the ideas of Habermas, who started to regard people as
subjects of change who should understand the historical dimensions of their
practises.11 The Frankfurt school motivated Reinhard Koselleck, whose famous
collection of articles, ”Vergangene Zukunft”, analysed the human understanding of
historical time and the awakening of historical consciousness as a relation between
experience and expectation since the 18th Century.12 Koselleck and his student, Jörn
Rüsen, continue to be the key theoreticians often referred to in empirical studies
dealing with topics related to the historical nature of humans or their societies.13
Rüsen was also an important figure in the early planning of the Youth and History
research project, which appears in section 2.2. Generally, attempts to define
historical consciousness theoretically were typical for many scholars in early 1980s,
but became less central as the entire theoretical discussion around the theory of
history lessened.14
Throughout the 1990s the idea of historical consciousness emerged in the
centre of history didactical discussions in Europe partly as a result of fundamental
political changes. The presentations held in the didactical sections of the
International Congress of Historical Sciences in Oslo in 2000 clearly illustrate this:
in fact, the collection of all the presentations is entitled ”Historical Consciousness
and History Teaching in a Globalizing Society”.15 Studies including this one
10
Hentilä 1994, 201, 205, 208, 216-219, 269. See also Füredi, Frank 1992. Mythical Past, Elusive Future. History
and Society in an Anxious Age. London: Pluto Press, 41-52. The central texts published as part of the
“Historikerstreit” are published in “Historikerstreit” Dokumentation der Kontroverse um die Einzigartigen der
nationalsozialistischen Judenvernichtung. München and Zürich: Piper. 1987.
11
Ahonen, Sirkka 1998, Historiaton sukupolvi? Historian vastaanotto ja historiallisen identiteetin rakentuminen
1990-luvun nuorison keskuudessa. Helsinki: SHS, 26.
12
Koselleck, Reinhart 1979. Vergangene Zukunft: zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 131-134.
13
See e.g. Rüsen, Jörn 1983. Historische Vernunft. Grundzüge der Historik I: Die Grundlage der
Geschichtswissenschaft. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; Rüsen, Jörn 1986. Rekonstruktion der
Vergangenheit. Grundzüge einer Historik II: Die Prinzipien der historischen Forschung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht; Rüsen, Jörn 1989. Lebendige Geschichte. Grundzüge der Historik III: Formen und Funktionen des
historischen Wissens. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; Rüsen, Jörn 1994. Historische Orientierung: über die
Arbeit des Geschichtsbewusstseins, sich in der Zeit zurechtzufinden. Köln: Böhlau.
14
See e.g. Pandel, Hans-Jürgen 1988. Geschichtsbewusstsein in Öffentlichkeit und Schule. Eihführung. In:
Schneider, Gerhard 1988 (ed.). Geschichtsbewusstsein und historisch-politisches Lernen. Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-
Verlagsgesellschaft. 97-100; Remus, Klaus 1988. Nationalbewusstsein und Geschichtsbewusstsein. Eine empirische
Untersuchung. In: Schneider, Gerhard 1988 (ed.). Geschichtsbewusstsein und historisch-politisches Lernen.
Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft. 101-111; Rüsen 1983, Rüsen 1986, Rüsen 1989, Rüsen 1994, Hentilä
1994, 89.
15
Pellens, Karl, Behre, Göran, Erdmann, Elisabeth, Meier, Frank and Popp, Susanne (ed.) 2001. Historical
Consciousness and History Teaching in a Globalizing Society. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
23
dealing with the role of history in the form of history teaching and other historical
phenomena such as historical consciousness are considered important for
understanding societies that have undergone fundamental political changes and
struggle to survive in the globalising world.
Despite the fact that dramatic political changes have mainly taken place
elsewhere, historical consciousness has been of special interest to German and
Scandinavian scholars. In fact, the theoretical definitions for historical
consciousness in the Youth and History research were written by Danish didactic
Vagn Oluf Nielsen, and the recently published collection of articles on European
Historical Consciousness is mainly the work of German authors.16 Norwegian and
German professors wrote the main report of the Youth and History research.
German involvement has historical roots while Scandinavian interest is perhaps
better explained through general broadening of the history discipline.
Outside the German-Scandinavian field, for example, British scholar Frank
Füredi has dealt with historical consciousness presenting the concept ’History’ with
a capital H as an opposing concept for historical consciousness. For Füredi,
’History’ presented the common spirit of Western societies in the 1990s; in his
view history had acquired a role of semi-divinity, having its own absolute (and
often national) character.17 Thus Füredi claimed that Western societies had fallen
back to the idea of one history, described in the beginning of the chapter, instead of
accepting the pluralistic approach developed by many professional historians.
If historical consciousness has been a concept mainly developed and analysed
by didacticians, another key concept related to history politics, memory or more
precisely, collective/social memory, which Maurice Halbwachs applied already by
the 1920s and 1930s has been of interest to several fields of research in past
decades. Jaqcues Le Goff, a representative of the school of Annales18 in France,
discussed the nature and concept of history in his book on historiography entitled
History and Memory. Le Goff analysed how history research is selective in a way
similar to that of memory, and how each generation therefore rewrites history. In
the preface to the English translation in 1992 he wrote: ”I believe(. . .)the memory
of men, women, peoples, and nations, will play a major role in the birth of this new
historiography.”19
16
Macdonald, Sharon (ed.) 2000. Approaches to European Historical Consciousness: Reflections and Provocations.
Eustory Series Shaping European History. Volume No 1. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung.
17
Füredi 1994, 1.
18
Already in the 1970s Annales school developed the idea of ”Collective Memory”, which was also the title of
Maurice Halbwachs' pioneering work. According to Swedish historian Peter Aronsson, the tradition continues in
France through Pierre Nora’s works, which focus on memory and nation. Aronsson, Peter 2000. Historiekultur i
förändring. In: Aronsson, Peter (ed.) 2000. Makten över minnet. Historiekultur i förändring. Lund:
Studentlitteratur. 7-33.
19
Le Goff, Jacques 1979/1992. History and Memory. Translated by Sten Rendall and Elizabeth Claman. New York:
Columbia University Press, x.
24
We have seen his predictions come true in the development of historiography,

and this research belongs to that development. As Yael Zerubavel wrote in 1995 in
the preface of her book about Israeli collective memory and nation building:
”This work grows out of the contemporary fascination with history and
memory. Perhaps in no other period has the creation of an ’archive of the
present’ turned into such a frenzy popular activity. Once the exclusive domain
of leaders and scholars, it is now conducted by individuals and families,
communities and nations. Memory and commemoration have emerged as two
major topics of scholarly concern. While psychologists and literary scholars
tend to focus on the nature and dynamics of individuals’ memory,
anthropologists, folklorists, sociologists, social historians, and political
scientists explore groups’ memory and their social construction, and examine
the history and politics of commemoration.”20
For this research, the important connection to the increased interest in collective
memory is related to the rise of nationalism – which Pauli Kettunen has aptly
characterised as an ideology or idea specialised in the use of history21 – in the
1990s, because collective memory in the form of national guilt, national traumas
and national taboos has typically been part of analyses on nationalism.22 In
Germany, Rolf Schörken has also shown interest in the construction of historical
memory, its controversies and the idea of historical guilt.23 In the Bosnian and
Balkan context, many have referred to nationalism theoretician Anthony Smith,
who has emphasised the ethno-symbolic form of nationalism to examine the power
of nationalism created by myths, memories, traditions and ethnic heritage.24
20
Zerubavel, Yael 1995. Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition.
Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press, xvii.
21
Kettunen, Pauli 2002. Historian läsnäolo. Suomen Historiallinen Seura [Finnish Historical Society]. Jäsentiedote
2/2002.
22
Nationalism as an ideology has gained increased attention among scholars due to the political changes that have
taken place since the early 1990s. Many consider nationalism the core of the wars in former Yugoslavia, and
nationalistic rhetoric has gained ground not only in transitional countries but also in Western Europe. Due to the
need to explain the success of new nationalisms, naturalism, which concentrates on the biological, psychological,
ethnic and cultural aspects of nationalism, has become increasingly popular alternatives to the classical modernist
theories of nationalism, written mainly in the 1980s, which focus on the functional role of nationalism as a unifying
factor in modern societies (e.g. Gellner, Hobsbawm and Andersson, who has stressed the nationalist discourse
together with modernity). Hall, Patrik 1998. The Social Construction of Nationalism. Sweden as Example. Lund:
Lund University Press, 31-32, 35-40.
23
Schörken, Rolf 1981. Geschichte in der alltagswelt. Wie uns Geschichte begegnet und was wir mit ihr machen.
Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
24
Smith, Anthony 1999. Myths and Memories of the Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 9. Elsewhere, Smith
has criticized modernist theories for failing to explain why nationalism has been so successful. Without challenging
the constructivist nature of nationalism, Smith has stressed its social, psychological and cultural dimensions. When
commenting on Benedict Andersson’s famous idea of imagined communities, Smith noted that in addition to the
historical and linguistic narratives on which Andersson focuses, national communities contain much more: symbols,
myths, values, memories, customs, traditions, laws, institutions, routines and habits, all of which are worth noting
when analyzing nationalism. Smith, Anthony D., 1998. Nationalism and Modernism. A critical survey of recent
theories of nations and nationalism. London and New York: Routledge, 127, 129-130, 136-138.
25
The most consistent approach to defining collective/social memory I have seen

is the monograph ”Social Memory” by Fentress and Wickham. The book analyses
the functions of memory and examines how historians and social scientists have
regarded memory and used it in their research. It emphases the social role of
memory and the importance of understanding that role when referring to memory
as a part of history or social science research.25
In Finland, the book Historical Perspectives on Memory edited by Anne Ollila
has suggested the idea of memory as one of the central concepts in history. Ten
articles analyse the relation of memory and history research.26 In addition, Jorma
Kalela has emphasised the potential of memory as a source for historians without
getting into a theoretical analysis about the concept.27
History culture has also recently been applied as a conceptual tool for analyses
on the use of history. Thus far I have seen only a few definitions of the concept.
Peter Aronsson in Sweden has defined the concept in his collection of articles on
the topic.28 Sirkka Ahonen has defined and developed the concept in several of her
works.29 Hannu Salmi discusses the concept and its German roots in his recently
published article.30
Finally, I would like to quote from the introduction of a recently published
anthology, ”Knowing, teaching & learning history”, for it summarises the main
idea of this discussion; that the interest for research on the concepts of history has
grown significantly in past 10 to 20 years. In the introduction, the editors argue
that research focusing on the meaning of learning and teaching history in society at
large, as well as at the universities and at schools, has become a new field of research
in the past decade. Three developments have contributed to the appearance of this
new field of interest: the “cognitive revolution”, which shifts the focus from
behaviour to acts of meaning, attributes and sense-making; heightened attention to
the nature of historical knowledge in the discipline of history itself; and growing
interest in the problems of historical consciousness, collective memory and the
public presentation of the past.31
25
Fentress, James and Wickham, Chris 1992. Social Memory. Oxford UK & Cambridge: Blackwell, 201.
26
Ollila, Anne (ed.) 1999. Historical Perspectives on memory. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society.
27
Kalela Jorma 1999. The Challenge of Oral History − The Need to Rethink Source Criticism. In: Ollila, Anne (ed.)
1999. Historical Perspectives on Memory. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 140-141. Elsewhere Kalela has
argued about the process of history research. Part of the analysis discusses the nature of traces of history and the
process through which they become sources for historians. One of Kalela's main arguments is that the historian and
the research question always pre-exist the source and that the validity of a source (e.g. memory) always depends on
the research question. See Kalela, Jorma 2000. Historiantutkimus ja historia. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 92-97.
28
Aronsson 2000.
29
Ahonen 1998, Ahonen 2000, Ahonen, Sirkka 2002. ”Historiakulttuuri, historiantutkimus ja nuorten
historiatietoisuus” (History culture, history research and historical consciousness of the youth). Oral presentation at
the Finnish Historical Society (Suomen historiallinen Seura) March 25th 2002.
30
Salmi, Hannu 2001. Menneisyyskokemuksesta hyödykkeisiin – historiakulttuurin muodot. In: Kalela, Jorma and
Lindroos, Ilari (ed.) 2001. Jokapäiväinen historia. Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura. 134-149.
31
Stearns, Peter N., Seixas, Peter and Wineburg, Sam (ed.) 2000. Knowing, teaching and learning history: national
and international perspectives. New York: New York University Press, 2-4.
26
2.2 Public Presentations of History

History didactics study the mediation and reception of history. Traditionally
didactical studies have mainly focused on history curricula and history textbooks.
However, as a result of the broadening horizon of history research, the field of
history didactics has also broadened to include empirical research on such concepts
as historical consciousness and history culture. In addition to didactics, the interest
for public presentations of history has also increased widely among historians. For
instance, a recent special issue of the Journal of Contemporary History bore a title
“Redesigning the Past” and included numerous articles concentrating on the
thematics related to history culture, public presentations of history and so forth.32
Several monographic presentations that have dealt with the mediation and
public presentations of history in modern society and have offered ideas as to what
aspects of society can be analysed to study such aspects history. For instance scholar
Frank Füredi has discussed the revival of “one true” History with a capital “H”
through the analysis of school curricula politics in Britain, the United States,
Germany and Japan in the 1980s.33 In his monographs, David Lowenthal in turn
has described how “the past has become a foreign country” in the modern world
where people are familiar with their heritage instead of their past. The history
culture is about the physical preservation of antiquity. Basing his argumentation on
empirical examples, Lowenthal sees the ”heritage industry” as part of identity-
building and identification with groups.34 Raphael Samuels shares this perspective
in ”Theatres of memory”, where he shows how historical memory is not only part
of a country’s heritage industry, but also part of its architecture and commercial
culture.35
While Füredi, Lowenthal and Samuels have concentrated mainly on theoretical
argumentation with some practical examples, German and Scandinavian scholars
have shown the way towards broader empirical studies on what has been called
history culture, and thereby opened new, broader research directions in history
didactics and history research broaderly. These studies have provided, among other
things, examples of possible research objects within the field of history research.
Systematic approaches, however, have thus far been few. In Sweden, an anthology
was recently published which consisted of empirical studies on history culture, and
dealt with such topics as museums, architecture and historical novels.36 In Denmark
a research project aimed for broader understanding of how the past constructs
32
See articles in Journal of Contemporary History. Special Issue: Redesigning the Past. 1/38. The great interest in
topics related to the use of history and history politics is also evident when looking at recent MA thesis topics in the
departments of political history in Finland.
33
Füredi 1992.
34
Lowenthal, David 1985. The Past is a foreign country. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Lowenthal, David
1998. Heritage crusade and the spoils of history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
35
Samuels, Raphael 1994. Theatres of Memory. Volume 1: Past and Present in Contemporary Culture. 3rd edition.
London: Verso.
36
Aronsson (ed.) 2000.
27
many significant channels, arenas and institutions. 37 Characteristic of both of these

projects has been an understanding of history culture as a broad and many-sided
phenomenon. The works of Birgitta Svensson on the construction of landscapes
may also belong to the scope of history culture.38 In Germany, history culture has
been analysed, for instance, through museums, exhibitions, television, newspapers,
literature, theatre and tourism.39
According to Aronsson, cultural geography in Finland and in the US, and
anthropology, ethnology and sociology more generally, have concentrated on topics
relevant to history culture. However, Aronsson also mentions that historians’
distance from non-academic history culture has discouraged analysis of historical
novels, films or the didactical purposes of museums and schools even though the
role of general history culture has over the last decade (1990s) become more
significant and important in international history research.40 In Finland, Sirkka
Ahonen has called for historians’ interest for empirical research on history culture
and the reception of history.41 Ahonen’s own work in the field appears as part of
the reception studies.
Jorma Kalela and Seppo Hentilä in turn have dealt with issues related to the
societal role of history and history writing. Hentilä’s research interests include
German historiography and history discussions during and after the cold war.
Kalela has concentrated more on discussing the meanings and understanding of
“history” among history scholars.42 The departments of political history at the
Universities of Helsinki and Turku have joint their efforts in what has been called
”future orientated history” (FOH). This FOH-collaboration has resulted in the
publication in 2001 of collection of articles. Those articles approach history as a
part of daily life from several perspectives. Hentilä’s discussion on German history
politics and the holocaust, and Salmi’s analysis of the role of public history both
resemble this research project’s understanding of the role of history.43
Political changes in former socialist Europe have led scholars’ growing interest
in the uses and role of history in politics in these countries in transition. In the
former Yugoslavian context, a conference took place in Sarajevo in November 2002
which concentrated on historical myths of Balkan societies.44 Serbian historical
37
Bryld, Claus, Floris, Lene, Handesten, Lars et. al. 1999.
38
See e.g. Svensson, Birgitta 1997. Vardagsmiljöer och söndagskulisser. Landskapets naturliga förflutenhet och
culturella samtid. In: Saltzman, Katarina and Svensson, Birgitta (ed.) 1997. Moderna landskap: identifikation och
tradition i vardagen. Stockholm: Natur ocn kultur. 21-44.
39
Füssmann, Klaus, Grütter, Heinrich Theodor and Rüsen, Jörn (ed.) 1994. Historische Faszination.
Geschichtskultur heute. Köln, Weimar and Wien: Böhlau.
40
Aronsson 2000, 15.
41
Ahonen 2000.
42
Hentilä 1994, Hentilä, Seppo 1998. Historian julkinen käyttö. In: Tieteessä tapahtuu 5/1998. 5-9; Kalela 2000.
43
Hentilä, Seppo 2001b. Historiapolitiikka – Holocaust ja historian julkinen käyttö. In: Kalela, Jorma and Lindroos,
Ilari (ed.) 2001. Jokapäiväinen historia. Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura. 26-49; Salmi 2001.
44
Relevant conference papers for this research included Agičić, Damir 2002. Bosna je...naša! Mitovi i stereotipi o
državnosti, nacionalnom i vjerskom identitetu te pripadnosti Bosne u novijim udžbenicima povijesti. Unpublished
conference paper. “Balkan societies in change: The use of historical myths” -conference 7-9 November 2002,
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Aleksov, Bojan 2002. View on Religious Conversions in Shaping the Serbian
28
myths and propaganda have been of particular interest to several scholars.45

Carlmichael discussed historical myths and the uses of history in the entire Balkan
context in her examination of the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing with emphasis
on the contemporary period.46 In Finland, PhD candidate Ranya Paasonen is
currently preparing her dissertation on the use of history in politics in post-
Yugoslav Croatia in the 1990s.47 In his dissertation in social politics Heino
Nyyssönen discussed the presence of 1956 in the politics of post-1956 Hungary
after. The dissertation studied mainly newspaper articles, but also included some
school textbooks and political documents. With the extensive amount of data,
Nyyssönen managed to show how the interpretation of 1956 was significant in
different ways in various periods between 1956 and 1991.48 Swedish historian
Kristian Gerner has dealt with the political role of history in Russia, the Baltic states
and the counties around the Eastern Sea.49 In the Western context, Aronsson has
mentioned Bo Stråth’s analysis on the rhetoric used when Sweden joined the
European Union. Related historical memory was used as part of the rhetoric by
applying the concepts “folk’s home” and “neutrality” to the rhetoric.50
The works presented in previous paragraphs are relevant due to their exemplary
nature in studying mediation and public presentations of history in a modern
society. Of particular importance is the understanding of the variety of research
objects when studying the role of history within society.
Despite the few mentioned works on Serbian historical myths and the like,
studies concentrating on the use of history or the history of concepts in the former
Yugoslavian context have been few and mainly concentrated on the historiography
of Yugoslavia and its successor states as one form of using history for political
National Consciousness. Unpublished conference paper. “Balkan societies in change: The use of historical myths” -
conference 7-9 November 2002, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Antić, Ana 2002. Evolution and the role of the
three clusters of historical myths in Serbian academic and public opinion in the past decade. Unpublished conference
paper. “Balkan societies in change: The use of historical myths” -conference 7-9 November 2002, Sarajevo, Bosnia
and Herzegovina; Kolsto, Pål 2002. Assessing the role of historical myths in modern societies. Unpublished
conference paper. “Balkan societies in change: The use of historical myths” -conference 7-9 November 2002,
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
45
Judah, Tim 1997. The Serbs. History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press; Anzulović, Branimir 1999. Heavenly Serbia. From Myth to Genocide. New York: New York
University Press; Cohen, Philip J. 1996. Serbia’s Secret War Propaganda and the Deceit of History. Texas: A&M
University Press.
46
Carlmichael, Cathie 2002. Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans. Nationalism and the destruction of tradition. London
and New York: Routledge.
47
See ElRamly, Ranya 2001. Historian käyttö Kroatian parlamenttivaaleissa – tapaus Cetverored. In: Kalela, Jorma
and Lindroos, Ilari (ed.) 2001. Jokapäiväinen historia. Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura. 50-62.
48
Nyyssönen, Heino 1999. The Presence of the Past in Politics. ’1956’ after 1956 in Hungary. Jyväskylä: SoPhi.
49
See e.g. Gerner, Kristian 2002. Ambivalence or Polyvalence? History, Memory and Reconciliation in North
Central Europe. Europe’s New Scripts seminar. 16-18th May 2002. University of Helsinki. (this presentation 16th
May 2002); Gerner, Kristian, Karlsson, Klas-Göran and Hammarlund, Anders (ed.) 2002. Nordens Medelhav:
Östersjöomradet som historia, myt och projekt. Stockholm: Natur och kultur.
50
Aronsson (ed.) 2000, 25.
29
purposes.51 As part of most of the works relating to former Yugoslavia, however,

phenomena related to the use of history are referred to as part of the story.
2.3 Textbook Research

Despite the few mentioned examples of new empirical approaches to public
presentations and mediation of history as a research topic, school textbook and
curricula research remains the most established and practised form of empirical
research within the field. This was demonstrated at a publication of presentations
held in the didactical sessions of the International Congress of Historical Sciences
in 2000; the 18 presentations either dealt with the general theoretical level
discussion or were based on conclusions drawn from the curricula and textbooks, or
both.52
Inspired by the League of Nations history textbook research started as textbook
revision already after the First World War. The International Textbook Institute in
Braunschweig was established after the Second World War, and in the course of
time ”international textbook revision has developed into a scientific discipline called
textbook research”. According to Pekkala the research has become characteristically
interdisciplinary, practised by historians, geographers, social scientists and
educationalists.53
The successor of the International Textbook Institute in Braunschweig, the
Georg Eckert Institute, is today the centre for international textbook research.54
The institute arranges seminars, publishes books and the quarterly journal
”Internationale Schulbuchforschung - International Textbook Research” with
articles on empirical studies. Since 1992 they have also published annually the
Unesco newsletter for the international textbook research network. In recent years,
papers and studies published by the Eckert Institute have included plenty of
material related to Southeast Europe since the Institute has been involved in the
Working group for history teaching within the Stability Pact for South Eastern
Europe.55 The inclusion of history teaching as a working group into the framework
of the Stability Pact has meant several small-scale activities in the form of seminars,
51
Magas, Branka 2000. Writing and rewriting history in Yugoslavia and after. Talk delivered at the conference at
Nancy in early May 2000. Published in Bosnia Report, Bosnian Institute. New Series No. 17/18. July-September
2000, 38-39; Banac, Ivo 2002. The Weight of False History. In: Jones, Fransis R. and Lovrenović, Ivan (ed.) 2002.
Reconstruction and Deconstruction. Forum Bosna culture–science-society-politics quaterly review. 15/02. 200-206.
In the Bosnian context, the only scientific journal published by the International Forum of Bosnia has appeared since
1998. Many articles have touched upon the issues that are part of the presence of history but none of the analyses has
dealt with the use of history or conceptual history.
52
53
Pekkala 1999, 29.
54
Pekkala 1999, 10-31.
55
For information on the Stability Pact see: Special Co-ordinator for the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe.
Homepages of the Special Co-ordinator for the Stability Pact of South Eastern Europe in the internet:
<www.stabilitypact.org>. 12th May 2003.
30
research papers and the like. Another venue of activities related to history teaching
in Southeast Europe since 1999 has been the History Education Committee of the
Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE).
Unfortunately, the work of the history working group of the Stability Pact and
the History Education Committee of CDRSEE started only during this research
project. Thus, neither their work nor any of its plans were available during the
planning stage of this research. Therefore, I could not foresee the number of
publications and related activities on history teaching that were to appear. None of
the studies, however, overlaps with this research, though knowledge of the up-
coming activities in the planning stage of this research might have slightly
influenced the data analyses and their focus. Now I have only used the related
works as comparative materials. The advantage of the concentrated interest in
history teaching at the time of this research has been the opportunity to present the
results of the Youth and History survey in relevant Bosnian contexts.
From relevant scholarly works we can mention Croatian scholar Snjezana
Koren, who has analysed the presentation of minorities in Croatian history and
geography textbooks. In her presentation she also commented on the educational
system in Croatia and history teaching in general. Koren did not apply any
systematic method, but presented general ideas and examples of the books in her
short article.56 Koren focused on the presentation of the Serb minority in Croatia.
She argued that the curriculum insists on negative examples of Croatian-Serbian
relations, which then appears in the presentations of the Serbian minority in
Croatia. As the leading example of this type of presentation (underlining P.T.), she
mentioned an 8th grade history textbook by Ivo Perić – the only history textbook
for the 8th grade in Croatia from 1992 to 2000.57 This is precisely the textbook
Bosnian Croats used and which was analysed in this research.
Unimaginative methodology, which often leads to self-evident conclusions,
seems to be a common shortcoming in textbook research. Zoran Janjetović’s
presentation on national minorities and non-Slav neighbours in 74 Serbian
textbooks in the period 1918 to 2000 demonstrates this. The analysis was based on
20 central events/topics, which the author analysed from the minority perspective.
The self-evident conclusion of the analysis was that the presence of minorities is
“on the whole extremely meagre”.58 It is of course a valid conclusion, but with such
material Janjetović could perhaps have analysed more the style and content of the
presentations. Instead, the analysis was mainly on the “to be or not to be” -level.
I have come across two articles on Bosnian history textbooks in particular. One
failed to discuss the contents of the textbooks but summarized the general
56
Koren, Snježana 2001. Minorities in Croatian history and geography textbooks. In: Minorities in textbooks:
South-East Europe. International Textbook Research. 2/23. 183-199.
57
Koren 2001, 188.
58
Janjetović, Zoran 2001. National minorities and non-Slav neighbours in Serbian textbooks. Minorities in Croatian
history and geography textbooks. In: Minorities in textbooks: South-East Europe. International Textbook Research.
2/23. 201-214.
31
developments in history teaching after the war in Bosnia based on a Unesco

report.59 The other presented a quantitative analysis of history textbooks used
immediately after the Dayton agreement.60 From the situation presented by the
article on developments in history teaching and the quantitative summary of the
content of textbooks, the need to present and analyse history teaching in Bosnia
and Herzegovina was more clearly evident.
Heike Karge, coordinator of the Stability Pact activities on behalf of the Eckert
institute until 2002, has written several articles on recent history textbooks of the
former Yugoslavian countries (usually excluding Slovenia). Karge has analysed the
presentation of Europe in the textbooks and the ways the nations present their own
history and that of their closest neighbours.61 As material, Karge has typically used
all the existing textbooks from Croatia, Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Macedonia. Karge has usually analysed all the former Yugoslav countries together.
Thus the textbooks used in Bosnia, which come from three countries (Bosnia,
Serbia/Yugoslavia and Croatia), are not analysed from the perspective of being
textbooks used in Bosnia but generally as textbooks from former Yugoslavian
countries. This is not to suggest that Karge would not have great specific
understanding for the Bosnian case or that her approach would not have been
justified. It simply shows that there is also a need to look at the Bosnian case
separately, to analyse the textbooks used there from the very perspective that they
have been used as Bosnian textbooks.
The History Education Committee of Center for Democracy and
Reconciliation in Southeast Europe has published articles that have been presented
in their seminars and workshops in 1999–2000 in two large volumes. As the
workshops have sampled information regarding systems and textbooks in different
countries, the articles contain comparative analyses based on such information.
Actual textbook analyses were not part of the publications, which generally
emphasised the practical level and the development of practises.62 Some ideas and
conclusions of the articles can serve as a comparative in the discussions of this
research, although specific analyses on the Bosnian situation and schooling are
unavailable in the publications.
59
Low-Beer, Ann 2001. Politics, school textbooks and cultural identity: the struggle in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Minorities in Croatian history and geography textbooks. In: Minorities in textbooks: South-East Europe.
International Textbook Research. 2/23. 215-223.
60
Baranović 2001.
61
Karge, Heike 1999. Geschictsbilder im postjugoslawischen Raum. In: Dealing with Conflicts. International
Textbook Research. 4/21. 315-337; Karge, Heike 2000. Between euphoria, sober realisation and isolation – how
Europe is presented in the history textbooks of former Yugoslavian countries. Unpublished conference paper
presented at the international conference ”The image of Europe between globalization and national consciousness:
traditional concepts and recent developments in the teaching of history, geography and civic education in the
countries of the European Union, Eastern Europe and the Balkans”. Turin, May 2000.
62
Koulouri (ed.) 2001, Koulouri (ed.) 2002.
32
Other publications closely related to the projects organised by the Eckert

institute and CDRSEE have dealt with Serbian elementary school books63;
schoolbooks and ethnic stereotypes and violence in Southeast Europe64; the
reconciliation in Southeast Europe65; and the Images of the Other in high school
history textbooks in the Balkan countries66. Unfortunately I have not managed to
obtain all of these titles and some of them have been published in the course of the
research. Finally, Höpken has analysed the history education in relation to
integration and disintegration of Yugoslavia, thus providing the historical
dimension for textbook research in former Yugoslav countries.67
Together with the Georg Eckert Institute and the CDRSEE, one important
source of information and materials on schoolbook research relevant to this
research, but not specifically to South East Europe has been Euroclio, the European
Standing Conference History Teachers’ Associations. In 2001 history textbook
research was the theme of the Euroclio special newsletter, thus demonstrating that
such research has been considered important, particularly in the transitional
countries of Europe in the last decade.68 In that newsletter, Evaldas Bakonis focused
his study on peace and war in history textbooks in Russia, Lithuania and Britain
while Sirkka Ahonen analysed the treatment of sensitive topics in Finnish and
Estonian history textbooks.69 Both of these short presentations supported the design
of the analysis of the textbooks developed for this research.
Finally, a few of Dan Fleming’s older articles have also been relevant in shaping
this research from the point of view of using history textbooks as research material.
His investigations concentrated on the presentation of propaganda in US history
textbooks70, the presentation of nuclear war in American schoolbooks71, and the
differences in presentations of the Vietnam war in different times72. As the topics
reveal, Fleming’s works clearly concentrated on sensitive and societally central
63
Plut, Diana et. al. (ed.) 1994. Warfare, patriotism, Patriarchy: The Analysis of elementary school textbooks.
Belgrade: Centre for Anti-War Action & Association.
64
Höpken, Wolfgang (ed.) 1996. Öl ins Feuer? – Oil in Fire? Schulbucher, ethnische Stereotypen und Gewalt in
Sudosteuropa. Studien zur Internationalen Schulbuchforcshung, Vol 89. Hannover: Hahnsche Buchhandlung.
65
International Conference Thessaloniki, Association for Democracy in the Balkans (ed.) 1997. Culture and
Reconciliation in South-East Europe. Greece, June 26-29, 1997. Thessaloniki: paratiritis.
66
Balkan Colleges Foundation (ed.) 1998. The Image of the Other – Analysis of the High School Textbooks in
History from the Balkan Countries. Sofia: Balkan Colleges Foundation.
67
Höpken, Wolfgang 1997. History Education and Yugoslav (Dis-)Integration. In: Bokovoy, Melissa, Irvine, Jill A.
and Lilly, Carol S. (ed.) 1997. State-Society Relations in Yugoslavia 1945-1992. London: Macmillan. 79-104.
68
Euroclio bulletin nr. 14 –2001. The Learning and Teaching of History With a focus on Textbooks.
69
Bakonis, Evaldas 2001. Peace and War in history textbooks in the Baltic States and Russia. In Euroclio bulletin nr.
14 –2001. The Learning and Teaching of History With a focus on Textbooks. 32-35; Ahonen, Sirkka 2001.
Stereotypes of Peoples and Politics in Estonian and Finnish History Textbooks. In Euroclio bulletin nr. 14 –2001.
The Learning and Teaching of History With a focus on Textbooks. 25-28.
70
Fleming, Dan B. 1985. The Treatment of Propaganda in Selected Social Studies Texts. Social Education. 1/49.
53-57.
71
Fleming, Dan B. 1983. Nuclear War: What Do High School History Textbooks Tell Us? Social Education. 7/47.
480-484.
72
Fleming, Dan B. and Nurse, Ronald J. 1982. Vietnam Revised: Are Our Textbooks Changing? Social Education.
5/46. 338-343.
33
topics and their presentations in the history textbooks. Even if the style of the
articles is somewhat “enlightened 80s”, their basic idea about the importance of
history textbook construction from the societal point of view is closely related to
the assumptions of my research.
In Finland in the 1970s, Marjatta Hietala carried a Unesco project on Finnish
history textbooks which concentrated on such questions as ”how is
something/someone presented?” ”how are some central concepts defined?”, and
”how different definitions of policy can be interpreted?”.73 Ahonen has conducted
curricula and textbook research in Estonia and Eastern Germany.74 The latest
example of history textbook research in Finland is Leo Pekkala’s dissertation in
which he studied the appearance of Nordic countries in the British history
textbooks.75 Currently there are several PhD studies under way that discuss history
textbooks from the point of view of political and societal history, which
demonstrates the interest in such approaches.76 Internationally, Bodo von Borries
has recently analysed the presentation of the Third Reich in German history
textbooks since 1945.77
2.4 Reception Research

In comparison to the textbook research, which has a relatively long tradition,
empirical research in the field of history and history didactics on the reception of
history or on the teaching and learning of history has been rare. Norwegian
didactician Magne Angvik has noted the lack of empirical research on students’
relation to history.78 Therefore, the Youth and History research project, from which
this research also stems, has been considered very important in providing new types
of information and knowledge and introducing new inroads into the field of history
didactics.
73
Hietala, Marjatta 1982. Maailmankuva historian oppikirjoissa. Unescon kansainvälisyyskasvatussuosituksen
toteutuminen suomalaisissa lukion historian oppikirjoissa. Helsingin yliopiston historian laitoksen julkaisuja N:o 9.
Helsinki: Helsingin yliopiston monistuspalvelu, 9, 26, 31-33.
74
Ahonen, Sirkka 1992. Clio Sans Uniform. A Study of the Post-Marxist Transformation of the History curricula in
East Germany and Estonia 1986-1991. Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian toimituksia B:264. Helsinki: Suomalainen
Tiedeakatemia; Ahonen, Sirkka 1995. Representations of History as a Tool in Manipulating Collective Identity: the
Cases of Estonia and Eastern Germany around 1990. In: Uljens, Michael (ed.) 1997. European Identity in Change –
the Meeting between German, Russian and Nordic Educational Traditions. Österbottens högskola Pedagogiska
institutionen, Pedagogiska rapporter 10/1997. 110-121.
Ahonen 1992 and Ahonen 1995.
75
Pekkala 1999.
76
Eliisa Vähä at the University of Tampere is studying Russian history textbooks from 1950 to 1995 and their role in
building national identity. At the university of Helsinki, Laura Kauppila is studying the use of history as part of
adapting to the democratic system in the transitional countries, and Iira-Maria Ullgren is exploring the use of history
and history teaching in Finnish schools in the 1960s and 1970s.
77
Borries, Bodo von 2003. The Third Reich in German History Textbooks since 1945. In: Journal of Contemporary
History. Special Issue: Redesigning the Past. 1/38, 45-62.
78
Angvik, Magne 2001. Youth and History – An Important Subject for Empirical Research. In: Pellens, Karl, Behre,
Göran, Erdmann, Elisabeth, Meier, Frank and Popp, Susanne (ed.) 2001. Historical Consciousness and History
Teaching in a Globalizing Society. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 249.
34
Before the extensive Youth and History research project, a few smaller scale
studies were conducted using similar methods. Bodo von Borries, one of the central
figures in the planning of the Youth and History project, undertook a survey
among Western and Eastern German adolescents of their ideas on history.79
Together with Jörn Rüsen, von Borries conducted the pilot study for the Youth and
History research.80 The results of both studies suggested that the idea of a
comparative European survey was reasonable. As the Youth and History research
constitutes a central method of this research, the original study and its results will
appear here, but the principles of methodology and the conduction of the data
collection and analysis will appear elsewhere.
The Youth and History project started with the idea of undertaking an
empirical investigation of the historical consciousness and political attitudes of
adolescents. The leaders of the project concluded in the beginning: “…this cross-
cultural comparative study has been started in a situation where no common
theoretical concept of historical consciousness does exist.”81 The Youth and History
project group accepted, however, as its definition for historical consciousness the
idea of history being a complex connection of interpretations of the past,
perceptions of the present and expectations of the future.82
The Youth and History research was conducted in most countries of Europe
and in Israel in 1995–1996 and the main report was published in 1997.83 By 2001
almost 100 publications had been reported using the results of the main data
analyses in one form or another.84 This first empirical work in the field of European
historical consciousness proved that the concept was not so easy to investigate
through a survey. The research itself, however, provided many interesting results in
terms of patterns and structures in the answers of pupils. In his initial analysis,
Bodo von Borries concluded that Europe could be divided into three main areas
according to historical-political orientations. Those areas form when communities
define their character along two separate axes: traditionalism versus modernism,
and liberalism versus conservatism. Traditionalism means a tendency to
fundamentalism in terms of religion, nationalism and social values, whereas
modernism is seen as a commitment to democracy, individualism and
internationalism.85
In Finland, the Finnish national coordinator for the Youth and History survey,
Sirkka Ahonen analysed the Finnish results and explained them further by
collecting in-depth interviews with the pupils. To study the collective elements of
79
Borries, Bodo von 1992. Kindlich-jugendliche Geschichtsverarbeitung in West- und Ostdeutschland 1990: ein
empirisch vergleich. Pfaffenweiler: Gentaurus.
80
Borries, Bodo von and Rüsen, Jörn 1994. Geschichtsbewusstsein im interkulturellen Vergleich. Zwei empirische
Pilotstudien. Pfaffenweiler: Gentaurus.
81
Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A36.
82
Ibid.
83
Abgvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A and B.
84
Angvik 2001, 250.
85
Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A153-183, A213-216.
35
their historical consciousness, interviewed pupils were asked which historical events
and phenomena they identified themselves with, and what meanings they
attributed to those events and phenomena. The collective elements of the historical
narratives/stories of the pupils showed that the great national story continues to
serve as the basis for the historical thinking and historical identity of Finnish
youth.86
Of the former republics of Yugoslavia, the Youth and History research was
originally conducted in Slovenia and Croatia, yet from the beginning researchers
hoped that the study could be repeated in the other republics as well. It was
considered interesting and important to include other former Yugoslav republics as
well because they had recently undergone dramatic societal changes characterised by
extensive history discussions. The multi-national state structure and several
historical communities living in one country made Bosnia and Herzegovina
particularly interesting for the Youth and History research project.
In addition to the Youth and History survey, examples of reception and belief
research can be found at least in the publications of historically-orientated social
psychologists and educationalists in the United States who have studied contents
and ways to cope with history, beliefs held for history and general understanding of
history.87
History didactics as a field of history research does not yet exist in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. History research in the faculties of arts and political sciences mostly
emphasizes the traditional approach to history research. However, a few foreign
scholars have analysed history teaching in Bosnia mainly as part of larger projects
for Southeast Europe in recent years.88 The few Bosnian participants in the
activities of these groups have mainly been young history teachers or scholars with
little academic background or interest, which perhaps explains why the
participation has produced no academic studies. However, interest may increase
when the societal and economic situation improves to allow research work in the
future.
2.5 This Study and New Openings in History Research

Since the late 1960s we have seen how the scope of history research has expanded
both in terms of methods and in terms of research objects. In particular, during the
last 10 to 20 years historians have shown increasing interest in the problems of
contemporary society. Questions asked in Germany and elsewhere about the role of
history have created ground for this research as well. With the intensified presence
86
Ahonen 1998, 9, 199.
87
Several articles in Stearns, Seixas and Wineburg (ed.) 2000.
88
A didactically motivated survey on the effect of civic education on the attitudes and behavior of youth was also
conducted in Bosnia in 1999. Soule, Suzanne 2000. Beyond Communism and War: The Effect of Civic Education
on the Democratic Attitudes and Behavior of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Youth. Center for Civic Education,
Calabasas. Internet publication: <www.civiced.org/eval_bih.pdf>. 26th May 2003.
36
of ‘History’ in many countries as a result of the rise of nationalism in 1990s,

understanding the phenomena related to the use and influence of history has
become an important scholarly concern with increasing moral relevance.89 In this
historical context of history research, this research belongs to these “new histories”
with its pluralistic methodology and interest in the historical thinking of youth and
historical phenomena present in the society. Yet, as we have seen in the previous
presentation, it is also based on an older tradition in textbook research and the
history of concepts.
Previously presented works have also been relevant to this research for they
have provided methodological examples and tools. The developments described in
sections 2.1 and 2.2. create the background for the definitions of the central terms
of this research in the following chapter. Existing works also helped to formulate a
manageable and relevant research plan for these thesis and encouraged me to
combine traditions and methods in a way that has been done: the problems of the
original Youth and History study convinced me of the possibility of additional
analyses. The lack of connection between many textbook investigations and the
surrounding society on one hand, and the pupils studying those books on the other
hand, supported the idea of combining textbook analysis with the Youth and
History research and a more general presentation of the history culture. The
development towards a societally orientated approach in textbook research also
supported the idea of including a detailed school textbook analysis in this research.
The presentation of previous works relevant to this research also demonstrates
that the thematic of this research has hardly been approached in the Bosnian
context. The Youth and History survey was itself of seminal nature in most
European countries, and through the present research has a similar role in the
Bosnian context. School textbook analyses have usually concentrated on the
broader context of former Yugoslavia or Southeast Europe where Bosnia has been
only one of the countries analysed. One recent article analysed post-war textbooks
quantitatively. In contrast, this research concentrates on the Bosnian case only,
presenting the history education as a whole with detailed contentual textbook
analyses.
The tradition of Begriffsgesichte, history of concepts, supported the idea of
focusing on a few historically constructed concepts for analysis. All of the concepts
used as working tools in this research (war, peace, nation) were defined as part of
the Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland. According
to Richter, the German tradition has emphasised the diverse use of the historical
nature of concepts, thereby suggesting that they could be applied as part of
methodology as in this work.90
89
See Evans 2003, 11. Scholarly concern with the presence of history is not, however, a new phenomenon.
Discussions on historical consciousness and collective memory have existed for decades, as was shown in this chapter.
90
Richter, Melvin 1995. The History of Political and Social Concepts. A Critical Introduction. New York: Oxford
University Press, 4-5.
37
Previous works on historical phenomena from the present perspective have

pointed towards possible objects that can be included in the analysis of history
culture and the general mediation of history. The difficulties of collecting and
obtaining systematic data in the post-war Bosnian context have limited the
possibilities for the analyses of the presence of history, yet this study will be among
the first attempts to describe the contents of such topics as history culture, historical
consciousness and history politics within the post-war Bosnian context. Generally,
connecting the analyses of the school textbooks and the Youth and History survey
with the contextual understanding developed through the presentation of the
presence of history in Bosnian society and the interpretations of modern Bosnian
history has been central to this study.
The following chapter examines more closely the theoretical and
methodological choices of the paper and presents in detail the combination of
methods actually intended for this research.
38
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL SCOPE
3 Theoretical and Methodological Scope
This chapter presents the general theoretical and methodological principles behind
the understanding of this research and the materials used and concepts chosen for
the analyses of the research. First I will concentrate on the general theoretical
framework on which the entire research is based (3.1). Second, I define the history-
related concepts used in the analysis of the general presence of history (3.2). Third,
I present the idea of pluralistic methodology applied in this research (3.3). The
presentation concentrates on the discussion of nature and the possibilities of a
survey for, although it is widely used within social sciences, it is an uncommon
method in history research. Finally, I present the materials used and concepts
chosen for the main analyses (3.4).
3.1 Theoretical Choices

3.1.1 SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM
The fundamental understanding of social constructivism1 is that the conceptions,
concepts, beliefs and theories2 do not exist in a vacuum but rather as part of a social
setting3 which includes institutions, laws, media discussions and so forth.4
1
The traditional understanding of social constructivism is usually based on the seminal work “The Social
Construction of Reality” by Berger and Luckmann from 1966. In his analysis of social constructivism from the point
of view of the social sciences, Collin has criticised the idealist definition of Bergen and Luckmann and their followers,
which holds that reality is generated as the object of the human cognitive processes, and thus easily leads to
ontological relativism (failure to construct any reality). Instead, Collin suggests adopting a more moderate
constructivist view, which emphasises that social reality essentially involves human thought (meanings given by
people) as components and aspects of it, yet the reality is seen as having components which are not human products,
the reality is not only an object of human thought. See Collin, Finn 1997. Social reality. London and New York:
Routledge, 3, 22, 64-76, 219, 236. Two contemporary American philosophers, Searle and Hacking, also present such
a moderate constructivist view from the point of view of the social sciences. See Searle, John R. 1995. The
Construction of Social Reality. London: Penguin books. Hacking, Ian 1999. The Social Construction of What?
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harward University Press.
2
In the constructivist language the words ‘idea’ and ‘social fact’ have been used to describe these conceptions,
concepts, beliefs and theories. Hacking 1999, 22, Searle 1995, 11, 26, 41, 88-90, Collin 1997, 6, 185, 194, 233-
234.
3
For the social setting, constructivist analyses have used the word ‘matrix’. Hacking 1999, 10, 22, 31.
39
Historical constructivism represents one form or grade of social constructivism.

From the viewpoint of historical constructivism, concepts, beliefs, theories and so
forth are understood as historically constructed in the course of social processes.
The ideas have not come out from those processes inevitably but as random results
of historical events.5 In other words, the content of a concept 'war' as we
understand it has not appeared as part of a logical, self-evident historical process but
as a result of the unexpected and unpredicted turns of history.
Thus, the concepts analysed in this research, ideas of 'war', 'peace' and 'nation',
have been constructed through different social contexts in different times. The ideas
of the above-mentioned concepts in the 18th century were constructed in a quite
different social setting than that of the 20th century, and everything attached to the
ideas of war, peace and nation has in the course of time moulded our
understanding of the concepts. The development of the concept of 'historical
consciousness' presented in section 2.1 also presents a good example of the
historical construction of concepts strongly influenced and motivated by social
settings of differents times. The meaning of the concept in German history
discussions during the 1970s and 1980s differed from what we now understand of
historical consciousness in the former Eastern European context where it has been
found relevant.
Similarly the concept of the Second World War is a result of the complex social
context at the time it occurred and the different processes it has undergone in the
course of time based on new historical information and changing political
situations. The meanings of the concepts change substantially in time. For example,
the Second World War as a concept had a very different meaning in the official
socialist Yugoslavia than in Bosnian society in the 1990s. Thus, the concepts we are
analysing as part of the research are understood as historically constructed. We are
not, however, analysing the historical construction of the concepts war, peace and
nation in Bosnia in a classical sense of Begriffsgesichte (trying to establish what the
concepts have meant in different times), but rather analysing aspects and contents
of that construction in the light of the research materials. Historical construction of
concepts is one basic assumption of this research.
The idea of 'social facts' entails concepts, definitions, theories and so forth
which involve collective intentionality. Social facts are formed by agents within the
social settings. The definitions of the agents are understood as components of that
social setting, as forming part of it, and the agents thereby generate social facts.
Agents may include individuals, groups of people or collective agents such as
associations, societies, political parties and so forth.6
In the context of this research, the 8th graders who answered to the Youth and
History survey represent the agents. By analysing their answers related to the three
4
Hacking 1999, 22, 10, 31.
5
Hacking 1999, 19.
6
Collin 1997, 20, 191.
40
selected concepts, we study their understanding of those concepts; in other words,

the contents of the historically constructed concepts understood as social facts.
When studying the representations of the schoolbooks, we study the contents of the
social facts which the institutions have chosen to emphasise or even impose. The
function of the schoolbooks is to influence the social facts of the pupils. To this
end, the schoolbook is by nature more influential than other books. Given three
similar books of which one was selected to be a school textbook, that selected book
would certainly be much more powerful in generating social facts than would the
other two books for two reasons: First, as a school textbook, it would enjoy wider
readership; and second, schoolbooks are generally trusted. In fact, in the Youth and
History survey, Bosnian respondents reported great trust in their history
schoolbooks and in the stories of their teachers as presentations of history. In fact,
their trust in their teachers’ stories was the highest of all the Europeans, and for
trust in their books they shared the highest values with Scottish, Portuguese and
Norwegian youth.7
Thus from the constructivist point of view the purpose of the study is twofold:
firstly, history-related and historically constructed social facts that institutions
attempt to impose upon the pupils are studied thorough schoolbook analysis. The
division of the institutions (e.g. schools) into three provides an interesting starting-
point for such a perspective. Secondly, the contents of historically constructed
social facts are studied through the Youth and History survey. From this point of
view, the points of interest are the differences between Bosnians and other
countries, and differences between the Bosnian groups. In addition the
constructivist understanding of societal processes forms the background of the
analysis of the historical phenomena in Bosnian society (chapter five).
3.1.2 SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

Within the general framework of social constructivism, the approach and analyses
of this research utilise the approach or theory of social representations and its related
concepts. The social representations can be understood as forming one specific
group of social facts.
Conceptually, the idea of social representations has its origin in Émile
Durkheim’s idea of collective representations. The concept was used to differentiate
collective and individual thinking. Members of a collective were perceived as
sharing the representations related to their society: myths, traditions, legends,
science and religion. These representations defined their relation to time and place.
Such societal representations formed independent of individual members of the
community or society but emerged in the thinking and action of the members of
the community collectively. Thus, the representations served to explain the life of
the community. As the concept developed as part of the sociologist tradition, the
7
Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B44-B45 and Annex 3: Table 1.
41
main interest lay in the construction of such representations rather than in their
dynamics.8
Modern understanding of the concept of social representations in social
psychology is typically presented through the ideas developed by Serge Moscovici.
As social representations, he has understood a set of concepts, statements and
explanations, which are constantly created (or constructed) in the course of
communication in the changing reality. Social representations are characteristically
dynamic and require analysis themselves.9
The approach of social representations focuses on the tendency of communities
to turn something unfamiliar into something general and familiar. New
phenomena are compared to the things known and anchored to the matrix of old
conceptions and values. As an example, Moscovici mentioned the discussion on
AIDS in France in the 1980s; the new disease is described in the familiar rhetoric
and vocabulary of tuberculosis. In addition to such anchoring, two other
development processes of social representations can occur: Objectifying, or
comparing the unknown to something familiar (god is referred to as father); and
naturalisation, or the process in which new concepts and images become an
established part of the prevailing social reality. Previous research has shown that the
images, concepts and language shared by the group will always determine the angle
from which a group attempts to cope with the unfamiliar. The group’s memory and
past play a dominant role in these processes.10
Moskovici has emphasised that his approach of social representations is clearly
part of the constructionist view of social life, the process of social construction by
which a phenomenon (an idea, concept, image and so forth) integrates into the
social reality, and is thus defined and attached with attributes.11
As the approach of social representations has been developed as part of social
psychology, it has mainly been used in research on the actions of groups and
individuals confronted with new and unknown phenomena. Moscovici has
illustrated the ways social representations develop through discussions within
communities.12 The main interest has been in the process of creation of social
8
Moscovici, Serge 1981. On social representations. In: Forgas, Joseph P. (ed.) 1981. Social cognition: perspectives
on everyday understanding. London: Academic Press, 184-185; Moscovici, Serge 1984. The phenomenon of social
representations. In: Farr, Robert M. and Moscovici, Serge (ed.). Social representations. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 16-18; Pirttilä-Backman, Anna-Maija and Helkama, Klaus 2001. SERGE MOSKOVICI.
Sosiaaliset representaatiot. In: Hänninen, Vilma, Partanen, Jukka and Ylijoki, Helena (toim.) 2001.
Sosiaalipsykologian suunnannäyttäjä. Tampere: Vastapaino, 264-265.
9
Moscovici 1981, 181, Pirttilä-Backman and Helkama 2001, 265.
10
Moscovici 1981, 188-189, 193-203, Moscovici 1984, 23-43, Moscovici, Serge 1988. Notes Towards a
Description of Social Representations. European Journal of Social Psychology. 3/18, 234-235, Pirttilä-Backman and
Helkama 2001, 267.
11
Moscovici has not supported the idealist constructivist theory but rather the moderate understanding in which the
object exists by itself while the representation names it. Pirttilä-Backman and Helkama 2001, 269. See also foonote 2
above.
12
Moscovici 1981, 181, 189-190, 204.
42
presentations, and thereby developing the ideas of the approach.13 Moscovici has,
however, opened a door for the broader analysing possibilities as well. He has
emphasised how the representations can also be “found in the world” and examined
separately, as they are not located only in the minds of people. He has noted how
we can visit laboratories to investigate how the scientific community produces facts
and theories, which suggests that we could in a similar manner visit factories,
hospitals or schools to understand how communities produce their facts and
representations. Moscovici has suggested that social representation could be
envisaged as Vorstellungen and Darstellungen. The former refers to reflections of
what exists in people’s minds while the latter refers to practical public performances
and stagings of matters. Plays and ceremonies present examples of such
performances or staging that supply representations in which group of people can
recognise itself.14
Thus we can see schoolbooks or media or other products of history culture as
serving to establish communication from the point of view of social representations.
They are Darstellungen, to use Moscovici’s terminology. In this research I generally
study not the process or nature of construction of social representations, but rather
consider the process of their construction as an assumption, and instead focus on
the contents of the representations from two perspectives specified at the end of the
chapter. In addition, I address one aspect of the “laboratory” in which the social
representations are constructed when describing the prevailing history culture.
The approach of social representations is suitable for this study for several
reasons. In the words of Moscovici, it provides ”a heuristically rich concept able to
capture the essential significance of some constructivist processes in the current
society”.15 I understand this suggests that the approach can be applied to different
contexts in which its principle ideas are useful.
Moscovici has also noted how the character of social representations emerges
especially in times of crisis and upheaval, when a group is undergoing change.16 In
such situations communities suddenly need to anchor new concepts and
phenomena. The crisis and upheaval ring true for Bosnia and we can observe the
concepts ’war’, ’peace’ and ’nation’ as relatively unknown and unfamiliar concepts
in their present context but which suddenly became central as a result of crisis.
Therefore they have required anchoring, objectification and naturalization within
Bosnian society in the 1990s, and it is relevant to study the content of their social
representations. Similarly, studying the general “laboratory” (history culture, history
textbooks and so forth) in which the social representations are constructed is
interesting in a society which has undergone such societal upheaval.
13
Moscovici himself has emphasised how the conceptual thinking in this research field in his view does not really
form a consistent and strictly defined theory. Therefore rather than discussing a theory of social representations, he
emphasises the approach of social representations. Pirttilä-Backman and Helkama 2001, 271-272.
14
Moscovici 1988, 214, 224, 228.
15
Pirttilä-Backman and Helkama 2001, 272.
16
Moscovici 1984, 54.
43
The approach is also suitable for social representations are (as mentioned
previously) historical in their essence, and thus support the understanding of
historical constructivism.17 The dominating role of social memory has also been
received as a characteristic for social representations. Social memory is also an
important characteristic of the understanding of historical consciousness, a concept
central to this research, which will be defined in the following sub-chapter.
The approach of social representations has been applied in a variety of research
settings. It has been used in media content analysis, statistical analysis of word
associations, analysis of individualism and democracy in post-communist Europe,
surveys on economic expectations and psychological aspects and associations related
to the Euro, and in a study on the representations of children in texts and films in
different times (which focused on the analyses of attributes and functions attached
to the concept of “the child” in different times).18 Perhaps because of the
aforementioned social psychological tradition behind the approach, I have only
come across the approach of social representations among the historically oriented
studies in a survey on social representations of history among university populations
in Malaysia and Singapore.19
I have chosen the approach of social representations for this research because it
is well equipped to provide concepts for the analyses of the research. Schools and
school teaching can be understood as social institutions in a given social context in
a similar way that media has been seen as such a social institution mediating social
representations.20 The school textbooks mediate the social representations, thus
presenting ”official” explanations of concepts. They reflect the ideas that the three
Bosnian communities approved of or aspired to, or both. Young people are exposed
to these representations and can reject or internalise them as they anchor, objectify
and naturalise the concepts.21 The representations of schoolbooks illustrate the kind
of material available for these processes and which definitions of the concepts have
been adopted in the daily discussion.22 Thus, by studying the representations of
schoolbooks, we study and analyse the social representations of war, peace and
nation set forth in the nationally-divided Bosnian social context. I believe this
approach enables to capture more aspects of the textbooks than would a purely
discoursive text analysis.
17
Moscovici 1984, 68.
18
Wagner, Wolfgang, Duveen, Gerard, Farr, Robert, Jovchelovitch, Sandra, Markova, Ivana and Rose, Diana 1999.
Theory and method of social representations. Asian Journal of Social Psychology. 1/2: 95-125; Meier, Katja and
Kircher, Erich 1998. Social representations of the Euro in Austria. Journal of Economic Psychology. 6/19: 755-774;
Chombart de Lauwe, Marie-José 1984. Changes in the representation of the child in the course of social
transmission. In: Farr, Robert M. and Moscovici, Serge (ed.). Social representations. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. 185-209.
19
Liu, James H., Lawrence, Belinda and Ward, Colleen 2002. Social Representations of history in Malaysia and
Singapore: On the relationship between national and ethnic identity. Asian Journal of Social Psychology. 1/5: 3-20.
20
Chombart de Lauwe 1984, 202.
21
see Moscovici 1984, 185.
22
Pirttilä-Backman 2001, 266.
44
The works of Dan Fleming merits mention as an example of schoolbook

analysis utilising the approach of social representations, even though he himself did
not define the approach as such. In one of his studies Fleming analysed the
presentation of the nuclear war in history textbooks. The analysis dates from 1983
when nuclear war seemed an unfamiliar and new concept in need of anchoring.
Fleming summarised what was told about issues related to nuclear war, what was
stressed, and thereby, in fact, constructed the social representations the schoolbooks
held for nuclear war. As a result of the analysis Fleming concluded that the history
textbooks paid scant attention to nuclear war.23 Fleming’s analysis of the coverage
of the Vietnam war followed similar patterns but concentrated more on the truth-
objective dilemma than on the analysis of the nature of presentation.24
As previously mentioned, a general analysis of history culture will serve as an
analysis of one aspect of the “laboratory” in which social representations are
constructed in the post-war Bosnian context.
Lastly to the Youth and History survey from the viewpoint of the approach
social representations. The creation of social representation, as Moscovici argued
and observed, is assumed to have taken place in daily communications, and thus
when studying the survey analysis from the point of view of social representations
of war, peace and nation, we study the contents of those representations as they
appear in the survey-answers of the pupils. In other words, the pupil’s responses
show how they appear to have anchored the concepts and what seems to have
influenced that anchoring process. Moscovici has studied what is shared in the
conceptions and ideas, whereas I assume the contents of the conceptions and ideas
to be shared.
In many analyses of the Youth and History data, the idea of social
representation appears as part of the analyses even if it is not a specified approach.
The survey itself was designed to provide information about such concepts as
nation, Europe, immigration and democracy in the new situation of Europe in
which these concepts formed a new part of societal discussion in many participating
countries due to dramatic political upheavals.
3.2 Phenomena Related to the Presence of History

This sub-chapter brings us to the understanding of the field of history and history
research in the context of this research. If the theoretical background presented
previously is crucial for general understanding of the background assumptions and
for systematic conclusions, the following presentation defines the field in which the
research operates inside the discipline of history, thus presenting the context and
concepts of the analyses of the research. So from general historical constructivist
23
Fleming 1993.
24
Fleming 1982.
45
understanding we now move to definitions of certain phenomena understood based

on the theoretical background of social and historical constructivism.
The conceptual development in the field of history relating to such historical
phenomena as ’history culture’, ’historical consciousness’, and ’history politics’ was
presented in section 2.1. The definitions of this research of these concepts are
presented in the following. The phenomena are by no means isolated and can often
be understood simply as different perspectives of similar phenomena. Definitions
sketched, however, can then be applied to the analysis of Bosnian society (chapters
four and five) and in the conclusions of the research. The definitions of these
phenomena should illustrate an understanding of the ”presence of history”. The
concluding sub-chapter (3.2.4) portrays what the presence of history for this
research in the light of the concepts defined means.
We can start with a sketch that presents different historical phenomena used in
this research.
Figure 1: Historical Phenomena in the Present
TRACES OF PAST
HISTORY CULTURE
Usable culture: Stories:
ACADEMIC HISTORY RESEARCH
films, books, pictures, monu- family memories
ments, art, exhibitions, symbols, ’small narratives’
schoolbooks, museums, build- ’grand narratives’
ings, games, ceremonies, songs
HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Collective/social memory: Existential dimensions:
conceptions, representations, perceptions of the present,
interpretations of the past expectations for the future

orientation in time, connection
with past in the present situation,
constructing past for present needs
HISTORY POLITICS
active intentional use of history
=influence =influence & making use of
.sas
46
At the top of the sketch we have traces of the past. Following the definition of some
Finnish historians, I use the word ”trace” here instead of the traditionally used
”source”, for the expression ”historical source” easily implies that the past would
establish some definite sources of itself. Therefore some historians have emphasized
the idea that the past leaves an uncountable number of traces for a historian to find
in the present, and only when the traces are used in history research do they
become historical sources.25
3.2.1 HISTORY CULTURE

The sketch shows academic history research as a fundamental way to relate to the
past. Despite differences in methods, principles and styles in different times,
interpreting the traces of history – whether traces of ideas, events, concepts or styles
– is the main focus of academic history research. In contrast to academic history
research, history culture presents a form of relating to the past that includes all the
people in a society. It is not a professional relation with the past, but a relation
expressed through a daily culture of a society.
History culture (Geschichtskultur) as a concept became part of the history
discussions in Germany in the 1980s, and therefore German use of the content of
the concept has greatly influenced it. Based on the German tradition, Hentilä has
defined history culture as the arena/forum for the use of history. History culture is
considered that part of the culture where people face the past and try to come to
terms with it. It includes mechanisms and avenues where knowledge about the past
can be produced, transmitted, presented, used and experienced within a society. As
a good example of the broad nature of history culture, Hentilä refers to the
”Historische Faszination”, a collection of articles about different examples of history
culture: history in pictures, cartoons, videos, films, novels, museum presentations,
contemporary political debates, political practises, historical exhibitions, television,
people’s own histories, theatre, tourism, advertising and so forth.26 Thus, the
experience industry turns the past into products. In Germany, history culture has
typically been a very political concept for it has appeared to the public in particular
as part of the Holocaust problem.
In the Anglo-Saxon world, the term ”public history” has been used to define
such history culture which includes popular culture and its ways of retelling the
past. Public history as a term is not so politically loaded as is the German
expression. For instance, Hannu Salmi has emphasized how the German term
”Geschichtskultur” has referred to ways by which images and knowledge of the past
were produced and used, how the past was maintained through school teaching,
museums, archives and exhibitions. In Salmi’s view ”Geschichtskultur” carries a
very strong societal and political dimension in Germany and therefore the content
25
See e.g. Kettunen, Pauli, Kultanen, Auli and Soikkanen, Timo (ed.) 2000. Jäljillä. Kirjoituksia historian
ongelmista. Osat 1-2. Turku: Kirja-Aurora; Kalela 2000.
26
Hentilä 2001b, 32. Füssman, Grütner and Rüsen (ed.) 1994.
47
of the term ”public history” in his view better suits what should be understood by
history culture.27
I do not, however, find the differentiation between the terms necessary; history
culture can be defined to include popular culture ALSO, yet retain its original
(German) characteristics. Therefore, I use Peter Aronsson’s definition of history
culture as a ”collective concept for meaning-carrying artefacts and stories”.28
Judging from articles in his book about history culture, Aronsson considers such
artefacts as films, monuments, buildings, books and so forth, as well as stories that
are collectively present in the society (such as grand narratives of a nation or smaller
narratives of different minorities).
Jorma Kalela has defined historical phenomena not as research objects but as
contextual elements of the work of history researchers. Even though the perspective
differs, the definitions appear to resemble those of Aronsson. For example, Kalela
has analysed the conceptions/images of history (“historiakuvat”) that have two main
sources. Firstly, ”the public presentations of history” (“historian julkiset esitykset”)
as a source of conceptions of history seem to carry a notion in Kalela’s language
similar to that of Aronsson’s ”meaning-carrying artefacts”; they include novels,
films, TV programs, art, advertisements, music, political speeches, school books,
museums, memorials and the like. Secondly, ”folk history” (“kansanomainen
historia”) as a source of conceptions of history for Kalela consists of views and ideas
told and adopted at home, at work and in other communities; a kind of history that
”is around”.29 I understand Kalela’s meaning is same as Aronsson’s ”meaning-
carrying stories”. Thus, I see Kalela’s definitions as sub-categories of history culture
(which Aronsson also defined as a collective concept). Following this
conceptualisation, history culture functions as a source of conceptions of history.
Sirkka Ahonen has argued similarly by defining history culture as an
”operating/usable culture”, meaning a historically loaded culture that is easy to
approach, a culture that people can face in their daily lives such as books, films,
monuments, museums, buildings, pictures, photographs, plays and so forth.30
In this research history culture serves as a ”form of relating to the past”. History
culture is characterised by its many-sided nature and appearance within the society.
27
Salmi 2000. About German definitions of the concept see e.g. Rüsen, Jörn 1994b. Was ist Geschichtskultur?
Überlekungen zu einer neuen Art, über Geschichte nachzudenken. In: Füssmann, Klaus, Grütter, Heinrich Theodor
and Rüsen, Jörn (ed.) 1994. Historische Faszination. Geschichtskultur heute. Köln, Weimar and Wien: Böhlau. 3-
26; Füssmann, Klaus, 1994. Historische Formungen. Dimension der Geschischtsdarstellung. In: Füssmann, Klaus,
Grütter, Heinrich Theodor and Rüsen, Jörn (ed.) 1994. Historische Faszination. Geschichtskultur heute. Köln,
Weimar and Wien: Böhlau. 27-44; Grütter, Heinrich Theodor 1994. Warum fasziniert die Vergangenheit?
Perspektiven einer neuen Geschichtskultur. In: Füssmann, Klaus, Grütter, Heinrich Theodor and Rüsen, Jörn (ed.)
1994. Historische Faszination. Geschichtskultur heute. Köln, Weimar and Wien: Böhlau. 45-57.
28
Aronsson 2000, 19.
29
Kalela 2000, 37-39, Kalela, Jorma 2001. Historiantutkimus ja jokapäiväinen historia. In: Kalela, Jorma and
Lindroos, Ilari (ed.) 2001. Jokapäiväinen historia. Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 17-18.
30
Ahonen, Sirkka 2002. ”Historiakulttuuri, historiantutkimus ja nuorten historiatietoisuus” (History culture, history
research and the historical consciousness of youth). Oral presentation at the Finnish Historical Society (Suomen
historiallinen Seura) 25th March 2002.
48
Aronsson uses the terms ”meaning-carrying artefacts and stories” when describing
the content of the history culture. We could also discuss ”usable culture” (Sirkka
Ahonen) or ”public presentations of history” combined with ”folk/popular history”
(Jorma Kalela). Crucially important is the understanding that history culture exists
within society in several forms and ways as part of the culture, that history culture
emerges through a group of channels from state approved memorials and curricula
to the sphere of cultural institutions, architecture and mass consumption.31
Hentilä defined history culture as ”the forum/arena where history can be used”.
It is important, however, to emphasize that the idea of ”using history” here serves
only as a tool for understanding, not as a condition for history culture. History
culture appears as a collective concept for all kinds products and narratives through
which history exists in the daily culture, regardless of whether one can detect active
and intentional attempts ”to use history”. In the sketch, some products, which are
part of the history culture, are mentioned to serve as examples of what is considered
to belong to the field of history culture. The product-nature of history culture is
essential; we are talking about usable cultural products and commonly held stories
(e.g. myths) of the society or smaller groups that embody the history culture of a
society.
In a way, history culture can be understood as opposite to academic history
research; history culture can be defined to include all public forms of relating to the
past except academic history research. In the Nordic context, for example, it has
been noted how history research and historians played an important role in
building and legitimising cultural heritage in previous periods. In the post-modern
situation, however, a great part of history culture develops outside the institutional
frame defined by politicians and scientists as confidence in authorities and scientists
has diminished among those who create products of history culture.32 Such a post-
modern reality, however, does not apply to Bosnia, as chapter five demonstrates.
On the other hand, history culture could also influence academic research, not
just the other way around. By showing interest in the prevailing history culture and
its forms, academic history research can function as a kind of controller and
corrector in post-modern times as well. Should there be common understandings or
interpretations of the past within history culture opposite to what is understood
among professional historians, knowledge of it could foster a more balanced and
rational history culture. In other words, researchers could determine how history
culture functions and attempt to influence it with their understanding.33
History culture can of course be analysed in different ways. We can be
interested in different forms of history culture that seem central in different
31
Aronsson 2000, 28.
32
Aronsson 2000, 11, 15. See also Braembussche, Antoon A Van den 2000. History and memory – Some comments
on recent developments. In: Kettunen, Pauli, Kultanen, Auli and Soikkanen, Timo (ed.) 2000. Jäljillä. Kirjoituksia
historian ongelmista. Osa 1. Turku: Kirja-Aurora, 81.
33
Jorma Kalela has argued about the importance of the surrounding history culture and its mechanisms and
influence among professional historians. See Kalela 2000, 37.
49
societies, or in the changes in history culture over time. The history culture can also
be evaluated. For example, Hentilä has briefly evaluated the history culture of
Germany as open and able to handle its difficult and painful past. Hentilä sees such
openness as one of the fundamental conditions for democratic development. In his
view, an increase in the stability of democracy means more critical, open and
permissive history culture. Such history culture is also able to tolerate disagreements
and conflicts.34
3.2.2 HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Definitions of the other main concept of the sketch, historical consciousness
(historische Bewusstsein), have varied among scholars within Europe. The most
commonly held definition among German and Scandinavian scholars35 has
characterised historical consciousness as ”a complex connection of interpretations of
the past, perceptions of the present and expectations of the future”.36 Following this
definition, Sirkka Ahonen has described her understanding of historical
consciousness as ”the rational way in which humans are connected with
temporality” thus echoing the modern understanding of time.37 Similarly, in his
analysis about history culture, Peter Aronsson states ”from knowing of both or one
of the parts of history culture (production side or reception side), the researcher can
construct historical consciousness, namely the sense through which a certain
concrete understanding builds up a general conception as to how the past is
connected with (his/her own) present and the possible future”.38
Historical consciousness can help to orientate oneself in time; knowing and
understanding the past can help to comprehend the present and influence future
expectations. Thus historical consciousness is the way people and communities deal
with the past in order to understand the present and future. Historical
consciousness links the past and the future, and can construct a sense of continuity.
Braembussche has defined historical consciousness slightly differently and with
more critical connotation. He has emphasised the role of the present in his
definitions for historical consciousness; people are reminded of past experience
through its presence in the current situation. Historical consciousness may also
illustrate how an individual or a community attempts to deal with the past in the
current situation. For Braembussche, historical experience is about attempting to
reconstruct the past, while historical consciousness constructs the past because of
the present. Thus historical consciousness “forgets” parts of the historical
34
Hentilä 2001b, 47-48.
35
See e.g. Rüsen 1983, 1986, 1989, 1994 a/b, 1996, Jeismann, Karl-Ernst 1988. Geschichtsbewusstsein als zentrale
Kategorie der Geschichtsdidaktik. In: Schneider, Gerhard (ed.) 1988. Geschichtsbewusstsein und historisch-
politisches Lernen. Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus. 1-24, Behre/Norborg 1985 (quoted in Angvik and von Borries (ed.)
1997, A36).
36
Angvik and von Borries 1997, A22, A36.
37
Ahonen 2002.
38
Aronsson 2000, 19.
50
experience. This forgetting can lead to historical traumas when people are faced
with a difficult situation (e.g. the holocaust). According to Braembussche, historical
consciousness should not “forget” possible traumas but instead work them out. If
historical traumas are not worked out, the memory of the traumas has a tendency
to become mythical and objects of taboo-formation.39
As part of the construction of historical consciousness, we can discuss socially
constructed representations understood as previously argued in this chapter. As
such, I see for example the conceptions of history individually or collectively held
passive; sometimes even unconscious ideas of the past. Conceptions of history are
part of the process of constructing historical consciousness.40 From different
perspectives, Hentilä and Kalela both define the conceptions through the use of
history as views and opinions that can direct and activate the use of history.41
Memory can be considered an integral part of the historical consciousness.
French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs emphasised the collective nature of memory
as early as in the 1920s and 1930s. In more recent times, social memory has often
replaced the concept of collective memory to emphasise the idea that an individual
does not passively obey some collective will. For social memory, the current
situation is crucial; recalled past experiences and shared historical memories are of
particular importance to the constitution of social groups in the present. Memories
are not retrieved from past experiences but rather reconstituted by the social groups
in which we presently participate. Thus, the social context appears to have
determinant significance in framing the contents of social memory as part of
historical consciousness.42
From the social nature of memory, it follows that social memory can be
considered an expression of collective experience; social memory identifies a
group.43 For the understanding of this research it is also important to see social
memory as connected to learnt culture as well as to media. All sorts of things
(politicians, debaters, museums, architecture, traditions, family stories, everyday
institutions, etc.) leave their mark on historical consciousness.44 Thus, school
textbooks are considered manifestations of history to be learnt.
This social understanding of memory in the context of this research does not
imply that memory has no subjective character. It is naturally part of people’s
cognitive apparatus, but in the context of this research its social character is the
centre of attention.
39
Braembussche 2000, 76, 80, 84, 87-88.
40
Lindroos, Ilari 2001. Historiankäsityksistä: Suomalaiset sosiaalipolitiikan tutkijat, hyvinvointivaltiollinen kehitys ja
historian jatkuvuus. In: Kalela, Jorma and Lindroos, Ilari (ed.) 2001. Jokapäiväinen historia. Helsinki: Suomalaisen
kirjallisuuden seura, 121-122.
41
Kalela 2001, 19-21, Hentilä 2001b, 33.
42
Fentress and Wickham 1992, x-xii, Hutton, Patrick 1999. Mentalities, Matrix of Memory. In: Ollila, Anne (ed.)
1999. Historical Perspectives on Memory. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 84-85. In contrast, Lowenthal, who
has written extensively on history and memory, has separated the two and defined memory as an individual capacity
validating personal identity, while the enterprise of history is crucial to social preservation. Lowenthal 1985, 213.
43
Fentress and Wickham 1992, 25.
44
Aronsson 2000, 11, 15.
51
Both academic history research and history culture influence historical

consciousness through the selection of memory. Maximal influence of academic
history research on historical consciousness has traditionally been considered
desirable. Recently, however, a growing number of historians has accepted that the
influence of different conceptions of history (constructed as a result of more than
just history research) on historical consciousness is not necessarily negative.45 Some
have argued that history culture generally has greater influence on the historical
consciousness than does academic history research.46
In conclusion, historical consciousness with all its characteristics and
expressions represents part of the receptional relations with history and history
culture, while history culture and academic history research represent the
productional relation with history.
3.2.3 HISTORY POLITICS

The third main concept of the sketch, history politics, is not a form of relating to the
past but rather a societal phenomenon characterised by the interests and aims that
direct the use of history in a society. Similarly to history culture (Geschichtskultur),
history politics (Geschichtspolitik) as a concept entered the vocabulary of historians
in the 1980s as part of the history debate in Germany. Habermas introduced the
concept to refer to those conservative historians who in his opinion had used their
professional skills, knowledge and positions for political interests when attempting
to explain Nazi Germany not as part of ”normal” German history, but as an ”Asian
act” which followed Stalin’s persecutions. Hentilä’s definition of history politics
emphasizes the necessarily active and conscious nature of history politics; the use of
history for certain purposes is intentional.47 Therefore, the schoolbooks analysed in
this research can be considered both part of history culture and a form of history
politics.
In this research, history politics is based on Hentilä’s definition: the use of
history for certain purposes. History politics is about using the results of history
research, commonly held ideas and conceptions of history or products of history
culture to support and legitimise certain arguments and aims in the current
situation.
Note that this definition includes the possibility of ”positive” or ”good” history
politics, for the purposes of using history can also be considered positive. Hentilä
provides a German example of this: a special law forbidding ”Auschwitz lies” aims
to eliminate Nazi propaganda and carries a penalty fee or even a prison term as
45
Kettunen, Pauli 2002. Historian läsnäolo. Suomen Historiallinen Seura [Finnish Historical Society]. Jäsentiedote
2/2002. Kettunen also discusses the general relation between politics and history, which does not depend on history
research on politics. See Kettunen, Pauli 1990. Politiikan menneisyys ja poliittinen historia. In: Ahtiainen et al. (ed.)
1990. Historia Nyt. Näkemyksiä suomalaisesta historiantutkimuksesta. 163-207.
46
Kalela 2000, 39-43, Aronsson 2000, 15.
47
Hentilä 2001b, 33, Habermas, Jürgen 1987. Eine Art Schadensabwicklung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 137-
148.
52
punishment (behind the law is the neo-nazi claim that mass persecutions of Jews
never occurred and that the Jews and the winners of the Second World War created
the lie of the Holocaust to humiliate Germany and the Germans).48 Even if one
understands the objectives of German authorities, it is questionable whether such
history politics represents a form of censorship within a society unable to tolerate
sensitive political views. The negative use of history, negative history politics, have
recently been analysed most typically in connection to nationalism.
The definitions for history politics here should not be confused with the
general political dimension of history research. I fully share Pertti Anttonen’s view
of the political relation between the past and present, as it always includes
interpretation, argumentation, manipulation and rhetoric.49
In relation to history culture and historical consciousness, history politics can
be understood as a second level category, which makes use of different forms of
relating to history (history culture, historical consciousness, academic history
research) because of political interests and purposes. Thus, history politics can be
seen as an overall concept that includes history culture and historical consciousness.
3.2.4 THIS RESEARCH AND THE PRESENCE OF HISTORY

the historical phenomena described and defined above form the fundamental
understanding of this research. As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter,
history culture, historical consciousness and history politics are not to be
understood as isolated or separate phenomena but as part of the understanding that
can be characterised as the ”presence of history” in society.50 They are separated
here only to enable more systematic analyses in the following chapters.
The understanding of the past as leaving innumerable traces that historians
transform into historical sources is the underlying assumption when presenting the
features of modern Bosnian history (chapter four). Historians’ interpretations of the
traces they have used as sources have been combined, with an emphasis on the
selection of materials used from the extensive number of possibilities as this chapter
later illustrates.
The definition of history culture as a productional form relating to the past
through meaning-carrying artefacts and stories, which are part of the usable culture,
form the frame of the analysis of the prevailing history culture in Bosnian society
(chapter five). Meaning-carrying artefacts form the central part of the presentation,
and the idea of history culture existing within the society in all kinds of forms,
provides the opportunity to analyse Bosnian society from a broad angle. To deepen
the analysis, we use school history textbooks as products of history culture to
analyse the representations that are part of Bosnian history culture. The
48
Hentilä 2001b, 48.
49
Anttonen, Pertti 2000. Menneisyyden politiikka. In Kettunen, Pauli, Kultanen, Auli and Soikkanen, Timo (ed.)
2000. Jäljillä. Kirjoituksia historian ongelmista. Osa 2. Turku: Kirja-Aurora, 11.
50
Kettunen 2002.
53
representations of school textbooks and general features of prevailing history culture

will also be discussed together.
Historical consciousness was understood both as collective and individual
phenomena; we can discuss historical consciousness as a characteristic of a society or
community and as a characteristic of individuals. As a definition for this research,
the social nature of historical consciousness was emphasised, thus opening room for
discussion of history-related attitudes and views present in Bosnian society. Chapter
five emphasises the radical change of conceptions officially supported as part of the
historical consciousness in pre- and post-war years. The idea that social memory,
determined by the social context (e.g. the prevailing history culture), influences
historical consciousness leads to a discussion of the nature of history culture’s
influence on historical consciousness in Bosnian society. The idea of historical
consciousness is most central to the Youth and History survey analysis (chapter
seven) where the connection between the past, present and future serves as an
underlying principle. Thus the results of the survey analysis will encourage
discussion on the historical consciousness of Bosnian youth.
The definition of history politics emphasised the active, conscious and
intentional nature of the use of history for certain purposes. History politics utilise
history culture and appear in the forms of history culture, thereby attempting to
influence historical consciousness. As mentioned, the extensive use of history often
characterises nationalism, and thus the discussion of the forms of nationalism in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1990s can be incorporated in the discussion of
history politics in chapter five. The divided schooling is one expression of that
nationalism. In the concluding chapter we can analyse and discuss the intentions of
Bosnian history politics as illustrated in this research.
3.3 Methodological Pluralism

There are plenty of prejudices and criticisms against the survey method applied in
the Youth and History research, which forms one of the main analyses of this
research. The classical surveys are often criticised for being too statistical and
reducing everything to numbers, for treating people in a deterministic way, and for
failing to provide additional understanding for the meaning of people's acts or
ideas.51
The aim here is neither to support the criticisms, nor to defend the survey
against such criticisms. Rather, in this chapter I argue that the survey and
qualitative research can be applied in parallel. This is the case in this study, which
has utilised both quantitative (the survey) and qualitative data. In the following, I
attempt to provide the theoretical reasoning for the pluralistic methodology applied
in this study and argue in support of its suitability. Such methodology has also been
51
See eg. De Vaus, D.A. 1996/1985. Surveys in Social Research. Fourth edition. London: UCL Press, 7-9, 220-225.
54
termed a ”mixed model method”52 for it combines features of qualitative and

quantitative paradigms in one research project.
3.3.1 COMBINING TWO APPROACHES IN THEORY

Two classical concepts of scientific discourse can show the problematic features of
the survey and open discussion towards pluralistic methodology: qualitative and
quantitative research. According to Lehto, it is crucial to understand the basic
philosophies of both and consider what is the outcome of choosing between the
different methodological approaches.53
The debate that has been central to the philosophy of science for more than a
century can be simplified as follows: The idea of science as positivist (quantitative)
and as post-positivist (qualitative) developed when the methods of natural sciences
were applied to human sciences with the belief that one single scientific method
could become a standard. Post-positivist thinking found its way into scientific
thinking as an anti-thesis to the positivist theory. The ideas of explaining and
understanding science developed, and positivist, quantitative research became
characterised as “explaining” while such fields as history or literature, with
qualitative methods, as “understanding”.54
Lehto follows the argumentation of John W. Creswell and his differentiation
between the quantitative and qualitative approaches. According to Creswell, one
can see the differences in several fundamental categories of the research. Table 1
(following page) has relied on his basic analysis and applied the categories for the
historical approach.55
Both Creswell and Pertti Alasuutari56 have concluded that this type of
differentiation does not happen in practice but many researches combine the two,
mainly in the process of data collection. In his book, Alasuutari altogether refuses to
make a clear division between the two research traditions.
52
Tashakkori, Abbas and Teddlie, Charles 1998. Mixed methodology: combining qualitative and quantitative
approaches. Applied social research methods series; Vol. 46. Thousand Oaks (California): Sage.
53
Lehto, Anna-Maija 1998. Laatua surveytutkimukseen. In: Paananen, Juntto & Sauli 1998 (ed.). Faktajuttu.
Tilastollisen sosiaalitutkimuksen käytännöt. Tampere: Vastapaino, 210. Lehto uses the term “paradigm”, but for the
purposes of this paper I find the “methodological approach” clearer as a term.
54
Lehto 1998, 210-211.
55
Creswell, John W 1998. Qualitative inquiry and research design: choosing among five traditions. Thousand Oaks
(California): Sage, 75.
56
Alasuutari, Pertti 1993/1999. Laadullinen tutkimus. 3. uudistettu painos. Tampere: Vastapaino, 50-54.
55
Table 1: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches in History Research
Qualitative research Quantitative research
Ontology: what Realities are and have been There has been an objective reality that
reality was/has constructed in the course of time can be researched. Social relations
been? and in the process of the research. have also existed objectively.
Epistemology: Researcher aims at understanding The researcher aims at explanation of

how to gain the subject of the research. This the phenomana through measurement
knowledge of the happens through hermeneutic and inferencing.
passed reality? interpretation.
Axiology: what is Research is not value free and that Research is value free. The values of
the role of is reported and discussed in the the researcher are separate from the
values? research. research.
Rhetoric of the Depending on the personality of Traditional form of reporting therefore

research the researcher. repetitive, clear and safe.
Logic of the Inductive, categories derived from Deductive, concepts, theories and
reasoning the research material (sources). hypothesis a priori.
In addition to the mentioned categories, there is yet another common

differentiation between qualitative and quantitative research: the dilemma of
objectivity and subjectivity.57 It can also be clarified in a table.
Table 2: Objectivity and Subjectivity in Qualitative and Quantitative Research
Qualitative research Quantitative research
How the subjects Subjects (people, sources) are Subjects simply provide information on
of the research seen as constructors of meaning. the objective reality that has been
are seen? around them.
Objectivity/ Researcher and the subject A central criterion of science is the

subjectivity of involved in a hermeneutic circle. objectivity of the researcher, which can
the researcher be achieved by following certain rules.
57
Lehto 1998, 221-223.
56
Objectivity/ People always interpret and have Objective answers if the criteria of the
subjectivity of interpreted everything through research are followed.
the answers of their own system of meanings.
sources
Creswell concludes that combining the methods can enrich the scope and breadth
of the research and help discover new perspectives. Generally scholars have
emphasised that the combination does not mean using only pluralistic practices
when collecting the data and source materials, but analytically combining the
methods so that all the mentioned paradigmatic differences between the methods
would be taken into account and then combined. That would result in an interplay
of approaches in one single research project; understanding would be possible for
someone applying the rhetoric of quantitative research.58
Pertti Töttö has also emphasised that the types of data should not be confused
with the discussion about the philosophy of science. Thus, the philosophical
differentiation between positivist/explaining and understanding traditions is not
systematically connected with the methodological differentiation between
quantitative and qualitative methods. One can use quantitative methods without
being a positivist. Quantitative results can be approached hermeneutically.59
Within history research, the philosophical discussion related to fundamental
epistemological and ontological questions has mainly concentrated on the
relationship between history and the question of objective truth. While the
“absolute objectivity and scientificity of historical knowledge is no longer accepted
without reservation”, the historian’s work is still considered a professional and
critical work with sources making access to the past reality possible. Typically, the
past is seen as pre-existing the historical text and outside of it. Among historians,
professional standards have been considered more central than abstract concepts of
truth and objectivity when considering the principles and possibilities of history as
a science. Regarding subjectivity, the importance of taking that into account in
history research has been increasingly emphasised; objects of history research have
their subjective intentions and individuality. In addition, the subjectivity of the
researcher is inescapable and perhaps more central in history research than in most
related sciences, which further emphasises the need to recognise it within history
research.60
3.3.2 COMBINING TWO APPROACHES IN PRACTICE

Chapter two demonstrated how a major turn in history research has taken place
since late 1960s. One consequence of the appearance of ”new histories” was
58
Creswell 1994, 189-190, Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, ix-x, 43.
59
Töttö, Pertti 2000. Pirullisen positivismin paluu: laadullisen ja määrällisen tarkastelua. Tampere: Vastapaino, 41.
60
Iggers 1997, 11-12,18.
57
methodological pluralism and the generally increased emphasis on methods and

theories in history research. First, many practises typically applied in social and
political sciences became part of history research as well, and quantitative methods
became part of the research on social and economic history in particular. Later,
cultural studies (e.g. anthropology) also influenced the practises of historians. As a
result of the increased interest in methods and theories the questions presented in
the previous Table 1 about ontology, epistemology, axiology, rhetoric and logic of
the research have become relevant to history research as well; different
combinations of the categories of qualitative and quantitave approaches can be part
of history research depending on the research topic and the choices of the
researcher. The same applies to the question of objectivity and subjectivity
presented in Table 2. Most importantly, such issues have been recognised as
important among historians as well, even if few practises have dramatically changed
within the research traditions.
Questions of history research related to contemporary society (historical
consciousness, history culture, history politics and so forth) further emphasise the
question of objectivity and subjectivity since the research operates in the scholar’s
own environment. As we saw in chapter two, the materials used in studies in history
didactics and in societal history include observations of scholars, cultural products,
newspaper articles, interviews, surveys and so forth. Such a nature of sources further
emphasises the importance of the methodological and theoretical approach, as well
as active choices scholars make concerning the categories presented in Tables 1 and
2. For example the theoretical ideas of social and historical constructivism and
social representations presented in 3.1. lead towards a qualitative approach in terms
of ontology, epistemology and axiology, but make the typically quantitative
approach possible when considering the logic of the reasoning and the rhetoric of
the research.
Some works mentioned in chapter two combine methods; for example, in the
Youth and History research, the quantative data was analysed through
contextualisation in many countries. Thus, in addition to explaining the results
through statistic analyses, attempts were made to understand the results by
understanding the social setting in which they occurred. History textbook research
has also utilised quantitative and qualitative approaches. The choice of approach in
such research is fundamental precisely because of epistemological and logical
differences which necessarily result when choosing whether to count the number of
times a certain word is used in the text, or to analyse the context in which a certain
word or expression appears.
The pre-eminence of the research question over considerations of
methodological approach has been considered characteristic of studies applying
pluralistic methodology; the research question and setting have favoured the use of
58
mixed methods.61 The setting of this research, post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina,
has necessitated the pre-eminence of the research question over the methodological
approach. For this there are practical reasons.
Namely, the research conditions differed dramatically from those of stable
countries when conducting research in such an unstable society as post-war Bosnia
and Herzegovina. The societal situation has been new and changing, and the
societal, demographic, and attitudinal changes have been significant due to the
collapse of the former system and the war. In many ways the post-war society has
lacked any direct link to the past. In addition, many functions of the society suffer
from the recent war, and thus are often nationally divided and antagonistic. The
society lacks many institutional functions, and it was difficult if not impossible to
obtain systematic data on the entire country.62 Often nobody could even tell where
the bookstore or library could be found (if it still existed). The poor conditions of
the roads and harsh winters made travelling between different places (e.g. from a
place dominated by one national group to places dominated by other national
groups during comparative data collection and observations) slow and difficult.
Finally, most of the functions are officially divided into two entities (the Serb
Republic and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and within the
federation, into ten cantons.63
Thus, the only reasonable way to approach research related to post-war Bosnia
and its youth under the existing post-war research conditions was to emphasise the
relevant material available, and the material that could be collected under the
prevailing conditions. Only in this way could we set ourselves to develop any
knowledge of post-war Bosnian society (or of any society under similar conditions).
After the research setting it was important to find methods which could
provide some kind of overall, general idea of the thinking of youth in a situation in
which little is known about the region. For this the large international survey
provided the most reliable method. Individual interviews would have posted the
methodological problem of selecting the respondents in a representative way since
so little information about the society was available to serve as a basis for the
choices.
It was also considered vitally important to carry out research that would also
allow for international comparison, in addition to providing some general ideas
about the thinking of youth in Bosnia. I believed that only through international
comparison could some basic standing of Bosnia among others be established in a
situation where very little societal data has been available. In fact, Bosnia has
61
Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, 167.
62
The statistics do not really exist for the entire country but only for two entities. A lack of reliable statistical data has
been noted as a limiting factor in other research projects as well. Human Development Report Bosnia and
Herzegovina 2000. Youth. UNDP: Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues, 12.
63
Illustrative of the difficulty of collecting research material in Bosnia is the failure to include the Serb Republic into
a large study on the effects of civic education on the democratic attitudes and behavior of young Bosnians only a few
months before the Youth and History research was conducted. The NATO bombardings were cited as the reason for
the failure. Soule 2000.
59
typically been analysed as an isolated, ”laboratory” case, which can result in

supporting the dominating conceptions/viewpoints/opinions.
Thus the quantitative survey provided the two crucial elements for the research:
the possibility to draw general conclusions of Bosnian youth in a comparative
manner. It was realised, however, that the survey results were insufficient in order
to explain and understand better the role of history for Bosnian youth in the post-
war reality. Bosnia’s particular nature could only be brought within the research by
analysing the Youth and History results parallel to the qualitative data on the
society and the role of history there. Schoolbooks were chosen as the main data for
the analysis, yet all kinds of materials relating to the presence of history within
society would be included in the scope of the qualitative analyses of the research.
The research setting again greatly influenced the qualitative approach: schoolbooks
were accepted as one of the main research materials since it would have been
difficult to develop other systematic ways of looking at the role of history based on
what is available and permitted in Bosnia.
Thus, we can conclude that this research utilises characteristically quantitative
data (survey data) and qualitative data (texts and other sources). For both types of
data, both traditions explaining (traditionally quantitative approach) and
understanding (traditionally qualitative approach) are applied.
The quantitative data will be treated in a way usually referred to as descriptive
statistics as opposed to statistical inference. The descriptive use of statistical
(quantitative) data necessarily leads towards a qualitative approach. The research
does not turn into a qualitative analysis, but the analysis and theoretical reflection
on the empirical data has the dimension of trying not just to explain but to
understand what the descriptions of the data could mean. In short, in the
quantitative analysis of the data, the results are contextually explained while the
conclusive theoretical reflection attempts also to understand the results.
Similarly the qualitative content analysis of the history textbooks attempts to
explain the features of the texts contextually. The conclusive theoretical reflection is
essential to understanding the findings of the analysis. Thus in both cases,
explaining is an integral part of the data analyses, while understanding deals with a
more general level of theoretical reflection, interpretation and discussion.
3.4 Research Material

3.4.1 YOUTH AND HISTORY SURVEY DATA
The Bosnian Youth and History data was collected in the last months of 1999, four
to five years later than the original Youth and History survey. Prior to collecting the
data, I had first contacted the Finnish national coordinator of the project, professor
Sirkka Ahonen, and then the coordinators of the entire project at the University of
Hamburg. With their support and permission, my role resembled that of a national
60
coordinator in the original Youth and History research project; I was in charge of
conducting the Youth and History survey in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As much as possible, the data collection in Bosnia relied on the principles of the
Youth and History project.64 However, the procedure underwent many changes
and adjustments because of the particular working conditions in BiH. Due to the
unusual sampling conditions and necessary adjustments made, the process of data
collection and coding must be described in detail here in order for the reader to
assess the reliability of the analysed data.
Preparation of the Survey

The Youth and History questionnaire65 was designed together with all the scholars
who participated in the original research, and tested in a pilot study before the
entire survey was conducted.66 The working language of the research was English.
Consequently, the questionnaire was designed in English and then translated into
different languages. The procedure for the translations was very detailed and
controlled67, and therefore the Croatian version of the questionnaire was considered
a valid translation68 for use among Bosnian Croats.
Two Bosniacs checked the Croatian version of the questionnaire and the
required changes were made for the Bosniac version of the questionnaire.69 The
questionnaire to be used in the Serb Republic was in the same language70 as for the
64
Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A27-35.
65
See Annex 1.
66
67
See Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A46-47.
68
Croatia participated in the research project professor Ivan Siber being the national coordinator there.
69
In the former Yugoslavia, the official language was Serbo-Croatian (or Croato-Serbian), which used both the Latin
and Cyrillic alphabets. At schools, for instance, some books were in cyrillic and some in latin characters. Since the
break-up of the country the language has become a political tool. The project of nationalising the language has been
most active in Croatia where old words from literature as well as brand new, invented words have been introduced,
and the Cyrillic alphabet is not used. Among the Bosnian Serbs, linguistic nationalisation appears in the extensive
usage of the Cyrillic alphabet. Among the Bosniacs, the language that used to be a variant of Serbo-Croatian is now
called Bosnian, and written in latin characters only. For these reasons it was important to be careful in the usage of
language. Having a politically “incorrect questionnaire” would have influenced the results. For more on the language
question, see Lindstedt, Jouko and Nuorluoto, Juhani 2000. Ovatko bosnia, kroaatti ja serbia sama kieli vai eri kieliä?
www-publication. Helsingin yliopisto, slavistiikan ja baltologian laitos May 2000. Internet document:
http://www.helsinki.fi/~jslindst/bo-hr-sr.html. 5th February 2003. An illustrative example of the political nature of
the language question is the linguistic choice of the UNDP report on youth. Young Bosnians who have written the
report noted: ”the language used to write the text in the local language does not fall into the category of any of the
official languages of BiH. Some parts of the text contain terms used in Bosnian, Croatian or Serbian and can give the
impression of an imbalance in the report. However, the young people wanted to write using the language they speak
and the different terms used in the three official languages of BiH are still only synonyms that we all understand.”
Human Development Report Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000. Youth. UNDP: Independent Bureau for Humanitarian
Issues, 13.
70
There have been proposals to replace the traditional Ijekavian pronunciation of the language with the Ekavian in
the Serb Republic as the Ekavian is the variant used in Serbia. That has not, however, taken place at schools and has,
moreover, no roots in the area of RS. Bugarski, Ranko 1996. Minority language rights in Yugoslavia in a European
Framework. In Collection of papers: Freeman, Pantić & Janjic (ed.) 1996. Nationalism and Minorities. Essex:
Centre for Human Rights, University of Essex, Institute of Social Sciences, Forum for Ethnic Relations, 96.
61
Bosniac-dominated areas, but the alphabet used was the Cyrillic. As a result, three
different questionnaires were prepared.
No additional Bosnian questions were added to the questionnaire for fear that
permission for the survey might be denied in the highly politicised atmosphere of
Bosnia. Permission to conduct the Youth and History survey was requested from
the ministries of education, science, culture and sports at the entity-level, in the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Serb Republic. Thus, I bypassed
the cantonal level in the Federation and was prepared to obtain permission there
only if requested.71
In meetings with the deputy ministers of both ministries in Sarajevo (FBiH)
and Banja Luka (RS), I handed in the abstract of the research with three
recommendations and the questionnaire itself. Everything was translated into
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian; in RS the Cyrillic alphabet was used, and in FBiH, the
Latinic.
A few days after the meeting, the federation ministry informed me that it
would approve the research if I would agree to a few changes in the questionnaire.
The changes included questions 12, 16, 17, 35(b, f), 36(b, f), and 40. The
translation of the text dealing with the questions as follows; the questions in
brackets are my own additions:
…After detailed study of the questionnaire we see no need for question 12
(To which religious community do you belong?), with question 16 (Your
parents’ education), option b (vocational training) must be changed so that it
applies to our educational system: elementary school, middle school, high
school, higher school. We also think that question 17 (If you compare your
family’s income with the income of other families in your country, do you
think you are below, about or above the average?) must be dropped. Question
35, (What do you think life WAS like in BiH 40 YEARS AGO) options b
(overpopulated) and f (polluted) in our opinion should be dropped. The same
applies to question 36. Question 40 (Suppose you are a young woman/man in
the fifteenth century. Your Father orders you to marry John/Catherine, the
son/daughter of a comparatively rich farmer in the neighbouring village. You
don’t love or even really know your future husband/wife. What might you do,
if you were living then? Consider the arguments.) has nothing to do with the
concrete project and therefore should not be included.72
The religion question was most likely withdrawn because it would have
demonstrated that schools are mono-religious instead of multi-religious, an
embarrassment for the federal ministry (the ministry did, however, permit
questions on the nationality of the pupils, and in post-war Bosnia, nationality and
71
According to the constitution of Bosnia, the country is divided into two entities (the Serb Republic and the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and the Federation is further divided into ten cantons, each having its own
minister of education with substantial autonomy.
72
The original fax in Bosnian is in the possession of the author.
62
religious group are nearly synonymous). Questions relating to income and social
status were considered sensitive since pupils and their families have faced enormous
economic difficulties. Comparing income would – in the eyes of the ministry –
have forced pupils to think in comparable terms and this was considered
undesirable. Finally the options ‘overpopulated’ and ‘polluted’ were dropped on
grounds that they were concepts unknown to Bosnian pupils.
After discussing with respected Bosnian academic, professor of political science
Gajo Sekulić, I decided to accept the changes to all the other questions except one
question: 40. Mr. Sekulić based his argument for keeping the question on the
sociological viewpoint of observing how the historical empathy of young people
might function differently in different societies. The ministry accepted this and
granted permission to conduct the research.
The RS ministry also granted permission in a week. With their permission, the
ministry expressed that they found it very important that BiH could participate in
such a survey. They also stated that in the ministry, they do not have financial
resources for such projects, and that they cannot require schools to take 90 minutes
from their normal lessons to participate in the survey, but that I should agree
instead to use some extra hours at the schools.
In the autumn of 1999, the European Community Monitoring Mission73
agreed to support the Youth and History research as the ECMM teams had just
undertaken a special tasking with schools and were therefore informed of the
schools in their respective areas.74 One of the humanitarian monitors was appointed
as a contact person and the form of the ECMM-co-operation was designed and
termed the ECMM-tasking 9.75 It was decided that ECMM would participate in
the school selection as their expertise on the educational field covered the whole
country. Another important form of co-operation was the help of ECMM teams in
returning the material to Sarajevo from the schools.
It was considered important that the participation of the ECMM not be too
visible to the schools, as that might have influenced the results. Therefore, I
contacted and visited the schools with no connection to the ECMM, and at those
meetings the schools were informed that even though ECMM teams would collect
73
The European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) was established in 1991 as the former Yugoslavia started
breaking up. Its first task was to observe and report on the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from Slovenia. Since
then, as the conflict spread over the region, the ECMM grew and deployed its monitors to all the countries of the
former Yugoslavia, and in addition to Albania. In 1999 they had about 40 teams in the region of which 16 were in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. ECMM-representatives monitor political, humanitarian, security, military, and economic
issues. Normally, the teams consist of two ECMM monitors and a translator. They write reports on the different
tasks they are given. In addition to the already mentioned routine areas of monitoring (politics, humanitarian issues,
security, military, economy), the teams have special taskings on particular topics.
74
In the summer of 1999, the ministers of education from both entities agreed to remove offensive materials from
school text books. The ECMM, together with other international organisations working in the area, decided to carry
out spot-checks at schools to verify whether the removal had actually occurred. Each ECMM team was supposed to
visit a certain number of schools in their respective areas by the end of 1999. See more in chapter 5.4.
75
The tasking is in the possession of the author.
63
the materials, they had no part in the research itself. I emphasised the logistical
nature of their support.
The aim was to collect a sample in which the three main national groups were
equally represented, as their separation was the present reality. Moreover, it
provided an additional analysis level inside the country sample. Thus the sample
was not to be a random sample of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but an intelligent
convenience sample as it was named in the Youth and History research.76 As different
sets of strata were also used (e.g. socio-historical criteria and areal criteria), the
sample can also be characterised as a stratified sample.77
In practice, several qualitative methods were required in deciding on the
sample. The ministry sources has no list of primary schools of the country. Another
great difficulty was to obtain valid contact information for all the schools in BiH,
where even the area codes for phones change within the country. This phase of the
research illustrates how working under Bosnian conditions required adjustments
that, strictly speaking, might influence the perfect representability of the data. The
guiding principle of the Youth and History could be quoted here: “…the principle
of YOUTH and HISTORY 1994/95 was to be as representative as possible in every
country” (italics in the original text).78
Based on the expertise and knowledge of the staff members of the ECMM
Mission office Sarajevo, I selected 11 ECMM teams working in different parts of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The chosen areas were from all the parts of the country
and represented the different political areas in terms of national group domination,
and backgrounds in the pre-war times. Together with ECMM experts, we believed
that the selection made would provide the most representative sample. Of the 11
teams selected, 4 were from Serb-dominated areas, 4 from Bosniac-dominated areas
and 3 from Croat-dominated areas. The smaller number of Croat-dominated areas
was due to the fact that there are significantly fewer of them and that some Croat
schools were included within the Bosniac-dominated areas.79
The chosen teams were asked to select a representative sample of four primary
schools representing their working area. In each area two schools were to be selected
from urban areas and two from rural areas. To control the teams’ selection they
were asked to justify their selection of each school. In the case of the city of
Mostar, which is strictly divided between Bosniacs and Croats, the ECMM team
76
Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A34, A252, A272. The intelligent convenience sample was collected in Sweden
where foreigners speaking poor Swedish were left out, and in Russia where the schools were picked from different
regions and areas chosen by the national co-ordinator.
77
For more on stratified samples, see Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A27.
78
79
The UNDP, in their survey of the Youth in Bosnia conducted around the same time, also used a similar method of
selecting sampling points using the knowledge of the majority national groups in different areas. This further
demonstrates that the intelligent convenience sample was the best way to collect a survey in Bosnia and Herzegovina
at that time. Human Development Report Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000. Youth. UNDP: Independent Bureau for
Humanitarian Issues, 75.
64
working in the area was asked to select one school from both sides. In all other
cases, the selection was entrusted to the expertise of the ECMM teams.
According to the information I obtained from the officials in the educational
sector, the number of pupils in one class was expected to be between 25 and 30. As
the size of the sample was to include between 800 and 1200 pupils80 the estimated
number of classes needed was between 30 and 35.
In the end, the ECMM teams provided me with the names and contact details
of 43 schools. One of the teams provided only three schools instead of four, which
explains the uneven number.
Material Collection
Letters in Croatian/Bosnian/Serbian introducing the Youth and History project
were sent to the headmasters of the selected schools. Headmasters were told that
their school had been selected to participate in the research project, with special
emphasis on the project’s pan-European nature. To guarantee reliability and to
obtain the correct postal codes, two separate posts were used to send the letters; one
in the FBIH, and the other in the RS.
Two weeks later we81 phoned the schools. Of the 43 schools, only 2 could not
be reached, so they were left out. In all the other schools, the headmasters were
willing to participate, usually enthusiastically. We agreed with the headmasters on
the approximate time of our visit.
After obtaining approval from all of the schools, we planned a visiting schedule.
To ensure the validity of the sample, it was important to conduct the surveys over a
short period of time so that differences in the political situation would not
influence the results. Finally, the plan to visit the 41 schools in a three-week period
seemed manageable. We decided that the normal practice would be to meet with
the headmaster in the school, provide the instructions and leave the materials. Only
in some cases, when our timetable and that of the school would allow it, would we
stay to conduct the survey ourselves.
I considered the personal meeting with a representative of each school necessary
to avoid misunderstandings. In most cases, I met the headmaster, who sometimes
appointed his deputy to receive us. Often the history teacher was also invited to
participate in the meeting, as he or she would conduct the survey.
Everything was explained at the meeting. The questionnaires were numbered
and handed to the headmaster with detailed instructions for the conducting of the
survey, and stickers for sealing the questionnaire upon completion were provided
along with an example of a sealed questionnaire. Sealing served to assure the
80
The size of the sample was decided for the entire Youth and History research. For comparison, it could be noted
that for the world value surveys in 1981-83 and in 1990-91 the country samples contained about 1000
cases/country. Abrahamson, Paul R. and Inglehart, Ronald 1995. Value change in global perspective. Ann Arbor:
The University of Michigan Press, 98-99.
81
I had a local assistant working with me.
65
students of their anonymity. At the meeting, we also agreed the time of the survey.
The schools were asked to complete the survey within a week time of our meeting.
From each of the first 14 schools, one class out of all eighth-grade classes was
chosen randomly. In a few cases, the class was changed because of the school
timetable. No classes were favoured to participate. In the remaining schools, the
method of choosing the class was changed because the size of the classes generally
proved larger than expected, and therefore the size of the sample was becoming
unnecessarily large. Consequently, the eighth-grade class with the smallest number
of pupils was selected. Where two classes contained equal number of pupils,
practicalities such as timetable dictated which class was chosen.
One class per school was selected from every school but one. In one Croat-
dominated school both of the two eight-grade classes were selected. There were two
reasons for this: each of the classes contained only about 20 pupils whereas in the
Bosniac- and Serb-dominated schools, the number of pupils was usually 30 to 40
per class. It also appeared to be more convenient for the history teacher to have
both classes participate. In three schools, the class that happened to be having a
history class during our visit was selected.
Generally, both the students and the teachers welcomed the Youth and History
survey. Headmasters and teachers read all the instructions through carefully and
asked about every little detail. There was no reason for even slightest suspicion that
the teachers or headmasters would influence the answers of the pupils. This kind of
strict obedience can be understood through the fact that all Bosnian officials have
since the Dayton agreement been under the close surveillance of the international
community and therefore, the schools are quite accustomed to following rules and
instructions.
In some schools, the students were asked to give written feedback. Almost all
the students emphasised how much they enjoyed being asked for their opinions on
the same questions that other European pupils were asked. 82 Students seemed to
feel that participation in such a survey was also of political importance. Many
papers indicated that the pupils were happy not to have to answer any special
questions about their recent war. In addition, the students commented that the
survey was interesting and made them think of their opinions and ideas in a way
that was unusual at school.
In the course of the data collection, there were a few cases in which the normal
practice of holding a meeting at the school and leaving the materials and
instructions there did not occur. In three schools, no meeting took place at the
school so the questionnaires and instructions were left with the school in the
neighbouring town.83 The headmasters were phoned later to ensure that there were
no questions regarding the survey. In three schools, each one in an area of different
82
Many papers used the expression “free opinions” (slobodno mišljenje).
83
Reasons for this typically included weather and roads: some schools could not be reached without a four-wheel-
drive vehicle.
66
ethnic domination, we conducted the survey ourselves to observe in practice the

testing situation and to note possible questions and special comments that might
arise. Finally, a few schools had to be dropped from the research due either to
weather conditions, which caused road closure, or to teacher strikes.
At the meetings in the schools, we agreed on the deadline for completion and
collection of the questionnaires. The ECMM teams were instructed to collect the
materials and send the packages to their mission office in Sarajevo by their own
shuttle.
There were some unexpected problems in returning the materials. Due to
unusual snowstorms, many roads were closed right at the time when most of the
materials were due for collection. Many schools were also closed for some days.
Finally, the material was received from all but one school: the road to Srpsko
Goražde was reported closed for the whole winter. Thus, in the end, the situation
was that in January 2000, questionnaires were received from 957 pupils in 37 eight-
grade classes in 36 schools. As the objective had been to obtain a sample of between
800 and 1200 pupils, this result was satisfactory.
Realised Sample
For coding the questionnaires the NSDstat+ -software designed for the Youth and
History research in the Norwegian Social Science Data Services in Bergen was used.
The work of four coders in Sarajevo was completed in March 2000.
For coding, the general principles presented in the booklet “Data Entry
Handbook” for use in the Youth and History project were followed. All of the
coders were given special instructions which explained the main steps of the data
entry procedure. The importance of accuracy was emphasised. The software itself
checked that the codes entered were valid (within the range of that particular
question). Therefore no invalid codes were entered into the data files. However, the
software obviously could not discover “in-range-errors” (input of valid but incorrect
codes). For this reason, other means of checking the validity of the data were
needed.
At the beginning, the work of all of the coders was supervised to determine
whether there were any particular problems, and to check that their working
methods were meticulous enough. About 10 % of each coder’s work was proofread
with the questionnaires. Generally, there were virtually no errors, which showed
that the coding system was simple enough, and that the coders worked carefully.
After coding, the data was merged and changed into SPSS format. In SPSS, the
missing value test was run. Those questionnaires withmore than 90 % of the
questions unanswered were deleted. After this operation the sample contained 923
cases. Further validity checks were applied to the data in the Youth and History
central analysis centre at the University of Hamburg. After all the cleaning
processes, the final data analysed consists of 907 cases: 360 Bosniacs, 311 Serbs,
218 Croats and 18 others, or uncodable in terms of nationality.
67
3.4.2 CHOICE OF HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

As examples illustrating the history culture to which young people are exposed,
three history school textbooks were chosen for detailed analysis. The books were
those used in the 8th grade (last year of obligatory schooling) in the schools of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1999–2000 school year.84
Selection the history textbooks of the 8th-grade was based on the idea to
analyse the books used by those pupils who participated in the Youth and History
survey.85 Moreover, the 8th-grade was considered the most interesting for it deals
with the most recent history.
In the 1999–2000 school year, three national groups used separate textbooks,
and the ministries of education selected the books used. Thus, the schools in the
area of the Serb Republic used the textbook Istorija86 (in the Cyrillic alphabet), a
book also used in Serbia proper. An additional booklet Dodatak (Addition)
published for use only in RS was used along with Istorija in the history teaching at
the 8th grade in RS.87 In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian
Croat-dominated schools used the book Povijest88, also used in the schools of
Croatia proper. The Bosniac-dominated schools used Historija89, the only history
textbook in use that had been published in Bosnia.
I tried to investigate how the books are used at schools and whether local
ministeries assist schools and teachers as to how to use the textbooks. From what I
have been able to gather from informal talks with teachers and sporadic
information available, it appears that the textbooks have functioned also as teaching
plans. Teachers have based their teaching on them and given orders have only
involved materials that should be erased. This has also been true for the materials
obtained from neighboring countries.
The contents of all these books were organised chronologically, but the periods
covered varied: Istorija and Dodatak start with the late 19th century, Povijest covers
the period after the First World War, and Historija starts with the First World War.
All the books finish in the 1990s. I chose to analyse the period starting with the
First World War. In the case of Povijest, however, that period was not covered
except for a few summarising sentences in the beginning of the book. The
definition leaves out of the analysis the first 50 pages of Istorija, but as it is used in
84
The same books were in most cases used most of the time 1993-2000, and in the years 2001-2003 some of them
were still in use and the new books in use were very similar to the books analysed here.
85
The survey was carried out in December, that is in the middle of the schoolyear which means that the pupils had
not finished studying the books. This was not, however, considered a problem since the purpose of the study was not
to compare the schoolbooks and the survey results one to one, but to analyse them separately and then discuss the
results in parallel.
86
Гаћеша, Младеновић-Максимовић & Зивковић 1997. Историја за 8.разред основне школе. Београд:
Завод за уджбенике и наставна средства.
87
Пејић, Ранко 1997. Додатак уджбенику историје за 8. разред основне школе. Српско Сарајево: Завод за
уджбенике и наставна средства Републике Српске.
88
Perić, Ivo 1995. Povijest za VIII. razred osnovne škole. IV izdanje. Zagreb: Školska knjiga.
89
Imamović M., Pelesić M. & Ganibegović M. 1994. Historija za 8. razred osnovne škole. Sarajevo: Republika
Bosna i Hercegovina ministarstvo obrazovanja, nauke i kulture.
68
Serb schools along with Dodatak, we end up having fairly similar amounts of text
for our analysis of each of the three national groups. I chose to analyse Dodatak
entirely, regardless of the time period it covers. The decision was based on the
assumption that the ”Addition” has been a central part of teaching among the
Bosnian Serbs for it is the Serb Republic in Bosnia’s first ”own” history book.
There were no such history books or booklets in any other grade but the 8th in the
1999–2000 school year. Thus, the Dodatak should present an example of a product
of official history politics in the Serb Republic.
I will present each book in greater detail in the beginning of the analysis of the
history textbooks in chapter six. The general situation in history teaching in post-
war Bosnia, including the agreement and procedure the textbooks underwent as
part of the “Removal of Objectionable Material from Textbooks to be used in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1999–2000 School Year”, appear in section 5.4.
3.4.3 MATERIAL ON HISTORY AND THE PRESENCE OF HISTORY IN BOSNIAN

SOCIETY
According to a librarian in the library of the British Council in Sarajevo, British
historian Noel Malcolm, the author of a central historical account on Bosnia, ”The
Short History of Bosnia”, was once asked which sources he considers the most
reliable in the Bosnian context. ”I would never dare to say it”, he had answered. ”I
would always refer to as many accounts as possible”, Malcolm had continued.
The latter sentence is a commonplace for any historian, yet Malcolm’s answers
reveal something of the special difficulty of history-writing within the Bosnian
context. The rulers have changed, the systems have changed, and thus the archives
have been destroyed, lost, written in numerous languages and placed in various
countries. And, most importantly, the recent violent turns that history has taken
have not lessened the disputes within history. As a consequence, those driven more
by their nationalistic aspirations than by their thirst for any true historical
understanding have also engaged in history-writing.90 In the meeting of the
Committee for History Science in Bosnia in 2001, professor of history Tomislav
Išek stressed the difficulties of historiography in the last decade and how single
works have managed to have incredible consequences. In addition, historians have
found themselves at the service of a nation so that now actually a triple-national
history exists in Bosnia.91 The history discipline has also been divided because, as
the universities are nationally divided, many professors gained their positions
during the war years.
90
Sekulić, Gajo 2000. Fünf Paradoxa der Menschenrechtsfrage vom Standpunkt det ethischen Rekonstrution der
Geistes- und Soyialwissenscheaften in Bosnien-Heryegovina – Thesen. In: Benedek, Wolfgang, Kčnig, Otto and
Promityer, Christian 2000. Menschenrechte in Bosnien und Heryegovina: Wissenschaft und Praxis. Wien: Böhlau
Verlag, 283.
91
”BiH je moguća kao samostalna država” Dnevni avaz. 31.oktobar/listopad, 2001, 9.
69
The difficulty of writing about the pre-war history of Bosnia and Herzegovina
is also exacerbated by the lack of materials specifically on Bosnia, which would have
been written before the 1990s outside the party-controlled socialist Yugoslavian
historiography. On the other hand, the events of the early 1990s inspired the
creation of massive amounts of material on Bosnia. As a Bosnian historian puts it:
“it is difficult to find any text on contemporary world issues published in the last
decade of the second Christian millennium which does not discuss the subject of
Bosnia”.92 In response to a vast number of books, reports and articles of varying
quality and level of analysis, the Bosnian Institute in London published in 1999 a
critical bibliography listing almost 350 titles of works related to Bosnia and
Herzegovina in West European languages.93
Because of the conditions described, when writing about the interpretations of
modern Bosnian history up to the present in chapter four, I have used the
bibliography published by the Bosnian Institute as a guiding reference when dealing
with non-Bosnian books related to Bosnia published prior to 1999.
For the period prior to1990s, four works emerge as the best and most central
sources: Noel Malcolm’s “Bosnia. A Short History”94, John Fine and Robert
Donia’s “Bosnia and Hercegovina: a Tradition Betrayed”95, Ivan Lovrenović’s
“Bosnia: a Cultural History”96 (originally published in Croatian), and Mark
Almond’s “Europe’s Backyard War”97.
These four works present the most important sources for Bosnian history for
the books cover the whole of Bosnian history from a Bosnian (not Yugoslavian)
perspective.98 These accounts have been considered reliable because the scholars are
all Bosnia specialists with broad access to different source materials. Malcolm relies
on a broad selection of sources when establishing a historical account of Bosnia
from prehistory to the 1990s. The strength of Malcolm’s work is his ability to read
original sources in the various relevant languages, including both Turkish and
Slavic languages. The work of Fine and Donia is a critical summary of the history
research completed prior to the early 1990s on Bosnia. Fine has specialised in
medieval Bosnian history while Donia has concentrated on research on modern
92
Mahmutćehajić, Rusmir 2001. The Bosnian Question and the World. Translated by Saba Risaluddin and Roselle
Angwin. In: Lovrenović, Ivan and Jones, Fransis R. (ed.) 2001. Life at the Crossroads. Forum Bosnae culture-
science-society-politics quaterly review 11/01. Sarajevo: International Forum Bosnia, 26-27.
93
Hoare, Quintin and Malcolm, Noel 1999. Books on Bosnia. A critical bibliography of works relating to Bosnia-
Herzegovina published since 1990 in West European languages. London: The Bosnian Institute.
94
Malcolm, Noel 1994/1996. Bosnia. A Short History. London: Papermac.
95
Donia, Robert J and Fine, John V.A, 1994. Bosnia and Hercegovina: a tradition betrayed. London: Hurst and
Company.
96
Lovrenović, Ivan 2001. Bosnia: A Cultural History. Translated by the Bosnian Institute (London) based on a
version by Sonja Wild Bičanić. London: Saqi Books. (Originally published as Unutarnja Zemlja: kratki pregled
kulturne povijesti Bosne i Hercegovine, Zagreb: Duriex 1998)
97
Almond, Mark 1994. Europe’s Backyard War. London: Heinemann.
98
Several accounts on the former Yugoslavia also include interpretations on Bosnian history, and have been used as
secondary sources when writing about Bosnian history. See, for example, Bennett, Christopher 1996. Yugoslavia’s
bloody collapse. Second edition. London: Hurst & co; Rogel, Carole 1998. The Break-up of Yugoslavia and the War
in Bosnia. Westport and London: Greenwood Press.
70
Bosnia. Both Fine and Donia are American historians who have lived and studied
in Sarajevo during the 1960s and 1970s. Ivan Lovrenović is a Bosnian Croat with
an impressive academic reputation as an independent scholar, free of national
aspirations. He has been the editor of the first Bosnian scientific journal since 1999.
Throughout his book, Lovrenović uses local mainly secondary, sources (except for
a few English accounts, among them Noel Malcolm’s book), and thus his book
presents a critical summary of Bosnian historiography up to 1999. Without losing
his critical tone and source-based approach, Lovrenović manages to write from the
local perspective and as a participant in the events of the last decades. Generally he
does not organise his analysis based on the idea of three nations (typical of most
historical accounts on Bosnia written in the 1990s), but rather on the idea of
Bosnia and its development. Mark Almond, professor of history at Oxford
University, wrote the first historical account on post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.
His book was not part of the primary construction of the chapter, for I managed to
obtain information on his book only at a later stage. It has, however, been used as a
parallel source for comparison and additional interpretations and information.
Anyone who has read a reasonable amount of the literature on Bosnia
published in the 1990s can also conclude that historical parts of the books are
typically either based on generally held views without no references provided, or
relying mainly on the works mentioned.
When writing about developments in the 1990s, essential sources cannot be
distinguished in the same manner. History books typically cover the events up to
the mid-1990s. Reports and accounts written by journalists and others involved in
the events in Bosnia provided first hand accounts and analyses of the events of the
1990s. Analyses on the post-Dayton period include analysis of the events of the
1990s.99 Bosnian Institute’s quaterly published since 1997, has also summarised the
events. The UNDP’s special report on Youth in 2000 included much useful data
and a description of the events in the society in the 1990s.100
Except for Lovrenović's work, local titles have been used with caution due to
the described situation in Bosnian historiography. The most useful of them has
been Enver Redžić's account on the Second World War in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. A research project begun in 1988 dealt with the events in Bosnia
based on the archival sources of the Germans, the Italians, the Croatian NDH-
state, the Chetnik movement, the partisans and Muslims movements.101 Also, the
99
E.g. Chandler, David 1999. Faking Democracy After Dayton. London: Pluto Press; Schierup, Carl-Ulrik 1999.
The Spectre of Balkanism: Globalisation, Fragmentation and the Enigma of Reconstruction in Post-Communist
Society. In: Schierup (ed.) 1999. Scramble for the Balkans. Nationalism, Globalism and the Political Economy of
Reconstruction. London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 1-31; Shoup, Paul 1998. Nation Building in Bosnia: from Tito to
Dayton. In: Bianchini, Stefano and Schöpflin, Stefano (ed.) 1998. State Building in the Balkans. Dilemmas on the
Eve of the 21st Century. Ravenna: Longo Editore. 275-294.
100
Human Development Report Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000. Youth. UNDP: Independent Bureau for
Humanitarian Issues.
101
Redžić, Enver 1998. Bosna i Hercegovina u drugom svjetskom ratu. Sarajevo: OKO.
71
work of a respected historian specialising in the history of Bosnian Muslims was of

use.102
The analysis on the presence of history in Bosnia in chapter five presented
different requirements for the source materials. Here I was interested in collecting
examples of the presence of history as broadly as possible, and therefore various
types of sources could be used. The analysis is based on materials collected from
Bosnia- and Yugoslavia- related literature, official documents and reports produced
by different institutions and organisations, newspaper articles, conference
presentations, films, and even personal observations. The collection is based on the
research completed in libraries in Bosnia, in the collection of the Bosnian Institute
in London103 and in bookstores in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar. All references
to newspaper and magazine articles have been collected incidentally during visits to
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Personal observations are based on numerous visits to
Bosnia since 1997, the last of which date from June 2003.104
Generally, the materials for chapters four and five differed significantly in
regard to the selection criteria since each chapter required different types of
information. Regarding chapter four, we could say that a careful selection was
needed to choose the most informative and reliable materials from the vast amount
of possible sources. Secondly, most of the works on Bosnia concentrated on pre-war
and war periods, so substantially fewer titles were available on the post-war years.
This emphasised the importance of other materials (mainly reports produced by
institutions) when writing about the post-war years (in both chapters). On the
other hand, the post-war and war periods are in many ways so inter-connected that
any strict distinction would have been unreasonable. Finally, the third worthy,
specific feature of the materials available is that there were plenty of analyses on the
history of Muslims, on Muslim national consciousness and so forth, while
particular Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb mentalities, historical backgrounds and
so forth have typically not been dealt with separately.
3.4.4 THE CHOICE OF CONCEPTS NATION, WAR AND PEACE

Central to the methodological framework of this research was the choice of
concepts used as tools of analyses when discussing both the representations of
102
Bojić, Mehmedalija 2001. Historija Bosne i Bošnjaka (VII-XX vijek). Sarajevo: TKD Šahinpašić.
103
Bosnian institute has collected all kinds of material related to Bosnia. Their collection includes books, reports
produced by different organisations, novels, reference books, magazines, tourist guides and so forth. See Bosnian
Institute. Library & Resource Centre. Homepages of the Library and Research Centre of the Bosnian Institute in
London in the internet: <http://www.bosnia.org.uk/about/library/default.cfm>. 19th May 2003.
104
Braembussche has differentiated subjective and objective traces of the past. Subjective traces refer to the past as
experienced and stored in memory, while objective traces refer to material relics the past has left behind. See
Braembussche 2000, 76. In the context of this chapter, we could discuss subjective and objective traces of the
presence of the past. Objective traces refer to object-like materials such as monuments, stories, symbols and so forth,
while subjective traces refer to interpretations and analyses of the role of the past within the society. Both types of
traces, objective and subjective, have been used when to analyse the presence of the past in post-war Bosnia and
Herzegovina in chapter five.
72
history textbooks and the representations held by young Bosnians as reflected in the
Youth and History survey. Several reasons influenced the choice of ’nation’, ’war’
and ’peace’ as the main concepts of the analyses.
The fundamental starting point was the nature of the Youth and History survey
data that existed for most European countries and was collected for Bosnia. Thus, a
complete data set existed and was to be used in a reasonable manner. Numerous
scholars from different countries with different research traditions designed the
original Youth and History survey which resulted in a heterogeneous and broad
questionnaire even after radical editing of the questionnaire toward the end of the
process. The broad nature of the survey also resulted from the broad theoretical
background of the research, which extended from the idea of historical
consciousness to history instruction at schools and the political attitudes of
adolescents. Political attitudes were assumed to reflect the historical consciousness
of the youth.105
Finally, the concepts of ’nation’, democracy’ and ’Europe’ were left as
historical-political concepts to be operationalised in the questionnaire.106
Operationalisation meant that one question requested definitions of the concepts.
In addition, the concepts were part of several other items. Due to the above-
mentioned broad nature of the questionnaire, many other topics or themes
emerged, however, in different question blocks. Thus, the Youth and History data
on the one hand provided possibilities for many different analyses, but on the other
hand failed as a consistent survey to be analysed as such, but was selectively based
on questions of interest and the societal context.
From this, it was considered vital to concentrate on topics most relevant to the
post-war Bosnian society. On the whole, the societal relevance of the research
seemed fundamental when deciding on materials and methods for the research
project. Therefore ’nation’ was a clear choice as a concept for analysis. It was one of
the central concepts in the Youth and History survey, and within Bosnian society
the concept is of vital importance to the question of nation, of belonging to a
certain nation, of national rights and national enemies, and has been significant
part of the almost daily experiences of Bosnians in war and post-war years. Through
the political structure of the state, each citizen has been forced to be aware of what
national group he or she belongs to and to declare it publicly.107
In the schoolbook analysis, the concept of ’nation’ allowed for dividing the
analysis based on the idea of ’self’ and ’other’. This seemed reasonable since the
Unesco guidebook for textbook research108 has noted that it is worth striving to
determine key points of reference in the text of a given history textbook and to
105
Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A35-A45.
106
Additional questions of concepts of ”progress and change”, ”war and peace”, ”economic growth and ecological
crisis” were finally left out due to space limitations. Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A45.
107
Most institutions and state organs, and all political posts, are arranged through the national quota principle. Thus,
only members of the three main national groups can participate in functions of the Bosnian state.
108
The most extensive guidebook for textbook research that I have come across.
73
examine the concept of self and its relation to the concept of others. It is
characteristic for history textbooks to contain self-images and images and portrayals
of others, and often the two are identifiable through the stereotypes and prejudices
present in the images and rendering the images immune to factual information.
This leads to the analysis of us and them, which in the Bosnian context is
fundamentally a question of nation. Previous research has also shown that the
nation and nation-building form a central part of traditional history textbooks as
‘our’ heroes, ‘our’ destinies and so forth are dealt with as a part of national projects
attempting to create common identities through education.109
Of the other socio-political concepts operationalised in the Youth and History
survey, ’Europe’ and ’democracy’, I analysed Bosnian perspectives on Europe as
reflected in the Youth and History survey separately elsewhere.110 I did not consider
democracy as such the most relevant question for Bosnian society when looking at
the youth and the role of history within Bosnian society. It would also not have
been a fruitful concept for history textbook analysis.
Supported by the societal relevance thesis and the numerous items in the Youth
and History data that could be used for the analysis of the concepts, war and peace
were included as additional central concept(s) of the research.111 The war-peace112
dilemma has existed in Bosnian society as the war fought in 1992–1995 was of such
total nature that it affected virtually everyone in the country at least indirectly.113
The war has also determined the post-war reality and continued to occupy public
space considerably. The parallels with previous wars and in particular with the
Second World War have also been a common part of the recent history culture
among Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs, as is described in chapter five. ”Peace”
as a concept, in turn, has received specific meaning through the Dayton Peace
Agreement, which was not only a classic peace contract but also a manuscript for a
new state created in the agreement, as chapter five demonstrates. Thus, ‘peace’ as a
social fact, and the ‘Dayton peace’ as an institutional fact have become central
concepts in Bosnian society.
In addition, similarly to the concept of nation, the concept of war was also
found suitable for the school book analysis based on previous knowledge of history
109
Pingel, Falk 1999. UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook Research and Textbook Revision. Studien zur
internationalen Schulbuchforschung vol. 103. Hannover: Verlag Hahnsche Buchhandlung, 25-26.
110
See Torsti, Pilvi 2001. A Youth and History Survey among the Three Bosnian Ethnic Groups and their Relations
to Europe. In: Leeuw-Roord, Joke van deer (ed.) 2001. History for Today and Tomorrow. What Does Europe Mean
for School History? Eustory series. Shaping European History. Volume No.2. Hamburg: Körber-Stiftung. 58-70.
111
As mentioned above in footnote 106, war and peace were initially to be part of the operationalised historical-
political concepts in the Youth and History survey. Even though the separate question of defining them was dropped
due to space limitations, the concepts existed in the planning of the questionnaire and were thus part of many item
blocks even if the separate question was dropped.
112
In many instances war and peace can and must be dealt with together for even if they are separate concepts, the
discussion around them is by definition connected.
113
The death toll is estimated between 200 000 and 250 000, more than half (2-2,5 million) of the Bosnian
population was displaced, 200 000 people disappeared and approximately 60 % of all dwellings were severely
damaged. See chapter four.
74
school textbooks; wars have classically been presented as decisive historical events
around which the contents of the textbooks are organised. In contrast, the previous
research also suggested that peace should hardly exist as a theme in textbooks
although some mention could be expected and analysed.114
All the concepts were chosen because they represent typical examples of
historically constructed societal concepts. As argued in chapter two, the history of
concepts has constituted a particular field of history research focusing on the
changing meanings of societal concepts over time. War, peace and nation are all
examples of such concepts. In this research we do not analyse the history of
concepts from the point of view of analysing the change of their meanings over
time. The historical construction of concepts, however, provides the framework for
the analysis of the representations of concepts in post-war Bosnian society. The
general idea of constructivism was presented earlier in this chapter.
Finally, it must be emphasised that due to the nature of the analyses and
research material, as well as clear choices made along the way, the levels of the
conceptual analyses differ from one another. While the Youth and History analysis
concentrates on the general, universal understanding of the concepts, the
schoolbook analysis has been designed to concentrate more on the self-
understanding level of the concepts. This is particularly true for the concept of
‘nation’; while the Youth and History analysis discusses the meanings, duties, etc.,
of a nation, the schoolbook analysis concentrates on representations of “us” and
“them”, not on the representation of nation as an actor in the schoolbook texts
(whether it is nations that go to war, suffer and so forth). The latter would have
been a universal (and therefore similar to the Youth and History analysis) means of
analysing the representation of nation in the schoolbooks but would not have
offered many interesting insights into the history culture to which youth in Bosnia
are exposed. In the case of the concepts of ‘war’ and ‘peace’, the differences in the
levels of analyses are not so clear, and will thus be discussed as part of the analyses.
I used no strict definitions for the concepts when selecting the items to be
included in the Youth and History survey analysis in the context of this study.
Either they have been a direct part of the questions asked (e.g. what is the meaning
of nation), or some additional definitions for including certain items into the
analysis have been used (e.g. analysing the importance of ethnic group and religion
as part of the analysis of the representation of nation). The items selected and
definitions used appear in the course of the analysis.
114
See Bakonis 2001. See also the Georg Eckert Institute’s publications on international textbook research in Georg-
Eckert-Institute für international Schulbuchforschung. Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research.
Homepages of the Georg-Eckert Institute on the internet: <www.gei.de>. 12th May 2003.
75
4 Past and Present of Bosnia and

Herzegovina
The following presentation does not attempt to provide a full and detailed account
of what seems to have happened in Bosnia in the course of time. To serve the
interests of this research, the interpretations of history are instead presented
through selected topics or themes – world wars, the national question, and the
1990s – which could all be characterised as central or even ”sensitive”, since their
nature has been at least partly controversial in the recent Bosnian context. These
“sensitive” issues are of special interest in the context of this study because they
might especially need anchoring and comfortable explanations as part of the history
culture and in relation to historical consciousness in the post-war situation in
Bosnia. It is also in their understanding of these sensitive issues that the national
groups are most likely to differ. This kind of approach also directly supports the
next chapter of the research dealing with the presence of the (sensitive) past in
Bosnian society. The following introduction to the discussion on the “sensitive
issues” briefly focuses on the origins of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a historical and
geographical entity.
In this chapter I use the term Bosnian Muslim or Muslim to refer to Bosniacs
when discussing the period before and during the Bosnian war in the 1990s, for
that was the official term applied prior to the post-war years. The term Croat here,
if unspecified, refers to both Bosnian Croats and Croats living in Croatia.
4.1 The Origins of Bosnia as a Historical and Geographical

Entity
The first mention of Bosnia as a territory appear appear in the handbook of a
Bysantine emperor in 958. Generally, we know little about developments in Bosnia
in those days because of its distance from Rome and Constantinopole, the origins
of the written records.1 The sources suggest that Slavs invaded Bosnia in the 6th and
1
Malcolm 1994/1996, 10, Donia and Fine 1994, 14.
76
PAST AND PRESENT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
7th Centuries; before them Illyric, Celtic and other small tribes had already been in
the region already before the arrival of the Romans. In addition, the many ethnic
groups that had visited the region invariably left their genetic traces to the Bosnian
inheritance. In any case, since the 7th Century the Slavs predominated.2
Croats and Serbs absorbed other Slav tribes. From the earliest times, they were
distinct but closely connected tribes. Both Croats and Serbs most likely had some
kind of Iranian component to their origins. Scholars have not established whether
the inhabitants of Bosnia were mainly Serbs or Croats; they were, however, Slavs
and pagans.3
Generally the history of early Slav Bosnia, between the arrival of Serbs and
Croats in the early 7th Century and the emergence of an independent Bosnian state
in the 1180s, is complex and leads to no specific conclusions. Bosnia endured a
succession of short-lived conquerers from the neighboring countries, though these
foreign rulers had little lasting influence. In particular, the mountains of the region
encouraged localism. Pagan practices also continued even after the Croats were
christianised in the 9th Century, and the whole of Bosnia was probably under Rome
by the 10th Century, but only nominally.4
The medieval Bosnian state existed from 1180 to 1463. It was not a continuous
kingdom and had different leaders and periods. The period was characterised by
civil wars and invasions as well as real prosperity during the high middle ages.
Under king Tvrtko in the latter half of the 14th Century, the Bosnian state included
almost all of modern Bosnia and some Serbian and Croatian lands, and the court
enjoyed relations with the courts of medieval Europe. The political and social
system of medieval Bosnia was feudal, and sought to preserve archaic forms of social
life and nurture a specific cultural tradition.5
Most of the historical debates involving medieval Bosnia have focused on the
role of religion and the identification of Bosnian inhabitants. One source of
disputes has been the independent Bosnian Church and its origins and
disappearance. The most likely conclusion based on local evidence suggests that
Bosnians established their own independent Bosnian Church to fill the schism with
Rome, and that the church – despite different scholarly claims – retained a basic
Catholic theology throughout the Middle Ages.6 Since the establishment of the
Catholic Franciscan mission in the 1340s, the rulers of Bosnia became Catholic.
The Bosnian Church was, however, still tolerated but had only little political
influence and remained a small organization. Finally, in 1459 the king offered the
clergy of the Bosnian church the choice of conversion or exile, and most embraced
Catholicism. Soon after the Ottoman conquest in the 1460s, the Bosnian Church
2
Malcolm 1994/1996, 2-6.
3
Malcolm 1994/1996, 8, 11, Donia and Fine 1994, 13-14
4
Malcolm 1994/1996, 8, 10-11, Donia and Fine 1994, 15-18.
5
Malcolm 1994/1996, 13, 24, Donia and Fine 1994, 29-30, Lovrenović 2001, 40.
6
Donia and Fine 1994, 19.
77
disappeared entirely and its members were absorbed into Islam, Orthodoxy and
Catholicism.7
Generally, Orthodox and Catholic believers in medieval Bosnia lived in
different regions which had been under the influence of Constantinopole or Rome.
Unlike most of the European courts, it seems that the medieval Bosnian rulers were
indifferent to religious issues. Intermarriages and alliances formed across
denominational lines demonstrate this phenomenon. In medieval Bosnia, it seems
that people avoided identifying themselves as Serbs or Croats; if they indentified
themselves at all, it was as Bosnians, an identity most likely based on a geographical
region.8
Turkish army conquered the Kingdom of Bosnia in 1463 and Bosnia lost its
independence for more than 500 years. The Turkish conquest lasted for more than
a century and was then followed by Turkish rule, which lasted until the late 19th
century. We will return to this period when discussing the national question of
Bosnia and its islamisation in section 4.3.9
4.2 World Wars

4.2.1 WW1: ASSASSINATION OF THE ARCHDUKE AND THE BOSNIAN MISERY
After the defeat of Turks, Bosnia and Herzegovina was awarded to Austria-Hungary
in the congress of Berlin in 1878. Croatia and Slovenia were also part of Austria-
Hungary while Serbia gained independent status after the defeat of the Ottoman
empire.
The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in
June 1914 in Sarajevo has been described as the single most notorious violent event
in Bosnian history. It was due to the place where ”the worst hitherto experienced
world catastrophe” began that the war remained linked to Bosnia both in history-
writing and in popular perceptions.10
Austrian investigation showed that the assassins were members of an
organisation called ”Mlada Bosna” (Young Bosnia) with ties to secret Serbian
nationalist societies. Historians still disagree whether Serb nationalism,
Yugoslavism, Serbian secret societies or a sheer local initiative caused the
assassination. In any case, one can reject the idea of a Serbian government having
planned the assassination, and it has been shown that the conspirators were all
Bosnian students with anti-Austrian sentiments, seven of them Bosnian Serbs and
one, a Bosnian Muslim.11
7
Donia and Fine 1994, 21-23.
8
9
Donia and Fine 1994, 34, Malcolm 1994/1996, 43, Lovrenović 2001, 81, 88.
10
Donia and Fine 1994, 115, Lovrenović 2001, 156.
11
Donia and Fine 1994, 115-116, Malcolm 1994/1996, 156.
78
Blaming Serbia for the assassination seems to have given Austria-Hungary an

opportunity to exploit the event to attack Serbia from ”a morally advanteous
position”.12 In fact, Austria-Hungary accused Serbia not of the assassination
directly, but of tolerating societies and movements against the monarchy.13
For many years, historians merely talked about the ’international system’ as the
cause of the war, but nowadays most agree that without the German pressure for
war, the assassination in Sarajevo could hardly have caused even a local conflict.
Serbia and Austria-Hungary were, however, closely linked to the opposed European
power blocs, which made it possible for the conflict to escalate as it did. In Sarajevo
the assassination was followed by immediate, violent anti-Serb demonstrations and
riots in which Bosnian Muslims and Catholic Croats beat Serbs and destroyed their
shops. Some leading Bosnian Serbs are said to have felt collective guilt and
petitioned the authorities to serve on the front line against Serbia to demonstrate
their loyalty to Austria-Hungary. Yet a few thousand Bosnians principally Bosnian
Serbs, are also known to have joined the Serb army. During the war, the authorities
of Austria-Hungary are shown to have held up to 5000 Bosnians, mainly Serbs, in
prison camps. It is suspected that many were mistreated and even starved to death.
Serbs were also sentenced to prison or killed without legal proceedings.14
Historians have agreed on the heroic nature of Serb fighting against Austrians,
who were twice repulsed from Serbia in 1914. Over the winter of 1914–1915,
however, the Serbs are said to have suffered not only major losses in battle, but also
from a typhus epidemic that killed hundreds of thousands. In 1915, after the
German offensive, remnants of the Serb army retreated through Montenegro and
Albania to the Adriatic coast and further to Greece where the Salonika front was
established. Historians have characterised this retreat as ”epic” and ”heroic”. The
same troops reconquered Belgrade in 1918.15
Historians have emphasised the misery of Bosnians during the First World War
even though no major operations occurred on Bosnian soil. Bosnians of all religious
groups served the imperial forces under poor conditions, without proper
equipment, far from their homes and fields and where diseases and harsh conditions
killed people. After the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Habsburg rule grew
harsher, particularly against the Bosnian Serbs who supported the Serbian and
Yugoslavian cause against Austria-Hungary. The First World War is considered the
first time in Bosnian history when a significant number of people were killed
because of their national or ethnic background.16
12
Lovrenović 2001, 156
13
Malcolm 1994/1996, 156.
14
Donia and Fine 1994, 116, 118, Malcolm 1994/1996, 156-159.
15
Donia and Fine 1994, 117-118, Malcolm 1994/1996, 157-158.
16
Donia and Fine 1994, 118-119, Malcolm 1994/1996, 158-159, Lovrenović 201, 156-157.
79
4.2.2 WW2: CRUEL AND COMPLICATED LOCAL WARS

In the beginning of the Second World War, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia appears to
have tried to remain neutral. Under German pressure, however, the king signed a
Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Yugoslavs reacted by preparing a military
coup and setting up a new government. The coup apparently outraged Hitler and
caused him to order the military invasion of Yugoslavia only ten days after the
military coup began. Yugoslavia surrendered unconditionally after ten or eleven
days of catastrophic defeats under the large and efficient German attack.17 It has
also been mentioned that Yugoslavia’s defeat was partly due to disaffection of the
population and general disintegration of the country.18
The Axis powers divided the royal Yugoslavia into several units. ‘The
Independent State of Croatia’19 (NDH=Nezavisna Država Hrvatska) was
established under the support of the Italians and Germans with the Nazi-minded
ustaša20 leader Ante Pavelić in charge. Almost all of Bosnia became part of the
NDH after a decision of Mussolini and Hitler; Sarajevo and most cities became
part of the German zone while Mostar and its surroundings fell under Italian
occupation.21
In principle historians share the overall picture of the situation in Bosnia in
1941–45. If the war in Yugoslavia was complicated, it was most complicated in
Bosnia, which was geographically at the heart of it. Officially Bosnia was part of the
NDH state organisation. In addition to the two-fold military organisation of the
official Croat army and ustaša/domobran forces, the Germans and Italians both
operated their armies in the area. On the other side, different Yugoslavian resistance
movements, mainly the chetniks, and since 1941 the partisans, fought battles
against the occupiers, and the chetniks later fought alongside them. Civil wars in
the region involved national, rival, extreme local units and militias, and competing
domestic resistance movements. Thus, several distinct wars were fought in Bosnia
and it disintegrated into its own hostile war camps. Finally, the fighting culminated
to a struggle for revolutionary social transformation, since Tito's Communist Party
and his partisans espoused an ideology that advocated an end to the old order.22
In regard to the Bosnian people, the conclusions of the war period typically
follow similar lines. Bosnian Croats seem to have followed the pattern of Croats in
Croatia. A minority was actively supporting the ustaša while the majority welcomed
the establishment of the NDH state. Many Croats also joined partisans supporting
Tito’s idea of creating a federal state and fighting against the occupants. Bosnian
17
Donia and Fine 1994, 134-135, Lovrenović 2001, 169, Almond 1994, 132-133.
18
Friedman, Francine 1996. The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 120.
19
Historians typically refer to this ’state’ in quotation marks. See Malcolm 1994/1996, Donia and Fine 1994,
Lovrenović 2001.
20
The ustaša movement had operated under Mussolini’s protection in Italy and as an underground movement in
Yugoslavia. It was responsible for the assassination of the Yugoslav king in 1934.
21
Donia and Fine 1994, 131, 137, Bojić, 2001, 185-186.
22
Lovrenović 2001, 173, Donia and Fine 1994, 136, Redžić 1998, 470.
80
Serbs, in turn, were from the beginning driven into opposition of the ustaša and
joined resistance movements due to the genocidal policies of the NDH state. The
royalist chetnik movement collected Serbs in particular from Eastern Bosnia while
partisans spent long periods in Foča, Jajce and Bihać, which made it possible for the
Serbs from there to join them. After the chetnik leader Mihailović called off the
battle against the occupants and started to fight againts partisans and communists,
Serbs started to join the partisans more often. The most difficult position was that
of Bosnia Muslims, some of whom collaborated with the ustaša or Germans or
both, but many fought with the partisans who promised an official position for
Muslims in the state of Bosnia in socialist Yugoslavia. There were also separate
Muslim militant formations. In conclusion it has been stated that nobody could
remain neutral among the numerous military formations in Bosnia during WWII.23
Despite the total nature of the WWII, it has also been noted that in many
towns people lived in relative peace during the war and felt hostilities only as the
Allies bombarded the area at the end of the war. The fighting mainly took place in
forests and isolated places.24
A commonly held view of the outcome of the Second World War in
Yugoslavian states is that the war ravaged all areas of the country and that Bosnia
suffered worst of all, unlike in the First World War in which Serbia had suffered
the heaviest losses. All Bosnian national groups experienced bloodshed and
suffering on a scale previously unknown; of all the groups the Bosnian Serbs
incurred the greatest number of deaths and losses. As during the war, Bosnians
ended the war on all possible sides: as victors, victims, cowards, heroes, tortured,
traitors and loyalists. It seems no exaggeration to say that not a single family in
Bosnia could have escaped the war’s touch. It seems to have been then – and not
earlier – that enormous inter-national and inter-religious hatred evolved into
extreme nationalism.25 In particular, Bosnian Muslims have apparently been found
on all sides: in ustašas, in home-guard units, in Muslim militias, in partisan forces
and even in chetnik forces.26
Thus historian’s, after working in the archives of all the sides of the conflict
since the late 1980s, can convincingly claim that Bosnia and Herzegovina entered a
time of peace and a new social and political situation “bearing deep wounds on its
body and fresh scars on its soul”.27 It was perhaps only in the 1970s that the hatreds
and tragedies of the Second World War started to diminish as new generations
appeared and mixed marriages became common.28
In the following section, three central aspects of the history of the Second
World War in Bosnia will appear in greater detail: the NDH state, chetniks and
23
Malcolm 1994/1996, 184-185, Rogel 1998, 48, Redžić 1998, 470, Bojić 2001, 189.
24
Lovrenović 2001, 175.
25
Lovrenović 2001, 176, Donia and Fine 1994, 157 , Redžić 1998, 472, Bojić 2001, 224.
26
Friedman 1996, 125.
27
Redžić 1998, 472.
28
Sells, Michael 1996. The Bridge Betrayed: religion and genocide in Bosnia. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London:
Univerity of California Press, 7.
81
partisans as part of the Bosnian resistance movement, and finally the death toll
figures of the war.
The NDH state in Bosnia and the Involvement of Bosnian Muslims

It is commonly held that in the beginning, most Croats perceived the NDH state as
the achievement of ‘centuries-long’ Croatian dreams of having a single ‘homeland’.
The idea was strengthened by the support for the ustaša state of the Catholic
Church, the highest authority for many Croats.29
Of the 6.3 million people living in the NDH, about 2 million were Serbs, 30
000 Jews, and 750 000 Bosnian Muslims. The ustaša regime immediately adopted
the strategy of getting rid of Jews and Serbs. Serbs were to be eliminated by killing
1/3 of them, by deporting 1/3 to Serbia and by converting 1/3 to Catholicism. It
has been noted how at one point the German military complained to Berlin of the
ustaša regime’s brutality to the Serbs.30 The catholic archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije
Stepinac, publicly spoke against the forced conversion of Serbs to Catholicism, but
his regular visits to the regime gave the conversion campaign a notion of legitimacy
from the side of the church.31 It has also been argued, however, that the pro-ustaša
accusations against Stepinac have mainly resulted from his refusal to establish a
separate national church after the war and to lessen relations with the Vatican, and
from the general demonization of the Catholic Church in Tito’s Yugoslavia.32
The massive and cruel arrests and shootings of Serbs, Jews and Gipsies began in
the beginning of ustaša rule. Serbs were massacred in Mostar and their villages near
Sarajevo, destroyed. Ustašas held concentration camps of which the most notorious
was Jasenovac. The genocidal policies of the NDH induced Serbs to seek revenge.
Many large-scale massacres of Muslims, Croats (on a smaller scale) and others
suspected of ustaša sympathies took place. Thousands of Bosnian Serbs enlisted if
they could in one of the organised resistance movements, either chetniks or
partisans.33
In the course of time, the cruelty, brutality and senseless violence of ustaša mass
atrocities against Serbs and Jews and other religious groups (including Croats) has
apparently troubled the conscience of many Croats who had supported the NDH
in the beginning, but towards the end of the war joined chetniks and partisans.34
The chronic instability of the ustaša regime has been attributed to the brutality of
the ustašas as well as to the resistance of Croats and Serbs.35
29
Donia and Fine 1994, 139, 141, Lovrenović 2001, 172. About the relation of Catholic Chruch also Cohen, Roger
1998. Hearts Grown Brutal: sagas of Sarajevo. New York: Random House, 46.
30
Donia and Fine 1994, 139, Lovrenović 2001, 170, Malcolm 1994/1996, 176-177, Almond 1994, 134, 136.
31
32
Anzulović 1999, 105-106.
33
Malcolm 1994/1996, 176-177, Donia and Fine 1994, 141, Lovrenović 2001, 173, Bojić 2001, 185, 188.
34
Donia and Fine 1994, 139, 141-142, Lovrenović 2001, 172.
35
Almond 1994, 136.
82
The position of Muslims in the NDH seems to have been more complicated.
The ustaša regime publicly held that Muslims were racial Croats who had converted
to Islam and proclaimed the NDH a state with two religions. Leading figures of the
central Muslim organisation JMO (Yugoslavian Muslim Organisation) referred to
themselves as Muslim Croats. The regime is seen to have gained the loyalty of
Muslims by promising them, together with the religious freedom, their own
Muslim schools.36
Despite the respect shown to the Muslim religion, a Croat historian has
emphasised that Pavelić never shared power with Muslims.37 Statistics on Muslim
participation in the functions of NDH state support this; Muslims seem to have
held no key positions in the top levels of the hierarchy and generally their
representation numbers in NDH organs was small.38
One view on the existing Muslim collaboration is that the NDH practised
‘divide et impera’ -politics: seeking to create tensions between Muslims and Serbs.
In Serb-dominated areas, ustaša propaganda stressed that Turks and Ballijas39 were
guilty of genocide against Serbs. At the same time, Muslims were referred to as
”flowers of Croathood” and enjoyed certain privileges in the NDH state even if it
seems clear from the archive documents that ustašas never trusted Muslims.40 Still,
particularly upper-class Muslims cooperated with the ustaša regime. It is held that
Muslim collaborators conducted many ustaša atrocities against the Serbs in Eastern
Herzegovina and in Southeastern Bosnia.41
Historians conclude that disillusionment among many Muslims grew in the
early stages of the NDH state. Their rights were not respected in practise simply
because, in Malcolm’s view, the rule of law failed to operate in the ustaša NDH
state. This led to a series of public resolutions and protests issued by the Muslim
clergy, which condemned the violence committed against Orthodox Serbs and
other fellow citizens. Many Muslims (as well as Croats) also joined the partisan
movement, particularly in 1943, and thereafter contributed significantly to the
movement.42
A Bosnian historian has described the fate of Muslims as ”cultural genocide”
because of the ”violent assimilation of the entire nation” under the NDH. He
presents the case for genocide against Muslims in the Second World War by citing
numerous studies and presentations about the religious and cultural genocide of
Muslims during the war. In addition, he emphasises that the NDH also carried out
36
Malcolm 1994/1996, 185, Lovrenović 2001, 172, Donia and Fine 1994, 141-42.
37
Banac, Ivo 1993. Bosnian Muslims: From Religious Community to Socialist Nationhood and Post-communist
Statehood, 1918-1992. In: Pinson, Mark (ed.) 1996 (1993). The Muslims of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Their Historic
Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia. Second edition. Harvard: Harvard Middle
Eastern Monographs, 142.
38
Bojić 2001, 200-202.
39
”Ballija” is a pejorative expression referring to a Muslim in Bosnia.
40
Bojić 2001, 189, 200, 202.
41
42
Malcolm 1994/1996, 186, Donia and Fine 1994, 142, 163, Lovrenović 2001, 172-173, Bojić 2001, 191-195.
83
physical genocide against Serbs, Jews and Gypsies, and concludes that ”in the
course of the war they (Serbs) were driven to the most difficult situation in their
centuries-long history”.43
Many scholars mention Muslim collaboration with the Germans. Muslim
military units are said to have collaborated with the Germans, committing crimes
against the Serbs and volunteering for the SS division in the thousands. In return
they hoped to gain autonomy for Bosnia under the direct control of the Third
Reich, for that seemed the only possible solution for Bosnian Muslim leaders
unwilling to support the communist partisans.44
Bosnian Resistance
After the German occupation of Yugoslavia, most of the leaders and members of
the royal family left the country. However, a small group of officers and soldiers
form the former Yugoslav army remained under the command of general
Mihailović and formed the nucleus of resistance against the German and Italian
occupation. The chetniks, as the Mihailović’s men called themselves (according to
the name of armed bands of Serbs who as bandits had challenged the Ottoman
rule45), saw Bosnia as Serbian territory according to their extreme Serbian
nationalist ideology. The Yugoslav Communist party under the leadership of Tito
had doubled its membership since the beginning of the war, but still numbered
only 12 000 when it also called upon all Yugoslavs to resist the fascist invaders after
Germany's attack on Russia in June 1941. The two groups are said to have been in
occasional alliances against the Germans in the beginning, but because of
Mihailović's different goals, chetniks soon saw partisans as their enemy and
eventually collaborated with the Italians and Germans against them.46 It has even
been argued that Serbia’s political, intellectual and religious leadership in fact
collaborated with the Axis powers extensively despite the publicly promoted idea of
resistance.47
At an early stage of the war, mainly the Serbs in Bosnia joined the resistance
movements because of their tradition of armed resistance against foreign rule and
because they in particular suffered from ustaša atrocities.48 Some scholars hold that
Serb attacks on Muslim villages in Herzegovina prevented the creation of a joint
front against the NDH, yet the Muslims also collaborated with NDH against the
Serbs. It has also been suggested that there existed a formal agreement between the
ustašas and chetniks in Bosnia in 1942.49
43
Bojić 2001, 185-187, 198-199.
44
Malcolm 1994/1996, 189-190, Lovrenović 2001, 172-173, Bojić 2001, 185-186, 188, 214-216.
45
In order to cultivate the primitive image Serbian chetnik brigades started wearing peasant garbs and grew long hair
and beards. Donia and Fine 1994, 143.
46
Donia and Fine 1994, 143-144, 146, 149-150, Lovrenović 2001, 170., Almond 1994, 127.
47
Cohen 1996, xxi.
48
49
Malcolm 1994/1996, 187-188, Donia and Fine 1994, 142, Lovrenović 2001, 172.
84
Historians have concluded that in the course of the Second World War, the
ustašas expelled the Serbs from Bosnia. After that, chetniks, whose power had
increased with the many angered Serbs that joined them, began their campaign of
terror mainly against the Muslim population. One of the worst massacres is said to
have taken place in Foča.50
Scholars hold slightly different views about the ideology of chetniks and
Mihailović. There seem to have been some chetnik supporters of the open Greater
Serbian policy, while Mihailović himself remained loyal to royal Yugoslavia. The
document commonly used as evidence of this policy of ethnic cleansing51 is a
suspected forgery made by some hard-liner chetniks themselves.52 On the other
hand, thousands of pages in the war-historical archive in Belgrade are said to
include accounts of the chetnik genocide against Muslims during the Second
World War.53 The publication of Serb historians “Genocid nad Muslimana”
(Genocide against Muslims) from 1990 also mentions how the chetniks had a clear,
outspoken goal either to destroy all the Muslims or to send them to Turkey, and to
create a Greater Serbia. Mihailović is also quoted as having written ’wherever there
is a Serbian grave there is Serbian land’.54
The official history-writing of socialist Yugoslavia presented the partisan war
led by Tito as a heroic national epic of the defeat of the Germans. After the Tito
era, however, historians have come to suggest that in reality the partisan fight rather
meant going around in circles, and that larce-scale fighting between partisans and
the Axis powers mainly only took place when the Axis commanders took the
initiative to eliminate the partisans from certain areas. The destruction of Tito’s
forces was never high on Hitler’s list of priorities, and the claims of ”pinning down”
large numbers of German divisions are also questionable since, in the beginning of
1943, there were only four German divisions present in the whole of Yugoslavia.
The war against the chetniks is believed to have dominated Tito’s strategy. Partisans
are given some credit for their own successes, but they likely benefited from Allied
victories towards the end of the war.55
Based on research in the archives of all the parties to the war it has been
suggested that NDH-ustašas, chetniks and Muslim autonomists, all depending
Germany's support, were quite weak in Bosnia when the Partisan National
Liberation Movement appeared with a new political program for the future of
Bosnia.56 Thus, popular support for partisans was particularly strong in Bosnia.
Serbs started to support partisans on one hand because of the increasing military-
political influence, and on the other hand because the Allied forces no longer
supported the chetniks. Muslims had apparently joined partisan forces en masse as
50
Bojić 2001, 208-212, Banac 1993, 142-143, Cohen 1998, 39.
51
referred e.g. in Banac 1993, 143 and in Lovrenović 2001, 170.
52
Malcolm 1994/1996, 179.
53
Bojić 2001, 206-207.
54
55
Malcolm 1994/1996, 181-182, Lovrenović 2001, 174, Donia and Fine 1994, 150-151, 154, Almond 1994, 148.
56
Redžić 1998, 470-471.
85
a result of the open conflict between partisans and chetniks that convinced Muslims
of partisan opposition to chetniks. Partisans also forbid Serb attacks against
Muslims villages, which helped to draw Muslims to partisan forces. In fact, the
most intense struggles between the partisans and their opponents occurred in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.57 It has been mentioned that in Bosnia the partisans were
great in numbers but weaker in their organisation than in Croatia or Slovenia.58
Generally it has been suggested that the resistance movement during the Second
World War was strongest in Croatia.59
All the scholars agree that the inter-ethnic policies of partisans drew people to
join. In Bosnia, Croats and Muslims feared revenge for ustaša actions, but partisans
succeeded in winning their widespread support. The partisan movement apparently
offered a real political alternative to inter-ethnic extermination of which the best
proof is that people of all nationalities and religions in BiH participated in it. In the
beginning the majority of forces were rural Serbs but other nationalities seem to
have joined in large numbers later in the war. In 1944, Tito recorded that 44% of
partisans were Serbs, a percentage that, according to scholars, probably understated
the extent of their participation.60
The success of the partisans has been explained through their ideology. They
seem to have shed Serb exclusivity in Bosnia and taken up the idea of Bosnian
statehood as one of their aims. In a quote from 1940, Tito said ”Bosnia is one,
because of its centuries-old common life, regardless of confession”. Generally the
partisan literature from the period suggests there was no attempt to define the
Muslims in any specific ”ethnic” sense but to recognise them as a distinct
community with rights equal to those of Serbs and Croats. Partisans also seem to
have managed to assert that the nations of Yugoslavia would be treated equally,
unlike Greater Serbian centralism and extreme nationalism. The national policies of
Tito and the partisans merged into the slogan ‘brotherhood and unity’.61
During the war, partisan authorities organised a number of political events
considered important to the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. The
meetings of ZAVNOBiH (Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina) and AVNOJ (Antifascist Council for the National
Liberation of Yugoslavia) in 1943 are believed to have defined the character and
political-administrative individuality of BiH in relation to other Yugoslav republics.
The meetings also guaranteed the complete equality of all Bosnian nations based on
the “equality of the Serbs, Muslims and Croats of BiH, their common and
indivisible homeland”.62
57
Donia and Fine 1994, 148, 152-53, Malcolm 1994/1996, 187, Redžić 1998, 470-471, Bojić 2001, 220-221.
58
Goldstein, Ivo 1999. Croatia: A History. Translated from Croatian by Nikolina Jovanović. London: Hurst &
Company, 143.
59
Cohen 1996, 135.
60
Donia and Fine 1994,152-53, Lovrenović 2001, 174, 177.
61
Banac 1993, 144, Bojić 2001, 189, Donia and Fine 1994, 146-147.
62
86
Scholars mention briefly the work of Tito’s army at the end of war, and how
they wanted to eliminate opposition. Large and varied mass of people trying to
escape new socialist Yugoslavia were delivered to partisans at the Austrian border. 63
Almond emphasises how at the end of the war communists came into power by
force, massacring their enemies and destroying those who did not join their cause in
time.64 A Croat historian notes that the border crossing was called Bleiburg and
that altogether probably some 134 000 people were killed or taken on death
marches called “the Way to the Cross” and then kept in camps for months.65 In
addition, the new regime arrested and killed “their enemies in the months and years
that followed”.66 A Bosnian historian concludes: “The new, partisan Bosnia and
Herzegovina hoped for and believed in the irreversibility of the darkness of its past,
and nurtured expectations and illusions of its future. But the reality was over-
pragmatic. As always in history, victory in war brought peace which served the
victor.”67
Numbers of the WW2

The numbers of victims of the Second World War in Yugoslavia and Bosnia remain
a source of contention. Immediately after the war, Yugoslav authorities announced
to the International Reparations Commission without documentation a figure of 1
706 000 victims. In the 1960s, Germany requested a list of war victims, for which a
figure lower than 600 000 was offered. The data were finally published in 1997,
but in a very limited edition and with controlled distribution.68
One subject of heated debate has been the number of Serbs who died in the
Jasenovac camp of the ustašas.69 The claims of Serb nationalists range from 700 000
to 1.1 million, which Almond has called as “demographically impossible death
tolls”70, while Franjo Tuđjman, historian and president of Croatia from 1990 to
1999, claimed that only 60 000 to 70 000 Serbs perished in the camp. On the basis
of his research, Tuđjman pressed the view that the Independent State of Croatia
was less a criminal regime than a legitimate expression of the Croatian quest for
sovereignty. Some Croat nationalists have argued that Tito’s government overstated
the death toll for political purposes.71
Milan Bulajić, a Serbian lawyer, who has worked obsessively on this theme for
years, completed in 1996 a list of 19 554 children under the age of 14 murdered in
the NDH camp Jasenovac, 12 113 of whom were Serbs. Based on this, Bulajić
estimated that the total number of victims in Jasenovac amounted to about
63
Malcolm 1994/1996, 193, Lovrenović 2001, 174, Donia and Fine 1994, 155.
64
Almond 1994, 150.
65
Goldstein 1999, 155-156.
66
Malcolm 1994/1996, 193, Lovrenović 2001, 174, Donia and Fine 1994, 155, Goldstein 1999, 155-156.
67
Redžić 1998, 472.
68
Anzulović 1999, 100-101.
69
70
Almond 1994, 137.
71
Donia and Fine 1994, 140-141, Rogel 1998, 48, Sells 1996, 61, Cohen 1998, 37, 101.
87
200 000, and that the Pavelić NDH-regime killed over 600 000.72 Another scholar,
Sells, has used the estimate of 300 000 deaths in Jasenovac. His figure includes
nationalities other than Serb, and thus comes quite close to Bulajić.73 Serbian
historian Bogoljub Kocović and Croat historian Vladimir Žerjavić have
independently conducted “the most rigorous research”74 which indicates that
between 295 000 and 334 000 Serbs died in the territory of the NDH state during
the war. It remains unclear how many of them were killed in battles, but it seems
that ustaša murdered at least 100 000 Serb civilians.75 Almond refers to similar
figures, suggesting that ustašas killed perhaps about 325 000 Serbs in the NDH,
and about 60 000 of them in Jasenovac.76
Another war of numbers fought mainly in Croatia has been over the number of
deaths in Bleiburg (the border-crossing between Croatia and Austria) at the end of
the war. Cohen, Donia and Fine have referred to”thousands killed” while Croat
historian Ivo Golstein has estimated that 45 000 to 55 000 former ustašas and
domobrans were killed in Bleiburg and in the death marches that followed.
Lovrenović has referred to ”an unknown but large number” of people in that
context, while Almond estimates the British handed over to partisans between 20
000 and 30 000 people.77 While Malcolm has not estimated the Bleiburg figures,
he has referred to estimates that 1945–46 up to 250 000 people perished in Tito’s
mass shootings, forced death marches and concentration camps. Goldstein has
considered the estimate of 250 000 partisan victims as a probable exaggeration.78
Bojić has estimated the number of chetnik victims between 36 000 and 50 000,
and the number of victims during the war in the whole Bosnia and Herzegovina,
410 000. Of them, 210 000 were Bosnian Serbs, 100 000 ”Muslim-Bosniacs”, 80
000 Croats, 10 000 Jews, 5000 Gipsies and 4000 to 5000 other nationalities. The
Serb figure is also used elsewhere, but Bojić’s Muslim figure is 25% higher than
that of Malcolm. Malcolm has noted that Serbs lost 7.3% of their total population
in Yugoslavia, while Bosnian Muslims lost 8.1% %. Rogel, however, has noted that
16.9% of the Serb population in Bosnia died. Finally, it has also been noted that
the number of Muslims killed will always remain unknown for they have been
listed both as Serbs and Croats. Malcolm has emphasised that, to defend
themselves, Muslims fought on all sides even though they had not started the war.79
Many scholars are very cautious when giving figures for these matters.80 In any
case, the losses on all sides are clearly overwhelming. Malcolm has concluded for all
72
Cohen 1998, 37.
73
Sells 1996, 95.
74
Cohen 1998, 37.
75
Cohen 1998, 37.
76
Almond 1994, 137.
77
Almond 1994, 150.
78
Cohen 1998, 44, Goldstein 1999, 155-156, Malcolm 1994/1996, 193, Lovrenović 2001, 170, Donia and Fine
1994, 155.
79
Bojić 2001, 205, 212, Rogel 1998, 48, Malcolm 1994/1996, 192.
80
Lovrenović 2001, Donia and Fine 1994.
88
of Yugoslavia: ”But it is clear that at least one million died, and it is probable that
the majority of them were Yugoslavs killed by Yugoslavs.”81
4.3 The National Question

4.3.1 THE EMERGENCE OF ETHNIC GROUPS AND THE ISLAMISATION OF BOSNIA
Through recent research in several archives on the ethnic roots of the Balkan
people, it has been shown that scholars have used almost all sources and stories at
different times in their writings whenever the question of ethnic roots of Balkan
people has been at stake. This “anything goes” practise seems to have resulted from
the small number of sources generally available and their dispersion.82
Before the 19th Century, the population of Bosnia could be described as “Slavs
who lived in Bosnia”.83 The labels ‘Serb’ or ‘Croat’ seem to have referred to
geographical regions while the overall label ‘Bosnian’ referred to a shared
geographical identity.84 Serbs were characteristically children of Slav ancestors who
moved south sometime around the 6th Century and converted to Christianity
sometime after the 9th Century, while Bosnian Muslims were children of those same
Slav ancestors who moved south at the same time, but converted to Islam sometime
after the 15th Century. All of them spoke Serbo-Croatian.85 Among Bosnian
Muslims still hold three theories of their own ancestry. Some Muslims believe they
are ethno-genetically Croat, others believe they are ethnically Serb, while some
believe Bosnian Muslims have acquired a special identity and despite their origins
cannot be equated with Serbs and Croats.86
In the Ottoman period, people were divided not according to their ethnic
background but according to their religion; ethnic identities were products of late
19th Century developments when Catholic Bosnians became Croats and Orthodox
Bosnians became Serbs. Bosnian Muslims did not adopt a national identity, yet
they belonged to a dominant social and political class.87 The secularisation of
Bosnian Muslims that continued throughout the Habsburg and Yugoslav periods
permitted “Serbo-Croat rivalry” over Bosnian Muslims, and there were attempts to
81
Malcolm 1994/1996, 174. See also Friedman 1996, 117.
82
Jezernik, Božidar 2000. Zemlja u kojoj sve naopako. Prilozi za Etnologiju Balkana. Translated by Medina Delalic.
Sarajevo: Bemust.
83
Malcolm 1994/1996, 12.
84
Donia and Fine 1994, 25, 71.
85
Davis, Scott G. 1996. Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia. New York: Routledge, xiiv, Fine, John V. A.
1993. The Medieval and Ottoman Roots of Modern Bosnian Society. In: Pinson, Mark (ed.) 1993/1996. The
Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of
Yugoslavia. Second edition. Cambridge: Harward University Press, 2.
86
Ramet, Sabrina Petra 1989/1994. Primordial Ethnicity or Modern Nationalism: The Case of Yugoslavia’s
Muslims, Reconsidered. In: Kappeler, Andreas, Simon Gerhard, Brunner, Georg (ed. German edition 1989) and
Allworth, Edward (ed. English edition 1994). Muslim Communities Re-emerge: historical perspectives on
nationality, politics and opposition in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Durham NC and London: Duke
University Press, 116.
87
Rogel 1998, 47, Malcolm 1994/1996, 200, Fine 1993, 19-20, Cohen 1998, 70.
89
convince Muslims that they did not constitute a separate national group and that it
was progressive to choose between Serb and Croat identities.88
Many consider the islamisation of a large part of the Bosnian population under
the Turks the most important and problematic feature of modern Bosnian
historiography as it has been a source of many myths that enjoy the support of
earlier scholarly literature and “not-so-scholarly” modern works.89 Although the
problem of islamisation in Bosnia has occupied scholars (mainly Bosnian Muslim
scholars) for nearly a century, among Bosnian historians the question remains an
open scholarly problem.90
Four common myths emerge in relation to the massive islamisation of Bosnia
during the Ottoman period: the mass settlement of Muslims from outside Bosnia in
the beginning of the Ottoman period; the massive, forced conversion of Bosnians
in the beginning of the Ottoman era; the mass conversion of members of the
medieval Bosnian church; and the en masse convertion of Christian nobility to
Islam to retain their feudal estates. History research has downplayed these myths;
Ottoman tax records indicate no mass settling of Turks, the conversion occurred
over many generations, two to three competing churches (Bosnian, Catholic,
Orthodox) were fractured and weak and some Islamic and Christian folk practises
even mixed, and the nobility theory collapsed already in the 1930s.91
Probable causes of islamisation (by the end of the 16th Century it seems that
most of the population in the area of modern Bosnia was Muslim) include the
devsirme system, the privileged status of Muslims in the Ottoman empire where
Islam was the religion of those in power, slavery (Ottoman slaves could apply for
freedom if they converted to Islam), and urbanisation (people embraced Islam to
take part of the development in such cities as Sarajevo). Finally, the influx of
already islamicised Slavs from outside Bosnia’s borders, particularly during the 17th
Century, as a result of the Ottoman retreat from Croatian and Hungarian areas
increased the number of Muslims in Bosnia. Compared to other Ottoman lands,
the survival of the Muslim population and of Islamic monuments in Bosnia
following Turkish rule is considered the only unique feature of Bosnian
islamisation, thanks to the absence of cultural and ethnic cleansing.92 To describe
the complex religious shifting in Bosnia between Islam, Catholicism, Orthodoxy
and the medieval Bosnian Church, some have proposed the term “acceptance of
Islam” instead of “conversion to Islam”.93
88
Banac 1993, 134.
89
Malcolm 1994/1996, 51-52, see also Aleksov 2002, 14.
90
Redžić, Enver 2000. Sto godina muslimanske politike. U tezama i kontroverzama istorijske nauke. Sarajevo:
Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine, Institut ya istoriju u Sarajevu, 200.
91
Malcolm 1994/1996, 52-54, 57-59, 63.
92
Malcolm 1994/1996, 53, 66-69, Fine 1993, 18, Heywood, Colin 1993. Bosnia Under Ottoman Rule 1463-1800.
In: Pinson, Mark (ed.) 1993/1996. The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their Historic Development from the
Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia. Second edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 39, 41, Redžić
2000, 200.
93
Fine 1993, 12, 15-16, 19, Sells 1996, 36.
90
4.3.2 THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA

The creation of the First Yugoslavia, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, at
the end of the First World War is considered the result of Wilson and his European
allies’ idea to support national freedom without expansionist monarchies together
with the notion of South Slav unification, a popular idea at least among Serb, Croat
and Slovene intellectuals.94 Thus, the arrangements of the victorious powers rather
than “the centuries-old aspirations of our peoples” (the view held by the official
historians of both Yugoslavias) resulted in the creation of the First Yugoslavia.95
The dominant attitude among Bosnian Muslims was that divisions between
Muslims and other communities had softened as a result of WWI, and the Muslims
of Bosnia supported the Yugoslav state.96
Some scholars claim that perceptions of the different nations of Yugoslavia
differed from the start; for Serbs, Yugoslavia was to be ruled by a Serbian dynasty
and led by Serbian army officers, bureaucrats and parliamentarians. Serbs seem to
have felt a particular affinity for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croats and Slovenes, on
the other hand, conceived Yugoslavia as a partnership of equals and, even though
they admired Serbs for their military prowess, they looked down on them as
peasants.97 Almost immediately, however, Croats in particular felt deceived because
of the country's social divisions.98
Historians refer to the agrarian question as the major national dilemma in
Bosnia in the First Yugoslavia. Traditionally, Muslims had been the landlords. In
the census of 1910, Muslims comprised 91.15% of the landlords while the
Orthodoxs comprised 73.92 of all Serfs or sharecroppers, and Croats, 21.49%.
Thus the agrarian question in Bosnia could only be solved at the expense of one
confessional community when, after the war, Serbs who had been fighting in the
Serbian army wanted to end the feudal relations as the army had promised. Finally,
over a million hectares of land were taken from their owners and given to some
150 000 to 250 000 mainly Serb peasant families who had served in the Serbian
army, and the previous owners received compensations in cash and bonds.99
The First Yugoslavia has been deemed entirely incapable of handling its
problems, and it fell deeper into corruption, national antagonism and criminality.
A mass exodus of Muslims to Turkey is said to have taken place as social
antagonism between towns and the countryside grew and raised complicated ethno-
religious tensions because of the land reforms.100 Muslim leaders publicly stated
that the political system in Yugoslavia had features of the “destruction of
94
Donia and Fine 1994, 120, Cohen 1998, 13-14.
95
96
Malcolm 1994/1996, 161.
97
98
Almond 1994, 118.
99
Donia and Fine 1994, 124, 127, Malcolm 1994/1996, 162-163, Lovrenović 2001, 160, Banac 1984/1988, 367,
Bojić 2001, 164.
100
91
Muslims”.101 Scholars have emphasised that attacks on Muslims occurred in

unusual circumstances and cannot be considered proof of ”ancient ethnic hatreds”.
At that time, some Serbs from Serbia considered Muslims their enemies, but this
was never the case among Bosnian Serbs. The violent events were principally social
conflicts.102 Serbian troops which came to Bosnia and occupied many territories are
said to have stopped the unrest. Afterwards, however, Serb officials began to replace
Bosnian Muslims in key positions.103 Generally Serbs seem to have attained
favorable positions in the army and in the service sector.104
Serbs, Croats and Muslims all had their own political parties in the First
Yugoslavia. The firm support of the JMO (Yugoslavian Muslim Organisation)
throughout the era of royal Yugoslavia is considered a testimony of “the solid
foundation of the Bosnian Muslim identity”.105 A Bosnian historian mentions that
some Serbs and Croats also supported JMO’s autonomy policies.106 In fact, JMO
was a practical political movement that tolerated the free expression of nationality
and focused on the indivisibility and autonomy of Bosnia. For example, in 1920
more than half of its leading members declared themselves Croats (majority) and
Serbs.107 Generally, however, Bosnian Serbs supported two main Serbian parties
(radicals and democrats) and the Serbian Agrarian Party, while Bosnian Croats
mainly supported the Croatian Peasant Party.108 It has been stressed that the
political tensions of the First Yugoslavia existed mainly outside Bosnia,109 yet
Bosnian Muslims were, especially during the initial phase of unified Yugoslavia,
systematically excluded from regional and local administrations and subject to
stereotyped public harassment as “Asians”, unstable, parasitical and even
perverted.110
The Vidovan Constitution of June 1921 retained the historical boundaries of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and passed with the votes of the JMO.111 Documents from
the inter-war years show that many prominent people publicly declared themselves
Muslim-Croats and Muslim-Serbs for political, cultural and economic reasons. The
slow process of secularisation that had started after the Ottoman defeat in 1878 also
supported this process.112
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia, proclaimed in 1929 under dictatorial leadership
of King Alexander, is said to have changed the national question in Yugoslavia. The
new Yugoslav unitarism meant proclaiming the single Yugoslav nation, hence the
101
Banac 1984/1988, 368.
102
Malcolm 1994/1996, 162-163, Donia and Fine 1994, 112.
103
104
Almond 1994, 128-129.
105
106
Bojić 2001, 165.
107
Banac 1984/1988, 374-375.
108
109
Malcolm 1994/1996, 168.
110
Banac 1984/1988, 371-372.
111
112
Malcolm 1994/1996, 166-167.
92
ban on all political parties and associations based on confessional and ethnic
grounds; even the Communist party was banned. Yugoslavia was divided into nine
banovinas with no respect for historical boundaries. Muslims became a minority
everywhere and even the integrity of Serbian territory was not respected, although
new appointments favoured them largely at the expense of Muslims.113 Scholars
also hold that Alexander’s rule remained essentially Serbian despite the name
“Yugoslavia”.114
King Alexander's assassination in 1934 is considered a national act as it was
plotted by the Croatian fascist ustaša movement.115
In 1939 discussions between Serbian and Croatian politicians took place
without the participation of the people of Bosnia, or even Serbs or Croats. The
resulting Cvetković–Maček agreement created an autonomous Croatian banovina.
Western and Central Herzegovina, where Croats were the majority in many rural
areas, were added to the Croatian banovina.116
4.3.3 TITO’S NATIONAL POLITICS

Besides the radical changes in Yugoslav society, the Second World War may have
resulted in consequencies of great importance for the national question and later
events. First, the Serb positions in the Partisan command partly remained in the
Yugoslav army. Second, Bosnia became the focal point of the Yugoslav defense
theory and the centre of Yugoslav munitions production in the post-war years. And
finally, the Yugoslav ideal was reborn in a new form which gave its citizens a chance
to create a new ideology based on the slogan 'brotherhood and unity'.117
'Titoism' has been characterised as having involved three approaches to
nationalities in Yugoslavia for which the common ground was the general principle
of equality (brotherhood and unity) and federalism with the six republics of
Yugoslavia. The first approach from 1942 to approximately 1948 reflected Stalinist
policies and emphasised national equality and the right of self-determination for the
five officially recognised nationalities. The approach posted two critical questions:
what nationalities would be recognised, and how would the territorial borders be
drawn? The constitution of 1946 recognised five nations: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes,
Macedonians and Montenegrins. Considerable disagreement over the political and
territorial status of Bosnia arose among the leading Yugoslav communists, and
many considered the Muslim population a religious group which should declare
itself either Serb or Croat or remain nationally undetermined.118 Some historians,
however, hold that the distinct nature of Muslims in the national sense was
recognised and that it appears in archive documents which deal with Muslims in
113
114
Almond 1994, 124.
115
116
117
Donia and Fine 1994,155-56.
118
Donia and Fine 1994, 147-148, 160, Bojić 2001, 223, Banac 1993, 144, Lovrenović 2001, 179.
93
the same manner as with Serbs and Croats.119 Others have interpreted the literature
of the period as not attempting to define Muslims in any specific ethnic or national
sense, but recognising them as a community with rights equal to those of Serbs and
Croats.120 Tito is also mentioned as being careful to recognise the distinct status of
Muslims in several declarations and appeals, although they were not accorded the
status of a nation. In the census of 1948 in socialist Yugoslavia, respondents could
separately indicate their religion (!) and nationality; 89% of those in Bosnia who
declared themselves Muslims elected to remain nationally undetermined, 8% of
them elected to be Serbs, and 3% Croats.121
During the second approach from the late 1940s up to the 1960s, Bosnian
Muslims have been considered the core of the strategy to emphasise Yugoslav
nationality as more sophisticated than the separate nationalities and as an eventual
outcome of socialism. In the census of 1953, a new category replaced the Muslim
option: ‘Yugoslav, nationally undeclared’, with which most Muslims seem to have
identified.122
The third approach from the 1960s onwards openly encouraged national
expression as part of state liberalisation and decentralisation, and the authority of
the Party resulted in the recognition of Muslims as a distinct nationality. In the
1961 census they could declare themselves ‘Muslims in the ethnic sense’ and the
1963 constitution guaranteed them equal rights. In the census of 1971, Muslims
were considered ‘Muslims in the sense of a nationality’.123
This period has mainly been characterised by the rise of national problems. In
the late 1960s and early 1970s Croatians had a growing list of grievances, and a
Croat analysis of 1971 also showed how Croats were underrepresented in the
Bosnian administration, which resulted in a quota system based on one-of-each
appointments. The system has been considered “cumbersome”, and as a whole
Tito’s policies of replacing Croat leaders in Zagreb and elsewhere are believed
merely to have driven Croatian nationalism underground, not eliminate it.124 In the
following years, leaders in Belgrade and Novi Sad (the capital of Vojvodina) were
also removed as conspiracy theories among Serbs about “losing” Kosovo,
Macedonia and Vojvodina in socialist Yugoslavia intensified. The Albanian
population in Kosovo grew as the Serb and Montenegrin population dwindled
from 27.9% in 1953 to 10% by 1987, which led to violent student-led protests in
1981. Anti-Serb riots and the albanisation of schooling and other functions from
119
Bojić 2001, 222. Also Lovrenović mentions that the separate ethnic, cultural and national affiliation of Muslims
was recognised and understood at early phase of Titoist Yugoslavia. Lovrenović 2001, 179.
120
Banac 1993, 144
121
Donia and Fine 1994, 147, 175-176.
122
Donia and Fine 1994, 175, Malcolm 1994/1996, 198.
123
Donia and Fine 1994, 178, Höpken, Wolfgang 1989/1994. Yugoslavia’s Communists and the Bosnian Muslims.
In: Kappeler, Andreas, Simon Gerhard, Brunner, Georg (ed. German edition 1989) and Allworth, Edward (ed.
English edition 1994). Muslim Communities Re-emerge: historical perspectives on nationality, politics and
opposition in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Durham NC and London: Duke University Press, 231-232.
124
Malcolm 1994/1996, 203-204, Donia and Fine 1994, 182-183, Karjalainen, Erkki and Valta, Raija 2000. Balkan
kolkuttaa Euroopan omaatuntoa. Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 30.
94
1968 onwards made Kosovo a permanent crisis area and the main focus of Serbian
nationalism.125
Generally the trend towards the decentralisation of Yugoslavia in this period
culminated in a new constitution in 1974. The central Party organs and the federal
government ceded power to the republics, which seem to have behaved as mini-
states since.126 The constitution itself has been characterised as “Orwellian” because
it sought “a utopia of democratic, socialist self-management, bereit of nationalist
divisiveness…the world’s longest and perhaps most complicated constitution…a
recipe for chaos, disintegration and economic decline”.127
Since the late 1960s, Tito’s new federalism has been interpreted as Tito’s hope
to produce a Yugoslav identity into which at least ethnic and religious differences
would dissolve.128 The emphasis on federalism, however, increased bureaucracy
more than democracy, and the contradiction between the Communist party and
pluralism seems to have weakened the idea of Yugoslavia that did exist.129
In addition to dividing Tito’s national approaches into different periods, the
socialist period in Bosnia has been divided into two parts.130 The first two decades
were characterised by “social cleansing“. The totalitarian, Stalinist policies of Tito
were directed mainly against religion, and he was particularly harsh against the
Catholic Church and Croats accused of being loyal to the NDH. The Orthodox
church benefited from the fact that some of their priests had served in the partisan
army. Bosnian Islam was considered a religion but its social practices were
threatened, and as a consequence Muslim organisations were banned, Muslim
schools were prohibited, and Islamic books could not be published before 1964.
On the other hand, Muslims were not attacked for their collaboration with the
NDH state because of their contribution to the partisan struggle.131
In the second period starting from the mid-1960s, the crisis of relations
between Yugoslav nations likely caused the party to decide that the national
equality of Muslims, Serbs and Croats was central, and therefore the party decided
to strengthen the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The period altered the way
people lived; at the end of WWII there were only 56 kilometres of asphalt road in
Bosnia, but as a result of the massive construction campaign in the late 1960s,
asphalt roads soon extended to 3000 kilometres. Schools, libraries, telephone and
electricity lines were also built.132
125
Donia and Fine 1994, 183-84, Malcolm 1994/1996, 204-205.
126
Donia and Fine 1994, 190-191, Malcolm 1994/1996, 202, Woodward, Susan L. 1995. Balkan Tragedy. Chaos
and Dissolution After the Cold War. Washington: Brookings, 45.
127
Cohen 1998, 104-105.
128
Almond 1994, 163.
129
Cohen 1998, 53-55.
130
Lovrenović 2001, 180-183.
131
Donia and Fine 1994, 162-164, Malcolm 1994/1996, 194-195, Lovrenović 2001, 180-183.
132
Lovrenović 2001, 180-183. Also Malcolm notes the change in till then Serb dominated policy but does not see
any clear reason for it. Malcolm 1994/1996, 198.
95
Scholars have been keen to analyse the role of Bosnian Muslims in this period,
and the socialist period as a whole has been considered “the rise of the Bosnian
Muslims” in a national sense. Muslims seem to have contributed to and benefited
from the Yugoslav leadership of the time in the non-alignment movement, which
included many Islamic countries or countries with substantial Muslim
populations.133 Yet, the recognition of Muslims as a nation seems to have been led
by Communists and other secular Muslims who wanted the Muslim identity to
develop into something non-religious by definition.134 It has been noted that the
official authorisation of mosque building and the toleration of public piety did not
lessened the secular character of Bosnia or Bosnian Muslims in the 1970s and
1980s. Instead the peculiarities of Bosnian Muslim socialist nationhood became
accepted in the Bosnian Muslim community; in fact one could be a Muslim by
nationality and a Jehovah’s Witness by religion, as was a commonplace in one
Bosnian town.135 Muslims of Bosnia seem to have adopted all the characteristics of
a modern nation in Titoist Yugoslavia and Tito’s nation-building in Bosnia as a
huge success by conventional standards.136 The majority of Bosnian Muslims and
many Bosnian Serbs, Croats, Jews, Gipsies and others started to reject the
identification of religion and nationhood and considered themselves Bosnian, and
in the census of 1981 the number of Yugoslavs in Bosnia rose from 44 000 to
326 000, a figure accepted as evidence of the waning of Islam.137
Urban development also influenced the national question. While the old town
centres had often been divided into ethnic neighbourhoods, the newly built socialist
blocks became ethno-nationally mixed communities. Schools and workplaces were
mixed and mixed marriages became acceptable in Bosnian cities and towns so that
by the 1990s, 40% of urban couples were ethnically mixed. It became harder to
determine the ethnic identification of Bosnians by name as secular naming practises
became common.138 It has been noted that mixed marriages and new urban
generations helped Bosnians to forget the hatreds and tragedies of WWII.139
Despite the urbanization making Bosnian cities melting pots, scholars note us that
most of the villagers remained ethnically segregated.140
133
Donia and Fine 1994, 172-173, 175.
134
Malcolm 1994/1996, 200.
135
Banac 1993, 145-146.
136
Glenny, Misha 1992. The Fall of Yugoslavia. The Third Balkan War. London: Penguin Books, 140, Shoup 1998,
280.
137
Sells 1996, 8, Almond 1994, 180.
138
Donia and Fine 1994, 185-186. Bringa has argued that the common Bosnian Yugoslav identity was the strongest
among those educated in 1950s and 1960s. Bringa, Tone 1995. Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: identity and
community in a Central Bosnian village. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 4.
139
Sells 1996, 7.
140
Donia and Fine 1994, 186. Proof of this is also seen in the mixed marriage figures: for all of Bosnia, including
both urban and rural areas, mixed marriages accounted for approximately 18% of all marriages in 1989 and 1990,
and 15% in 1991, while the urban approximation has been 30-40%. Human Development Report Bosnia and
Herzegovina 2000. Youth. UNDP: Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues, 59. Tone Bringa's anthropological
account of life in one central Bosnian village in the late 1980s also demonstrates the ethnic segregation of daily lives
in a traditional community. Bringa 1995.
96
4.3.4 THE NATIONAL QUESTION AT THE END OF YUGOSLAVIA

Scholars believe the trials of Muslim141 and Serb142 nationalists in the 1980s
revealed great concern within the Bosnian communist party about the revival of
national extremism in post-Tito years. The working coalition within the Party
mainstream, however, was considered effective from a national point of view during
the final years of Yugoslavia. All three major national groups supported the
preservation of the Yugoslav Federation. Also, the parliament and the Bosnian army
remained multi-ethnic during the first years of the war.143 In the last census in
1991, about 44% registered as Muslims, 31% as Serbs, 17% as Croats, and 6% as
Yugoslavs, which shows the increase in people who considered themselves primarily
Yugoslavs, not only in Bosnia but in the whole of Yugoslavia.144
At the same time, national propaganda worked and Western journalists have
been seen as echoing the propaganda ideologues by suddenly starting to portray
Tito as a tyrant who suppressed national aspirations and relied on repression to stay
in power. This has been considered ironic in light of Tito's campaign at the expense
of central power over his last 10 to 20 years.145
According to all accounts, the rise of Milošević to power in Serbia since 1987
has been central to the national question in the last years of Yugoslavia.
Disintegration of the communist party in Bosnia in 1990 resulted in the formation
of national parties. From 1989, the presence of Serb president Milošević and Croat
president Tuđjman in the politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina was evident. It meant
that the main Serb party in Bosnia was SDS, Milošević’s party, while the Bosnian
Croat version of Tuđjman’s HDZ party became the main Croat party of Bosnia.146
In early 1991, Milošević and Tuđjman met separately from other republican
presidents and secretly agreed to partition Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia.147
The collapse of the Yugoslavian communist party in 1990 left Yugoslavia with
only one institution with a Yugoslav orientation: the Yugoslav People's Army,
which had endorsed the Yugoslav ideal of national brotherhood and unity but never
eliminated the preponderance of Serbs and Montenegrins in the officer corps. All
nationalities were well represented in the enlisted ranks.148
141
13 Muslims were persecuted in 1983, among them the later president Alija Izetbegović. The trials have been seen
as taking place because the secular Muslim leadership wanted to ensure that the newly recognised Muslim nationality
was secular rather than religious at the same time when the nationalistic affiliations in Serbia had increased. Donia
and Fine 1994, 200-201. Malcolm 1994/1996, 208.
142
Vojislav Šešelj, who openly declared himself a chetnik in 1990, was tried for spreading hostile propaganda in
1984. Donia and Fine 1994, 201.
143
144
Donia and Fine 1994, 263-264, Bennett 1996, 8, 113, Lautela, Yrjö and Palo, Sauli 1992. Jugoslavia.
Kansakunta, jota ei ollut. Helsinki: VAPK-kustannus, 191.
145
146
Malcolm 1994/1996, 217.
147
148
97
The first multi-party elections in Bosnia as a part of Yugoslavia have been seen
as a way back to First Yugoslavia; Bosnians voted for ethnically-based parties and
one party achieved a majority among each nationality (the SDS among Serbs, the
SDA among Muslims and the HDZ among Croats) .149 In March 1992, a
referendum on the independence of Bosnia was organised. At that point Bosnian
Serbs, with Radovan Karadzić as their leader, had already established their
‘autonomous Serb regions’ within Bosnia. The Serb Democratic Party (SDS)
forbade Serbs to vote, but a considerable number of them is known to have voted
especially in towns.150 In the same referendum, the HDZ, working closely with the
same party in Zagreb, sought a referendum on the nationally-organised cantons as a
solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the Bosnian Croat public, intellectuals
and church leaders are said to have opposed it. The majority of Bosnian Croats in
rural Western Herzegovina and in some parts of central Bosnia wanted to secede
from Bosnia and become part of Croatia, while Croats in cities and towns and in
central and northern Bosnia with long tradition of multi-ethnic tradition opposed
ethnic division and supported pro-Bosnian politics. 151
4.4 Bosnia in 1990s

4.4.1 THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA
For Bosnia, the Winter Olympics of Sarajevo in 1984 had a great propaganda and
media effect, and Sarajevo became a city connected firmly with contemporary
Europe and the world.152 Simultaneously, however, Yugoslavia’s economic decline
had grown more severe after Tito’s death in 1980. Despite the success and
optimism brought by the Olympics, a general sense of economic malaise was
common in the whole of Yugoslavia. By the end of the decade, inflation was rising
out of control, debt grew, output fell and unemployment increased, which lead
British economist Harold Lydall to note in 1989 that such a decline in living
standards in any other country would most likely have resulted in strong reaction,
radical political change or even revolution.153 The general uncertainty and
instability in the country paved the way for national politics to rise as we saw
previously. Journalists have also mentioned the lack of knowledge of and contact
with Europe, which had resulted mainly from cooperation with Third World
countries through the movement of non-aligned countries, as an additional
problem for Yugoslavia in the 1980s.154 Finally, one generation had practically been
excluded from politics during the 1970s for fear of rising nationalism, and the
governing elite still consisted of aged partisans even in the 1980s, which has also
149
150
Donia and Fine 1994, 238 and Malcolm 1994/1996, 224-225, 227, Lovrenović 2001, 195.
151
Lovrenović 2001, 197, Goldstein 1999, 239, Donia and Fine 1994, 248-250.
152
153
Donia and Fine 1994, 195, 199, Cohen 1998, 105.
154
Karjalainen and Valta 2000, 35.
98
been considered a contributing factor to the death of Yugoslavia. There was plenty
of debate about reform, but not in the same sense of urgency as in other countries
of Europe in the 1980s.155
Thus, it can be said that Yugoslav society suffered from many problems of
underdevelopment, including the erosion of moral values and neglect of the youth,
together with social, political and economic difficulties. The greatest problem,
however, seems to have been the national question and the growth of
nationalism.156 Therefore the death of Yugoslavia likely originated with the birth of
Serb national movements that intensified in the 1980s. In 1986, the Serb Academy
of Sciences drafted its nationalistically orientated-Memorandum, considered the
bridge between official and unofficial Serbian nationalism.157 Because of the
prestige of its authors, the memorandum reinforced the conviction that the Serbs
had been abused by the other nations of Yugoslavia, and thereby formed the
ideological platform for the policies of Slobodan Milošević.158 The rise of Milošević
in the end of the decade prepared the tactics that spread everywhere in the 1990s.
First, the Serb population was radicalised through the “non-stop bombardment of
misinformation and fear-mongering of the media and the local politicians”. Second,
the technique of ‘compromising the villagers’, which involved staging an incident –
such as shooting a carload of Croatian policemen outside a particular village – to
invite a crackdown or reprisal, and then distributing arms to the villagers, telling
them that the police were planning to attack. Finally, violent incidents were
perpetrated, which then gave the army cause to intervene as an “impartial
arbiter”.159
4.4.2 DEVASTATING WAR(S)

The armed conflict in Bosnia closely followed the war between Croatia’s Serbs and
the defence forces of Croatia, which started in 1991. The Bosnian war began in
April 1992 when Serb para-military forces and the Yugoslav army attacked
Sarajevo. Until 1993, the war was fought by Serb forces attempting to take as much
of Bosnia as possible. In the spring of 1993, the conflict between Bosnian Croat
forces (HVO) and the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina broke out, lasting until the
spring of 1994 after which the two armies fought side by side against the Serbs until
the end of the war.160 The following section provides a description of the
background of the war, its nature, patterns and possible reasons.
155
Karjalainen and Valta 2000, 30, 34, Donia and Fine 199-200.
156
Janjić, Dušan 1997. Ethnic Conflicts and the Breakup of Former Yugoslavia. In: Janjić, Dušan (ed.) 1997. Ethnic
Conflict Management. The Case of Yugoslavia. Ravenna: Longo Editore, 38-39.
157
Janjić, Dušan 1998. National Identity Building Processes in Post-Communist Society: Serbian Case (1989-1996).
In: Bianchini, Stefano and Schöpflin, Stefano (ed.) 1998. State Building in the Balkans. Dilemmas on the Eve of the
21st Century. Ravenna: Longo Editore, 340.
158
Anzulović 1999, 114.
159
Almond 1994, 179, Malcolm 1994/1996, 216-217.
160
99
In late 1990, the old Yugoslavian army (JNA) seemed divided about its
mission. Several leading officers of the JNA provided arms to Serbs outside Serbia
and attempted simultaneously to disarm the forces of the other republics. The
JNA’s withdrawal from Bosnia meant that only some 14 000 troops actually left
while 75 000 remained with the heavy weaponry under the premise that they were
Bosnian in origin.161 When open war was waged against Slovenia and Croatia in
1991, JNA allegedly armed the Serb population secretly throughout Bosnia. As a
result of the secret arms smuggling, Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia were well armed.162
Lovrenović writes how these Serbs were later presented as “people who had
organised themselves to protect their age-old hearths and homes”.163 Estimates of
Serbian military superiority range from 20:1 to 100:1.164
Scholars consider several external developments as important to the start of the
war in Bosnia: the JNA dramatically changed its mission from the latter half of
1991 onwards, the war in Croatia strenghtened Bosnian Serb extremists, and the
actions of the international community drove major Bosnian politicians to press
separatist claims. The European Community's recognition of the independence of
Slovenia and Croatia under Germany’s pressure in January 1992 seems the most
important of these pressures for it brought about the referendum in Bosnia and
immediate recognition of its independence. The UN imposed arms embargo in
1991 made it impossible for the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to arm
itself.165 The war started in Bosnia in April 1992 after its declaration of
independence and its recognition by the European Community.
During the months before the war, however, a mass peace movement was
organised. It was supported by the media, trade unions, intellectuals and students.
In July 1991, tens of thousands of people formed a human chain across every
bridge in Mostar, and in August a rally in Sarajevo drew 100 000 people. The high
point and end of the movement occurred in March and April 1992.166
The general pattern of events during the war, both military and political, has
arguably been characterised by the Croat responses to Serb initiatives, and to some
extent imitations of them. The pattern of the war was first set by young gangsters
from Serbia, whose lead nationalistic Croats then followed. For example, the
establishment of the Croats’ quasi-statehood167, “Herceg-Bosna”, in the Croat-
dominated areas represents an imitation of the “Serbs autonomous region”.168
161
162
163
164
Sells 1996, 117.
165
Donia and Fine 1994, 220, 233, 239, 280, Malcolm 1994/1996, 230.
166
Kaldor, Mary 1999. New and Old Wars. Organised Violence in a Global Era. Cambridge and Oxford: Polity
Press, 43.
167
The terms is borrowed from Manuel Castells. Castells, Manuel 1997. The Information Age: Economy, Society
and Culture. Vol. II. The Power of Identity. Padstow: Blackwell, 32.
168
Malcolm 1994/1996, 232, 252.
100
“Ethnic cleansing”, as it became known, mainly occurred in the countryside of

Bosnia and was perpetrated by paramilitary groups allegedly having recruited their
members mainly from among criminals. The paramilitary units employed different
strategies: inciting hatred, rape, and perpetrating violence.169 Based on the evidence
and testimonies collected by UN representatives and other respected international
organisations, it has been stated that the systematic, widespread and methodical
persecution in the countryside exceeded anything shown by the popular media.170
The most reliable estimates suggest that the number of women raped is tens of
thousands.171 Those raped also included Christian women, yet the rapes committed
by the Bosnian army seem to have involved only individual, not systematic, cases.172
Another war, with greater media focus, was fought in the cities, particularly in
Sarajevo, which remained besieged for more than three years. One characteristic of
the Bosnian war was that only limited fighting occurred between the two sides,
while most of the attacks were directed against civilians.173
Serb army officers are reported to have used alcohol to break the normal
inhibitions of young men under their control. Evidence suggests that many Serbs
who refused to participate in the siege of Sarajevo or other activities were publicly
executed as examples to others. Many Bosnian Serbs escaped into refugee camps in
Serbia proper from where thousands were taken at the end of the war and sent to
front lines without proper training. The Serb Civil Council has stated that less than
half of Bosnian Serbs lived in the area of the Bosnian Serb Republic during the war,
while 150 000 lived in areas under Bosnian government control, and half a million
fled abroad as refugees.174 Generally it has been stated that the dichotomy between
rural and urban areas caused the conflict to spread in 1992 and 1993 as peasants
were drawn more to military groups. Urbanites of all nationalities commonly
perceived the conflict as one of primitive peasants seeking to destroy the urban
civilization in Bosnia.175
In the first months of the war, Bosnian resistance against the attack of the JNA
and armed Serb units was based on volunteers of whom the majority were Bosnian
Muslims, yet the Bosnian army that was created was multi-national in the
beginning. The army became, however, more mono-national in the course of the
war through the conflict with the HVO combined with the ambiguous stance of
the SDA party.176 Bosnian war crimes also became more common, including
murders and attacks on the civil population, destruction of property and
169
Bojicić, Vesna and Kaldor, Mary 1999. The Abnormal Economy of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In: Schierup (ed.) 1999.
Scramble for the Balkans. Nationalism, Globalism and the Political Economy of Reconstruction. London: Macmillan
Press Ltd, 96; Manfred Novak, Turku, 23.8.2001, Rogel 1998, 51.
170
Sells 1996, 17.
171
Vranić, Seada 1996. Breaking the Wall of Silence. The Voices of Raped Bosnia. Zagreb: Izdanja Antibarbarus.
(Original: Pred zidom šutnje). English version assisted by Diane Conklin, 246.
172
Sells 1996, 22, Vranić 1996, 29.
173
Bojicić and Kaldor 1999, 96, Sells 1996, 17.
174
Sells 1996, 73-74, 78-79.
175
176
101
vandalisation of religious objects even if in different measure than that of Serb and
Croat armies.177 Generally the clash between Bosnian and Croat forces in early
1993 has been seen as a shock for Bosnian Muslims.178
In the beginning, Bosnians, and Muslims in particular, believed that
international forces would put an end to the Serb attack. The Bosnian government
was ill-prepared for the war, and believed that the international community would
defend a recently admitted sovereign member of the United Nations. The
reluctance of the international community to intervene militarily is considered
among the greatest shocks and disappointments for Bosnian Muslims.179
Scholars have accused Europe and the US of failure in Bosnia. The US and EC
apparently engaged in the politics of ’ends without means’ as they recognised the
multi-ethnic Bosnian state but never allowed the necessary means for securing that
state. Western policy makers made the conditions possible for the genocide even if
they managed to prevent the extent of it to some degree. The UN Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) could not protect the civilian population and even watched the
slaughter as it occurred in Srebrenica, which Malcolm called ”the blackest moment
in the history of the UN’s involvement in Bosnia”.180 It has also been demonstrated
that many policy makers knew well what was happening in Bosnia, but still let the
war crimes continue.181
Journalists have also criticised the international community. An experienced
BBC war correspondent, Martin Bell, who followed the war in Bosnia for years, has
argued that the Bosnian war was particularly touching even for an old war
correspondent like himself, as this time not only those who made it happen but also
those who let it happen can be considered responsible.182 Political leaders are said to
have criticised journalists and accused them of being ‘pro-Muslim’ when they stood
by basic European democratic principles. Objectivity was essential in the midst of
this “most appalling racial violence”.183
It is widely agreed that total war ravaged Bosnia from 1992 to 1995.184 Some
scholars have even questioned the use of the term ’war’ for Bosnian conflict since
the term ’war’ refers to a clash between two armed adversaries not the destruction of
a largely unarmed population.185 The nature of the conflict from Serbian aggression
against Bosnia and Herzegovina to a civil war within Bosnia between three warring
parties apparently changed when the conflict between the HVO and Bosnian army
177
178
179
Silber, Laura and Little, Allan 1996. The Death of Yugoslavia. Revised edition. London: Penguin books, 384,
180
Donia and Fine 1994, 236, Malcolm 1994/1996, 264, Rogel 1998, 57-69, Sells 1996, 116, Vranić 1996, 335,
Manfred Novak, Turku, 23.8.2001.
181
Sells 1996, 115, Vranić 1996, 23.
182
Bell, Martin 1996. In Harm’s Way. Revised Edition. London: Benguin books, 295-299.
183
Vulliamy, Ed 1994. Seasons in Hell: understanding Bosnia’s war. New York and London: Simon and Schuster, ix-
ix.
184
“Wir haben einen totalen Krieg erlebt”, writes a professor from Sarajevo. Sekulić 2000, 275.
185
Sells 1996, 117.
102
started in early 1993.186 It has been emphasised that even if the Bosnian war can be
defined as a civil war, it was a war against civilians and the civil society.187 Mary
Kaldor considers the Bosnian war an archetypical example of what she defines as
“new wars” typical of the 1980s and 1990s.188
Many books have been written on the inhumanities of the war. The human
losses were terrible; ethnic cleansing by Serbs, Croats and Muslims destroyed the
multi-ethnic demographic structure in many parts of Bosnia. Estimates of death
vary between 200 000 and 250 000, most of whom were Bosnian Muslims. Of the
pre-war population of 4.4 million, 2 to 2.5 million Bosnians were displaced and
resettled during the conflict, and over 1 million of them became refugees abroad.
Reports state that 20 000 people have disappeared, 85% to 90% of whom were
Bosnian Muslims. Tens of thousands of women, children and men are estimated to
have been raped, mainly Bosnian Muslims, but also Croats and Serbs.189
In all, 60% of all dwellings and 28% of roads were severely damaged. After the
war, the domestic production of Bosnia crashed to 5% to 10% of its pre-war
level.190 It has been claimed that the wars of Yugoslav succession produced no real
winners and that victors and victims both suffered terribly, even if in different
degrees and in different ways. Many felt that the historical traditions of coalition
politics, compromise and coexistence of different religious communities and
national groups in everyday life in Bosnia have been “betrayed”.191
As the reasons for the war, some observers have argued that all the conflicts of
the former Yugoslavia were always present but were only suppressed under Tito’s
regime.192 Those who disagree193 have blamed those particular conditions (power
vacuum, propaganda, political and economic instability) that facilitated the
violation of multiculturalism. It has also been mentioned that nationalist ideas also
attracted large masses in other parts of Eastern Europe in late 1980s.194 Many
consider the Bosnian war the result of the JNA’s transformation into an instrument
of Serbian nationalists, of Croatian and Serbian governments annexationist
ambitions, and of the eagerness of national extremists to conduct a campaign of
ethnic cleansing with military support.195
186
187
Lehti, Marko 2000. Etnisen puhdistuksen trauma. Miten selittää Balkanin sotien väkivaltaisuus? In: Kettunen,
Pauli, Kultanen, Auli and Soikkanen, Timo (ed.) 2000. Jäljillä. Kirjoituksia historian ongelmista. Osa 2. Turku:
Kirja-Aurora, 144.
188
Kaldor 1999, 31. As the political goals of “new wars”, Kaldor emphasizes the claim to power on the basis of
nation, tribe and religion. New wars are connected to globalization, and typically involve organised crime, the large-
scale violation of human rights and the blurring of distinctions in war. Kaldor 1999, 1-2, 69-70.
189
Donia and Fine 1994, 279, Rogel 1998, 73, Vranić 1996, 336, Lovrenović 2001, 208, Manfred Novak, Turku,
23.8.2001.
190
Rogel 1998, 74, Bojicić and Kaldor 1999, 95.
191
192
193
e.g. Malcolm 1994/1996, Donia and Fine 1994, Manfred Novak, Turku, 23.8.2001, Lovrenović 2001, Rogel
1998.
194
195
103
The historical experience of Serbs is also considered a central factor. For

Serbian nationalists, Yugoslavia had been a metaphor for Greater Serbia. In the
First Yugoslavia, Yugoslavism was based on Serbian national epics and the tradition
of Serbian Saint Sava, and in the socialist Yugoslavia the supposedly unifying role
was assumed by a programme combining the ideologies of class and nation,
expressed in the slogan ’brotherhood and unity’. As the arrival of democracy failed
to allow the conditions that permitted the maintenance of Yugoslavia as a metaphor
for greater Serbia, it had to be achieved physically by conguering many of the key
areas of Yugoslavia.196
For the fate of Bosnia, the change in relations between Serbia and the Bosnian
Serb leadership was significant. In late 1994, Milošević suddenly started to support
the ”Contact Group” peace plan for Bosnia and publicly broke relations and
support for Bosnian Serbs under Karadžić’s rule. The regime-controlled media in
Serbia started to present Milošević as ”an unavoidable factor for peace” while
Bosnian Serb leaders were presented as irresponsible gamblers and war profiteers.197
This change in Milošević’s politics, reflected in declining support of Bosnian Serbs
in last year of the war, led Bosnian Serbs to accuse Serbian Serbs of betrayal.198
During the war years, several international peace attempts failed as a result of
their own impossibility and of the opposition of one of the warring parties.199 The
path towards the Dayton peace agreement started in August 1995, after more than
three years of war, when NATO started heavy air strikes against Serb military
installations. The agreement was announced after intensive talks in November
1995.200
The Dayton agreement was the first of its kind known in the history of
international relations. It was not only a peace treaty, but included territorial
settlement, a new constitution, various mechanisms for the protection of human
rights, the return of refugees, the reconstruction of the economy, and a plan for the
deployment of an international force under NATO leadership. Rather than a one-
off act, the Dayton agreement can be characterised as a peace process,201 or as the
most complicated peace treaty ever.202
The agreement has been blamed for having left many problems. The policies of
Europe and the US, which continued to see ‘ancient hatreds’ as the origin of the
conflict, are seen to have ‘poisoned’ the peace treaty as well because the treaty
envisioned ethnic separation as a solution, thus ensuring the troubled and uncertain
196
197
Gordy, Eric D. 1999. The Culture of Power in Serbia. Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives.
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania Univeristy Press, 154.
198
Janjić 1998, 344. Janjić also reminds that deep cultural, civilizational and political differences cut across the
Serbian nation as a result from living under different conditions and regimes for long.
199
Donia and Fine 1994, 260, 262, Malcolm 1994/1996, 233, 242, 246-248, 251.
200
Malcolm 1994/1996, 266, Lovrenović 2001, 206.
201
Malcolm 1994/1996, 268, Lovrenović 2001, 206-207, Magas, Branka (ed.) 1998. Question of Survival – a
common educational system for Bosnia-Herzegovina. London: The Bosnian Institute, 11.
202
104
future for Bosnia.203 The international community imposed the constitution on

Bosnia and Herzegovina from above.204
In any case, Dayton signalled the beginning of a new effort at nation-building
in Bosnia based on the principle of one state and one nation to which all three
nationalities should owe allegiance. The all-Bosnian government was to have
representation in the United Nations, conduct foreign policy, control customs and
set up embassies abroad. Yet, the government could have no army, only a limited
power of taxation and no power to implement its decisions. In contrast to the
Dayton structures, the Bosnian reality included three national regions: the Serb
Republic, Herceg-Bosna and the Bosniac-administered areas of the Bosnian
federation. Each region had an army, control over its territory and clearly identified
borders in most places.205 Moreover, Dayton’s constitutional model had no
predecent anywhere in the world.206
A journalist who has reported on the Balkan area for 30 years, has characterised
the Dayton Peace Accord from the points of view of the three Bosnian groups: the
Serbs lost the war but won the peace for they got half of the state even though they
only had one third of its population; the Croats won both the war and the peace for
they got more than their 17 percent of the land and in such a way that future gains
are possible; the Bosniacs won the war but lost the peace for all their areas are
located in pockets of Serb and Croat areas, and this pocket-situation might lead to
further isolation of people.207
It has also been emphasised that the Dayton peace agreement was the first time
the Serb Republic, a state within a state declared by Radovan Karadžić, has been
recognised.208 According to some accounts, the agreement gratified the genocidal
process of creating Greater Serbia by allowing the Serbs to hold territories forcibly
conquered and ethnically cleansed.209 The Dayton agreement has been seen as
leaving the media to the nationalists and pushing elections unnecessarily.210
211
4.4.3 BOSNIA AT THE TIME OF THE RESEARCH
The Dayton agreement divided Bosnia and Herzegovina into two separate entities:
the Serb Republic, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (often referred to
203
Malcolm 1994/1996, 271.
204
Magas (ed.) 1998, 10.
205
Shoup 1998, 290-291.
206
Vranić 1996, 25.
207
Vihervuori, Marita 1999. Tervetuloa helvettiin. Välähdyksiä Jugoslavian perintösodasta. Helsinki: Otava, 406-
407.
208
Rogel 1998, 39.
209
Vranić 1996, 26.
210
Ramet, Sabrina Petra 1999. Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War
for Kosovo. Boulder: Westview Press, 277-279.
211
The Youth and History survey was conducted in the last months of 1999, and the school texbooks analysed were
in use in the 1999-2000 schoolyear (see previous chapter). The description of the presence of history within Bosnian
society is not strictly defined to handle certain years or months but to describe the situation in which the youth of
1999-2000 live and have lived.
105
as the Federation of Bosniacs and Croats). As part of the agreement, the

Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina also defined a complex state structure.
Alonside the national political structures, the Office of the High Representative
(OHR) represents the international community as an organ established for the
implementation of the Dayton agreement. At the time of research, the post was
held by Wolfgang Petritsch; Paddy Ashdown succeeded him in 2002.
The constitution also regulates national-level administration. The basic
structure involves representatives from the three main national groups at virtually
every level of Bosnian state administration.212 Virtually every task within the
Federation reguires a Bosniac and Croat representative. The Serb Republic is
centrally governed while the Federation has ten cantons with a high degree of
autonomy.213
The first elections after the war were held in 1996. The election process was
characterised the three ruling parties’ control of local electoral commissions
responsible for voter lists and of access to state-run television networks. With few
exceptions, election campaigns were restricted to areas administered by each of the
three ethnic communities and the authorities in the areas ensured that the “wrong”
parties did not appear.214 Therefore it was no surprise that the national parties won
the elections. This was also the case in the second post-Dayton elections in 1998.
The electoral victories of nationalistically orientated parties resulted in a parliament
unable to function or to prescribe laws for the new state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The “state” had no citizenship, passport, flag or even automobile
license plates. As a result, the power of the office of the High Representative, the
representative of the foreign community, was strengthened in 1997 so that the high
representative could start prescribing laws. That made Bosnia more an international
mandate area than an independent state.215
In 1999 it was concluded that opposition parties were marginalized in the
FBiH while in the RS not a single party questioned Serb nationalism.216 The
elections in 2000 brought a victory for the Social-democrat-led coalition in the
FBiH, but the elections in 2002 returned the nationally-divided parties to power.
In the late autumn of 1999, the international crisis group (ICG) published an
article “Is Dayton failing?” which evaluated the current situation in light of Dayton.
According to the report, the national-level administration had not developed. The
report also stated that all the objectives of Dayton had so far failed. The most
212
It has been noted that power-sharing between the three groups as prescribed in detail in the Dayton constitution
in Bosnia differs from other multi-national countries (e.g. Lebanon and Switzerland) where the system is at least
partly informal. This institutional set-up for national representation in Bosnia tends to ignore the role of citizens in
power-sharing. Bieber, Florian 2002. Bosnia-Herzegovina: developments towards a more integrated state. Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs. 1/22, 206-208.
213
See Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine. Устав Босне и Херцеговине. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
OHR-photocopy. In the possession of the author.
214
Shoup 1998, 293.
215
Vihervuori 1999, 412.
216
Is Dayton Failing? Bosnia Four Years After the Peace Agreement. International Crisis Group Balkans Report No.
80. October 1999 (printed as a booklet), 37.
106
dramatic from the point of view of the people was that well over a million Bosnians
still remained displaced, waiting for a permanent solution as to where to live.
Estimates noted that at the current rate the last Bosniac would return to the RS in
2117. The “multi-ethnic administration” created by the international community
was described as “a farce” in BiH municipalities.217
There was supposed to be a one-year ‘transitional’ international administration
in Bosnia. This one year, however, had been “indefinitely extended” and by the late
1990s the democratisation process in Bosnia seemed a major international
experiment.218
While many of the important basic tasks of Dayton had succeeded, many
important parts such as the safe movement of people, free elections, control of the
military etc., still remained unimplemented in 1999. The return of people to their
pre-war homes had only started to accelerate during 1999, and war criminals still
remained at large and unpunished; these two criteria being considered the only two
objective criteria for assessing the implementation Dayton.219 Ethnic cleansers
remained in power in the de facto mono-ethnic entities, and the few successes (e.g.
Central bank, common currency, state symbols and customs reforms) seemed
superficial and imposed by the international community.220 Moreover, the political
and economic instability had led to an atmosphere of hopelessness in many parts of
the country, and the majority of people were still unemployed and dependent on
humanitarian assistance.221
Ethnicity and demographic changes characterise post-war Bosnian society. The
ethnic cleansing during the war succeeded in the sense that most areas of Bosnia
were at the time of research almost mono-ethnic, and people had a strong and clear
notion of their ethnicity. Ethnic discrimination was also systematic among
government officials.222 As the ethnic maps from 1991 and 1998 demonstrate, the
demographic composition has changed dramatically in many areas. The most
dramatic change has been in the area of the Serb Republic, where before the war
54% of the people were Serbs and 46% were Bosniacs, Croats and others. As a
result of ethnic cleansing, Serbs comprised 92.3% of the population five years after
the war.223 By August 1999, 0.7% of all returnees had been non-Serbs returning to
the RS, and generally the return of minorities began to diminish during 1999.224
217
80. October 1999 (printed as a booklet), 45, 83.
218
Chandler 1999, 2.
219
Bennett Chris 1997. The Dayton Peace Agreement: Scenarios of Non-Implementation. In: Sopta, Marin (ed.)
1997. Proceedings from a two day International Conference Held in Zagreb, Croatia 15-16 March 1997. Zagreb:
Croatian Center of Strategic Studies, 210.
220
221
Bojicić and Kaldor 1999, 92.
222
223
Živanović, Miodrag 2001. A Frame for the Picture of my Country: an Outline for Research on the Serb National
Question Today. Translated by Milena Marić and Jean Crocker. In: Lovrenović, Ivan and Jones, Fransis R. (ed.)
107
Map 2: Ethnic Compositions before Map 2: Ethnic Compositions after the
the War in Bosnia and War in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (1991) Herzegovina (1998)
Source: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps/images Source: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/maps/images

/ethnic-composition-before-the-ware-1991.gif /ethnic-composition-after-the-war-in-1998.gif
The general pattern has been that middle-class, educated people have left and been
replaced by internal refugees.225 Immediately after Dayton, the plans to ensure the
freedom of movement and return of refugees across entity boundaries proved a
failure for which Serb Republic authorities and Bosnian Croats hardliners have
been mainly held accountable.226 In 1997, of the UNHCR’s estimated 2.3 million
displaced at the end of the war, only some 250 000 had returned to their pre-war
homes. Some 80 000 Serbs had also been forced to leave after the Dayton
agreement, mainly from Sarajevo, in the exchange of territories.227 Of Bosnian
Serbs 39% became refugees and displaced persons, as did 67% of Bosniacs, and
63% of Croats.228 Most of the Serbs in the displaced-category are likely those who
have moved to the Serb Republic from other parts of Bosnia. This was
demonstrated by the 29% of Serbs in the UNDP-survey in 2000 who reported
2001. Life at the Crossroads. Forum Bosnae culture-science-society-politics quaterly review 11/01. Sarajevo:
International Forum Bosnia, 122.
224
80. October 1999 (printed as a booklet), 84, 86-87.
225
Bose, Sumantra 2002. Bosnia after Dayton. Nationalist Partition and International Intervention. London: Hurst
& Company, 106.
226
Shoup 1998, 292.
227
Bennett 1997, 210.
228
Živanović 2001, 123.
108
being displaced from other entity.229 For example in Mostar, only 1000 the of 20
000 pre-war Serbs remained in the city.230 A good indication of the continuing
demographic change was the exchange of flats between Western and Eastern
Mostar which continued between Croats (in control of Western Mostar) and
Bosniacs (in control of Eastern Mostar) in 2000, thereby accelerating the rise of
single-ethnic entities.231
Together with the demographic changes, the questions of nationality and
ethnicity characterise Bosnian society. According to young Bosnians, ethnicity is
almost a synonym for religion. People are forced to accept a religious and ethnic
identity which is particularly complicated for the children of mixed marriages.232
Lists given in the CIA World Fact Book in different times illustrate the complexity
of the notions of the Bosnian population. In 1999, the description of nation was:
Nationality:
noun: Bosnian(s), Herzegovinian(s)
adjective: Bosnian, Herzegovinian
Ethnic groups: Serb 40%, Muslim 38%, Croat 22% (est.); note–the Croats claim they now make
up only 17% of the total population
233
Religions: Muslim 40%, Orthodox 31%, Catholic 15%, Protestant 4%, other 10%
In 2002 the similar discription was:
Nationality:
noun: Bosnian(s),
adjective: Bosnian
Ethnic groups: Serb 31%, Bosniac 44%, Croat 17%, Yugoslav 5.5%, other 2.5% (1991)
note: Bosniac has replaced Muslim as an ethnic term in part to avoid confusion with the religious
term Muslim – an adherent of Islam
234
Religions: Muslim 40%, Orthodox 31%, Roman Catholic 15%, Protestant 4%, other 10%
Thus the CIA had decided to stop using estimates for ethnic groups between 1999
and 2002, and to call Bosnian Muslims ‘Bosniacs’ when discussing ethnicity.
Similarly the noun and adjective have been changed so as not to include
Herzegovinian as a separate category of the nation.
229
230
Bose 2002, 105.
231
Bose 2002, 105.
232
Humanitarian Issues, 57. See also Bieber 2002, 208.
233
CIA The World Factbook 1999. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Internet source: <http://www.odci.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/bk.html#people>. 2nd August 2000.
234
CIA The World Factbook 2002. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Internet source: <http://www.odci.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/bk.html#People>. 8th December 2002.
109
In regard to economy, the war broke out before the socialist economy had
transformed into a market economy. Thus, in Bosnia, the task has not only been to
reconstruct the economy destroyed by the war, but also to build up an economy
different from what existed before the war.235 Per capita GDP fell from $2719 to
$250 annually during the war years.236 Estimations of per capita GDP from 1998
to 2001 ranged from $1,700 to $1,800.237 As a result of the two separate economic
systems within the entities, no reliable statistical indicators are available.238
As a result of war, foreign aid, and governance, the Bosnian economy of the late
1990s could be called “abnormal” as it was a mixture of foreign aid and
criminalised practices, which started during the war and have continued ever
since.239 Local or international players had made no use of the numerous studies
made by different organisations to describe the problems and to offer
recommendations. Five years after the war and after five billion dollars in foreign
aid, the economic transition was still only in its infancy and Bosnia could be
described as being ”burdened by an oversized administration attempting to collect
high and numerous taxes”.240 The economy was not really running normally;
official unemployment rates estimates from 1996 range from 40% to 50%.241 In
1999, the International Crisis Group estimated the unemployment rate in the
FBiH at 39%, and in the RS, 50%.242 The UNDP estimated a wider
unemployment rate including all ages as well as unsalaried workers on waiting lists
at 56.3%. Of all the unemployed, those under 35 years old constituted 64%.243
Pensions were paid irregularly and people’s incomes were very low. Basically, all
products were imported and the black market was significant. Moreover, the
numbers of people unemployed, living in poverty or both seem to be rising.244 As a
result of all this, much of the economy is believed to be underground.245
Inside Bosnia and Herzegovina, two entities have differed economically. Most
of the foreign aid was channelled to the federation of Bosniacs and Croats and less
to the Serb Republic as a result of its failure to implement the Dayton agreement in
235
Bojicić and Kaldor 1999, 109.
236
Bojicić and Kaldor 1999, 95, Rogel 1998, 74.
237
CIA The World Factbook 1999. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economy. Internet source: <http://www.odci.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/bk.html#econ>. 2nd August 2000. CIA The World Factbook 2002. Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Economy. Internet source: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html#Econ. 8th
December 2002.
238
Bosnia Report. Bosnian Institute. New Series No. 21/22. January-May 2001, 19.
239
Schierup 1999, 19.
240
Bosnia’s Precarious Economy: Still not open for business. International Crisis Group. August 2001, i-ii, 1.
241
CIA The World Factbook 1999. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economy. Internet source:
<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/bk.html#econ>. 2nd August 2000. CIA The World Factbook 2002.
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economy. Internet source: http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
geos/bk.html#Econ. 8th December 2002.
242
243
244
Bosnia’s Precarious Economy: Still not open for business. International Crisis Group. August 2001, i.
245
Bosnia’s Precarious Economy: Still not open for business. International Crisis Group. August 2001, ii.
110
the initial post-war years.246 As indicators of the state of the Serb Republic, it was
mentioned in 1997 that hospitals lacked medicine, unemployment rates soared to
90%, schools lacked books and young people, professionals, and skilled workers
emigrated elsewhere.247 The financially catastrophic situation in the RS led the
International Crisis Group to conclude in 2001 that the entity had collapsed
financially had not the international community’s funds saved it time and again.248
A demonstrative and broadly analysed indicator of the state of Bosnian society
has been the media. It has been noted that since Milošević’s rise to power in 1987,
one of the most crucial issues in the former Yugoslavia has been control of the
information space.249 In Bosnia, around the time of research, significant
developments were underway. The war led to the rigid division of three completely
separate and antagonistic media systems, and the attitudes of Serb and Croat media
in Bosnia towards the political obligations of the Dayton agreement (mixed
national institutions, return of refugees, etc.) were often sceptical and reflected the
respective political views in the aftermath of the war. Despite some improvements,
media analysts still concluded in 1999 that ”the most influencial media continue to
address mono-ethnic audiences, and to reflect the political agendas of the various
regimes in BiH”.250 In 2000, however, the UNDP reported on a change that had
taken place within one year; papers published in different entities could be found in
almost all parts of Bosnia, and the quality of journalism was improving as a result of
loosening political ties which has made journalists increasingly free to obtain
information from a variety of sources outside their own national circle.251
NATO bombings against Serbia in 1999 awakened reactions in Bosnia as well,
as illustrated by the example of the media’s reactions. The media in the Serb
Republic held a pro-Serb attitude and even changed their programme schedules to
include extra programs from the national television network in Belgrade, Serbia.
Some television stations in the Serb Republic began broadcasting 24 hour-a-day
programmes from Belgrade, which finally caused the OHR to intervene and stop it.
On the other hand, private, independent media in Sarajevo expressed their support
for NATO, although somewhat reservedly. Bosnian Croat media were stronger in
246
Young, Boris 1999. Nothing from Nothing is Nothing: Privatisation, Price Liberalisation and Poverty in the
Yugoslav Successor States. In: Schierup (ed.) 1999. Scramble for the Balkans. Nationalism, Globalism and the
Political Economy of Reconstruction. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 166, Galbraith, Peter W. 1997. Bosnia-
Hercegovina After Dayton. In: Sopta, Marin (ed.) 1997. Proceedings from a two day International Conference Held
in Zagreb, Croatia 15-16 March 1997. Zagreb: Croatian Center of Strategic Studies, 44.
247
Galbraith 1997, 45.
248
Bosnia’s Precarious Economy: Still not open for business. International Crisis Group. August 2001, 1.
249
Kuzmanović, Jasminka 1995. Media: The Extension of Politics by Other Means. In: Ramet, Sabrina and
Adamovich, Ljubiša (ed.) 1995. Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics and Culture in a Shattered Community.
Boulder: Westview Press, 84.
250
Thompson, Mark 1994/1999. Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Completely
revised and expanded edition. Article 19. Avon/London: The Bath Press, 261-262.
251
111
their support of NATO.252 Reactions to NATO bombings seemed to reflect

attitudes towards the international community. In post-war Bosnia and
Herzegovina, “the international community” has had a double-meaning: it refers
both to the external international community, such as the UN and the like, and to
the particular international community working within Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The international community living in the country constituted a very central
feature of Bosnian society. Chandler characterises the magnitude of the role of the
international community as follows:
…In effect, Bosnia, under Dayton, has been governed by a network of
international community institutions representing the major world powers,
with NATO, the UN Mission in Bosnia and Hercegovina (UNMiBH) and
the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Hercegovina as leading implementing
organs. At state level, Bosnian representatives have had the opportunity to
discuss policy proposals, under the guidance of the Office of the High
Representative and other international bodies such as the World Bank and
IMF, but at the most the Bosnian institutions could only make minor
alterations to OHR prepared packages or delay their implementation.253
In addition to humanitarian aid, the foreign community has all kinds of missions
within the governing system of Bosnia. At the end of the 1990s approximately
1500 NGOs worked in Bosnia.254 In the field of human rights monitoring alone
there were 194 international and local organisations.255 The former public sector
was basically replaced by the humanitarian aid industry run from outside and the
effects have been arguably disastrous for the development of the local labour
market, for the valuation of indigenous expertise and for the promotion of local
self-confidence.256 The UNDP report states what anyone familiar with Bosnia
knows well from the 1990s: it was not uncommon for a person with PhD in
engineering to work as a cleaner in an international organisation.257 Bosnians have
lacked what Maurice Apprey calls “psychological independence”258, considered
necessary for communities to propel them into the future. In his analysis about the
success of Dayton, Chandler has concluded how the dynamic of the Dayton process
252
Milev, Rossen 1999. South East Europe. In: Goff, Peter (ed.) 1999. The Kosovo, News & Propaganda War.
Vienna: International Press Institute, 380-381.
253
Chandler 1999, 64.
254
255
80. October 1999 (printed as a booklet), 80-81.
256
Schierup 1999, 19.
257
258
Apprey, Maurice 1998. Staging and Transforming Historical Grievances: From Cultural Memory to a
Reconstructable Future. Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture & Society. Volume 3, Number 1, Spring 1998,
87.
112
has been to institutionalise fears and insecurities by disempowering Bosnian people

and allowing over-dependency on the international community.259
Generally, growing criticism of the Dayton agreement and of the international
community typically characterised the period of research, as shown in issues of the
Bosnia report which re-published several selected articles from Bosnian papers and
magazines.260 Earlier, the media’s approach of the international community had
been critised by the International Crisis Group as ”unimaginative”. Press
conferences were held only in English and Bosnian journalists often felt ignored.
Only the Soros foundation seemed to have a long-term strategy, yet the
international community poured lots of money into media development.261
Regarding the daily experience of Bosnians at the time of research, the country
was de facto divided into three. The Serb Republic functioned as a state within a
state, and the Croat-dominated cantons within the federation continued to refer to
Herceg-Bosna as their “entity”.262 The process as to how the schooling became part
of the national division will be described under a separate heading in section 5.4. in
the following chapter.
4.5 Summary: Sensitive Historical Themes in the 1990s

As illustrated, Bosnian society remained deeply divided through the 1990s.
Similarly, the central and even sensitive themes of history were likely to remain as
long as the situation continued more as the absence of war than peace. The
following is a summary of themes and issues on which different national groups in
my view are most likely to search for different interpretations and perpectives.
The First World War remains historically disputable in regard the significance
of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand for the break-up of the war. In particular,
the role of the Serbs or Bosnian Serbs in the assassination continues to be a
contested historical theme.
The Second World War as a whole remains a sensitive issue for so many
Yugoslavs died particularly on the Bosnian soil, as a result of cruel atrocities and
fighting between numerous groups. The partisan atrocities at the end of the war
have also been recently re-discovered, creating yet another sensitive topic. As a
whole, the Second World War period has allowed for many ”rediscoveries” for the
ethos in Tito’s Yugoslavia strongly focused on the Partisan struggle and kept other
259
Chandler 1999, 196. Based on the examination of the interventions of the international community on
facilitating the advocacy of rule of civic groups and fostering citizens' participation, Bellon has also argued how the
international community's approach has made local development dependant upon international pressure. Belloni,
Roberto 2001. Civil society and peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journal of Peace Research 2/38: 163-180.
260
Bosnia Report. Bosnian Institute. New Series No. 15/16. March-June 2000. See also Bosnia Report. Bosnian
Institute. New Series No. 11/12. August-November 1999.
261
Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina: How international support can be more effective. International Crisis Group.
March 1997, i-ii.
262
Despite the visible decline in the institutions of Herceg-Bosna in 2000 due to the weakening of the HDZ party in
Croatia, the non-federational Croat institutions have largely remained in place. Bieber 2002, 211.
113
aspects of the cruel war from public discussion. Moreover, as Cohen has suggested,
similarities between Serbia’s Second World War record and the developments of
the 1990s can be seen as critical for understanding the recent rise of Serbian
nationalism.263
The national question as a whole is naturally sensitive in the post-war Bosnian
context. The question is difficult and complicated at present, and is likely to
encourage people to seek solutions and explanations from the past. Finally, the war
of 1990s is so recent that it is likely to remain a sensitive issue in the country where
it caused massive destruction and suffering. Bosnian Serbs called the war a civil war,
whereas the Federation portrayed it as an aggression, which further illustrates the
difficulty of coming to common terms with the conflict. Generally critical and
analytical public discussion of the war at the inter-ethnic level has not really taken
place.
The complicated and central role of the past within the war-torn and post-war
Bosnian society appear in the following chapter through the idea of ”the presence of
history” within the society, which illustrates how the daily culture of the society
reflects the sensitive historical issues presented previously.
263
Cohen 1996, xxi.
114
THE PRESENCE OF HISTORY IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
5 The Presence of History in Bosnia and

Herzegovina
History has been present in Bosnian society in a dramatic way starting from the
final years of the former Yugoslavia. An illustrative comment about the role of
history is the reasoning of British historian Noel Malcolm as to why he found it
important to write a general account of Bosnian history in the mid-1990s. First,
there is a need to understand the origins of the fighting as well as a need ”to dispel
some of the clouds of misunderstanding, deliberate myth-making and sheer
ignorance in which all discussion of Bosnia and its history has become shrouded”
(underlining P.T.).1 The presence of history has been true for both the outside
observers of Bosnia, and Bosnians themselves. As a journalist working in Bosnia
during the war has written, ”history dominates every interview in the Bosnian war.
The answer to a question about an artillery attack yesterday will begin in the year
925, invariably illustrated with maps.”2
This chapter will illustrate some characteristics of the presence of history in
Bosnia with the help of the concepts defined in chapter three: history culture,
historical consciousness and history politics. At the end of the chapter, schooling
and history teaching in general are discussed. The presentation extends from pre-
war years to the early 21st Century. Most of the source material available relates to
the war period and much less material has been available from post-war years.
As argued in section three, the phenomena themselves are not separate, but
overlap and often depend on the perspective taken; the same observation can reflect
history culture, historical consciousness and history politics depending the
viewpoint. Therefore clear definitions merely serve the following presentation. I
have emphasised the idea of history culture as something concrete that exists
materially and visibly even if it becomes meaningful only as part of a social setting.
By definition, narratives and stories are seen as part of history culture provided that
they have some common and public level. Thus, the presentation of history culture
is concrete by nature.
1
Malcolm 1994/1996, xix.
2
Vulliamy 1994, 5.
115
Historical consciousness in turn can only be discussed on the basis of what we

know about the history culture and general historical developments of the society.
As shown in chapter two, except for the Youth and History survey, researchers have
hardly addressed the contents of the historical consciousness of individuals or
communities empirically. Thus, in this chapter we are not presenting the historical
consciousness of Bosnia or Bosnians but only suggesting some possible features of
it. The analysis is based on the historical consciousness of a community (not
individuals), and on the attempts to construct and influence it. This creates a clear
linkage to history culture: products of history culture can seem part of the process
of constructing a certain kind of historical consciousness. The idea of including
general public narratives in the realm of history culture leads to the conclusion that
the parents’ historical consciousness can be considered the history culture of
Bosnian youth.3 The title of the subchapter “On historical consciousness”
emphasises the nature of the presentation.
The presentation on history politics emphasises the active intention present
when using history for certain purposes. Therefore history politics can often be
described through history culture and its features. History culture is the focus on
the intentional action of history politics. Similarly, seemingly conscious attempts to
influence the historical consciousness of a community can represent history politics.
In Bosnia, two media or arenas for the use of history – mass media and history
teaching – have been central. The presentation “On history politics” concentrates
mainly on media, while a separate chapter concentrates on schooling and history
teaching.
As mentioned previously, nationalism as an idea is related to the idea of the
presence of history. Therefore methods of analysing nationalism also apply here. As
a tool in the analysis of history culture, the concept of “banal nationalism”
developed and presented by Michael Billig has been particularly useful. By banal
nationalism, Billig refers to the daily habits through which a nation is “flagged” in
the lives of the people. “Flagged” refers to all sorts of public presentations of nation:
flags, songs, stamps, banknotes and so forth. Although Billig has developed the
concept for the analysis of relatively stable Western societies, the idea of banal
nationalism, which provides a continual background for cultural products, political
discourses and so forth, well describes the understanding of this chapter regarding
the phenomena that reflect the presence of history in the society. Billig has also
noted how nationalism has deeply affected contemporary ways of thinking and is
therefore not easily studied. Based on this, we can see the analysis of history culture
as one way to study existing forms of banal nationalism. Through his book, Billig
suggests that scholars should look and see the constant “flaggings” of nationhood,
which are by no means hidden.4
3
Here we can remember Kalela's idea of public presentations of history and folk history presented in chapter three.
4
Billig, Michael 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage, 6, 8, 37, 174.
116
This chapter serves the analyses of chapters seven and eight as well as the final
conclusions of this entire research project. It illustrates the nature of historically
characterised phenomena that have existed within the Bosnian society in general,
thus constructing the reality in which the youth of Bosnia have lived.
The principles of collection of materials used in this chapter appear in section
3.4.3.
5.1 History Culture in Bosnia

The following analyses the prevailing Bosnian history culture through three themes.
First, I examine the deconstruction and reconstruction of physical symbols and the
significance of those processes. By reconstruction I also mean new-construction,
which is one aspect of the reconstruction of physical history culture. Second, I
present features of the history culture from the point of view of the division of
national symbols and language. Finally I present a selection of different cultural
artefacts to elucidate further the nature of post-war Bosnian history culture.
5.1.1 THE DESTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF PHYSICAL SYMBOLS

One of the characteristics of the Bosnian war was the systematic destruction of
mosques, graveyards and other religious and cultural monuments, and therefore
one of the faces of post-war Bosnia throughout the 1990s was that of ruined and
plundered mosques, churches and other monuments.
The Council of Europe compiled at least ten reports from 1993 to 19975 and
the European Community Monitoring Mission compiled at least five reports in
1995 and 19966 on the war damage to cultural heritage, which demonstrates the
5
Relevant material for this research was found in: Information Report on war damage to the cultural heritage in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented by the Committee on Culture and Education. Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe ADOC6756. February 1993, Strasbourgh; Second Information Report on war damage to the
cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented by the Committee on Culture and Education.
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ADOC6869. July 1993, Strasbourgh; Third Information Report
on war damage to the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented by the Committee on Culture
and Education. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ADOC6904. September 1993, Strasbourgh; Sixth
Information Report on war damage to the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented by the
Committee on Culture and Education. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ADOC7133. August
1994, Strasbourgh; Seventh Information Report on war damage to the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, presented by the Committee on Culture and Education. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe ADOC7308. May 1995, Strasbourgh; Ninth Information Report on war damage to the cultural heritage in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented by the Committee on Culture and Education. Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe ADOC7464. January 1996, Strasbourgh; Tenth Information Report on war damage to the
cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented by the Committee on Culture and Education.
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ADOC7740. January 1997, Strasbourgh.
6
Cultural Heritage Report No.1 on the situation in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. European Community
Monitoring Mission (ECMM). Humaritarian sector. Zagreb 1995; Cultural Heritage Report No.2 on the situation
in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM). Humaritarian sector.
Zagreb 1995; Cultural Heritage Report No.3 on the situation in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. European
Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM). Humaritarian sector. Zagreb 1995; Cultural Heritage Report No.4 on
the situation in Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM).
117
significance and magnitude of the destruction of cultural heritage. These reports list
dozens of examples of destruction. The ECMM reports concentrated only on
sacred buildings because of their symbolic significance while the Council of Europe
has defined cultural heritage to include “monuments, historic towns and districts,
vernacular heritage, both rural and urban, art galleries and museums, libraries and
archives”.7
The total numbers of destroyed objects has been estimated in several sources.
According to (incomplete) data from the Institute for the Protection of the
Cultural, Natural and Historical Heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1454
cultural monuments were destroyed or damaged. Of those, 1284 were Islamic
sacred and other objects, 237 Catholic, and 30 Orthodox.8 Other figures cited refer
to over 1100 destroyed mosques and Muslim buildings, over 300 Catholic churches
and monasteries and 36 Serbian Orthodox churches.9 The Catholic community has
published a large, four-colour reference book on the destroyed and damaged
Catholic objects, claiming that 269 were totally destroyed, 313 heavily damaged
and 418 damaged. In 706 cases, Serbs were responsible for the destruction of
Catholic objects, and in 294 cases, Bosniacs.10
Non-sacred structures also suffered: the Ottoman-era bridge in Mostar, Roman
ruins, archives, libraries, medieval and archeological sites.11 In 1993, the Council of
Europe reported that the destruction was increasingly damaging the Ottoman
heritage.12 The most notorious destroyed cultural monument with enormous
symbolic significance was the national and university library of Sarajevo. The
damage in the fire was finally less than feared in terms of irreplaceable documents,
yet still very serious: 600 000 volumes out of 1 500 000 library units were
destroyed.13 The destruction of two socialist era skyscrapers, the Unis, in Sarajevo
can also be considered a conscious symbolic act. The Unis were known as Momo
Humaritarian sector. Zagreb 1996; Cultural Heritage Report No.5 on the situation in Croatia and Bosnia &
Herzegovina. European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM). Humaritarian sector. Zagreb 1996.
7
Information Report on war damage to the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented by the
Committee on Culture and Education. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ADOC6756. February
1993, Strasbourgh, 16.
8
Bublin, Mehmed 1999. Gradovi Bosne i Hercegovine, milenijum razvoja i godine urbicida (The Cities of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, a Millenium of Development and the Years of Urbicide). Sarajevo: Sarajevo Publishing, 243.
9
Perry, Valery 2002. Legislating and Implementing History, Culture and Memory: Annex and the Re-development
of a Shared Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina. ASN-CECOB Convention ”Nationalism, Identity and
Regional Cooperation: Compatibilities and Incompatibilities”. June 4-9, 2002. Forlí, Italy, 2.
10
Raspeta Crkva u Bosne i Hercegovini, uništavanje katoličkih sakralnih objekata u Bosni i Hercegovini (1991-1996)
1997. Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo, Zagreb: Hrvatski informativni centar. 357.
11
Perry 2002, 2, Bublin 1999, 11, Riedlmayer, Andras 1995. Erasing the Past: the Destruction of Libraries and
Archives in Bonsia-Herzegovina. Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 1/29: 7-11. Internet source:
<http:\\fp.arizona.edu/mesassoc/Bulletin/bosnia.html>. 26th May 2003.
12
Second Information Report on war damage to the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented
by the Committee on Culture and Education. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ADOC6869. July
13
Third Information Report on war damage to the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented
by the Committee on Culture and Education. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ADOC6904.
September 1993, Strasbourgh, 5.
118
and Uzeir: the latter bearing a Muslim name, the former, a typically Serb name.
The fact that nobody in Sarajevo could say which of the buildings was Momo and
which, Uzeir, seemed to symbolise the multi-national character of the city.14
Typically, the means of destruction of cultural heritage in most places of Bosnia
included dynamiting and burning rather than heavy bombarding.15 The organised
and systematic destruction was worst in areas outside the war zones where one
national party and army had absolute control. One example is the capital of the
Serb Republic, Banja Luka, where all sixteen historical mosques were destroyed.16
The place where the main mosque of Banja Luka – Ferhadija (dating from 1579) –
once stood was turned into a car park after the mosque was destroyed in 1993. In
1998, the mayor of Banja Luka stated how the Serb people would construe the re-
building of Ferhadija ”as the blackest humiliation, and this would inflame old
wounds and provoke far-reaching consequences(. . .)Ferhadija is a monument to
the cruel Turkish occupation”. The president of the mayor’s party continued,
saying that the re-building of Ferhadija could not be discussed before Orthodox
monuments ”razed” by the Germans, Croats and Muslim Ustašas during the
Second World War would be rebuilt. He also claimed he was deeply convinced that
Ferhadija, as well as the other mosques in Banja Luka, had been destroyed by the
Muslims themselves.17 Despite these statements, the re-building of the mosque
began in 2001, raising claims that archaeological excavations should be made to
determine whether there are remnants of previous structures (e.g. a Christian
church) on the site.18 The re-building of an Orthodox church in the very centre of
Banja Luka has also continued with a sign stating (in English also) that an
Orthodox church was built on the site in the 1920s and then destroyed by the
ustašas in 1939, and that the reconstruction of that very church began again in
1993.
Similar total destruction and “rewriting” of physical history has also taken place
elsewhere, as the following few examples illustrate. After expelling Muslims from
Foča and Zvornik, the Serb forces are said to have dynamited all the mosques, and
then to have declared that no such mosques ever existed in those towns even
though the first mosques had in fact been built in the 16th Century.19 In the areas
under the control of the HVO and HDZ, centuries-long Islamic heritage was
destroyed, including urban city centres in Mostar, Stolac and Počitelj. After the
war, Herceg-Bosna authorities are said to have organised a conference, ”The
Historical Development of Croat Počitelj”, reclaiming their heritage after five
hundred years under Islam. A Turkish han (bath) had been converted to a church
14
Kreševljaković, Nihad 1996. Sarajevo 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995. Drawn map with explanations. Sarajevo: FAMA.
15
Sixth Information Report on war damage to the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented by
the Committee on Culture and Education. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ADOC7133. August
16
Lovrenović 2001, 204, 208-209.
17
Bosnia Report. Bosnian Institute. New Series No. 3. March-May 1998, 20.
18
Perry 2002, 13.
19
Sells 1996, 104.
119
and two crosses erected on the roadside of Počitelj and on the roof of the fortress of
the town. The Croat community has demanded archaeological excavation to define
the Christian origins of the settlement and thereby to prevent the full
reconstruction of the mosque and the return of Bosniac population.20 There have
been reports that a Catholic church will be built on the ruins of a destroyed mosque
in Počitelj, where the Islamic building dates back to 16th Century.21 In Bugojno,
Bosniac authorities demolished the resistance memorial built by Communist
authorities after the Second World War on the site of a Bosniac cemetery, which
itself had been destroyed. Though many Bosniacs opposed it, this managed to split
the population of the city emotionally.22
The city of Mostar, traditionally an ethnically mixed city, powerfully embodies
this new situation in which the previous physical history has ceased to exist. ‘West
Mostar’, now dominated by Croats and the unofficial Bosnian Croat capital, forms
the other bank of what used to be a relatively small city. What is called ‘East
Mostar’ is now Bosniac-dominated and includes the traditional Turkish-built
Mostar city centre (heavily damaged in the war). This Turkish city centre and
famous (now destroyed) bridge drew tourists en masse from the Adriatic coast to
visit Mostar before the war; visitors have again started returning in recent years.23
The tourist office in West Mostar, a few hundred meters away from the old city,
however, mentions not a word about the old city of Mostar in its brochures but
instead presents the sites of West Mostar and the surrounding Croat-dominated
Herzegovina. The most visible new construction of West Mostar, the new
cathedral, has been erected in the Franciscan order despite opposition from Rome.24
The systematic destruction of cultural and historical memory has been seen as
an underlying purpose of the genocide in Bosnia.25 The destruction of cities is
considered an expression of the intent to destroy their distinctive images and their
spirit.26 Such terms as ethnic and cultural cleansing, cultural genocide,
warchitecture or urbicide have been used to describe what happened.27
Religious monuments and buildings represent the core of the multi-cultural
nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As physical objects, they carry symbolic
20
Barakat, Sultan and Wilson, Craig 1998. Challenges and Dilemmas Facing the Reconstruction of War Damaged
Cultural Heritage: the case-study of Počitelj, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Destruction and Conservation of Cultural
Property. World Arheological Congress, Inter-Congress, Brac, 3-7 May 1998, 9, 18, 20, Barakat, Sultan and Wilson,
Craig 1997. The Revitalisation of Historic Settlement Počitelj. Post-War Reconstruction & Development Unit
(PRDU) of the University of York, 43.
21
Lovrenović 2001, 208-209, Sells 1996, 104.
22
Seventh Information Report on war damage to the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented
by the Committee on Culture and Education. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe ADOC7308. May
23
Niemeläinen, Jussi 2002. Sodan arvet näkyvät yhä Mostarissa: Vanhassakaupungissa tuore historia unohtuu ja
kaduilla kaikuu jo matkaoppaiden saksa. Helsingin Sanomat 9.10.2002. Matkailu, C18.
24
Barakat and Wilson 1998, 19.
25
Sells, Michael 1996b. Religion, History, and Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In: Davis, Scott G. 1996. Religion
and Justice in the War over Bosnia. New York: Routledge, 26-28, Bublin 1999, 7, Vulliamy 1994, 356-357.
26
Bublin 1999, 7.
27
Perry 2002, 2.
120
meaning. Thus, as a reason for the systematic destruction of these monuments and
buildings, we can see the will to destroy such symbols as material evidence of the
past.28 As a result of this systematic destruction of religious objects as well as other
historical monuments, the products of history culture, the post-war generation can
be seen as having lived in many places without seeing an Ottoman minaret or a
Bogomil tomb. “The tangible, visible and rich history of their people and its strange
hybrid culture down the centuries, of their curious and inimitable place at a
fulcrum between the Orient and Western Europe” has been ruined.29 In Banja
Luka, all the physical evidence of the past life of a city, with its multi-cultural
tradition and significant Muslim population, has been destroyed and a first-time
visitor to Banja Luka could not think of it as a city with a centuries-long Islamic
history alongside its Christian history. Počitelj (and so many other places) is seeking
to return the era 500 years ago by changing the symbolic and religious
environment. Illustrative of this is the comment from a Croat child born after the
war in West Mostar; she calls the traditional centre of Mostar as ‘old-Mostar’.
As a result of the destruction of the cultural memory, “the graphic and palpable
evidence of over 500 years of inter-religiously shared life in Bosnia”, such banalities
as ‘age-old-hatreds’ can become incontestable. Those who destroyed the products of
the history culture can also create new ones.30 In some other cases, those who “won
the peace” can create the new history culture as is happening in and around
Sarajevo where numerous enormous Wahhabi-style Mosques typical of the Middle
East have been erected despite Bosniac criticism and snide questions asking why the
Saudis are not building factories instead. In any case, the physical appearance of
Sarajevo has already changed. Incidents in Počitelj, Banja Luka and many other
places demonstrate similar processes of constructing new history culture.
On the other side, Bosniacs and others with pro-Bosnian orientation have
refused to accept the inevitable changes in the physical culture. It is common for
Sarajevans to criticise the new enormous Mosques and describe in detail what is
typical and characteristic for Bosnia (even though that might not be visible in some
places). Illustrative examples of unwillingness to accept the changes are the
postcards still sold in East Mostar in 2001 and showing pictures of the traditional
Mostar city centre before the war. The famous bridge is there and the city is idyllic
and beautiful. The image strongly contrasts with the reality of Mostar in 2001,
where the war nearly destroyed the old city centre. The same is true of a post-war
tourist publication “Mostar. 99 pictures” which has few pictures of destroyed or
damaged objects. For instance the booklet includes several pictures of the famous
bridge before it was destroyed thus reflecting the tendency not to want to deter the
past.31
28
Riedlmayer 1995.
29
Vulliamy 1994, 356-357.
30
Sells 1996b, 25-26.
31
Mostar. 99 pictures (no author, publisher or date specified, post-war period).
121
The Annex 8 of the Dayton peace agreement illustrates the significance of

national heritage in the form of products of history culture in Bosnia. In the Annex,
officially titled the ”Agreement on Commission to Preserve National Monuments”,
the preservation of cultural heritage is regulated in the same manner as the other 11
Annexes of the Dayton agreement regulate elections, the composition of military,
human rights, and so forth. The purpose of the Annex has been to guarantee that
the citizens of Bosnia have a right to reconstruct, rehabilitate and protect their
national monuments. In the following, I present Annex 8 from the perspective of
the discussion on history culture using the conference paper of Valery Perry as my
primary source of information.32
The Annex regulated that a Commission of three Bosnian members and two
additional members appointed by Unesco be nominated. From 1995 to 2000 a
provisional list of national monuments, which included 776 monuments, was
drafted. Of the monuments, 56% were of a religious nature, 192 Catholic, 135
Islamic and 115 Orthodox. In addition to religious sites there were for example
seven socialist era sites and six museums and libraries on the list. When comparing
these figures to the numbers of destroyed religious objects presented in the
beginning of this chapter, we can see that the numbers do not really reflect the
proportions of either the population or the destruction caused by war for each
religious group.33
Several incidents related to cultural heritage took place in 2001. In Stolac, the
reconstruction of a mosque was a subject to a small attack, and in Banja Luka and
Trebinje, the ceremonies arranged to mark the reconstruction of the central
mosques were attacked. These incidents seem to have motivated the OHR to
impose a law concerning the preservation of monuments in the Bosnian Serb
Republic in early 2002. The same law had been adopted in the Federation of
Bosnia earlier. The publicly stated goal of the law was the adoption of harmonised
and nation-wide legislation for the implementation of Annex 8. In fact, Perry states
that Annex 8 only began to receive attention from international and domestic
authorities in 2001.34
Illustrative of the Bosnian case is the wording of the new law. It no longer uses
the expression ’reconstruction’ but speaks of ’rehabilitation’. The reason for this is
the fear of replacing traditional small Ottoman mosques with the enormous
Wahhabi-style mosques.35 The physical evidence of the mosques built around
Sarajevo in the post-war years, or of the enormous church tower in Mostar confirms
that such fears have merit.
The international community seems to have realised the importance of the
equal reconstruction of national and cultural heritage in Bosnia in 2002 in contrast
to the lack of interest in seriously tackling the issue throughout the 1990s. At the
32
Perry 2002.
33
Perry 2002, 6-8.
34
Perry 2002, 1, 10.
35
Perry 2002, 11.
122
end of 2002, eight months before leaving Bosnia, the United Nations Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina announced that it would support the reconstruction and
preservation of four religious sites in BiH: the mosque in Foča (Srbinje), the
Orthodox cathedral in Sarajevo, the Jewish cemetery in Sarajevo and the Catholic
Church in Derventa.36
5.1.2 THE DIVISION OF NATIONAL SYMBOLS AND LANGUAGE

Alongside the destruction and reconstruction of historical and cultural heritage,
Bosnia has seen an emergence of new history culture, or better, history cultures.
Namely, the new products that appear to belong to the field of history culture, have
divided into three nationally-defined groups. Products characteristically part of
everyday dealings with the past, and reflecting banal nationalism have all become
examples of the separate history cultures among the three communities within one
society. In the following, I analyse the divided history culture from the point of
view of such national symbols.37
National symbols are understood in a broad sense based on the understanding
of banal nationalism defined in the beginning of the chapter to include all kinds of
“flaggings” of nationhood that are often left unnoticed.38 Billig has mentioned flags,
national anthems, coins and banknotes, national emblems, the name of the
currency unit, national holidays, Independence Day parades, and language.39 We
can add other instances in which the nation can be “flagged” through symbols:
coats of arms, street names, maps, colours used in public and so forth.
For the analysis of the Bosnian case we can note the observation that the new
nation-states appearing after the break-up of Yugoslavia started with changes to the
public memory in the form of flags, national anthem, uniforms and street names,
and positioned their collective memory into a distant history; in the case of Serbs,
to the 14th Century and to the Kosovo battle40, among Croats, 9th Century Croatia
and the first king became part of their collective memory and symbolism.41
Generally it has been stated that the Serbs were in the 1990s most eager to fall
back on old stereotypes and symbols. They perceived themselves as having fought
against the Turks and the Vatican and considered themselves eternal victims.
36
Perry 2002, 15.
37
When analysing symbols in the former Yugoslavian context, Varady has noted how ”symbols carry great weight in
this part of the world. In the spiral of competing nationalisms, most people rely on symbols as indicators of
direction.” Varady, Tibor 1997. Minorities, Majorities, Law and Ethnicity: Reflections on the Yugoslav Case. In:
Janjić, Dušan (ed.) 1997. Ethnic Conflict Management. The Case of Yugoslavia. Ravenna: Longo Editore, 132.
38
See Billig 1995.
39
Billig 1995, 8, 41-42, 45.
40
Almond has noted how Lazar's defeated army in the battle against the Turks in Kosovo Polje in 1389 was
composed of soldiers of many different nationalities including Albans. According to Almond, Serbian history books
have ”ethnically cleansed” the battle of Kosovo already a long ago. Almond 1994, 190. Also Kolsto mentions how
Albanians, Bosnians and Romanians participated in the anti-Ottoman forces. Thus the myth of brotherhood and
solidarity among Balkan people could well have come about from this event. Kolsto 2002, 13.
41
Bašić-Hrvatin, Sandra 1996. Television and National/Public Memory. In: Gow, James, Paterson, Richard and
Preston, Alison (ed.) 1996. Bosnia by Television. London: British Film Institute, 67.
123
Among other things cartoons served to reinforce the ustaša myth and to reawaken
the hatred of Albans.42 In addition to the cross with four Cyrillic S-letters (letters
stand for “only unity saves the Serbs”), the old Yugoslavian flag was still used, only
without the (communist) star. The chetnik style of clothing was characteristic of
soldiers and para-military units and the royal double eagle from the First Yugoslavia
has been widely used as a symbol. Serb paramilitary fighters in Croatia and Bosnia
often referred to themselves as chetniks and drew part of their inspiration from
fighters in the Second World War and in the Balkan Wars. Most national fighters
grew beards as a badge of warriorhood.43 Pictures of chetnik leader Mihailović and
double eagle symbols have been on sale in Banja Luka on T-shirts, keyholders,
stickers and so forth. Thus, all the symbols remind one of both Yugoslavias where
the role of Serbs was central, as demonstrated in the previous chapter.
Characteristic of the new Bosnian Serb history culture is the rejection of Bosnia
and Herzegovina as a state and instead emphasis on the Serb Republic. Bosnian
flags and other symbols of the state appear nowhere. For example in the autumn of
2001 at the border crossing from Bosnia (Serb Republic) into Croatia, the Serbian
flag (old Yugoslav flag without the star) flew and the passport stamp bore no
mention of Bosnia and Herzegovina but instead the name of the border town
written in the Cyrillic alphabet. At schools (in the years 1999–2002 I visited dozens
of primary schools within Bosnia and Herzegovina) one can find maps on the walls
showing either the Serb Republic only, or the Serb Republic connected to Serbia
with similar colours, while the rest of Bosnia appears rather as a foreign country.
The same has been true for all sorts of products with maps: telephone cards,
weather forecasts in newspapers and the television channel of the Serb Republic.
Schools mostly carry the names of Serbian national heroes and saints (the most
typical seem to be Vuk Karadžić, Petar Petrović Njegos and Saint Sava), and
pictures of these heroes often hang on school walls.
Religion has been closely tied to national symbolism as part of the prevailing
history cultures in Bosnia. Religious scientist Sells has emphasised how the genocide
in Bosnia was religiously motivated and justified. According to him “religious
symbols, mythologies, myths of origin (the pure Serb race), symbols of passion
(prince Lazar’s death in the battle of Kosovo Polje against the Turks in 1387), and
eschatological longings (the resurrection of Lazar) were used by religious
nationalists to create…the race traitor, the alien, and, ironically, the falsely accused
’fundamentalist’ next door”. Sells argues that this ideology also operated in specific
rituals of atrocity and in states where the Serb Orthodox Church in particular
supported extremists and gave ritual and symbolic support to programs of ethnic
expulsion and the destruction of mosques.44 Anzulović has noted how the Patriarch
Pavle drew parallels between the fates of Serbs and Jews, accusing Croats and
42
Sells 1996b, 35, Rogel 1998, 49.
43
Rogel 1998, 49, Carlmichael 2002, 42-46.
44
Sells 1996, 79, 89.
124
Muslims of genocide.45 A professor of philosophy from Banja Luka has also noted
how church has become a state matter: representatives of the church attend sessions
in the National Assembly of the Serb Republic, religious rites are performed in the
legislative bodies and some religious holidays are proclaimed as ethno-national
holidays. The church has become removed from religion.46
Finally, Bosnian Serb history culture seems to have preserved the Yugoslavian
era through symbols and flags. Another illustration of the idea of history culture
fostering the continuity between the old Yugoslavias and contemporary Serb
culture is related to the physical national monuments of the past. In Banja Luka,
the capital of the Bosnian Serb republic, polished sculptures of the partisan veterans
stand in one of the main squares of the town. Next to them lay inscriptions
referring to them as ”national heroes”. A few kilometres away, next to the railway
station stand a very similar-looking statue with face carvings of Bosnian Serb
”national heroes” from 1995. Thus, the idea of war heroism is conveyed and a
direct parallel drawn between the anti-fascist partisan struggle in the Second World
War and the struggle of Bosnian Serbs in the 1990s.
Among Bosnian Croats the new history culture has followed the example of
“mother” Croatia. President Tuđjman of the Republic of Croatia adopted harsh
nationalistic rhetoric which quickly appeared in symbols. His regime encouraged
the public display of ”šahovnica”, the red and white checkerboard emblem dating
back to the Middle Ages but which more recently served as the main symbol of the
ustaša movement during WWII. Similarly the name of the new currency, ”kuna”
(literally meaning marten), dated back to the 13th and 14th Centuries when the
figure of the marten was used on Croatian coinage but reminded of the ustaša state
which had used the name ”kuna” for its currency. Some Croat paramilitary forces
also used black uniforms and other images which resembled ustaša uniforms. Many
Croatian and Bosnian Serbs hated the ustaša symbolism for it reminded them of
the oppression. As part of Tuđjman's nationalistic rhetoric, 10th Century Croatia
under King Tomislav has also been remembered.47 Carlmichael has noted how
nearly every aspect of daily life became part of this new symbolism in Croatia in the
1990s: chocolate boxes, recipe books, popular and folk music all carried
checkerboard symbolism.48 Part of the new Croatian nationalism was the close
relation to the Catholic church. For example, in 1992 a popular Catholic magazine
celebrated because the cross of Christ stood next to the Croatian flag.49 A series of
events in Medjugorge (a village in Bosnian Croat area) characterised the relation
between nationalism and religion; Croatia declared its independence on 25th June
1991, which was the 10th anniversary of the apparitions of Medjugorge when six
45
46
Živanović 2001, 121.
47
Donia and Fine 1994, 223, Rogel 1998, 50, Sells 1996, 62, Carlmichael 2002, 44, 48, Unwin, T. and Hewitt, V.
2001. Banknotes and national identity in central and eastern Europe. Political Geography 8/20, 1009.
48
Carlmichael 2002, 60.
49
Sells 1996, 103.
125
children saw and heard Madonna speaking. This event served to create an
association between the virgin and the independent Croat state.50
All the symbols, including the Croat flag, on which the šahovnica appear were
adopted by the Bosnian Croats, and Croatian kunas have been used in the Croat
parts of Bosnia, although the Bosnian mark has also become popular since the late
1990s. In the late 1990s, Croat flags and šahovnica symbols overwhelmingly
appeared throughout Croat-dominated parts of Bosnia. Post offices used Croatian
symbolism, telephone cards bore Croat colours and symbols on them, the mobile
phone network available was the Croat version (this was true even in the “Croat
pockets” where Croats dominated one village within and surrounded by Bosniac- or
Serb-dominated areas). Croat flags decorated restaurants and walls inside and
outside. It has been hard to tell from the visual culture of West Mostar that one is
not in Croatia proper for practically all the institutions were Croatian; the television
channels watched were those of Croatian public television, newspapers and
magazines available came from Zagreb, postal and telecom services were Croatian
and so forth.51 By Billig’s definition, the Croat nation has been ”flagged”
overwhelmingly in Bosnian Croat areas.
The third form of history culture in Bosnia is characterised by its pro-Bosnian
notion. It is part of the daily life of Bosniacs and other pro-Bosnian-minded citizens
of the country who share the multi-ethnic ideal. If Serbs are said to have returned
to chetnik and royal Yugoslav traditions as well as to 14th Century myths, and
Croats to the era of King Tomislav and the ustaša state, the stereotype of Bosnia
(Bosniacs, people from other national groups, those of mixed origin and others with
pro-Bosnian orientation) is its multi-national, multi-religious, multi-cultural and
tolerant tradition, particularly in its cities.52 School maps display Bosnia as a state
and treat Bosnia as a state, and use official state symbols (flag, coat of arms and so
forth).
The imposed nature of symbols is characteristic of this culture. Billig has noted
how each nation must adopt conventional symbols to be a nation, and how a
nation is expected to have its own flag and national anthem to symbolise its
universal existence among other nations. Thus banal symbols of a nation’s
uniqueness also become banal symbols of its universality.53 It is this need of
conventional symbols that has been difficult in Bosnia: in the Federation of
Bosniacs and Croats it took 32 months to agree on a flag and a coat of arms since
50
Sells 1996, 107.
51
The OSCE election inspector noted in 1998: ”Despite stringent regulations that there should be no party election
materials within 50 meters of the polling station and no national symbols in the station itself, it was quite clear from
the surroundings (children’s t-shirts with the Croatian chequer-board design drying on balconies, flags on telegraph
poles) that we were in solid HDZ territory. And we were in a classroom which, like every school-class-room in
Croatian majority areas it seems, has a Croatian coat of arms embedded in the wall above the blackboard.”
Hawkesworth, Celia 1999. The Bosnian elections. September 1998. The South Slav Journal. Vol. 20 No1-2/1999,
68.
52
Rogel 1998, 50.
53
Billig 1995, 85-86.
126
their peace agreement in 1994.54 The national flag for the whole of Bosnia, as well
as its national anthem (without lyrics) has been imposed by the international
community. The same is true for car number plates. The name of the unit of
currency illustrates the lack of national symbols: Bosnian currency is called
“convertible mark” for it was convertible 1:1 to the German mark prior to the
introduction of the Euro. Convertible marks, however, do carry historical symbols
referring to the Bosnian Bogumil church in the 14th and 15th Centuries.55 Bogomil-
theory has been one of the theories of Bosnian Muslim historian trying to build
continuum for Bosnian Muslim nation since the Middle Ages. It has been proven
historically untenable on several occasions.56
These symbols created for the Bosnian state have appeared less frequently than
have the symbols in the Croat and Serb areas, yet they have appeared in Bosniac-
dominated areas and in areas under Bosnian government control. State flags are
required at the state borders and at state buildings which house state institutions. In
the late 1990s the “forced” state flags have been seen flying alonside RS flags and
illegal former flags and emblems of the Herceg-Bosna in the Serb Republic and
Croat-dominated cantons of the Federation. Typically in these places the often
dirty and worn-out BiH flag has been of the same size or smaller than the “national
flags” of the areas.57 The post-war situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has thus
shown how the idea of conventional symbols signifying the universal position of a
country among other nations becomes problematic when the symbols are contested
inside the country.
There are, however, a few exceptions that demonstrate the existence of some
specific features of Bosnian or Bosniac symbolism that have not been imposed by
the international community but have risen naturally from the people. During the
war, the Bosniac-dominated troops of the established Patriotic League appeared in
the streets of Sarajevo, some of whom carried the coat of arms of King Tvrko who
ruled the Bosnian kingdom from 1353 to 1391 and sent troops to fight alongside
Serbian prince Lazar against the Turks in the famous Kosovo Polje battle of 1389.
Few people understood the symbolism of the coat of arms and many are reported to
have said that the three lilies in it symbolised the three national groups of Bosnia.58
People who have been involved with Sarajevo for longer claim that the green colour
(symbolising Islam) has become more dominant than it used to be. Thus, specific
Bosniac features which are not associated with the Bosnian state are also becoming
54
Bennett 1997, 211.
55
Robinson, Guy M., Engelstoft, Sten and Pobric, Alma 2001. Remaking Sarajevo: Bosnian nationalism after the
Dayton Accord. Political Geography 8/20, 970-971.
56
Höpken 1989/1994, 215-216.
57
See The High Representative declares the establishment of an independent commission to propose alternatives for
the flag of BiH. Office of the High Representative. Press Office. OHR Press releases. 12th January 1998. Internet
source: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=4876>. 14th May 2003; Flags
Commission proposes three models. Office of the High Representative. Press Office. OHR Press releases. 26th
January 1998. Internet source: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=4579>. 14th May
2003.
58
Judah 1997, 80-81.
127
part of the third form of history culture in Bosnia (or developing into a separate
Bosniac history culture different from the Bosnian one).
The division of history culture influences everything from TV channels to
national holidays. Illustrating the divided nature of the history culture, the national
day of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 25th November, imposed by the High
Representative has been celebrated by only one third of the country, and has
resulted in extensive public debate.59 In 2001, one of the main dailies published in
Sarajevo displayed on that very day a cartoon with two dinner tables, one with the
coat of arms of the Serb Republic and the other with the coat of arms of the FBiH.
The text says, “Cheers for 'our' national day”.60 Both entities have their own laws
regarding other national holidays. Characteristic of the federation is that the
national days include old traditional holidays such as 1st May and the New Year for
which people usually enjoy two days of national holiday. Then there is the national
day and the religious holidays for which everyone enjoys a certain number of days
off per year, and which one may use freely depending on one’s religious
background.
Anthropologist Raymond Firth has defined national flags as symbols, or as both
symbols and signals depending on the case. In established Western societies, flags
are typically symbolic while in places such as Northern Ireland or Palestine they
carry a symbolic message and signal of resistance, control of territory and so forth.61
This is also true for Bosnia: flags and other national symbols signal who controls
the territory. Perhaps most strikingly, the visual national-religious symbols create
and mark borders in Mostar. The Bosniac territory on the eastern side of the main
road is marked by a long line of minarets of mosques built after the war. On the
other side of the road an enormous Catholic Cathedral under construction (with a
pricetag of some 12 million euros) signals the beginning of Croat territory. In
addition, the HDZ and HVO installed an enormous cross in 2000 on the
mountain overlooking the entire town, particularly the Bosniac parts of it.62
Generally, it can be stated that the separate history cultures make the places visually
distinct, that not only national flags but also other products of history culture serve
both the symbolic and signalling roles in the post-war Bosnian context.
The language has also been part of the nationally divided phenomena. Billig
has noted how the suppression of minority languages, and thereby the creation of a
national language, is typical for national hegemony.63 As this criterion of distinct
national language is so manifest for national hegemony, it has lead to the need to
stress the separate existence of three languages in Bosnia despite their great
59
Dukić, Zlatko 2001. Kakva država, takav praznik. Oslobođenje Subota 24.XI 2001, 8, Ulicama zavijorile zastave.
Oslobođenje, Nedjelja 25.IX, 2001, 1, Kolar, Ramo 2001. Praznik jednog i. Oslobođenje, Ponedjeljak 26, XI, 2001,
2, Omeragić, Dk. Praznik za trećinu države. Oslobođenje, Ponedjeljak 26, XI, 2001, 3, Praznik obilježili članovi i
simpatizeri SDPBiH. Oslobođenje, Ponedjeljak 26, XI, 2001, 4, Serdadević 2001.
60
Stefanović, Božo 2001. Živio dan našsih državnosti. Oslobođenje, Nedjelja 25.IX, 2001, 2.
61
Billig 1995, 39, 41.
62
Bose 2002, 141-142.
63
Billig 1995, 27, 29.
128
similarity.64 The separation of standard languages into three has then reinforced the
symbolic function of language and diminished the communicative one.65
In the Serb Republic the use of Cyrillic alphabet has created visible boundaries.
In the area where both Latin and Cyrillic alphabets were traditionally known and
used, the exclusive use of the Cyrillic alphabet in signs, newspapers, and books –
simply everywhere – has imbued the alphabet with the notion of national belonging
(or exclusion). The power of such “sign language” is well illustrated by the common
practise of Bosnians coming from the Federation to the Serb Republic and placing
newspapers written in the Cyrillic alphabet so they are visible through the back
window of the car to create the impression that the car was “local”.66 On the other
hand it was almost impossible to find a computer that used the Cyrillic alphabet in
Sarajevo in the late 1990s even though the Cyrillic script had been previously used
as much as the Latin script all over Bosnia and Herzegovina. As mentioned earlier,
one of the most common Serb symbols has been the cross with four Cyrillic S-
letters on it. Generally Serbs have eliminated from their dictionaries words that
have clear Croat roots.67 Continuing the theory of Firth presented earlier, we could
say that in the post-war Bosnian context the language has also acquired both
symbolic and signalling significance commensurate to the entire history culture.
Part of the separation of the Bosnian Serb language has been the attempt to
adapt to the Ekavski dialect instead of to their native Ijekavski dialect, which all
Bosnians use. This is because many Serbs and Croats believe that the Ekavski
dialect is authentically Serbian whereas Ijekavski is Croatian. The actual
distribution of these variants of the language is more complicated, yet Ijekavski is
typically a Croatian variant and Ekavski, typically a Serbian variant.68
The appearance of the “first daily newspaper in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
Croatian language” illustrates that the language question has been central, especially
for the Bosnian Croats. The Bosniacs have been blamed for not using proper Croat
in the Federation administration and wanting Croats to speak “Bosniac language”
(“Bosnjacki jezik”), which is a pejorative expression referring to the Bosniac term
Bosnian Muslims have adopted for their nationality.69 They themselves usually refer
to their language as “Bosnian” (“Bosanski jezik”). The new Bosnian Croat
64
A linguistic analysis of the prevailing situation in Bosnia concluded that language in Bosnia does not follow ethnic
borders but rather the urban-rural borders. Some Turkish words and expressions have been used only by Serbs in
certain areas. Phonologically, syntactically and morphologically the language used in Bosnia is a mixture of Croatian
and Serbian dialects. Turkish words have been its special flavour. Husić 1999, 12-16.
65
Baotić, Josip 2002. The Identity of Language and the Identity of Nation. In: Jones, Fransis R. and Lovrenović,
Ivan (ed.) 2002. Reconstruction and Deconstruction. Forum Bosna culture–science-society-politics quaterly review.
15/02, 157-159.
66
Until 1999 it was difficult to find newspapers published in the Serb Republic in the Federation, and Federation
newspapers in the Serb Republic. Human Development Report Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000. Youth. UNDP:
Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues, 50.
67
Husić, Geoffrey 1999. Is There/Will There Be a ”Bosnian” Language? Aspects of the Language Question in Post-
war Bosnia. The South Slav Journal. Vol. 20 No3-4/1999, 19.
68
69
Juka, Darko 2001. Bošnjački jezik je ravnopravniji of hrvatskoga. Dnevni list. Prve dnevne novine u BiH na
hrvatskom jeziku. Mostar, godinu I, broj 63. 3.12.2001, 6.
129
newspaper issue also echoes the common accusations among Bosnian Croats as to
how the Bosniacs, with the help of international community and the peace
agreement, try to “assimilate Croats in Bosnia into Bosniak-Catholics”, referring to
the practise of Bosnian Muslims (now Bosniacs) once being forced to define to
themselves as Muslim-Croats or Muslim-Serbs.70 Typical of Croats has been the re-
introduction of words that had been forgotten during the Communist years.71
The Bosniac reaction to the language-nationalism of Croats and Serbs has been
two-fold. Some have started pressing the separate notion of Bosnian language
different from Serbian and Croatian, while the majority typically refers to all the
languages officially recognised in the country (Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian) as “the
same language”. A number of new reference and textbooks on the Bosnian language
have been published which try to establish all features of a distinct language from
its history to its specific grammar rules.72 The use of Turkish words and expressions
has also become more emphasised among some Bosniacs.73
As nationally symbolic products of history culture we can also look at names.
The town of Foča that is part of the Serb Republic is now called Srbinje (Serb
place) by the Serb authorities and in official maps of the RS. In Sarajevo, the main
street named after Marshal Tito (Maršala Tita) has remained, while in Banja Luka
the street is now called Skendera Kulenovica or Kralja Petra Karađorđevica. In
Sarajevo, the street of the Yugoslavian National Army is now the Street of the
Green Berets (Zelenih beretki) referring to the Bosniac-dominated Bosnian army
during the war in the 1990s. One of the new road names in Sarajevo, ”The Road of
Young Muslims”74 carries a clearly religious notion. A 15-member Commission
consisting of artists, writers and historians renamed 403 of 1044 streets in Sarajevo
after the war. Names referring to Marxism and Communism and to supporters of
the Yugoslavian communist regime mainly disappeared while the memory of key
events and individuals from the Ottoman Period and, to a lesser extent, from the
Austro-Hungarian period were introduced.75 To commemorate the recent war, the
Vrbanja bridge has been renamed the Suada Dilberović bridge after a Muslim girl
who was killed there.76 In Bosniac-dominated East Mostar, most of the street names
have remained the same and the street of Marshal Tito still exists. In Croat-
dominated West Mostar, the street names resemble those in Zagreb and we find
Bulevar (previously National Revolution), Kralja Trvtko (V. Nazora), Zrinskog
(Leninova Šetaliste), Zagrebačka (Avenija 14 Februar), Splitska, Kralja Tomislava,
70
Pločkinić, Leo 2001. Petrisch ukida hrvatsko Sveučilište u Mostaru! Dnevni list. Prve dnevne novine u BiH na
hrvatskom jeziku. Mostar, godinu I, broj 63. 3.12.2001, 3, Juka 2001.
71
Husić 1999, 19.
72
See e.g. Isaković, Alija 1992. Rječnik karakteristišne leksike u bosanskome jeziku. Sarajevo: Svjetlost; Isaković, Alija
1995. Rječnik bosanskog jezika. Sarajevo: Bosanska Knjiga; Jahić, Dževad 2000. Bosanski jezik u 100 pitanja i 100
odgovora. Zenica: Linguos; Jahić, Dževad 2000b. Bošnjački narod i njegov jezik. Zenica: Linguos; Jahić, Dževad,
Halilović, Senahid and Palić, Ismail 2000. Gramatika bosanskoga jezika. Zenica: Dom štampe.
73
Husić 1999, 12-16.
74
Mladi Muslimani – Young Muslims was a Muslim Youth organisation before and during the Second World War.
75
Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobric 2001, 966-968.
76
130
Kneza Branimira, Starčevića, Stjepan Radića, Zvonimirova and Rudarska – all

names of the main streets in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia.77 In post-war Banja
Luka, the tendency to replace Communist names with those of Serb national heroes
(as seen with the change of Marshall Tito street) also appears in the change of V. I.
Lenin street to Vuk Karadžić street. Generally, all Muslim names have been
removed from the citymap of Banja Luka. As one of the new names, we have
historically-loaded “Detainees of Jasenovac” (Jasenovačkih logoraša).78
5.1.3 HISTORY CULTURE AND OTHER CULTURAL ARTEFACTS

As presented in chapter three, the realm of history culture includes all kinds of
cultural artefacts and stories of people. The following section present some features
of different cultural artefacts from the point of view of Bosnian history culture. The
private stories of people are beyond the scope of this research.
Forgotten Museums and Exhibitions

Museums and exhibitions can be seen as the classical forms of celebrating and
remembering the past. In fact, most museums in Bosnia and Herzegovina had
active programmes of exhibitions, research, ethnographic projects and
archaeological excavation before the war.79 During the war, museums were usually
not targets of warfare but only suffered from poor environmental conditions.80 In
the post-war period, however, the atmosphere of indifference and uncertainty as to
what to do with the past seemed a characteristic of history culture with regard to
museums. This has been excerbated by the lack of means of material support
(which of course appears partly to reflect the lack of public and political interest).
For example, the national museum in Sarajevo, which houses valuable collections,
has remained without heating since the beginning of the war, and became a topic of
a public discussion in 2001. The situation has been similar in another museums,
and the Sarajevo city museum has lost most of its buildings; only one traditional
Bosnian house remains on display. According to the director of the museum,
mainly foreigners visit the building.81
77
Mostar et ses environs. Petites monographies Touristiques Numéro 9. Zagreb: Turistkomerc. 1985. Mostar Plan
grada/City map (no date specified, post-war period). Torsti, Pilvi 2002. Sankarimatkailijan Slovenia, Kroatia ja
Bosnia ja Hertsegovina. Helsinki: Kustannus Oy Taifuuni, 327.
78
Banja Luka and its surroundings. Pocket guides for tourists number 94. Zagreb: Turistkomerc, 1984. Banja Luka
2000. sa preporukom. Banja Luka: Tradeeng Arco 2000.
79
Tenth Information Report on war damage to the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented
January 1997, Strasbourgh, 13.
80
81
Seksan, Vedrana 2001. Muzeje u muzej! Dani 9. Novembar 2001, 45-46.
131
In 1990, ”the Museum of Revolution” was turned into ”the Historical

Museum” in Sarajevo.82 The museum has no permanent collection on display but
has hosted several exhibitions. Among them have been ”Bosnia and Herzegovina in
the 19th century” and ”The hundred years of stamped money in Bosnia and
Herzegovina”.83 The titles of the exhibitions reveal that they have not dealt with the
topics likely to provoke much collective interest or feelings for the past. Another
illustrative example from 2001: in the inner courtyard of the museum I saw a huge
statue of Tito lying down, partly covered by snow. When I asked whether the statue
would be included as an exhibit in the museum, nobody in the museum could give
an answer.
The changed political and national atmosphere has naturally created additional
difficulties. Also, as with the Museum of Revolution, the Museum of the Sarajevo
Assassination (formerly the Museum of Mlada Bosna and Gavrilo Princip, the
assassin of Franz Ferdinand in 1914) will most likely never be restored to its
original form. The exhibits of the museums have been regarded as too pro-Serb in
their presentation.84 The most notorious exhibit, the statue of Gavrilo Princip, was
removed from the centre of Sarajevo already under Tito because it was seen as a
symbol of Serb nationalism. A plan exists to return the statue at least to the city
museum, but no official decisions have been made.85
Many loan exhibitions from the institutions in Belgrade were characteristic of
the museums in the Serb Republic during the war thus reflecting the changed
national and political situation.86 After the war, museum staff in the RS said they
had preserved everything from the pre-war collections. Comments from the
director of the former ”Liberation War Museum” in Foča (now Srbinje for Serbs)
perhaps reflect the general atmosphere in museums of the RS after the war: he said
he would never use objects from pre-war collections as the ideology had changed.
Yet the old collections were completely preserved and he would give them to
anyone who would like to use them.87
The seemingly unconscious atmosphere of indifference and uncertainty as to
what to do with the past has also characterised relations towards the recent past.
One new museum in Sarajevo, the Tunnel Museum, built at the site of the
82
The Council of Europe mentions this change only in their report in 1996, while Dani's article with the interview
of the director of the museum mentions the year 1990. Ninth Information Report on war damage to the cultural
heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented by the Committee on Culture and Education. Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe ADOC7464. January 1996, Strasbourgh, 5.
83
Seksan 2001, 47.
84
Ninth Information Report on war damage to the cultural heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, presented
85
Seksan 2001, 46.
86
87
January 1997, Strasbourgh, 14-15.
132
entrance to the war tunnel going under the airport to the besieged city since the
second year of the 1992-95 war. The museum includes a short part of the original
tunnel and plenty of information and material related to the tunnel’s use which was
extremely important to Sarajevans during the war. So far the Tunnel Museum has
been maintained by a private family who makes their living from it. The state has
provided no support and the tunnel’s other entrance is used as a private garage.
To my knowledge, no great interest in the past – recent or distant – in the form
of exhibitions, museums and so on has existed in Bosnia. The concept of banal
nationalism seems to describe well the way the Bosnians relate to the past through
language, symbols and other ”flaggings” of nation and the past in their daily lives.
At the same time they seem to lack any active interest in the past. For example, the
date when the Dayton peace agreement was signed is hardly celebrated, and I have
witnessed only a few celebrated historical events relating to such major events as the
fall of Srebrenica or the shelling of the Sarajevo Market place. Even those
celebrations have not aroused much interest. In Banja Luka, I have witnessed the
celebration of the anniversary of the army of the Serb Republic.
Divided Media and Historybooks

Shortly after the war it was argued that the media in general and television in
particular became central in the unification of people’s personal memories and
national memories, offering day-to-day legitimisation to new commemorations and
rituals in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina.88
Television has been divided along national lines. The Bosnian Federation has
its own channels and the Serb Republic its own. In addition, there are numerous
local channels. Visual symbols and images are part of programs in the form of
weather forecast maps (in the RS, they include Serbia and emphasise the Serb
Republic as a virtually separate state within Bosnia and Herzegovina).89
Immediately after the war, news of events in the Bosnian Federation were aired as
foreign news. An illustrative example of the importance of symbolism in television
occurred at the end of 1998 when the prize from independent media in Sarajevo
was awarded to the new TV director for changing the green triangle logo to a
yellow triangle (the green colour being associated with Islam).90 In some
federational channels, female journalists might wear a head-covering hijab thus
symbolising an expression of Islam not typical for Bosnia. In 2002, common
simultaneous television news transmissions began on the channels of both entities.
The texts of the news emission alternate daily between Cyrillic and Latin script.
The studios are located in several towns, and the main journalists come from
Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar.
88
Bašić-Hrvatin 1996, 68-71.
89
Thompson 1994/1999, 281.
90
Thompson 1994/1999, 268.
133
The main dispute concerning the television program has been among Bosnian
Croats. Already in 1998, the international community protested the transmission of
Croatian national television (HRT) in Bosnia. Bosnian Croats argued that they
needed HRT in the absence of their own native media.91 In 2001, HRT was made
a satellite channel subject to separate fees, which angered Bosnian Croats. A typical
comment in the autumn of 2001 blamed ”them” (other Bosnians, mainly Bosniacs)
for watching ”our program”, and that we are now forced to watch ”their program”.
The local newspaper, however, continued to display the programs of Croatian
national television channels first and only under them the Bosnian ones. The
sensitive relationship with Zagreb and the need to concentrate on separate Bosnian
Croat nation-building was reflected in the appearance in 2001 of the ”first daily
Croatian-language newspaper in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Dnevni List.
Similarly, in the main bookstore of Western Mostar the big map on the wall
displayed neither Bosnia and Herzegovina nor Croatia, but the Western
Herzegovinian region. The selection of history books included a series of general
history books for a large audience, all published between 1998–2000 in Croatia,
and dealing with the national history of Croatia from different perspectives.92 In
addition, two critical books on Bosnia written by Bosnian Croats were said to have
sold well.93 In the library of Western Herzegovina, most books were from the
Yugoslav period, and some dealt with Herzegovinian history, but not Bosnian
history. Bosnian Croat schoolbook production had also begun on a larger scale in
2001, which also shows the growing emphasis of history culture on Bosnian Croat
separatism over Croatia and common Croathood, considered central throughout
the 1990s. A map displayed at a Croat school in Kiseljak in the autumn of 2002
included both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.
In regard to general history books (not academic history research and other
than school textbooks discussed separately), the main bookstore of “Serb Sarajevo”
(Srpsko Sarajevo) had only one book dealing with history: ”the History of Serb
Culture”, an English account of the cultural history of Serbs (not Bosnian Serbs).
The editor of the book, Djoko Stojičić, was the cultural minister of Serbia in 1993
and the Ambassador of Serbia to Czech Republic since 1995. In the introduction to
the book, he writes about “hundreds of thousands of Serbs from Croatia and
Bosnia finding refuge in Yugoslavia”, about “the third genocide of Serbs in the 20th
century”, and how the book was to respond to “a wave of denials of Serbian spritual
91
Thompson 1994/1999, 275-276.
92
Bilandžić, Dušan 1999. Hrvatska Moderna Povijest. Zagreb: Golden Marketing; Matković, Hrvoje 1998. Povijest
Jugoslavije (1918-1991). Hrvatski Povijest. Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavićić; Matković, Hrvoje 1999. Povijest
Hrvatske Seljanke Stranke. Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavičić; Matković, Hrvoje and Trumbetaš, Drago 2001. Mala
illustrirana Hrvatska Povijest. Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavićić; Pavlićević, Dragutin 2000. Povijest Hrvatske. Drugo
izmijenjeno i prošireno izdanje. Zargeb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavićić.
93
Ančić, Mladen 2001. Tko je pogriješio u Bosni. Na razdjelnici između povijesti i politike. Drugo dopunjeno i
popravljeno izdanje. Mostar: Crkva na kamenu; Vojinović, Alexander 1999. Nije sramota biti Hrvata ali je šeh velike
i male tajne NDH. Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavićić.
134
achievements and to the satanisation of Serbs”.94 The general historical account of

Bosnia I have managed to find among Bosnian Serbs is written in the Cyrillic
alphabet and called “the History of Bosnia”. It is printed in Banja Luka in 1999
with a cover design that suggests it is a recent publication. The cover, however, is
misleading for the book is a reprint of a book published by the Serbian Royal
Academy in 1940.95 Bosnian Serbs seem to have copied the practise of re-printing
books written at earlier times from Serbia: at least three books written at the time of
the Serbian expansion (1912 and 1913) have been re-published in 1995, 1998 and
(electronically) 1999–2000 in Serbia. The titles are “On Albanians in Old Serbia
and Sandžak”, “Muslims of Our Blood in South Serbia, and “Old Serbia,
Geographic and Ethnographic Picture”.96
Several Bosnia-orientated books have been published about the general history
of Bosnia. It is difficult to differentiate between general books and purely academic
accounts for all of the titles have been published in response to the great public
demand. A Turkish work of history from 1878 entitled ”The history of Bosnia 1-2”
has now been translated for the first time from Turkish.97 As with this Turkish title
from the 19th century, a recent account of general Bosnian history only covers the
period from the 6th Century to 1900, omitting the last century entirely.98 A war-
time product written by professors at the University of Sarajevo was intended for
soldiers, teachers and so forth who needed new material on the country of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.99 In addition, the history of Bosniacs has been dealt with
separately. A monumental history of the Bosniacs from the 7th to 20th Century
was published in 2001, touting itself as an academic history for a nation that never
had one before. That the history of the Bosniac nation was never taught in schools
before 1992 is also mentioned.100 Of the book’s approximately 600 pages, 155
pages are devoted to the years 1990–92. Finally one of the most widespread and
popular works on the history of Bosniacs ”Historija Bošnjaka” (History of
Bosniacs) by Mustafa Imamović, suggests the separate origins of Bosnian Muslims
as a special Slavic tribe.101 Thus, using Moscovici’s terminology, we can see the
numerous general history books with the Bosnian or Bosniac orientation as
”Darstellungen”, which offer people new representations of the past in which to
recognise themselves.
The book ”Crimes in the Stolac Municipality (1992–1996)” presents a separate
example of a product of history culture created as a result of the will and interest of
94
The History of Serbian Culture 1999. Second edition. Belgrade: Mrlješ Publishin & Distribution Verzal Press,
344.
95
Ћеровић, Владимир 1940/1990. Хисторија Босне. Репринт иѕданје. Банја Лука: Глас срспки.
96
Aleksov 2002, 16.
97
Hadžihuseinovic, Murekkit 1878/1999. Povijest Bosne 1-2. Sarajevo: El-Kalem.
98
Džemaludin, Alić 1998. Devetnaest Stoljeća Bosne. Historija i kultura Bosne od 6 do 1900 godine. Sarajevo:
dinex.
99
Bosna i Hercegovina od najstarih vremena do kraja Drukog svjetskog rata 1994/1998. Sarajevo: Bosanski kulturni
centar.
100
Bojić 2001, 622.
101
Kvaerne 2002, 2-5.
135
the community members. The book lists and illustrates the destroyed houses and
cultural monuments of Stolac. The presentation also specifies those villagers that
participated in the destruction: ”According to available testimonies, Rudolf Colic
and Zdenko Beno, both from Stolac, in addition to Marijan Prce, Nikola Vojinovic
and Zdravko Pazin, also took part in mining the mosque.” The names of all those
thought to have participated in the destruction of Stolac are listed in 23 pages at the
end of the book. The book has been printed in two editions: the first one in 1996,
and the second in 2001, which hints at its popularity.102 Perhaps this product of
history culture presents a more common problem felt in Bosnia: the recent past and
the war has not been properly dealt with on legal and public terms, and the feeling
of justice in regard to the past – necessary for reconciliation – is lacking. Such a lack
of feeling of justice is manifest in “The Crimes of Stolac” -book.
New Myths through Guides and Films

Tourist guidebooks provide illustrative examples of the change in history culture. I
have managed to obtain guidebooks on Banja Luka (the capital of Bosnian Serbs),
Mostar (the unofficial capital of Bosnian Croats) and Sarajevo (the capital of Bosnia
and center of pro-Bosnian culture) from the 1980s and from the post-war period.
The greatest change has taken place in the materials on Banja Luka.
The guide from 1984 presents a multi-ethnic city emphasised through pictures
of mosques, Orthodox churches and Catholic churches. One of the mosques is said
to be among the most beautiful in the whole of Yugoslavia, and the story of the
history of the city through different periods (Turkish rule, Austro-Hungarian times,
royal Yugoslavia) closely resembles the story of Sarajevo as presented in the
brochures of the 1990s. The coat of arms on the cover includes a stilicised mosque
together with a red star. The introduction states how ”Serbs, Muslims, Croats and
members of other peoples and nationalities of Yugoslavia all live and work there
equally” thus echoing the typically Bosnian multi-national ethos.103
The new Banja Luka tourist guide published in 2000 concentrates on
presenting the cultural and political centre of the Serb Republic and mentions
Bosnia and Herzegovina only once, when telling that Banja Luka is the second
largest city in Bosnia. The road map attached to the guide presents the Serb
Republic as a separate state and has arrows pointing to Belgrade, Zagreb and
Sarajevo as though they all were capitals of the neigbour countries while the capital
of the RS is Banja Luka. In contrast to the guidebook from 1984, the historical-
cultural dimension of the presentation of Banja Luka has given way to a focus on
the future. This is illustrated by the passage: ”These days, Banja Luka rises up in its
full beauty, rapidly trying to compensate for what has been lost. This is the town of
young people where youth has a very important role in all segments of the society.
102
Crimes in Stolac Municipality (1992-1996) 1996. Sarajevo: DID.
103
Banja Luka and its surroundings. Pocket guides for tourists number 94. Zagreb: Turistkomerc. 1984, 7, 13-16,
51-52, 57-58.
136
They are trying to forget all bad things from the past and turn to the future. BL will
step into the 21st century as the main town of Republic of Srpska and the center of
the crossing of roads in this part of Europe.”104
Historical developments are described with clear opinions about the nature of
different periods. ”The dark period of Banja Luka’s history” is seen as having
started with the Turkish capture in 1528. ”Almost four centuries of the cruelest
occupation and exploitation together with the most brutal terror of domestic
population kept Banja Luka underdeveloped territory until the end of 19th
century.” The tone is different when describing the Serb rule: ”During the
Kingdom of Karađorđević dynasty, Banja Luka got its most beautiful buildings and
became the Beauty of Krajina.” During the Second World War, the German army
and the ustašas are said to have killed almost a million people, predominantly Serbs,
in concentration camps.105 There is no mention of chetniks, as was the case in the
guidebook published in 1984. The recent war is only referred to in one sentence:
”After the latest war and disintegration of Yugoslavia, Banja Luka is the capital of
Republic of Srspka and is developing rapidly as a cultural, industrial and economic
center important in this area especially in the beginning of new era.”106 Thus the
unhistorical approach to and ignorance (or willful forgetting?) of the past and
forward-looking attitude is characteristic of the guide.
The unimportance of history is also clear when the guide mentions about the
historical objects how ”frequent wars took a toll together with the great earthquake
in 1969 so there are not many old buildings that will greet 2000(. . .)soon(. .
.)Orthodox temple of Jesus the Savior which was destroyed by ustašas in 1942, will
be erected on the site of the original.” The guide also presents small Orthodox
churches from the 18th and 19th Centuries which appeared nowhere in the guide of
1984.107 The buildings from the Turkish period are not mentioned at all, as though
they had never existed in Banja Luka.
The tourist guides of Sarajevo have undergone no such major change. They
concentrate slightly more on the Turkish-Bosnian tradition, and the Orthodox
icons have not been as widely presented in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Generally,
however, the nature of the guide is similar in its presentation of Sarajevo as a multi-
ethnic and multi-religious city.108
In Mostar, Bosniac-dominated East Mostar continues to present the city of
Mostar similar to before the war, while West Mostar concentrates on that side only
104
Banja Luka 2000. sa preporukom. Banja Luka: Tradeeng Arco. 2000, 05. Here we can remind ourselves of the
quite miserable socio-economic situation in the RS, as described in the previous chapter.
105
In chapter four it was argued that most likely about 300 000-350 000 Serbs died during the Second World War
in Yugoslavia while the entire death toll was perhaps around 600 000.
106
Banja Luka 2000. sa preporukom. Banja Luka: Tradeeng Arco. 2000, 11, 13, 15.
107
Banja Luka 2000. sa preporukom. Banja Luka: Tradeeng Arco. 2000, 17, 19.
108
Baš-čaršija. Sarajevo. Pocket guides for tourists. Zagreb: Turiskomerc. 1986. Dobro došli u Sarajevo: novi
turistički vodić 1998 = Welcome to Sarajevo: new tourist guide 1998. Husedžinović, Sabira (ed.). Sarajevo through
history. Tourism Association of Sarajevo Canton. (Handed out in 2001).
137
and mentions nothing of the Turkish-built old city of Mostar at all (as discussed in
5.1.1).109
Regarding films, there have been some activities in the early 1990s, at least in
Serbia. In August 1991, a film exhibition in Belgrade commemorated the massacres
of Serbs in the Croatian NDH state between 1941–44 with the theme “Ustaša
crimes do not fade with time”.110 After the war, at least three films constructing
myths connected to the recent past have circulated among Bosnians. Two films
have described the suffering of people in a realistic style: ”Sarajevo Krug” (Sarajevo
Circle) describes the situation in Sarajevo during the war and has appeared on
television several times. Videotapes of a Serb produced film ”Lepa sela, lepa gore”
(Beautiful village, beautifully burns) circulated soon after the war when cinemas
hardly functioned. Both of these films illustrated the immediate interest of people
in collective presentations of the past. A later product, ”No man’s land” was
awarded the Oscar prize in 2002. The film describes the absurdity of the war and
effectively shows many commonly held conceptions of Bosnians: the ethnic groups
of the main characters, a Serb and a Bosnian soldier, cannot be known from their
names and their common past is emphasised through common friends. The fight
over who started the war is absurd. The UN and foreign journalists are presented
very critically. Generally, the film does not assign guilt but rather points to the
absurdity of the war. Indirectly the archive materials of Mitterrand and Radovan
Karadžić seem to assign guilt, but not on the level of a single nation or soldier.111
The film has appeared everywhere in Bosnia in cinemas and also on TV. It has been
quite popular also in the Serb Republic, yet in Mostar the public hardly noticed
it.112 Thus it seems that the representations of the film are recognisable to Bosnian-
orientated Bosniacs and, to a lesser extent, to Bosnian Serbs, but not to Bosnian
Croats.
Inclosing, regarding history culture in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, we
can conclude certain tendencies. Among Bosnian Serbs the signalling aspect appears
crucial. Destruction and forgetting of the past while simultaneously digging into
old, unchangeable history is also characteristic. Thus the past is not made into
history and the ahistorical future orientation is a central part of the culture.113
109
Mostar. 99 pictures. Mostar: Microbook. (Published in late 1990s).
110
Almond 1994, 135.
111
Mitterrand visited the closed city of Sarajevo in June 1992 when the war had been going on for about two
months. No international politicians had been able to visit the place because Serbs controlled the airport and all
peace attempts were made outside the place. Despite different original plans, Mitterrand only met the Serb leader
Radovan Karadžić at the airport before taking off again as the fighting around the airport started. Silber and Little
1995/1996, 255-256. According to Richard Holbrooke, Mitterrand demonstrated pro-Serb attitudes stemming from
the Second World War on several occasions. Holbrooke, Richard 1998. To End a War. New York: Random House,
65. According to Anzulović, Mitterrand took both the myth of ancient hatreds and the myth of the heavenly Serbia
seriously and reduced historical complexities to simplistic black-and-white schemes. Anzulović 1999, 161-162.
112
Interview with the press officer of the Sarajevo Film Festival, Medzida Buljubasić, 24th April 2002 in Sarajevo.
Notes with the author.
113
As presented in 3.2.2, Braembussche has suggested that forgetting parts of the historical experience can lead to
historical traumas which often form a basis for myths and taboos about the past.
138
Among Bosnian Croats, the language plays a particular role in the construction of
the separate history culture. The construction of new buildings and other things
expresses to the need to signal to others. As a whole, the creating of new culture is
central: first, with mother-Croatia; and later, as part of Herzegovina. The Bosniacs
on the other hand do not seem to stress the creation of new culture and most of the
new products are imported from outside. While Bosniacs are unwilling to accept
the changes in the history culture, they stress the need for universal symbols of a
state which have little signalling significance. The number of new history books and
language books are part of this same phenomenon; they build a foundation for the
universality of Bosnia and Bosnians, and for Bosniacs as a nation and as a country.
Robinson et. al. have also concluded how the new street names in Sarajevo are part
of the deliberate creation of exclusively Bosnian history.114 Similarly, Sarajevo has
seen the creation of the National Theatre and the National Museum.115
All these tendencies have resulted from a dramatic and aggressive, conscious
process. The use of history as part of history culture (that is history politics) has
mainly been based on banal nationalism from the destruction and reconstruction of
cultural heritage to all forms of daily symbolism, not on museums, exhibitions,
films, and other cultural products. In fact, the so called ethno-histories and school
textbooks seem the only official or conscious presentations of history as part of the
aggressive use of history. Any other aspects related to the dramatic process of
constructing three separate history cultures within Bosnia can be characterised as
banal nationalism. This has resulted from failure to deal with the past, and instead
of being made history, the past has been made present in banal forms.
Finally we can apply Hobsbawm’s basic idea of invented traditions for
understanding nations and the appeal of nationalism in the Bosnian context.
Hobsbawm has emphasized that typically, the invented traditions attempt to
establish a suitable historical past for a nation.116 Because many symbols and
traditions in Bosnia used to be common and shared, particularly Bosnian Serbs and
Croats have (re)invented new traditions in the new situation. We have seen how
Bosnian Serbs have invented and reinvented traditions to emphasise the continuity
between them and the Yugoslav past and Serb war heroism by using chetnik
symbolism and a flag that resembles the Yugoslav flag. They needed to invent new
traditions because they have simultaneously ignored and destroyed traditions that
would connect them to the multicultural past of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the
destruction of mosques, texts of tourist guides). Among Bosnian Croats we have
seen traditions reinvented in the form of medieval and ustasa symbolism which
construct the proper Croat past for Bosnian Croats. As among the Serbs, the
tradition of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been destroyed and neglected. Of course
Bosnian-minded people have also been active in “reinventing” as much Bosnian
114
Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobric 2001, 969.
115
Robinson, Engelstoft and Pobric 2001, 973.
116
Hobsbawm, Eric 1983. Introduction: Inventing Traditions. In: Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence (ed.) 1983.
The invention of tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1-2.
139
tradition and history as possible, but it is disconnected from the Bosnian tradition
as it is among Serbs and Croats.
Smith has critisiced Hobsbawm’s idea of traditions being “invented” for not
explaining the appeal of nationalism, but only seeing nationalism from the
functional point of view in connection to capitalism and state-building. For Smith,
traditions cannot be invented out of blue, but must be relevant to the existing social
and cultural context.117 Without discussing what Hobsbawm meant and whether
Smith’s criticism is reasonable, we can note here that in the Bosnian case we can
perhaps see a difference between the idea of “invented” tradition and “reinvented”
traditions and their chances for success. While the Bosnian Serbs and Croats have
“reinvented” traditions from the existing past, many traditions “invented” or
imposed at least partly by the international community have characterised
Bosnian/Bosniac history culture. We have seen that the “reinvented” traditions have
been much more successful than the purely “invented” traditions which, from the
functional perspective, have in fact been invented to serve state-building (close to
Hobsbawm‘s idea). Thus, the process of (re)invention seems to make a difference
for in the appeal of symbols and traditions when analyzing nationalism.This also
opens room for the discussion of elitism as part of the Bosnian nationalisms. Both
the “reinvented” and “invented” traditions described above have at least partly been
imposed by local and international political elites as an instrument to acquire and
maintain power. Yet we cannot underestimate the power of nationalism expressed
through cultural and ethnic identity in the form of myths and symbols which have
not been imposed upon the people from above (which does not mean that the elites
would not have politicised and used such a form of nationalism as well). Thus in
the context of Bosnian history culture we can attempt to understand the new
nationalisms from the elitist as well as from the naturalist points of view.118
5.2 On Historical Consciousness in Bosnia

In chapter three, historical consciousness was defined as the relation humans have
with time; as an understanding of the past constructed through a social process.
Social groups and individuals remember the past from their present perspectives,
the present influences the remembering process. Historical consciousness connects
the past with the present and influences possible future expectations; the past
experience and future expectations form a complex relation. The collective
historical consciousness of a community could be been seen as constructed by the
117
Smith 1998, 128-130.
118
My understanding of elitism and naturalism in the context of analysing nationalism is based on Hall's discussion
of theoretical traditions of nationalism. He defines elitism as nationalism which is the outcome of elitist self-interest;
thus nationalism is an instrument for either power-holders or power-seekers. As examples of elitist nationalism
theoreticians, he mentions Tilly and Breuilly. As naturalism, Hall understands approaches which hold nationalism to
be a natural expression of kinship, human psyche, ethnicity or culture and discusses the cultural-ethnic nationalism
mainly through Smith. Hall 1998, 32-40.
140
influence of the prevailing history culture and academic historiography. But the
historical consciousness of a community can also influence the process of
construction of history culture. Therefore history culture and academic tradition in
history research can reflect the historical consciousness of a community.
As argued in the beginning of this chapter, we can make some comments on
the characteristics of historical consciousness in this context. The features of history
culture presented previously can reflect the historical consciousness: the products of
history culture reflect the understandings of the past that seem to prevail in the
society. The concentration will be on the dramatic change that has necessarily been
experienced as part of the Bosnian historical consciousness in the last 10 to 15
years. Thus we will also describe the features of history culture in earlier times as
well for they reflect this change.
In Titoist Yugoslavia, the official historical consciousness was characterised by
the celebration of the incredible partisan survival and heroism in the partisan fight
against fascism. As Donia and Fine noted, it [the partisan fight] assumed ”the
dimensions of biblical lore in post-war (WW2) Yugoslavia”.119 The present political
need in post-war Yugoslavia was to support the Titoist Socialist Yugoslav
Federation, and therefore the historical consciousness had to be built around the
collective partisan anti-fascist ideology which had worked in the name of
brotherhood and unity. Those who were subjects of Yugoslavia ought to share a
collective social memory enhanced by the state-supported and state-controlled
history culture: memorial sites, symbols, museums. The collected works of Josip
Broz Tito were published and continually re-printed in seventeen volumes.120
Pictures of Tito typically hang on the walls of every household, particularly in the
countryside, while in cities the practise was usually limited to official public
buildings.121 History teaching was not only one-sided but based on extremely
selective social memory.122 We can also remember the Museum of Revolution in
Sarajevo, which in 1990 was turned into the Museum of History, or the still-
present statutes of the partisan heroes in one of the main squares of Banja Luka.
Academic research was also controlled by state ideology, so only research
supporting the official picture was undertaken and publicised even if the degree of
freedom can be assumed greater than in other communist countries. Therefore we
can assume that both the history culture and academic research in the socialist
Yugoslavia supported a similar historical consciousness.
Along with the partisan myth, the historical consciousness of Yugoslavia from
the Bosnian perspective was dominated by the legacy of Nazism and the crimes of
the ustaša regime. The historians of the former Yugoslavia showed great interest in
119
Donia and Fine 1994, 150-51. Almond emphasises the personal cult of Tito and annual homages paid to the
beloved Marshall in the regime's youth races across Yugoslavia. Almond 1994, 163.
120
Ostojić, Mile 1999. History From Zero. The South Slav Journal. Vol. 20 No3-4/1999. 66-71. (originally
published in Dani), 66.
121
Bringa 1995, 8.
122
Höpken 1997, 88.
141
Serb victims and crimes against the Serbs, and many Croats and even Muslims are
said to have had to atone for what they or someone had done before they were even
born.123 Thus, Titoist Yugoslavia placed heavy conviction on those involved with
ustaša activities during WWII. The private stories of people as part of the history
culture naturally kept other interpretations alive.
In contrast to the conviction of Croats and Muslims, historians in the socialist
Yugoslavia expressed hardly any interest in chetnik atrocities against Muslims and
others during the Second World War. It has been speculated whether this was a
direct result of a deliberate political decision to minimize the negative historical
record. In other words, the Serbs needed to be a perfect victim. Finally, when the
federal newspaper Borba in 1988 published a series of articles written by a Serbian
historian on the historical genocide against Muslims, it caused considerable
difficulties for the editors.124
The common Yugoslav historical consciousness can be seen as particularly
important for Bosnians. During socialist Yugoslavia they experienced great
economic growth together with the urbanisation that resulted in truly multi-ethnic
communities and families, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. The social
context for many people must have become more and more Bosnian (or Sarajevan,
or Mostar, or Banja Lukan). “The glories of Bosnian social history and the
achievement of the Bosnian experience and way of life” began.125 Even buildings
served to support such a view, as with the skyscrapers of Sarajevo, the Unis, as part
of the history culture reflecting the multi-cultural society. And as Sells has argued,
this resulted in forgetting the hatreds of WWII, and from that it can be assumed
that the social memory started increasingly to include perceptions of the common
past and the expectation of common future development based on the present
situation. Scholars have considered Bosnia “the last bastion of genuine
Yugoslavia”126, and a large research project conducted in Yugoslavia in 1990
showed that Bosnia had the highest tolerance level in all of Yugoslavia. That was
true for all the national groups living in Bosnia.127 One important Western scholar
on Bosnian history emphasised the unity of Bosnians, and in particular the
Sarajevan-identity, even as late as 1993.128
This leads us to the dramatic change that the form and content of the historical
consciousness of Bosnians has been forced to take. Previously we analysed the
division of symbols as one of the main characteristics of the prevailing history
culture of post-war Bosnia. Serb-dominated areas celebrate Serbian symbolism,
Bosnian Croat areas associate with the symbolism of Croatia – and increasingly of
Herzegovina, while Bosniacs and other Bosnians try to get used to celebrating
123
Donia and Fine 1994, 142, Lovrenović 2001, 177, Vranić 1996, 335.
124
Vranić 1996, 335.
125
126
127
Massey, Hodson and Sekulić 1999, 682.
128
Fine 1993, 21.
142
symbols imposed mainly as part of the Dayton agreement and other international
decisions and pressures. Lovrenović has analysed the change from the Bosnian
perspective: ”To be Bosnian was to have a feeling for otherness, for the different as
part of the daily reality of one’s most personal environment. It was this experience
of the different that made it possible to be Bosnian. In the new territorialisation,
grown from the poison of chauvinism, Bosnians have ceased to be Bosnian and
become just Bosniac Muslims, Serbs and Croats.”129 Lovrenović sees the war as
equalising all three histories after the long dominance of the Serbian version of
history in Bosnia. Because of the long Serb dominance, people did not notice to
what extent the other two histories that had been repressed were also based on
myths, popular fabrications and pseudo-historical premises which resulted in three
separate paradigms, each thinking it must turn to its own pure separate history, its
own pure separate literature and its own pure separate language.130
In this new situation three communities construct their historical
consciousness, also based on myths, which by definition were seen as part of their
history culture influencing the historical consciousness. Croats have emphasised
their separate language, Serbs the impossibility of a common state, and Bosniacs the
tradition of unity. In those cases where the nationalist project has simply been
impossible, the Bosniac project has often been the Bosnian one as well. An
illustrative example is the story of the Oslobođenje newspaper where in the
beginning of the war in the spring of 1992, 51% of the staff was Serbs, in the
autumn of 1992, 31%. Before the war, the newspaper had been pro-JNA and pro-
Yugoslavia. The only option the newspaper had was to emphasise the victimisation
and unity of Bosnia together with the impossibility of war in Sarajevo. What has
been called “rational, anti-national dogmatism” can be seen as one quite broadly
accepted way to react in a new nationalistically-divided situation.131 It appears to
have become the Bosnian and Bosniac form of reorientating themselves to the new
situation; they have the experience of the multi-ethnic and multi-national past and
that forms the crucial ingredient for their future expectations, and thereby for their
historical consciousness.
If Titoist Yugoslavia had emphasised the Partisan struggle and the anti-NDH
as part of the officially supported and constructed history culture and historical
consciousness, the new nationally-divided situation turned the Bosnian groups and
foreign observers to look for a connection between the past and present from the
Second World War. This was seen in the presentation of the prevailing history
culture; the symbols, and even symbolic atrocities of Croats and Serbs, were argued
to bear direct connections to the symbolism of Croats and Serbs during the Second
World War. Historically-loaded terms have also become common in public
discussion, and a column of a main newspaper referred to the “ideology of
129
130
131
Thompson 1994, 244-246.
143
Chetnicism and Ustašaism” as having returned to Bosnia after the dissolution of

Yugoslavia.132 Such parallels have been common in written and spoken language.
Foreign Bosnia experts Donia and Fine also cultivate a vocabulary that draws
parallels between the 1990s and the Second World War.133 They also state how
“the primary contenders of WWII have been emulated in ideology, rhetoric,
symbolism, organisation and even disorganisation by the groups that emerged in
the early 1990s as combatants in the Bosnian conflict.”134 It has also been noted
that memories of the Second World War survived because individuals preserved
souvenirs and told their children and grandchildren what had happened or kept in
touch with relatives who had gone into exile after the war.135
Thus the “new” historical consciousness of Bosnia results from a divided
history culture and is based heavily on the social memory of the Second World
War. In this context we should be reminded of the idea that in the current society,
the social memory is necessarily connected to the learnt culture and to media that is
not naturally given or predefined.136 The propagandists in Bosnia have understood
this and have used the media since the late 1980s.137 Later we will see how the
school history textbooks are manifestations of history to be learnt by each national
group of the society. Due to the work of the so-called “ethno historians”138,
academic history research has also supported the process of a creating separate
historical consciousness among the three Bosnian national groups. In a study
conducted in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union it was noticed how the
national historiography began to reach a wider audience only when the state and
mass media began “to sing the same tune”.139 Thus history culture and political
decisions are crucial in influencing which parts of the new history research become
part of the historical consciousness of the people, and previously we have seen the
ethno-national division of both (history culture and political decisions). Bennett
has argued that, although some good histories of the Second World War in
Yugoslavia have been written, only a few people either in Yugoslavia or abroad have
read them. What actually happened has been less important than what people have
believed or led to believe to has happened.140
As one example of the new historiography developed and broadly circulated, we
can discuss the work of Bosnian Muslim historians who have been keen to analyse
the origins of Muslims and their nation-building. One of their common theories is
the historically untenable Bogomil-theory mentioned in section 5.1.2. On the other
132
Didrarević, Zija. Država demokratskog jezgra. Oslobođenje, Nedjelja 25.IX, 2001, 2.
133
E.g. Donia and Fine 1994, 142, 151, 152.
134
135
136
Aronsson 2000, 11. As in earlier times, social memory was constructed as part of a processes and influenced not by
media but other features of the culture.
137
Malcolm 1994/1996, 252.
138
Sekulić 2000, 283.
139
Kuzio, Taras 2002. History, Memory and Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Colonial Space. Nationalities
Papers, Vol. 30, No. 2/2002, 251.
140
Bennett 1996, 42.
144
hand, Serb historical sources portray the Bosnian Muslims as offsprings of Serbs
Islamisiced during past centuries, and thus Muslims are blamed for believing the
wrong faith of their ancestors 500 years ago in the historiography of Serbs. In
contrast, the Orthodox is seen as fighting to preserve the Christian heritage in
Ottoman times.141 Among Serbian academics and propagandists, the 1980s have
been described as ”a decade characterised by feverish recountings of real and
imagined past injustices and current threats to the Serbs”.142 Generally it has been
observed that Serbian historical revisionism (anti-federalist and nationalistic), which
filled the national media starting in the 1980s, provoked corresponding responses
in other parts of Yugoslavia, thus turning history into a battlefield. It has been been
considered crucial to understand how everything in the area of history has been in
need of re-examination.143
Finally, we can return to the destruction of national monuments and cultural
heritage and their reconstruction and protection. Perry argues that the protection of
them in a multi-ethnic society is important and controversial precisely because ”it
cuts to the core of regional identities, fear of ’the other’, and the development of a
people’s narrative of the past, as well as their vision of the future”.144 Historical
consciousness is constructed based on the visual national heritage (or the lack
thereof) and therefore the protection of national monuments and cultural heritage
is at the heart of constructing historical consciousness, which can be critical,
manipulated or affirmative depending on the situation. Similarly we can assume
that, just as destroying a mosque greatly injures and influences Bosniac historical
consciousness, so the reconstruction of that mosque at twice its original size has
significant meaning for the construction of the Serb historical consciousness. In
fact, it can be assumed that the division process between the contents of the
historical consciousness of the three communities intensifies with the rebuilding of
new physical surroundings. We defined the historical consciousness as the
orientation that humans have with time; as the relation between experience and the
expectation. Based on this; Bosniac dominance in the city of Sarajevo continues to
grow as other nationalities continue to leave and do not return. Because the
physical apperance of the city differs from what it used to be, its characteristically
multi-ethnic past has convinced many Serbs not to feel connected with the city any
longer, and to expect that such a tendency is true also for the future.
5.3 On History Politics in Bosnia

To write separately about history politics is in many ways senseless in a society that
has suffered from a war with such a historical dimension. The active political use of
history for certain interests and purposes has emerged in war-torn and post-war
141
Aleksov 2002, 4, 23.
142
143
Magas 2000, 38-39.
144
Perry 2002, 2.
145
Bosnian society in so many ways and so intensively that almost all the features of
history culture and historical consciousness presented above could be analysed as
examples of history politics; they have emerged as a result of the intentional use of
history.145 However, the perspective of history politics will allow yet another way of
describing the presence of history in Bosnian society, for ’politics’ here emphasises
the idea that culture (in this case history culture) has been the focus of intentional
and conscious action.146 I will only mention some accounts of the most obvious
forms of history politics in Bosnian context.
First of all, nationalism and history research together have produced so-called
”ethno-historians” who have raised to the centre of attention the ethnic groups and
division of Bosnia, national inequality, national rights, and the conflicts in which
ethno-national groups have shown their hatred towards other national groups.147
Thanks to the nationalistically-motivated ”ethno-histories” many issues previously
considered absolutely irrelevant have become decisive factors in constructing
people’s understanding of their own past and present.148 Even well-intentioned
scholars are becoming involved in historical manipulation providing historical roots
for the new ethnic entities.149 One example of the work of “ethno-historians” is the
dispute over the figures of the Second World War presented in 4.2.2. Generally,
the events of the Second World War are typically discussed as if they occurred
yesterday to justify acts of revenge towards the descendants of the perpetrators 50
years ago.150
Central to the fate of Bosnia was the rise of Milošević in Serbia. He has been
considered master in using history by manipulating the symbolism and rhetoric of
Serbian nationalism for his Greater Serbian agenda. In the late 1980s, Milošević
took into his hands the mainstream media, dailies, television and magazines, thus
making control of the information space one of the most crucial issues in the
former Yugoslavia, due to its important role in reproducing and reinforcing ethno-
nationalist discourse.151 Political posts were also filled with pro-Milošević – thus
pro-Serbian – appointees in Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro who later
145
Perhaps somewhat illustrative is that Cohen noted already in 1996 how documents regarding the former
Yugoslavia were disapperaring from libraries in the United States. Cohen 1996, 136.
146
We can understand this through a parallel: one can analyse and describe how a school functions in practical and
concrete terms. This is different from analysing school politics for which the focus of action is the school.
147
As an example of an ethno-historian we can mention associate professor of history at the University of Belgrade,
Dušan T. Bataković, who tests the limits of history-writing in his English account of the history of Bosnian Serbs by
writing in the preface ”in the spirit of an interpretative essay I have omitted all footnote references(. . .)but have
included a bibliography from which the quotations and the information in the text are taken.” Among other
arguments, Bataković presents an ethnic map of 1991 of Bosnia and Herzegovina which in truth resembles a post-
war ethnic map. See Bataković, Dušan T. 1996. The Serbs of Bosnia & Herzegovina. Paris: Dialogue, 7, 138.
148
Sekulić 2000, 283.
149
Ivekovic, Ivan 1998. Identity: Usual Bias, Political Manipulations and Historical Forgeries. The Yugoslav Drama.
In: Bianchini, Stefano and Schöpflin, Stefano (ed.) 1998. State Building in the Balkans. Dilemmas on the Eve of the
21st Century. Ravenna: Longo Editore, 262-264.
150
Almond 1994, 134-135.
151
Kuzmanović 1995, 84, Bašić-Hrvatin 1996, 64..
146
undermined the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina.152 The key aspect of the
propaganda was the representation of Serbs as oppressed and endangered people
morally comparable to the Jews after the holocaust. The idea of Serbs defending not
only themselves but also Western interests and values has been central in Belgrade’s
propaganda campaign. Thus Belgrade claimed there was an Islamic threat in Bosnia
and accused Croatia of Fascism.153
Before the independence of Bosnia and the beginning of the war in the spring
of 1992, the Bosnian Serb Republic carried a massive historically loaded
propaganda campaign in the media. On a daily basis, extensive propaganda
designed to convince the Serbs that a common life with any other nation was
impossible, that other nations only hated Serbs and that therefore the only solution
was the territorial and political division appeared throughout the mainstream
media. Bosniacs were portrayed as a particularly intolerable nation to co-exist with
and it was emphasised how Serbs had been the largest single community for
hundreds of years, but that in the last 25 years the Bosniacs had suddenly “outbred”
them. Prior to Bosnian elections, the Bosnian Serb party announced that if Bosnia
became independent, the Serbs would be subject to the laws of Bosniac landlords,
thus alluding to Muslim landowners before the land reform in the First Yugoslavia,
and that independence represented forfeiting everything Serbs had died for since
1804.154 The key factor in spreading the propaganda was the seizing of TV Sarajevo
repeaters around Bosnia with the help of the JNA in late 1991 and reprogramming
them to carry TV-Belgrade.155 Later, Bosnian Serb television forced war prisoners
to state in front of the camera that Bosnia was Serb.156 The active use of history was
typical also in the comments of President Karadžić. When asked about Bosniac and
Croat claims of their ownership of Bosnia, he was reported to have said: ”Of course
not, because Croats are fascists and Muslims are Islamic fanatics(. . .)Sarajevo is a
Serbian city.”157 In another interview, he was reported to have stated that “the city
of Sarajevo was Western oriented and even the Muslims felt more Serb than
Muslim. In fact that is what they are. They are Serbs who became Muslim during
the Turkish occupation.”158
The mental atmosphere created by Serbian politicians and media has been
described as “a kind of political psychosis (…) in which the ‘defence’ of the ‘rights’
of Bosnian Serbs was given such absolute status that people ceased even to wonder
whether they were really under attack”.159
The Croat nationalists are said to have employed similar media propaganda to
persuade Bosnian Croats of the impossibility of a common life with Bosniacs.
152
Donia and Fine 1994, 204-06, 213.
153
Cohen 1996, xxiii, 135.
154
Lovrenović 2001, 195, Judah 1997, 199, Carlmichael 2002, 33.
155
Zimmermann 1996/1999, 174.
156
Thompson 1994/1999, 278.
157
Zimmermann, Warren 1996/1999. Origins of a Catastrophe. New York and Toronto: Randomhouse, 175.
158
Antić 2002.
159
Malcolm 1994/1996, 233.
147
According to Lovrenović, Herceg-Bosna leaders used exactly the same propaganda

in the media and in political speeches as the Serbian aggressors had used in the
beginning of the war. The value of the Bosnian tradition of common life was
denied, and the idea of Bosnia as a state ridiculed. The notion of the separate
identity and culture of Bosniac Muslims was also questioned.160
President Franjo Tuđjman’s regime orchestrated Croat propaganda during and
after the war. As shown in the previous chapter, Tuđjman, a historian himself by
profession, actively approximated both the number of victims who died at the
hands of the Croat ustašas (his estimates being unusually low) and the number of
victims who died at the hands of partisans right after the war (his estimates being
unusually high). By suppressing rival media and controlling governmental radio
and television, he made active use of history in his politics through harsh
nationalistic rhetoric.161
Through the political use of history during the Bosnian war, the propaganda
generally managed to present the conflict as a war between two nations, not
between two political elites and ideas.162
A cruel and horrible example of active history politics occurred when Serbs
slashed the throats of some Croatian policemen and gouged out the eyes of at least
one of them in the beginning of hostilities in Croatia. These heinous acts have been
considered symbolic re-enactments of chetnik reprisals against Croats in WWII,
calculated to inflame inter-ethnic hatred by evoking the memories of wartime
genocide. In the beginning of the war, Vojislav Seselj publicly threatened revenge
against Croats for both the recent Serb deaths as well as for those in WWII.163
The idea of “ancient hatreds” has also been used to support political aims.
Scholars emphasise, however, that no tradition of religious hatred and civil war
existed in Bosnia before the Second World War. It is only from that war that some
parallels to the situation in the 1990s can be drawn – not from ancient times, as has
been the case in numerous political speeches and arguments.164 Yet, even regarding
the Second World War, to see the 1990s as a spontaneous continuation of this
tradition of hatred would be to read “from the script of Milošević and Karadžić”.165
The only difference among Bosnians in the 1990s was their religious background –
and only their background, for after 50 years of secularist Yugoslavia, very few
Bosnians were deeply religious.166
Croat and Serb history politics also aimed to convince their people of the threat
of orientalism. Alija Izetbegović's little known work about the principles of a
160
Lovrenović 2001,198, 203.
161
162
163
164
Donia and Fine 1994, 11, Rogel 1998 12, 48, Anzulović 1999, 138, 170.
165
Malcolm 1994/1996, 251-252. Anzulović also argues that the high rate of mixed marriages in the period
preceding the war demonstrates how the old tolerance largely reasserted itself even after the Second World War.
166
Fine 1993, 2.
148
Muslim state was reprinted in Belgrade and widely distributed to create stereotypes
that appealed to semi-repressed fears and hatreds. Some 110 000 Bosnian Muslims
were said to have been studying Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt.167 Croat
President Tuđjman has been recorded as saying: ”The Muslims(. . .)want to
establish an Islamic Fundamentalist State. They plan to do this by flooding Bosnia
with 500 000 Turks. Izetbegovic has also launched a demographic threat. He has a
secret policy to reward large families so that in few years the Muslims will form the
majority in Bosnia.”168 As seen in chapter four, however, it can be said that any
claims about Islamic fundamentalism in the context of Bosnian Muslims in the
beginning of the 1990s were utterly baseless; Bosnian Muslims were among the
most secularised Muslims in the world and the role of religion was comparable to
that of many Western European countries.
Yet Bosniacs reacted to Serb and Croat nationalism by using history for their
purposes. Firstly, they strengthened their own Bosniac nationalism by emphasising
the most distinctive thing about it: the religious component. Secondly, they
emphasised that they stood, and had always stood, for the preservation of Bosnia’s
multi-national and multi-ethnic character.169
Milošević’s sudden shift in 1994 in support of the peace plan for Bosnia, which
Bosnian Serbs and Karadžić opposed, caused a major change in history politics
during the war. Milošević broke relations with the Bosnian Serb entity and the
Belgrade-controlled media began to promote Milošević as a key to peace in the
Balkans. In contrast, Bosnian Serb leaders were portrayed as irresponsible war-
profiteers guilty even of war crimes.170
In the post-war years, similar themes have characterised history-political
disputes in Bosnia. As shown previously, discussion of the preservation of national
monuments and cultural heritage is not free from political rhetoric and
manipulation.171 A scholar specialising in this field has suggested that it would be
necessary to de-politicise the topic and give it to relevant professionals instead of
politicians.172 As noted previously, however, archeologists can easily be drawn into a
hidden agenda behind almost any proposed excavations when the historical
justification (or lack thereof) is sought to use a certain site for a
Catholic/Islamic/Orthodox building.173
As the central forum of history politics, mass media remained nationally
divided after the war, the political elites of the ethnic groups had direct control over
the flow of information and in 1996 and 1997 Thompson characterised the
situation as ”completely separate and mutually antagonistic systems of
167
Sells 1996, 119.
168
Zimmermann 1996/1999, 181.
169
Malcolm 1994/1996, 218-219.
170
Gordy 1999, 154.
171
172
Perry 2002, 12.
173
149
information”.174 By 1999, however, the situation seemed to have improved

significantly and the aggressive vocabulary and war-rhetoric subsided.175 As an
example of typical misuse of the past in mass media after the war, Ivo Banac has
mentioned the writings of a Croat paper, Slobodna Dalmacija, which discussed the
different genetic origins of Croats and the possible linear continuity of Croat
ethnicity. In Banac’s view, this is related to the view expressed in many political
documents suggesting that, because Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina have 14
centuries of ethnic and cultural continuity, they therefore deserve a separate area.
Banac concludes that it is nonsense to speak of this 14 century-old ethnic
continuity in the context of modern Bosnian identity.176
The NATO bombings against Serbia in 1999 provoked history-political
discussions in Bosnia mainly among Bosnian Serbs. Many radio and television
stations changed their programme schedules to include segments from Belgrade
television.177 The Website ”Free Srpska – NATO go home” published a ’scientific’
discussion on the origins and intentions of Bosniacs. It stated: “it is a real shame
that our leaders did not recognise this from the very beginning and that in the
Dayton agreement, they permitted the name Bosniacs to Muslims. It is the starting
point of the further enslavement of Serbs, plunder and forgery of the history, and
the beginning of the full Muslim domination of BiH.”178
Serbian superiority over Bosniacs in Bosnia in particular has been a typical
topic of history-political discussion in the Serb Republic. A professor of language in
Banja Luka is said to have insisted that the Serbian language, with its double
alphabet and pronunciation, is language of all ethnic Serbs. She denied the
existence and authenticity of the Bosnian language and stated that at least 90% of
Bosnian Muslims were Serbs by their historical, ethnic origins and therefore spoke
Serbian by definition. In the introduction to an economic fair in the town of Brčko
in 1997, it was explained how the Serbian presence predates the establishment of
the city and how the area was part of real Serbia in the 10th Century. This was
related to a discussion of the fate of Brčko, for which support was finally granted as
a specific multi-ethnic town not belonging to either of the entities of Bosnia.
Finally, the official statement of the RS government after the 2001 terrorist attacks
stated how the activities of Al Qaida ”finally showed the entire civilised (Christian)
world what kind of enemies Serbs had been forced to wage war against in the 1990s
Muslim-Serb conflict in Bosnia. The USA and Europe offered support and
assistance to the Muslim side, having failed to realize that they themselves would
174
Thompson 1994/1999, 261-262, Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina: How international support can be more
effective. International Crisis Group. March 1997, i, Human Development Report Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000.
Youth. UNDP: Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues, 50.
175
Thompson 1994/1999, 261, Human Development Report Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000. Youth. UNDP:
Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues, 50.
176
Banac 2002, 205.
177
Milev 1999, 380-381.
178
Antić 2002.
150
serve as the next target of the monstrous ideology of Islamic terrorism.”179 In 1997
a series of short stories entitled “Balije” relating to dehumanization of Muslims was
published in the Serb Republic.180
Illustrative of the central role of history politics is also the reaction against the
head of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jacques Klein,
when in the autumn of 2001, he stated publicly that one difficulty in building
Bosnian civil society is its lack of tradition as an independent state. He made the
statement while visiting Croatia, and most likely as a result of a well prepared and
leading question. The consequence, however, was that for several days the media in
Sarajevo continued arguing about the medieval state of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and everyone in the city seemed to know how ignorant Mr. Klein was.181
Generally the presentation of history culture in section 5.1 described well the
divided situation of national culture. The arguments of history politics follow
similar lines; pro-Bosnian minded politicians refer to the tradition of Bosnia when
arguing for the unity of the country, while Croats emphasise the historical
differences when arguing for the justification of their own entity (which HDZ-
minded Croats continue to long for). Generally, history is always there to legitimise
different demands. Former Yugoslavian professor now working in Egypt has
summarised the use of history in the Balkan societies in the late 1990s exceptionally
well (underlinings P.T.):
”The ’scientific’ reconstruction and revalorisation of the past has to serve the
present and future. Historical versimilitude – in re-writing ”national”
geography, history, philology, philosophy, arts and in other domains of
human creativity – has to prove both the historical continuity of the ethno-
national community and the cultural uniqueness of its national experience.
That seems to be the main concern of the Balkan ethnocratic regimes whose
presidents, governments, parliaments, mass media, educational and cultural
institutions and intellectuals are tremendously busy re-writing our histories,
reforming our languages, ”rehabilitating” our national cultures and values(. .
.)In fact, history is rewritten and reconstructed in order to serve present rulers
and legitimize their contemporary political project.”182
Finally, along with the history politics making use of the more or less mythical past,
we can also notice the unhistorical tendency as a form of history politics in the
post-war Bosnia. As we saw in the sub-chapter on history culture, part of the new
history culture is simply to forget the past. The tourist guides of West Mostar and
Banja Luka demonstrated this by ignoring any historical continuity, and instead
concentrating on the present and the future. To ignore and disregard the past can
179
Antić 2002.
180
181
Klein’s interview with HRT provokes strong reactions by BiH politicians. OHR Press Office. BiH Media report.

BiH Media Round-up, 6/2/2002 International Community. Internet document: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-
dept/presso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/default.asp?content_id=6865#4>. 3rd June 2003.
182
Ivekovic 1998, 264-265.
151
also be an active way of using the past for present purposes, as in the case of Banja
Luka by suggesting that the current Banja Luka, devoid of any physical Islamic
heritage, is the way the city should be. The following quotation from an article
published in the Feral Tribune183 in February 1998 illustrates this:
”Everything you see or hear in the streets and cafes of Banja Luka induces you
to forget the past. The radio blares out Oliver Dragojevic and Kemal
Monteno(. . .)people behave as if the war has been over for a long time and
usually employ the third person when speaking of all that has happened over
the past six years. It is always ’they’ who orchestrated it all, ’they who killed
and deported and destroyed, whereas ’we’ – which means all of us now
conversing – ’we’ were the victims of all that.”184
History school teaching and history school textbooks can be seen as part of history
culture, and the schooling policies as part of history politics. The following section
presents the schooling situation in general and history teaching in particular, while
chapter six concentrates on the history textbook analysis.
5.4 Division of History Teaching

History teaching in post-war Bosnia can be seen as an example, or even the
culmination, of this divided history culture likely to lead to divided historical
consciousness in Bosnia. The following presentation about the schooling in general
and history teaching in particular in former Yugoslavia and post-war Bosnia should
illustrate why the basic assumption of this research is that the history teaching at
schools is part of history culture, and school teaching is considered a specific and
important part of history culture when attempting to influence the construction of
historical consciousness. Moreover, as the textbooks are considered to follow the
curricula and teaching programmes in post-war Bosnia, the books can be taken as
illustrating the history teaching as a whole. Thus, they also offer an example of the
views of the official educational authorities.185 To contextualise the situation in the
1990s, we will first look shortly at history teaching in Yugoslavian times.
5.4.1 HISTORY TEACHING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAV IDENTITY

In the First Yugoslavia, the school system was reformed for the first time in 1929 in
the name of Yugoslavianism. History teaching sought to present the history and
historical identity of the three-named-nation. The project of bringing the Yugoslav
people together in history textbooks has been seen as failing because it failed to
183
The Feral Tribune is an independent paper published in Split. It became famous for its oppositional voice and
criticism of Tudjman's national politics and nationalism at large through the 1990s, which resulted in constant law
suits.
184
Bosnia Report. Bosnian Institute. New Series No. 3. March-May 1998, 2 (Translation of a text published in the
Feral Tribune in February 1998).
185
Magas (ed.) 1998, 24.
152
coincide with political experiences and because the new textbooks promoted
Serbian-based historical consciousness in their underlying assumptions.186
In Tito’s Yugoslavia, education and history teaching in particular played an
important role in attempting to implement the common Yugoslav identity.187 All
textbooks focused on the ”self-managed socialism” and ”brotherhood and unity”.
For instance, while historiography was not under direct pressure from the
communist party, history textbooks underwent strict party control throughout the
entire Tito era.
Education became part of the responsibilities of the republics as a result of the
general federalisation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. History textbooks were
now to transmit the concept of a Yugoslav identity with the values of the system
together with the separate national historical identity. The tendency continued after
the 1974 constitution which further emphasised ethnic individuality in education.
At the same time, the national question was not really dealt with and the conflicts
in inter-war Yugoslavia appeared as a consequence of desire of the elites for
hegemony.188
5.4.2 NATIONAL DIVISION OF SCHOOLING 1991–2002

The educational system in Bosnia was centralised and under the Republic Ministry
of Education before the break-up of Yugoslavia.189 In 1991 and 1992, the new
Bosnian government was aware that it should pass new educational laws, but with
other pressing matters following the first multi-party election and the collapse of
communism, had no time to do so.190 Thus, at the onset of the war, the old
Yugoslavian school system was still in place in Bosnia, as were the textbooks
designed for the federal republic of socialist Yugoslavia.
During the war, each local area adopted its own curricula and school books.
The areas under the control of the Serb army borrowed books and curricula from
Serbia, and the areas under the control of the HVO, from Croatia. In Bosnian-
controlled areas, the production of new textbooks and curricula reflecting the
ideology of the integral and civic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina started. The
curricula was introduced in 1994 and in 1994 and 1995 books were published in
besieged Sarajevo. Those areas under the control of the HVO/HDZ rejected the
new books even when offered a chance to make changes and delete some parts of
the texts.191
The political and administrative divisions that arose during the war were
retained in the Dayton peace settlement. Education was only mentioned as a part of
186
Höpken 1997, 81.
187
Wachtel, Andrew Baruch 1998. Making a Nation, Breakin a Nation. Literature and Cultural Politics in
Yugoslavia. Stanford: SUP, 5. Höpken 1997, 82.
188
Höpken 1998, 88-91.
189
Volker, Kesidou and Stockman 1999, 11.
190
Magas (ed.) 1998, 4.
191
Low-Beer 2001, 216, Magas (ed.) 1998, 4-5, 8, Volker, Kesidou and Stockman 1999, 11-12.
153
one Annex of Dayton which related to human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Education was not, however, mentioned as a means of peace-building.192 Some
claimed that legally, the Dayton agreement established grounds for the possibility –
or even obligation – for the state to establish a common educational system. The
fact that education was left to the entity-level has been considered to reflect the
general legal misunderstanding of Dayton; it was written according to the American
tradition, but has been interpreted in accordance with the European legal tradition,
and thus everything not stated as belonging to the state level has been passed to the
entities.193 The judicial division of education has led to a situation in which the
educational systems of two entities are completely different.194 The prevailing
situation has been described as ”educational apartheid”.195
In the Serb Republic, the educational system is centralised and under the
control of a single Minister of Education guided by the pedagogical institution in
Banja Luka. In the Federation, educational authority has been delegated to the ten
cantons, each of which have their own ministers of education. Of the ten cantons,
five have a Bosniac majority, three Croat, and two are mixed. The cantons pursue
their educational policies independent of the central government of the Federation,
and the federal ministry of education is at best a coordinating body. Thus the
Dayton agreement has resulted in a situation involving 12 ministers of education (1
in the RS, 1 in the FBiH and 10 in the cantons) with their deputies.196 The most
problematic aspect of the situation has been the division within the Federation. As
late as 2001 the certificates of pupils finishing their schooling in the three Croat
HDZ-ruled cantons indicated: ”Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna”.197
Following the idea of institutional facts presented in chapter three, the
nationally-divided schooling system can be seen as institutionalised through the
structures of the RS and FBiH. The institutional position of cantons in the FBiH is
important for Croats because it guarantees institutional power and thereby
legitimises their position.
For the first time, education was recognised as an important part of the peace
process in the Bonn conference and in the resulting article in December 1997. It
stated that education must promote understanding and reconciliation between
ethnic and religious groups, and that the prevailing policies in the RS and in the
FBiH failed to conform to these principles. Other points in the article also stated
that authorities should ensure that everyone obtains an education in the spirit of
tolerance and according to their needs. The authorities in the RS rejected the article
192
193
Magas (ed.) 1998, 12, 14-15.
194
Segregation and Discrimination in Education in the Federation of BiH. A human rights report one year after the
revocation of the Instruction on dual curricula in the schools with recommendations from Bosnian NGOs.
International Human Rights Law Group, 25 February 1999, 16.
195
Cirjakovic, Zoran 1999. The ’Kosovized’ Bosnia. In: Drezov, Kyril, Gokay, Bulent and Kostovicova, Denisa (ed.).
Kosovo myths, conflict and war. South East Europe Series. Staffordshire: Keele European Research Centre, 39.
196
Volker, Kesidou and Stockman 1999, 11-12, Magas (ed.) 1998, iiiv, 8, 19, Low-Beer 2001, 216.
197
Karabeg, Omer 2001. Obrazovanje u BiH. Tržište udžbenika. Dani 9. Novembar/studeni 2001, 32-33.
154
claiming that it was not in the vocabulary of Dayton.198 In the Federation, the
Ministry of Education issued new instructions about the dual curricula and
treatment of minorities. The instructions were implemented by asking pupils in a
classroom to raise their hands according to their ethnic group. Even though the
instructions were cancelled, they led to helding classes for the minority ethnic
group outside the school building in tents, and to general differentiation between
the ethnic groups even in places where it did not exist before. Thus the instructions
in fact led to further segregation.199
In August 1999, UNESCO completed a report which examined the curricula
of the ’national’ subjects in Bosnia and Hercegovina. As national subjects they
included: mother tongue, geography, history, visual culture, music, musical culture,
economy and society, and knowledge of the society. The narrow orientation of
Bosnian Croats towards the Republic of Croatia was criticised as well as that the
region of reference in the RS was Serbia and Yugoslavia instead of Bosnia.200
In February 2000, officials agreed to develop a Swiss model201 for Bosnian
schools.202 Based on the model, each constituent people would develop curricular
modules with regard to culture, language and literature for integration into the
curricula of the other constituent peoples. The linguistic and literary heritage of all
three communities would also be taught throughout BiH.203 It has, however, been
noted that the situation in Bosnia is only superficially similar to that of Switzerland.
Bosnia is not segmented into ethnically homogenous entities and the languages are
not linguistically different as is the case in Switzerland.204
Later in 2000, an agreement was reached between ministers of education
representing the three national groups. 205 Among other things, the agreement
stated that the use of books published outside of Bosnia would not be allowed after
June 2002, and that the most recent history should be removed from the
textbooks.206
198
Magas (ed.) 1998, 15-16.
199
Segregation and Discrimination in Education in the Federation of BiH. A human rights report one year after the
revocation of the Instruction on dual curricula in the schools with recommendations from Bosnian NGOs.
International Human Rights Law Group, 25 February 1999, 2-3, 5-6.
200
201
In Switzerland, 26 cantons each have their own school regulations. and federal government exercises educational
functions only at the university level. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Education in the 20th Century. Western patterns of
education. Other European Countries. Switzerland. Online Article. Internet source:
www.britannica.com/eb/article?query=&ct=&eu=108336&tocid=47671#47671.toc. 20th May 2003.
202
Low-Beer 2001, 217.
203
Office of the High Representative. Human Rights/Rule of Law: Education. Education Policy in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Thursday, May 10, 2001. Internet source: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/hr-
rol/thedept/education/default.asp?content_id=3519>. 30th January 2003.
204
Baotić 2002, 176.
205
Agreement at the Meeting of the Conference of the Ministers of Education of Bosnia and Herzegovina 10th May
2000. Internet source: <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/hr-rol/thedept/education/default.asp?content_id=382>. 26th
March 2002.
206
Here we can see an example of traumatic experiences of the past being institutionally repressed. Following the
thinking of Braembussche, such repression easily renders the memory of historical traumas mythical and defies any
construction of historical meaning, resulting in historical taboos. Braembussche 2000, 87-88.
155
The agreement not to allow books printed outside Bosnia and Herzegovina did
not result in common schoolbooks, but the Bosnian Serb Republic has continued
its own textbook production since the late 1990s and since the 2002–2003 school
year Bosnian Croats have increasingly had their own books published in Mostar.
Between 2000 and 2002, there were attempts to unify the curricula and
programs for teaching history, literature and language in the federation of Bosnia.
As a result, a more critical and multi-perspective approach to these subjects was
finalised in the federal ministry by the end of 2001, including the manuscript for
new textbooks.207 However, the elections in October 2002 returned the
nationalistically-orientated parties to power and the non-nationally-orientated
government that was in office 2000–2002 had to resign in early 2003.
The international community made education one of its priorities in 2002.
The responsibility of the reform in education was assigned to the OSCE in July.
The Education Forum presenting the OSCE’s agenda was organised in August, but
the representatives of the Serb Republic failed to attend.208 In November 2002,
however, the strategy plan for educational reform signed by all the ministers of
education was presented to the Peace Implementation Council.209
With all these plans and attempts, history teaching and education, as it is
organised and inspired, continues to deepen intra-national divisions and aims to
create or consolidate ethnically pure territories.210 Children are separated according
to their national groups and in some places one group goes to school in the
mornings, while the other national group uses the same building in the
afternoons.211 The problem has not been so much the existance of three educational
programs as that the programs have so clearly served nationalistic politics.212
Critically-minded Bosnians are well aware of the problematic situation of the
schooling. This is illustrated from a comment in the main daily on history teaching
in December 2001, six years after the Dayton agreement:
”Six years after the Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina has still not involved itself
in discussing the last war. Schoolbooks are creating blank spots instead of the
pupils seeing – why for us, how for us and what is it all about. With this
emptiness, learning history becomes subjectless, like a story about a
grandfather and great-grandfather in which you cannot mention mother and
father. The grandfather has been in a war that you learn about and father in
207
See the interview of Deputy Minister of Education Dubravko Lovrenović. Puzigaća, B 2001. Politika nema
Mjesta u školi. Nezavisne novine. Banja Luka, 3.9.2001, 5.
208
Education Reform - The Only Perspective for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Oslobodjenje, 2nd August 2002. Internet
source: <www.oscebih.org/ppi/from/press_article.asp?no=121>. 15th May 2003.
209
OSCE applauds education strategy presentation. OSCE Press Release. Sarajevo 21st November 2002. Internet
source: <www.oscebih.org/pressreleases/november2002/21-11-02-eng.htm>. 15th May 2003.
210
Magas (ed.) 1998, viii.
211
Interview with the Head of the Mission of OSCE in Bosnia and Herzegovina Robert Beecroft. 17th September
2002 in Sarajevo. The tapes in the possession of the author.
212
Mulić-Bušatlija, Snježana 2001. Obrazovanje u BiH. Zajedničko dijeljene. Dani 9. Novembar/studeni 2001, 30-
33.
156
another war, the one that you learn about only through oral history and
through tradition.”213
So far, the most concrete internationally-imposed project regarding history teaching

in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the schoolbook review in 1999–2000 that also
well illustrates the reality, in which the youth, whose textbooks and thoughts are
the central subject of this research, have lived. In Moscovici’s terms: here we see an
aspect of the laboratory where communities produce their representations.
5.4.3 TEXTBOOK REVIEW AND REMOVAL OF OBJECTIONABLE MATERIAL

The nationally-divided schoolbooks became a subject of the international
intervention for the first time in 1998 as part of the Sarajevo Declaration, which
generally addressed the issues related to the return of refugees to Sarajevo. One of
the issues was education. The Declaration called for establishing a Sarajevo
Education Working Group. About textbooks, the Declaration wrote: “Under
supervision of the Working Group, Sarajevo education authorities will review all
currently used textbooks and withdraw any that contribute to ethnic hatred and
intolerance no later than September 1, 1998.”214
The report of the Working group was completed by June 1998 and was leaked
to the Press later in the autumn of 1998. No changes concerning the textbooks
were made.215
In 1999, Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for recognition by the Council of
Europe. One of the minimum requirements for accession was the withdrawal of
potentially offensive material from textbooks before the start of the 1999–2000
school year. In July 1999, all the ministers of education signed the agreement to do
so – “The Agreement on Removal of Objectionable Material from Textbooks to be
used in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1999–2000 School Year”. In August 1999, a
second agreement was signed which established the procedure as to how to remove
the objectionable material for there was insufficient time to produce new
textbooks.216
Finally, it was agreed that an international team of experts would identify the
objectionable material. There were two categories for the identified materials: either
they were to be removed or annotated. Material was removed by blackening the
text, and then annotated with the following stamp: “the following passage contains
material of which the truth has not been established, or that may be offensive or
misleading; the material is currently under review”. The Ministries of Education
and the World Bank would cover the cost of the procedure, and “verifiers” from
213
Bakšič, Hamza 2001. Povratak u gradić Dejton. Oslobođenje Petak 23.XI.2001, 2.
214
The Sarajevo Declaration (issued following a conference on displaced persons and refugee returns to Sarajevo
Canton) 3rd February. Bosnia Report. Bosnian Institute. New Series No. 2. January-February 1998. Internet source:
<http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/janfeb98/declarat.cfm>. 14th May 2003.
215
Low-Beer 2001, 219.
216
Ibid.
157
international organisations working in BiH would monitor the process. The

deadline was postponed to the end of the year 1999.
The reports of the verifiers showed that there were many schools that had not
undertaken the removal procedure by the end of the year. In some schools there
had been a misunderstanding as to what to blacken and what to stamp. UNESCO
staff reported about a school where unchanged pages had been exhibited on a
bulletin board so that pupils could read them there.217
New books were only partly printed for the 2000–2001 school year and it is
likely that many schools continued to use the blackened and stamped textbooks.
When visiting three schools at the beginning of the 2002–2003 school year, old
books were still in use in two of the three schools. Stories have also been circulating
as to how easy it is to read the blackened paragraphs against the window. Thus
these “forbidden” texts have gained even more importance as the pupils have taken
a particular interest in them.
The agreement to remove the objectionable material from textbooks concerned
the primary and secondary school books in geography, mother languages, visual
culture, history, music culture, music, economy and society, and knowledge of the
society.218 The books analysed in this research were part of this process. Their
particular cases will be presented as part of the presentation of the textbooks in the
beginning of chapter six.
217
Low-Beer 2001, 220-221.
218
Annex 1 (Revised). List of Objectionable Material to be Removed or Annotated in Textbooks for Schools in
Bosnia and Herzegovina for the 1999-2000 School Year. Document in possession of the author.
158
PRESENTATIONS OF WAR, PEACE AND NATION IN HISTORY TEXTBOOKS
6 Presentations of War, Peace and Nation in

History Textbooks
This chapter analyses the presentations related to three socio-historical concepts in

Bosnian history textbooks. The principles regarding the theoretical and
methodological choices of the analysis were partly discussed in chapter three. Here,
an introduction to the books analysed (6.1) follows the presentation of the methods
applied in the analysis. Then I will turn to detailed analyses of the presentations of
war (6.2), peace (6.3) and nation (6.4) in those books. At the end of each sub-
chapter I will conclude the features of the representations constructed in regard to
war, peace and nation in each book, followed by additional interpretations at the
end of the chapter (6.5).
6.1 Methods and Materials

6.1.1 PRINCIPLES OF QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS
The methodology developed for the school book analysis of this research project
was based on the main principles of Pingel’s ”UNESCO Guidebook on Textbook
Research and Textbook Revision”, and in particular on the chapter ”How to
conduct a project: methodological issues and practical guidelines”.1 In addition
some other exemplary studies on textbook research were used.
The sample was chosen to include the textbooks that have been in widespread
use for years, not new unused books or some outdated series, since the scope of the
research was to analyse the prevailing history culture into which young Bosnians
have been exposed to at large. Based on the two different points of views from
which Pingel advises analysis of subject-orientated texts, I decided to apply content
analysis instead of didactical analysis.2 Pingel characterises quantitative methods as
determining ”how many times a term is used, a person or people are mentioned”
and ”how much space is allotted to a country or topic, etc.” From this it follows
1
Pingel 1999, 19-35.
2
Pingel 1999, 22-23.
159
that quantitative methods can tell about the emphases of the text, but not about the
values and interpretations. Qualitative methods in turn can answer such questions
as ”what does the text tell us, what messages does it transmit?”, and tell about the
presentation, whether it is multi-perspective or monocausal in its explanations, and
how the results of scientific studies can be seen in didactics of the book. If using
quantitative methods, Pingel emphasizes the need for pre-testing categories and
concepts to ensure that the understanding is the same. Of the qualitative methods,
Pingel mentions linguistic analysis, which can offer ”insights into how messages are
characterised and transmitted, as well as examining the facts, events, persons and
processes mentioned in the text”. As a method, the researcher can list adjectives
used and analyse them, or analyse whether the story is told from the point of view
of the victims or the perpetrators. The characters of protagonists of the books can
also be analysed (as often school books are written in a passive voice).3
I would characterize the methodology developed for the textbook analysis in
this study as a qualitative content analysis, even though I made use of some
quantifications of the text. The quantifications were used, however, only to support
and illustrate the qualitative analysis.
As I sought to analyse the presentations related to three societal concepts – war,
peace and nation – in schoolbook texts, the analysis had to be designed accordingly.
Finally, the principles applied for analysing the representations of war and peace
were slightly different from those applied for the analysis of the representation of
nation. The concepts were understood broadly, and were based on common sense
notions without any strict definitions as such an approach seemed the most
reasonable choice for the case of the school textbooks.
The representations of war and peace were analysed with the help of pre-
categorisations. Such categories included: which wars/peaces are mentioned, how
they are presented, what kind of values are attached to the war/peace, what
justifications are given for the war/peace, what is the historical significance of the
war/peace. All the texts were read through and references of textbooks to the
mentioned categories were collected. Then the collection categories were used as a
basis for organising the final analysis. Finally, the analysis of the representation of
war/peace from each book studied was written separately. Thus the analysis
followed the example of UNESCO history textbook research in early 1980s, which
concentrated on assessing how different historical phenomena were presented or the
order of importance things are presented, and so forth.4
In the case of the analysis of the representation in regard to nations, no pre-
categories were used. Instead, ALL the references to nations and nation-groups were
collected from the books studied. After a test sampling, it was decided to collect
3
Pingel 1999, 45-47.
4
Hietala 1982, 26, 31-33.
160
only the local references, for any other references to nation(s) were rare.5 The local
was understood as South Slavic (Yugoslav). As argued already in the chapter three,
by this understanding the analysis came to concentrate on the self-understanding of
nation in the different books rather than on a universal analysis about the idea of
nation (e.g. whether “Germany” is seen to do something).
By collecting all possible references I wanted to avoid the risk of more selective
and pre-categorised data collection and analysis and to guarantee that such a
sensitive topic as ’nation’ in today’s Bosnia will be treated without risk of selecting
only the examples and expressions that support commonly (or even unconsciously)
held views of different national groups.
After having collected the references I decided not to apply comparative
analysis to the books but to handle each book and its representations of nation
separately for all of the books had significantly different handlings.
The categorisation between “self” and “the other” provided a basic
conceptualisation to serve as an analytical tool for organising the analysis.6 The
collected references to nation were divided between those referring to “us” and
those referring to “them”, and then further categorised within those groups. As “us”
entailed those associated with the entity presented as the particular unit in the
handlings of the book; typically the units were organised based on the idea of first
presenting the Second World War internationally and then “locally”. In Historija,
“local” meant Bosnia and Herzegovina; in Povijest, Croatia; in Istorija, Serbia,
Montenegro and partly Yugoslavia; and in Dodatak, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
“Them” or “others” included all other South Slavs (Yugoslavs) mentioned in the
texts. A more detailed discussion about the meaning of “South Slav (Yugoslav)
nations” appears in the beginning of the analysis in section 6.4. Generally I
considered the “us”–“them” concentration in the analysis of the representation of
nation as a way to illustrate the role and meaning of nations in the textbooks in the
post-war Bosnian context.
It is worth noting that in the context of international relations, Neumann has
emphasised the fact that different social spheres are constantly connected with one
another and that therefore the ’selves’ and the ’others’ are continuums without
limitations. 7 In the case of this analysis, this was clear when dividing the collected
references; some of the “we”-groups overlap or even contradict one another. Thus,
both categories included several same references.
Some quantifications were made to support the qualitative content analysis. For
the general presentation of all the books, the pages used for different topics were
calculated and presented in comparative tables. In the “nation”-analysis, I tested the
5
Rare references included classical history textbooks references telling how “Germans” were defeated or how
“Germany establishes a SS Unit in Bosnia”. Mainly actors other than the local ones were defined through countries
which did something or were objects of the actions.
6
Hall has mentioned exclusion-inclusion as an interesting view of the new Balkan nationalism. Hall, Patrik 1998.
The Social Construction of Nationalism. Sweden as an Example. Lund: Lund University Press, 26.
7
Neumann, Iver B. 1999. Uses of the other. ”The East” in European identity formation. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 36.
161
idea of calculating positive and negative expression of “us” and “them” but
concluded that such an approach was unreasonable, as it cannot disclose the
features of the text in a fruitful manner. It would also have required strict categories
as to what is negative and what is positive for in many cases the evaluation was
purely a matter of perspective.
In his advice Pingel also points out how textbooks nowadays serve multiple
functions and therefore in a research project one could also ”evaluate how textbooks
are used”, their design, the functions of illustrations (noting that not only text
matters). This, however, was irrelevant to the Bosnian case as the quality of the
books is very poor. The contents of the illustrations were naturally part of analyses
but in my view the main content of all the books were the texts and only
occasionally some pictures or other illustrations were worth mentioning to support
the text-based analysis. The summary of the graphical elements of the books is
presented in section 6.1.3.
Alasuutari has differentiated the factist perspective and the specimen perspective
view of analysing texts. In this analysis, the specimen perspective was evident for the
factist perspective is interested in the truth-value of the text, which was secondary
to this research.8
Finally, as one of the rules for qualitative analyses, Alasuutari has suggested that
the rules should be valid for the entire data. This can cause presentational
difficulties, for one should present all the texts on which one meta-observation is
based.9 As a principle of this research project, I have followed the practise of
presenting almost all observations to show the content of the meta-observation.
6.1.2 INTRODUCTION OF THE TEXTBOOKS ANALYSED

As mentioned in chapter three, this analysis concentrates on the 8th-grade history
textbooks used in the schools in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 1999–2000 school
year, the same year the Youth and History survey was collected. Schools in the RS
used Istorija10 and Dodatak11, Bosnian Croat-dominated schools used Povijest12
and Bosniac-dominated schools, Historija13. In the following tables, I have divided
the topics dealt with in the books into several categories. Table 3 includes all the
contents of the books while Table 4 includes only the materials common to all the
books (the post-WWI period). Both tables display the contents in percentages and
numbers of pages devoted to different subjects to allow for comparisons between
the books.
8
Alasuutari, Pertti 1995. Researching Culture. Qualitative Method and Cultural Studies. London: Sage, 63.
9
Alasuutari 1995, 116.
10
Гаћеша et. al. 1997.
11
Пејић 1997.
12
Perić 1995.
13
Imamović et. al. 1994.
162
Table 3: The division of the contents of the analysed history textbooks in

number of pages (and as percentages)
Topic Historija Povijest Istorija Dodatak Istorija and

Dodatak
Before First World War, - - 43.5 17 (64.2%) 60.5 (34.0%)

local (28.7%)
Before First World War, - - 8.5 (5.6%) - 8.5 (4.8%)

international
First World War, local 5 (4.2%) - 10 (6.6%) 3 (11.3%) 13 (7.3%)
First World War, 9 (7.6%) - 7.5 (5.0%) - 7.5 (4.2%)

international
The formations of the 13 (11.0%) 6 (4.1%) 2 (1.3%) - 2 (1.1%)

first Yugoslavia
Between the World 27 (22.8%) 41 (28.0%) 13 (8.6%) 2 (7.5%) 15 (8.4%)

Wars, local
Between the World 15 (12.7%) 28.5 (19.5%) 7 (4.6%) - 7 (3.9%)

Wars, international
Second World War, local 16 (13.5%) 21.5 (14.7%) 37.5 - 37.5 (21.1%)
(24.8%)
Second World War, 11 (9.3%) 10,5 (7.2%) 4 (2.6%) - 4 (2.2%)

international
After Second World 9.5 (8.0%) 14 (9.6%) 11.5 - 11.5 (6.5%)

War, local (7.6%)
After Second World 9 (7.6%) 13.5 (9.2%) 5 (3.3%) - 5 (2.8%)

War, international
The breakdown of 4 (3.4%) 11.5 (7.8%) 2 (1.3%) 4.5 (17.0%) 6.5 (3.7%)
Yugoslavia and after
Total 118.5 146.5 151.5 26.5 (100%) 178 (100%)

(100.1%) (100.1%) (100%)
Total of local topics 74.5 (62.9%) 94 (64.2%) 119.5 26.5 (100%) 146 (82.1%)
(78%)
163
Table 4: The division of the contents common to all of the analysed books in
number of pages (and as percentages)
Topic Historija Povijest Istorija Dodatak Istorija

and
Dodatak
The formations of the 13 (12.4%) 6 (4.1%) 2 (2.4%) - 2 (2.3%)

first Yugoslavia
Between the World 27 (25.8%) 41 (28.0%) 13 (15.9%) 2 (30.8%) 15 (16.9%)

Wars, local
Between the World 15 (14.4%) 28.5 (19.5%) 7 (8.5%) - 7 (7.9%)

Wars, international
Second World War, 16 (15.3%) 21.5 (14.7%) 37.5 (45.7%) - 37.5 (42.4%)
local
Second World War, 11 (10.5%) 10.5 (7.2%) 4 (4.9%) - 4 (4.5%)

international
After Second World 9.5 (9.1%) 14 (9.6%) 11.5 (14.0%) - 11.5 (13.0%)
War, local
After Second World 9 (8.6%) 13.5 (9.2%) 5 (6.1%) - 5 (5.6%)

War, international
The breakdown of 4 (3.8%) 11.5 (7.8%) 2 (2.4%) 4.5 (69.2%) 6.5 (7.3%)
Yugoslavia and after
Total 104.5 146.5 82 (99.9%) 6.5 (100%) 88.5 (99.9%)

(99.9%) (100.1%)
Total of local topics 69.5 (66.5%) 94 (64.2%) 66 (80.5%) 6.5 (100%) 72.5 (81.9%)
Regarding the authors of the textbooks, I have managed to find information on

Mustafa Imamović, the main author of the Bosniac book Historija, on Nikola
Gaćeša, the main author of the Belgrade published Serb book, on Ivo Perić, and on
Ranko Pejić, author of the Bosnian Serb additional booklet. Imamović is a
professor of law at the university of Sarajevo and appears regularly in public in
Sarajevo as an “intellectual”. In the field of history, he has published one of the
most widespread and popular works on Bosnian Muslims. Kvaerne has critised this
work for suggesting that only Muslims have historical roots in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.14 Pejić is professor of history at the university of Banja Luka and has
worked as an associate minister of education in the Serb Republic since the late
1990s. Gaćeša is a senior professor of history at the university of Novi Sad and has
puslished numerous volumes on Serbian national history. Other authors of the Serb
14
Kvaerne 2002, 2-5.
164
book are most likely high school teachers. Ivo Perić, the author of the Croat book
Povijest, is a Croatian historian who and has written also other books on Croatian
national history.
All of the books belong to the first generation of schoolbooks published after
the break-up of socialist Yugoslavia. When compared to the 8th-grade history
textbook used in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Yugoslav period15, the great
difference is the structure of the texts in the book. In all the new books, the texts
and topics are organised according to the nation-state principle, while the old
Yugoslav book follows the Marxist idea of structural organisation of the history
textbook. In her analysis of the school textbooks from the former Yugoslavia (not
including Slovenia), Heike Karge has found the same principle difference but
points out that the Serbian books have partly kept to the Marxist principle and
added the national principle to it.16
Regarding changes in the 8th-grade textbooks between the 1999–2000 school
year and the 2002–2003 school year, it can be noted that the Bosnian Serbs
developed their own 8th-grade book in 2000.17 The new Federation book appeared
in 2001 with half-Latin, half-Cyrillic alphabets.18 It has not, however, been used by
the Croat-dominated schools, which until the 2001–2002 school year have used
Perić’s book analysed in this study. Bosnian Croat schools expected a new Bosnian
Croat history textbook for the 2002–2003 school year. The new federation book
was mostly a copy of the old texts now written half in the Cyrillic alphabet, and it
underwent only a few changes in regard to the previous one.19 The new Bosnian
Serb book also followed the structure and contents of the older Serb book to a large
extent. Thus the books from 1999–2000 represent the type of history textbooks in
use in Bosnia from 1992–1993 to 2003.
Istorija & Dodatak

Istorija and Dodatak were used in the schools of the Serb Republic in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The book Istorija is published and printed in the capital of Serbia
proper, Belgrade, thus representing a schoolbook of Serbian schools. As mentioned
in the previous chapter, the schools of the Serb Republic started using Belgrade
books in the beginning of the 1990s. The Dodatak is an additional booklet written
by a Bosnian Serb professor of history from Banja Luka. It was used in the RS only.
15
Grbelja, Tanci and Otasević, Dušan 1986. Istorija. Prirucnik za izbornu nastavu za VIII razred osnovne škole. III
izdanje. Sarajevo: Svjetlost.
16
Karge 2000, 2-4.
17
Шејић, Ранко 2000. Историја за осми разред основне школе. Српрко Сарајево: Завод за уџбенике и
наставна средства Републике Српске.
18
Ganibegović, Muhamed, Durmisević, Enes and Pelesić, Muhidin 2001. Historija za 8 razred osnovne škole.
Sarajevo: Svjetlost.
19
Most significant was the removal of one chapter on the organisation called Mladi Bosna – Young Bosnia. The
content of the description of the Mladi Bosna in the Bosnian Serb booklet Dodatak will be referred to in section
6.4.4.
165
Istorija consists of eight units, each further divided into 39 chapters. The titles
of the units are ”The world in the second half of the XIX and in the beginning of
the XX Century”, ”Serbia, Montenegro and their neighbours in he end of XIX and
in the beginning of XX century”, ”The First World War and the Russian
Revolution”, ”The World between the First and Second World War”, ”Yugoslavia
from 1918 to 1941”, ”The Second World War, NOR and the Revolution in
Yugoslavia”, ”The World after the Second World War” and ”Yugoslavia after the
Second World War”. The largest units are those on Serbia, Montenegro and their
neighbours 1850–1910 and the unit on the Second World War. The national
emphasis of the book is clear: only about one fifth of the texts handles topics
beyond the national history (Table 3). The book is written from the Serb-
Yugoslavian viewpoint.20
The Dodatak covers the same period as Istorija, thus starting from the middle
of the 19th Century and continuing up to the mid-1990s. The content division is
curious: most of the booklet concentrates on the period from 1850 to the First
World War, followed by a short section discussing WW1 and the period after it.
The entire period starting with the Second World War until to the breakdown of
Yugoslavia is missing completely, and after describing the 1930s on one page, the
Dodatak jumps to the events of the 1990s. Thus, in the light of this booklet, what
happened between 1850–1914 and then again in 1990s is the important history.
Other explanation (a more likely one) might be that the handling of that period in
the Belgrade book is satisfactory while the previous periods require an additional
Bosnian Serb point of view.
Povijest
Povijest was first published in the beginning of the 1990s and different editions of
the book have been used in the Bosnian Croat-dominated schools for the entire
decade. For the 2002–2003 school year, the Bosnian Croats planned to publish
their own textbook.
Povijest consists of three units that divided into 41 chapters. The units are ”The
Period between the two World Wars 1918–1939”, ”The Period of the Second
World War” and ”The Period from the Second World War (1945) until today”.
Compared to other books, Povijest handles extensively the period between the
world wars mainly from a national, but also from an international point of view
(see Table 3 and Table 4).
The perspective throughout is Croatian. While Istorija presents the Yugoslav
period (both the First and Second Yugoslavia) through the Yugoslav perspective,
the Croat book presents the First and Second Yugoslavia in a critical tone from the
Croat perspective (examples of titles include: ”The Situation of Croatia in the
20
An overall analysis on primary and secondary school history textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina has also
concluded that unlike Croat or Bosniac books, the Serb books do not separate Serbian historian from Serbian history
but cover Serbian history as an integral part of Yugoslavian history. Baranović 2001, 19.
166
chains of centralised, great-Serbian hegemony”, ”The Croatian question seeks a

solution”, ”Croatian decades in the complex socialist Yugoslavia I–III”).21 There is
no reference to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the organisation of the book, which is
worth noting, when we remember that the book is studied and analysed here in the
context of having been the history textbook of Bosnian Croats for a decade.
The technical quality of the book is the best of the books analysed. Povijest also
contains a few topics beyond political history (history of art and science). As Table
3 shows, the ratio between national and international material is 64.2% to 35.8%.
Historija
Historija was written and published during the war in Bosnia. The book was
completed in Sarajevo and then printed in Slovenia, for no publishing houses were
working within Bosnia and Herzegovina at that time. The quality of the book is
poor; it contains less text than the other two books, the pictures are of poor quality
and the text itself is often general and lacks detail.
Historija consists of nine units: ”The First World War”, ”Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the First World War”, ”Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Yugoslav
Question”, ”The World between the two World Wars”, ”Bosnia and Herzegovina
in Yugoslavia between the two World Wars”, ”The Second World War”, ”Bosnia
and Herzegovina in the Second World War”, ”The World after the Second World
War” and ”Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Second World War”.
The perspective of the book is that of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
thus the main actor in the book is Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, 62.9% of the
material in the book involves local and national issues (Table 3).
6.1.3 POOR-QUALITY PICTURES AND MAPS

The pictures and maps in all three books are of relatively poor quality. All the
pictures are black-and-white, though in some maps one additional colour is used. I
have summarised the quantity and contents of the pictures and other illustrations in
the tables below. I have included pictures of the entire book in each case regardless
of whether texts are only partly included in the analysis in the case of Istorija for I
sought to describe the nature of illustrations.
21
Baranović has also concluded that the preoccupation with state issues in generally characteristic to Croatian
textbooks. Baranović 2001, 24.
167
Table 5: Pictures and other illustrations in the analysed history textbooks in

number of items and (percentages)
Type of illustration Historija Povijest Istorija Dodatak
Picture, local history 14 (26.4%) 26 (40.6%) 44 (57.1%) 3 (100%)
Picture, international history 24 (45.3%) 31 (48.4%) 17 (22.1%) -
Map, local 10 (18.9%) 3 (4.7%) 6 (7.8%) -
Map, international 3 (5.7%) - 8 (10.4%) -
Drawings and posters 2 (3.8%) 4 (6.3%) 2 (2.6%) -
Total of pictures and illustrations 53 (100.1%) 64 (100%) 77 (100%) 3 (100%)
Table 6: Motives of the pictures and illustrations in the analysed history

textbooks in number of items and (percentages)
Type of illustration Historija Povijest Istorija Dodatak
War related 15 (37.5%) 16 (26.2%) 24 (38.1%) -
Person, group of people 18 (45%) 31 (50.8%) 35 (55.6%) 2 (66.7%)
Other 7 (17.5%) 14 (23.0%) 4 (6.3%) 1 (33.3%)
Total of pictures and illustrations 40 (100%) 61 (100%) 63 (100%) 3 (100%)

with motive
168
Table 7: Special characteristics of pictures and illustrations in the analysed

history textbooks
Historija Povijest Istorija Dodatak
-Pictures of Mahatma -Several pictures of -Numerous portrait-style -Three pictures:

Gandhi and Ataturk buildings and public places photos of Serbian two military and
leaders and military men political leaders,
-Three pictures of -One picture of the one picture of
“common people” Vatican, two pictures of the -Picture of Gavrilo the first train in
illustrating the Pope, in the other together Princip
Banja Luka
economic crisis in the with president Tuđjman,
United States 1929- two pictures of bishops -A series of pictures in
1933 relation to the NDH-
-The Croatian coat of arms state: Pavelić with Hitler,
-The only full-page and flag in pictures the suffering of people,
picture of three dead bodies in
detainees in -Four international culture Jasenovac
and science figures
Buchenwald
In conclusion, we can say that the pictures were small and mainly involved war-
related events or portrait-like pictures of persons or groups of people. Only a few
women were illustrated. Istorija was the most locally-emphasised of all the books,
and its illustrations emphasised the negative aspects of the NDH state. Povijest had
fewer maps than the other two books and several illustrations related to the
Catholic Church. Finally, Historija had numerous local maps and emphasised the
suffering aspect of crisis situations. Dodatak illustrated two Bosnian Serb leaders
and the first train in Banja Luka, thus emphasising the Bosnian Serb perspective.
6.1.4 OBJECTIONABLE MATERIAL AND THE BOOKS ANALYSED

The school textbook check appears in section 5.4.2. The 8th-grade history textbooks
were naturally subject to the check as well.
No objectionable material was identified in Historija, the book used by
Bosniac-dominated schools. This demonstrates that the book did not use terms or
phrases directly antagonistic towards other national groups and that the
interpretations of the book could be considered historically tenable. In Istorija, the
book published in Belgrade and used in the RS, one paragraph was to be removed
and five pages annotated as questionable. The annotated pages dealt with the
history since the new constitution of Yugoslavia in 1974. Later we will see how the
constitution was interpreted as an injustice against Serbs and how since 1987 Serbia
has done everything possible to correct the injustices of the 1974 constitution.
Clearly, other Bosnian national groups found intolerable such interpretations of
Serbian acts since 1987 as positive and just. The paragraph to be removed from
Istorija constituted simply propaganda, not a problematic interpretation:
169
”Through the Catholic Church and its fanatic followers, the fight was led
against the Orthodox religion and Serbs. It seemed almost as if the situation
from 1941 was repeating. Serbian people had to move out of Croatia, Serbs
were tortured and innocent people were killed in the same horrible way as 50
years ago. Entire Serbian villages were robbed and burnt down, the Orthodox
churches were destroyed, graves and sacred places desecrated.”22
In the additional Bosnian Serb booklet, Dodatak, the entire part (five pages)
describing the disintegration of Yugoslavia was ordered removed. We will later see
how that part describes the events of the 1990s with very few references to available
factual material. In addition, the page presenting the events between the two world
wars was ordered to be annotated as questionable.
In Povijest, five sentences had to be removed; all were hostile to the Serbs and
used such expressions as ”Great Serbian aggressors”. In addition, 22 pages had to be
annotated as questionable material for they systematically described Croatia as a
home country, a view considered intolerable for a Bosnian-used textbook.
6.2 Wars as Central Determinants of History

In her analysis of the history textbooks in former Yugoslavian countries, Heike
Karge has concluded that differences between the various books are particularly
noticeable when dealing with 20th Century history. As an example, Karge has noted
that ”As a rule, Serb textbooks devote more than a third of their books to
presenting both World Wars…in contrast, Croatian and BiH textbooks use only a
quarter to one third for this period”.23
From the Table 3 and Table 4, we can conclude that the Second World War
serves as an example to illustrate differences with emphases in relation to war. The
Serb book devoted to the Second World War half of the space used for describing
the entire period from the First World War until the present. As the tables show,
most of the descriptions related to local developments. In contrast, Historija
devoted from the same period only one fourth to the Second World War and
Povijest, one fifth. Here we can remember that section 5.1 on history culture
described how chetnik symbolism from the Second World War period has been a
central part of the Bosnian Serb new symbolism.
In the following analysis about the presentation of wars, I have chosen to
analyse each book separately using the same criteria. The analysis of each book is
divided into the First World War, the Second World War, the recent wars in the
1990s, and other mentioned wars. The basic characteristics and nature of different
wars, as well as the reasons for wars and their consequences, are discussed. Thus the
analysis is divided based on the actual wars mentioned in the books, and such
themes as justifications for wars, values attached to wars, significance attributed to
22
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 157.
23
Karge 2000, 4.
170
wars and so forth are dealt with inside the discussion of actual wars. Finally, the
representation of war will be concluded comparatively based on the presentations.
6.2.1 HISTORIJA: UNIVERSAL SUFFERING
The First World War

Historija presents the First World War as a result of the rearmament of two blocs.
Germany had grown in strength and was unsatisfied with the colonial division of
the world and wanted to re-divide the colonies through war. Central powers and
Entente powers were also interested in expanding their colonies through war.24
According to Historija, the war started with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in
Sarajevo.25
Historija sees the entering of the United States into the war as turning the war
into a true world conflict. The Entente powers received ”the decisive additional
strength” from the support of the United States for they had weakened because of
Russia’s exit from the war.26 Historija rationalises with economic reasons the
United States’ entry into the war; the countries of the Entente powers were so
heavily indebted to the US that their victory was important for the United States.27
According to Historija, all the parties planned a short-term war. The new
armaments, however, made a quick victory impossible. The need for different new
armaments also increased.28
As a consequence of the First World War, Historija mentions changes in the
economy and how women had to do work previously done by men. The suffering
of people worldwide is emphasised: “the position of most parts of the citizenry
became worse. There were many refugees, wounded, and people that had suddenly
become impoverished. Shortages, high costs and dissatisfaction were common. In
some parts of the war-afflicted countries, hunger and epidemics dominated.”29
Historija also mentions that the war caused 10 million deaths, left 20 million
wounded and wreaked enormous material losses. It stresses the psychological
consequences: ”A lot more difficult [than the enormous material loss] were
psychological consequences of the war. The people of the Western countries had
since then much less trust in the ideals of freedom, rationality and progress.” As one
of the consequences of the war, Historija also mentions the origins of communist
rule in Russia.30 As the main political result of the war internationally, Historija
states that ”in 1918 Europe ceased being the centre of the world”. Instead, the
United States and Japan assumed the position as the most important powers, thus
24
Imamović et. al. 1994, 7-8.
25
Imamović et. al. 1994, 8.
26
27
28
29
30
171
moving the economic centre of the world outside Europe.31 Historija fails to
mention the creation of nation states as a consequence of the First World War.
From the Bosnian viewpoint Historija raises the negative consequences of the
war. Tens of thousands of Bosnians were killed or wounded during the war and the
massive mobilisation threw the country into a total economic catastrophe.32 At the
end of the chapter on the local events of the First World War, Historija
summarises:
”At the end of 1917 BiH, appeared an extremely exhausted country. For a
great number of poor families, the war imposed a real fight for survival. In
BiH, during the four years of war, almost 300 000 people or 15% of the
citizenry were either killed or starved to death and the war damage was
estimated at 2.5 billion francs of gold. Bosnia and Herzegovina faced the end
of the war in 1918 in very difficult conditions.”33
Thus, the conclusion that Serbs suffered the greatest losses in human terms
presented in chapter four is not mentioned in Historija. Instead the book
concentrates on the general misery of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Second World War

Regarding international developments, the presentation of the Second World War
in Historija is general and lacks in detail, and the course of the war is explained
clinically. Historija merely presents the technical inventions and political
developments without analysing reasons, consequences and so forth.
In the beginning, Historija describes the war as a ”lightning war”. The Axis
powers, however, failed to win in a short time as they had planned, and ”after that
followed a long-lasting war”. Historija first emphasises German supremacy and how
Germany sought to divide the world with Japan, its only ally. The joining of the
US with allied forces is mentioned as one of the main factors that strengthened the
position of the Allies. Historija tells that in the continuing war, the Allies and the
Soviet Union mobilised all their human and economic potential and thereby
surpassed the Axis powers. The victory of allied forces is described as ”the fight for
freedom and the right to live removed the imposing weight of tyranny”.34 Historija
also mentions propaganda as part of the war, supporting ”determinately the war’s
aims”.35
According to Historija, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union as a result of the
resistance of Britain. The superiority and surprise of the oppressor of the war (the
Axis) are seen as having incurred great losses on the Allies.36 When describing the
31
32
33
34
Imamović et. al. 1994, 81, 82, 84.
35
36
172
attack on the Soviet Union and how the US entered the war, Historija uses slightly
evaluative language generally not characteristic of its presentation. First, Historija
tells how the German attack caused great damage but not a victory, suggesting that
it was quite a senseless attack. After that, the Americans are said to have gradually
changed “from limited neutrality to a limited war”.37
The Nazi concentration camps are presented as inhuman and Historija
mentions that millions of people died there. A horrifying picture of the prisoners in
Buchenwald illustrates the horror.38 The controversial issue related to the Second
World War, the use of the atomic bomb, is presented without any moral
considerations: “Americans were afraid of great losses if they would carry out a
landing in Japan. Because of that, they decided to shorten the war by using the new
atomic weapon”.39
Locally, the beginning of the Second World War is presented neutrally.
Historija mentions how Yugoslavia joined the pact with Germany and how that
caused demonstrations in Belgrade and elsewhere in Serbia. The kingdom of
Yugoslavia was occupied in 12 days and its territories divided between the Axis
powers.40 Thus Historija does not comment on the idea presented in chapter 4.2.2
that Yugoslavia’s defeat was also due to the disaffection of the population and
general disintegration of the country.
Historija mentions that the greatest war preparations were carried in the
territory of BiH. When talking about the ustaša camps, Historija states that tens of
thousands of people died there.41 Based on the estimates presented in chapter four,
this figure seems low. The difficult aspect of the Second World War from the point
of view of Bosnian Muslims and their co-operation with Germany, is explained to
have been a result of successful propaganda: “in case Bosnia wanted autonomy,
Germany demanded Muslims to form a division, which they would train and
which would be on their side. Such a division was created with successful
propaganda”.42
As justifications for the war internationally, Historija mentions how Hitler’s
Third Reich sought an empire stretching “from the Atlantic to the Urals”. The
entire population and economy in the areas needed to work for Hitler. Ideologically
Hitler’s reason for the war was the intention to destroy Jews completely and Slavs
partly. Historija mentions that the Axis forces intended to defeat democratic
Western countries and communism in the Soviet Union once and for all. “After
that they would impose their ideology on triumphed nations and become the sole
masters of the world.”43 As mentioned previously, the justification for the war from
37
38
Imamović et. al. 1994, 82, 87.
39
40
41
Imamović et. al. 1994, 96, 102.
42
43
173
the perspective of the Allies was seen through the idea of “the fight for freedom and
the right to live”.44
After the clinical and superficial account of the international developments in
the Second World War, Historija summarises the standing of the “World at the
end of ‘total war’”. Historija tells that 50 million people died as a consequence of
the war, thus emphasising the total destruction and human suffering:
”Industry and agriculture in a great number of countries were ruined in the
course of the Second World War. A great number of people was left without
work and without shelter. Great dangers in the form of famine, illnesses and
hopelessness threatened. Recovery of the European and world economy lasted
long after the end of the war.”
Historija concludes that the Second World War was the most destructive war in
human history.45 The cold war is also mentioned as resulting from the unresolved
issues of the Second World War.46
Locally, as a consequence of the war, Historija mentions that of all those killed
or wounded by the occupants, ustašas and chetniks, in the territory of Yugoslavia
more than 50% were from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Historija states that the Serbs
suffered the most; in the course of the war 500 000 Serbs died, 200 000 Croats,
103 000 Muslims and 57 000 Jews.47 It adds, however, that proportionally the
Muslims suffered the most for they lost 8.1% of their total population. Historija
mentions that genocide was carried out against the Bosnian Muslims and states that
“until then an unseen genocide against Muslims took more than 100 000 lives”.
Places where the massacres of Muslims are said to have occurred are also listed. 48
Generally, Historija states how Bosnia was mostly destroyed as a consequence
of the war. There is also a picture with the text “Bosnian Petrovac in ruins” which
further emphasises the damage caused by the war.49 As one separate outcome of the
war, Historija mentions how in the meeting of AVNOJ (Anti-fascist Council for
the National Liberation of Yugoslavia) in 1943, ”a decision was finally made about
the forming of a committee to establish the facts of occupants’ war crimes and those
of their domestic helpers”.50
The war in Bosnia in the 1990s

The last short chapter of Historija, ”BiH as an independent and sovereign state”,
describes the war in the 1990s. Historija presents that after the independence of
Croatia and Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina had to follow the same road. In
44
45
46
47
Thus the figure of the Second World War victims in Historija is over 850 000 when the list published in
Yugoslavia only has approximately 600 000 names.
48
Imamović et. al. 1994, 97, 119.
49
Imamović et. al. 1994, 105, 119.
50
174
response, Historija tells that “Great-Serbian nationalists tried to prevent that by

mobilising vast numbers of soldiers and bringing heavy weaponry and frightening
people away.”51
Historija describes how Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence and
was acknowledged by the European Union with its “historically and internationally
recognised borders”. Thus Historija emphasises the state-nature of BiH prior to the
war. Following the same reasoning, the war then seems an act of aggression against
“our country”. It started as an “intensifying occupation”, and developed to an
“open aggression”. As the main aggressor, Historija describes the JNA (Yugoslavian
National Army), then greatly assisted by the domestic terrorist formations of the
SDS (Serb Democratic Party) party, and mercenaries from Serbia, Montenegro,
Romania, Russia and other parts of the world. It is worth noting that Historija
mentions that all the soldiers coming from outside Bosnia were paid mercenaries,
thus suggesting that some people other than the soldiers themselves masterminded
the war.
Generally Historija presents the war as spreading across Bosnia as Serbia,
Montenegro and the JNA started bombarding and destroying cities and villages.
Mass killings, plundering and expelling the people were characteristic. Even the
youngest and oldest civilians were taken to jails and beaten and tortured without
reason. Historija also mentions that there were concentration camps throughout
Bosnia, as well as in Serbia and in Montenegro.52 For the aggressor’s motivation,
Historija mentions the aim of creating Greater Serbia, and therefore destroying
everything that was non-Serbian. As a consequence of such aims, ethnic cleansing
took place and Bosnian refugees had to escape all over the world.53
Of those defending Bosnia against the aggression, Historija mentions the
Patriotic League, established in the spring of 1992 as a first secret armed formation.
When the SDS barricades were erected in Sarajevo, the League also became active
itself and started coordinating the fight on behalf of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.54
Historija also refers to the Bosnian war in the context of European integration.
Historija suggests that Europe failed in its dealings with the Bosnian war and that
some countries even supported the war:
“The year 1992 was supposed to be the year of European unity. However, the
crisis in Eastern Europe did not subside. The already internationally-
recognised Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was brutally attacked.
Europe, which had recognised it, did not take it into its protection
51
52
53
54
175
sufficiently. Some European countries even supported the aggression against

the Republic of BiH.”55
Historija’s presentation extends to the spring of 1992, and thus the course of the
war and the end of it are not discussed.
Other wars
In addition to world wars and Bosnian war in the 1990s, Historija presents several
other wars. When dealing with the First World War, Historija mentions separately
how the Osman Sultan Halifa invited all the Muslims for the holy war but how
only some Libyans and Algerians joined.56 About the war between Germany and
France, Historija raises the great losses of both sides in human terms, thus again
emphasising suffering in the context of wars.57 The emphasis on human suffering
continues when Historija describes the civil war in Russia as ending with the victory
of the Soviet army, and costing great human losses and devastation of lands.58 The
Spanish civil war is described as the ”war of national liberation” in which Franco,
with fascist support suppressed the others.59
About the wars after the Second World War, Historija generally states that they
have been fought in the third world. According to Historija, they were partly
consequences of colonialism, partly resulting from new confrontations in third
world regions. Historija mentions the Pakistan-India war, the Korean war, the
Vietnam war, the Nigerian war, the Arab-Israeli wars and the Iraq-Iran war. More
specifically, Historija mentions that the main reason for the wars between India and
Pakistan was India’s attempt to weaken Pakistan. As a reason for the Arab-Israeli
wars, Historija mentions the creation of Israel and expelling of the Palestinians. Iraq
is said to have targeted Iran because of oil. Mainly the wars in the third world are
described through human losses: the war between India and Pakistan cost ”millions
of human lives”, the Korean war ”cost two million human lives” and the Vietnam
war ”removed millions of bodies”, in Nigeria two million people suffered in the
area of Biafra partly because of hunger, and finally in the Middle East wars ”took
away numerous human lives and created instability in the Middle East”.60 Thus the
suffering aspect of wars is constantly central.
Specifically, Historija mentions how the wars against and between Islamic
countries had difficult consequences. Historija claims that in those wars, some
Great Powers wanted to make integration and better collaboration between the
Islamic states impossible. As reasons, Historija mentions: “Great Powers think that
55
56
57
58
59
60
176
they must do everything in order to make the rise of Islamic world impossible. That
way the Great Powers exclusively take care of their interests.”61
Historija also mentions one local riot, which it describes as an armed revolt.
The revolt of Serb and Muslim peasants in Cazin as a reaction to the
collectivisation of the countryside after the Second World War is presented as
justified. Historija sees the bloody revolt as having resulted in fairer politics for the
peasants, which could be seen in new legislations. The death of the peasants in the
revolt is presented as heroic.62
Finally, as “a war” Historija also presents the cold war as a result of the
unresolved conflicts of the Second World War. Its nature is described: "The cold
war was the result of efforts of the Great Powers to expand their influence in the
world by damaging the interests of their rivals. It caused great danger in particular
in Europe which was in the centre of the interests of the USA and USSR.”63
6.2.2 POVIJEST: CROATIAN INTERPRETATION IN NEUTRAL STYLE

As mentioned earlier, Povijest starts with the period after the First World War and
thus we cannot analyse the presentation of the First World War. In the beginning
of the book, however, Povijest provides a general description of war in relation to
the First World War: “In war, just like in any other rivalry, the strongest win.” 64
Povijest also describes the total nature of the First World War in numbers: 36 of
the world’s 54 countries were involved, 72% of the world’s land was part of the
war, and 75% of the world’s population lived in countries that were part of the war.
During the more than three years of the war, 70 million people were mobilised, and
10 million people died. Approximately 21 million people were wounded and
material devastation was great.65

The general presentation of the Second World War internationally is clinical in
Povijest. The introduction to the war discusses the growing strength of Germany,
and the description of the 1939–1941 war is a list of territorial occupations. The
motivation of different countries to participate in the war is not touched upon. The
quick spreading of the war is also mentioned.66
Similar declaratory style continues through the entire description of the
international developments of the Second World War. Povijest presents the victory
of the Allies as self-evident from 1943 onwards. The landing in Normandy is seen
as a great historical event. Povijest describes the Yalta conference in detail and
61
62
Imamović et. al. 1994, 126-127.
63
64
Perić 1995, 5.
65
Perić 1995, 5.
66
Perić 1995, 81-84.
177
emphasises how there were no easy questions on the table at the conference. In
particular, the division of Germany is analysed in detail.67
The self-evident nature of the developments during the war is also part of the
description of the attack of the Red Army in 1944: first Povijest describes the attack
and then how the areas were simply returned. The US attack against Japan in 1945
is described as advancing from victory to victory. In a way similar to that of
Historija, Povijest does not comment on the use of the atom bomb morally but
states: ”In order to quicken the end of the war, the Americans after that [Japan
turned down an agreement] also used atom bombs.”68
In contrast to the distant and factual descriptions of the Second World War
internationally, Povijest describes the horrifying rule of Stalin in Russia very
emotionally.69 “The crimes of the occupants” are also described colourfully,
emphasising the cruelties. Povijest, however, talks not particularly about Nazis or
the Nazi regime but about the occupants. It sometimes uses the term fascist, and
sometimes it talks about Germany as a country committing crimes and having
concentration camps.70
Locally, Povijest describes the pact and the attack of Germany and Italy as the
beginning of the Second World War in Yugoslavia. Unlike the Bosniac book
Historija, Povijest states that the Yugoslavian army was incompetent and found
itself quickly in ruins, after which Yugoslavia was divided.71
The anti-fascist fight is presented as Croat-initiated and described as “a fight
against occupants, chetniks and ustaša”. The anti-fascist war happened
“predominantly in Croatia and BiH” but elsewhere in Yugoslavia also. Compared
to the understanding of historians presented in chapter four, this interpretation of
Povijest emphasises the dominant role of Croats and Croatia. The partisan fight is
presented as a simple one-way battle progressing gradually:
“Partisans had persistently fought against the occupants, ustaša, chetniks and
other opponents(. . .)it was the force that could undertake fighting actions to
the greatest extent and was as such also valued by the Allies. In the autumn of
1944, partisan unions started their last fights with German, ustaša and chetnik
forces on the soil of Croatia. Until the beginning of December 1944 they had
taken the entire Dalmatia.”72
Povijest presents the chetnik terror during the war with a reference to the current
past: “what they did not succeed in achieving, they tried to achieve with an
aggression against the republic of Croatia in 1991”.73
67
Perić 1995, 92-95, 99-101, 107-109.
68
Perić 1995, 100-101, 108.
69
Perić 1995, 81-82.
70
Perić 1995, 102.
71
Perić 1995, 85.
72
Perić 1995, 97-98, 110.
73
Perić 1995, 110.
178
Finally, the most detailed, colourful and emotional description related to the
Second World War is that of Bleiburg. In a chapter about Bleiburg and the crimes
committed by the partisans during the war, Povijest concentrates on emphasising
all the savage details. It tells how many civilians, priests and so forth suffered:
“partisans(. . .)committed horrible crimes: they killed helpless people with all types
of guns, rifles, cannons and even with shooting and bombarding from the war
airplanes.”74
The clinical and event-concentrated description of the war results in the
justifications for the war not really being touched upon, and the consequences of
the war are mentioned only through the war tribunal and list of losses. As an
exception confirming the rule, we can mention that Povijest describes the defence
of the British in 1940 as incurring ”suffering and great human losses and material
destruction”.75
Povijest presents the trials in Tokyo and Nürnberg and concludes the
significance of the processes: ”The judicial processes of Tokyo and Nürnberg had a
special meaning. In them, for the first time in history of the courts, there was a trial
for the initiators and organizers of the war of conquest who were responsible and
guilty for many crimes against humanity, and especially for the crime of
genocide.”76 Thus, Povijest sees the international war tribunal as important and
clearly states who could be considered guilty for the war and war crimes.
Finally the superficial description of the Second World War finishes with a
sub-chapter entitled ”WW2 in numbers” which lists the consequences: 6 years, 61
countries, 96 % of the area of the world, 109 million mobilised people of whom 50
million died and 35 million were wounded. Material losses are said to have been
huge.77 Local losses are unspecified. Thus Povijest’s description of the war’s
consequences is also clinical and in great contrast to Historija’s suffering-
emphasising description.
The War in Bosnia in the 1990s

Povijest is a book written in Croatia for use in Croat schools. Thus, the war in
Croatia is more central than the Bosnian war, described mainly as a continuation of
the Croat war with similar characteristics. The description of the Croat war ends as
follows ”the war in Croatia, and then from April 1992 in Bosnia and
Herzegovina…”.78 Therefore, I will briefly present the basic characteristics of the
Croatian war, for the Bosnian war is presented as parallel to it.
The war is presented as being initiated by the Serbs who ”in their barricades,
attacks, robberies and assassinations jeopardised peace, order, security and the life of
others.” Povijest emphasises that despite their propaganda of being ”an unarmed
74
Perić 1995, 112-113.
75
Perić 1995, 83.
76
Perić 1995, 115.
77
Perić 1995, 109.
78
Perić 1995, 152.
179
nation”, ”those rebels were armed not only with light, but also with heavy arms
which they had got from Serbia and from the so-called confederal ’Yugoslavian
people’s army’, which from then on actually became the Greater-Serbian army.”79
Povijest describes the course of the war in simple terms: Serb terrorists
committed crimes, destroyed entire villages and towns and tried to kill as many
Croats and destroy as many material goods as possible. They also pulled down
cultural monuments, hospitals, schools, factories and residential and administrative
buildings. They even attacked first aid vehicles. People were shot, massacred and
transported to numerous collective camps. The attacks were ”uncivilised”. Povijest
also mentions that for the world, Serbia maintained that it is not at war even if it,
according to Povijest, started and managed it all.80
Povijest describes Croatian participation in the war as defensive. First regular
police forces were mobilised, and towards the end of the war, ”a powerful Croatian
army was built”. All the equipment and armaments had to be purchased from
abroad, which was very expensive and difficult. Croats also took guns from the
”unfriendly JNA”. As justification for the defence war, Povijest mentions the need
to ”defend independent and sovereign Croatia”. UNPROFOR (United Nations
Protection Force) is said to have come to make and keep the peace. Povijest does
not evaluate its role at all.81 There is no mention of the Bosnian war with regard to
Croat involvement or to the war fought between Croats and Muslims.
As is evident from the above description of the war, the reason for it was Serb
expansionism: ”they all talked openly about the creation of Greater Serbia, which
would, as they imagined in their greed for foreign territories, include Bosnia and
Herzegovina and large parts of Croatia”.82 The reasons for Croats to become
involved in the war were purely defensive.
Povijest lists the consequences of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It mentions how there were not only enormous human sacrifices and
immense material destruction, but also a great exile of people. According to
Povijest, until the end of 1992 approximately 700 000 people had to leave Croatia
and Bosnia (no distinction between the two is made). It states that ”In its
proportions, it endured the greatest and most horrible suffering of the soil of
Europe after the Second World War.”83
Finally, as a consequence of the war, Povijest mentions that in February 1993
the United Nations Security Council decided to create an international court for
the war crimes that had taken place “on the soil of the republic of Croatia and in
the other countries of the former Yugoslavia”.84
79
Perić 1995, 150.
80
Perić 1995, 150-152.
81
Perić 1995, 152.
82
Perić 1995, 150.
83
Perić 1995, 152.
84
Perić 1995, 152.
180
Other wars
In the period before the Second World War, Povijest mentions Italy’s aims to
expand itself through wars from the late 19th Century onwards. The reasons for
wars were both territorial and tactical.85 In the chapter on the origins of the Soviet
Union, Povijest particularly describes the ”heavy consequences of the war”: 7.5
million people died and the economy collapsed as a result of the war.86 When
discussing the post-Second World War period, Povijest mentions the cold war but
only in two lines without any explanations or analysis.87
In the chapter about decolonisation and the new states that appeared as a result
of it, Povijest mentions how the Great Powers fought long to maintain their spheres
of interest. It also mentions that the colonial wars, resulting from these countries
taking over of the colonies for themselves, were long. Povijest neither takes sides,
nor suggests whether countries were justified to do this or that, but mentions only
that colonial wars resulted in some of the new states.88
Finally Povijest has a special chapter ”Local wars and political crises” which
states: ”Since the end of the Second World War until today there has been a series
of local wars and political crises. Here we will list only some of those wars, as well as
some of those crises.”89 In the four pages that follow, Povijest presents the Korean
war (the duration of three years and the inability of UN are mentioned); the main
events of the Israel-Arab wars (emphasises the strength of Israel and the role of UN,
and how the conflict is still unsolved); the India-Pakistan war very briefly (states
that as a result Bangladesh was established); Vietnam war (only through the power-
positions); the war between Iraq and Iran (as a many-year-conflict in which neither
won and both suffered in human terms and materially); and finally the Gulf war in
which the UN with its multinational forces saved Kuwait’s independence and
sovereignty. Thus, the description of wars is neutral and only in the case of Iran-
Iraq does Povijest mention losses and thus assume a somewhat negative stance
toward the conflict.90
Finally, Povijest mentions the war in Slovenia in 1991 as having lasted for ten
days and being fought between the Slovene territorial defence forces and the
attacking Yugoslav army.91
85
Perić 1995, 17.
86
Perić 1995, 30.
87
Perić 1995, 116.
88
Perić 1995, 120.
89
Perić 1995, 123.
90
Perić 1995, 123-126.
91
Perić 1995, 149.
181
6.2.3 ISTORIJA AND DODATAK: SERB HEROISM AND BLOC IDEOLOGY

The presentation of war in Istorija and Dodatak will be discussed together for they
form the material used in the Serb-dominated schools. This is also reasonable for
only Dodatak discusses the recent war and the period prior to the First World War.
The First World War

Istorija presents the First World War internationally as a war between blocs.
According to Istorija, when looking at the goals of different sides, the war could be
described as an imperialist war and as a war of conquest. Otherwise, the
international events are described in a detailed story concentrating on changing
military positions and frontlines.92
If the international side of the war is seen as imperialist, the local characteristics
of the war are described differently: “but for Serbia and Montenegro this war was a
defence war and therefore a justified war. It was led in order for Serbians to survive
and gain their freedom but also to free and unite the Yugoslavian people into a
single state.”93 Istorija also states that the tripartite alliance caused the war and that
Serbs were wrongly accused for having started it. Istorija describes the war
involvement of Serbia as consisting of great victories. Serbia and Montenegro are
seen as helping the Entente powers to win the war and the victory of Serbs is
mentioned as the first victory of the Entente powers. As a reason for the Serb
victory, Istorija mentions the high morality of the Serb army and its good
command. Generally, Istorija states that Serbs were mobilised despite the superiority
of Austria-Hungary.94
Generally, Istorija presents the causes of the First World War as lying in the
imperialist system. One side wanted to maintain its position, while the other side
wanted to gain new properties, markets and materials. Istorija maintains that the
reasons for the war existed already before 1914 but that the Axis powers were not
militarily ready and therefore wanted to postpone the war. Franz Ferdinand’s
murder in Sarajevo was a direct cause of the war only because Austria-Hungary
used the opportunity to attack Serbia. Gavrilo Principe is described as a member of
the Youth Bosnia organisation, his national group is not specified. As mentioned
already earlier, the justification for the war from the point of view of Serbia and
Montenegro was the defence of their people and “free country”, and the unification
of the Yugoslavs.95
As the consequences of the war, Istorija emphasises human suffering: lives were
lost and during the war many epidemics also spread. It states how 1.5 billion people
from 36 countries were affected by the war, 10 million died, 21 million were
wounded. Thus the figures are same as those in Historija and Povijest. Generally,
92
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 58-60.
93
94
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 58, 63-64.
95
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 56-57.
182
“the war brought great suffering, illness, poverty, killings, destruction and material
damage. It exhausted the countries in economical terms as well.” Istorija also
mentions how, as a result of the war Europe was no longer the economic leader of
the world, and instead the USA became the greatest power.96 Like Historija and
Povijest, it does not mention the emergence of nation states as a consequence of the
war.
Istorija emphasises how Serbia and Montenegro, despite their victory at the
war, suffered greatly in both human and material terms, and 1.2 million were killed
or died in the course of the war. Yet, Istorija also mentions that Serbia and
Montenegro managed to get a good reputation as they helped the Entente powers
to win the war.97 Thus Istorija’s presentation emphases the imperialist nature of the
war and the special military success of Serbia and Montenegro as for Entente
powers.

Generally, Istorija presents the Second World War from the military perspective. It
was “a clash of countries belonging to two different blocs”. The international
description of the war is a series of fights, territorial gains and losses. The style of
description is as thought someone somewhere was having a war.98
The basic nature of the war is described as Germany attacking different
countries with the help or support of certain other countries. Germany is presented
as fighting for Nazism while England and other Allies as against Nazism. The
chapter entitled “Character of the WWII” illustrates the nature and style of the
description:
”WWII lasted from September 1st, 1939 until September 2nd, 1945. It was
initiated by the countries that were not satisfied with the decisions of the
Versailles Treaty. The fighting took place across Europe, in Eastern and
Southeastern Asia, in Northern and Northeastern Africa, in the sea and in the
air. Approximately 170 million soldiers and 61 countries participated in
WWII. The character of the war could be described as anti-fascist.”99
While the war developments and events are described very unemotionally and
distantly, Istorija emphasises the horrors of the Second World War. The
concentration camps are particularly mentioned as being a reality both abroad and
at home.100
In contrast to the distant description of the Second World War internationally,
the presentation of the Second World War locally is generally emotional. On the
one hand, Istorija concentrates on the heroic partisan fight, and on the other hand,
96
97
98
E.g. Гаћеша 1997 et. al., 97, 117.
99
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 136-137.
100
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 116-117.
183
emphasises the civil war-like character of the conflict. Istorija describes the partisan
fight in detail. Chapters are entitled “the war for freedom in 1942”, and “the war
for freedom in 1943”. Thus, Istorija’s interpretation of the Second World War
locally is similar to that of Tito and his regime. WWII was the war for freedom
while the Croat book, Povijest, failed to apply the term at all, but instead used the
expression “anti-fascist fight”, and Historija also only mentioned “the war for
freedom” a few times without stressing the term. Generally, Istorija presents the
formation of partisan units and their fight in positive light. It describes first the
atrocities of the occupants, and then ‘good’ partisans as reacting to the atrocities. A
partisan fight is described as a riot that spread and liberated areas and people.101
The civil war nature of the Second World War is described through chetniks
that are represented negatively throughout. While the positive presentation of the
partisans is based on the idea that they fought against the enemy, the chetniks are
seen as being opportunistic. Istorija states how the division between the two groups
forced people to take sides: “quarrels started between people who had been fighting
together just a while ago, between relatives”.102 The thoroughly negative
representation of chetniks is interesting given that chetnik symbolism has been part
of the new symbolism among Bosnian Serbs.
One side of the local presentation of the Second World War is the horror of it.
Istorija tells how “the most horrible camp in Yugoslavia was Jasenovac, where 700
000 people were killed in the most terrible way at the hands of the ustašas, and
most of those people were Serbs, Jews and Gypsies”. Jasenovac is referred to on
several occasions of the book as one of the most terrible camps. Istorija also displays
a picture with a text that describes “ustašas taking people from the Kozara
mountain to camps”. The generally horrible fate of Serbs in the Croatian NDH-
state is also discussed.103
Typical of the presentation of the Second World War locally is to discuss &
vilify “the enemy” without specifying whom it actually was. Very often the
partisans are described as something good and as something to identify with, while
“the enemy” is the one against the partisans. The description of the battle in Kozara
serves as a good example: “one of the most dramatic battles in the war” when
people “fought heroically in Kozara(…)the enemy treated the arrested and
wounded people terribly; 70 000 people were brought to a camp called Jasenovac
(one of the most terrible)(…)because of these difficult conditions, the enemy took
over Kozara, but it was never conquered completely.”104
Istorija’s interpretation of the reasons for the Second World War was that it
was the clash of two blocs. It mentions Italy and Germany in particular, who were
dissatisfied with the division of the world and world power. When describing
101
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 115, 117.
102
103
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 106, 116, 119, 120. In regard to numbers the book thus uses “demographically impossible”
figures. See 4.1.2. and Almond 1994, 137.
104
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 120, 122.
184
Germany’s attack on Poland, Istorija states that its goal was “to destroy the Poles
and the Jews and to conquer Poland’s territory”. And Germany sought oil in the
Middle East, and Stalingrad was also important for transporting oil.105 The entering
of the communist Soviet Union to the war is reasoned through power: according to
Istorija, communists realised that the war was a way to gain power.106
Istorija states that Yugoslavia was driven to war most likely because fascist
countries surrounded it. Later the war continued as partisans wanted to free the
occupied territories.107
Istorija emphasises the destruction and losses as the consequences of the Second
World War using mainly the same statistics as Historija and Povijest:
”More than 50 million people were killed, and 35 million people were
wounded. Civilians were also killed. A lot of people were taken to
concentration camps (around 26 million, and 20 million of them were killed).
Many of them were deported and performed forced labour. WWII caused a
lot of material damage. In terms of the material damage it incurred,
Yugoslavia is third place, after the USSR and Poland. In terms of the number
of people killed, Yugoslavia (1 706 000) was fourth, after the USSR, China
and Poland.”108
Istorija mentions that 19.6% of the Yugoslavian population was killed, and
emphasises that 1 401 000 of them were civilians compared to 305 000 soldiers. In
all, 405 000 people were wounded, 170 000 survived the camps, 530 000 were
driven from their homes, 270 000 were sentenced to forced labour, and 320 000
were mobilised under coersion. Istorija continues: ”But this was not all. Millions of
people, a great majority of people, suffered during the war – they had nothing to
eat, they were frightened.” Regarding material damages, Istorija mentions that in
Yugoslavia alone damages totalled USD 46 billion during the war.109 A picture
showing the destruction reinforces the idea of great destruction the war wrought.110
Noteworthy in Istorija’s description of human losses resulting from WWII is that it
refers to Yugoslavs as one group without differentiating nation groups.
Istorija also mentions how around 300 000 “enemy soldiers and quisling
soldiers” were arrested at the end of the war. Partisans are said to have managed to
inflict heavy casualties on withdrawing Germans and their allies but the account
lacks any particular description or analysis of the “death marches” presented in
detail in Povijest.111 As a political consequence of the war, Istorija mentions that at
the end of the war the anti-fascist coalition was divided. The leading role on the
105
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 97, 98, 117-118.
106
107
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 100, 137.
108
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 136-137. Here we can note that the partisan figure given immediately after the war denotes
the number of victims even though a figure almost one third of that has been used later. See 4.1.2.
109
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 137-138.
110
111
185
political scene belonged to those who had enjoyed the greatest influence during the
war: the US and USSR.112
The war in Bosnia in the 1990s

Istorija describes the wars in former Yugoslavia as civil wars caused by separatism:
“During 1991 and 1992 there was a civil war in Yugoslavia and the SFRJ [Social
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] fell apart. Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina separated from Yugoslavia with force and became sovereign
countries.”113
The Croatian war is said to have started because the new constitution meant
that the Serbs were no longer a nation but only a minority. In August 1995, the
Croatian army, with the help of NATO, forced 200 000 Serbs to leave their homes
in which they had lived for centuries. For the Bosnian war, Istorija provides no
particular reasons, but states that it just started and spread, thus giving a similar
idea of the war which just came and went as the tourist guide for Banja Luka
described in section 5.1.3. As a consequence of the war, Istorija mentions that
thousands of people were killed and more than 2 million people were forced to
leave their homes.114 Thus for the war in Croatia, the Croats are held responsible
while in regard to the Bosnian war, the responsibility of different national groups is
not analysed.
Istorija brings up the non-aligned politics of Yugoslavia in connection to the
wars in the 1990s. The book sees the non-aligned politics as a reason why the
separation of federal states from Yugoslavia was internationally accepted:
“This [the non-aligned politics of Yugoslavia] had great consequences for
Yugoslavia. It could be seen already in 1991 when Yugoslavia started falling
apart. Even though the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina was nothing more than a secession, that is a forced
separation from a country that was internationally accepted, the fact was that
the separation was supported by most of the European countries.”115
Istorija concludes that the international community in particular continued

blaming the Serbian republic of Yugoslavia for the civil war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The UN Security Council is said to have made a special decision to
impose an economic, political, information, cultural, scientific and sports blockade
on Yugoslavia ”because, they thought, it was the main guilty party for the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was untrue”. Istorija mentions that because of that
decision, Yugoslavia became detached from all international organisations. That is
said to have damaged ”our country” a lot.116
112
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 137, 139-140.
113
114
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 156-157.
115
116
186
Dodatak discusses both, the war in Croatia and the war in Bosnia in the 1990s.
The chapters dealing with these wars were all ordered to be removed during the
schoolbook check in 1999 (described and discussed in sections 4.4 and 5.1.3).
The war in Croatia is described as having resulted from the politics of the
HDZ party, which threatened Serbs. Finally the Serbs started an “armed
fight(…)for the survival of their territory”. Serbs are said to have fought successfully
for four years before “well-armed Croatian army and police, with the help of
NATO forces and the approval of the international community, performed a brutal
offensive”. The horrors of the war are described from the Serb perspective and
Dodatak mentions how Serbs were forced to leave Croatia.117 Thus the description
resembles that of Istorija, only it is more specific.
The Bosnian war is described under the heading “Civil War in BH and the
formation of the Serb Republic”. Thus the war is presented as a civil war in contrast
to Historija, which used the term “aggression” for the war.118
After describing the political changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
declaration of the independent republic against the will of the Serb population of
Bosnia, Dodatak describes the start of the actual war as, “facing the attacks by the
Muslim fundamentalists and Croatian cleric nationalists, Serbian people had to
organise themselves and defend their life, national identity, honour and human
dignity with weapons.”119 Dodatak tells that there were three armies fighting in
Bosnian territory and that they were formed based on nationalities. It calls the army
of Bosnia and Herzegovina simply as “the Muslim army” and the Serb army as “the
army of the Serb Republic” thus suggesting that the only army presenting a state
formation was the Serb army. It describes the Muslim army as “being afraid to step
into an open and fair fight against the Serbian army(…)when they entered a village
(if they managed) they would kill all the people there and burn down the homes of
the people.” Later Dodatak also mentions that Mujahedins from Islamic countries
participated in the Muslim army and that they massacred Serbs.120 The Croat army,
together with Muslims, is also presented as fighting unfairly against Serbs. Their
attacks on the retreating Yugoslav army is described: “During these horrible attacks
(by the cowards) hundreds of innocent young men serving the army were killed and
burnt in the trucks.”121
Similarly to Istorija, Dodatak also blames the international community for
treating the Serbs unfairly. The book tells how the unbelievable campaign in the
world media judged the Serbs as the aggressors, and therefore Serbian people were
attacked with weapons. NATO forces assisted the Croat and Muslim forces when
they undertook “a brutal offensive against the Serb Republic”. As a part of the
117
Шејић 1997, 27.
118
Шејић 1997, 29.
119
Шејић 1997, 29.
120
Шејић 1997, 29-30.
121
Шејић 1997, 29.
187
offensive they are said to have burnt down houses and killed people. Finally
Dodatak states that after the Dayton Peace Agreement, the civil war ended.122
Other wars
Dodatak describes the riots in 1875–1878 in terms similar to those of the wars in
the 1990s: ”The Serbian people were again forced to defend their honour and
dignity with weapons because of increased taxes. They were unable to engage in
commerce and they were often robbed and mistreated forcefully by the Turkish
ruler”.123 Thus, as reasons for the conflict Dodatak emphasises economic conditions
and the unfair rule of the Turks. Other wars receive no mention in Dodatak.
Istorija describes the Russian revolution and includes as part of the description
there is one sub-chapter titled “civil war”. In practise, however, the war is dealt with
in two sentences presenting the warring sides and concluding at the end that “the
revolutionists won”.124 Regarding the post-WWII period, Istorija generally states
that the beginning of the cold war drove countries into blocs. Unlike Historija and
Povijest, Istorija sees all post-WWII wars as a result of the conflict between the
blocs. The consequences or nature of the wars are not discussed in Istorija.125 Thus
the interpretation emphasises the idea of the world being divided into the blocs and
different wars are not analysed separately but as part of bloc politics. This
interpretation supports the structural idea of history and is directly related to the
rhetoric of the non-aligned politics adopted by Titoist Yugoslavia. Thus Istorija
strongly echoes the socialist Yugoslavian ideas of history and historical forces.
6.2.4 CONCLUSION: DIFFERENT REPRESENTATIONS OF WARS

Descriptions of the world wars and recent wars in the 1990s constitute 30% to
40% of the material in the 8th-grade history textbooks used in Bosnia (see Table 3
on page 163). In addition, the units dealing with the pre- and post-war periods
discuss the reasons and consequences of the different wars. Thus, wars form an
important element of the textbooks and are therefore central in reflecting the
conceptions of history present in the textbooks.
The following Table 8 illustrates the features of the representations of wars in
the three textbooks. The table is divided into aims, causes and reasons for the
war(s); actors of wars; and other typical contentual characteristics of the general
representation; and finally, to the general style of the representation in each book.
In my view, this categorisation manages to bring about the central elements of the
representation of wars in the history textbooks used by the three Bosnian
communities in the post-war period.
122
Шејић 1997, 30.
123
Шејић 1997, 7.
124
Гаћеша 1997, 74-75.
125
Гаћеша 1997, 141.
188
Table 8: The Representations of Wars in 8th Grade History Textbooks in

Bosnia
Historija Povijest Istorija and Dodatak
Aims, expansionism anti-fascism fight for freedom

World causes, economy expansionism, expansionism,
wars
fight for freedom (mentioned imperialism
reasons
racist ideology
indirectly only) political gains, oil
fascism and anti-fascism
defence
Actors blocs local groups blocs
local groups different countries
countries, Allies local groups
Other universal suffering local/national emphasis on horrors
suffering and destruction
charac-
teristics
self-evidence of detailed military
events descriptions
civil war nature of WWII
Presen- general, lacking clinical extensive, detailed
tation
details, superficial internationally, military, distant
technical dramatic locally

declatory (not
horrors emotionally
analytical)
Aims, ethnic nationalism jeopardy of suppression
Wars causes,
others unfair treatment
in
reasons
ethnic defence
1990s

expansionism
defence
threat
Actors nationalists rebels separatists,

mercenaries nationalistic secessionists
terrorists army nation army (e.g. Serb)
national army regular police national army (state)
patriotic league national army police
NATO
ethno-religious army
Other suffering uncivilised -
charac-
destruction, killing destruction
teristics
failure of Europe
Presen- reason: aggression reason: attacks reason: fundamentalist

against simply started separatists threatened
tation independent state without reason unity
colourful, pamphlet-like
language
189
Aims, colonialism territorial and interest of blocs,

Other rise of Islamic tactical colonialism
wars causes,
states expansionism economic rights
reasons national liberation
expulsion
holy war
political gains, oil
Actors several countries Great Powers blocs

(special mention of Colonies nation

the third world)
parties to civil wars
several countries revolutionists
and local actors
Islamic States
Great Powers
Other general suffering, concentration on no analysis of different
human losses power positions wars but all part of the
charac- and military war between blocs
teristics strength
Finally some comparative comments on the summarised representations of wars in

the above table can be made. Regarding the world wars, the main differences
between the books involved the general nature of the representations. In the
Bosniac book Historija, the presentation was technical, adhering to a very general
level without becoming emotional at any point. In contrast, the Croat book
Povijest presented the local aspects of war in dramatic terms. In the Serb books
Istorija and Dodatak, we can note the detailed military description and
emotionally-loaded description of horrors.
In regard to the wars in the 1990s, the war aims emphasised ethnic nationalism
and suppression of the others, and actors in the wars included all kinds of forces
from terrorist formations to national armies and NATO forces. In the Bosniac
book Historija, we can particularly note the mention of mercenary soldiers and the
patriotic league as actors in the war. Neither of these two received mention in
Povijest or Istorija. NATO, in turn, was only mentioned in Istorija. Istorija also
separated the nation army (Bosnian Serb army), national army (Yugoslavia army)
and ethno-religious army (armies of other Bosnian national groups). In terms of
general characteristics, Povijest stressed the uncivilised nature of the conflict (in
which the Croats were defenders only) while Historija stressed the element of
suffering. Historija was also the only book to mention the failure of Europe as a
characteristic element of the Bosnian war. Finally, the most important point is to
note the different reasons given for the conflict; Historija presented it as an
aggression against an independent state while for Istorija, the fundamentalist
separatists threatened unity, and thus caused the war. Povijest failed to specify the
causes of the war at all.
Regarding other wars we can pay attention to the specification of Historija
when talking about the war aims, causes and reasons and note that the rise of the
190
Islamic states and the holy war were mentioned separately. Generally the most
important differences can be seen in the last line of the table; for Historija, general
suffering and human losses were characteristic (as was the case for their
representation of world wars). Povijest concentrated on the idea of expansionism
and power positions while the Serb representation emphasised the idea of
colonialist wars between the blocs without separately analysing those wars.
Thus overall, we can conclude that the representations of wars differ
significantly when comparing the books used by the three national communities.
The conception of history conveyed by the Bosniac book stresses the suffering
element as part of wars. It also describes the past in broad terms, including other
cultures and Islamic countries in its representation. Finally, the conception of the
recent war is based on elements that emphasise the unfair nature of the conflict,
and the responsibility of Europe. The Croat book Povijest in turn creates the
historical conception of expansionism and power struggles. Regarding the 1990s,
the participation of rebels and police are notable elements of the conceptions.
Finally, Istorija and Dodatak convey the conception of history stressing the military
nature of wars and the role of blocs and bloc politics. Thus they convey more
structuralist idea of history echoing the former Yugoslavian concept of history.
Vividly described horrors also belong to their picture of the past.
All books, at least to some degree, share a common element. The narratives of
the books have the tendency to use former wars as a metaphor for the recent war
and as a provocative way to describe the cruelties of war in general. We will return
to this and to the general representations of war as part of the broader conclusive
analysis at the end of this chapter.
6.3 Peace as a Rare Condition of History

As could be concluded in previous studies and shown in Table 3 and Table 4 in the
beginning of chapter 6, wars constitute a large proportion of history school
textbooks while peace as a force or condition in history is hardly mentioned. In the
following, I have summarised the special references to peace in each of the books.
‘Peace’ involves discussions on or mention of peace negotiations, peace-keeping,
treaties and so forth resulting from the wars. The reconciliation aspect of peace was
also part of the analysis.
6.3.1 HISTORIJA: QUESTIONING THE UN

The Bosniac book Historija touches upon the idea of peace three times: in relation
to the United Nations (UN); when presenting the movement of the non-aligned
countries; and in relation to the recent war.
Historija presents the origins of the UN after the Second World War and
mentions how it replaced the League of Nations. The book states how the UN has
often been incapable of helping threatened nations because of member countries’
191
right to veto in the Security Council. About the UN in the context of war and
peace, Historija writes:
”To areas threatened by war, the UN sends its peace-keeping forces (blue
helmets). Sometimes those peacekeeping forces do not have a strong enough
mandate, which would be supported by the authority of the great powers.
Therefore, it happens that they are unable to protect the civilian citizenry
from great suffering. The most obvious example today is Bosnia.”126
Thus, Historija questions the UN’s capability as a peacekeeper, suggesting that

conflicting interests between the great powers always weaken the UN.
When Historija presents the movement of the non-aligned countries, it
mentions that in their first conference they announced that “the main principle of
the politics of the non-aligned countries is peaceful and active co-existence”.
Historija concludes the one-paged presentation of the movement of non-aligned
countries by stating that the great power, which the movement enjoys inside the
UN, has lessened the conflicts and wars between single non-aligned countries.127
In relation to the recent past, Historija discusses Yugoslavia and peace in a
fatalistic tone. Describing the situation in the beginning of the 1990s, it writes:
”The fate of Yugoslavia was then, just as in 1918, in the hands of Europe and the
world. It [Yugoslavia] again returned where it had already been, to an international
conference, that is, it found itself at its origins. All possibilities for its survival
sank.”128 Thus, international conferences are seen as solving wars and peace in the
region.
6.3.2 POVIJEST: COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS

The Croat book Povijest discusses topics related to peace more than Historija and
describes in detail, for instance, the peace negotiations following the First World
War. The phases of the Versailles negotiations are analysed in three pages and the
peace is represented as a complicated process of power-related deals. Similarly, the
Paris conference in 1919–1920 is presented with emphasis on the complicated
nature of peace treaties. It is particularly mentioned how Americans, when
finalising peace treaties, were most interested in the economy, its structures and
future potential.129 The complicated nature of peace negotiations also figures in the
presentation when Povijest describes the peace treaties after the Second World War
in a three-paged-chapter. The presentation concentrates on territorial losses.130
Povijest also uses several pages to describe both international and national
developments in art and science between the World Wars. The presentation clearly
126
127
128
129
Perić 1995, 14-16.
130
Perić 1995, 115.
192
illustrates the potential for development in times of peace (=between the great
wars). Povijest discusses scientific victories, Nobel prize winners and developments
in cinematography, music and sports.131
When Povijest describes the Atlantic Charter masterminded by the Americans
and the British during the Second World War, it mentions how the charter
emphasised ”demands for a lasting peace, disarming the attackers, and restoring a
post-war system of security that would keep the peace and enable progress”. Other
aspects mentioned and emphasised in the Charter, and thus associated with
peaceful developments, included freedom and democratic principles, the
sovereignty of nations, the right of nations to engage in commerce, the right of
access to international waters, and the right of international collaboration.132
The origin of the movement of the non-aligned countries is presented only
shortly in Povijest with the conclusion: ”the non-aligned countries committed
themselves to the fight for peace and international collaboration”.133 Thus, Povijest
also connects the movement of the non-aligned countries with peace even if it does
not handle the movement itself at all.
Finally, when discussing the wars and crises after the Second World War,
Povijest presents peace in relation to the Catholic Church with the heading “The
role of the Catholic Church in keeping the peace in the world”. First, Povijest
describes the aims and the role of the Catholic Church generally, and ends the
argument with the particular case of Croatia. The Pope is said to have defended
Croatia and the Croats, and to have pressured other countries to acknowledge the
state of Croatia in 1991.134
6.3.3 ISTORIJA AND DODATAK: BLOCS VERSUS NON-ALIGNMENT

Istorija first mentions peace in the context of the League of Nations, which,
according to the book, was created by the winners of the First World War to keep
the peace and to stabilise the conditions created by the peace treaty. Istorija fails to
comment on how the League of Nations succeeded in its efforts.135
Istorija presents the signing of the Atlanta Charter as a significant step in
strengthening the Allies during the Second World War. It writes:
“It was emphasised that the Allies were not fighting for the expansion of their
territories, that every nation would be able to choose the structure of its
society according to its wishes, that peace should be preserved after the war,
that destroyed countries should be reconstructed and that there should be
close economic co-operation among the countries.”136
131
Perić 1995, 73-80.
132
Perić 1995, 93.
133
Perić 1995, 133.
134
Perić 1995, 126.
135
136
193
Thus, Istorija’s presentation of the treaty is similar to that of Povijest.

In the period following the Second World War, Istorija lists the peace treaties
made, and emphasises how the winners of wars made them with those they had
defeated. The book also states how the interests of the blocs of the Great Powers
were always present in different local conflicts in the post-WWII world and how in
fact “these blocs were a threat to world peace”.137 Thus the interpretation of history
based on a negative attitude towards the blocs, which was central to the non-aligned
politics of Yugoslavia, receives added emphasis.
Istorija presents peace as a central concept when discussing the movement of
the non-aligned countries. It states that ”the basic principle of the movement of the
non-aligned countries was active, peaceful coexistence”. The principle is described
thus: “this stood for the respect of territorial integrity – there should be no
attacking; domestic problems of other countries should not be meddled with –
equality, co-operation and peaceful coexistence.” Istorija emphasises how
Yugoslavia has been leading the movement and how new countries have continued
to join the movement. The general idea Istorija conveys is that the movement is still
active, even though it mentions that the break-up of Soviet Union has weakened
it.138
Istorija presents the creation of the UN, mentioning that the original goal was
to maintain peace and security in the world. The presentation continues with a list
of places where the UN has had peacekeeping missions, among them Yugoslavia is
also mentioned. Thus, Istorija suggests that the reasons for peacekeeping in
Yugoslavia existed. Unlike Historija, the book failes to analyse, comment or
evaluate the work of the UN at all.139
Istorija returns to the UN in the context of Yugoslavia and peace when
discussing the 1990s. It first states how in the 1950s, Yugoslavia found new ways to
escape the situation it found itself in. When specifying “the new ways”, Istorija
emphasises the peace-aspect: “As these ways we can see the peaceful co-operation
between the countries, the defence of a country’s independence and the fight for
peace in the world”. Istorija continues to argue that as a member of the UN,
Yugoslavia has always been against wars and supported co-operation between
countries. Then the book claims that the emphasis of Yugoslavia on non-aligned
politics led to problems in its relations with the European countries. That is cited as
the reason why most European countries supported the secession of other Yugoslav
states from the country. Thus, Istorija suggests that Yugoslavia based its politics on
the non-aligned principle, which was at its core peaceful and emphasised the
coexistence of countries and nations. The other states, however, failed to respect
such peace-orientated politics and in fact worked against the “internationally
accepted country”.140
137
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 140-141.
138
139
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 143-144.
140
194
Dodatak is the only one of the textbooks that discusses the Dayton peace
agreement. It writes: ”In November 1995, a peace agreement was signed in Dayton
(USA) and the Civil War ended. According to the agreement, BH, as a union, has
two entities: the Serb Republic and the Federation of BH. Thus, the Serb Republic
was internationally accepted as a part (entity) of the Union of BiH.”141 The Dayton
peace agreement appears as having ended the war. Dodatak presents it as a rather
positive agreement for it states that it established BH as a union, which is not the
official name (the name of the state is simply “Bosnia and Herzegovina”).142 Thus,
the wording used suggests that the Serb Republic was part of a union of two states.
6.3.4 CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONALISM AND NON-ALLIANCE

As expected from previous textbook studies, the space devoted to peace as a theme
was marginal, although the Croat book Povijest handled peace and phenomena
related to it more than did Istorija and Historija. Yet, based on the presentations
given, we can draw the following conclusive table:
Table 9: Representations of Peace in 8th-Grade History Textbooks in Bosnia
Historija Povijest Istorija and Dodatak
Actors international parties international parties international parties

non-aligned countries non-aligned non-aligned countries
United Nations
countries
United Nations
Catholic Church
Emphases UN criticism: conflicts complexity of principles of non-

of Great Powers negotiations after aligned countries
fatality in connection
world wars
Great Powers: threat
with negotiations in to world peace
1990s
satisfaction with
Dayton peace
Table 9 above illustrates that the representations of peace include many similar
elements. Povijest devoted more space to peace-related issues, concentrating in
particular on describing the complicated nature of peace negotiations. As
141
Шејић 1997, 30.
142
In his book about the peace negotiations, Richard Holbrooke describes how Slobodan Milosević would have liked
to call Bosnia and Herzegovina either as the ”Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina” or ”the United States of Bosnia-
Herzegovina”, but finally accepted the name ”Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Holbrooke 1998, 135.
195
differences between the books, we can note the different relation to the peace
agreements in the 1990s in Historija and Istorija and Dodatak. On the other hand,
they all share a critical approach to the Great Powers in relation to war. Povijest’s
viewpoint of the Catholic Church as a peacemaker was unique.
One similarity of the representations deserves further discussion. The
movement of the non-aligned countries is mentioned in each book in connection to
peace. At the same time, however, none of the books mentions Tito in connection
to the non-aligned movement or non-aligned politics. This is most surprising in the
case of Istorija and Dodatak, which describes the United Nations and the non-
aligned movement in the spirit of Tito’s Yugoslavia and its peace politics. Thus,
even though non-aligned countries were presented in a positive sense in all of the
books (Povijest only mentions the movement without evaluating it at all), even that
part of Tito’s heritage has not been included in the conception of history conveyed
at schools in post-war years.
This leads to a more general comment regarding Tito’s heritage, which has
been totally neglected in the presentations of textbooks. Socialist Yugoslavia is part
of the conceptions of the textbooks, but Tito’s role is simply removed altogether: he
is only mentioned in connection to Partisan formations but not as the leader of
socialist Yugoslavia. This is well illustrated in the pictures in the books; in Historija,
Tito is illustrated in two small group photos (in a third group photo, it is
impossible to recognise him among the people in the picture) one from a meeting
of AVNOJ (Council of Antifascist National Liberation of Yugoslavia) and the other
from a meeting of the non-aligned countries.143 In Povijest, Tito is part of the
picture of the meeting of AVNOJ.144 In Istorija, Tito is devoted one small
individual portrait photo.145 In this context, we can also note Cohen’s comment
about very few visitors to Tito’s grave and birthplace, once popular places for
visitors, in the 1990s.146 Thus none of the national groups in Bosnia seems to have
found ways to deal with Tito, who after all was the architect and father of their
country for decades.
Overall, the reconciliation aspect of peace was not part of the conceptions of
history related to peace in any of the books. The peace-related matters discussed
were rather practical (e.g. the UN). As seen, Tito’s reconciliation work was not
recognised and the only book discussing Dayton presented the agreement only in
pragmatic terms. When remembering the broad and partly emotional, suffering-
concentrated conceptions of history related to war, we can notice a contrast in the
peace conceptions which fail to construct the idea of finding solutions for people
after the suffering caused by wars.
To emphasise the aspects of the peace representations in the textbooks, we can
refer to Quentin Skinner’s theory of concepts. He has emphasised the importance
143
Imamović et al. 1994, 101, 103, 113.
144
Perić 1995, 103.
145
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 108. Here we can note that portrait photos were generally very common in Istorija.
146
Cohen 1998, 103, 106.
196
of contextual analyses of concepts and formulated a tri-partite model for such

analyses. Skinner has argued that, through studying the vocabulary used for
describing the social world, three main types of insights emerge: The words or
concepts can have (1) a meaning which tells about social beliefs; (2) a range of
reference, the way the term can be used, which tells about social perceptions and
awareness; and (3) a range of attitudes the term can express which tells about the
social values.147 To sum up, one concept can be analysed through its meaning,
usage and the values attached to it. When applied to the ways the concept of peace
was represented in the textbooks, we could conclude that (1) the meanings given to
the concept were pragmatic, (2) the usage of the concept related to the UN,
negotiations after crises and to non-aligned countries, (3) and that no values were
attached to the concept.
6.4 The Presentation of Nation through “us” and “them”

In the following, we will concentrate on the understanding of “us” and “them”,
how the characteristics included in the presentation of “our nation” and “their
nation” are presented in the school textbooks. Thus, unlike with the analysis on the
representations of war and peace, I am not analysing the general universal
characteristics attached to the concept of nation in the dealings of the textbooks, or
whether the texts typically views nations and nation states as the basic organising
principle of the world political system and as actors in history (e.g. Germany doing
something to Poland). It can, however, be mentioned here that “nation” as an actor
is seen as a self-evident, basic element of history in all the textbooks.
Before turning to the analysis, it is necessary to define “nation” and what the
relation is between nation group and ethnic group in the Bosnian context, for both
terms have been applied to describe the three main communities living in the area
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The word “narod” can be translated as both nation and
people.148 “Nacija” is a local form of the English word “nation” and “narodnost”
means “nationality”. In Yugoslavian times “narod” was used to describe South Slavs
who lived mostly in Yugoslavia and had their own republic (e.g. Serbs, Croats,
Slovenes) while “narodnost” denoted those Yugoslav populations living in large
groups in Yugoslavia but with a state elsewhere (e.g. Albans and Hungarians).
Finally, “ethnic minority” was the term used for those who did not fit either of the
groups.149 Because of this differentiation, it was politically important to define
Bosnian Muslims as “narod” in the last decades of Yugoslavia, as was presented in
chapter four. In the constitution of Bosnia, Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs form three
147
Skinner, Quentin 1989/1995. Language and political change. In: Ball, Terence, Farr, James and Hanson, Russell
L. (ed.) 1989/1995. Political innovation and conceptual change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 9-11, 20.
148
See e.g. Vulliamy 1994, 5, Universal Croatian Dictionary English-Croatian Croatia-English. Berlin and Munich:
Langenscheidt, 388.
149
Friedman 1996, 3, Varady 1997, 132.
197
”narods”.150 This conceptual background, resulting in the lack of distinctive

analytical divide between ethnicity and nationalism, has lead scholars dealing with
Bosnia to conclude that the terms “nationhood” and “ethnicity” are
interchangeable; nation can be construed as “an ethnic group seeking to advance its
interests through organised political action”151 or “a psychological construct or state
of mind of a group of people who share a sense of solidarity that has little or
nothing to do with citizenship”.152 Therefore, in the following analysis, nation is
interchangeable with ethnic group, and both “narod” and “narodnost” mean
“nation” in the sense of being included as groups of “ours” or “theirs”.
6.4.1 HISTORIJA: CONCENTRATION ON US

After collecting the references to ”nation” and ”nations” in Historija, I decided to
divide the “we” category into two sub-categories. The two categories stem from two
ways of representing “our nation”, thereby supporting the idea of national
belonging of certain groups of people. The actor and national unity to most often
referred in the book is Bosnia and Herzegovina, the people who are defined
through living in its territory. Thus, we can define the “territorial Bosnian nation”.
Another group often referred to as “us” and as a sub-group of the Bosnian group is
”the Muslims”, and thus we can refer to ”the ethnic Muslim nation”. Finally, the
presentation of nations includes only a few comments, remarks and references to
”them”, to other South Slav nations. The emphasis of Historija is on the ”we”-
group: the Bosniac book supports more the construction of the image of us than
that of others in its references to nations.
We 1: The Territorial Bosnian Nation

The idea of a single Bosnian entity is a basic presentation through the entire book.
The presentation is characterised by emphases on the historical continuity and
tradition of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state. Thus, this presentation becomes
structure orientated: the Bosnian unity finds its expression in organic state
structures, federal principles and the like.
In a 15-paged chapter entitled ”The Question of Bosnia and Herzegovina”,
which discusses the period immediately following WWI, Historija presents
different concepts of the possible Yugoslavia (country of the South Slavs) from the
perspective of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its special characteristics.153 When
Historija describes the formation of the First Yugoslavia, BiH always figures as the
subject. The tone emphasises the historical tradition of BiH as a state, which was
not respected in the beginning of the First Yugoslavia: ”By entering the united state
150
Ustav Bosne i Hercegovine. Устав Босне и Херцеговине. The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. OHR-
photocopy, 15, 25, 37.
151
Ramet 1989/1994, 113.
152
Friedman 1996, 2.
153
198
of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, a 1st December 1918, BiH retained
for a long time some elements and forms of its statehood and autonomy.”154
Historija emphasises that despite attempts of the central power in Belgrade to the
contrary, the Bosnian government continued its work just as they had done under
the autonomy of Austria-Hungary. According to Historija, ”that only shows that
the tradition of Bosnian statehood and autonomy had deep roots.”155 Finally,
Historija mentions that the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina participated
in the first government of the new Yugoslavia, which again emphasised the nature
of Bosnia as an entity: ”Three ministers from Bosnia and Herzegovina also entered
the government based on their nationality and religion. They were the minister of
religion – Croat, minister of national health – Serb, and minister of forestry –
Muslim.”156 The three ministers, representing the three national groups, thus
clearly represented Bosnia.
Historija describes the new constitution of the First Yugoslavia from 1921,
known as the ”Vidovan Constitution”157, from the perspective of traditional
Bosnian statehood: ”This way [through the Vidovan Constitution] the territorial
entirety of BiH was guaranteed. That article [Article 35, entitled the ”Turkish
paragraph”] expressed the fact that the state-territorial continuity of Bosnia and
Herzegovina already existed in the Middle Ages.”158 In regard to the new
constitution, which centralised the functions of the state, Historija mentions that
Bosnia and Herzegovina were stripped of all provincial activities and functions in
two years. Yet Bosnia (with its tradition of statehood) still remained: ”The only
trace of the several centuries of statehood and autonomy of Bosnia and Herzegovina
was the fact that, despite this division of districts in the SHS (the kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes), BiH remained territorially united.”159
Historija also raises the idea of the historical unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina
when it presents the idea of establishing ”Serbian lands” as part of the Yugoslavian
kingdom. The plan of Serbian lands is said to have been ”a total harm and
misfortune for Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in all of those plans for re-
arrangements was denied its right as a historical, political and state-sanctioned
entity”.160
When discussing the Second World War, the partisan movement and the
establishment of socialist Yugoslavia, Historija continues to concentrate on the
structures of the partisan organisations and later on the structures of the state and
the role of a single BiH in it. The militarily and politically central role of Bosnia in
the partisan ”fight for national liberation” is emphasised: ”The most important
154
155
156
157
The date when it was signed (28th June) was and is Saint Vitus day for the Orthodoxs. Hence, the name of the
constitution.
158
159
160
Imamović 1994, 74.
199
fights and all of the most important events in the Fight for National Liberation
(NOR) occurred on its [Bosnia’s] soil. From the first days of its occupation, the
resistance against the occupants and the military powers of the NDH continued to
expand…”.161 It is also mentioned that Tito, with the main commanders, spent
more than half of the war on the soil of Bosnia and Herzegovina.162
After the extensive presentation of the organs of the partisan forces during the
war, Historija concludes that “the construction of Yugoslavia according to the
federal principle guaranteed the a solution to the national question(…)the
formation of GŠ NOO [the main command of the national-liberation forces] for
BiH, together with already previously formed committee of KPJ [Communist Party
of Yugoslavia] for BiH, clearly marked the position of BiH and its nations in a
future state unity.”163 The similar presentation of BiH and its nations as one unity
and subject is also characteristic when the state structure of the established socialist
Yugoslavia is explained. The description of the beginning of the work of the basic
organ in Yugoslavia AVNOJ, Council of Anti-fascist National Liberation of
Yugoslavia, offers an illustrative example (underlining P.T.):
”In the first meeting of ZAVNOBiH (Country Council of Anti-fascist
National Liberation of BiH), the Resolution was adopted as well as the
proclamation/manifesto of the nations in BiH. It emphasised that the future
BiH and its nations within the country and abroad can only be represented by
ZAVNOBiH and AVNOJ. Simultaneously with these actions, the will of
nations in BIH expressed that their country would be a unity where the rights
of all nations living there would be guaranteed. In the meeting, a 58-member
delegation, which would represent BiH in the second meeting of AVNOJ, was
elected.”164
In further presentations of the work of ZAVNOBiH, the unity of BiH and its
nations remains the focus, and many ’national’ functions mentioned refer to BiH as
an entity.165
In the second meeting of AVNOJ, the status of BiH in the federal Yugoslavia
was decided. According to Historija, ”The management of NOP
[Narodnooslobodilački pokret – National Liberation Movement] committed itself
to the decision to include BiH as a federal unity of equal standing because BiH
possessed and had possessed a statehood illustrated in its political traditions, and
because three nations – Muslims, Serbs and Croats and other national minorities –
lived in its territory.”166 Thus, the historical statehood of BiH with its multi-
national character is presented as the basic element of Bosnia and Herzegovina that
became part of socialist Yugoslavia. Historija further mentions that AVNOJ
161
162
163
164
165
Imamović et. al. 1994, 106-107.
166
200
considered that, ”with such mixed citizenry, any other solution would have been
politically unacceptable with far-reaching and unforeseen consequences.”167
Ravnopravne Narode i Države – Equal Nations and Countries

A concept used often in the context of nation or nations in Historija is
”ravnopravan”, which can be translated as “equal” or as “enjoying the same rights”.
Historija uses the concept both internally and externally. Internally, it refers to the
different nations living within Bosnia and Herzegovina, and externally, it refers to
Bosnia and Herzegovina as one of the states “ravnopravan – equal” to Serbia and
Croatia. The external “ravnopravnosti” is more emphasised in Historija and can
thus be seen as an important part of Bosnian nation-building.
Historija mentions external “ravnopravnosti” already in the context of state
formations after the First World War. When meeting the president of Hungary ”in
Sarajevo, Yugoslavian-orientated Serb and Croat Bosnian-Herzegovinian politicians
delivered a memorandum in which they demanded a solution to the Bosnian
question based on the principle of self-determination of nations, namely a form of
equal and state-wise independent nations.”168 Thus, a Serb and a Croat in Bosnia
and Herzegovina are presented as demanding equality (ravnopravnosti) for
Bosnians.
In the 1930s, after the king had announced a new constitution that created in
practise an absolute dictatorship, several parties throughout Yugoslavia are said to
have reacted. Historija presents the Bosnian reaction with emphasis again on
“ravnopravnosti”. According to Historija, the leader of the Muslim organisation
(JMO) published a Sarajevo declaration in which ”he emphasised that the basic
democratic principles upon which the state is built had been abused, and this
caused all the political and especially the national questions to intensify. Therefore
an arrangement was required for equal political-historical entities, of which also
Bosnia and Herzegovina is one.”169
The idea of external national equality continues to be central when Historija
discusses the formation of socialist Yugoslavia. For example, the decision that
”Yugoslavia will be constructed under the federal principle as a union where all
nations that live in it enjoy equal rights”, is mentioned as one of the most
important decision in the second assembly of AVNOJ.170
The federal principle is central in Historija when it emphasises equality
between the different parts of Yugoslavia. According to Historija, the case of Bosnia
and Herzegovina was separate, for only five nations (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes,
Macedonians, and Montenegrins) were acknowledged (with their national
minorities) at that time and thereby enjoyed full rights (ravnopravni) and
167
168
169
Imamović 1994, 69-70.
170
201
sovereignty within Yugoslavia. In the second meeting of AVNOJ, however,

”Considering that it had been shown that BiH gave a huge contribution to the
NOB [Fight for National Liberation] and that such ideas had been overcome by the
decisions of ZAVNOBiH and AVNOJ, BiH gained equal footing with other
members of the democratic federal Yugoslavia.”171
Historija’s description of the internal organisation and constitution of BiH in
the federal Yugoslavia illustrates the idea of ravnopravnosti internally within Bosnia
and Herzegovina: ”For all the nations that live in it [BiH], the constitution of NR
BiH acknowledges their nationhood equally and makes it possible for them to
enjoy all the protection for cultural development and for the freedom to use their
language.”172
Idea of Unity
As shown above, the idea of a unified Bosnian nation (consisting of nation groups
with equal rights) is linked and related to structural state formations and historical
traditions of such structures. In other words, using Skinner’s tri-partite model for
analysing concepts presented in section 6.3.4, we can see that the meaning of the
Bosnian nation has emphasised the equally-righted groups of nations, and the usage
has concentrated on state structures. Values have not really been attached to the
Bosnian nation. There are, however, a few instances in which the more abstract idea
of a Bosnian nation (or group of nations) is presented.
Historija presents the idea for the first time when it notes that parliamentary
representatives of all three nations asked the army to interfere and ”prevent riots
and persecutions of Serbs” following the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in
1914.173 The description of the First World War emphasises how it brought
difficult times for the entire country. The suffering of Serbs is emphasised, as well
as the fact that the majority of Muslims was on their side against their terror: “The
high representatives of the Islamic community with reis-ul-ulema Đžemaludin
Čaušević as leader rose against the persecutions of Serbs, demonstrating that those
Muslims and individuals who had participated in the persecutions would give up
such ‘god-hating acts’.”174 Generally, the idea of unity is central when dealing with
the First World War, and the basic actor is always BiH.
The clearest and most extensive presentation of the idea of unity as part of the
Bosnian territorial nation is the sub-chapter telling about the letters written by
students in 1937, 1938 and 1939 demanding autonomy for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. According to Historija, the letters were written by ”Bosnia-
Herzegovinian student youth” and ”509 students from all the nationalities of BiH,
Serbs, Muslims, Croats and Jews” signed them. In the letters, students emphasised
171
172
173
174
202
the historical tradition of BiH and ”demanded democracy, national and religious
equality, and the unity of Bosnian-Herzegovinian nations”. They ”determinedly
declared themselves against any kind of ethnocentrism, injustice and patronage
towards other nations.”175 Historija sees the relevance of the letters in their political
and symbolic importance:
”The letters of the student youth showed, primarily, the historical and
existential community of the nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their
standing in BiH did not allow the establishment of administrative-political
borders between them. Such community of nations has been seen not only as
the past by those who signed the letters, but as a commitment to the future.
With these letters, the category ’nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ was
adopted as an expression of confessional and ethnic agreement in the
communist publicity.176
Thus, the idea of Bosnian-hood is presented as a primordial unity of nations.

Instead of talking about Serbs or Croats, Historija tells how the adopted expression
from then on was ”the nations in BiH”.
Generally Historija connects the idea of Bosnia as a unity with Bosnian
Muslims. An entire page is devoted to the organisation called “Mladi Muslimani”177
established 1939. Historija presents the organisation favourably, with respectable
human goals aiming at the unity and equality of Bosnia and its nations with Serbia
and Croatia. It also mentions that even though Mladi Muslimani underwent
difficulties and persecutions, they were the greatest force of resistance to the
communist system in Yugoslavia after 1946.178 It is worth mentioning here that in
the new edition of the Bosniac history textbook the most significant single change
was the omission of the chapter on “Mladi Muslimani” and to draw attention to
one of the new street names in Sarajevo since the war: “the road of young
Muslims”, mentioned as part of the new history culture in chapter five.
In the pre-Second World War situation, the belonging of Bosnian Muslims
together with other national groups is also emphasised: ”Bosnian Muslims did not
make their peace with the understanding that they would live divided. Justifiably
they wanted to feel an partner in the Yugoslavian unity of nations.”179 Historija also
expresses the Bosnian idea when it presents the recent war as a military aggression
against “our” country, ours clearly being Bosnia and Herzegovina.180
175
176
Imamović et. al. 1994, 72
177
’Young Muslims’.
178
179
180
203
We 2: Ethnic Muslim Nation

The other basic “we” group in the presentations of Historija is the group of
Muslims. Historija mainly presents Muslims as a national group fully comparable
to other national groups. The basic characteristic of that presentation is to view the
Muslim group as a natural national group that should always have been treated as
the other groups, but that this has not been the case. The interpretation of the
changes to the constitution in the beginning of the 1970s leading to the 1974
constitution illustrates well the basic approach: ”In the series of democratic
requirements, it finally came to the national recognition of Bosnian Muslims.”181
Thus, the message is that it was always supposed to be like this, that the
development was inevitable and natural. The complicated, even “Orwellian”182
character of the constitution is not mentioned; only the national aspect is
considered important for Bosnian Muslims.
Historija raises the Muslims’ lack of official nationhood already when it
presents the birth of political parties in the First Yugoslavia. It argues that ”in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, only three ”tribes – Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – were
recognised as a unitarian state”. This is considered the reason why all political
parties formed on national and religious bases.183 Thus, the nation became central
in politics because only three groups enjoyed that status. The use of the word
”tribe” instead of nation further emphasises the message.
The presentation of Muslims as a nation whose position is not as it should be
continues through the reasoning behind the 1921 constitution and the voting of
JMO (Yugoslav Muslim Organisation) for the federal model of the state: ”[they]
hoped thereby to preserve the entirety of BiH and to solve the question of the status
of Muslims and generally to improve their position.”184 When describing the re-
arrangement of the country into banovinas in the 1920s and 1930s, the position of
Muslims is mentioned as inferior to that of other groups: ”Muslims in all four
banovinas were in full minority, while the Serb-Orthodox and Croat-Catholic
citizenry held the majority.”185
The need to bolster the nationhood of Muslims is problematic for there were
and are Muslims other than Bosnian Muslims already within the South Slavic
countries. In Historija, the definition of “us” as Bosnian Muslims, not just as
Muslims, appears when Historija mentions that already in 1909, Bosnian Muslims
fought for their religious autonomy.186 In this way the Bosnian Muslims are
differentiated from other Muslims.
Regarding the period of the Second World War and the ustaša NDH state into
which Bosnia was incorporated, Historija claims that the historical Muslim
181
182
see 4.2.3.
183
184
185
Imamović 1994, 64
186
204
nationhood was in danger. It writes: “Bosnian Muslims (Bosniacs) were striven

simply to be considered Croats and in this way their historical and national identity
would be taken from them(…)It was in fact a form of genocide against the Bosnian
Muslims.”187 In addition to noting the assumption of the historical nationhood of
Muslims, it is also worth noting that the term “Bosniac” is used here. It is a concept
first perhaps applied during the Ottoman period but which in any case disappeared
and was re-introduced in the 1960s and became commonly used only in the 1990s.
We will return to this in the concluding part of this chapter.
After the Second World War, Historija presents the new constitution and how
the Minister of Justice considered the nationhood status of Muslims as a
”theoretical question” which could not be solved immediately. Therefore, only five
nations (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins) were mentioned
in the Yugoslav constitution of 1946.188 As mentioned already in the beginning of
this sub-chapter, the constitution in 1974 guaranteed the nationhood of Muslims
at which time Historija considers it ”finally granted”.
With the basic presentation of Muslims based on the idea that they were always
a nation just like the others, there are two categories of typical characteristics
attached to the nature of the Muslim nation. On the one hand, they are a brave,
tolerant people who defend others, yet on the other hand, they have undergone
great suffering. In the following we will examine those presentations in detail.
Good Muslims
References to the goodness of Muslims typically involve their tolerance towards
others, their general moral strength as a nation, and their concern for Bosnia.
A Muslim leader is presented as having saved other nations when Historija
recounts how the leader of Muslims, reis-ul-uleima, gave an interview for the
French Le Temps on the suffering of Muslims during the period of the First
Yugoslavia. After that, officials tried to remove him from his position, but the
representatives of Bosnia said they would not allow it because the reis-ul-uleima had
saved Serbs from persecutions in 1914.189 Historija also presents Muslims as the
leaders of the movement that sought autonomy for Bosnia before the Second
World War; the already mentioned organisation of Mladi Muslimani, established
in 1939, is said to have supported the case of a unified Bosnia equal to Serbia and
Croatia. The Muslim organisation is also mentioned as the greatest resistance
movement against communists in the former Yugoslavia.190
When presenting general cultural and economic politics in BiH between the
World Wars, Historija makes special mention of Muslim intellectuals active in
cultural politics and who ”engaged themselves in educating their nation and in its
187
188
189
190
205
(nation’s) economic and cultural progress”.191 Thus, the passage emphasises the
enlightened spirit of Muslims.
Historija uses three consecutive sub-titles to characterise the treatment of the
Second World War and the treatment of Muslims in relation to it: “the Genocide
of the ustaša state in BiH”, “Chetnik genocide against the Muslims of BiH”, and
“The Fight of Muslims against ustaša and chetnik genocide”. Thus, it is clear that
the genocide of the ustaša state and the chetnik genocide occurred in BiH, and in
the latter case, it is clear that it was against the Muslims. The third title describes
the role of Muslims most clearly. In the text, Historija emphasises how Muslims
openly protested against the ustašas, and how Bosnian Muslim religious officials
condemned those who collaborated with the ustašas saying that the attacks on Serbs
and Jews were at the same time attacks on Muslims. Historija mentions how the
ustaša state tried “in vain” to win the support of Muslim leaders but admits the fact
that some Muslims were working for the ustašas. The book states, however, that the
number of Muslims in high state positions was very low.192 Thus, the Muslims are
portrayed as a morally strong, tolerant nation that helps others.
The creation of Muslim division within the German army is explained through
the idea of necessity and propaganda with mentions of the special character of the
collaboration: “In case Bosnia wanted autonomy, Germany demanded Muslims to
form a division which they would train and which would be on their side. Such
division was created with successful propaganda”. Historija tells how the Muslim
unit rebelled in France and “was noted in history as the only incident of rebellion
in the German army in the Second World War”. Within Bosnia, the Muslim
military is said to have been created with the help of Germany to “defend from
chetnik attack”.193
The Suffering of Muslims

The passive suffering of Muslims is another typical characteristic of Historija’s
references to Muslims in a nation-sense. Historija writes about the Yugoslav
kingdom created after the First World War and emphasises the suffering of
Muslims:
”The suffering of Muslims presents the basic characteristic of life and the
situation in BiH in the first decade after unification in 1918. All kinds of
attacks against the lives and property of Muslims and the pathological hatred
of them had been followed by insulting shouts ’Go to Asia!’, ’Move to Asia!’
and so on. First, Serb peasants attacked Muslim farmers from whom land was
taken, property plundered and homes burnt throughout Bosnia. The Serb
191
Imamović 1994, 74-76.
192
Imamović et. al. 1994, ¨96-97.
193
206
army not only could, but did not want to prevent this even though it was an
army called upon to secure general peace and order.”194
Historija cites the leader of the Muslim community as having said to the local
authorities that ”Muslims were put under such terror, which Bosnia does not
remember.” The book tells that until June 1919, Muslim landowners had been
stripped of 400 072 hectares of their land, and that by September 1920,
approximately 2000 Muslims had been killed. It is said that many escaped to
Turkey ”to save their skin”. In most of the sentences, Historija uses the passive
voice and fails to specify the subject, or the evildoer.195 According to Historija,
terror against Muslims was worst in Sandžak, where ”in the villages of Šahovic and
Pavino Polje approximately 2000 armed Montenegrins killed and slaughtered
approximately 600 Muslim adults, women and children.” Historija also mentions
that the Muslims were stripped of their property and some of their mosques were
destroyed and turned into storage houses and sport halls.196 Here we can note that
in the context of the terror against Muslims in the 1920s, the Muslims of Sandžak
are also represented as ”us”. Typically the book differentiated Bosnian Muslims
from other Yugoslav Muslims.
In a chapter discussing agrarian reforms during the First Yugoslavia, the
national-political reasons are presented as decisive, and the victims are Bosnian
Muslims: ”(1918) in BiH over 62% of private land was in the ownership of
Muslims. Therefore Bosnia and Herzegovina was the skeleton and target of agrarian
reforms by which not only social-economic goals, but above all, national-political
goals were realised. Muslim farmers had to be totally destroyed socio-economically,
and Muslims enslaved nationally and politically.”197 Historija sees all the proposed
agrarian reforms in the First Yugoslavia as harmful and unfair for Bosnian
Muslims.198
The solving of ”the Croatian question” in the 1930s receives an entire page,
and concludes that ”the agreement and solution of ’the Croat question’ was
achieved at the expense of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and especially at the expense of
Bosnian Muslims.” As a reaction to solving the Croat question, an idea arose to
establish “Serbian lands” of which BiH would have been a part. According to
Historija, that ”would have been a total catastrophe for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which in all those plans was denied its rightful status as a historical, political and
state-righted entity”.199 Thus, according to Historija’s presentation, the difficulties
of other nations were solved at the expense of Bosnians, and particularly at the
expense of Muslims.
194
195
196
197
Imamović 1994, 67.
198
199
Imamović 1994, 73, 74.
207
When Historija deals with the Second World War period, the suffering of
Muslims is a central topic. First, the ustašas are said to have performed “a form of
genocide against Bosnian Muslims” by forcing them to declare themselves
Croats.200 Under the headline “Chetnik genocide on the Muslims in BiH”, the
suffering of Muslims is described: “Serbian-chetnik genocide against Muslims has
deep roots. On one side, it represents unreasonable religious hatred and intolerance,
and on the other, the will of Serb ideology and politicians to create an ethnically
clean territory at any cost. Consequently, from the beginning of the war in 1941,
they carried out a systematic liquidation of Muslims, respectively a genocide.”201
The mass massacres of Muslims are mentioned and places where they took place
listed. The end of the chapter concludes that “Under chetnik knives many villages
disappeared. This hitherto unforeseen genocide against Muslims destroyed over 100
000 lives.”202
They: Few References to Serbs

Historija concentrates more on “us” than on “them”. As we have seen, the suffering
of Muslims is emphasised and those causing the suffering only rarely mentioned.
Instead, Historija employs mostly the passive voice to express the ”evil-doers”.
Typically, the others throughout the book are the Serbs (and Montenegrins,
often referred along with Serbs).203 The Croats, the other main “they” group within
Bosnia, are only rarely referred to when Historija discusses the state formations
which mention all three national groups and their positions. The only occasion
involving a clear description of both Croats and Serbs is when Historija describes
the second meeting of AVNOJ, and how there were different opinions concerning
the position and rights of BiH as a state in the future state; the possibility of being
connected to Serbia or Croatia is said to have caused constant mistrust among the
Muslims. Yet the fear of constant Serbo-Croat conflicts and misunderstandings was
also worrisome.204 This is the only occasion in which Historija clearly refers to the
Serbo-Croat conflict. Historija describes the ustaša NDH state in several pages but
with no direct references to Croats.205
Bosnian Serbs versus Serbs

The description of the Serbs begins with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.
According to Historija “it was done by Serbian nationalists” and started the First
World War.206 When discussing the First World War locally, the murderer of Franz
200
201
202
203
In a study on primary and secondary school history textbooks it was concluded that Serbs are most often
mentioned as an enemy in the Bosniac textbooks. Baranović 2001, 20.
204
205
206
208
Ferdinand, Gavrilo Princip is described as “a member of a group of nationalistic

Serb youngsters who belonged to the organisation called Bosnian Youth (Mlada
Bosna)”. Historija mentions that the murder caused demonstrations against Serbs
in Sarajevo and in some other places.207
According to Historija, Franz Ferdinand’s murderers were in direct contact
with officials in Serbia. It is emphasised how Bosnian Serbs remained loyal to the
existing system: “In BiH the feeling of fear dominated, especially among the Serb
citizenry, and a group of Sarajevan Serbs led the way with the Orthodox
Metropolitan visiting the deputy president of the country government in Sarajevo
and expressing their loyalty and devotion to the Austrian emperor, and to the
Austro-Hungarian state already on 1st August 1914.”208 Historija emphasises the
differentiation between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia by stating that the First
World War brought difficult times for the entire country, but especially for the
Serbs.209 Thus, it is clear that the country is Bosnia and the Serbs living there
differed from those living in Serbia.
The presentation of Serbs changes, however, when Historija starts to describe
the war itself. The Serbs and Montenegrins are said to have fought against Austria-
Hungary at the borders of Bosnia and inside Bosnia. ”Through these actions, the
Serbian and Montenegrin army also engaged in more battles with the Austrians,
with plundering actions in the Drina and in Eastern Herzegovina.” From this it is
clear that the battles were also against other Bosnians. Otherwise the war is
described neutrally and the losses of the Serbs receive some mention. Anti-Serb
sentiment is said to have grown as a result of their anti-Austrian politics.
“Instructed by the experience of Serbian-Montenegrin attacks in Eastern Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Muslims established their different ‘protection forces’ to defend
themselves in the event of more such attacks.210
In a unit entitled “Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Yugoslav question”, the
presentation of Serbs begins to point towards the idea of Greater Serbia. First it is
told how the Serbs “emphasised that Serbia in this war was not fighting only to take
care of its sovereignty but simultaneously to liberate ‘all non-liberal brother Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes’.” The book mentions that the emigrant Yugoslavian
politicians viewed the intentions of the Serbian government with great reservations
“which later proved justified”. It also mentions that the greatest Croat politician of
the time, Frano Supilo, “because of the suspicious attitudes” of the Serbian
president, wanted “to clear the question of Great-Serbian hegemony in the future
state”.211 Thus, the clear message is that the Serbs cannot be trusted; even if they
claim to want to liberate the brothers, the suspicions of others later “proved
correct”.
207
208
209
210
211
209
Historija presents the Serbs entirely negatively when dealing with the inter-war
period. The terror against Muslims is emphasised and it mentions how their homes
were burned, property confiscated, mosques destroyed and turned into sport halls
and storage houses, and how many Muslims were killed. References to the doers are
rare yet clear: the Montenegrins are said to have killed Muslims in Sandžak; and
about the Serbs, it is said that ”the Serb army neither could nor wanted to prevent
that”. Historija also refers to the village of Šahovic where Muslim women and
children are said to have been killed, and mentions that ”in the place where Šahovic
once stood now lies the Orthodox village of Tomaševo”.212 Thus, Historija
connects the atrocities perpetrated in Šahovic to Orthodox Serbs.
When discussing the establishment of political parties in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Historija mentions how the first one was the democratic party, which
was at its core part of the Serbian democratic party and aimed at a unitary and
centrally-governed system. The interpretation of Historija is that consequentially
other parties also formed on religious and national grounds. Thus, the idea is that
the Serb nationalism forced, or at least caused, others (Muslims and Croats) to
form their parties on a national-religious basis.213
In the years before the Second World War, Serbs are said to have been against
the movement that sought Bosnian autonomy, for they supported ”the idea of
Serbian supremacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.214 The language hardens when
discussing the Second World War. Under the subtitle “Chetnik genocide towards
the Muslims in BiH”, Historija states that “Serbian-chetnik genocide toward
Muslims has deep roots. On the one side, it is unreasonable religious hatred and
intolerance, and on the other, the will of Serb ideology and politicians to create an
ethnically clean territory at any cost. Therefore from the beginning of the war
1941, they carried out a systematic liquidation of Muslims, respectively a
genocide.” Chetnik documents are referred to and cited using such expressions as
“homogenous Serbia” and “cleansed of non-Serb elements”. The Muslims are said
to have been victims of “massive massacres” and numerous Bosnian villages are
listed as places of massacres. Many of the listed villages were central in the last war
as well (e.g. Višegrad, Rogatice, Goražde, Srebrenica, Nevesinje, Foča).215
There are, however, no further comments about Serbs in the Second World
War beyond the above-mentioned half page sub-chapter on the chetnik genocide.
The chapter on the local events of the Second World War concentrates on the
partisan-led war of liberation and on the formations of the anti-fascist movement.
The only references as to who the chetniks were include the above expression
“Serbian-chetnik genocide”, and when in the same chapter Historija mentions that
the main ideologue of chetniks was an advocate from Banja Luka (thus, a Bosnian
Serb).
212
213
214
215
210
In the text discussing the period after the Second World War, there are only
two clear nationally-emphasised references to the Serbs. The agrarian reforms in the
late 1940s are presented as unfair to landowners whose nationalities are not
mentioned.216 It is, however, mentioned that the land was given to the poor
peasants ”exclusive of Serbian nationality”. It is stated that through the reforms, the
ethnic composition and the structure of the population totally changed.217 Historija
tells how the collectivisation of the countryside caused dissatisfaction among the
farmers and even led to violent riots which the book presents as a justified, ”united
Muslim-Serb uprising against ransom and robbery”.218 Thus, the Serbs are
presented as collaborators with the Muslims, while the picture of Serbs after the
Second World War, based on a very few references, is ambiguous.
Finally, in the chapter about more recent history, Historija describes the Serbs
as enemies and destroyers:
“Great-Serbian nationalists tried to prevent it [the declaration of
independence] frightening the nation by accumulating a vast army and heavy
armaments(…)it broke into open military aggression, carried out against our
country by Serbia and Montenegro with the help of the former Yugoslavian
national army and the terrorist formation of the Serbian democratic party
(SDS) of Bosnia and Herzegovina(…)To realise the plan of ‘Greater Serbia’,
everything that was not Serb was destroyed. The greatest cultural treasures of
the Bosniac nation were destroyed, and the sole nation from the silently,
ethnically cleansed territory found itself as refugees around the entire
world.”219
It is worth noting from the previous quotation that Historija mentions Serbia and
Montenegro as the main aggressors and clearly isolates the Bosnian Serbs as a
group. As part of the aggressors, Historija sees only those Bosnian Serbs who were
from the SDS party. Historija, in turn, considers that party a terrorist formation,
thus suggesting that only extremists participated in it.
6.4.2 POVIJEST: CENTRALITY OF CROAT–SERB RIVALRY

In her general analysis about the history textbooks in former Yugoslavia, Karge has
noted that Croat history textbooks consider the entire Yugoslav period starting after
the First World War as an occupation.220 Thus, it is obvious that the presentation
of ”we” on the one hand, and of ”they” on the other hand, is quite stereotypical:
“we” are the survivors and sufferers while “they” are the occupants who have taken
our rights from us.
216
We know the land was mainly owned by the Muslims.
217
218
219
Imamović et. al. 1994, 129, 131.
220
Karge 2000, 2-3.
211
We: The Survival of Croats

Three analytical categories could be established for Povijest’s presentation of ”us as
a nation”. First, we will examine how the book deals with the Nazi puppet-state in
Croatia during the Second World War. Second, we will see how Povijest presents
the anti-fascist struggle as a Croatian struggle, and finally we will concentrate on
how the Croats see themselves as surviving under the ”occupation” of Yugoslavia
and how the general idea of Croathood emerges.
NDH
As presented in chapter five, the NDH-state (Nezavisne Države Hrvatske – The
Independent State of Croatia) was led by the ustaša-movement and established
under the protection of Germany and Italy. When Povijest describes the creation of
the ustaša-movement in the 1920s, it emphasises that most of its members had to
leave the country and that they worked from abroad. The good work of the ustašas,
the appeal to the League of Nations concerning the Great-Serb dictatorship, is also
mentioned in the beginning of the description of the ustašas.221
When coming to the Second World War, Povijest describes the origins of the
NDH-state. The justification of the state is based on the national argumentation:
(1) The Croats had a right to their own state; (2) The Great-Serbs had unfairly
suppressed Croats since 1917; (3) It was impossible for the Croats to bear the
situation any longer; (4) Croats had a great will for independence. Povijest states
that for all these reasons, the Croats were ready to establish the NDH state after the
German and Italian initiative:
”The Croat nation had its state in the early Middle Ages(…)it also enjoyed its
statehood under Croatian-Hungarian (1102–1526) kings and under Austrian
emperors (1527–1918). In the Yugoslavian kingdom, that millennium-long
thread of Croatian statehood was broken(…)the Great-Serbian regime tried to
destroy all marks of Croatian national sovereignty. The Croatian nation could
not reconcile with it. Its will was to create an independent, free and Croat
state”.222
Thus, the reasoning relies heavily on the idea that Croats were ready to establish
any kind of a state (underlining P.T.).
Povijest emphasises the differentiation between ustašas and Croats by
mentioning that many Croats were not ustašas, and that even those who were –
because of their dream for a state – were disappointed after the Rome agreement,
which made the vassal position of the NDH clear in regard to Germany and
Italy.223 Povijest continues by telling how Italy and Germany used the vassal
221
Perić 1995, 50-51.
222
Perić 1995, 85-86.
223
The Rome agreement ceded to Italy almost all of Dalmatia, much of the Croatian Primorje, and a small part of
Gorski Kotor. Goldstein 1999, 134.
212
relation to exploit the natural and military resources of Croatia.224 Thus, finally, the
NDH with its vassal position is described almost as the enemy of Croatia.
Povijest describes the structure and actions of the ustaša regime as cruel and
being constructed according to the example of Hitler. Jasenovac is mentioned as the
most well-known concentration camp of the ustašas. Ustaša terror is said to have
been directed against Jews, Gypsies and Serbs, and ”some of the criminals were also
against those Croats who disagreed with the politics of terror”. It also mentions
how prominent Croatian politicians were forced into ustaša camps and 1.5 pages
are devoted to eye witness accounts of the prominent Croats (Maček, Stepinac)
who suffered at the hands of ustašas. Finally, Povijest mentions how NDH leader
Pavelić demonstrated that he stood firmly with Germany by having two Croats,
who had been in contact with the Allies, killed.225 Thus, Povijest describes the cruel
actions of the ustašas, and simultaneously constructs a picture that the ustašas were
separate from Croats. This idea is reinforced by emphasising the resistance and even
suffering of Croats under ustašas.
Distancing the Croats from the NDH state continues when Povijest mentions
how the fascist countries only came to Croatia to expand their territories and to
fulfil their political and financial desires. The basic story of Croats opposing the
ustaša state right from the beginning (when they supported it because of the dream
for their own state) is reiterated: ”From the beginning of the occupation, Croat
citizens treated the occupants predominantly with great distrust. Enthusiasm
among Croats grew after the declaration of NDH, but soon(…)a great
disappointment appeared.”226
Finally, the story turns to Croatian anti-fascism: ”The pre-war anti-fascism,
remarkably present in Croatia, was even more present and expressed by the
Croatian nation from the beginning of the foreign occupation and the origin of the
NDH.” Povijest tells how many Croat intellectuals participated in the movement
and how the different situation and events demonstrated people’s (Croats)
reluctance to co-operate with foreign occupants and the NDH state.227
At the end of the chapter entitled ”The resistance and fight of anti-fascist
Croatia”, the pupils are asked ”How did the Croat nation experience the
occupation and ustaša regime?”, thus further emphasising the distance between the
ustaša and Croat nation. Generally the typical expression ”occupants, ustaša and
chetniks”, which is used throughout the unit on the Second World War, also serves
to separate the ustaša from “us” and makes them part of ”them” by grouping
ustašas with chetniks and occupiers.228
224
Perić 1995, 89.
225
Perić 1995, 89-91.
226
Perić 1995, 96.
227
Perić 1995, 96.
228
Perić 1995, 96, 98.
213
The Croatian Anti-fascist Struggle

As we have seen, Povijest presents the ustaša state and movement as separate and
far-removed from ”us” Croats. Instead, during the Second World War, Croatian
national history focuses on the anti-fascist struggle of the Croats. First, Croats are
connected with the anti-fascist fight as participants in the Spanish civil war with
other Europeans. In connection to the ustašas, Povijest mentions how the origin of
the NDH-state intensified the anti-fascist movement led by Croat intellectuals.
Then it describes how the fight against ”occupants, ustašas and chetniks grew into a
military conflict. First, Croats established a partisan force in Croatia (and generally
in the Yugoslavian area) in surroundings of Siska.”229 Thus, according to Povijest,
the Croats first established the partisan forces in Croatia. The picture given suggests
that the internal structure of the movement, its principles, etc. were all formed in
Croatia. The partisan movement is presented as part of the national history of
Croats. Later, Povijest mentions that the partisan fight predominantly took place
not only in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in other parts of
Yugoslavia.230 Povijest also includes Croats in the worldwide anti-fascist struggle by
mentioning that ”the anti-fascist fight of the Croat nation was part of the universal
anti-fascist fight.”231
Under the sub-heading ”The creation of Croatia as a part of the Yugoslavian
federation,” the connection between the partisan movement and the Croat nation is
presented through the example of Andrija Hebrang. He was a high official of the
communist party who ”felt like a communist and like a Croat simultaneously”.
Povijest describes Hebrang as believing that the partisan fight would lead to the
freedom of both individuals and nations.232
Finally, the description of the end of the war and the liberation of Croatia
supports the idea that the partisan fight almost exclusively occurred in Croatia, and
is thus part of Croat national history:
“Partisans had persistently fought against the occupants, ustaša, chetniks and
other opponents(…)it was just such a force that could undertake fighting
actions in the largest proportion, and was as such also valued by the Allies. In
the autumn of 1944, partisan unions started their last fights against German,
ustaša, and chetnik forces on the soil of Croatia. Until the beginning of
December 1944, they had taken the entire Dalmatia.”233
In addition to the Croats being the initiators of the partisan fight, Povijest also
mentions the Croat Peasant Party (the largest party in Croatia before the war) and
how its members participated in the anti-fascist struggle. This is considered an
important factor that caused many Croats to support anti-fascists. It is, however,
229
Perić 1995, 55-56, 96.
230
Perić 1995, 98.
231
Perić 1995, 98.
232
Perić 1995, 104.
233
Perić 1995, 110.
214
mentioned that the communists treated the people of the peasant party poorly
towards the end of the war. Povijest states how that already showed what it would
be like under the communist dictatorship of Yugoslavia.234
The Idea of Croathood

Croathood is the general underlying “we” characteristic throughout the book as
direct references to ”us” are rare; it is mentioned that ”after the Second World War
sports both in the world, and with us in Croatia…”.235 Generally, however, it is
clear from the style and the context that “we” are the Croats.
The idea that Croatia is ”ours” is best illustrated through references to state
formations. In a picture of the parliament from the year 1918, the text under the
picture talks about Croatian Sabor, which is the same name that is currently used
for the parliament of independent Croatia. This refers to the idea of the historical
continuity of the Croatian parliament (and thus statehood).236 When describing
Austria-Hungary, Povijest argues that the Croats did not experience the state as
theirs, and that they felt they had the right to a Croat state. Therefore, the options
were either an independent Croatia or a union of three states (Austria, Hungary
and Croatia).237
Povijest describes the dynamics of forming the First Yugoslavia in detail. It
emphasises how Serbs, Croats and Slovenes formed a federation before starting to
negotiate with Serbia. According to Povijest, Serbia was rather forced to negotiate
for it had lost the support of Russia and because the US had entered the war. This
way the formation of the First Yugoslavia is presented as an equal process between
the Croat-Serb-Slovene federation and Serbia, yet it is mentioned that the threat of
Italy forced the federation to co-operate with the Serbian kingdom.238
Under the title, ”the Croat question demands an answer”, Povijest describes the
position of Croats in the First Yugoslavia. The chapter begins: ”As an old European
nation, Croats enjoyed their state already in the 9th Century”, thus emphasising
how the Croats were an old nation that already enjoyed statehood more than 1000
years ago. This is followed by the description of how difficult and unfair it was for
Croats under the Great-Serbian regime and hegemony in the First Yugoslavia. It
mentions how the regime suspected the Croats of being separatists and enemies of
the regime. Therefore the Croats were in constant danger. Povijest mentions the
names of individuals killed in different incidents organised by the regime. Thus,
Croathood is presented as something natural, but which the regime suppressed.239
Regarding the 1990s and the creation of an independent Croatian republic, the
process is described as unambiguous. Povijest refers to no minorities, and the results
234
Perić 1995, 105.
235
Perić 1995, 156.
236
Perić 1995, 7.
237
Perić 1995, 8.
238
Perić 1995, 8-9, 11, 12.
239
Perić 1995, 65-66.
215
of the referendum in 1991 are analysed from the point of view of no other nation
than the Croats. In Povijest, only Croats seem part of Croatia, which quite
naturally had to regain its statehood.240
As we have seen, Croathood and its relation to a state is presented as something
natural and self-evident. The idea of a nation is primordial and a nation should
have its state. This raises to the next question: what are the insights of Croathood,
and how does Povijest define Croathood?
The Catholic Church is bound to Croathood when Povijest describes the role
of the Church as a peacemaker. The expression “dear Croatia” is quoted from Pope
whose role is emphasised as acknowledging the state of Croatia in the 1990s.
Another reference to the Catholic Church is the description of its forbidden
position under the communist regime. Particularly emphasised is the fate of Bishop
Stepinac of Zagreb.241 Bishop Stepinac was accused of harbouring ustaša sympathies
during the Second World War and arrested by Partisan authorities.242 In the 1990s,
his reputation revived among Croats. His grave lies in front of the altar in the
Cathedral of Zagreb and the Pope beatificated him in 1998.
The nation-building process, the building of Croathood, exists throughout the
entire book. It is almost ironic when, in a chapter analysing the different phases of
the Versailles peace treaty, Povijest mentions how the Croats considered US
president Wilson as their friend and expected a lot from him. ”For their friend” the
Croats gave some national laces from the region of Zadar to emphasise the fact that
Zadar belongs to Croatia (at that time Zadar was part of Italy).243
The spirit of Croathood is enhanced also when concluding the story of Macek,
the president of the Croat Peasant Party, drawing parallel between Macek and the
Croat nation. Povijest writes: ”He lived the life of the Croatian nation who
suffered, fought and hoped, believing in oneself and in the justification of his
demands”244 The peasant party and its history have also been a generally important
part of national Croat history in the 1990s.245
When presenting the world of culture, education, and sport in Croatia in the
inter-war years, Povijest states how difficult the conditions were and how,
particularly in the field of education (school places, scholarships, professorships),
the Serbs were privileged at the expense of Croats. Yet the Croats, ”thanks to their
talents and interest”, managed very well.246
240
Perić 1995, 143-145, 147.
241
Perić 1995, 126, 130-131.
242
We can note here that chapter four argued that the criticism of Stepinac might have been largely based on the
general demonisation of the Catholic Church in Titoist Yugoslavia.
243
Perić 1995, 15.
244
Perić 1995, 68.
245
It was mentioned in chapter five that a series of general history books has been published in recent years in a
special collection of Naklada publishing house in Croatia. Most of them are general history books of certain periods
but one special book focuses on the history of the peasant party. See Matković, Hrvoje 1999. Povijest Hrvatske
Seljanke Stranke. Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavičić.
246
Perić 1995, 78-79.
216
The highly developed Croat culture is also emphasised in the story describing
the Croat refugees who had to escape the crimes of the occupiers and their allies
during the Second World War. About 40 000 people are said to have ended up in
Southern Italy, and some of them continued on to Egypt. With the picture
showing the tents in which the Croat refugees lived, Povijest writes: ”our
educational and cultural workers, who were also found among the composition of
the Croatian refugees in those overseas areas, organised educational programs for
children and different educational courses, lectures and culturally entertaining life
for adults.”247
After the Second World War, many Croats worked abroad. According to
Povijest:
”Croats demonstrated and proved themselves everywhere as hard-working,
active and honest people. Interestingly, it can be emphasised that individual
Croat emigrants, writers and painters, fruitfully continued their literary and
artist works in foreign countries too. Croatian emigrant literature and
emigrant art therefore form an integral part of Croat literature and art.”248
Thus Croats are presented as people managing exceptionally well, even in difficult
conditions. Regarding the general development of science and technology after the
Second World War, many developments within Croatia and among Croats are
presented.249
Under socialist Yugoslavia, the ”Matica Hrvatske” movement, which
emphasised the importance of Croatian culture, language and history, was active
throughout the entire country and is presented as an important actor in the fight
against the nationalistic and unitary system. After the presentation of the active
politics of the movement, Povijest mentions how many of the members of Matica
Hrvatska were imprisoned and how the movement itself was finally forbidden.250
Thus, Croats are presented as people caring for their language and culture on the
one hand, and on the other hand as people reguiring restraint and control.
Another aspect in the presentation of Croathood, together with the above-
described cultural-intellectual success, is the description of their determinant and
doughty fight for equality, and their brave suffering as part of it.
For instance, the suffering of Croats and Slovenes under Italy since the end of
WW1 is presented very emotionally.251 Then Povijest presents Stjepan Radić, the
founder of the Croat Peasant Party, devoting an entire chapter to the work of the
party and describing Radić himself as ”a great Croatian politician”. Generally the
message is that Croats were unsatisfied and in active resistance. Povijest’s
description of the party’s meeting in 1919 entails a detailed description of the
247
Perić 1995, 106.
248
Perić 1995, 137.
249
Perić 1995, 154-156.
250
Perić 1995, 135-136.
251
Perić 1995, 19.
217
Croats’ strong demands and defiant comments, such as: ”we want that for us, the
Serb is brother, not a master”. Radić is quoted: “If the Serbs want to have a
centralist state, let them have it” thus emphasising the independent position the
Croats are ready to take.252 A similar tone is typical when Povijest describes the
period after 1929. It mentions how the Great-Serbs ”were persistently against
equality” and how the Croats, ”not fighting against the common state but for
equality in it, were also very persistent”.253 Finally, after describing in length and in
detail the inequality of inter-war Yugoslavia from the Croat point of view, Povijest
concludes: ”strong and even stronger resistance of Croats forced the leading regime
in the Yugoslavian kingdom to reach the agreement with Croats”. Thus, the
tenacious fighting of Croats is emphasised.254
After presenting the Vidovan Constitution in a thoroughly negative light (one
state, one language, and no rights for women), Povijest present the Croat position:
”after the declaration of the Vidovan constitution the Croatian republican peasant
party started with the persistent fight against Great-Serbian hegemony”.255 Thus,
Povijest sees the Croats as stubbornly and strongly opposing the unfair
constitution. According to Povijest the party leader Radić was honoured in an
international press after his death not only as a great politician but also as ”the
victim of outrageous Great-Serbian violence”.256
A separate chapter entitled ”Crimes in Bleiburg and the ’the crossed road’ of
the Croat nation” describes events which are said to have been taboo for a long
time, but that which ”the Croat martyrs will never forget”. The story tells of tens of
thousands of occupiers, ustašas, patriots, army officers, chetniks and civilians killed
in the road to Bleiburg by partisans. On the next page appear eyewitness accounts
from those who witnessed Bleiburg atrocities, making the story even more vivid.257
Noteworthy for the idea of Croathood is the expression of Bleiburg as a crossed
road for the Croat nation, and how Bleiburg created Croatian martyrs.
They: Bad Serbs and Dysfunctional Yugoslavian Unity

In the Croat book Povijest, the basic “others” are the Serbs. The presentation of
“them” can be divided into two overlapping categories: one stereotype refers to the
Serbs as a central part and architects of the Yugoslavian formations considered
negative throughout. This stereotype is of a structural nature; the Serbs represent
certain (negative) structures. The other analytical category used here is based on the
characterisation of Serbs as a people or nation. The most common words used to
construct this characterisation include “Great Serbia”, “Great-Serbs” and “chetnik”.
252
Perić 1995, 24-26.
253
Perić 1995, 68.
254
Perić 1995, 70.
255
Perić 1995, 39.
256
Perić 1995, 47.
257
Perić 1995, 112-113.
218
Serbs as the Central Part of the Yugoslavian System

In Povijest, the Yugoslavian era is considered entirely negative for Croats. Thus, the
negative presentation referring to Serbs as architects and leaders of Yugoslavia
always serves as the context for Croat suffering as discussed previously as part of the
presentation of ’our’ nation.
When Povijest describes the planning of the First South Slavic state, the
position of Serbs is presented: “Serbian politicians(…)wanted to carry out the
union of South Slavic countries by joining them to Serbia, so that this way the new
united South Slavic state would have Serbian name – New Serbia or Great Serbia.”
It is also mentioned how the leader of the Serbs was not satisfied with Korfu
declaration (which established the new state) because it made it possible that the
Serb hegemony would be threatened. He is told not to have agreed with the
resolutions for ”they were against his idea of creating Great Serbia”.258
Povijest describes the formation of the first Yugoslavia: ”Melting into the
kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, on 1st December 1918, Croatia lost its
statehood which until then it had steadily maintained more than a thousand
years.”259 The description of the first Yugoslavia follows for four pages under the
heading: ”First expressions of Croat dissatisfaction in the kingdom of Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes”. Povijest describes the demonstrations against the regime and
mentions how in the end, ”Serbian and soldiers and officers” beat soldiers and
peasants.260 Later it is said that caution in the First Yugoslavia resulted from the
“existence of Great-Serbian strivings.261 The Vidovan Constitution of 1921 is
described mainly as the product of Serbian parties and presented as entirely
negative: only one state, one language, and no rights for women. Povijest states that
after the constitution, the Croatian peasant party started the struggle against
”Great-Serbian hegemony”.262 The creation of the new state is described
provokingly in a contemporary drawing or leaflet, considered to be ”from the year
of the ’unification’”. In the picture stands an army with horses attacking villagers
dressed in national costumes. Many of the villagers are already lying dead on the
ground and the soldiers are pictured as shooting continuously. The soldiers carry
the Serbian flag and the pictures bears the text: ”This is Croatian freedom!” Thus,
the picture thus also clearly presents the Serbs as soldiers and murderers attacking
Croats.263
The negative presentation of the First Yugoslavia persists when Povijest
presents an incident of the parliament ”in the kingdom’s capital, Belgrade” in
which several Croat representatives were shot. The international significance of the
event is described as ”showing to the whole world how the state was uncivilised and
258
Perić 1995, 11-12.
259
Perić 1995, 13.
260
Perić 1995, 20-21.
261
Perić 1995, 25.
262
Perić 1995, 39.
263
Perić 1995, 29.
219
morally unhealthy”. The description is immediately followed by a story of a

demonstration in Zagreb which was dispersed by the police and resulted in 3 dead,
60 injured and 120 jailed.264 Thus, even if the word ”Serb” is not used, it is clear
from the context (e.g. Belgrade) that the negative references point towards the
Serbs. The word ”uncivilised” can also been seen in light of the emphasised cultural
sophistication of the Croats, described earlier.
In the three-paged chapter entitled ”The Position of Croatia in the Chains of
Centralism and Great-Serbian Hegemony,” Povijest presents the misery of Croats
in the First Yugoslavia. The First Yugoslavia is described ”as expanded Serbia (that
is enlarged, Greater Serbia), in which they [Serbs] felt and behaved like Great-
Serbs, pressing and tyrannising other nations.” Povijest also mentions how Serbs
enjoyed all-important positions from the beginning. The ratio of Serbs to Croats in
public state positions is listed separately. In the description of the economy of First
Yugoslavia, Povijest tells how Serbs enjoyed all the benefits while Croats suffered
when the value of the currency was changed. Finally, no governmental funds were
allocated to developing Zagreb but all the money went instead to the development
of Belgrade.265
In total, Povijest devotes 41 pages (Historija, 23 pages; and Istorija, 15 pages;
see Table 4 in the beginning of this chapter) to local events in inter-war years and
thus the description is very detailed. The basic message of the period is that the
system was in all possible ways detrimental to Croats because the Great-Serbian
regime and hegemony ruled unfairly. Finally, the Croat struggle resulted in an
autonomous banovina. The presentation of “them” is clear also in regard to this for
it is said that the Great-Serbs reacted negatively to the Croat banovina.266
In the Second Yugoslavia, the word ”communist” is emphasised and they are
clearly presented as “others/them”.267 The position of Croatia in the new Yugoslavia
is presented first structurally and then interpreted:
”That was not, however, true federalism. The members of the federation
(federal republics) had only formal independence. All the power was in
Belgrade, at the top of the party and at the top of the state. The centralisation
of power started at the end of the war and was finalised after the war. The
power and state arrangements of newly created Yugoslavia were arranged
according to the Soviet model as a central communist state with inherited
Serbian supremacy. In such a state, national manifestation was smothered,
especially that of non-Serb nations.”268
The description continues:
264
Perić 1995, 45.
265
Perić 1995, 63-64.
266
Perić 1995, 70, 72.
267
See Perić 1995, 127 after the subtitle where first it describes what Croats thought, and then what the communists
thought.
268
Perić 1995, 129.
220
“In the Federal Nations’ Republic of Yugoslavia, in which national equality

was also guaranteed with the constitution, Serbs were ‘more equal’ (more
privileged). Serb privileges in the public services were visible throughout
Croatia, and the Croats, in the name of ostensible ‘brotherhood and unity’,
had to tolerate their own inequality.”269
Thus, the presentation of supreme Serbs who were unfairly privileged in

communist Yugoslavia is characteristic. Povijest continues the description of Serbs
in socialist Yugoslavia, describing how agrarian reforms caused more Serbs to move
to Croatia. Povijest calls this movement “colonisation”.270 As the salvation of Croats
in the communist Yugoslavia, the association ”Matica Hrvatske” is described at
length. Tito, however, attacked the association and the people active in it under
”the pressure of anti-Croat (hegemonist-centralist and Great-Serbs) powers from
the very top of the alliance of the party and the army”. Povijest mentions that
Croats were arrested and suppressed by people seeking good positions in the system
and by ”those (of Serbian and Montenegrin nationalities) who thereby expressed
their intolerance of Croats”.271 Thus, Povijest again presents the Serbs as intolerant
and anti-Croat because of the state formations.
Finally, according to Povijest, mainly Serbs and Montenegrins worked in
Yugoslav embassies abroad while all the Croats abroad were considered ustašas.272
With regard to the 1990s, Povijest once more connects the structural state
formations to the Serbs when it tells that Serbia introduced a special customs fees
on Croatian and Slovene products.273
Great Serbs and Chetniks

Throughout the negative presentation of Serbs in Povijest, the most commonly
used references are ”Greater Serbia” and “Great-Serbs”. Generally, the language
used is often colourful and expressive, as the following examples illustrate.
With a detailed description of the incident, the person who shot the Croat
representatives in parliament with a pistol in 1928 is said to have sought ”to protect
the interest of the Serbian nation, the interests of their fatherland”. According to
Povijest, after the shooting he shouted “Long Live Greater Serbia”. Moreover,
Povijest tells how the shooter was treated extremely well in prison and how his wife
was given a special pension. According to Povijest (and after a one-page detailed
description), the assassination showed “the extreme brutality of Great-Serbian
hegemony in the kingdom of SHS”.274
In the chapters on the inter-war years, the permanent subjects of the text
include “Serbian hegemony”, “Great Serbs”, and “the Great Serbian regime”: the
269
Perić 1995, 130.
270
Perić 1995, 134.
271
Perić 1995, 136.
272
Perić 1995, 137.
273
Perić 1995, 146.
274
Perić 1995, 42-43.
221
Great Serbs “persecuted Croats peasants for not wanting to vote”, “the Great Serbs
were persistently against equality” and so forth. One page displays a picture with
coffins of Croat peasants shot by “Great Serbian gunmen”. The picture text is
titled: “the sacrifices of Stibinja.”275 The book fails, however, to identify Great
Serbia, or who the Great Serbs are.
Regarding the Second World War period, the common group of ”them” and
the negative actors in Povijest is the group described as ”occupiers, ustašas and
chetniks”276. Only in the chapter ”Croatia at the end and immediately after the end
of the Second World War” the ”chetnik terror” is presented separately and in detail,
and with a direct connection to Serbs (underlining P.T.):
”Chetniks constantly persecuted anti-fascists, participated in conflicts against
partisans, and also carried out a horrible criminal genocide against Croats and
Muslims, seeking to create in some parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Croatia ethnically clean Serb areas. They planned the complete liquidation of
the Croatian and Muslim population in other areas as well, according to the
ideologists of Great-Serbhood.”277 (Underlinings P.T.)
The most gloating description emphasising the brutality and cruelties of the others
is the two-page story of Bleiburg. Here “they” are the partisans, but the passage
specifically notes how the Serbs formed the majority of them:
“Before handing over or capturing those masses of soldiers and civilians,
partisans (predominantly under the command of honoured officers of Serbian
nationality) committed horrible, evil crimes: they killed helpless people with
all kinds of weapons (rifles, machine guns, explosives, canons, guns, as well as
with machine guns and bombs from war aircraft).” 278
Povijest mentions that the number of the victims will never be known, but that
they number in the tens of thousands. The story continues with a description of
partisan crimes during the war and emphasises how they killed Catholic priests,
Croat businessmen and so forth.279 Thus, even if the Bleiburg story is a description
of the crimes of the partisans, Povijest clearly suggests that, at this point in the war,
the partisans were the same as the Serbs.
The emotional references to the Serbs during the socialist Yugoslavia period
(which we previously saw presented as a negative system throughout) are related to
the relation between Croats and ustašas:
”To fetter and frustrate the Croats even more, they imposed the unfair burden
of ustaša war crimes. The number of ustaša sacrifices was so exaggerated that it
appeared as though in Jasenovac alone [the most famous ustaša camp] more
275
Perić 1995, 46, 66-69.
276
E.g. Perić 1995, 97-98.
277
Perić 1995, 110.
278
Perić 1995, 112.
279
Perić 1995, 112.
222
Serbs were killed than the number of human sacrifices during the war in the
whole of Yugoslavia.”280
As demonstrated in chapter four, when discussing the numbers of the Second

World War, Povijest’s claims of impossible death toll figures regarding Jasenovac
appear to be accurate.
In the presentations of the 1980s, the description of Serbs as Great Serbian
nationalists intensifies. As one of the many problems after the death of Tito in
1980, Povijest mentions ”sharpened international relations”, particularly in Kosovo,
where ”Serbian politics most cruelly jeopardised the human, civic and national
rights of the Albans, the majority population in that region”281. Povijest mentions
how the Serbs were unsatisfied after the constitution of 1974, but managed finally
to change it in 1988. Even that, however, was not enough for a Serbia that sought
to strengthen the state centralisation in order to realise ”its hegemonic, Great
Serbian interests and weight”.282According to Povijest, all this was proved by the
celebration in 1989 after 600 years after the Kosovo battle when the pretend coffin
of Prince Lazarus was carried through Serbian cities and villages:
”The carrying of that coffin everywhere evolved into Great-Serbian
nationalistic gatherings, and such was the main gathering organised in
Kosovo. Serbianhood was called upon to gather; it was emphasised how Serbs
were jeopardised, how Serbs had won the wars and lost the peace; how an all-
Serb movement had to be developed, a movement in which Serbs outside
Serbia would also participate. It was clear for everyone that such expansionist
Serbian politics had a goal: either that the whole of entire Yugoslavia becomes
an enlarged Serbia (under Yugoslavian name) or that a Greater Serbia
emerges.”283
Povijest mentions that the Montenegrins were allied with the Serbs and that in
Yugoslavia’s first multi-party elections, only in Serbia and Montenegro did the
communists, who had turned into socialists, win the elections while in all other
Yugoslav republics the non-communists rose to power.284
In the part describing the events of the 1990s, the throughly anti-Serb book
spares no words. The chapter entiteled “The war of Great-Serbian Power against
Croatia” begins by presenting both Yugoslavias as Great Serbian projects. It
mentions that the Great Serbian politicians were alarmed when socialist Yugoslavia
started to decay. After that, Povijest describes the events with constant references to
Serbs. The following presents a sampling of the expressions used: 285
280
Perić 1995, 129.
281
Perić 1995, 140
282
Perić 1995, 140.
283
Perić 1995, 140.
284
Perić 1995, 141.
285
Perić 1995, 150-152.
223
“They (Serbs) all talked openly about the creation of Great Serbia, which
would, as they imagined in their lust for foreign territories, include BiH and
large parts of Croatia.”
“In their oppressor-like expansionism, Great-Serbs got away with the politics
of genocide in those areas stated for the creation of the ethnically clean area
(which meant expelling or killing Croats, Muslims and all remaining non-
Serbian national groups in those areas, so that only Serbs would remain).”
“Great-Serbs from Serbia with various influential activities achieved the
political unanimity with like-minded persons among the Serbs outside Serbia
also (in the territories which wanted to join Serbia).”
“Great-Serbs (followers of the idea of creating Greater Serbia), rebellious Serbs
in Croatia, spread various untruths to justify their procedures with these
powerful fabrications.”
“They emphasised that Serbs were ’jeopardised’, but nobody and nothing
jeopardised them. On the contrary, they had jeopardised peace, order, security
and the lives of others with their barricades, attacks, robberies and
assassinations.”
”In the same way, they emphasised that the rebellious Serbs were a
’barehanded’, unarmed nation. Yet those rebels were armed not only with
light weapons, but with heavy arms also, which they had got from Serbia and
from the so-called con-federal ’Yugoslavian people’s army’”
”Serb terrorists and the so-called ’Yugoslavian people’s army’ (under the
command of the Great Serbian generals and politicians) committed many and
more crimes in Croatia. Entire Croat villages were destroyed(…)[they]
demolished the Croatian town of Vukovar, attacked old Croatian towns,
destroying them with grenades”
”In their hatred towards everything which is Croatian, the Great Serbs tried to
kill as many people and destroy as many material goods as possible. They
pulled down churches, cultural monuments, hospitals, schools, factories,
residential and administrative buildings with cannons, bombs and rockets
from military helicopters. They also attacked a first aid vehicle, even though
the vehicle was marked with a Red Cross.”
”They slaughtered, shot, hung, massacred, robbed, burned, and transported
people to numerous collective camps not only in Glin and Knin, but
elsewhere also, even in the territory of Serbia.”
”Serbia, who started, supported and managed it all (with the help of its
terrorist groups, the so-called ”Yugoslavian people’s army” and their public
media), maintained, and deceived the world into believing that it is not at
war.”
224
Thus through the Greater Serbian idea Povijest concentrates on portraying the Serbs as
expansionist and having a great lust for territories. The acts of Serbs are presented as
violent and harsh, thus constructing the idea of barbaric Serbs. Povijest’s description
also includes the presentation of Serb’s self-image as consciously false, trying to establish
an image of jeopardised and unarmed victims not at war. Thus Povijest describes the
Serb strategy as one of presenting themselves as victims; the hatred towards Croats is
seen as the Serb motive for war.
6.4.3 ISTORIJA: HEROISM AND SUFFERING FOR YUGOSLAVIA

The national perspective of Istorija is expressed in the constant references to the
”Serbian people/nation” (srpski narod) as either a subject or object of the events.
The group of “ours” and its boundaries is thus very clear: it is the Serbian
people/nation.286 The references to “them” mainly involve negative references to
Croats and sometimes to Albans.
We: Heroes and Victims

As mentioned, the references to us, Serbs, are numerous and clear in Istorija. From
all the references, three categories emerge: Serbs refer to themselves (1) through
success and heroism in wars, (2) as the sufferers and victims of the actions of others,
and (3) as the caretakers of the common good in supporting all Yugoslavias. Here
we can see a parallel to a general analysis of Serbian myths: Anzulović has explored
the process through which the myth of an “innocent suffering Serbia” and that of
“foreign evildoers” have influenced the behaviour of the Serbs in the 20th Century.
He emphasised how the fear of being annihilated by the enemy and confidence in
one's own strength have together caused relatively normal people to think or even
act in a genocidal way.287
The chapter dealing with the constitution of 1974 will be analysed separately at
the end of the chapter for it has several characteristics of the presentation of
Serbhood. The chapter is special also because it was among the material judged
questionable in the schoolbook check in 1999, described in section 5.4.
War Heroism
In the beginning of the description of the First World War, the Serbs are presented
as a strong and independent nation. Istorija states, however, that ”Serbia was
wrongly accused for starting the war” which was, according to Istorija, imposed
rather by the tri-partite alliance.288 Serb success and heroism in war are still the
dominant themes in the description of the First World War. Istorija begins the
description by saying that despite the superiority of Austria-Hungary, Serbian
286
The meaning of the word “narod” was discussed in the beginning of section 6.4.
287
Anzulović 1999, 3-4.
288
225
people went to the fight after a successful mobilisation. In the course of the war,
Istorija presents Serbia and Montenegro as significant contributors to the Allied
victory: “Because of the great victories in the war, both Serbia and Montenegro
helped the Entente to win the war. Because of the courage showed in Cerska,
Kolubara, and in the Mojkovacka battle, and because they broke through the Solun
front, they became quite respected among the Allies.” ”The Serbian troops had
helped a lot in the breaching of the front. Because the Serbian troops reacted so
well…”289
Istorija also describes the heroism of Serbs: ”Serbs showed their heroism and
love for their people best when they defended Belgrade in 1915…asked them
(troops) to defend the honour and freedom of the homeland.” On the same page,
there is a picture and text: ”the heroic defence of Belgrade”.290 Istorija portrays the
heroism also through difficulties: ”though faced with all these bad events [people
died due to epidemics, 150 000 had been taken to the Krf islands], the Serbian
army gathered at Krf and prepared itself for new battles”.291 As an explanation for
the success of Serbia Istorija states: “Serbia won this battle thanks to the high
morale of the Serbian army and its good command”.292 The Serbs coming from
abroad and from the areas of Austria-Hungary to fight with Serbia are said to have
”joined the Serbian troops because they wished to help their brothers and their
homeland”.293
Istorija presents Serbia and Montenegro as fighting together but not as being
the same. This is illustrated by the title ”Serbia and Montenegro in WW1 and the
work on unity”, and by stating that ”thanks to the heroism shown by the
Montenegrin soldiers…”294. Thus the Montenegrins are not us, Serbs, but they are
like us, working ”on unity” and being ”heroic”.
The presentation of the army of the First Yugoslavia further supports the heroic
presentation of Serbs: ”the army was taking care of the freedom in the country and
it was based on the heroic tradition of the Serbian army”.295 Istorija continues to
emphasise the role of Serbs in the war when it describes the Second World War.
The book tells that the riots in Croatia were mainly organised by the communist
party; the rioting troops, according to Istorija, ”consisted mostly of Serbs”. The role
of Serbs is again emphasised when discussing expectations in 1942, according to
which Germans would soon be defeated and how after that, ”Serbia would be the
most significant country for resolving Yugoslavia’s faith”. Istorija emphasises the
role of the Serbs in the partisan conflict by stating that after the fights had started in
the spring of 1942 in southern Serbia, it remained one of the centres of the fighting
289
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 63, 68.
290
291
292
293
294
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 63, 66.
295
226
throughout the war.296 In its concluding analysis of the Second World War, Istorija
states:
“The contribution of the Yugoslav people to the war for freedom and to the
fight against fascism was not equal. The contribution of the Serbian people
was the greatest. The Serbs made up most of the soldiers in the partisan
troops, and the chetnik forces consisted mainly of Serbs. The Serbs were also
the only ones in Yugoslavia and Europe who, besides Jews and Gypsies,
survived the genocide perpetrated by the Croatian ustašas, a fact some have
tried to hide after the war for political reasons.”297
This last claim that ustaša treatment of the Serbs has been hidden for political
reasons is questionable; as presented in chapter five, ustaša cruelties were part of the
Yugoslav historiography, at least more so than were chetnik atrocities.
Serbs as Victims
The suffering and victimhood of Serbs is another central characteristic of the
references to Serbs in Istorija. On the one hand, the victimisation of the Serb
nation is part of the war descriptions, and on the other hand, it is seen in the
structures of the state and other similar formations.
The description of the suffering of Serbs under different state structures begins
with the description of the sufferings of Serbs and Montenegrins under the
occupation of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Bulgaria during the First World
War. The brutal terror, including killings and mass murders, is described in detail.
The chapter ends with a curious nation-building of Serbs through the suffering:
”The enemy was terrorising people in all the occupied parts of Serbia in the
worst possible ways. They terrorised people who had nothing to defend
themselves with – women, children, the old. At the time, a world famous
criminologist, Archibald Reiss, came to Serbia to investigate the war crimes.
Thanks to him, the world discovered all the terrible things committed to the
people of Serbia. While staying in Serbia, Archibald spent a lot of time with
the people and with the Serbian army, liked them very much and decided to
stay in Serbia. According to his wish, he was buried in Belgrade, his heart
being buried at Kajmakčalan.”298
After the description of great successes in the First World War, Istorija states that
”Serbs paid for their love of their country and for their freedom with a great
number of killed people.” It also tells how many people died due illnesses and that
150 000 were taken to Krf-island.299
296
297
298
299
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 65, 67.
227
Serbs are also said to have suffered when Yugoslavia decided to join the Tri-
partite Alliance in March 1941: ”Serbian people were dissatisfied with a decision to
join the TA. They considered it opposite to their life interests(. . .)they thought that
those people who signed the Protocol betrayed the interests of the Serbian people.”
300
The repetitive use of the expression Serbian people strongly constructs the idea
of Serbs as a strong and unified group that was dissatisfied but had to suffer.
In the beginning of the Second World War when Germany attacked
Yugoslavia, Istorija mentions that ”there were many treasons. Especially in Croatia”
and continues how ”in this short-lasting war in April, 375 000 Yugoslav officers
were arrested (most of them came from Serbia). Germans used to release the
Croats, who were members of the former Yugoslav army, from prisons.” Thus,
according to the presentation of Istorija, the Serbs, being most numerous in the
defensive army, suffered the most while Croats were guilty of treason and released
from the prisons.301
Istorija tells that during the Second World War riots began in Serbia and with
Serbs, but that those in Kosovo and Metohija began at the hands of separatists and
nationalistic Alban troops who terrorised the Serbian people, burned down their
villages and forced them to flee.”302 Istorija also tells how Serbs rose successfully
against the crimes of the ustašas in Herzegovina in 1941 as ”the ustašas, joined by a
part of the Muslims, without any reason began killing and torturing the Serbs”. 303
Thus, the Serbs were victims who then arose in resistance.
As part of the representation of the Second World War, Istorija presents the
chetniks as enemies even if they are said to have been mainly Serbs. Istorija states
how they sought to destroy all the partisans (who were mainly Serbs, according to
Istorija, just as they were mainly Croats in Povijest).304 Thus, the chetniks caused
suffering for the Serbs.
Istorija emphasises how the public in the world did not know the real truth
regarding what was happening in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. In
relation to this, Istorija emphasises the local problems: ”Terror of the domestic
traitors was no less worse than the terror committed by the occupiers.” Istorija lists
Muslims, NDH and Macedonian traitors as terrorising the Serbs. The book tells
that Serbian Cyrillic was forbidden in Macedonia. Those Serbs who had moved in
after 1918 had to move out and they lost their property. Istorija mentions how the
Serbs were also thrown out by Hungarians, as well as thrown out of Kosovo and
Metohija.305
The worst suffering of Serbs is presented in the sub-chapter titled “Jasenovac –
a mass grave of the Serbs”. Under the title lies a half-page picture of dead bodies
300
301
302
303
304
305
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 114-116.
228
with the text “Jasenovac – the camp of death”. Before the sub-chapter, Istorija has
already referred to the Jasenovac camp several times. A separate chapter describes
the suffering of the Serbs:
“Serbs called it the camp of death because 700 000 (of all ages) were killed
there in the most horrifying of ways. Most of them were Serbs(…)People in
this camp were killed with knives, hatchets, torches, and steel levers. They
were shot and burnt in a crematorium, they were cooked alive, they were
hanged and starved to death or they were not allowed to drink(…)Jasenovac
camp will forever remain in the memory of the Serbian people as their greatest
suffering and their greatest mass grave up to now, since the Serbian people
came to the Balkans.”306
In the final analysis of the Second World War, Istorija mentions how the Serbs
were the only ones in Europe, besides Jews and Gypsies, who survived the genocide
of the ustašas.307
When telling about the massive reconstruction of Yugoslavia after the Second
World War, Istorija writes that despite the massive reconstruction “many factories
from Serbia were moved to other republics, which weakened its economy”. Thus
Istorija suggests that Serbia’s economy was a victim of the politics that supported
other republics.308 The Serbs also complain about having been treated unfairly in
socialist Yugoslavia, not only Croats as in Povijest.
Finally, regarding the constitution accepted in 1974, Istorija claims that “there
were multiple negative changes, especially in Serbia(…)the constitution of 1974
represented a victory of nationalistic and separatist powers from the republics and
regions(…)the constitution of 1974 can be seen as the most destructive in the
recent history of Yugoslav people.”309 Thus, the interpretation is the opposite of
that of Historija, and Serbs are again seen as the single greatest sufferer and victim
of politics and state formations. We will come back to Istorija’s presentation of the
1974 constitution later.
Defending Unity and Yugoslavia

A great number of references relating to Yugoslavia creates a third typical
characteristic of the presentation of Serbs in Istorija: pro-Yugoslavianism, the idea
of wanting to defend and preserve Yugoslavia. First, Istorija mentions the defence
of Yugoslavia as part of the justification for the Serbs and Montenegrin war against
Austria-Hungary. One entire chapter is entitled ”Serbia and Montenegro in WWI
and the work on unity”, and the declaration of Nis in 1914 is said to have
”emphasised the importance of the struggle for unity of ’all our unliberated
brothers’”. Istorija enforces the idea of South Slavs (Yugo-Slavs) by mentioning
306
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 120-121.
307
308
309
229
how all the South Slavs under Austria-Hungary supported the unity.310 Here we
can note that the book was written in a country whose official name at the time of
writing was still Yugoslavia even though it included only the former Yugoslav
republics of Serbia and Montenegro.
Istorija presents Serbia as having the central role in creating the First
Yugoslavia: the Serbian government helped in establishing the Yugoslavian board
whose work it also supported financially. Finally, ”in July 1917(…)it came to an
agreement(…)on uniting the kingdom of Serbia and our countries, which were
under the rule of Austria-Hungary.”311 Particularly notable here is that Istorija
refers to all the Yugoslav lands as ”ours”. Generally, Istorija presents the creation of
the First Yugoslavia as a process characterised not by the will of different
nationalities, but as a result of external pressures and the great will of Serbia.
When presenting the First Yugoslavia, Istorija mentions the first government
announcing a few of its ministers and their nationalities. Similarly, the parties
which appeared are presented very neutrally with no national emphases. Istorija
mentions the assassination of the Croat representatives in parliament but does not
analyse or comment on the event in any way.312 Thus, Istorija presents the multi-
cultural nature of the administration but only in a clinical way, unlike Povijest
which described the national problems and inequality in detail. The national
question is addressed in a separate sub-chapter which notes that:
”At the time when the Kingdom of SCS was created, as well as in the
beginning of the 1920s, everyone thought that Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
were three tribes of one nation and that there were only slight differences
between them, namely the religion and their language. This was a theory
about the three-named nation. But very soon people realised that this kind of
understanding of the national program in the new country was unrealistic and
unstable, because Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were three different nations,
regardless of their common Slavic origin and linguistic similarities.”313
Thus, according to Istorija, it is clear that three different nations already existed in
the First Yugoslavia.
Istorija mentions the Croatian question and how the Serb question would have
needed a solution well had the Second World War not interrupted the
developments of the First Yugoslavia.314 The nationality question is not, however,
presented as referring negatively to Croats, but simply as a structural development
in the First Yugoslavia, which consisted of three nations.
310
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 56, 63, 70.
311
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 71-72.
312
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 84-85.
313
314
230
Istorija also credits Yugoslavs, not any particular nation, with the achievements
in science and literature during the period of the First Yugoslavia, unlike Povijest,
which always listed the nationalities of Yugoslav artists, sportsmen and so forth.315
When presenting the Second World War, Yugoslav and Serb actions are
presented as joint. Istorija tells that Yugoslavia joined the coalition against fascism.
It mentions that independent Croatia was allied with Germany and how Yugoslavia
was also among the countries that signed the Atlanta charter promising many
progressive things. Istorija writes: ”The signing of the Atlanta charter heralded great
progress in gathering together all the freedom-loving countries in the fight against
fascism.”316 Thus, Yugoslavia (and Serbia) both appear on the good side.
Instead of using the word partisan, starting from the events in 1944, Istorija
speaks only of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslavian people.317 Istorija presents the new
socialist Yugoslavia structurally, mentioning how all the nations had their assembly,
constitution and government. There is, however, no emphasis on national problems
or national questions in the presentation of socialist Yugoslavia before the
constitution of 1974, which we will discuss in the following.318
The 1974 Constitution and the Break-up of Yugoslavia

The last chapter of Istorija, ”Self-government in Yugoslavia”, discusses mainly the
1974 constitution of Yugoslavia, and the country’s break-up. Four of the five pages
of the chapter were judged as ”questionable material” in the schoolbook check in
1999. The national perspective is central to the chapter and combines many of the
characteristics discussed earlier in this chapter.
Istorija sees the new constitution, which added the power of individual
republics and granted Vojvodina and Kosovo the status of autonomy, as the cause
of ”multiple negative changes, especially in Serbia”. It repeats several times, how the
constitution represented ”the victory of nationalist and separatist powers”.
According to Istorija, ”it [1974 constitution] can be seen as the most destructive in
the recent history of the Yugoslav people”.319 Thus, we can see here both the idea of
Serbia as a victim, and the idea of the Yugoslav people suffering along with Serbia.
Istorija specifies the constitution’s negative effects on Serbs and Serbia under
the sub-heading ”The Disintegration of Serbia (autonomy in Vojvodina and Alban
separatism)”. Serbia’s victim position is clear, for ”the constitution from 1974 had
the worst consequences for Serbia…Serbia was stripped of half of its territory…had
no rights in the territory of the regions”. Istorija emphasises how ”this kind of
organisation of a special confederation within a sovereign country is unknown to
any theory of law in the world”. It mentions that in 1987, Serbia did everything
possible to correct the injustices inflicted upon it by the constitution of 1974, yet
315
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 92-93.
316
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 98, 100.
317
318
Гаћеша et. al. 1997 146.
319
231
the 15 years ”had its consequences”. The situation is said to have been particularly
difficult in Kosovo and Metohija: ”The legal leadership(…)pressured the Serbian
and Montenegrin people to force them to leave their homes and property so that
Kosovo and Metohija could be ethnically clean. In a very short time, thousands of
Serbs and Montenegrins left the region. Their land and houses(…)were inhabited
with refugees from Albania and other parts of Yugoslavia”.320 Thus, the suffering of
both Serbia and Serbs (and Montenegrins) is clear. The “caring for Yugoslavia”
aspect arises later when Istorija tells how a group of prominent scientists and
professors from Belgrade opposed the constitution because they knew it was
negative for Yugoslavia and Serbia.321
In regard to the developments of the 1990s, Istorija further describes Serbia as
the victim of others and as trying to preserve and defend Yugoslavia. In its new
constitution of 1990, “it was emphasised that Serbia is a country for all its peoples.
Citizenship, personal freedom and rights are in the centre of the society”.
According to Istorija, the republic of Serbia and Yugoslavia also ”undertook
necessary measures and were successful in transferring the problem to the UN
Security Council”, but
”the efforts of the Great Powers (Germany especially) to destroy Yugoslavia
confirm the fact that the appetites of the Great Powers do not choose the
means to realise their interest. Serbia was first to stand in their way…after all
kinds of threats, blackmail and biases that had never been seen
before(…)spread in BiH, Belgium, France, Hungary, Morocco, England and
the USA suggested that the UN Security Council decide to impose very strict
sanctions on Yugoslavia(…)there was a break in air traffic, trade, oil and the
Serbian republic of Yugoslavia was cut off from all cultural and sports
manifestations.”322
They: Croats and Albans

The presentation of other South Slav nations in Istorija focuses on the negative
description of Croats. Another group mentioned mainly in the context of the last
30 years is Albans. Except for Croats and Albans, other national groups barely
receive mention despite the Montenegrins who are seen as parallel to Serbs through
the book.
The Anti-Croatian Spirit towards Catholics and Ustaša

The anti-Croat presentation concentrates on two issues: the ustaša state and the
Catholic Church. Thus, in the period before the First World War, negative
references to Croats are rare: Istorija presents the parties of the First Yugoslavia, but
320
321
322
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 156-157.
232
fails to emphasise their national aspirations at all. Similarly, the incident when
Croat members of the parliament were shot appears clinically without comment or
analysis.323
Istorija refers to Croats evaluatively when it mentions that in the 1930s, Italy
supported ”Croatian separatist thrivings”. In the same context, the ”Croat
question” is mentioned with reference also to the ”Croatian ustaša emigrants” in
Germany and Italy. When Istorija mentions the assassination of the Yugoslav king,
it states that he was killed by ustašas. Croats or Croatia are not mentioned in that
context.324 Altogether, the mentioned references to Croats before WWII can be
seen as insignificant for they did not conform to any particular pattern and were
neither constant nor consistent.
As part of the presentation of “us” Serbs, Istorija claims that ”there were many
acts of treason” during the Yugoslav defence against the attack on Yugoslavia in
1941. The acts of treason occurred “especially in Croatia(…)Germans used to
release Croats, who were members of the former Yugoslav army, from prisons.”325
Thus, the Croats are described as traitors. The language hardens and negative
references to Croats intensify when Istorija comes to describe the ustaša state:
”The ustašas, being extreme nationalists, chauvinists and racists, tried to build
their country and its institutions based on the example of Hitler’s Germany.
They would use all possible methods to create an ethnically pure state. They
would say that the Serbs were different from the Croats in terms of religion
and race, and this is why they liquidated them, converted them and expelled
from the country. They wanted to destroy the Jews and the Gypsies in the
NDH. In order for the Croats and Muslims to live without any other people
in the NDH, massive physical destruction and conversion of Serbs to
Catholicism took place.”326
Thus, here Istorija describes the Croat ustašas as destroying other nations and with
such expressions as ”racist” and ”chauvinist”. The Muslims are referred to as having
just the same goals as the ustašas. Later, Istorija describes the relation of Muslims to
ustašas when it discusses the uprising of Serbs in Herzegovina: ”the ustašas, joined
by a part of the Muslims, without any reason began with the killing and torturing
of the Serbs”. Elsewhere in the chapter the relation between ustašas and Muslims is
described as ”the movement of ustašas was also joined by a part of the Yugoslav
Muslim organisation.”327 Thus when dealing with anti-Croat presentations during
the Second World War, Istorija partly includes Muslims in the discussion as well.
This is very different from the presentation of Historija, which emphasised how
323
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 84-85.
324
325
326
327
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 106, 109.
233
Muslims were only marginally involved in the NDH state and how their forming of
an SS unit was based on ustaša propaganda.
Istorija describes the crimes committed by ustašas vividly and in detail. In
1942, ”Besides these mass killings, hundreds of women, children and old people
were sent to concentration camps – the camps of death – and most of these were in
the territory of the Independent Croatian Country.” Thus, the reference to Croats
is clear when discussion involves the Croatian Country. Next to a picture
describing people walking appears the following: “ustašas are taking people from
Kozara mountain to camps”.328 As seen already when presenting the suffering as
part of the national presentation of “us” Serbs, Istorija presents the Jasenovac camp
in detail as ”the camp of death” which will forever remain in the memory of the
Serbian people. Referring to ustašas as subjects, Istorija tells that “they” called the
camp ”the concentration and work camp of Jasenovac” and that “they” buried
bodies in mass graves.329
A separate chapter concentrates on religions under the title ”Religions in
Yugoslavia. Reasons for division and quarrels on religious grounds”. The chapter
presents the different religions of former Yugoslavia. It concentrates mainly on the
Serbian Orthodox Church, which according to the text has always had ”the same
interests and needs as the Serbian people”. The Catholic Church, in turn, ”has not
been and still is not nationally characterised(…)at the same time, the Roman
Catholic Church is a strong political factor and its influence on its believers is great.
It requires an absolute obedience of them and behaviour according to the teachings
of the church. The teaching is very precise, especially against the Orthodox”.330 The
chapter emphasises how the different attitudes of the churches were significant
during the Second World War. The Catholics (Croats) are strongly blamed: ”The
Roman Catholic Church, and to some extent the Muslim organisation, wanted
Yugoslavia to fall apart and they supported the occupation, the establishment of a
Croatian state and genocide of the Serbs in it.” Istorija tells how the Orthodox
patriarch was kept in jail in the Dachau concentration camp, and how more than
200 Orthodox priests were also murdered ”in this massacre”. The Roman Catholic
Church did not blame anyone. On the contrary, it tried to convert a large number
of Serbs during difficult war conditions to Roman Catholicism.”331 When
discussing the ustaša movement, Istorija also emphasises how the highest
representatives of the Catholic Church never even tried to say anything against the
ustaša.332 Thus, here the Catholic Church and the Croatian state are connected as
the church is presented as supporting the ustaša state. The chapter on religions in
Yugoslavia concludes that:
328
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 115, 119.
329
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 120-121.
330
331
332
234
“the hostile attitude of the Roman Catholic church towards Yugoslavia has
not changed much during its seventy years of existence(…)The Roman
Catholic church also thought that the rights of Roman Catholics would be in
danger because they lived in a country where most of the people were
Orthodox. This is why the Vatican was among the first to accept the
separation of Croatia and Slovenia from Yugoslavia.”333
Thus, Istorija clearly attaches the presentation of the Catholic Church to the events
in recent history already when describing the earlier periods. The most outright,
hostile language is, however, used when describing the actions of Croats and
Catholics in the 1990s:
”The role of the Vatican’s politics in ’Yugoslav syndrome’ is also significant.
The fight was led against the orthodox religion and against Serbs with the help
of the Catholic Church and its fanatic followers. It seemed almost as though
the situation from 1941 was repeating. Serbian people had to flee from
Croatia. Serbs were tortured and innocent people were killed in the same
horrible way as 50 years ago(…)in August 1995, the Croatian army, with the
help of NATO, forced 200 000 Serbs from their homes in which they had
lived for centuries.”334
Albans
The negative references to Albans in Istorija intensify in the presentations of the last
30 years. Yet, a few comments also appear in the description of the earlier periods.
First, when Germany occupied Yugoslavia, ”Great Albania” controlled parts of
Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia. Istorija claims that the Albans in the area
supported the occupier, thereby creating a negative picture of the Albans.335
Moreover, Istorija mentions that the Serbian-led riot in Kosovo and Metohija was
unsuccessful, and that in fact ”separatist and nationalist Alban troops were
terrorising the Serbian people, and they would burn down Serbian villages and
force the Serbs from the area”.336 When Istorija tells about the ”terror of the
domestic traitors” in the Second World War, the Albans are again described: ”A
division called ’Skenderbeg’, comprised of Alban people who collaborated with the
occupier, was notorious for the crimes it committed.”337 Finally, when forming
socialist Yugoslavia, Istorija presents the Albans as a people who could not be
trusted. According to Istorija: ”The communists who led the PFM at Kosmet, and
especially the leader from Albania, would speak for Yugoslavia but act against it.
333
334
335
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 105, 107.
336
337
235
They did not accept the decisions of AVNOJ. In Bujan, they decided that Kosovo
and Metohija should join Albania.”338
As mentioned, the negative references to Albans intensify when Istorija
describes the last 30 years. Regarding the 1974 constitution, Istorija states that
”Alban separatists pressured Serbs and Montenegrins to leave their property and to
move out in order for Kosovo and Metohija to be ethnically clean.” The same
description is repeated later, where Istorija mentions how a secret separatist
organisation later named ”The Kosovo alternative” started working and ”still works
to tear down the constitutional organisation in Serbia and Yugoslavia ”.339 Istorija
mentions how the education system became Alban, as well as local television, and
that children started considering Albania their home country instead of Yugoslavia.
”The history has been falsified for a long period and the relations between
Yugoslavia and Albania were shown uncritically, and Serbia and Yugoslavia were
blamed for the low standard of living.”340
Finally Istorija refers to the Albans when it tells how the spread of nationalism
was first observed in Kosovo and Metohija in 1981, when ”Alban masses, according
to the instructions of separatists and secessionists, acted very aggressively,
demanding their republic”.341 Thus the presentation of Albans is entirely negative.
6.4.4 DODATAK: BOSNIAN SERB EMPHASIS

From the point of view of analysing the presentation of nation in Dodatak, it is
important to bear in mind that it represents the first Bosnian Serb material for
history teaching. The need for publishing such a booklet reflects the changed
political situation already at the end of the war: Serbia proper was no longer fully
supporting the Bosnian Serbs and the Serb Republic, which has lead Bosnian Serbs
to build up their own concept of Bosnian Serbhood.342
As mentioned earlier, Dodatak, the additional Bosnian Serb booklet for history
in the 8th grade, has a curious content division. The first 20 pages cover the late 19th
Century up to the First World War, followed by one page about the development
during the inter-war years, nothing at all about the Second World War or the
decades following it, and finally a few pages on the developments in the 1990s.
The style of writing when dealing with the events in the 1990s differ from the
rest of the booklet. Those pages were all ordered removed from the booklet as part
of the monitoring in 1999. Therefore, I have decided to analyse those pages
separately at the end of the chapter.
338
339
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 153, 154.
340
Гаћеша et. al. 1997, 154-155.
341
342
The change in Serbian politics is clear from the description of the 1995 peace negotiations when Milosević
behaved very arrogantly towards the Bosnian Serbs. See Holbrooke 1997. See also Gordy 1999, 154 and Janjić 1998,
344.
236
We: The Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The references to “us”, the Bosnian Serbs, define the “we” group of the booklet.
The references to nation form an idea of Bosnia and Herzegovina as “our” place,
and Bosnian Serbs as “our” group. In the following, I will first concentrate on
references to the idea of the Bosnian community and how it is described, and then
to the presentation of Bosnian Serbs as a group within the Bosnian community.
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a Community of Nations

Dodatak refers to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the context of different national
groups. For example, it tells how the Muslims also participated in the riots initiated
by the Serbs in 1875, and how ”following the example of the Serbian rioters in
their fight against the Turks, the Catholics from Herzegovina did the same
thing”.343 In the Bosnian context, Catholics from Herzegovina are the same as
Croats. When Dodatak later describes the attitudes towards Austria-Hungary and
its annexation of BiH, Bosnia is again described as a community of three nations.
Dodatak mentions how Serbs were against it for they knew that liberation would be
harder than under the Turks (Ottoman empire). Muslims were also against it
because they feared they would lose their privileges. Only Croats were in favour of
the annexation for they hoped to enjoy privileges in a Catholic state.344
Dodatak presents the idea of Bosnianhood as imaginary when telling about
Benjamin Kallay who governed Bosnia for 20 years as a representative of Austria-
Hungary:
”In order to detach BH Serbs from Serbia, Muslims from Turkey, and Croats
from Croatia, Kallay presented a theory, that a nation of three names and
three religions lived in BH. On the basis of this imaginary theory, he tried to
create some kind of a ‘Bosnian nation’ and a ‘Bosnian language’. By imposing
this ‘Bosnianhood’ on the Serbs, he suffocated feelings of nationality and did
not want to find a solution to the Serbian and Yugoslav question. Serbs,
Croats and even Muslims all stood against this imaginary ‘Bosnianhood’.”345
Together with the idea of the ”imaginary nature” of Bosnianhood, the reference to
Turkey in the quotation above as the point of connection for Bosnian Muslims
resembles the way Croatia serves as the point of contact for Bosnian Croats, and
Serbia for Bosnian Serbs. This further constructs the idea of Bosnia as a place for
three national groups who have their ”supporters” and ”brothers” elsewhere.
The organisation Mladi Bosna (Young Bosnia) is presented as a multi-national
youth organisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,346 which contrasts sharply with the
343
Пејић 1997, 7-8.
344
Пејић 1997, 13.
345
Пејић 1997, 14.
346
Пејић 1997, 19.
237
presentation in the Bosniac book Historija of the Mladi Bosna as an organisation of

Serb nationalists.347
Dodatak presents Austria-Hungary as a common enemy of all the Bosnian
nations. It tells how Austro-Hungarian ”capitalists came to Bosnia to use our woods
and ores to increase their wealth” (underlining P.T.). Dodatak also mentions how
the political circles in Vienna tried to push Muslims and Croats against the Serbs
after the assassination of Franz Ferdinand.348 Thus Dodatak suggests that Bosnians
were a unity which Austria-Hungary attempted to break.
Finally, Dodatak tells how after the First World War, Bosnian Serbs supported
the union with Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnian Muslims with Hungary, and
Croats with the federation under Austria-Hungary, thus again supporting the idea
of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a construction of three nationalities with different
ideas and equal status.349
Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The entire booklet starts by describing the rise of Serbs in the late 19th Century. In
the first two paragraphs, the basic tone of the booklet describes the ”Serbian people
in BH” as follows:
”The second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th Centuries were
periods of such historic events that contributed to an economic, socio-political
and cultural life of the Serbian people in BH(…)this was also a period when
Serbs in BH had a right to be engaged in trade, craft, cultural-educational
work and the right to start their own church-educational municipalities. This
is how ’intelligent and middle-class Serbian people’ were created(…)the most
significant events that changed the faith and destiny of the Serbian people
were the riots in BiH in 1875 and the Austro-Hungarian occupation of BiH
in 1878.”350
About the riot in 1875–78, Dodatak tells how ”the Serbian people were again
forced to defend their honour and dignity with weapons because the taxes
increased, they were unable to engage in commerce and they were often robbed and
treated force fully by the Turkish ruler”.351 It is worth noting that Serbs had to
defend their honour and dignity ”again”. The expression refers to the idea that
Serbs have always had to defend themselves, that they have always been the victims.
The war heroism typically part of the presentation of Serbs in Istorija is
repeated in Dodatak when it presents the riots. Dodatak states that ”even though
they did not have enough weapons, munitions and food, the Serbian rioters
managed to beat the Turkish army in several battles”. The fighting did not,
347
348
Пејић 1997, 17, 22.
349
Пејић 1997, 23.
350
Пејић 1997, 5.
351
Пејић 1997, 7.
238
however, bring good results and Dodatak concludes: ”so a three-year long fight for
freedom and dignity ended with a new ruler ruling the country and with the arrival
of the new oppressor”. Dodatak mentions how the Bosnian Serbs would have
preferred to be under Serbian rule, yet that aspect receives little emphasis.352
Dodatak describes the period under the rule of Austria-Hungary as an
occupation, and presents it as negative throughout. The references to the Bosnian
Serbs during the period serve, however, as part of nation-building. The Serbs in
BiH during the Austro-Hungarian rule are described as:
”the majority and economically the strongest nation. They had their religious
schools, economic and cultural-educational societies and they also published
books, magazines and newspapers(…)Until 1914, when they were forbidden
to have schools, the Serbs had 126 elementary, 2 higher-level schools for girls
and a theological school in Reljevo. Because of Austria-Hungary’s need for
state offices in trade and industry, the administration opened in BH,
gymnasiums, schools for teachers, and for trade, as well as technical and craft
schools in which most of the Serbian children had been learning.
Gymnasiums, as elite schools for preparing young people to become state
officers, were opened in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar and Tuzla. Many future
intellectuals were educated in these schools and they contributed to the rise of
Serbian national conscience for the freedom of nationality and unity.”353
Dodatak also describes the cultural activities of the Serbs by telling about their
organisations and magazines. Bosnia’s social democrats, whose leaders are said to
have been mostly Serbs, are said to have published their magazine “Voice of
Freedom” in the Cyrillic alphabet. Dodatak also mentions how the first political
activity of the Bosnian Serbs was seen in magazines.354
The mentioning of the Cyrillic alphabet as the alphabet of the Serbian
magazine directly links the history to the practise of Bosnian Serbs today as only
they use the Cyrillic alphabet. The significance of the alphabets for the nation and
its history culture was discussed in chapter five. When discussing the assassination
of Franz Ferdinand, Dodatak emphasises how the entire Serb nation was accused of
the murder and how the Cyrillic alphabet was forbidden and the constitution
cancelled. It describes in detail how Bosnian Serbs died, were starved to death,
forced into camps and so on an the hands of the Austro-Hungarian army and
police. Thus, the suffering of the Bosnian Serbs is emphasised.355
A truly Serbian perspective is introduced when discussing defections of Bosnian
Serbs to the Serbian and Russian armies after they had been forced to fight against
Serbia (the Russian army helped the Serbian army). Dodatak concludes: “This
352
Пејић 1997, 9-11.
353
Пејић 1997, 15.
354
Пејић 1997, 16, 18.
355
Пејић 1997, 22.
239
shows how many BH Serbs took part in the fight for the freedom of Serbia, many
of whom died for the same cause.”356
Dodatak presents the first Yugoslavia, the kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes, positively and emphasises Serb success and heroism in war:
“Since the National Guard could not stop the robbing and anarchy, the
government called the Serbian army. On August 6th, 1918, a larger group of
the Serbian army arrived in Sarajevo and successfully took care of peace and
order. The people of BH saw the Serbian army as a hero. After the arrival of
the Serbian army, the conditions for the unity were created. People gathered
in Livno, Doboj, Prijedor, Banja Luka, Ključ, Teslić, Glamoč, Petrovac,
Dobrljin and Čevaći near Teslić, and demanded that unity be proclaimed
right away. The act of proclaiming the Kingdom of SCS (December 1st,
1918), was accepted with pleasure by the Serbian people in BH and was
celebrated.”357
Thus, the basic description is that the Serbs brought unity and order for others.
The Serbian perspective is emphasised: “by joining the kingdom of SCS the Serbs
were united into one country for the first time and were equal with other
nations”.358
Finally, Dodatak describes how the position of peasants also improved in the
First Yugoslavia. Then, however, after the assassination of king Alexander, ”the
Yugoslav country was jeopardised by foreign extremists who belonged to the fascist
organisations”. Therefore, ”to maintain the Yugoslav country and the freedom of
the Serbian people, the political work of Serbian national-patriotic organisations
and associations revived”. As such an organisation, Dodatak mentions chetnik
organisations in most of the towns. Even Muslims are said to have had their chetnik
association near Prijedor.359 Thus, Dodatak again presents the Serbs as seeking to
maintain Yugoslavia and the freedom of the Serbs. The reference to a Muslim
chetnik organisation may be based on historical fact, but when mentioned here, it
seems to suggest that Muslims were also part of chetniks, thereby relativising the
term “chetnik” to include nations other than Serbs.
They: Croats Hating the Serbs

As we observed in the previous analysis of Dodatak’s references to Bosnia and
Herzegovina as a unity of three nations (one of them being the Serbs), Muslims and
Croats were referred to neutrally or as co-operating with the Serbs (mainly the
Muslims). As in Istorija, the negative references to “them” in Dodatak mainly
involve Croats. Before the First World War, when describing magazines published
356
Пејић 1997, 23.
357
Пејић 1997, 23-24.
358
Пејић 1997, 25.
359
Пејић 1997, 25.
240
in BiH, Dodatak mentions the “Croatian diary” magazine which “wrote and asked
people to hate Serbs and Yugoslavia in general”.360
After the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the beginnings of the First
World War, Dodatak tells how the Croats and Muslims robbed and demolished
the shops of the Serbs. A magazine called “Croatia” wrote: “People are declaring a
life-or-death struggle over the Serbs and their exile from the country. We have to
deal with them once and for all and destroy them. The Serbs are angry snakes and
you are safe only when you kill them!”361
Dodatak and the Recent Past

The last four pages of Dodatak consist of two chapters. The first one concentrates
on events in Croatia in the 1990s, and the second on events in Bosnia in the 1990s.
In both of the chapters, Dodatak constantly refers to the Serbs as ”the Serbian
people/nation”362 whether they are living in Croatia or in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The extensive cultivation of the expression creates a very ”Serbian spirit” in both of
the chapters. The following excerpts all come from only one paragraph (underlining
P.T.): ”they began forming military forces that started threatening the Serbian
people with their ustaša methods. The political program of HDZ was based on the
secession and terror of the Serbian people(…)now Serbian people again had to live
in fear of genocide committed by ustašas. To survive in the territory where they had
lived for centuries, Serbian people organised into a Serbian democratic party.”363
In the chapter on the events in Croatia, the Croats are referred as ustašas several
times. Dodatak talks about ”ustaša methods” and a new country that ”functioned
in all areas of political and social life like the former country of the ustašas”. The
use of ustaša rhetoric here parallels the campaign of Serb propagandists in the 1980s
against the Catholic Church and Croats.364 Croats are further described as ”cleric-
nationalists” and Croatian soldiers are said to have ”killed Serbian women, children
and old people in the most horrible way, they burnt their houses and destroyed
everything that belonged to Serbs(…)the lines of refugees were bombed by a
Croatian aviation, and innocent women, children and old people were killed.”
Referring to the areas in Slavonia that were part of the Serb-controlled Croat areas,
Dodatak writes ”The only question is: how to survive under such brutal rule?”365
The chapter entitled ”Civil war in BiH and the formation of the Serb
Republic” presents a threatened and unfairly treated Serb nation against the
oppressive Croats and Muslims. After the first multi-party elections, ”Muslim and
Croat delegates joined the coalition and made all decisions without the Serb
360
Пејић 1997, 16.
361
Пејић 1997, 22.
362
The discussion regarding the concepts was in the beginning of 6.4.
363
Пејић 1997, 27.
364
Anzulović 1999, 106-109. As part of the campaign, a member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts wrote
an essay ”On the Genesis of the Genocide of the Serbs in the NDH”.
365
Пејић 1997, 27-28.
241
delegates and damaged the Serbs. In a number of gatherings, Croats and Muslims
tied their flags together and threatened Serbian people.”366
Dodatak writes that because of the danger of separation from their brothers in
Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnian Serbs proclaimed the Serbian People’s Assembly.
Dodatak continues by telling how Muslims and Croats voted for the referendum to
separate BiH from Yugoslavia without respecting the wishes and interests of Serbs.
Thus, Dodatak sees the referendum on the independence of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (where Bosnian Serbs also lived) as ”their” referendum. The Serbs are
presented as committing separatist acts only because they were forced to do so. A
similar interpretation is true for the war/aggression:
”Facing the attacks of the Muslim fundamentalists and Croat Cleric-
nationalists, Serbian people had to organise and defend their life, national
identity, honour and human dignity with weapons. After four whole years of
this ’dirty, civil war’, the Serbian army, that is the armed people, successfully
defended their nation and territory.”367
Dodatak describes the actions of Muslims and Croats:

”The Muslim army, being afraid to step into an open and fair fight against the
Serbian army, decided to undertake diversions. When they entered a village (if
they managed), they would kill all the people in it and burn down the homes
of the people. There was a shameful and horrible attack organised by Muslim
and Croat leaders in May 1992 in Sarajevo and Tuzla. They attacked the
troops of the Yugoslav army, which was, as had been agreed, retreating
towards Serbia. During these horrible attacks (by the cowards), hundreds of
innocent young men who were serving the army were killed and burnt in the
trucks.”
Dodatak also mentions that there were mujahedins from Islamic countries who
massacred Serbs.368
The idea of Serbs as victims who were wrongly accused by their enemies and by
the international community is clearly presented:
”An unbelievable campaign against the Serbs ensued in the world
media(…)after all, the international community proclaimed the Serbian
people as the aggressor and attacked them with weapons. Muslim and Croat
politicians and all the media spread lies and even went so far as to claim that
some of their own crimes were committed by the Serbs. They used any means
they could to demonise the Serbian people and make them responsible for the
war.”369
366
Пејић 1997, 29.
367
Пејић 1997, 29.
368
Пејић 1997, 29. Marko Lehti has argued how the Serbs were the only ones seeing the conflicts in former
Yugoslavia as clashes of civilizations for it suited to their aims. Lehti 2000, 133-134.
369
Пејић 1997, 30.
242
Finally, Dodatak tells how the Muslim and Croat armies, together with NATO,
undertook a brutal offensive against the Serbs Republic and burnt houses and killed
people who failed to escape.370
6.4.5 CONCLUSION: HISTORICAL STEREOTYPES OF ”US” AND ”THEM”

Sirkka Ahonen has defined historical stereotypes as being created in public
discourse (e.g. in school textbooks) to strengthen the identity of a group: either
“ours” (auto-stereotypes), or “them” (hetero-stereotypes). Stereotypes can be
defined as ”oversimplified representations of reality”. About hetero-stereotypes
Ahonen writes: ”The most powerful hetero-stereotypes are enemy images. They are
used to legitimise and provoke hostilities among groups.”371
As we have seen, the representations of others as hetero-stereotypes, anti-
images, were part of the presentations of all three groups, yet the intensities
differed. The national groups that have been enemies in recent history were
portrayed negatively through their actions in history, while “our group” was in
most cases presented as the ideal one and a victim of the atrocities of the others.
Despite some single critical mentions of “us” (Historija mentioned that some
Muslims collaborated with the NDH, Istorija noted that some Serbs also followed
Hitler and that chetniks were mainly Serbs, and Povijest told of the atrocities of the
ustaša state against Serbs, Jews and Gypsies), the history and the role of “us” in each
book was presented rather uncritically. Controversial issues were not discussed at
all, or were dealt with superficially. Instead, the best parts of the story were
presented as “ours” and the negative parts as “theirs”. Illustrative of this is that the
Croats presented the anti-fascist fight of partisans as “ours” to show how they were
against Germany and Hitler, but then later, when the partisans were committing
atrocities against Croats, they were presented as mainly Serbs, and thus as “them”.
Similarly the Croats justified the origins of the NDH-state but distanced
themselves from it later.
As a result of this kind of approach, the reinforced stereotypes serve on the one
hand to support the nation-building of one’s own group, and on the other hand to
maintain and justify the hostile attitude towards the others. It can also be noted
here that this finding seems true also when discussing other periods of history in
different class grades. In her analysis of former Yugoslavian textbooks, Heike Karge
mentions how, particularly in the Croat and Serb books, the idea of perceiving
other ethnic groups as a threat to one’s national existence can be traced back as a
leitmotif from the Middle Ages to modern history.372 Naturally, this does not serve
any kind of reconciliation process.
The Bosniac book Historija included two levels of “we” groups: the
territorially-defined Bosnian nation, and the ethnically-defined Muslim nation. The
370
Пејић 1997, 30.
371
Ahonen 2001, 25.
372
Karge 2000, 3.
243
two categories were inter-related, for the Muslim nation was included in the
Bosnian nation as well. The basic idea of Bosnianhood was ”Bosnia with its
nations”. Muslims were presented along with the Bosnian nation, and a common
construction of the book served to present an event or an occurrence first from the
Bosnian point of view, and then particularly from the point of view of Muslims,
who were seen as true Bosnians defending common values and so forth. The multi-
national nature of Bosnianhood was seen as an eternal characteristic: Bosnia was
considered fundamentally multi-national state, and multi-nationalism as a
fundamental characteristic of Bosnianhood. Interestingly, Historija used the word
”narod” (nation) in three different meanings on three different levels: all the nations
in Bosnia were referred to as separate ”narods”, Bosnia as a whole was referred to as
a single ”Bosnian narod”, and finally a single ”Yugoslavian narod” became part of
the presentation. All these narods co-existed in the book.
Based on the above-mentioned features of the presentation, we can conclude
this characteristic of the auto-stereotype of the representation of nation in Historija
as pan-nationalism, a nationalism which can include several nations without
competition between them.
An important characteristic of the presentations of “us” in Historija was the
extensive use of the word ”ravnopravan”, literally translated as “having the same
rights”. It was used to present Bosnia and Bosnians as equal to Croatia and Serbia,
and to Croatians and Serbians. Crucial for the presentation of Muslims was the
emphasis on Muslims as a nation comparable to and having the same rights as other
nations of the country (Serbs, Croats, as well as Macedonians, Montenegrins and
Slovenes in regard to Yugoslavia). Bosnian Muslims were presented along with
other nations in the historical developments. Also, it was often mentioned that their
national status was unfairly different until the constitution in 1974 guaranteed
Bosnian Muslims the official status as a nation. Thus, we can conclude equality as
the second characteristic of the auto-stereotype of the representation of nation in
Historija.
Finally, the third characteristic of the auto-stereotypical representation of
nation in Historija included ideas typical of the presentations of the Bosnian
Muslims. On the one hand, they were portrayed through their high moral values
and sophisticated nature, and on the other hand, the text emphasised the passive
suffering of Muslims in different periods of history. This part of the representation
can be characterised as humanity.
The other side of the representation of nation in Historija can be concluded
through the characteristics of the hetero-stereotype. Generally, it was noted that
Historija contained few references to others. The book often described the suffering
of Muslims in the passive tense without reference to any other group. From this we
can conclude that historical unimportance characterised the representation of the
hetero-stereotype of nation in Historija.
In the existing references to “them”, Historija mentioned the atrocities of Serbs
in the 1920s, in the Second World War, and in the recent past. Historija’s
244
presentation of Serbs, although negative, was not unambiguous. While negative

references clearly accusing the Serb nation were common when discussing the
1920s, the Second World War, and the most recent past, most of the time the
Serbs were not referred to specifically as “them”. From this we can conclude that
another characteristic of the hetero-stereotypical representation of nation in
Historija can be called sporadic/random nature: the references were occasional and
described only part of some specific events and periods in history.
The Croat book Povijest emphasised the importance of a state for Croats.
Croats were explained as having enjoyed such a long state tradition since the 9th
Century that life under Serb occupation in the first Yugoslavia was such a tragedy
that the Croats were ready to accept any kind of a state, even the NDH ustaša state.
The general negative presentation of the period prior to the independence of
Croatia in 1991 emphasised the idea of justification attached to Croat statehood.
Thus, one characteristic defining the representation of the auto-stereotype of nation
in Povijest can be defined as right to a state.
Generally, the presentation of “us” Croats included mainly the Croats who
now reside in the state called Croatia. The general representation of Croathood was
based on the eternal idea of nation, which has a right to its own state. The cultural
sophistication of Croats, their suffering at the hands of Serbs, as well as their
persistent struggle and demands for their equal positions constituted the central
characteristics of the idea of Croathood. The Catholic Church was also part of the
presentation. This general notion of the nation can be characterised as the idea of
primordiality in the representation of the auto-stereotype of nation. Primordiality
formed part of the representations of Serb and Bosniac books as well, but was
especially emphasised in the Croat book.
Finally, Povijest presented controversial topics from the period of the Second
World War from the point of view of “ours” in a way that “we” were part of the
good developments, but were clearly separated from developments considered
negative. At worst, “we” were only unintentionally part of them. The book
emphasised that when Croats noticed that the NDH was not a Croatian state, but a
vassal of Germany and Italy, they no longer supported it. The partisan fight was
presented as instigated by Croats in Croatia, and the internal structural formations
of partisans were also presented as the work of Croats. Towards the end of the war,
however, the presentation changed and the expression “communists” served more
as a reference to the partisans. Thus, the communist partisans were differentiated
from “us”. This differentiation was necessary, because the partisans caused the
important Croat myth, the tragedy of Bleiburg. The third characteristic of the
representation of the auto-stereotype of nation in Povijest can thus be defined as
uprightness/moral superiority. According to the presentation of Povijest, “we” Croats
understood what was the right thing to do in different times of history.
In Povijest, references to “them” (Serbs) were extensive, thus emphasising the
importance of the anti-“us” category for the Croat national project. Povijest
referred to “them” almost as much as to “us” throughout the book. Therefore the
245
representation of the hetero-stereotype of nation in Povijest can be characterised

through the idea of historical importance.
The references to Serbs characteristically dealt with the unsatisfactory state
structures. According to Povijest’s presentation, both Yugoslavias had such state
formations, which illustrated why the Serbs were against the Croats. In the first
Yugoslavia, the main problems related to the state structures were the unjust social
and professional position of the Croats and the economy that was run poorly at the
expense of Croats. In communist Yugoslavia, Povijest presented the Serbs as better-
positioned professionally and socially, and as colonialists in regard to Croats. From
these presentations we can conclude that unfairness/subordination characterises the
representation of the national hetero-stereotype in Povijest.
Finally, the language used to describe the Serbs throughout the book was
characteristically negative. Throughout the book the references to Serbs extensively
cultivated such expressions as ”Great Serbia”, ”Great-Serbs”, ”Serbian hegemony”,
and ”chetniks”. From this we can conclude that the third characteristic of the
representation of the national hetero-stereotype is enmity/hostility.
The Belgrade-published Istorija presented the Serbs along with Montenegrins,
but without special mention of Bosnian Serbs or Serbs living in Croatia. Istorija
described Serbs as heroes when discussing the First World War and the partisan
fight. The heroic Serb tradition was also considered to have formed the traditions of
the common Yugoslav army in the First Yugoslavia. Therefore we can define
heroism as the first characteristic of the representation of the auto-stereotype of
nation in Istorija.
A central characteristic in the representation of “us” Serbs was the idea of
victimhood. The Serbs were described as victims of the occupiers during the First
World War and of the ustašas during the Second World War. Generally, Serbs were
misunderstood and treated unfairly in different periods of history; Istorija presented
the constitution of Yugoslavia in 1974 as the worst decision for all Yugoslavs, and
for the Serbs in particular, for it strengthened the position of those in favour of
separatism (e.g. Albans). Similarly, in the 1990s the Serbs’ will to save Yugoslavia
was misunderstood, and the Serbs were treated unfairly not only by their
neighbours, but also by the international community. Therefore, based on the
above presentation, victimhood can be defined as a second characteristic of the
representation of the auto-stereotype of nation in Istorija.
Another crucial characteristic of Istorija’s presentation of Serbs was the idea of
being Yugoslavs. Yugoslavism was considered synonymous with Serbhood; the Serb
nation was portrayed as constructing and taking care of Yugoslavia for the sake of
the common good. All the great accomplishments in art and science were seen as
the products of Yugoslavs regardless of which nation was in question. Istorija also
presented the suffering of Yugoslavia and Serbia as synonymous since the
constitution of 1974. From this, we arrive at the third characteristic of the
representation of the auto-stereotype of nation in Istorija: unifying federalism.
246
Istorija’s presentations of “them” involved Albans and Croats. The Croats were
described negatively in the context of the cruellest atrocities of the ustaša movement
and the ustaša NDH-state during the Second World War. Often Istorija referred
only to ”ustašas”, but in several instances, clearly identified them as Croats and
operating in Croatia. Similarly, through different periods, Albans were referred to
as terrorising Serbs and as separatists. Thus, we can conclude that one characteristic
of the hetero-stereotype of nation in Istorija is cruelty.
A central characteristic in the negative presentations of Croats was the negative
description of the Catholic Church, which was seen as supporting the fascist NDH
state and separatist Croat aims in the 1990s. From this we can define the second
characteristic of the hetero-stereotype of nation in Istorija as religious nationalism.
Finally, Istorija referred to Albans as traitors who co-operated with the occupier
already during the First World War. Croats were also referred to as traitors on some
occasions. Thus, a third characteristic of the hetero-stereotype of nation involves
unreliability.
The special additional booklet of Bosnian Serbs, the Dodatak, mainly shared
the characteristics of the representation of nation with Istorija both in auto-
stereotypes and in hetero-stereotypes. Dodatak presented the Bosnian Serbs as war
heroes under the Turks and under Austria-Hungary as well as during the last war,
thus sharing the characteristic of heroism. Bosnian Serbs were also portrayed as
eternal victims who always had to defend something. In the 1990s, the
presentations drew a picture of threatened and jeopardised Serbs whose enemies
included the international community. Thus victimhood is also a shared
characteristic of the general representation. In addition, the descriptions of their
magazines and schools served to emphasise the cultural strength of the Bosnian
Serbs as a people and as a nation. From this we can add a third characteristic of the
auto-stereotype of nation in Dodatak: advancement/progressiveness.
Before the events of the 1990s, Dodatak only occasionally referred to Croats in
a negative context. Other references to “them” involved the three nations living
together in Bosnia acting individually in different situations. Dodatak also referred
to co-operation between Muslims and Serbs. Nonetheless, these sporadic references
suggest the characteristic of historical unimportance.
When presenting the 1990s, however, the language of Dodatak was
characterised by the name-calling of Croats and Muslims, such as
”fundamentalists”, ”cleric-nationalists”, ”ustašas”, ”friends of Mujahedins”,
”cowards”, ”brutal attackers” etc. Thus, the second characteristic of the
representation of the hetero-stereotype of nation can be enemity/hostility.
Finally, we can present the representation of nation in all the books in the
following table:
247
Table 10: The Representation of Nation through “us” and “them” in 8th Grade
History Textbooks in Bosnia
Historija Povijest Istorija Dodatak
Auto- pan- right to a state heroism heroism

stereotype nationalism
primordiality victimhood victimhood
equality
uprightness/ unifying advancement/
humanity moral federalism progressive-
superiority ness
Hetero- historical historical cruelty historical

stereotype unimportan importance
religious
unimportance
ce
unfairness/ nationalism enemity/
sporadic/ subordination
unreliability
hostility
occasional
nature enemity/
hostility
6.5 Officially Expressed Social Representations in Bosnian

Context
Chapter three concluded that the basic idea of the approach of social
representations is the need of the communities to make the unfamiliar and new
understandable and general by attaching to it attributes and names/labels. Based on
this, it was suggested that schoolbooks mediate social representations of different
concepts and phenomena and thereby convey the “official” explanations of the
society. Based on this, it was argued that studying the contents of the
representations of Bosnian history textbooks could yield knowledge about the social
representations set forth by the authorities in the Bosnian context.
6.5.1 NATIONALLY-DIVIDED REPRESENTATIONS

Based on the representations of the history textbooks, the officially available social
representations of the most central societal concepts within post-war Bosnian
society were nationally divided. The public understanding of nation, war and peace
appeared to have different characteristics among Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs. The
representations of concepts naturally included some similarities (as Tables 8,9 and
10 show) but those characteristics were typically self-evident (e.g. blocs as actors in
248
the old wars, several war aims, etc.). As a whole, however, the officially-supported
understandings of war, and peace and self-understanding regarding the idea of
nation differed.
In the case of the representation of peace, the differences were unsurpricing yet
clear. Among Bosniacs, the critical attitude towards the UN and the fatalistic
approach in regard to developments in the 1990s specifically formed part of their
understanding, while among Croats, the Catholic Church as a peacemaker and the
general complexity of peace negotiations provided the particular framework for
understanding the peace. Among the Serbs, the satisfaction with the Dayton Peace
Agreement and the positive perception of non-aligned countries versus the negative
attitude towards the Great Powers in the context of peace formed the
underpinnings of the Bosnian Serb representation of peace. Among all groups, the
idea of peace was associated with international negotiations and the non-aligned
countries movement.
The social representation of peace thus suggests that the officially supported
Bosniac interpretation of peace includes a critical attitude towards the United
Nations and an ambiguous view of negotiations in the 1990s as something imposed
upon them and that they were forced to support regardless of its merits. This
suggests that criticism of the UN among Bosniacs has resulted from the UN’s
failure to protect the civilians in the course of the Bosnian conflict. The officially-
supported Croat representation of peace, in turn, draws a picture of peace as being
achieved through complex deals and negotiations and with the help of the Catholic
Church. This suggests that among Bosnian Croats, the official rhetoric sees peace as
something complicated and negotiable and gives the Catholic Church a positive
societal role. The Serb representation of peace clearly supports the Dayton Peace
Agreement. This suggests that among Bosnian Serbs the officially-supported
position values the Dayton Peace Agreement, which officially recognised their Serb
Republic. Serb criticism of Great Powers in connection to peace suggests the
officially-supported view among Bosnian Serbs that independent states themselves
(non-aligned) should decide and negotiate, not the Great Powers. This, as well as
the expressed resistance towards NATO bombarding of Serbia in the name of
peace, suggests the fundamental criticism of the Great Powers and military blocs as
part of publicly-held Bosnian Serb perceptions.
In contrast to the many clear differences, the idea of the non-aligned countries
was part of the representation of peace among all Bosnian groups. This suggests
that the officially-supported elements of the concept of peace still publicly carry the
understanding attached under Titoist Yugoslavia where the rhetoric of non-
alignment was central. In connection to this, it is worth noting that Tito was not
part of the historical representations among any of the Bosnian communities.
Regarding war, the social representations publicly set forth in the textbooks
within the Bosnian communities appeared to differ greatly. Among Bosniacs the
aspect of universal suffering constituted a central part of the representation of wars
generally. The pro-Islamic approach and general relations with Islamic states could
249
be seen as a specific part of the representation. The representation of the Bosnian

war included the idea of ethnic nationalism as a war aim. Among the combatants,
such groups as terrorists and mercenaries were separately mentioned. The failure of
Europe also figured largely in the proposed understanding of war.
This leads to the conclusion that for the understanding supported by the
Bosniac authorities, the most important component of the concept of war was that
of universal suffering: wars have always meant suffering for people. The war-related
fates of Islamic countries also appeared as issues that pupils were expected to know
about as part of their understanding of wars. The proposed representation of the
recent war in Bosnia suggested that it was caused by ethnic nationalism, and that
together with nationalists such particular groups as mercenaries and terrorists
instigated it. This idea clearly distances the “common people” of Bosnia from the
idea of war. Thus the representation officially set forth suggested that the war was
fought mainly by outsiders and extremist groups, not by their fellow Bosnians.
The particular feature in the proposed understanding of wars in Bosnian Croat
textbooks appeared to be the lack of analysis. Representation of war was
characterised by self-explanatory nature and by focusing on power positions. In the
case of recent wars in the 1990s, defence and ethnic expansionism were presented as
opposite war aims. The warring parties were understood as rebels versus
army/police (an official, established force). The nature of war, of ethnic
expansionism, was considered uncivilised.
Thus we can conclude that the Bosnian Croat idea of past wars appeared as a
sequence of events without much analysis: wars are wars. In regard to recent wars,
the supported representation suggested that the aggressors were rebels against
whom the official security forces could (justifiably) fight. The special mention of
police as part of the official security forces echoed the role of the para-military
police forces in the Croatian army; according to the official view, the role of official
forces was that to defend against rebels guilty of uncivilised ethnic nationalism.
Remembering that the Serbs were the typical warring enemies in the Croat book, it
is clear that the picture created suggests the construction of Serbs as uncivilised
ethnic nationalists.
The official Bosnian Serb understanding of the wars focused on detailed
military description. The horrors of the past were also characteristic of the Serb
representation. The idea of imperialism was a dominant characteristic when the
international aspect of the representation of war was in question. Regarding the
new wars, the representation brought forward the idea of suppression and unfair
and threatening treatment against which one had to mount a defence. The
separatists were considered the instigators of conflict between all kinds of groups,
which finally led to a civil war. The colourful language of the representation
suggested that the official idea of war among Serbs was more passionate than
among the other groups.
Thus, we can conclude that military detail appears significant for the Bosnian
Serb account and that imperialism was a central part of the officially proposed
250
understanding of wars, which might reflect the attitude towards the Great Powers
in the present situation as well. Serb views thus seem to echo those of Titoist era
not only in their emphasis on the non-aligned movement but also in their
structuralist understanding of traditional wars. The suggested understanding of
recent wars construct a picture in which separatists suppressed and threatened, and
thereby forced the national army to defend its people.
The presentations of nations in the textbooks were analysed from the
perspective of self-understanding. Thus, we can conclude what kinds of
representations of “us” and “them” are officially set forth among the Bosnian
communities through schooling. Generally, the construction of “us” and “them”
was strongly present in the history presentations among all the groups, thus
forming the basic structure of the representation.
In the case of nation, the publicly-supported understanding of Bosniacs
emphasised the idea of pan-nationalism including different levels of nation-groups.
Equality and humanity were also central to the understanding of nation. The idea
of anti-nation did not form an important part of their understanding. This allows
us to conclude that the social representation constructed appears rational from the
point of Bosniacs in today’s Bosnia: only the equal status of co-existing nations can
secure the position of Bosniacs.
The Croat official understanding of nation pointed to the idea of a nation-state
as part of the nation. For them, the anti-nation was understood as an enemy who
has been unfair towards others. Thus we can conclude that the social representation
set forth among Croats supports the idea of a justified Croat state (through
historical unfairness and primordial nature of Croats). Here we can remember that
discussion of the “third” entity in Bosnia continues and that the nationally-minded
Bosnian Croats continue to support the idea and act politically in accordance with
this idea, as was argued in chapters five and six.
Finally, among Serbs we could see the idea of federalism (Yugoslavia and Serbia
seen as parallel) as part of the understanding of nation. At the same time this
understanding of nation also entailed cruel and unreliable actors, in particular
religious nationalists. Among Bosnian Serbs, their particular representation (that of
their booklet Dodatak) emphasised the heroism, victimhood and advancement of
“our” nation over the misdeeds of its enemies. From this representation we can
draw a parallel to the development of the relations between Bosnian Serbs and
Serbia; as argued in section 4.4.2, they first worked together and the Bosnian Serbs
were to understand themselves as guardians of Yugoslavia (federalism) together with
Serbia. Later, however, the support of Serbia lessened and the Bosnian Serbs had to
start building up their own national identity, which we can now see as reflected in
their officially-proposed social representation of nation.
251
6.5.2 HISTORICAL CONTINUITY AND REOCCURRENCE

Despite the differing contents of the “official” social representation among the three
Bosnian communities, one common characteristic, the connection between the
present and the past, could be observed and seen to belong to the representations of
each book. In particular, previous wars typically served as metaphors of the recent
conflict. As seen previously, several direct cross-references across time were used: the
Serbs ”had to defend their rights again with guns”, ”the Serb-chetnik genocide on
Muslims has deep roots”, ”The Catholic church has not changed its attitudes much
in 70 years”, ”the Orthodox church has always shared the fate of Serbs”, “what they
[chetniks] did not succeed into achieving then, they tried to achieve with an
aggression towards the republic of Croatia in 1991”. The Bosnian Muslims were
referred to as Bosniacs373 when discussing the events of the 1940s; the story of
Montenegrins killing hundreds of Muslims 70 to 80 years ago in one village was
concluded by telling that now in the place of that village stands an Orthodox (i.e.
Serb) village called Tomaševo. When discussing the origins and work of the UN,
Historija mentioned how Bosnia is the latest example of its incompetence.
(underlining P.T.)
In addition to direct references, the indirect references to the present situation
were also part of the presentations. The atrocities committed by Bulgarians, Albans,
chetniks, ustašas and so forth were described using similar terms for the historical
atrocities typical of the recent affairs. There was also an indirect reference to the
present when Istorija discussed Alban children considering Albania as their home
country because they used Alban schoolbooks in the 1970s and 1980s.
In particular, the presentations of war were loaded with references to the
present situation and to the recent past. Historija emphasised the genocide towards
Muslims in the Second World War, but did not use the word genocide for the
crimes against Serbs. It also listed the places where Muslims were killed and
suffered the most – most of the places being in Eastern Bosnia and having suffered
similar horrors in the last war (e.g. Foča, Rogatice, Goražde, Srebrenica). The
description of losses and suffering in the Second World War was also such that it
could have been of the recent war: ”Many companies and mines were destroyed,
schools and other public buildings were ruined, housing facilities were totally
373
The term Bosniac has become the term used for Bosnian Muslims in the ethnic sense only in the 1990s. This is
illustrated by the doctoral dissertation of a Croat historian, Ivo Banac, currently a professor at Yale university. In his
broadly-respected and referred to dissertation of 1984, Banac concentrates on the national question in Yugoslavia.
The term ”bosniac” is not even mentioned in the index of the book, while ”Bosnian Muslims” as a term is used
broadly. Banac Ivo 1984/1988. The National Question in Yugoslavia. Origins, History, Politics. Ithaca and London,
Cornell University Press, 437-453. A more recent general history book on Bosnia by Noel Malcolm refers to the
term ”Bosniac” in question marks in relation to the 1990s, and once in a historical context when discussing Bosnians
who moved to Turkey. Malcolm 1994/1996, 140, 353. There was an attempt by philosophy professor Muhamed
Filipović in the late 1960s to force the Bosnian Muslim identity in the ethnic sense and to call them Bosniacs. This
idea did not become part of the official public language and Filipović was accused of Bosniac nationalism. It has been
suggested that the term Bosniac might have been used during the Ottoman period but then abandoned. Judah 1997,
155-156, Redžić 2000, 205-206.
252
ruined, and the entire economy suffered. Almost all means of public transport were
damaged, particularly railways, and livestock was totally destroyed.”374
The present situation can also be seen as influential when considering
Historija’s specific pro-Islamic description of the wars in Islamic countries during
last decades. Historical continuity was also clear when Historija mentioned that
AVNOJ (Council of Antifascist National Liberation of Yugoslavia) established a
council for war criminals in 1943, thus echoing the idea of the Hague tribunal.
Similarly, we could find a clear parallel to the present when Istorija discussed the
civil war in Yugoslavia during the Second World War and noted how the division
between chetniks and partisans (who according to the book were both mainly
Serbs) caused relatives to fight each other. This phenomenon of fighting against
relatives was common in the recent Bosnian war too. Povijest in turn mentioned
the incompetence of the Yugoslav army as a reason for the occupation of Yugoslavia
in the beginning of the Second World War thus suggesting that the Yugoslavian
army might have been incompetent also at a later stage.
Generally entire chapters (e.g. the chapter on religions in Yugoslavia in
Povijest) could have been analysed from the point of view of how they serve to
make the present more understandable by equalising the past and present.
Numerous direct and indirect references across time construct the idea of historical
continuity and reoccurrence when the construction of representations of nation,
war and peace in the history textbooks is in question. This is true among all three
communities.
In her analysis of the presentations of the history conceptions related to a
nation’s own and neighboring countries in the former Yugoslavian context in the
1990s, Karge also concluded that the present situation appears to filter the
interpretations of the school textbooks. In particular, she noted that the experience
of violence and the nationalistic political context cause the textbooks to portray the
relations with neighboring countries through conflict and confrontation in history
textbooks.375
Finally, it is important to point out that to conclude that the representations
set forth in the society include stereotypical images of nations, or that the
representation of the books used by different communities differ is nothing new.
Neither is it striking that the representations of schoolbooks link the past to the
present. What makes the Bosnian case different, and therefore important to
understand, however, is, first, the fact that we are always discussing three separate
sets of stereotypical images of “us” and “them”, three separate representations of
war, and to some extent of peace, within one society which intends to be multi-
national and multi-cultural. Most striking of all, we can see the fact that the hetero-
stereotypes of nation in the books greatly differed and opposed one another; a
multi-cultural society can better tolerate three different auto-stereotypes,
374
375
Karge 1999, 334-335.
253
conceptions of “us”, than find a way for the hostile heterostereotypes of national
groups belonging to the same society to co-exist within one small society. Secondly,
the present context is always part of the representations of schoolbooks. The degree
and nature of the influence of the present, however, can vary significantly. In the
Bosnian case, we can observe a high degree of influence (numerous direct and
indirect references to the present), and mostly of a negative nature (the hostilities of
the present being dominant in influencing the schoolbooks). Thus, in the Bosnian
context, the divergent representations officially set forth among the Bosnian
communities and the strong past-present relation as part of those representations
suggest the unusually strong importance of historical representations within the
society.
6.5.3 ANCHORING THE PRESENT WITH THE HELP OF THE PAST

In addition to analysing the representations of the textbooks as illustrations of the
social representations set forth in the society, we can also analyse the representations
as being part of the naturalisation process of the pupils who study the books. As
presented in the chapter three, in the context of social representation, naturalisation
refers to a process by which new and unknown phenomena and concepts (also
known concepts, which have received new meanings due to societal upheaval)
become anchored into the prevailing social reality by attaching attributes and names
to them. Thus, here we can analyse the representations of the history textbooks as
being part of the naturalisation process of young Bosnians. In the case of history
textbooks, we discuss the naturalisation process which anchors new ideas and
concepts, or makes them general and understandable, through the use of the past.
In the previous section, we saw how the idea of historical continuity and
reoccurrence are characteristically part of the differing representations of war, peace
and nation in the history textbooks used by the three Bosnian communities. That
enhances the power of the differing representations for they are not only historical
representations but directly connected to the present on the textual level. From the
point of view of the naturalisation process, this means that images of the past with
direct connections to the present are available for the naturalisation process. The
more distant past, which is often accepted right and unquestionably truthful, can
help to clarify the recent past/present which otherwise would be hard to understand
and come to terms with.376
In other words, the representations of the most central concepts of today’s
society in Bosnian schoolbooks can support the pupils in making sense of the
complicated new situation in the war and in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. If
the representations of the schoolbooks coincide with the experience of the present
reality, the pupils can obtain explanations as to how and why the new situation has
376
Here we can remember the example of social representations presented in chapter three about AIDS being
presented with terms usually associated with tuberculosis.
254
happened. In the following paragraphs, I will provide a few examples to illustrate

this idea.
As part of the representation of war, the Serb book Istorija mentioned how
relatives fought one another in Yugoslavia during the Second World War. From the
naturalisation point of view this can lead pupils to connect with the past the
difficult idea of the recent war in which relatives fought one another: If that was
possible in the past, why could it not have happened recently? This way, history can
help to explain new ideas.
The cruelties of the others in recent history, ”neighbours” suddenly becoming
our brutal enemy, can become more understandable when ”the genocide”
perpetrated by the others is presented as having ”deep roots”. Similarly, when the
list of the places where the worst atrocities of the Second World War took place
appears to include the same places where the most notorious massacres of the recent
war took place, history can facilitate the understanding of the horrible events in
multi-ethnic communities. If it was possible in the distant past, it can occur now as
well.
The Bosniac book Historija described the damages and losses of the Second
World War using terms similar to those used when describing the recent war,
which again can assist the pupils to connect the inexplicable fate of their country
and hometown to a context in which it becomes understandable and “part of
history”.
The naturalisation process can also be analysed through the use of terms. In
Historija, the use of the term “Bosniac” in the historical context suggests that the
term has always existed alongside Croat and Serb, when in fact it was introduced as
part of the ethnic emphasis of Muslims in the late 1960s and entered the official
language to denote Bosnian Muslims only in the 1990s.377 A Serb book’s use of the
Second World War term “ustašas” when discussing events in the 1990s serves the
need for naturalisation. In fact, it presents an active attempt to incite hatred
towards others, the Croats, in the present context.
Finally, the negative reference to the UN as part of the representation of peace,
and its direct comparison to the Bosnian case can help the pupils understand the
UN’s failure in their country; if UN peace-keepers have failed in their mission
previously, it is therefore normal and understandable. In a similar way, the
presently popular idea among Herzegovinian Croats of emphasising the importance
of one’s Croathood, the Croatian language and so forth becomes more
understandable and reasonable for young people through the representation of
Croats in the past: they were presented as having survived in difficult situations
thanks to their particularly upright and sophisticated nature and tenacity in their
struggle as a nation.
The representation of war as great suffering for the people in the Bosniac book
makes the recent war more understandable from the point of view of pupils of
377
See footnote 373.
255
whom many have been refugees and lost their homes. The mixture of suffering and
war heroism in the Serb representation functions in a similar way. The description
of the events in Bleiburg in Povijest in turn can help Croat pupils understand the
story they have been told regarding their national suffering and why their nation
had to defend itself in the last war.
The representation of nation in Historija, which emphasises pan-nationality
and equality, is also politically central in post-war Bosnia. The clear national
identity based on specific and quite unique characteristics (several religious and
national groups living together and in mixed communities) is a popular idea among
the ”pro-Bosnians”. They include more Bosniacs than Croats or Serbs and this kind
of thinking is popular particularly in cities where the tradition of multiculturalism
and mixed communities has been stronger and more prevalent than in the
countryside, as noted in the chapter four. Thus, this type of representation through
history supports the thinking of certain groups in Bosnia; Bosnia must be presented
as having a distinct, unique national and folk tradition.
In analysing the representations of Povijest as a textbook read by Bosnian
Croats, it is worth noting that Bosnia figured nowhere in the presentations of the
book, except when discussing the events in Yugoslavia in the 1990s and Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s position therein. Povijest presented BiH as a totally distinct actor.378
Thus, the book is about Cro ats, about the homeland (domovina). The basic
interpretation of post-WWI history is that of occupation, which was finally
overcome in the 1990s when Croatia gained independence. Therefore, when
studying Povijest, Bosnian Croat pupils cannot but be left with the idea that they
are part of the primordial Croat nation which has the right to its own state. The
Serbs, as Great-Serbs and chetniks, on the other hand, are their eternal enemy.
When looking at this from the perspective of the naturalisation process, the purely
Croat nature of the representations set forth in the textbook may suggest that
Bosnian Croats should either have their own state in Bosnia, or that they should
belong to Croatia proper.
6.5.4 THE POWER OF TEXTBOOK REPRESENTATIONS

The above discussion about the social representation from the naturalisation point
of view is based only on the analysis of the textbooks, not on the pupils’ ideas on
the textbooks. Thus, we can only discuss the possibilities of the naturalisation
process, not the definite contents of it. My assumption, however, is that the school
textbooks play a significant role in the anchoring process. I believe that the
presentations of school history textbooks are considered reliable ones for they are
part of schoolbooks and because history in general is typically perceived as
something firm and unchangeable. The relation between the textbooks and general
history culture also supports this view.
378
Perić 1995, 146.
256
In the definition of this research project, history school textbooks were

considered a part of history culture. One can, however, argue that school textbooks
have less influence on the historical consciousness than do other products of history
culture. This idea is illustrated in Figure 2.

Consciousness, version 1
History Textbooks
Historical Consciousness
Other Products of
History Culture
In this research project, however, the history textbooks to a large extent shared the
values and argumentations present within the history culture. The representations
set forth in the history textbooks resonated with other aspects of history culture
presented in chapter five. For example, the Serb books mention several times the
Cyrillic alphabet as one of the crucial features of Serbhood, and that use of this
alphabet was forbidden in different periods in the name of Serb suppression. In the
last 10 years or so, the use of the Cyrillic alphabet has been one of the important
elements in differentiating ”us” from ”them” among Bosnian Serbs in their history
culture, as mentioned in chapter five. The central characteristic of the prevailing
history culture of Bosniacs, the emphasis on the symbolism and rhetoric of multi-
cultural Bosnia, was also present in the history textbook’s representation. Among
the Croats, the upright idea of the nature of ”us” (particularly in comparison to
others), which is typically part of the history culture of Bosnian Croats, was
certainly reinforced by the presentation of Croats in their school textbook.
Therefore the schoolbooks can serve as good representatives and illustrations of
the prevailing history culture among the three national groups of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In addition, we can remember here that when young Bosnians were
asked about their trust in the history textbooks as presentations of history, Bosnian
8th-grade-respondents reported greatest trust in history textbooks (together with
Scottish, Portuguese and Norwegian) than did respondents from 29 other
European country and minority groups.379
Thus, based on this research, we can argue that the influence of school
textbooks on historical consciousness and the conceptions of history inherent in it,
can be assumed greater than in most cases. At least this grows more and more
379
Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B44-B45 and Annex 3: Table 1.
257
ceratin the longer such textbooks remain on the market and the more generations
are exposed to them throughout their schooling years. This gives additional societal
significance to the representations of the schoolbooks as having influence on the
thinking of Bosnian youth. In the case of Bosnia, the picture above could be drawn
as in Figure 3.

Consciousness, version 2
History Textbooks
Historical Consciousness
Other Products of
History Culture
We will see, however, that at the time of research, 1999–2000, young Bosnians, at
least to some extent, did contradict the above assumption. From the representations
present in the history textbooks, we will now turn to analyse the thinking of the
pupils who read those textbooks. The survey was conducted late in the autumn
term which means that the pupils had read through approximately the first half of
the books analysed.
258
REPRESENTATIONS OF WAR, PEACE AND NATION IN THE YOUTH AND HISTORY SURVEY
7 Representations of War, Peace and Nation

in the Youth and History Survey
The Youth and History survey was conducted among the same 8th-graders that have
studied the history textbooks presented previously. The survey questionnaire
(Annex 1) asked pupils to consider all kind of issues related directly or indirectly to
the past. In the beginning of this chapter, the methodological principles of the
Youth and History analysis and some basic features of the analysed sample will be
presented (7.1). Then we will analyse the items related to the concepts of war (7.2),
peace (7.3) and nation (7.4) and thereby attempt to form a representation of those
concepts among Bosnians when compared to the European average. In the end of
the chapter, I summarise the representations and draw conclusions (7.5).
7.1 Method and Materials

7.1.1 PRINCIPLES OF THE BOSNIAN ANALYSIS
The principles of the quantitative analysis follow the example of the Youth and
History general analysis developed for the Youth and History material.1 In
addition, the analysis relies on the principles presented by De Vaus2 and Alkula3 in
their respective guidebooks on quantitative research. The analysis was based on a
descriptive statistical analysis in difference to statistical inference. In the following, I
present the main principles of the analysis; a detailed presentation of the statistical
analyses applied is available in Annex 2.
The Youth and History questionnaire was designed to provide analysing tools
for a broad set of topics and questions partly due to its nature as a joint effort of
numerous scholars from different scientific and cultural traditions. The
questionnaire included 48 questions and about 280 items. In addition to
1
See Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A and B.
2
See De Vaus 1996/1985.
3
See Alkula, Tapani, Pöntinen, Seppo and Ylöstalo, Pekka 1994. Sosiaalitutkimuksen kvantitatiiviset menetelmät.
Helsinki: WSOY.
259
conceptual questions mentioned in section 3.4.1, several questions dealt with

history teaching and pupils’ interests in history. Pupils were also asked about their
opinions on several socio-political issues such as immigration and controversial
political topics. Conceptions held for different periods in history were also part of
the survey as well as pupils’ knowledge of some historical facts.4
Due to its broad nature, the survey does not form a concise research unity but
rather a set of data that can be used in several ways depending on the interest of the
research in question. The Bosnian data was analysed exploratively in my master
thesis;5, for this research project, the analysis was defined to include the
representation of three mentioned concepts – war, peace and nation – for the
reasons specified previously. This definition allows an analysis which can make use
of the data broadly, yet allows me to concentrate on a clearly defined perspective in
the analysis, which would not have been possible if I had included more concepts
or themes in the scope of the analysis.
The main analyses were performed on the single item level. De Vaus considers
both crosstabulations and comparison of means as appropriate methods for
measuring the associations between nominal (e.g. national groups or countries in
the case of Youth and History) and ordinal (e.g. an item on a likert scale 1–5,
which was the most common in the Youth and History research project) variables.
In the Youth and History research report, the means were used for the single
item level analysis. The figures were usually between 1 and 5, for the likert scale
used in the questionnaire had the answering scale from 1 to 5. The Youth and
History data were not published in crosstabulations, yet for use in the analysis, such
tables were printed. The reason for not publishing the crosstables as part of the
analysis of the samples from 29 country and minority is two-fold: each item would
require its own table, and handling 29 groups in the tables would be impossible.
Secondly, the comparison of items in such enormous tables would be impossible.
Following the original Youth and History survey, the primary form of the
single item level analysis in this research was the mean value analysis. That allowed
for both international and national comparison. The crosstabulations were used as
additional single item level analyses in a few questions. In some questions,
crosstabulations could help in detecting the associations between the variables and
represented a more illustrative way to present the data.
In addition to crosstabulations in the bilateral analyses I sometimes used the
correlation coefficients to detect the connections and associations between the
variables. The associations were, however, mainly measured through the constructs.
Constructs (scales and factors) were built after the single level analysis. The
model of the central analysis team of Youth and History was used. Thus, the
4
The questionnaire as an Annex 1.
5
Torsti, Pilvi 2000. ”Peace-loving and similar” Youth and History – an Explorative Study of the Historical Thinking
Among the Adolescents in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unpublished Master Thesis. Topelia Library. University of Helsinki.
260
analysis was set to find “conceptually or semantically similar items and combine
them with the technique of scaling or factor analysis or both.”6
The Youth and History data is by nature suitable and appropriate for scaling
and factorising: there are plenty of items, many of them deal with opinions and
attitudes (and can therefore be considered as relatively unreliable as single items, yet
very interesting if combined with some other attitudes or opinions which are
semantically similar). Moreover, as the research project has an international
character with several translations of the questions, it is quite likely that the
hermeneutic and explanatory plausibility increases when building constructs. In the
original report, the Hamburg team used the term “combined measures” for
“constructs” to emphasise the idea of combination in building the construct.7 Such
understanding is central for understanding the scaling and factorising possibilities
and relevance in this study too.
The factors and scales were both used as part of the analysis in a way similar to
what was done in the original Youth and History report. The analytical difference
between factors and scales is that scales are unweighted summed scores of the single
items (e.g. a combined item of the importance of religion and importance of ethnic
group), whereas the factors can show dimensions in the answering patterns of the
students to a certain question (e.g. which definitions of nation are associated).8
In this research two different possibilities of factorising were considered. First,
the method available was the one applied in the original Youth and History study;
the overall sample with all the countries was used and constructs calculated. The
second and selected option was to study the combinations and dimensions inside
the Bosnian data only. As the position of Bosnians in the international comparison
level could already be concluded from the single item level analysis (and scales as
well, if needed), after the single item level analysis, we could concentrate on
analysing the characteristics of the Bosnian sample in particular, and make use of
combined statistical measurements in it. The comparison possibility was not absent
in this option either; we could analyse the differences in the structure and search
possible semantic reasons for them. The British national coordinators carried this
type of analysis in the Youth and History research report.9
A comparative approach was central for the Youth and History analysis, which
had several levels of comparison. On the country level, the Bosnian results could be
compared to all of Europe, to the other former Yugoslav republics (Slovenia and
Croatia), and to any other country when relevant and reasonable from the
analytical-semantic point of view. This approach (1) enabled us to view the Bosnian
pupils in the pan-European perspective (2) enabled some analysis of the relation
between the former Yugoslav republics, such as whether pupils from those coutries
6
Angvik and von Borries 1997, A48.
7
8
Angvik and von Borries (ed.), A49.
9
Angvik and von Borries 1997, A377-387.
261
often appeared to be thinking similarly, or whether there were some major

differences, etc.
Another level of comparison was possible when the Bosnian sample was divided
into three main national groups. Bosniacs, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats
could be compared to one another as well as to other sub-groups. In some
instances, comparing the Bosnian Croats to Croatians and other Bosnians could be
a fruitful way to see whether Bosnian Croats’ attitudes seem to converge more with
their Croat-brothers or with their country mates (Bosniacs and Bosnian Serbs)
when judging from the Youth and History results.
Finally, some final remarks regarding the Youth and History methodology. In
the original Youth and History report, the team reported all the results first in the
single item level (mean tables and crosstabulations which were printed only as an
unpublished copy for people analysing the results), and then built all the constructs
for the entire sample. In the Bosnian case, all the single item values were calculated
for the explorative analysis of the data.10 For this study, I have calculated only those
mean tables and crosstabulations relevant to the following analysis. The same is true
for constructs; many more constructs were built in the process of the analysis than
appear in the final product, which only reports those constructs that have been used
in the analysis. A detailed presentation of the statistics used in the analysis is
available in Annex 2. None of the calculations of the explorative analysis has been
used in this research.
In the analyses, I could not avoid some repetition. Because I wanted to analyse
the representation of three concepts that are related, some questions and items were
used for argumentation in two or even three concepts.
The terms used in the statistical analysis follow the principles of the original
Youth and History report. The term M/m refers to the statistical mean value, R/r
refers to the Pearson correlation between two items, and F/f to a factor score. For
Croats citizens of the Republic of Croatia, I have used the term ’Croatians’. When
referring to Serbs other than Bosnian Serbs, it is clear from the context. In the
Youth and History analysis, the term ’Europeans’ means all the pupils who
participated in the Youth and History survey, and ’European overall’ is the mean
value of their answers to a certain item. mBosn refers to the mean value of the
entire Bosnian sample, moverall means the mean of the entire European sample.
The national group means are: mSerb, mCroat and mBosniac. mCroatian refers to
the mean value of the Croatian national sample. The words pupil and student will
be used as synonyms referring always to the students that participated in the
research.
To avoid the overuse of numbers and tables which compromises the readability
of the text, the statistical tables are printed separately in Annex 3, and referred to in
footnotes. In the tables, the abbreviations for items developed for the Youth and
History research project are used. Thus the question asking about the definitions
10
Torsti 2000.
262
for nations has items that are coded as NATIO_A, NATIO_B, NATIO_C, etc.
The codes for each question appear in the questionnaire (Annex 1).
For the availability of the data, the solution of the Youth and History research
project is used: the data matrix is included on a cd-rom with this study for any
reader to use or check the calculations. The statistics of the European sample are
available as a cd-rom in the Youth and History research report.11
7.1.2 GENERAL FEATURES OF THE SAMPLE

The principles of the sample and sample collection were presented in chapter three.
In the following, I have summarised the general features of the actual realised
sample used in the analysed that follow.
In the final sample, 49% of the pupils are boys and 51% girls. Of the sample,
48% consider their place of residence in a rural area, the rest report living mainly in
small towns, and 9% in large towns or metropolises. Of the Bosniac pupils, a great
majority (71%) report living in towns, while Serb (61%) and Croat (64%) pupils
mainly report living in rural areas.
Most of the pupils are 14-year-olds, the average of the age of the pupils being
14.05.
Of the analysed sample of 907 pupils, 322 go to school in the Serb Republic
(RS). The remaining 585 go to school in the other entity of Bosnia and
Hercegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of those, who reported
their nationality as ”Serb”, 5 went to school in the FBiH, and the rest in the RS,
while in the schools of the RS, 4 pupils reported being Bosniacs, and 3 pupils
Croats. Thus, our sample shows that at the end of 1999 the school classes and
schools were almost perfectly divided along nationality lines.
The religious denomination of the pupils cannot be observed from the Youth
and History data as the question ”To which religious group do you belong?” was
forbidden in the schools in FBiH. As mentioned, the Ministry of Education banned
the question. However, since nationality and religious community often follow the
same lines of division in today’s BiH, we can assume that there are only a very few
exceptions to the rule that Croat=Roman Catholic, Serb=Orthodox,
Bosniac=Muslim. Thus, we can analyse the meaning of religion in contrast to the
interest in politics as descriptive general information about our informants.
Pupils were asked ”the meaning of religion for you” in the scale very little,
little, some, much, very much. As many as 77% of Bosniacs, 78% of Croats, and
70% of Serbs considered the meaning of religion as “much” or “very much”. When
all the Europeans are taken together, only 45% considered the meaning of religion
as “much” or “very much”. In the neighbouring former Yugoslav republics, as few
as 29% of Slovene pupils, and 66% of Croatian pupils considered the meaning of
11
Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B.
263
religion as much or very much. Compared to BiH, the religion was of equal or
greater meaning only in Turkey, Poland and Palestine.
Bosnians show as little interest in politics as do their peers in other former
Yugoslav republics: 61% of Croatians and 70% of Slovenes report having little or
very little interest in politics; Corresponding figures for Bosnians are 59% among
Bosniacs, 55% among Croats and 62% among Serbs. As a whole, 46% Europeans
report having little or very little interest in politics. Similar results were recorded by
the UNDP among 14-to-30-year old Bosnians in 2000: 55% were totally or mostly
disinterested in politics; 50% thought they cannot influence the politics of Bosnia
and Herzegovina at all, and only 7% to the degree required.12
7.2 War
In the following, we will discuss the representation of war among Bosnian
adolescents based on the Youth and History survey results. In this context the “war”
is understood as a general concept that is closely related to conflict and violence,
even if not exactly the same.13 Most of the items discussed here do, however, leave
room for discussion of how the pupils are most likely to define the concepts when
considering different questions. I attempt to take up that discussion in the course of
the argumentation.
Our discussion on the insights of the representation of war in the minds of
Bosnian pupils divides into five sub-chapters: we will consider the possible fighting
parties in war situations and the reasons to go to war (7.2.1), the justifications and
rights to fight wars (7.2.2), the historical (7.2.3) and future (7.2.4) significance of
wars, and finally the associations with Hitler (7.2.5). In the conclusion, I put all the
different aspects together to formulate a coherent picture of the representation of
war that young Bosnians apparently have.
7.2.1 WHO IS FIGHTING AND WHY?

Some of the items in the Youth and History questionnaire allow us to discuss the
question of who the possible fighting parties in conflict situations are. As the items
used in the questionnaire were of such a nature that they also include the reason(s)
the group is likely have for the conflict, we can deal with the question “why are they
fighting” in the same context.
First, we can examine the question in which the respondents were asked their
associations with the changes in Eastern Europe since 1985. The associations
considered included “the Downfall of the USSR”, “the Democratisation of Soviet
12
13
In one of the basic books on peace studies, Johan Galtung constantly refers to violence and war in a synonymous
sense. Galtung, Johan 1996. Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. Oslo:
Prio, 17.
264
society”, “the Freedom of member states of the Warsaw treaty”, “the Victory of the
USA in the Cold War”, “Treason against socialist ideas”, “National conflicts and
civil wars”, and “the Establishing of market economy in Eastern Europe”. As we
can see from Table 2, among young Bosnians, the association “national conflicts
and civil wars” had the second highest mean (m=3.29) of all the associations after
“the establishing of market economy in Eastern Europe” (m=3.34).14
The strength of the consensus among Bosnians on “national conflicts and civil
wars” characterising the change in Eastern Europe since 1985, however, was not
high in European comparison: of the overall sample, only in Finland (m=3.22) and
in Hungary (m=3.28) was the mean value lower than in Bosnia.15 Within the
Bosnians, Serb pupils (m=3.40) associate the changes in Eastern Europe since 1985
slightly more with “national conflicts and civil wars” than do Croats (m=3.23) and
Bosniacs (m=3.25).16
Thus, we can see that Bosnians indeed associate the idea of “national and civil
war” with the changes in Eastern Europe since 1985. For them, it carries a stronger
association than does for instance the “Downfall of the USSR” (m=3.25) which was
clearly the strongest association among the Europeans (m=3.64) when thinking
about the changes in Eastern Europe in last 10 to 15 years.17
What the young Bosnians understand of Eastern Europe is, however, unclear.
We cannot know for example whether the pupils include their country in Eastern
Europe while considering the associations. Generally, “Eastern Europe” is not a
commonly used concept in Bosnia, and the students are likely to be much more
familiar with such concepts as “Southeast Europe”, “Central Europe”, “the West”,
and “the Balkans”. In any case, the answers do imply that the national question and
the civil aspect are possible reasons for conflicts in the thinking of young Bosnians.
Moreover, the answers do reflect that young Bosnians agree with the idea that the
warring parties can well be national groups and groups inside one civil society. This
should not become as a surprise, for young Bosnians live in a nationally-divided
society where war has recently taken place and the different groups continue to
experience constant conflicts on a political level even if the violent conflict is over.
Additional information concerning the ideas of the warring parties and the
reasons for conflicts can be gathered from a block of three questions asking about
conceptions of life 40 years ago and in the coming 40 years. The pupils could
consider the likelihood of the following conditions in the past and future of their
own country18, and in the future of Europe: “peaceful”, “overpopulated”, “exploited
by a foreign state/some states exploit others”, “prosperous and wealthy”,
14
Annex 3: Table 2.
15
Annex 3: Table 2, Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B249.
16
Annex 3: Table 2.
17
18
In the questionnaire, the country was called BiH to avoid the risk of pupils considering different countries
depending on their nationality instead of the state in which they lived.
265
“democratic”, “polluted”, “torn by conflicts between rich and poor” and “torn by
conflicts between ethnic groups”. 19
Who are the likely warring factors in the war representations of the Bosnian
youth? We can compare two groups: “rich and poor” (that is, the socio-economic
factor as a reason for conflicts) and “ethnic groups” (the ethnic factor as a reason for
conflicts). As the wording of the two conceptions in question was “torn by
conflicts”, it is reasonable to assume that the respondents understood the word
conflict in this context as a synonym for a war-like situation.
Bosnians followed the pattern of the European overall sample in considering
the likelihood of conflicts between the rich and poor and between ethnic groups as
being quite the same, as we can see from the very close mean values. This
phenomenon is clear at all time levels both when considering the case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (past m=2.99; 3.11, future m=2.69; 2.83) and when talking about the
future of Europe (m=2.94; 2.94).20
Even though the Bosnians seem to consider the conflicts in their own country
slightly more likely to happen between the ethnic groups than between the rich and
poor, there is no such difference when talking about the future of Europe.21 Thus,
it seems that young Bosnians consider Europe separated from their own country.
Therefore, the greater likelihood of national conflicts between ethnic groups than
between rich and poor reflects the current idea of the nature of typical war in
Bosnia, while the ethnic aspect is not emphasised in the European context. Finally,
the reader ought to be reminded that the previous discussion was relative in the
sense that we did not discuss the absolute values of the possibility or likelihood of
conflicts – whether because of socio-economic or ethnic reasons – but only the
relations between the different types of conflicts. The general idea of the possibility
or likelihood of the wars in the past and in the future in the perception of young
Bosnians will be discussed in the following sub-chapters.
Finally we can briefly look at one item in a question asking about the views of
the pupils about nations and national states (we will return to this question later in
this chapter when we discuss the representation of nation). Bosnians supported the
item “national groups have the right to go to a war to make their own state”
(m=3.14) while the Europeans generally rejected it (moverall=2.68). In fact, the
Bosnian values were among the highest for the question. Inside the Bosnian
sample, Bosniacs expressed slightly less support for the idea (mBosniac=3.05;
mCroat=3.19; mSerb=3.24).22 Thus, we can conclude that young Bosnians see
national groups as likely to wage war when they want to establish a state. The
interpretation is, however, only a cautious one for Bosnian support of the idea was
modest.
19
Of all the items, the items ‘overpopulated’ and ‘polluted’ had to be omitted in the Bosniac and Croat school due to
the regulation of the Ministry of the Federation of Bosniacs and Croats. See 3.4.1.
20
Annex 3: Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5.
21
Annex 3: Table 5.
22
266
7.2.2 REASONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS RELATED TO WAR

Wars usually tend to have justifications behind them. The justifications can be
based for instance on security aspects, political disputes, or a national question.
Therefore, the next aspect of the representation of war among young Bosnians
concerns the justifications and values related to wars.
Territorial justifications
An interesting question in regard to the territorial justifications for war was the fate
of Newland. The pupils were asked: “Suppose that the imaginary territory Newland
was occupied by your home country A from 1500 to 1900. From 1900 until today
Newland has been occupied by country B. Your country A wants to have Newland
back, and puts forward several arguments for its case. How much weight would you
give these arguments?” The arguments which the pupils could consider included
“The people of Newland speak our language and share our culture”, “Newland was
under our control for a longer period (1500–1900) than it has been under the
control of B (1900–1994)”, “Settlers from our country came to Newland in the
year 1500 whereas people from B did not settle in Newland until 1900”, “When
asked, the majority of the people of Newland say that they would prefer to be
controlled by us to be controlled by B”, “B took Newland from us by war in 1900,
which was an unjust act”, “An international peace conference has examined the
case, and recommended that we shall have Newland back”, and “We have the
military power and we will use it to get Newland back under our control”.
The Newland-question focuses on the territorial dispute. Such a dispute is
likely familiar to all Bosnians, including the respondents who were only seven years
old when the Bosnian conflict started, because many of them have also experienced
the consequences of territorial disputes. Thus we can assume that the pupils relate
to this question in a concrete sense and with close connection to the recent war in
their country. One can assume that for young Bosnians, the territory dispute means
a conflict, for the whole war in Bosnia involved territories and was finally resolved
through an international peace conference. Moreover, territorial disputes have also
occurred in Bosnia after the war.23 Thus, when discussing the fate of Newland, we
can speak of the justifications related at least to a conflict situation if not to war.
The three items: “peace conference”, “unjust territory loss by war” and
“military strength in relation to territorial dispute” are of particular interest when
discussing the accepted and rejected justifications and reasons related to war(s).
Other aspects of this question appear in the sub-chapter dealing with the
representation and concept of nation.
Among Bosnians, “The unjust loss of Newland by war” (m=3.44) and “the
recommendation of the peace conference” (m=3.51) are the strongest arguments to
23
For example, the status of the city of Brčko was decided only in 1999, and border disputes have occurred between
the entities.
267
justify getting Newland back. On the other hand, the territorial dispute solved
through military strength, which would indicate justifying wars as a means of
solving territorial questions, finds less support as an argument (m=3.23). However,
if we look at the Bosnian values in absolute terms, support for the military strength
argument is among the highest in Bosnia when compared to the entire sample: only
Poles (m=3.43), Bulgarians (m=3.33), Israelis (m=3.33) and Palestinians (m=3.55)
give even more weight to the argument.24 The international comparison is
illustrated in Graph 1.
Graph 1: Support for the use of military strength in the re-annexation of
Newland
4,5
4
55
3,
43
3,5 3, 33 33
Mean of the answers
25 25 3, 3,
18 3, 3, 16 21 19
15 3, 3, 15 3, 3,
08 3, 07 3,
3, 3,
3
98 93 97 93 93
2, 2,
2, 2, 2,
78 78 73
72 2, 2, 2,
7
2, 71
2,5 2,
2,
67 2,
55 59 59
2, 2, 2,
41 39
2, 2,
2
1,5
1
Ic
S w rk
Fi
Es
Li
Po
Sl
Bo
Bo : Bo
Bo : Cr
Bu : Se
Is
Is
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Sp
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Be
Fr
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t.
ity
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In all the scale and factor solutions of the Newland question for the Bosnian
country group, the argument of military strength does not belong to any formed
construct but is always left as a separate argument.25 “The peace conference”
argument (.714) and “the unjust loss” argument (.801), in turn load in the same
factor combined with “the self-determination of people” (.540). The factor (14% of
the variance, eigenvalue 1.0) has been interpreted as “Arguments based on justice
and negotiations”.26
On the mean level, Bosnian national groups display no significant differences,
but the constructs formed are, however, slightly different in the national sub-
samples. The “Arguments based on justice and negotiations” factor appears among
Croats (42% of the variance, eigenvalue 3.0) and Serbs (16% of the variance,
eigenvalue 1.1) combining “the unjust loss”, (loading of Croats: .689; loading of
Serbs: .736) “peace conference” (loading of Croats: .776; loading of Serbs: .745)
and “self-determination of people” (loading of Croats: .733; loading of Serbs:
24
25
Annex 3: Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, Table 11, Table 12, Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15.
26
Annex 3: Table 12.
268
.653).27 In turn, among the Bosniacs “unjust loss” (.427), “peace conference” (.669)
and “military strength” (.831) form a factor (15,5%, eigenvalue 1.1) which can be
interpreted as “Arguments based on decisions made by weapons and peace
conference”.28 Among the Serbs, “the military strength” (.833) argument loads in
the third factor of the solution (14%, eigenvalue 1.0) with small by-loading of the
“unjust loss” (.376) argument. The factor is interpreted ”Arguments based on
military power and injustice”. The Croats, in turn, combine “the military strength”
(.780) with “the length of control” (.740), “common language and culture” (.570)
and “earlier settlement” (.570) and the factor (14%, eigenvalue 1.0) can thus be
interpreted as “Arguments based on traditional dominance and violence”.29
What can be concluded from the constructs? The discussion here concentrates
on the same three items as before: through constructs we can obtain some idea of
what belongs together in the minds of the respondents. From the ways that the
“military strength” argument forms constructs, we can see thinking dimensions that
show how the different groups have slightly different ways of justifying war (use of
military strength). The Croats combined “military strength” with “length of
control” and “cultural history”, which could indicate that the use of force could be
justified with traditional values and possessions. In the Serb factors, “military
strength” had only one weak by-loading, thus indicating that “military strength”
stands on its own merit. Finally, the Bosniacs combined “military strength” with
“unfair loss” and “peace conference”, which could perhaps indicate that for them,
injustice in past territorial issues could justify the use of country’s military strength;
in other words, to wage war. Altogether, the conclusions from the factor structures
of the groups can only suggest possibilities of the slightly differing thinking
patterns, but they cannot be considered affirmative.
Finally, one can conclude that the “justice-peace conference” dimension is
strongest when all the Bosnians evaluate the war in the Newland question; Bosnian
adolescents approve “unjust loss” and the “decision of a peace conference” as
reasons when settling a territorial dispute. Thus, the “injustice experienced in the
past” would qualify as reasoning for claiming a lost territory. As mentioned, it is
assumed that young Bosnians in fact consider the settling of territorial dispute in
very close connection to their recent past (=war). Therefore, we can conclude that
the “injustice in the past” seems the clearest plausible reason for war among young
Bosnians as a whole.
The definition and meaning of what is just or unjust for young Bosnians
cannot be discussed based on our material.
27
Annex 3: Table 14 and Table 15.
28
Annex 3: Table 13.
29
Annex 3: Table 14, Table 15.
269
National justifications and reasons

The question of “territorial dispute” as it was formed in the “re-annexation of
Newland” question clearly included nationally-based thinking, for there were two
countries fighting over control of Newland with different arguments based on
traditions, force and a peace conference. Thus, it is logical to ask next about the
national justifications for wars.
As mentioned earlier, in the Youth and History research project the
respondents were asked to agree with different concepts of a nation and national
states. Among the items was “National groups have the right to go to war to make
their own state”. The sentence needs no interpretation as the wording is so
straightforward.
Graph 2: Agreement with the right of national groups to wage war to establish
their own state
5
4,5
4
Mean of the answers
3,5 27 3
3, 3, 24 24 25
19 3, 3, 3, 18
3, 09 3,
06 05 3,
3, 3,
3
73 7 74
2,5 65 67 68 2, 2, 2, 69 67
63 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 59
2, 57 2,
47 2, 2,
5
4 43 2, 4
2, 2, 2,
29 28
2, 22 2,
2 2,
17 2,
1,5
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Fi
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Sl
Bo
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As Graph 2 shows, the differences between the thinking of adolescents around

Europe on this question are significant. Under the central line lie those countries in
which pupils clearly reject the idea of national groups having the right to go to war
to make their own state. Countries or national groups that agree with the idea of a
nations’ right to go to war to make their own state include Lithuania, Poland,
Slovenia (modestly), Bulgaria, Israel, Israeli Arabs, Palestine and all the Bosnian
groups (Bosniacs modestly).
It is also worth noting that Croatians do not support the argument (m=2.73)
which might be considered a surprise for a great part of the Croat public rhetoric
has focused on the idea of war for Motherland, which is justified precisely for
national reasons.30
30
Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B365.
270
Anyhow, it is clear that all the Bosnian national groups agree with the idea of
nations having right to wage war to establish their state. Serbs and Croats are more
supportive of the idea than are Bosniacs, but from the answers of Bosniacs, it seems
clear that they see themselves as a national group. Otherwise they would not
support this kind of thinking, which nearly made them a nation without a territory
during the war in which Serbs and Croats were willing to divide Bosnia among
themselves. Chapters four and five showed that the national question has been
central to the history disputes and that the division of the country has happened
purely along national lines, under the influence of genocidal policies.
As the question on the concept and rights of a nation and nation-states relates
to the question of the re-annexation of Newland, I decided to calculate a factor
solution for the items of the two questions. The factor solution in Table 16 shows
that the third factor of the solution (eigenvalue 1.253, explaining 9.6 % of the
variance) combines the arguments: ”we (our country) have military strength and we
will use to get Newland back” (.699) and ”Nations have right to go to war to make
their own state” (.799) in a factor which can be interpreted as “Nations’ right for
military use in forming its own state”. There are no other factors in the solution
that would combine items of the two questions, and the two items of the third
factor do not load significantly on any other factor of the solution.31 This result
further confirms the earlier claim that young Bosnians support the idea of a nation’s
right to war; in other words, they support the use of military strength to solve
territorial disputes. Moreover, this factor supports the earlier interpretation of the
Newland question in which it was assumed that young Bosnians relate the
territorial dispute question to the idea of war between different national groups.
7.2.3 THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF WARS

When discussing young Bosnians’ representation of the war in light of the Youth
and History research, one important aspect is the historical significance the
adolescents give to war(s). How do they evaluate wars? Are they interested in the
history of wars? Do they consider wars important determinants of change in the
past? Do they see wars as a significant part of life in the past?
First we can have a look at the values that are generally related to wars. There
can be for instance national values, heroic values, human values, or territorial
values, which are central to the conflict. The collective memories of past conflicts
also often have their own set of shared values in the collective memory of the
country. That the symbols of the Second World War appeared among Serbs and
Croats in the 1990s and thus found their way to Bosnia too, represents not an
example of a country’s collective memory, but of that of a national group. We saw
several examples of it when analysing the prevailing history culture in chapter five
of this research report.
31
Annex 3: Table 16.
271
The question in the Youth and History survey that allows discussion of the
values related to war is the question in which the pupils were asked to consider the
weight they would give to the preservation of different items if a motorway was
planned in their region. The items to be preserved included “a stone-age religious
site”, “a medieval church”, “a three hundred-year-old farmhouse in good
condition”, “an old factory still in use”, “a war memorial remembering World War
II”, “the residence of a famous poet who died 100 years ago”, “a rare geological
formation” and “a nesting site for a threatened bird”.
Among the Bosnians, the “preservation of the war memorial for WWII” was
considered by far the most important item to be preserved (m=3.65). This is
interesting since in Croatia for example only preserving “the old factory still in use”
(m=2.55) was considered less important than “preserving the WWII memorial”
(m=3.08). The other former Yugoslav republic Slovenia followed the same line of
argumentation; the “war memorial” was the third least important item for
preservation (m=3.42), while only “old factory still in use” (m=2.88) and “rare
geological formation” (m=3.39) proved less important for preservation. Within the
Bosnian sample, Serbs give more weight to the “preservation of the war memorial”
(m=3.83) than do Bosniacs (m=3.53) and Croats (m=3.59).32
Among the Croats, the preservation of the medieval church (m=3.76) was
considered even more important than the preservation of the war memorial
(m=3.59), which simply indicates the great importance of the Catholic Church
among the Croats.33
Thus, all the Bosnian national groups seem to value World War II highly and
positively, as they are willing to preserve a war memorial to it. It can, of course, be
discussed whether this willingness to preserve can actually be interpreted as an
indication of a positive evaluation of WWII. The other interpretation – which has
been used in many countries in discussing on war monuments and their importance
– could be the importance OF NOT FORGETTING the cruelties. In this case,
however, the more likely and plausible interpretation seems to be the high valuation
young Bosnians, and young Bosnian Serbs in particular, have of WWII. As
mentioned in chapter five, the WWII memorial resembles the memorial of the
recent war in Banja Luka, thus creating the idea of a continuum between the two
wars.
Next, we can examine the interest Bosnian adolescents have in the history of
wars. The pupils were asked to consider their interest in different kinds of history:
“the everyday life of ordinary people”, “Kings and queens and other famous
people”, “adventures and great discoveries”, “wars and dictatorships”, “distant
foreign cultures”, “the making of nations”, “the development of democracy”, “the
effects of humans on their environment” and “the development of agriculture,
industry and trade”. The Bosnians reported the greatest interest in “the story of
32
Annex 3: Table 17, Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B339-340.
33
Annex 3: Table 17.
272
your family” (m=4.29) and “adventures and great discoveries” (m=4.03). The
interest in the history of “wars and dictatorship” (m=3.17) was lower among young
Bosnians than among other nations: only Icelandic (m=3.04), Estonian (m=2.92),
Ukrainian (m=3.10), Polish (m=3.12), Czech (m=2.99), Slovene (m=2.86) and
Palestinian (m=3.11) youth showed less interest in the history of wars and
dictatorships than did Bosnians.34
Compared to the other republics of former Yugoslavia, however, Bosnians
(m=3.17) show similar levels of interest in the history of wars and dictatorships to
Croatians (m=3.18) while Slovenes show less interest (m=2.86). Of the Bosnian
national groups Croats (m=3.40) show more interest in the history of wars and
dictatorships than do Bosniacs (m=3.09) and Serbs (m=3.13).35
Thus, former Yugoslavian adolescents in general express only little interest in
the history of wars and dictatorships. This is interesting provided that they have
experienced (Slovenes only in passing) war in their memorable past, and generally
wars have shaped life in their region greatly during the last century. In Table 3 and
Table 4 in the beginning of chapter six, we concluded that the wars constitute
extensive amounts of the history textbooks as well. This was particularly true of
Serbs, but is not at all reflected in their interest in the history of wars and
dictatorships. Greater Bosnian Croat interest might indicate that they associate the
history of wars and dictatorships with the Croat nation-building project. The
“homeland war” has been central among them.
How then the interest in the history of wars and dictatorships seems to be
constructed? We can look at the factor solution to see which items load together
with the interest for wars and dictatorships.
From all the items asking about the pupils’ interest in the different kinds of
history, we obtain the factor solution presented in Table 19. Of interest in this
context is the first factor (eigenvalue 3.041, explaining 27.6% of the variance),
which I have interpreted as “Interest in national and democratic processes and wars
in history”. Its leading items with highest loadings are “interest in the history of the
making of nations” (.784) and “interest in the history of the development of
democracy” (.713) with high by-loading in “interest in the history of wars and
dictatorships” (.592) and “interest in the history of foreign cultures” (.540).36
Based on the factor solution, it seems that an interest in “the history of wars
and dictatorships” is connected to an interest in “the history of nation-making” and
in the “development of democracy”. Perhaps pupils perceive the “history of the
emergence of democratic nation-states” and “the history of wars and dictatorships”
as parallel, interconnected processes. The nature of the association remains unclear
on the basis of our data. The way the pupils connect their interests in the different
34
35
36
Annex 3: Table 19.
273
kinds of history, however, seems to indicate the thinking that wars and
dictatorships are a necessary part of the development of democratic nation states.
The interest that the pupils report having in the kinds of history does not,
however, indicate the significance they attach to the different factors in history.
Thus, to move from pure interest in the history of wars to the significance of wars
in history, we can examine the question which asked the pupils to consider how
much different factors have changed life up to today. One of the 15 determinants
of change was “wars and armed conflicts”.
As can be seen from Table 20, Bosnians did not consider “wars and armed
conflicts” significant factors at all (m=3.06) when compared to all the other factors
in question: only “kings, queens and outstanding political persons” were, in their
opinion, even less significant (m=2.95) in changing the life up to today. The
international comparison in Graph 3 shows that the Bosnians in fact have the
lowest mean of all the countries. Within Bosnian sample, Serb pupils consider wars
and armed conflicts the least important (m=2.94) while Croats attach to them
slightly higher value (m=3.18). Of the entire sample, only Croatians have as low
value as Bosnians (m=3.10).37
Graph 3: The significance of wars and armed conflicts in changing life up to

today
4,5
15
4,
97
3, 91 4
4 81 84 3,
3, 3, 78 3,
8
72 72 73 3, 71
63 3, 3, 67 63 66 3, 66 3,
3, 3, 3, 62 3, 61 3,
54 4 53 3, 53 3,
3, ,5 3, 3, 51 5
3 3, 3, 46
39 3,
3,5 34 3,
Mean of the answers
3,
18
1 1 3,
3, 3,
3
94
2,
2,5
1,5
1
Ic
De y
Sw rk
Fi
Es
Li
Po e
Sl
Cr
Bo
Bo : B
Bo : C
Bu
Tu
Is
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Pa Ara
Po ne
Sp
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Be ny
Fr
Cz ry
G
or
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B: itai
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ity
.
The graph illustrates well how, by international comparison, exceptionally little

significance young Bosnians attach to wars and armed conflicts as factors that have
changed life up to the present. Taken together with their exceptionally low interest
in the history of wars and armed conflicts, we can note their particular war
orientation in regard to history compared to other countries: wars in history are
37
Annex 3: Table 20.
274
uninteresting and have little significance as factors for change. Croatian adolescents
demonstrated similar war orientation, thus suggesting similar thinking among the
youth there to those in Bosnia.
The scales built for Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding significant factors for
change in history further support the argumentation that can be developed from
the mean tables: “technology, science and thinkers” (m=3.98) are the most
important factors that have changed life up to now, compared to other scales
combining “ecological, demographic and military processes” (m=3.12) and “events
and persons” (m=3.18).38
When discussing the significance of wars in the past, the factor structure of the
question suggests interesting thinking patterns. In Table 24, we can see the factor
solution for the entire Bosnian sample. The three dimensions in the solution
provide us a structure that is easy to interpret: The first factor (eigenvalue 4.748,
explaining 31.7% of the variance) has high loadings on four items: “wars and
armed conflicts” (.562), “ecological crises” (.794), “natural disasters” (.809) and
“mass migration” (.766). Thus, it can be interpreted as ”Influence of ecology,
demography and wars in the past”. The crisis/disaster aspect in the items that load
on the factor could be emphasised even a bit more than the name of the factor now
indicates. It seems quite likely that the pupils have combined events in the past that
somehow relate to unavoidable crisis situations. In their minds, ecological
catastrophes and wars might have a similar, slightly deterministic nature. This is, of
course only, a speculation; our data cannot provide proof of such thinking and
thus, in order not to over-interpret the data, we’ll keep the name of the factor as
stated.39
The two other dimensions (eigenvalues 1.761 and 1.004 explaining 11.8% and
6.7% of the variance) can be interpreted as ”Influence of persons and politics in the
past” and ”Influence of technology and rationality in the past”. For the analysis of
the representation of the war and its significance in the past, the “influence of
persons and politics in the past” dimension is noteworthy, for the “war and armed
conflicts” item has relatively high by-loading on it (.515). Thus, in the thinking of
young Bosnians, the influence of wars in the past seems to be associated with (1)
natural/demographic changes and disasters and (2) politics and persons.
The Bosnian sub-group factor solutions for the factors influencing the change
of life up to now offer some hints about the different thinking structures that exist
among the Serbs as compared to Bosniacs and Croats regarding the question of the
role of wars and armed conflicts. Bosniacs and Croats show fairly identical
dimensions in their thinking, as Tables 25 and 26 show. The item “influence of
wars and armed conflicts” loads in both sub-groups in the same factor with
ecological and demographical factors.40
38
Annex 3: Table 21, Table 22, Table 23.
39
Annex 3: Table 24.
40
275
Serb pupils, in turn, seem to associate the role of wars and armed conflicts in
the past slightly differently. In factor 2, “Influence of ecology and demography”,
the “wars and armed conflicts” do have a notable by-loading. The item loads highly
(.748), however, in the fourth dimension of the solution together with “social
movement & conflicts” (.660) and “economic interests and competition” (.636).
The factor 4 can thus be interpreted as ”Influence of social & economic factors and
wars in the past”. The factor 4 only explains 6.7% of the variance and has a
relatively low eigenvalue (1.100) and thus has little significance for our analysis.
Yet, it does indicate that Serb pupils associate wars and conflicts in the past with
socio-economic factors. This might indicate thinking about social unrest in
association with wars, since because both “social conflict” and “economic
competition” have the connotation of a slightly unstable society – at least for young
Bosnians.41
The significance of wars in the past can also be discussed in relation to the
question of the conception of life in one’s own country 40 years ago. The items
were already previously listed. Comparison with the entire European sample must
be performed with a little caution for there is a 3 to 5 year difference in the
answering time of the pupils, which thus changes the point in time regarding what
40 years ago means. In addition, the great differences between the countries in their
recent past made the central analysis group in Hamburg opt not to compare the
subgroups as it would not have yielded reliable results.42
Table 3 displays the Bosnian means and from this, we can see that just as much
as the Bosnians see the past of their country “torn by conflicts between ethnic
groups” (m=3.11), they see it as “peaceful” (m=3.11). Serb pupils consider the
ethnic conflicts of the past more likely (m=3.27) compared to Croats (m=3.05) and
Bosniacs (m=3.04). In fact, in the European sample, only two groups – Croatians
(m=3.29) and Welsh pupils (m=3.29) – consider life torn by ethnic conflicts in
their countries 40 years ago more likely than do Bosnian Serbs.43
To conclude: the idea of the past among young Bosnians is not at all war-
orientated. It is only the Serb pupils who have a clearly positive value for the idea of
their country having been torn by ethnic conflicts 40 years ago, while Croats and
Bosniacs refuse such an idea.
7.2.4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WARS IN THE FUTURE

The representation that young Bosnians hold for the war can also be viewed from
the future perspective. As argued earlier, the original Youth and History research
project was based on the idea of historical consciousness seeing past, present and
future as interconnected; the way one sees the past will influence the way one
perceives the present, which in turn influences expectations for the future.
41
Annex 3: Table 27.
42
43
276
The pupils were asked to consider how much different factors will change life
in the coming 40 years. The factors were the same as in the question asking about
the pupils’ conceptions of the determinants of the past listed in section 7.2.3.
Young Bosnians have lived through a total war in their recent past. In that
light, it seems surprising that they do not believe that wars and armed conflicts will
be important factors of change in the coming decades. Table 28 illustrates that they
consider “wars and armed conflicts” the second least remarkable factor of change in
the future. Their mean value (2.83) is indeed the lowest by far of all the countries
in the European overall sample, which Graph 4 is illustrates. In conclusion, of all
the adolescents from the 29 country- and minority groups surveyd, young Bosnians
demonstrated the weakest belief in the idea that wars and armed conflicts would
change life in the coming 40 years.44
4,5
05
4,
4 84
78 3, 73 75
66 3, 66 68 68 3, 68 3,
3, 62 3, 3, 3, 61 61 3, 64
54 3, 52 56 3, 54 3, 3,
3, 3, 5 3, 5 47 3,
3, 4 42 3, 3, 39
3, 35
Mean of the answers
3,5 3, 34 33 3, 3,
3, 3,
18 18
3, 3,
3
99
2,
81
2,5 2, 75
2,
1,5
1
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Graph 4: Wars and armed conflicts as the determinants of the change in life in
future
Instead, young Bosnians attach far greater significance to “technical inventions”
(m=3.92), “the development of science” (m=4.18), and “philosophers” (m=3,70) as
determinants of future change. This is best and most reliably demonstrated by the
scale “Influence of Technology, Science and Thinkers in the Future” (m=3.94) in
Table 29 that combines the three single determinants with the highest mean
values.45
Thus Graph 4 compares directly to Graph 3: young Bosnians are consistent in
their argumentation about the role of wars and armed conflicts in bringing change.
In Graph 3, the question concentrates on the change in the past, while Graph 4
44
Annex 3: Table 28.
45
Annex 3: Table 29. The strong belief young Bosnians have in technology as a factor of change is interesting, for
internet services have been poorly available for youth in Bosnia. In 2000, only 8% of youth reported using Internet.
Human Development Report Bosnia and Herzegovina 2000. Youth. UNDP: Independent Bureau for Humanitarian
Issues, 51.
277
illustrates the future orientation. In both graphs, Bosnian groups fall below all other
samples, which demonstrates their particular orientation towards wars and armed
conflicts as factors of change.
Even though, in the opinion of young Bosnians, “wars and armed conflicts”
were of little significance as determinants of change in the future, we can examine
the combinations of determinants characteristic of their answers. What do they
associate with wars and armed conflicts when thinking about the determinants of
change in the future?
Table 30 shows that the factor solution for the future determinants is parallel to
the solution of the past determinants (Table 24). The solution results in three
dimensions, which can be interpreted as ”The influence of ecology, demography
and wars in the future” (eigenvalue 4.557; explaining 30.4% of the variance), ”The
influence of technology and rationality in the future” (eigenvalue 1.630; explaining
10.9% of the variance) and ”The influence of persons and politics in the future”
(eigenvalue 1.275; explaining 8.5% of the variance). The “wars and armed
conflicts” loads (.661) in the first factor. Other items loading in the factor include
“ecological crises” (.795), “natural disasters” (.818), and “mass migration” (.741).46
This means that in the minds of young Bosnians “wars and armed conflicts” as
future determinants are related to natural disasters and population movements; in
other words to more or less deterministically occurring events, which are relatively
unpredictable. Young Bosnians demonstrated similar thinking when asked to
consider the past determinants. On the single item level, all the items loading on
the ”Influence of the ecology, demography and wars in the future” factor, however,
had relatively low values (m=3.06–3.22). Therefore, it is important to bear in mind
that we are talking about a dimension in thinking, not the strength of it.47
The differences in thinking among Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs are only
marginal in regard to wars and armed conflicts as determinants of future change on
the single item level.48 The factor solutions of the three groups can offer some hints
about possibly slightly different ways of combining the future determinants. In the
Bosniac sample, the “wars and armed conflicts” load (.615) in factor 2 of their
solution, which can be interpreted as “Influence of political changes and wars in the
future” (eigenvalue 1.651; explaining 11.0% of the variance). The wars and armed
conflicts also have a high by-loading (.442) on the factor 1 “Influence of ecology
and demography in the future” (eigenvalue 4.646; explaining 31.0% of the
variance).49 When looking at the Croat solution, the dimension in factor 1 is clear
and interpreted as “Influence of ecology, demography and wars in the future”
(eigenvalue 4.378; explaining 29.2% of the variance).50 In the Serb sample, in
addition to ecological and demographic items, the items related to political change
46
Annex 3: Table 30.
47
Annex 3: Table 28.
48
Annex 3: Table 28.
49
Annex 3: Table 31.
50
Annex 3: Table 32.
278
(“political reforms” and “political revolution”) load in the same factor (.474 and
.429) with the “wars and armed conflicts” (.701). The factor is interpreted as
“Influence of ecology, demography, wars and politics in the future” (eigenvalue
4.651; explaining 31.0% of the variance). Thus, the Serb pupils seem to relate wars
as a future determinant not only to the ecological and demographic factors but also
to active political changes. Wars as future determinants also have a modest political
dimension.51 Here we can note that the Serb pupils also had a socio-economic
dimension connected to the significance of wars as past determinants.
The previous discussion concentrated on the ideas of the future determinants
that young Bosnians have. As the question was worded “how much the different
factors will change life in the coming 40 years”, it is clear that the low significance
given for “wars and armed conflicts” does not indicate that Bosnians would
necessarily think there will be no wars but that they think that ”wars and armed
conflicts” will not change life too greatly (underlining P.T.).
Based on our data, we can, however, also discuss the likelihood of wars in the
future in the thinking of Bosnian adolescents. This can be accomplished through
the questions asking about the conceptions of life in one’s own country and in
Europe in 40 years. The possible conceptions were the same as in the question in
which respondents previously considered the past of their own country.
The conflict related conceptions, “torn by conflicts between rich and poor”
(m=2.61) and “torn by conflicts between ethnic groups” (m=2.83) are not
considered at all likely to characterise the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina
according to young Bosnians. The idea of conflicts in future Europe is also seen as
an unlikely situation (m=2.94; 2.94).52 When looking at the Bosnian and European
future together, it can be noted that the young Bosnians in fact consider “life torn
by conflicts” more likely to be true in the future of Europe (m=2.94 and 2.94) than
in the future of their own country (m=2.69 and 2.83).
The reliability of the scales “The expectation of internal conflicts in the
country” (α=.6170–.7084) and “The expectation of internal conflicts in Europe”
(α=.6747–.6919) among all the three groups confirms the relation between the two
conflict items. Thus, we can reliably speak of the likelihood of conflicts in general
without distinguishing ethnic groups from the rich and poor.53 The scale proved
reliable in all the countries that participated in the Youth and History research and
the values are illustrated in Graph 5 (following page).
51
Annex 3: Table 33.
52
53
279
Graph 5: Expectation of internal conflicts in one’s own country

5
4,5
49
3, 39
3,5 38 3,
Mean of the answers
29 3, 29 33
3, 23 25 27 3, 23 26 23 3,
22 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3,
3, 3,
2
12 12 3,
2
07 05 3, 07 3,
3, 3, 3,
3
98 94
89 2, 2, 88 2,
9
2, 79 83 2,
74 76 2, 2,
2,5 2, 2, 71
64 2,
2,
1,5
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The graph clearly shows that the Bosnians really consider conflicts in the future far
less likely than most of the adolescents in Europe. In fact, the values of Bosniacs
(m=2.64) and Croats (m=2.71) are the lowest in the entire sample, indicating that
they consider the outbreaks of conflicts in their country least likely of all the
European countries. Serb pupils see the possibility of future conflict more likely
(m=2.94), yet their value is also clearly lower than the European average
(m=3.13).54 The thinking pattern is similar and as consistent when considering the
future of Europe: the scale “Expectation of Internal Conflicts in Europe” shows
that the Bosnians (m=2.94) see the conflicts as much less likely than do Europeans
in general (m=3.30). Again, within the Bosnian sample, Serbs (m=3.06) differ from
Bosniacs (m=2.87) and Croats (m=2.86) in considering the greater likelihood of
“life torn by conflicts”.55 The scale appears in Graph 6 (following page).
54
55
Annex 3: Table 35.
280
Graph 6: Expectation of Internal Conflicts in Europe

5
4,5
4
62 59
53 3, 3,
3,
5 3, 45 45 46 44
3, 3, 39 41 3, 3,
Mean of the answers
3,5 31 31 31 33 3, 31 3, 34
3,
3 3, 3, 3, 3, 24 28 26 3, 24 3,
3 3,
18 3, 3, 3, 3,
3, 14 15
08 3, 6 3,
3, 02 ,0
3, 3
3
93
2, 87 86
2, 2,
2,5
1,5
1
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Sw
Fi
Es
Li
Po
Hu
Sl
Cr
Bo
Bo : Bo
B o : Cr
Bu : Se
Is
Is
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Po ne
Sp
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Fr
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7.2.5 THE ROLE OF HITLER
Lastly, when discussing the representation of war that young Bosnians have in light
of the Youth and History survey, we can examine one separate question in which
the pupils were asked to consider different associations with Adolf Hitler. To
include this question in this discussion appears reasonable because Hitler’s image is
one of the central elements of the Second World War, which, in turn, represents
one of the most widely treated topics in the school history books of our respondents
in the 8th-grade. Moreover, the Second World War has been one of the central and
sensitive topics of history in post-war Bosnia, as argued in chapters four and five.
The personal characteristics of the leaders (in particular Milošević, Tujđman,
Karadžić) have also been central to the recent Bosnian war, and thus the
associations with an old war leader might reflect some of the characteristics of the
representation of war and conflict we are interested in. It should, however, be noted
that the Hitler question differs from most of the items included in this analysis as it
is not part of the general universal representation of wars, but is a specific element
directly related to the understanding of the Second World War among Bosnian
adolescents.
The Hitler question is also interesting, for the pupils seem to have answered it
with great enthusiasm; the agreement and disagreement with different associations
clearly stands out (means vary 2.46–3.97), which demonstrates that there are strong
opinions involved in the answers of the pupils.
The mean values of pupils agreeing with different considerations of Hitler
among Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs appear in Table 36. As can be seen, the
differences particularly between the Croat and Serb pupils appear to be clear. In
281
fact, the associations with Hitler are among the items in which the Bosnian national
groups differ most in the entire Youth and History survey. The differences of
agreement among the associations are particularly notable in items: ”a cynical
dictator and aggressor, guilty of genocide”, ”a gifted orator, organiser and leader”,
and ”a mentally ill, anti-social criminal”. The differences are also notable in items:
”the leading opponent of communism”, ”a puppet of German industrialists and
imperialists” and ”the most notorious representative of totalitarian power and
violence”.56
Serb pupils judged Hitler most strongly by agreeing that he was ”a cynical
dictator, guilty of genocide” (m=4.24), while among the Croats, the thinking on
this item clearly differed (m=3.79). In the same manner, the Serb pupils considered
Hitler a ”mentally ill and antisocial criminal” (m=3.99) and ”the most notorious
representative of totalitarian power and violence” (m=3.96), while among Croats
and Bosniacs, the figures are (m=3.42; 3.67) and (m=3.56; 3.68) respectively.
Croats agreed that Hitler was “a gifted orator, organiser and leader” (m=3.59),
Serbs disagreed (m=2.83), and Bosniacs considered him quite neutral (m=3.15).57
Thus, Croat pupils and, to a lesser extent Bosniacs, tend to agree with the
association of Hitler as a great leader as much as they agree with purely negative
associations of Hitler being a cynical dictator, an anti-social criminal or the most
notorious representative of totalitarian violence. The Serbs, in turn, more clearly
and consistently reject all positive associations of Hitler and strongly agree with the
negative ones.
7.3 Peace
Similar to the way we studied the representation of war among young Bosnians in
light of the Youth and History survey, we can also approach the representation of
peace. As a definition of peace, I have applied the idea of peacefulness/peacelessness
in a given situation.58 In the following, we will concentrate on questions such as
what secures the peace in the minds of Bosnian adolescents (7.3.1), and the
importance of peace (7.3.2). Our data unfortunately does not allow discussion of
the past and future significance of peace for the questions asking pupils to evaluate
the determinants of change did not include “peace”.
7.3.1 WHAT SECURES THE PEACE?

To discuss ideas related to peace, we have to begin by looking at the considerations
for a peaceful life that the Bosnian pupils have. This can be done by investigating
56
Annex 3: Table 36.
57
Annex 3: Table 36.
58
Peace researcher Galtung has argued that in peace studies, the term 'peace' must be defined, but not too strictly.
He suggests using the idea of peacefulness/peacelesness and different typologies when defining peace for research
purposes. Galtung 1996, 13-14.
282
the questions of the Youth and History survey in which adolescents were asked
about their ideas on the peaceful life in the past (40 years ago) and in the future (in
40 years) of their own country, and in the future (in 40 years) of Europe. The
“peaceful life” was an option for consideration together with “exploited by a foreign
country/some states exploit other states” (with Europe), “prosperous and wealthy”,
“democratic”, “torn by conflicts between rich and poor”, “torn by conflicts between
ethnic groups”, “overpopulated” (only with Europe) and “polluted” (only with
Europe).
When considering the past, pupils consider it as likely and possible to have
been “peaceful” as “torn by ethnic conflicts” (m=3.11). In comparative terms,
young Bosnians have one of the highest values in belief in peace in their country in
the past. Only the Nordic students and Russians have an even stronger value in
belief in peaceful life in their country 40 years ago (mNordic=3.35; mRussia=3.23),
as we can see from Graph 7.59
Graph 7: The likelihood of the peaceful life of the country in the past
4,5
4
52
3,
Mean of the answers
3,5 33 36
3, 3 28 3, 27
3, 3, 23 3,
3, 15
09 09 3,
02 3, 3, 03
3, 3, 3
3
98 94
2, 2,
9
88 88 2,
81 83 2, 2, 85
77 2, 2, 2,
2,5 63 68 2, 67 67
2, 61 2, 2, 59 2,
2, 55 55 2,
45 2, 2,
2,
2 2,
19
1,5
1
Ic
Sw rk
Fi
Es
Li
Po e
Sl
Bo
Bo : B
Bo : C
Bu
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Tu
Is
Is
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Sp
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The conception is of course correct: in 1959 life in Bosnia as part of Yugoslavia was
peaceful. But so was it for most of the countries participating in the Youth and
History survey, except some individual countries like Hungary where the national
revolution was crushed in 1956 which seems to be reflected by the one of the lowest
mean values in considering life peaceful 40 years ago (m=2.45). Yet, in most
countries and national sub-groups (excluding perhaps Israel and Palestine), the
youth would not consider life 40 years ago as peaceful from today’s perspective.60
Among the Bosnian national groups one clear difference stands out in relation
to their conceptions of their country’s past: Croats consider all the negative items
59
60
The survey was performed in most of the countries in 1994 or 1995, which means that 40 years ago was 1954 or
1955. Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B256.
283
more likely to have characterised life in their country 40 years ago than peaceful.
Thus, in their thinking, the past is slightly more connected with ethnic conflicts
(m=2.93), conflicts between the rich and poor (m=3.05), and exploitation
(m=2.97) than with peace (m=2.81).61 In contrast the Bosniacs consider the
“peaceful life” as the most likely of all past conceptions (m=3.27), while the Serbs
consider life “torn by ethnic conflicts” the most likely (m=3.27), followed
immediately by the “peaceful life” (m=3.15). Thus, Serb consideration is a confused
mixture of likeliness and possibility of both war and peace.62
Thus, particularly for young Bosniacs, life in their country 40 years ago was
peaceful. Serbs also have a positive mean on the concept even though they find life
characterised by ethnic conflicts even more likely. The Croats, in turn, differ: they
consider life in 1959 not as peaceful but rather connected with conflicts and
exploitation. The idea of future peace is similarly possible and likely in the minds of
young Bosnians both in their country (m=3.42) and in Europe (m=3.42).63 As can
be seen in the Graph 8 and Graph 9, in the European comparison Bosnians’
expectations for a peaceful life are outstanding. When looking to the future of one’s
own country, only Lithuanians (m=3.48) and Czechs (m=3.60) have even higher
expectations for a peaceful life than do Bosnians. Moreover, if examined from the
national group level, Bosniacs have the highest expectation for a peaceful life in the
future in the entire sample (m=3.68).64 In the case of the future of Europe,
Bosnians as a group have the highest expectations for a peaceful life on the
continent in 40 years. If we look at the level of the Bosnian national groups, they
form the three groups with highest expectations for a peaceful life in Europe in the
entire sample (mBosniac=3.60, mCroat=3.40 and mSerb=3.25).65
Graph 8: The likelihood of the peaceful life in the future of the country
4,5
4
68
6 3,
48 3,
3,
Mean of the answers
3,5 33 28
27 3, 26 24 3,
3, 15 17 3, 3,
11 3, 3, 14
3, 07 3, 08
3, 3,
3
98
91 2, 2,
9
2, 79 8 83
2, 2, 2,
2,5 68 71 2,
7
2,
7
68
2, 2, 64 2, 6 61 59
58 2, 55 2, 2, 2,
2, 51 2,
2,
1,5
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61
Annex 3: Table 3.
62
Annex 3: Table 3.
63
Annex 3: Table 4, Table 5, Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B174, B179.
64
65
284
4,5
4
6
3,
Mean of the answers

4
3,5 29 3,
24 21 3, 25
3, 3, 3, 18
1 3, 06
01 3, 3,
3,
3
88 91
81 2, 2, 82
76 74 2, 2, 72
2,5 2, 2,
7
2, 2,
69
61 61 66 2,
7
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41 42 2 46 41
2, 2, 2, 2,
2
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Graph 9: The likelihood of the peaceful life in the future of Europe
In their considerations about the future of BiH and Europe in 40 years, all the
national groups see a peaceful life among the most likely characteristics. Among the
Serbs, however, life in which “some states exploit other states” is more likely
(m=3.61) than a life that is “peaceful” (m=3.25).66
As we have seen, most young Bosnians consider the past of their country
characterised by the peaceful life. Even more consistently they believe the future of
both their own country and Europe will be peaceful. This can be considered slightly
surprising in the post-war situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina where a real war has
taken place and the situation has for years seemed perhaps more a ‘post-war’ or
‘non-war’ life than a peaceful life due to its instability and sense of impermanence,
as described in chapter four. Moreover, the antagonistic national division of the
country, also demonstrated in chapters five and six, could be assumed the source of
fear of war or conflicts.
Therefore, we have to ask what seems to secure the peace in the minds of young
Bosnians, or at least, what belongs together with the peaceful life they so much
believe in as a characteristic of future life and, to some extent, the life in the past
also. Of course, we are limited by the Youth and History data and can discuss the
securing of the peace aspect only within those limitations.
First we can examine what belongs together with the “peaceful life” in the
thinking of young Bosnians by looking for possibilities to build constructs from the
items of the three questions in which pupils considered the possibility and likeliness
of peaceful life in the past and in the future. The message is consistent from the
three factor solutions. In the question of the past of BiH, as well as that of the
future of BiH and Europe, the factor solutions result in two clear dimensions. They
can be interpreted as “The expectation of well-being” (34.3; 20.7; 21.9% of the
variance, eigenvalues 2.1; 1.2; 1.8) and “The expectation of conflicts and
66
Annex 3: Table 4, Table 5.
285
exploitation” (22.4; 37.7; 28.9% of the variance, eigenvalues 1.3; 2.3; 2.3). The
factors “The expectation of well-being” combine the items “peaceful”, “prosperous
and wealthy” and “democratic” and the factors “The expectation of conflicts and
exploitation” the items “exploitation by foreign states”, “torn by conflicts between
rich and poor”, and “torn by conflicts between ethnic groups”. 67 Thus in the minds
of young Bosnians, the peaceful life is associated with democratic life and a
prosperous and wealthy life in this item bloc.
By using the Pearson correlation, we could further investigate the associations
between “peaceful life” and other items with the question in mind of what belongs
together with a peaceful life. By applying this method here, we can see the possible
differences between the strength of association when talking about democracy and
prosperity & wealth, correlating with the idea of a peaceful life.
In all the national groups – and mostly among the Serbs – the “peaceful life” is
less associated with the “democratic life” (rSerb=.161; rCroat=.278; rBosniac=.307)
than with the “prosperous & wealthy life” (rSerb=.338; rCroat=.359;
rBosniac=.491) when talking about the past and future of one’s own country.68 In
the future considerations there are more noteworthy differences between the
national groups. The Croats associate the future peaceful life almost equally
strongly with both the democratic life and the prosperous & wealthy life (r=.359
and r=.324), while Bosniacs and Serbs show only weak association between the
peaceful life and the democratic life (r=.244 and r=.188), and emphasise the
association between the peaceful life and the prosperous and wealthy life in the
future of their country (r=.440 and r=.390). 69 In the case of future expectations of
life in Europe, the Bosniacs associate the peaceful life as much with the democratic
life (r=.338) as with the prosperous and wealthy life (r=.347). Croats and Serbs
show no similar trend but associate the peaceful life more with the prosperous and
wealthy life (r=.392 and r=.311) than with the democratic life (r=.278 and r=.197),
also in the question of future expectations for Europe.70 In all time levels, the Serbs
clearly have a lower association between democracy and the peaceful life (r=.161;
r=.188; and r=.197) than do Bosniacs (r=.307; r=.244; and r=.347) and Croats
(r=.278; r=.324; and r=.278).71 In this context, we can also note that Serbs generally
consider democracy much less important (m=2.94) than do Bosniacs (m=3.60) and
Croats (m=3.43) when questioned on the relative importance of different things.72
The correlations are all weak but the patterns suggest that of all the groups, the
Bosniacs associate peace most with democracy, which they also consider important.
For Serbs, in turn, democracy is not that important, and the correlation between
the peaceful and the democratic life in the past and in the future is extremely weak.
67
68
Annex 3: Table 40.
69
Annex 3: Table 41.
70
Annex 3: Table 42.
71
72
Annex 3: Table 43.
286
On the basis of the Youth and History data, we can further explore the
question of what secures the peace and the peaceful life which young Bosnians so
strongly believe in. The questions we can ask based on our survey are “Can
European integration keep the peace?”, “Should European armies participate in UN
activities to suppress wars?” (and thus work for the peace) and “Should police have
more power to secure safety?”.
Let us start with the European integration. The pupils were asked “What do
Europe and European integration mean to you?” With regard to peace and securing
it, we are particularly interested in two items: “European integration is the only way
to peace between the nations that previously attempted to destroy each other” and
“European integration will solve the economic and social crises of the countries in
Europe”. The former item is concerned with the conflicts between nations while
the latter emphasises the socio-economic crises inside countries. In the former item,
the word “peace” is directly referred to in an active sense (“a way to peace”) while
the latter speaks of “solving crises”, which refers to “keeping the peace” in contrast
to dealing with a conflict situation. Thus, the situation in which we need to “solve
crises” does not necessarily mean war, but clearly refers to an unstable state of
affairs.
Graph 10: European integration as the way to peace between the nations that
have attempted to destroy each other
4,5
4
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3, 53 54
3, 3, 49 44
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Mean of the answers
3,5 3 3, 2 32 3,
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3
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Graph 11: European integration will solve economic and social crises in
European countries
4,5
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3,
44 43 44 43
Mean of the answers
39 3, 3, 39 3, 3, 39
3,5 3, 29 33 31 3, 33 3,
3, 3, 3, 3,
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16 2 3, 3, 19
09 14 3, 3, 11 3,
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As we can see from Graph 10 and Graph 11, Bosnians have a strong belief in the
integration of Europe as a peace-securing factor. Only Poles (m=3.65), Croatians
(m=3.53) and Italians (m=3.49) have slightly higher means than do Bosnians
(m=3.46) when considering European integration as “the only way to peace
between the nations”. In terms of “European integration solving socio-economic
crises” only Portuguese pupils (m=3.57) have a stronger belief in the integration
than do Bosnians (m=3.54).73
From Table 44, which presents pupils’ considerations for all possible items of
Europe and European integration, we can also conclude that the peace-keeping,
crisis-solving nature of European integration clearly carries the most important
meaning of the whole integration for Bosnians (m=3.46 and m=3.54). The idea of
Europe as “a birthplace of democracy, enlightenment and progress” is also valued
positively (m=3.27). The differences between the national groups are insignificant.
The Croats emphasise the socio-economic, crisis-solving role more (m=3.64) than
the idea of integration being the only way to peace (m=3.38). The Serbs agree with
the “European integration solving socio-economic crises” meaning less than do the
Bosniacs and Croats (mSerb=3.39; mBosniac=3.60; mCroat=3.64).74
Thus, for our question of what/who can secure the peace – which young
Bosnians clearly seem to expect greatly in the future – one answer, according to our
data, appears to be European integration; young Bosnians believe that integrating
Europe is important for both keeping the peace between the nations and solving
socio-economic crises. The Bosnians clearly do not at all share the scepticism that
many Western Europeans have for European integration, but seem rather to have a
very idealistic picture of the possible meanings and consequences of the integration.
73
Annex 3: Table 44, Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B369-B370.
74
Annex 3: Table 44.
288
An additional aspect of the analysis of the role of European integration in

securing the peaceful life can be found in the question in which the pupils were
asked to consider the personal importance of different things. Among the items was
“European cooperation” for which the Bosnians report very high importance
(m=3.46); only Polish (m=3.61) and German (m=3.49) pupils consider the
importance of European integration even greater. Of the Bosnians, Bosniacs attach
the greatest importance (m=3.54), and Serbs the least (m=3.35), though they also
figure high in the European comparison.75
Thus, young Bosnians consider European integration important. As they also
considered European integration important for securing the peace and directing
solutions to crises on the single item level as well as peaceful life, we can conclude
that, based on all the items discussed here, young Bosnians consider European
integration as important for peace.
From the European integration we can turn to more militaristic means of
securing the peace. Namely, in one of the questions pupils were asked to consider
several controversial issues and then vote either for or against (or undecided) the
issues. Two of the issues are of interest here: “Use of European armies in UN-
activities to suppress civil wars all over the world” and “Expanded authority for the
police in order to subdue criminality and violence”. In the former we speak of the
supranational UN forces and European participation in them as a tool for peace in
civil wars; the second issue deals with internal safety inside one’s country. Of
course, “Subduing criminality and violence” is not fully comparable to peace, but
criminality and violence in society are closely related to non-peaceful situations as a
whole. Moreover, in the case of Bosnia this is even more true for one of the
consequences of the war has been the growing violence and crime rate, and
therefore the question of internal safety has been central. Thus, it can be assumed
that Bosnian pupils associate “the police as subduing criminality and violence” with
police keeping the peace. Therefore, it is reasonable to discuss this item in this
context.
As we can see from Table 45, Bosnians clearly voted for both of the items
(m=2.31 and m=2.41).76 In the European comparison, their answers to the
questions are close to the European mean values (moverall=2.27; 2.50). Inside the
Bosnian sample there is one significant difference: only the minority of Serb pupils
(m=2.13) voted for “the use of European armies in UN-activities to suppress civil
wars”, which is significantly lower than among Bosniacs (m=2.41) and Croats
(m=2.43).77
Thus it seems that Serb pupils tend to think that the police should have the
power to take care of internal security, but have some doubts about participation in
75
76
In the voting question, a 4-step likert scale was used in the questionnaire (see question 48 in Annex 1). As part of
the analysing process, the question was recoded into a 3-step scale by combining the answers ”un-decided“ and ”will
not vote“. As a result, the values are between 1 and 3 instead of 1 and 5 as in the other items.
77
289
the international UN forces that would suppress civil wars all over the world.
Perhaps their thinking refers to the more reserved attitude that Serbs and the Serb
Republic have had towards the international intervention in Bosnia and
Herzegovina and towards the international troops during the post-war years.
Moreover, just a few months before the Youth and History survey was collected,
NATO bombings against Serbia suffered strong criticism in the media of the Serb
Republic, as was shown in chapter five. However, this is not to say that the Serbs
would not believe that the UN troops could not bring and keep the peace. But
from the Youth and History data we can conclude that they are reserved in regard
to European participation in suppressing civil wars all over the world. We would
need another question to properly judge whether young Serb pupils feel that the
multi-national UN troops do in fact secure the peaceful life. Yet the fact that a
majority of Croat and Bosniac pupils are ready to send Europeans to UN armies to
help to suppress civil wars seems to speak on behalf of their own experience; the
UN was needed to bring and keep the peace in their surroundings.
The role of the police force and the idea of expanding its authority are
interesting in a different way. During the Bosnian war, the police were in many
ways a para-military force78 and after the war they were also involved in violent
incidents.79 In the report of the International Crisis Group in 1999, it was
mentioned how the three ethnically-based police forces are maintained in Bosnia,
and that the forces maintain a reputation for corruption, brutality, lawlessness and
are often seen as private armies of the ruling ethnic parties.80 From this perspective
it can be considered surprising that young Bosnians favour expanding the authority
of the police. This seems to indicate that they trust the policemen and their ability
to guarantee internal security.
In this context, we can also briefly consider the role of the peace conference in
the minds of young Bosnians. We cannot discuss the securing the peace but rather
settling the conflict and thereby bringing the peace, when dealing with question in
which the pupils were asked to consider different arguments by which their own
country A wanted to take “Newland” back from country B. The arguments
appeared in the beginning of section 7.2.2. One of the arguments was “an
international peace conference has examined the case, and recommend that we shall
have Newland back”. As we can see from Table 7, among Bosnians, the peace
conference argument enjoys the highest support of all the arguments (m=3.51).
When looking at the national groups separately, however, the Serbs would support
as much the argument of self determination “when asked, the majority of the
people of Newland say that they would prefer to be controlled by us to be
78
Kaldor has argued that, in addition to regular forces, it is possible to identify three main types of irregular forces in
the Bosnian conflict: paramilitary organisations, foreign mercenary groups and local police. Kaldor 1999, 46-47.
79
In February 1997, an incident occurred in Mostar in which Croat police fired at an unarmed crowd of Muslims,
killing one and wounding 20 people. All three charged policemen remained free. Bennett 1997, 209.
80
80. October 1999, 109.
290
controlled by B” (m=3.46) as the recommendation of the peace conference

(m=3.47).81 This can be interpreted as trust in the peace conference and its
decisions in a conflict situation. In other words, the peace conference can be seen as
bringing and securing the peace because its decision is the argument young
Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs most agree upon, although Serbs also support self-
determination.
7.3.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF PEACE

For the analysis of the representation of peace among Bosnian adolescents, one of
the key questions in the Youth and History survey was the question of personal
importance of different items. The items included “family”, “friends”, “hobbies and
personal interests”, “my country”, “my ethnic group”, “money and wealth for
myself”, “religious faith”, “European co-operation”, “democracy”, “freedom of
opinion”, “peace at any cost”, “solidarity with poor people in own country”,
“welfare, social security”, and “environmental protection”. The mean values of the
Bosnians appear in Table 43 in Annex 3.
Of primary interest here is the personal importance of “peace at any cost” and
the values associated with it. The wording is interesting; instead of simply asking
the importance of peace, the nature of the argument is changed to emphasise the
idea of peace under any conditions by using the utterance “at any cost”. In the case
of Bosnians, the expression “at any cost” is likely to have directed the pupils to
think about their recent experiences of the war and the peace that followed.
Graph 12: The importance of peace at any cost
5
5
62 61 4,
6
51 54 4, 4, 4,
6 55 9 5 4
4 4, 4, 4, 4,
4 47 4,
5 4, 4,
5
4,
4 4, 34
4,5 33 27 33 4, 32
4, 4,
3 25 4, 4, 26 4,
4, 14 4,
2
4,
2 4,
4,
98 97
3, 3,
4 1 76 75
67 3,
7 3, 3,
3,
Mean of the answers
3,5 28
3,
3
87
2,
2,5
1,5
1
Ic
Sw rk
Fi
Es
Li
Ru
Po e
Sl ia
Bo
Bo : B
Bo : C
Bu : S
G ia
Tu
Is
Is
Pa Ara
Po ne
Sp
Ita
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m
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t.
ity
81
Annex 3: Table 7.
291
As Graph 12 shows, Bosnians value the personal importance of peace at any cost
more than all the others in the entire sample (m=4.61), except Greek pupils, who
have a higher mean value (m=4.65). There are no differences between the Bosnian
national groups. To illustrate the strength of the evaluation we can examine
frequencies; among all Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs, 91% of the pupils attach much
or very much importance to peace at any cost. Three quarters of them in fact have
attached very much importance to peace at any cost, while only about half of the
respondents in the overall European sample attached very much importance to
peace at any cost.82
Such frequencies, as shown by the Bosnians, are unusual in a survey dealing
with attitudes and opinions, for normally quite many students choose the “safe
middle”, which in this case would have been to attach “some” importance to peace
at any cost. As seen, however, young Bosnians find peace at any cost almost
unanimously important. This is not a self-evident outcome in a country where the
disputes during and after the recent war (1992–1995) have continued over such
fundamentals as territories, language and religion, as demonstrated in chapters four
and five. Thus, one could assume that young Bosnians might question the idea of
peace at any cost for they know what the actual “costs” can be. Yet, they say that
peace at any cost is of great personal importance to them.
How can we understand this? If “peace at any cost” is so important, what
belongs together with it? We can look at the factor solution of the importance
question and see whether “the peace at any cost” is part of any construct that can be
interpreted. The solution resulting in four dimensions explains 54.2% of the
variance. The dimensions seem clear and can be interpreted as follows: the first
factor (eigenvalue 4.181; 27.9% of the variance) “The importance of peace and
liberty and solidarity”, the second (eigenvalue 1.400; 9.3% of the variance) “The
importance of socio-ethnocentric values”, the third (eigenvalue 1.303; 8.7% of the
variance) “the importance of international co-operation and democracy”, and the
fourth (eigenvalue 1.240; 8.3% of the variance) “The importance of privatist
values”.83
The first dimension “The importance of peace, liberty and solidarity” is of
interest here for its main components are “the importance of peace at any cost”
(.695), “the importance of solidarity with poor people in own country” (.622), and
“the importance of freedom of opinion” (.605). The dimension also has loadings
on “the importance of environmental protection” (.518), “the importance of
family” (.511), “the importance of friends” (.501), “the importance of solidarity
with poor in the third world” (.470), and “the importance of welfare and social
security” (.469).
Thus, young Bosnians do not link “peace at any cost” to political ideas or
concepts such as “democracy”, “European co-operation” or “my country”. For
82
Annex 3: Table 43, Table 46, Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B301.
83
Annex 3: Table 47.
292
them, the political – whether national or international – mechanisms seem less

important than the importance of peace. Instead, young Bosnians connect the
“peace at any cost” with more individual values such as “solidarity inside one’s
country” and “freedom of opinion”. Does this indicate that young Bosnians believe
that freedom of opinion exists together with peace and that both are important for
one another? What about the reasoning with solidarity for the poor in one’s
country? Do they think that solidarity can only co-exist with peace and vice versa?
These questions are interesting from the perspective of the recent history in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. As argued in chapters four and five, the way to the war
was a good example of the use of propaganda tools, such as controlling the media
(limiting freedom of opinion) and using ethno-social (e.g. urban-rural) differences
as arguments in propaganda.84 Thus, the thinking of young Bosnians would
indicate great opposition to what happened; peace at any cost is extremely
important and is associated with solidarity with poor people and freedom of
opinion.
All of the main items loading in the dimension “The importance of peace and
liberty and solidarity” also had high values on the single item level (“the importance
of peace at any cost” m=4.61; “the importance of freedom of opinion” m=4.19;
“the importance of solidarity with poor people in one’s own country” m=4.20),
which attaches further significance to the construct as an indicator of the important
thinking dimension of young Bosnians.
7.4 Nation
Nation and nation-building have, of course, been the essential elements of Bosnian
society during the last decade. We have seen that the representations of nation in
the textbooks read by the pupils who responded to the Youth and History survey
clearly differentiated ”our” nation from ”their” nation. In many cases, this
differentiation was a central feature of history presentations and had even hostile
overtones. When the schoolbook analysis concentrated on the self-understanding of
nation among the Bosnian national groups, the following analysis of the Youth and
History results discusses the concept of nation on a more universal level.
”Nation” was one (together with ”Europe” and ”democracy”) of the essential
concepts of modern socio-political language to be studied in the light of historical
consciousness in the Youth and History survey. In the analysis of the Youth and
History central analysis group, Andreas Körber argued that ”nation” is a political
concept relevant to the present-day context which simultaneously contains
historical narratives. It is a historically laden concept, which serves as a political
84
People monitoring the Bosnian media after the war have noted how the attitudes of Serb and Croat media have
usually been sceptical and often contemptuous towards such key political obligations under Dayton as the right of
refugees to return home, respect for electoral process, cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and the creation of a
mixed-nationality institution. Some improvement has been noted, however, since 1999. Thompson 1994/1999,
262-263.
293
principle and is presented often as a part of aims and values. Based on these reasons,
Körber argued that the pupils’ answers about the meanings of nations can offer
insight into ”the historical basis of present-day political attitudes as well as into the
present-day foundation of historical interpretations.”85
In addition to studying the question of pupils’ ideas about nations and nation-
states, which Körber has in mind in his previous argumentation, in the following
we will analyse the representation of nation with the help of some other questions
as well. Thus, based on the answers of the pupils, we will first ask ”what is a nation”
(7.4.1). Then we will continue to consider the duties and rights of nations (7.4.2)
and see whether the Youth and History results give us any hints about the historical
and future significance of nation(s) in pupils’ minds (7.4.3). Finally, we will end
with a short analysis of the associations that Bosnian pupils have regarding the
concepts ”nation” and ”Europe” (7.4.4).
7.4.1 WHAT IS A NATION?

In the important question about the representation of nation, pupils were asked
”What are your views on nations and nation-states?” Thus the question
immediately put together the idea of ”nation” and ”nation-state”, which in the
Bosnian case complicates the analysis of the question for the pupils are most likely
not to think that a nation equals a state based on the reality of their immediate
surroundings: they live in a multi-national state.
The items included ”Nations are born, grow and perish in history, just like
everything else”, ”Nations are natural entities, unified by common origin, language,
history and culture”, ”Nations represent the will to create a common future, despite
cultural differences in the past”, ”The claims of national groups for a state of their
own was one main cause of wars in recent centuries”, ”National groups have the
right to go to war to make their own state”, and ”National states should give an
essential part of their sovereignty to a supranational organisation”. Thus, the first
three items were definitions of nations while the latter three deal with the role of a
”nation” in the past and in the future. As noted in the original Youth and History
report, some of the items are in conflict with one another but none clearly
contradicts one another.86 This further complicates the analysis of the pupils’
answers, as we shall see.
What, then, does ”nation” represent for Bosnian pupils based on their answers?
First, we can look at the three first items, the definitions of ”nation”. As in most
countries in Europe, young Bosnians support most strongly the Herderian
definition of nations as natural entities unified by common origin, language,
culture and history (m=3.43). The support expressed by the Bosnians is, however,
among the lowest. Only Belgian (3.27), Slovene (3.28), and Welsh (3.39) youth
85
Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A136, B360.
86
294
had lower values than did the Bosnians. Within the Bosnian sample, Croats show
slightly higher support for the idea (m=3.52) but the difference is insignificant.87
The Bosnians support all the three definitions of nations almost similarly
(m=3.29; 3.43; 3.31). In the international comparison, their support for the idea
that nations grow and perish just like anything else in history (m=3.29) is very high,
as Graph 13 illustrates. This suggests that in multicultural Bosnia, the pupils are
more prepared to see ”nation” as something that changes over time. Such an
interpretation enjoys the highest support (in the entire overall sample) among
Bosniac pupils (m=3.38). For Bosniacs, the idea of nation has been the most
complicated one for decades, as presented in the national question discussion in
chapter four.88
Graph 13: Concept of Nations: born, grow and die
4,5
4
Mean of the answers
3,5 3,35 3,38 3,38

3,29 3,27 3,24
3,18 3,14 3,17 3,15 3,19
3,09 3,10
3,03 3,06 3,00 3,03 3,05
3
2,97 2,98 2,97 2,97 2,99 2,97
2,88 2,86 2,86
2,81 2,79 2,81 2,79 2,81
2,5
1,5
1
Icela
Norw
D enm
Swe
Finla
Esto
Lithu
Russ
Ucra
Pola
Hung
C zec
Slov
Croa
Bosn
Bosn
Bosn
Bulg
Gree
Turk
Israe
Israe
Pale
Portu
Spain
Italy
Italy:
Germ
Belg
Grea
GB:
Fran
enia
den
nia
ium:
nd
aria
ey
stine
Scotl
ce
in
nd
nd
ania
tia
t Brita
ce
l: Ara
ia
hia
ia: B
ia: C
ia: S
a
gal
lang.m
any
ark
y
ry
Flam
and
os
erbs
roats
bic ci
in
niaks
inority
ish
t.
Thus, we have seen that young Bosnians, regardless of their national group,
consider all the different definitions positively without being too excited by any of
them. The small differences in mean values invite us to look for the composition of
the values by having a look at the frequencies of pupils’ answers in Table 48. As we
can see, the pupils are clearly most undecided (almost 50%!) about the idea of a
nation resulting from a common will. Notable is also the very low (8.7%)
frequency of Croats who disagree with the idea of nations as natural entities: only
8.7% of Croat pupils claim that nations are not natural entities, compared to
13.4% Bosniacs and 17.7% Serbs.89 Here we can remember the strength of
primordiality as part of the representation of “our nation” among Croats in the
87
88
Annex 3: Table 6.
89
Annex 3: Table 48.
295
textbook analysis. The Youth and History results suggest that such understanding
appears stronger among Bosnian Croats than among Bosnian Serbs and Bosniacs.
When moving from the definitions of nations to the roles and functions of
nations, namely to the three latter items of the nation question, we find two
interesting results in the international comparison as was partly seen already when
discussing the representation of war. In the European overall sample, the idea of
national groups having the right to wage war to establish a state, and the idea that
national states should yield their sovereignty to supranational powers, were both
rejected (moverall=2.68; 2.88). Bosnians, however, supported both items (m=3.14;
3.21).90 As Graph 2 and Graph 14 show, the Bosnian values are among the highest
for the question of the rights to wage war, and the highest in regard to yielding
sovereignty to supranational organisations. A cautious interpretation would suggest
that young Bosnians see national groups as having the right to wage war for their
state and therefore would be ready to submit the sovereignty of national states to
multi-national powers.
Graph 14: National states should yield sovereignty
4,5
4
Mean of the answers
3,5 3,28
3,16 3,22 3,11 3,06 3,15
3,03 3,08 3,03 3,00
3
2,98 2,97 2,99 2,96 2,97
2,87 2,90 2,90 2,91 2,89 2,94 2,88 2,86
2,75 2,74
2,5 2,61 2,63 2,67 2,64
2,56 2,59
2,50
1,5
1
Icela
Norw
D enm
Sw ed
Finla
Esto
Lithu
R uss
Ucra
Pola
H ung
Czech
Slov
Croa
Bosn
Bosn
Bosn
Bulg
Gree
Turk
Israe
Israe
Pale
Portu
Spain
Italy
Italy:
Germ
Belg
Grea
GB:
Fran
enia
nia
nd
aria
ey
stine
ium:
Scotla
ce
ine
nd
nd
ania
tia
ce
l
l:
t Brita
ia
ia: B
ia: C
ia: S
ay
ary
gal
la
en
any
ark
ia
Arab
ng.m
F
osnia
erbs
roats
lamis
nd
in
ic cit
inori
ks
h
.
ty
45f
This interpretation is further supported by the factor solution of the nation

question, which results in two dimensions explaining 43.5% of the variance. The
second factor (eigenvalue 1.086; explaining 18.1% of the variance) shows that the
conceptions ”national groups may fight for own state” and ”national states should
yield their sovereignty” belong together in the thinking of the young Bosnians. In
fact, they form a clear dimension of thinking with relatively high loadings (.756
90
296
and .737) and without any by-loadings of the other items. I have named the factor
”The problematic character of nations”.91
Inside the national groups we can note that Bosniacs support “the right of
national groups to fight for their own state” (3.05) less than do Croats (3.19) or
Serbs (3.24).92 The factor solutions of the groups also show slightly different
thinking patterns among the groups. Bosniacs follow the pattern of combining all
the definitions of nation (NationA: .515; NationB: .748; NationC: .552) with the
idea of nations being the main cause of wars in recent centuries (.589). The factor
(eigenvalue 1.506; explaining 25.1% of the variance) is named ”The theoretical-
traditional concept of nation”. The second factor (eigenvalue 1.149; explaining
19.2% of the variance) is a combination of “the right to go to war” (.691) and
“yielding national power to supranational organisations” (.779).93
Serbs differ from Bosniacs in that their second factor (19.3%, eigenvalue
1.159) is lead by the idea of yielding national power (.780). The idea of nations
having been the main cause of wars (.542) and the idea that national groups have
the right to go to war (.575) have relatively strong by-loadings. I have interpreted
the factor as ”The problematic nature of nations”. It seems to suggest that young
Serbs would yield the sovereignty of national states because of the warring (even if
justified) nature of national groups. In the first factor (26.3%, eigenvalue 1.581) of
the solution, Serbs combine all the definitions of nation (NationA: .752; NationB;
.616; NationC: .692).94
Finally, the Croats form the most difficult combination to interpret. The first
factor (26.2%, eigenvalue 1.574) combines the will of the people (.779) with the
idea of nations being natural entities (.574). It has by-loadings on the idea of
nation-states having caused wars (.469), and on the idea that nation-states should
yield their sovereignty (.399). Because the will to live together is clearly a leading
item in the factor, followed by natural entity, the factor can be interpreted as ”The
voluntary and natural concept of nation”. The second factor (17.0%, eigenvalue
1.020) combines the idea that nations are born and die (.758), with the idea that
national groups have the right to wage war (.571). It can cautiously be interpreted
as ”The constructive concept of nation” for it seems to emphasise the role and
nature of nation in the course of time.95 From the Croat solution, we can mainly
note the first factor and the idea that the will to live together and the idea of
nations as natural entities belong together in the minds of Croat pupils. This
dimension can be seen as relatively strong, for both of the items had relatively high
values also as single items (m=3.52 and m=3.31).96
91
Annex 3: Table 49.
92
Annex 3: Table 6.
93
Annex 3: Table 50.
94
Annex 3: Table 51.
95
Annex 3: Table 52.
96
Annex 3: Table 6.
297
The relation between the supranational power and the national state was also
questioned when the pupils were asked about their voting behaviour. One of the
items to vote for or against was ”to reduce the power of the European Community,
giving more power to the national states”. Generally, Bosnians are quite undecided
(m=2.01), but the Bosniacs (m=1.91) again support the idea the least
(mCroat=2.07, mSerb=2.08). In fact, their mean is the fourth lowest in the entire
sample, after Belgium (m=1.80), Italy (m=1.82), and France (m=1.87).97 Thus, it is
clear that the Bosniacs would not be ready to give national states more power at the
expense of the EU, and would rather support the idea that national states should
yield their sovereignty to supranational powers (such as EU).
The question of what a nation is for young Bosnians is of course very central
and interesting and we would hope to answer such a question as whether for the
Bosnian pupils a state means the same as a nation. Unfortunately, the Youth and
History data does not exactly allow that. The expressed support for national groups
to make a state only suggests that in pupils’ minds, the concept of nation is imbued
with the idea of a state. We can, however, continue to discuss the representation of
nation in light of some other questions. First we have the question of importance
where, among other things, the pupils were asked about the personal importance of
”my country”, ”my ethnic/national group” and ”religious faith”.
Before analysing the results, we must analyse what is actually asked here in the
Bosnian context. Here we are interested in the representation of ”nation”. As
argued in the beginning of the chapter, ”national group” and ”ethnic group” can be
used as synonyms in the Bosnian context. Therefore, in the original Croatian
translation of the Youth and History questionnaire the item “national group” was
translated as “ethnic/national groups”. The same translation was used in Bosnia.
What about ”my country”? Bosnia and Herzegovina is by definition a multi-
national (consists of three equal nations) state. The pupils’ understanding of the
word ”my country” can of course be questioned: Do they think of Bosnia and
Herzegovina or the entity in which they live (the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbs) as ”my country”? Do Croat pupils associate
”my country” with Herceg-Bosna or Croatia instead of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
Finally ”the religious faith” is interesting in the context of the representation of
nation for that is the clearest distinction between the national/ethnic groups of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which speak (or at least spoke) practically the same
language and have similar ethnic Slav-origins, as was argued in chapter four.
Chapter five mentioned how religion has been an important element in the history
politics of all national groups.
On the single item level, young Bosnians considered all three items important.
”My country” (m=4.24) is for them the fourth most important thing, compared to
all Europeans, only Greek (m=4.36), Turkish (m=4.59) and Palestinian (m=4.29)
97
Annex 3: Table 45, Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B355. See footnote 76.
298
youth consider ”my country” more important than do the Bosnians. There are no
differences between the three Bosnian groups.98
The picture is similar in relation to the importance of ”the ethnic/national
group”. Only Greeks (m=4.20), Palestinians (m=3.93) and Arab Israelis (m=3.99)
give it even greater importance than do the Bosnians (m=3.90). 99 There are no
significant differences among Bosnian national groups.100
The importance of ”religious faith” is also comparatively very high among
Bosnians (m=4.04), and again the same countries have even higher figures: Greece
(m=4.35), Turkey (m=4.37), Arab Israelis (m=4.13) and Palestinians (m=4.30).
Among the Bosnians, Croats consider the importance of religious faith the highest
(mCroat=4.24; mSerb=3.95; mBosniac=4.01).101
The results on the single item level served as the basis for a scale called ”The
importance of socio/ethnocentric values”. From the high reliability of the scale
(α=.709) we can see that the three concepts are associated.102 In Graph 15, that
displays the mean values of the scale, we can see that the Bosnian values for the
importance of these values are very high in the international comparison.
Graph 15: The importance of ethnic group, my country and religious faith
5
4,48
4,5 4,30
4,18 4,18
4,02 4,06
3,95 3,92
4 3,84 3,84
3,69 3,64 3,68 3,69
3,58 3,54
3,51
3,44
Mean of the answers
3,5 3,34 3,34

3,27 3,22 3,27 3,27
3,15
3,08 3,04 3,04 3,04
3
2,97
2,89
2,5 2,64
1,5
1
Icela
Norw
D enm
Swe
Finla
Esto
Lithu
Russ
Ucra
Pola
Hung
C zec
Slov
Croa
Bosn
Bosn
Bosn
Bulg
Gree
Turk
Israe
Israe
Pale
Portu
Spain
Italy
Italy:
Germ
Belg
Grea
GB:
Fran
enia
den
nia
ium:
nd
aria
ey
stine
Scotl
ce
in
nd
nd
ania
tia
t Brita
ce
l: Ara
ia
hia
ia: B
ia: C
ia: S
a
gal
lang.m
any
ark
y
ry
Flam
and
os
erbs
roats
bic ci
in
niaks
inority
ish
t.
To see whether the associations between the concepts differ, the Pearson
correlations were also calculated for the Bosnian sample. When looking at the
98
99
Annex 3: Table 43, Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B300. Note that permission to ask the question was not
granted in Turkey.
100
Here we can note the result of the UNDP survey in which 52% of the respondents in the FBiH and 72% in the
RS considered that the three ethnic groups are not on equal footing. Human Development Report Bosnia and
Herzegovina 2000. Youth. UNDP: Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues. 102.
101
102
Annex 3: Table 53.
299
correlations among the sub-groups in Table 54, we find that the Serb correlations
show no difference in correlations between different items (all correlations .470–
.475). Among the Croats, the correlation between “ethnic group” and “religious
faith” (r=.619) is stronger than the correlation between ”my country” and ”my
ethnic group” (r=.378), and ”my country” and ”religious faith” (r=.297). The
Bosniacs emphasise the relation between the importance of “ethnic group” and
importance of “religious faith” (r=.459) to that between the importance of “ethnic
group” and “my country” (r=.335).103 From these correlations we can note the
special correlation between the importance of “religious faith” and importance of
“ethnic group” among Bosnian Croats, which emphasises the religious component
as part of their nation-building. Here we can remember the surrounding culture
and the enormous church and cross built in Croat-dominated parts of Mostar in
the late 1990s, presented in chapter five.
7.4.2 THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF ”OURS” AND ”THEIRS”

As argued in chapter six, a central part of the representation of ”nation” is the
question of ”us” and ”the others” which form the core of the self-understanding of
national groups. The Youth and History data allows us to look at the right and the
duties of nation(s) in this context from two angles: that is, a question of an area
dispute between ”my country” and a neighbouring country, and the questions
related to the immigrants, to ”the others”.
The Newland question was already presented in section 7.2.2. It will be partly
repeated here, for the wording of the question is important for the analysis. The
question asked about the right of your home country to the territory of Newland,
which was occupied from 1500 to 1900, but which had been under the control of
another country since 1900. The arguments for reannexation were "The people of
Newland speak our language and share our culture", "Newland was under our
control for a longer period (1500–1900) than it has been under the control of B
(1900–1994).", "Settlers from our country came to Newland in the year 1500
whereas people from B did not settle in Newland until 1900", "When asked, the
majority of the people of Newland say that they would prefer to be controlled by us
to be controlled by B", "B took Newland from us by war in 1900, which was an
unjust act", ”An international peace conference has examined the case, and
recommend that we shall have Newland back", "We have the military power and
we will use it to get Newland back under our control".
Based on the previous question we can assume that young Bosnians associate
such expressions as ”your home country”, ”us”, ”our control” with their
ethnic/national group. Thus, the entire question of the fate of Newland can be
analysed from the point of view of the role of the nation.
103
Annex 3: Table 54.
300
The Fate of Newland

“People unite to bigger units and collectives – and those collectives often quarrel.
Thus the evaluation of power, the perception of collective identity and the
legitimisation of violence are important indicators of historical – and political
understanding, which merit a central position in our study.” This statement
precluded the analysis of the Newland question in the Youth and History project
report.104
As seen in chapter four, the statement is valid in a very real and concrete sense
in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Units and collectives have been formed in
an extreme way over the last ten years according different types of criteria. The
disputes that have appeared in the political rhetoric during and after the war have
concentrated on four issues: ethnic issues, territorial issues, religious issues, and
language issues, as illustrated in chapter six when discussing the prevailing history
culture. The perception of collective identity (and thus the representation of
nation) and the legitimisation of violence are central to these disputes.
Therefore, from the Bosnian point of view, the question of the “imaginary
territory” of Newland can be considered one of the most important in the whole
research project. It can provide us important indications of the historical and
political understanding of young Bosnians in relation to the arguments that have
been central to their society. The last three items of the question were already
discussed in the previous sections. Here we will concentrate on the national
perspective of the question.
Generally, Bosnians clearly support the three most convincing arguments for
the return of Newland to their own country. Perhaps not surprisingly, after the
Dayton agreement, which despite all its complications did stop the war, “the
recommendation of the peace conference” received the most support (m=3.51).
Pupils also consider “the unjust loss of Newland 100 years ago” (m=3.44) and “the
self-determination of the people in Newland” (m=3.41) as important reasons for
claiming the territory back.105
The classical representation of the nation, belonging to a national group, “the
common language and culture of people from the country A and people from
Newland” was the least convincing argument for the Bosnian pupils (m=3.15).
Among all the Europeans, the Bosnians were among the ones who showed the
lowest support for the common language and culture argument. Among Europeans,
it was the third most supported argument for the re-annexation of Newland.106
Thus, we can conclude that for Bosnians the classic national reasons of common
language, culture and heritage, would be unadequate reasons for re-annexation.
This could easily be explained by the nature of Bosnian “nations”; they share
language, culture and heritage.
104
105
Annex 3: Table 7.
106
301
Within the Bosnian sample, the three national groups show no great
differences. “The duration of control in the distant past” argument does, however,
enjoy Bosniac (m=3.34) and Croat (m=3.27) support, but the Serbs reject it
(m=2.97). In turn, the Serbs supported the argument of self-determination of the
people (m=3.46) of Newland (that is the Newland nation) the most.107
This clearly points to the position of the Serb Republic. If the long period of
control in history was supported as an argument, there would hardly be any
reasoning for the existence of such a “Serb country” in Bosnia for the areas of the
RS were until the recent war occupied almost equally by Bosniacs and Serbs, as seen
in chapter four. The republic itself is a new creation. Thus, it seems that this item
in fact reflects how the young Serbs argue from the point of view of their current
society. This idea is further supported by the fact that the Serbs give the greatest
support to the argument of self-determination of people. In other words, rather
than value the issue of control in history, people themselves should be able to
choose where they want to belong.
The constructs of the Newland question can further explain the thinking
pattern of young Bosnians. An interesting one for our analysis of the representation
of nation is the scale showing a combination unique to Bosnia: traditional
possession arguments (”duration of control” and ”earlier settlement”) can be
combined with ”the common language and culture argument”. Thus we get a scale
”Annexational arguments based on the historical-cultural common tradition” which
is fairly reliable for all the Bosnian nation groups (α=,5853–,6821). In the scale, the
same difference that was clear on the single item level can be observed: Serbs
(m=3.05) find the historical-cultural traditional argument less important than do
Croats (m=3.23) and Bosniacs (m=3.26).108
The Newland question also allows us to ask what seems to belong together with
the traditional idea of nation (common language and culture). The factor solutions
of each of the three national groups suggest that there are in fact some structural
differences in the thinking of the adolescents.
In the Bosniac sample, the arguments based on ”the language & culture”
(.655), ”the duration of control” (.623), ”the priority of settlement” (.728), and
”the self-determination of people” (.695) all share equally high loadings on the
factor 1 which is named ”Arguments based on shared identity & past and self-
determination” (35% of the variance, eigenvalue 2.4). Thus, the traditional
possession arguments and the self-determination of people are associated with the
common culture and language in the thinking of Bosniacs.109
Among Serbs, the pattern is similar but the ”self-determination” has only
relatively weak by-loading (.357). Thus I have named the Serb factor (35% of the
variance, eigenvalue 2.4) differently as ”Arguments based on identity and common
107
Annex 3: Table 7.
108
Annex 3: Table 10.
109
Annex 3: Table 13.
302
past“ to emphasise the main loadings of the factor (”language & culture” .693;
”duration of control” .735; ”priority of settlement” .724).110
Finally, the Bosnian Croats in turn associate the historical-cultural arguments
with military power. The loadings of ”military power” (.780) and ”the duration of
control in history” (.740) are particularly strong, but the loadings of ”culture &
language” (.570) and ”priority of the settlement” (.570) are also significant in the
second factor of the solution (14% of variance, eigenvalue 1.0). Thus, I have called
the factor “Arguments based on traditional domination and military power”.111
This factor suggests that Bosnian Croats associate traditional national values with
military strength. Here we might see the impact of the recent events in the thinking
of the Bosnian Croat pupils; the Croats have emphasised Herzegovina as
traditionally theirs.
Rights of the ”others”

The discussion about ”the others” in the Youth and History research project was
based on the question block of immigrants and their rights. In addition to that, in a
question asking pupils for their voting decisions, one question asked about the
immigrant issue.
In the Bosnian context, the immigrant approach for ”the others” is, however,
problematic. The multi-national society has made the others who are part of one’s
own society much more central than ”the others” in the sense of being immigrants.
This was clear from the schoolbook analysis. We will have a quick look at the
Bosnian results on the immigrant items anyway.
The immigrant question asked: ”People in many countries discuss whether
immigrants (people from abroad) should be given full citizenship, including the
right to vote. Which immigrants should – in your opinion – enjoy voting rights in
parliamentary elections in your country?” The items ranged from ”none” to ”all”
including reasoning based on cultural assimilation, observance of the law, the
victimhood of immigrants, and loyalty of immigrants to one’s country.
Generally, Bosnians would grant immigrants the right to vote based on
different reasoning more easily than would Europeans in general. In all positive
items, their mean values were higher (mBosn=3.79; 3.86; 3.65; 3.51; 3.12;
moverall=3.54; 3.65; 2.94; 3.48; 2.59), and in the item stating that civil rights
should be granted to the victims of oppression, Bosnians gave the greatest support
(m=3.65) of all countries (moverall=2.94).112
Similar positive thinking towards immigrants was also clear when young
Bosnians were asked about their voting preferences; they reject strongest the idea of
voting for the reduction of immigration, which has the lowest value (m=1.75) in
110
Annex 3: Table 15.
111
Annex 3: Table 14.
112
Annex 3: Table 55, Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B347-B348.
303
the entire sample (moverall=2.14).113 Thus, young Bosnians consistently support

the rights of immigrants. Whether that could be interpreted as openness towards
”the others”, or simply as a result of the recent past when many Bosnians have in
fact found themselves or their family members as immigrants, and therefore would
wish good treatment for immigrants, can of course only be speculated. Young
Bosnians definitely do not think of their peers, who belong to other national groups
of the country, as ”immigrants”. In fact, had this been a national survey, there
should have been a similar question concerning ”displaced” and ”returnees” instead
of immigrants.114
Finally, we can simply note from the question the importance of different
things that for young Bosnians ”solidarity with the poor in own country” was
considered very important (m=4.20). Only Greek (m=4.36), Turkish (m=4.59) and
Palestinian (m=4.29) youth considered it more important.115 Thus, young Bosnians
seem to see ”us” as responsible for the well-being of ”our” fellow countrymen.
7.4.3 THE HISTORICAL AND FUTURE SIGNIFICANCE OF NATION

Few questions in the Youth and History survey also allow us to study the actual
interest and concentration the pupils claim to have in the history of nation and
national groups. In the following, we will first analyse the role of nations in the
history interests of young Bosnians, and the role of the nation in school history
teaching. Secondly, we will discuss a few other items that can shed light on the
historical significance of nation in the minds of Bosnian pupils.
In a question asking about the concentrations of history lessons, one of the
eight items was ”We learn to acknowledge the traditions, characteristics, values and
tasks of our nation and society.” Bosnians reported great concentration on national
traditions and values. Their value (m=3.61) was the fifth highest in the entire
sample after Greek (m=4.02), Turkish (m=3.95), ArabIsraeli (m=3.81) and
Palestinian (m=3.82) youth. Among the Bosnian sample, the Croat pupils in
particular emphasised the national-traditional emphasis of history lessons
(mCroat=3.75; mSerb=3.59; mBosniac=3.55).116 The results are illustrated in
Graph 16.
113
114
”Internally displaced” people are those who have left their homes during the war and now live elsewhere (usually
in another entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Returnees are those either returning from abroad to their pre-war
homes or those returning from one entity to the other entity where they now belong to the minority.
115
116
Annex 3: Table 56.
304
Graph 16: Concentrating on the acknowledgement of our traditions in history

lessons
4,5
4,02
3,95
4 3,81 3,82
3,75
3,55 3,59
3,51 3,52 3,51
3,43
Mean of the answers
3,5 3,32
3,29 3,23 3,26 3,18 3,21 3,20
3,09 3,04
3,02
3
2,99 2,98
2,87 2,92 2,86
2,81 2,83 2,85
2,78
2,5 2,67 2,67
1,5
1
Icela
Norw
Denm
Swe
Finla
Esto
Lithu
Russ
Ucra
Pola
H ung
C zec
Slov
Croa
Bosn
Bosn
Bosn
Bulg
Gree
Turk
Israe
Israe
Pale
Portu
Spain
Italy
Italy:
Germ
Belg
Grea
GB:
Fran
den
enia
nia
nd
aria
ey
stine
ium:
Scotl
ce
ine
n
nd
ania
tia
ce
l:
t Brita
ia
hia
ia: B
ia: C
ia: S
ay
ary
gal
la
any
d
ark
Arab
ng.m
Flam
and
osnia
erbs
roats
in
ic cit.
inority
ish
s k
Another question asked about pupils’ interest in different kinds of history. One of
the items enquired about the ”making of nations” (All the items of the question are
listed in chapter 7.1.3. Bosnians reported a slightly positive interest in the making
of nations (m=3.13) while the general European judgement was negative
(moverall=2.90), but as we can see the difference is very small.117 Generally we can
state that the youth do not appear terribly interested in the history of the ”making
of nations” but do not ignore the topic either.
In a question that probed pupils’ interests in the history of different
geographical areas, pupils were asked to consider ”the history of your immediate
locality”, ”the history of your region”, “the history of BiH/own country”118, ”the
history of Europe”, and ”the history of the world outside Europe”. Generally,
Bosnians reported a relatively high level of interest in the history of different areas.
The greatest interest they claimed to have was in the history of their own
country/BiH (m=4.18). There is a significant difference within the Bosnian sample:
Bosniacs (m=4.39) report a much higher level of interest in the history of Bosnia
and Herzegovina than do Croats (m=3.88) or Serbs (m=4.14). In fact, Croats are as
interested in the history of their own region (m=3.86) and even more interested in
their immediate locality (m=3.97) than in the history of their country.119 The
unusually high level of interest in the history of their country among Bosniacs in
the international comparison is illustrated in Graph 17.
117
118
Here a very unfortunate mistake must be reported: in the questionnaires used in the Federation of BiH, that is in
Croat- and Bosniac-dominated schools, the wording was ”the history of BiH”, while in the questionnaire used in the
Republic of Serbs, the wording was ”the history of your own country”.
119
Annex 3: Table 57.
305
Graph 17: Interest in the history of one’ own country
4,54 4,49
4,5 4,39
4,25 4,23
4,14 4,11
4,01 4,07
3,97
4 3,88 3,82
3,79 3,75 3,76 3,73
3,62 3,67 3,66
3,44 3,50 3,47
Mean of the answers
3,5 3,35 3,33 3,39

3,27 3,27 3,22
3,18 3,19
3,09 3,10
3
2,5
1,5
1
Icela
Norw
D enm
Swe
Finla
Esto
Lithu
Russ
Ucra
Pola
Hung
C zec
Slov
Croa
Bosn
Bosn
Bosn
Bulg
Gree
Turk
Israe
Israe
Pale
Portu
Spain
Italy
Italy:
Germ
Belg
Grea
GB:
Fran
enia
den
nia
ium:
nd
aria
ey
stine
Scotl
ce
in
nd
nd
ania
tia
t Brita
ce
l: Ara
ia
hia
ia: B
ia: C
ia: S
a
gal
lang.m
any
ark
y
ry
Flam
and
os
erbs
roats
bic ci
in
niaks
inority
ish
t.
The results clearly illustrate that the Bosniac pupils identify mostly with Bosnia and
Herzegovina as ”theirs”, while the Bosnian Croat pupils in particular emphasise
more the immediate locality and region. Had we asked of the Serb pupils the same
question asked of Croats and Bosniacs, the interest in the history of BiH instead of
”your country”, we would most likely have got a lower mean value as well. This
assumption is further supported by the data of the UN’s ”Youth 2000” report. In
the report, approximately 1000 Bosnians aged 15 to 34 were asked among other
things how attached they feel to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Of Serb respondents,
33% answered “not at all” and 37% “slightly” while among Bosniacs, the respective
percentages were 3% and 11%, and among Croats, 15% and 18%.120
Thus we can conclude that of the national groups, Bosniacs clearly identify
with their country by showing great interest in its history; in particular, the Croats
emphasise more the regional interest, in other words the interest in the history of
the region dominated by their national group. We must, however, remember that
the level of interest in BiH among Croats was still higher than the European
average (m=3.71).121 In this context, it is worth remembering that Bosniacs are also
the only ones who have used school textbooks in which the region of reference is
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
We can hardly speak of the historical or future significance of the nation in
light of the Youth and History data, for the questions asking about future and past
determinants did not include nation, or nationalism, or any other related concepts.
In the Nation question itself there was, however, one item pointing to the historical
120
Humanitarian Issues. 93.
121
306
role of nations; pupils were asked whether they see nations as a main cause of wars
in recent centuries. As we have seen earlier, the pupils answered the question
affirmatively but without particularly high support. The Bosnian mean (m=3.33)
was close to the European average (moverall=3.40) and there were no differences
within the Bosnian sub-groups. Thus, we can only conclude that young Bosnian do
not deny the idea that the wars of national groups have been a main cause of wars,
but suggest little else.122
Finally, we had the block of three questions asking pupils’ ideas of the
characteristics of life in the past and in the future. From the point of view of the
representation of nation, the relevant characteristic is ”life was/will be torn by
conflicts between ethnic groups”, assuming that young Bosnians consider national
group synonymous with ethnic group. According to the answers of young Bosnians,
the conflicts between ethnic/national groups have been possible in their country’s
past (m=3.11) but are unlikely to recur in their own country’s future (m=2.83) or
in the future of Europe (m=2.94). Serb pupils find the life torn by ethnic conflicts
more likely in the future (m=3.01 and 3.07) and in the past (m=3.27).123
Thus, taken together, the idea of “national groups’ right to wage war to
establish their state”, and the slightly agreed likelihood of the ”life torn by ethnic
conflicts” among the Serbs (but lower values than the European average) and their
rejection among Bosniacs and Croats, we can conclude that the young Bosnians
give national conflicts some significance as historical and future determinants.
Based on our data, the significance is, however, very modest.
7.4.4 NATION AND EUROPE

Finally as part of the representation of nation, we will briefly examine the relation
between Europe/European integration and the idea of nations.
As with the concept of nation, the pupils were also asked about their ideas and
definitions for Europe. The question was ”What do Europe and European
integration mean to you”, and the items included ”Europe is a geographical
expression, no more”, ”Europe is a birthplace of democracy, enlightenment and
progress”, ”Europe is a group of white, rich countries guilty of economic and
ecological exploitation of the rest of the world”, ”European integration is the only
way to peace between nations that previously attempted to destroy each other”,
”European integration is a danger to sovereign nations, to their identity and
culture”, and ”European integration will solve the economic and social crises of the
countries in Europe”.
In the overall sample, the most agreed-upon idea of Europe was that it is the
birthplace of democracy, enlightenment and progress (m=3.34). As already seen
when discussing the representation of peace, Bosnians, in turn, supported the most
122
123
Annex 3: Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5.
307
the idea that European integration is the only way toward peace between nations
wanting to destroy each others (m=3.46), and the idea that European integration
will solve crises (m=3.54). In the international comparison, illustrated in Graph 10
and Graph 11, we can see that the agreement of Bosnian pupils with these two
ideas is among the highest of the entire sample. Within the sample, the Serbs agree
less with the idea of European integration solving crises (m=3.39) than do Croats
(m=3.64) and Bosniacs (m=3.60), yet their value exceeds the European average.124
What can we conclude from these ideas stemming from the nation viewpoint?
First, Bosnians seem to agree with the idea that the nations have attempted destroy
each other and therefore European integration is needed as a peacemaker. Second,
we can note a sort of anti-nation approach; the integration of Europe is seen as a
way toward peace and as a solution to problems, which points to a quite positive
idea of Europe and a negative idea of nations and nation states.125
The positive approach to European integration is further supported by the
pupils’ answers to the importance of European co-operation and to the voting for
European integration, including the common currency. Both Bosnian scores are
among the highest in the entire sample (m=3.46 and m=2.33). The national
pattern is also similar: the Serbs consider European co-operation slightly less
important (mSerb=3.35; mCroat=3.44 and mBosniac=3.54), and would be slightly
more reserved in voting for European integration, including the common currency
(mSerb=2.20; mCroat=2.45; mBosniac=2.36).126
7.5 Representations of War, Peace and Nation in the

Bosnian Context
After discussing the items related to war and conflict, peace and nation, we can
conclude the representation of the concepts of war, peace, and nation in the Youth
and History survey. The conclusive representations are based on the previous
comparative analysis of the thinking of Bosnians in comparison to other countries
that participated in the Youth and History survey; we have been able to conclude
the Bosnian representations based on the international comparison. In addition, the
comparisons also revealed some differences in the representations among Bosniacs,
Croats and Serbs and these differences are also part of the conclusive representation.
In the following, a short summary of the representations of war, peace and
nation as they appeared in the Youth and History survey will be presented. The
representations of the concepts will appear in a single table and we will see the
Bosnian representation in comparison to Europe and differences between the
Bosnian national groups. Finally we will discuss the possible reasons for the
124
125
In this context we can note an interesting conclusion made in an overall study on Bosnian primary and secondary
school history textbooks: regardless of their nationality the Bosnian pupils do not learn about European integration,
war or peace as specific terms. Baranović 2001, 24.
126
308
contents of these representations and consider the significance of some aspects of

the representations.
7.5.1 UNLIKELY AND INSIGNIFICANT WARS BETWEEN NATIONS

In the thinking of young Bosnians, wars formed part of the process of change in
Eastern Europe after 1985. Their thinking in the European comparison did not,
however, emphasise the wars in general.
The socio-economic and ethnic conflicts were associated in the minds of young
Bosnians both in the past and in the future; they did not involve separate reasons or
phenomena in light of the data. The only clear difference between the two types of
conflicts was that the Bosnians consider ethnic conflicts more likely in their own
country in the future than socio-economic ones, while such differences did not
figure into their picture of the future conflicts in Europe.
Discussion of territorial loss and the re-annexation of the lost area revealed that
young Bosnians justified the use of military strength in order for a national group
to regain its territories. Their value was among the highest in the European sample.
Nevertheless, young Bosnians supported more strongly the decisions of a peace
conference and reasoning based on the unjust loss in the past than on military
strength as reasons for reclaiming a territory. The national and military aspect were
related in the thinking of young Bosnians: the idea of nation and the idea of war
belong together.
The associations with Adolf Hitler demonstrated the clearest and greatest
differences between the Bosnian national groups in the entire Youth and History
survey. The representations differed, particularly between Serbs and Croats, which
would indicate a difference in the representation of the entire Second World War.
For that representation, the Youth and History data unfortunately could provide no
further information. Based on the data we can only say that all the national groups,
and Serbs in particular, valued highly the preservation of the World War II
memorial. Whether they did so for different reasons cannot, however, be
determined; but only speculated.
Finally, the discussion around the wars in the past and in the future proved that
the past and future representations are related. It supports the basic idea of
historical consciousness applied in the Youth and History research: the way we see
the past influences our perception of the present and expectations for the future –
and vice versa. In the perception of young Bosnians, the past as well as the future
significance of wars in changing life was considered very modest. The fact that
Bosnians had the lowest values in the entire European sample on wars as
determinants of change in the past and in the future (see Graph 18) is particularly
interesting, for the schoolbook analysis showed how war-concentrated their history
teaching is.
309
Graph 18: Wars HAVE DONE/WILL DO much in changing life
70 %
61 % 57 %
60 %
50 % 45 % 45 % 42 %
35 %
36 %
40 % 38 %
30 %
20 %
10 %
0% in next 40 years
s
until now
c
ia
s
sn
at
ro
Bo
s
rb
C
Se
s
an
pe
ro
Eu
From the graph, we can conclude that in regard to representations of war in

connection with the past or future, young Bosnians appeared to have a very distinct
perception of life. In particular, their expectations for the future were interesting
because of their clear difference from other countries in considering the wars so
unlikely.
7.5.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF PEACE

Peace had an absolute value for young Bosnians, that was demonstrated by the great
importance they attached to peace at any cost. Related to that we detected a strong
thinking dimension that included solidarity with poor people and the freedom of
opinion in addition to peace at any cost.
The importance of peace seemed to influence the future expectations of the
pupils for they strongly believed in the peaceful life in the future of Europe and in
the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the case of Europe, they in fact had the
highest belief in peace in the entire sample. Of the Bosnian national groups, the
Bosniacs demonstrated the highest belief in the future peace of their own country
among all the European countries.
The belief in peace in the past was divided along the national lines. The
Bosniacs believed the most that the life in their country 40 years ago had been
peaceful while Croats emphasised more the negative aspects of life in the past.
Among the Serbs, the peaceful life and life torn by ethnic conflicts were both
considered likely in the past.
310
The Bosnians associated peaceful life more with prosperous & wealthy life than
with democratic life. In the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croats emphasised
the association between democratic life and peaceful life as much as between
prosperous & wealthy life and peaceful life. Bosniacs, in turn, emphasised the
association between democratic life and peaceful life in the case of the future of
Europe. All the groups emphasised the association between prosperous & wealthy
life and peaceful life with regard to their country’s past.
The Bosnian adolescents found European integration generally important, and
the most important aspect of the integration for them was the idea of keeping the
peace and solving socio-economic crises. The Bosniacs and Croats also supported
European participation in UN troops when suppressing civil wars; all the groups
supported the idea of expanding the authority of police to lessen violence and
criminality.
The basic and consistent difference between the national groups of Bosnia was
the strength and intensity of their belief in peace and things related to it; Bosniacs
usually had the highest values for peace yet Serbs and Croats always followed well
above the European average.
7.5.3 PROBLEMATIC NATIONS

The main question about the definitions and role of nation showed that young
Bosnians gave very similar values to different definitions of nation. It indicates that
the definitions were relatively meaningless or confusing to the pupils.
We could, however, detect some Bosnian particularities with the help of the
international comparison. Of six possible concepts, young Bosnians showed the
highest support for the traditional Herderian concept of nations as natural entities
unified by common language and culture, but their support for the concept was
modest compared to the European average. In turn, young Bosnians expressed
comparatively high support for the more constructivist concept that nations are
born, grow and die just like anything else in history. The differences between the
national groups were modest, yet the Croats expressed the clearest support for the
Herderian concept of nations. They also combined the natural entity idea with the
idea of will to live together.
The national/ethnic group was of great importance to young Bosnians. This
was clear from their answers about the personal importance of it. Similarly, they
claimed that “my country” and “religious faith” were very important to them. From
the associations between the concepts, we could conclude that “religious faith” and
“my country” belong together with the ethnic/national group. For Croats, the
association between religious faith and national/ethnic group was stronger.
The high importance of “my country” among all the national groups is
interesting. Unfortunately, we cannot know whether the Serbs associated the
expression “my country” with the Serb Republic or whether Bosnian Croats did so
through Croatia proper or through Herceg-Bosna when answering this question.
311
Cautiously we can assume so, for the importance of “my country” was associated
with the ethnic group and religious faith. In turn, we can be quite certain that
Bosniacs, who considered the importance of “my country” the highest, were
thinking of Bosnia and Herzegovina as “their country”.
The absolute importance of the ethnic/national group is further supported
when we remember that pupils reported that they were focused on learning about
their nations’ traditions and characteristics in history lessons. The Croats
emphasised this the most. They also had as great an interest in the history of their
immediate locality and of their region as in the history of BiH. Of all the areas, the
Bosniacs reported the greatest interest in the history of BiH, which further supports
the idea that for young Bosniacs the importance of the national/ethnic group and
religion is comparable to the importance of a multi-national and multi-religious
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, their representation of nation is twofold: the
ethnic-religious group is important (that is, the Bosnian Muslim group) as is the
multi-national country (Bosnia and Herzegovina).
The question about the annexation of Newland showed that for young Serbs,
the idea of the self-determination of people was more significant than the common
cultural-historical traditions. Croats and Bosniacs also considered the self-
determination of people an important factor, but did not deny the cultural-
historical traditions either. Croats differed in that they combined the national
cultural-historical traditions with the idea of using military power if necessary.
The ideas relating nations to wars created a problematic picture of nations. The
Bosnians supported (unlike Europeans in general) both, the idea that nations
should have a right to wage war to establish a state, and the idea that national states
should give an essential part of their sovereignty to a supranational organisation.
Thus, nations have the right to wage war on the one hand, but on the other hand it
would be better for even existing nation states to yield their sovereignty. Bosniacs
supported the right of nations to wage war less than did Serbs and Croats.
As before, Bosnians also considered European integration very positively and at
the expense of nation states. The consideration of Europe and European integration
was positive among all the national groups while national groups were seen as
having caused conflicts which European integration can solve. Serbs were generally
more reserved in their support for the integration of Europe.127
The historical significance of nations was only directly asked in connection to
wars. We saw young Bosnians agree with the idea that national groups have been
one main cause of wars in recent centuries. They also agreed that wars between
ethnic and national groups have been part of the characteristics of life in the past,
but are unlikely to be so in the future. Serbs considered the national conflicts clearly
more likely, yet their absolute values remained relatively low. This is not to say,
127
I have elsewhere analysed the different relation of Serbs towards Europe in the Youth and History survey. It was
shown that their thinking was concistent and that they were less interested, more pessimistic and so forth in terms of
Europe than were to Bosniacs and Croats. See Torsti 2001.
312
however, that the only historical significance young Bosnians attach to nations and
national groups would be connected to wars. Rather, we can claim that it was a true
misfortune that the Youth and History survey failed to include “nations/nation
states/nationalism” as one of the possible determinants of the past and future in
questions 24 and 25 of the questionnaire.
Finally, the differences among the national groups in their representations of
nation were of minor nature and should not be over-interpreted. Croats emphasised
the traditional values of nations and religion slightly more, while Serbs believed
more in the self-determination of people than in cultural-historical traditions as
reasons for uniting lands. Serbs also supported strongly the right to wage war and
the likelihood of national conflicts to breakout in Bosnia. They were less negative
about nations and national states, and less positive about the integration of Europe
than were the other national groups. Bosniacs expressed a picture in which the
importance of the ethnic/national group and Bosnian and Herzegovina were
combined.
7.5.4 OVERALL SIMILARITY OF NATIONAL GROUPS

In conclusion, we can illustrate the representations of the three concepts in the
following table (next page).
313
Table 11: Representations of War, Peace and Nation in the Youth and History
survey in Bosnia
War Peace Nation
Special historically very likely in the importance of

Characteristics uninteresting future of Bosnia ethno-nation
in European unimportant factor
and Herzegovina
and Europe
concentration on
Comparison for change (past & values and
future) secured by traditions of own
not likely in the
European nation at school
future of Bosnia
integration
should yield power
nor Europe achieved for
justified to go to
connotated with
example through
international
war for a state
natural disasters conference solidarity with
justified by connotated with ”own” people
historical unjustice
solidarity and
and the will to freedom of opinion
have a state
Differences for Serbs more among Bosniacs dominant

among likely in the future greatest belief in association with
Bosnian of their country future peace in ethnic/nationalism:
National and Europe Bosnia and
Croats religion,
Groups for Bosniacs the
Herzegovina
Serbs religion
will to have a state among Bosniacs
and own country

Bosniacs own
less possible greatest belief in country
justification future peace of
for Croats Hitler
Europe in the among Bosniacs
entire sample, greatest interest
also a great leader followed by other for own country,
Serbs most Bosnians followed by Serbs
negative on Hitler
Serbs question the for Serbs
for Serbs future peace in historical-cultural
remembrance of Europe tradtion less
WWII most
important
Serbs doubtful for
significant in
justifying nation’s
UN participation in claims
civil conflicts
The table summarises the previous analysis and suggests that all the differences
among the Bosnian national groups exists merely in the intensity of thinking, not
in the dimensions of thinking. Therefore, to see whether any one conclusion about
the similarity/dissimilarity between the Bosnian groups could be established, I
decided to test whether the Bosnian national groups in fact seem to form a cohesive
314
whole among the other countries in the Youth and History survey. Technically one
could perform this through cluster analysis.128
Cluster analysis simply attempts to groups cases. In our case, countries and the
country groups that had participated in the Youth and History survey each formed
a case. Similarly, each Bosnian national group formed its own case. Through cluster
analysis we could see which of the cases belong together; in other words which
country groups had similar answering patterns in the items discussed in this
chapter.
The clustering structures of the entire Youth and History material were
analysed in the original report,129 and here I was interested only in the clustering
structures from the point of view of the Bosnian national groups. As expected, the
Bosniac, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs formed one cluster. Despite the
analysing method used, the three Bosnian groups always formed one single cluster
when all the country groups were compared. This demonstrates the overall
similarity of their answers to the questions analysed in this research. Depending the
clustering method, the Palestinian and Arab-Israeli samples and the Croatian
country sample were closest to the Bosnian national groups,130 yet in each analysis
the three Bosnian groups always formed their own cluster. Thus, we can
convincingly state that the thoughts and attitudes young Bosnians expressed in
regard to their representations of war, peace and nation demonstrate that young
Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs share their representations to a large extent.
After concluding the representations resulting from the Youth and History
analysis and confirming the overall similarity of the Bosnian national groups, we
will now discuss the representations as social representation in the Bosnian context.
7.5.5 THE RECENT PAST EXPLAINING THE REPRESENTATIONS

What seems to have influenced the process of anchoring the concepts in the
thinking of the youth among the three Bosnian national groups? When looking at
the social representations summarised in table above, we can argue that mostly the
representations of young Bosnians seem to rely on their experience of the recent
past and of the current situation, and that they have understood the central
128
Using the example of the original Youth and History research report, the similarity was technically measured by a
cluster analysis (Ward method). The European student file and the Bosnian file were merged, Bosnian groups were
included as separate country-group samples and the file was aggregated on the country basis with mean-values as the
aggregation formula. We used those items that were part of the analyses of this research (all items of questions 6, 22,
23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 37, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, items a, c, d, e, g, h of questions 35, 36 and items e, h, i of question
48). The Ward method was chosen and calculations performed using the squared Euclidean dissimilarity coefficient.
Referring to the example of the cluster analysis in the original Youth and History report, the Average Linkage
Between Groups, Single Linkage (Nearest Neighbour) and Complete Linkage (Furthest Neighbour) methods for
clustering were also calculated on squared Euclidean distances to test what different solutions they would yield. For
the original Youth and History cluster analysis principles, see Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A50-51.
129
130
In Ward and in the Furthest Neighbor analysis, the Palestinian and Arab-Israeli cluster would have formed the
next level cluster with Bosnian groups. In Average Linkage Between Groups and Nearest Neighbour analysis, Croatia
could have been included to the cluster in the next level.
315
concepts of post-war Bosnian society with the help of the recent past. This might
also help to explain why the answering patterns of Palestinians and Israeli Arabs
were often close to those of Bosnians: all these groups have lived in the presence of
war and nationalistic rhetoric. Here we can note that the recent past did not appear
as the most influential factor when looking at the Youth and History survey results
in all countries. For example, in Finland the pupils' answers reflected more the
national historical project than the civic society, which is part of the experience of
the recent past.131
Ethnicity was of crucial importance in the representation of nation for all the
Bosnian groups. Ethnicity has had a dominant role in deciding their fates as to
where they live, which school they go to and so forth. It has been crucial to belong
to one’s own group, which is a dramatic difference from the 1980s when an
increasing number of school pupils in towns were children from mixed marriages,
as the figures presented in chapter four demonstrated. Ethnic nationalism has been
at the core of Bosnian society throughout the 1990s. Generally, the importance
question could be considered revealing and central to the representation of nation:
the values mentioned (the ethnic/national group, religious group, own country)
were all considered of high importance, and the wording of the question (“personal
importance”) was such that it guaranteed that the pupils were answering based on
their feelings. Therefore, we can assume that the answers to this particular question,
in fact, touched upon the national identity and identification of young Bosnians.
The great importance of religion was also noteworthy and suggests that young
Bosnians have accepted the notion of religion as the (only) differentiating factor
between national groups. Therefore religion must play an emphasised role in
contrast to the secular traditions of Bosnia in the Yugoslav era.
The great importance of religion may also result from the emphasised role of
the churches during the 1990s. Churches have, to various degrees, been involved in
politics and thereby the lives of young people as well. Chapter five demonstrated
how the destruction and reconstruction of religious objects lies at the core of the
division of history culture and national heritage. This also emphasizes the role of
religion and can cause young people to consider religion important. I believe that in
the Bosnian case, religion and church are equivalent: after secular traditions in
Yugoslavia where people might have been members of the church but did not
consider religion that important, the change that occurred has raised the idea of
religion as part of the church more to the forefront.
Part of the representation of peace of young Bosnians was the idea that
European integration, or some other supranational power to which the nations
should yield their sovereignty needs to exist between the warring nations. This also
suggests that the current situation and recent past are the most dominant
determinants in the pupils’ thinking; they have seen the destructive nature of
national groups and how international support was vital for ending the war between
131
Ahonen 1998, 187.
316
the national groups. The Bosnian war was long in which national groups fought,
destroying the country physically and forcing half of the people from their homes.
Only after 3.5 years, with the NATO military attack and intensive Western-led
negotiations, did the war cease. Perhaps young people have also experienced the
post-war period as a battle between the destructive national groups, which are
presented from violent fighting only by the presence of supranational military and
civil forces. In post-war Bosnia many have said that if the internationals left, the
war would continue.
As part of the representation of nation, Bosnians combined the idea of nations
as natural entities united by common language and culture, and the idea that
nations are temporal constructions of history. This could also be explained through
the experience of the recent past. Since the 1960s, the Yugoslav nation was actively
constructed along the lines of ethnic nationalities. The national policies of
Yugoslavia can be divided into three phases. The phase immediately after the
Second World War concentrated on the equality and sovereignty of separate
nations according to Stalinist ideas. Since the 1950s, the Yugoslav identity was seen
as the eventual outcome of socialism and emphasised as the progressive national
identity. Finally, as part of liberal policies starting in the 1960s, the diversity and
distinct nature of the several national and ethnic groups was acknowledged and
considered the embodiment of Yugoslavism; one could be Yugoslav and Serb
simultaneously.132 In the last 10–15 years, the Yugoslavian nation has paved the
way for the ethnic nations, which have also undergone constant changes. Among
Bosnian Croats, general Croathood has been forced to turn towards Bosnian or
Herzegovinian Croathood, for the government in Zagreb has made it clear that
Bosnian Croats are not part of Croatia. Similarly, Bosnian Serbs have started to
emphasise their Bosnian Serb nationality, for ties with Belgrade have loosened.
Finally, Bosniacs have been building their national identity to a large extent as a
result of the pressure from Serb and Croat nation-building projects. From the
overall sample, it is interesting to note that both former Yugoslav republics –
Croatia and Slovenia – also had relatively high values for the idea that nations are
born, grow and die in history (mCroatia=3.29; mSlovenia=3.14).133 This further
suggests that the Yugoslavian past has influenced the thinking of youth in regard to
definitions for nation.
Most of the small differences in attitudes between the national groups
differentiated Bosnian Serbs from the other national groups. These differences can
also be suggested as being based on the recent past.
Bosnian Serb pupils considered the historical-cultural tradition less significant
in justifying the claims of a nation than territorial claims. This points to the
position of the Bosnian Serb Republic: if the cultural-historical tradition was
supported as an argument, there would hardly be any reasoning for the existence of
132
133
317
such a “Serb-country” in Bosnia for the areas of the RS were, until the recent war,
inhabited almost equally by Bosniacs and Serbs, as the demographic maps illustrate
in chapter four. The republic itself is a new creation. This idea is further supported
by the fact that the Serbs gave the greatest support to the argument of the self-
determination of people in the question of the re-annexation of Newland. In other
words: rather than any cultural-historical traditions, the people themselves should
be able to choose where they want to belong.
The more negative attitude of Serbs towards the future of Europe and the
participation of the UN in civil conflicts as part of the representation of peace can
also be explained through recent history. In the Yugoslav era, all Bosnians were
equally connected to or disconnected from the outside world,134 but during war and
in post-war years, Bosnian Serbs have lived in a very isolated world. They were the
aggressors of the war, which from the beginning made them guilty as a nation in
the eyes of the outside world. Many of the Serb refugees from Bosnia went either to
Serbia proper or to the Bosnian areas that the Serb army had already “ethnically
cleansed”. Thus, not many of them ended up in European countries or elsewhere
abroad, which created bonds between Bosnian Serbs and Europe and the rest of the
world.
As argued in chapter four, financial support for Serb areas has dwindled due to
their politics in post-war years. There was a visible difference between the Serb areas
and the rest of Bosnia in the late 1990s, which could be observed, for example, in
construction activities and in condition of the roads. There was simply less funding,
and therefore less reconstruction work in the Serb Republic than in the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A more negative, or at least more doubtful, attitude
towards the international community and its politics has also meant that fewer
international people have been working in the Serb parts of Bosnia than in the
Federation.
Regarding UN involvement in civil conflicts, from the recent historical point of
view it is logical that Serbs oppose it, for in the recent war they were themselves on
the side against whom the UN troops were called up.
The experience of the recent war can also be seen influencing the thinking of
Bosniacs, who considered a nation’s desire to have a state a lesser justification for
war than did Croats and Serbs. In fact, as argued in chapter four, it was a plan of
Milošević and Tuđjman to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between the two nation-
states, thus leaving the Bosniacs a minority inside both Croatia and Serbia.
Therefore for Bosniacs to justify wars with the idea of gaining a national state is
rather dangerous even if they consider that some Bosniac-dominated areas could
form a state of Bosniacs.
134
Yugoslavs were more connected to the outside world then people from other socialist countries for at least three
different reasons: as leaders of the movement of non-aligned countries, they were connected to countries all over
world through visits, media and so forth; over a million Yugoslavs worked as guest workers in Western Europe in the
1960s and 1970s; and millions of tourists have visited Yugoslavia since the 1960s. Bennett 1996, 63-64, 66, Lautela
and Palo 1992, 180, Donia and Fine 1994, 172.
318
Some aspects of the representations reflected in the Youth and History survey
raise questions about how the students have come to think the way they do. All
Bosnians, and in particular, Bosniacs, demonstrated an exceptionally strong belief
in peace in the future of their country and in the future of Europe. This idea
definitely did not originate from the recent past or current reality, which in the
Bosnian case has been more non-war rather than peace. We can perhaps ask
whether this rather illustrates the wishful thinking of young Bosnians; they want
peace to characterise the future, and so they believe in it.
Another possibility is that the pupils demonstrated their weariness of great
fatigue of the war and therefore believe in peace. That they were also uninterested
in the history of wars would support this argument. The fatigue would be easy to
understand since the actual war lasted for so long (3.5 years) during the childhood
of the pupils, and the period right after the war could hardly be distinguished from
the war years in terms of the conditions in which the pupils lived, either as refugees
waiting to return to or reconstruct their homes. Clearly the war and its
consequences must have been among the central experiences of pupils who
responded to the Youth and History survey. Their lack of interest in the history of
wars and great – wishful? – belief in future peace may suggest that the centrality of
the war in their lives has caused them to grow weary and tired of it.
A study of Israeli and Palestinian children after the Lebanon war showed very
different results from the Bosnian attitudes: 60% of Israelis and 71% of Palestinians
held the opinion that wars always exist. This opinion prevailed even though 80.5%
of Palestinians and 62% of Israelis agreed that “all people suffer from the war” and
91% of Israelis and 52% of Palestinians said that “none of us wants more wars”.135
One possible explanation for the difference in Bosnian attitudes could be in the
age of the pupils. Previous studies on war attitudes among children have shown that
ages 11 to 14 (the respondents in this study were 14) are very central to the
cognitive as well as social development of attitudes towards war. At this stage the
development of attitudes and opinions of different reference groups is critical
central in shaping children’s attitudes.136 Thus, we could speculate whether war
fatigue is true for most of Bosnian society regardless of nationally divided daily
practices and hostile attitudes towards other groups expressed, for example, in
history textbooks. Here we can also note that two separate studies among Australian
and American schoolchildren during the Vietnam war demonstrated no correlation
between children’s moral evaluation of war (whether it is good or bad) and their
attitude toward their own nation’s fight.137 In the Bosnian context. this could mean
justification for the war in Bosnia while pupils stress peace as a likely future
condition.The idea of wars as insignificant factors of change both in the past and in
135
Punamäki, Raija-Leena 1987. Childhood under Conflict. The Attitudes and Emotional Life of Israeli and
Palestinian Children. Tampere Peace Research Institute Research Report No. 32. Tampere: Peace Research Institute,
66, 69-70.
136
Punamäki 1987, 33.
137
Punamäki 1987, 34.
319
the future might appear similarly more difficult to interpret than the belief in peace.
One possibility is to argue that we are discussing the change wrought by wars, and
even though the war changed everything in Bosnia, it left the majority of people
with the feeling of neither winning nor losing the war. The idea of change can be
seen as having a negative connotation, for the change the war wrought has failed to
foster the sense of security or stability. No great enthusiastic spirit of reconstruction
has revived the country after the war, for the same people who had started the war
remained in power. From this point of view, one can understand why the Bosnian
pupils failed to consider war an important factor of change.
The previous analysis of history textbooks would also have encouraged the
assumption that wars are great decisive factors in history since the textbooks
concentrated on them so heavily.
From the point of view of the history textbooks and the discussion about the
power of textbooks at the end of that chapter, it is interesting how the
representation of Hitler as part of the general representation of war differed among
the Bosnian groups. The groups seemed to have anchored Hitler differently, with
the greatest difference between the Serbs and Croats. For Croats, Hitler was not
only an evil dictator, but also a great leader. The clear and consistent pattern in the
different persecutions of Hitler is notable for it raises the question whether pupils
from different national backgrounds have in fact internalised different
representations of Hitler, and whether that in turn might indicate different
representations of the Second World War. In chapter four, we already saw that the
traces of history from the period of the Second World War differ depending on
whether we look at the fate of Croats, Serbs or Bosniacs; and the schoolbook
analysis showed that those differences have become part of their presentations in
extreme forms.
7.5.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REPRESENTATIONS

How could we consider the significance of the social representations reflected in the
Youth and History survey? Here we need to return to the general theory of social
construction, presented in chapter three mainly as an introduction to the approach
of social representations. The idea of ’social facts’ meant concepts, definitions,
theories and so forth which involve collective intentionality. For the construction of
such social facts, a social setting (e.g. Bosnian society or the community of Bosnian
Serbs or any smaller community) is required as is the collective intention (meaning
collective idea) within that social setting. 'War' can serve as an example of a social
fact understood this way. It is always a result of collective intentionality, “it is a war
only if people think it is a war” in a certain social setting.138
From this understanding of social facts (and considering social representations
as types of social facts which therefore can be analysed using the approach of social
138
Searle 1995, 89.
320
constructivism) we can come to discuss the possible significance of social

representations reflected in the Youth and History survey in light of a few examples.
As part of the representations of war, young Bosnians demonstrated that they
did not consider wars a significant factors of change. This leads to the suggestion
that, if they continue to think in such a way, it is hardly likely that they would be
willing to participate in war. Young Bosnians are not likely to believe in war as a
way to change the prevailing reality in a positive way and therefore the idea that war
should re-appear within the society is unlikely when looking at the young people.
Sadly, however, we should remember that most likely in the 1980s, most Bosnians
did not believe the idea of conflict or war. As illustrated in chapter four, local and
western observers have done everything possible to cultivate that view. Yet, the
conflict appeared as a result of several factors, most importantly as a result of
nationalistic, political mobilisation. Thus, the thinking of the youth as reflected in
the Youth and History survey only suggests that the possibility for a future without
wars exists, since the youth do not believe in wars. For such an attitude to remain,
however, political support is vital.
Bosnians also demonstrated great belief in the future peace, the greatest in the
entire sample. When examining it from the social constructivist perspective, it
could be of tremendous importance that the Bosnians in general, and Bosniacs and
Croats in particular, have such a distinct view of the future of their country and of
the future of Europe. If you do not expect conflicts to happen in the future, and
that becomes common knowledge (social representation, social fact) in a situation
where the threat of conflict is real, such a social representation can serve as part of
the reconciliation process and work against the conflict, for people believe actively
in peace. It has, however, been noted that seeing the future as better than the past
can lead to optimistic naiveté, while adopting the idea that the future will be worse
than the past and that suffering will therefore increase can actually cause people to
become more concerned and responsible citizens.139 Thus if the idea of future peace
becomes self-evident and part of the idea of continuous progress, people will no
longer concern themselves about the possibility of the conflict, which makes the
conflict more possible. This was tragically the case in Bosnia in the beginning of the
1990s.
Representations in turn reflect the attitudes held for related matters. The
construction of the idea of war as justified and as part of human nature is likely to
enhance such attitudes towards war in the future also. If on the other hand, the
construction of war includes elements that make the idea appear mainly useless and
a cause of human suffering, the members of the society are likely to construct their
future attitudes similarly. The connection between wars and national catastrophes,
which was part of the Bosnian representation can, on the other hand, lead to
fatalistic attitudes towards wars; wars can arise uncontrollably, just like natural
disasters. These attitudes can finally influence the political actions of people and
139
Mahmutćehajić 2001, 23-24.
321
social groups, and thus we can say that the constructions of political concepts can
carry considerable power within them.
322
8 Divergent Stories, Convergent Attitudes
There is no one conclusion to this research project, just as there is no one solution
to the problems encountered when dealing with history and use of history in post-
war Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conclusions have been drawn as part of the analyses
in different chapters and here our task is to look at the results as a whole and to
open further discussions.
Chapter five demonstrated that the destruction, reconstruction and rewriting of
the physical past continues to be a conscious project among the national groups of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through destroying cultural heritage, the physical
evidence of 500 years of history has been destroyed in many towns. The heated
debates about the historical, national-religious right over a certain piece of territory
have continued far beyond the destructive war years, as the publications,
conferences and incidents of the late 1990s and after have demonstrated. We saw
that among Serbs and Croats, the emphasis was on the creation of a new physical
environment and on the evidence of historical roots in certain areas. Among
Bosniacs, the tendency expressed itself more in the refusal to accept the change in
the physical environments. Tourist brochures served as one good example of these
different tendencies; Bosniacs continue to present pre-war images, and in so doing
emphasise the multi-cultural and multi-religious heritage of Bosnia. The
destruction of such images as a result of war is ignored. Bosnian Serbs, on the other
hand, only concentrated on emphasising the importance of the future, leaving the
past of their immediate surroundings undiscussed and unpresented. In a similar
manner, Bosnian Croats had “cleansed” the common Bosnian past from their
presentations which concentrated on separate Croat-Catholic images only.
As a whole it could be concluded that the entire history culture has fragmented
into three in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. The division influences everything
from banal national symbolism to media, language, religion, history writing and so
forth. Such division has created clear physical and linguistic borders in a region
where such borders did not exist 15 years ago. In fact, based on the historical
accounts of pre-war decades, we could conclude that the historical consciousness
323
among Bosnian Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs must have included an increasingly
significant Bosnian component in the late 1980s.
It is this Bosnian component of the historical consciousness among Bosnians
that is likely to have undergone (or be undergoing) a dramatic change as a result of
the divided history culture. In addition to the division of cultural artefacts, the new
historical consciousness of Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs has also celebrated
“new” historical myths. The greatest sources of such myths were suggested to have
been the interpretations of the Second World War. Chapter four argued that
together with the Second World War, the national question of Bosnia, the recent
war, and to some extent the First World War continue to produce the need for
different and separate interpretations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Active history politics have given rise to these dramatic changes. In addition to
the main topic of this research project, schooling and history education, the mass
media has addressed large audiences and spread its historical propaganda in
particular among Bosnian Serbs. Among all the national groups, mass media has
been a powerful transmitter of separate, banal nationalism in the form of symbols,
rhetoric and so forth. The nationally divided schooling started in the early 1990s
and has continued unchanged in the post-war years. We saw that the few, largely
unsuccessful attempts to change the situation happened only because of
international pressure and seemingly without any real commitment from Bosnian
educational authorities. In fact, separate textbook production has even intensified.
The case study analysing the 8th-grade history textbooks in chapter six
demonstrated what kind of arguments and interpretations have been put forward in
the post-war history teaching among Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs. It was
shown how each community teaches a different history with different emphases.
The contradictory and even hostile anti-presentations of country's other nations
were seen as the most problematic feature of the textbooks. This was especially true
of the Serb and Croat books.
To a large extent the historical representations echoed the present political
reality and the direct crossreferences between the past and present created the
impression of historical recurrence. It was argued that direct comparisons between
the Second World War and the wars in the 1990s as part of history teaching can
lead pupils to believe that such difficult aspects of the recent war as ethnic cleansing
or turning against one's neighbor are in fact the historical “normality” instead of
unprecedented crimes against humanity that tragically happened once and should
never happen again.
The Youth and History survey analysis presented the attitudes and beliefs of
young Bosnians. The international nature of the survey meant that the analysis was
on a more universal level than the other more nationally-orientated analyses of the
research. The results demonstrated that on the level of general attitudes and beliefs,
young Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs were rather similar. Some differences
between the groups existed, but in most cases the differences were marginal when
324
examined in the context of all the European countries. Thus, we could say that the
Youth and History analysis demonstrated the existence of one Bosnian group.
We can of course ask how much the general similarity of the Bosnians results
from the general, traditionalist character of all Bosnian communities. Here we can
recall the main results of the entire Youth and History research project which
classified countries along two separate axes: traditionalism versus modernism, and
liberalism versus conservatism. Traditionalist countries included those with a
tendency toward fundamentalism in terms of religion, nationalism and social
values.1 Bosnian sub-groups clearly fall into this group. Yet it does not change the
importance of constructing a particular Bosnian cluster separately from other
traditionalist countries. Thus, the general similarity of the three groups seems to
result not only from the traditionalist character of all three societies but also from
their more deeply shared values and attitudes. Perhaps the similar experiences of the
recent past are among the influencing factors that lead to irrational hopes necessary
for survival in situations of crisis.
In addition to the general similarity of the national groups, as the most notable
results in the Bosnian context we could conclude the great importance of the
national-ethnic group for all Bosnians, their exceptional belief in the peaceful future
of their own country and of Europe, and the refusal to consider wars as great factors
of change in history.
The contrast between the results of the schoolbook analysis and the Youth and
History survey can be presented through the ideas of Serge Moscovici. Based on the
conditions under which representation can be socially shared, he has divided them
into polemic, hegemonic and emancipated representations. Polemic representations
are determined by the antagonistic relations between the members of society and
intended to be mutually exclusive. The representations of history textbooks can be
defined as such polemic representations. Hegemonic representations are uniform
and reflect homogeneity and stability among the members of the society. Finally,
emancipated representations refer to sub-groups of a society having representations
which can be shared by the other sub-groups. Thus the representations reflected in
the Youth and History research can be seen as emancipated, even hegemonic
representations.2
The greatest differences between the Bosnian national groups in the Youth and
History survey arose in their perception of Adolf Hitler. This could indicate that
the general changes in the construction of Bosnian historical consciousness were
reflected in the historical thinking of the youth. It has been mentioned that the
construction of Bosnian Serb, Croat and Bosniac historical consciousness has been
heavily based on the interpretations of the Second World War. In the school
textbook analysis we also saw that the presentations of the local events during the
Second World War differed widely among the groups. Thus, the pupils, who
1
2
Moscovici 1988, 221-222.
325
typically thought quite similarly on less specific and more universal issues, showed
their greatest difference on a topic which has been a central part of the divided
history culture.
Unfortunately, very little research exists to support the interpretations of the
Youth and History survey in Bosnia. We could use the original Youth and History
research and its country samples as comparative material in part of the analyses.
With regard to comparison possibilities in Bosnia, the UNDP report on youth has
been referred to on several occassions. To some extent the Youth and History
survey results questioned the most publicised conclusion of the report, stating how
negatively young Bosnians perceive the future prospects of their country. On the
other hand, the Youth and History results supported the findings of a survey
performed in schools in Mostar in 1997 suggesting that differences in the thinking
of the young people did not seem to result from their ethnic differences.3
Conclusions regarding the construction of historical consciousness and history
culture in Bosnia have been presented as part of research works concentrating
largely on other subjects. The same is true also more generally regarding research or
descriptions on history culture, historical consciousness and history politics in
School textbooks, however, have been the subject of increasing interest in
recent years in the context of Southeast Europe. The Center for Democracy and
Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE) hosted several workshops on
history teaching in Southeast Europe in 1999–2001, and has published papers
related to the discussions held in two volumes in 2001 and 2002.4 Generally the
conclusions are similar to those of this research project: teaching is divided,
interpretations are ethnocentric, the superiority of one group and the inferiority of
the others is central, as is the victimization of “our” group. In particular, Serbian
and Croatian books have been considered uncomfortably close to political
propaganda.5 Bosnian history teacher Vera Katz who has participated in workshops
organised by CDRSEE has concluded that the first step towards understanding and
accepting the differences between the different groups would require revised
3
Knežević, Mladen 1998. Work values of students in Mostar schools. Cities 2/15: 75-83.
4
Koulouri (ed.) 2001, Koulouri (ed.) 2002.
5
See Koulouri, Christina 2001. Introduction: The Tyranny of History. In: Koulouri Christina (ed.) 2001. Teaching
the History of Southeastern Europe. Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe.
15-25, Koulouri 2001, Karge 2000, Koren, Snježana 2002. A Look in the Broken Mirror. Who is the ’Other’? In:
Koulouri, Christina (ed.) 2002. Clio in the Balkans. The Politics of History Education. Thessaloniki: Center for
Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe. 193-202, Najbar-Agičić, Magdelena 2002. The Yugoslav
History in Croatian Textbooks. In: Koulouri, Christina (ed.) 2002. Clio in the Balkans. The Politics of History
Education. Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe. 232-248, Stojanovic,
Dubravka 2002. Yugoslavia in a Broken Mirror. The Serbian Textbooks. In: Koulouri, Christina (ed.) 2002. Clio in
the Balkans. The Politics of History Education. Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast
Europe. 249-253, Repe, Bozo 2001. The Situation Regarding History Textbooks in SEE. In: Koulouri Christina
(ed.) 2001. Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe. Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in
Southeast Europe. 89-92, Dragonas, Thalia and Frangoudaki, Anna 2001. The Persistence of Ethnocentric School
History. In: Koulouri Christina (ed.) 2001. Teaching the History of Southeastern Europe. Thessaloniki: Center for
Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe. 37-47.
326
definitions of “us” and “them”. As in this research project, Katz has also noted how
the past is often equated with the present in the textbooks, thus leading children to
determine the future based on the past.6 The history textbook used by Bosnian
Croats and analysed in this research has been concluded to be the most nationalistic
and pro-Croat of the many other history textbooks available in Croatia.7
In his earlier research, Höpken has also noted how history education in the
former Yugoslavia has continued to be just as dogmatic as in the Tito era, offering
no alternatives for the pupils. According to him, the aim of the education has not
been to develop civic identity but to supply political elites with legitimacy. In his
view, the post-war history education seems to pave the way for future
confrontations.8
Despite similar conclusions in regard to the contents of the textbooks, I would
disagree with the conclusions of other researchers about the possibility of history
education influencing the pupils. In the CDRSEE workshop, the scholars
representing various former Yugoslav countries suggested that school history is
ineffective because it cannot compete with family history, or influences from the
media, newspaper and so forth. The argument was based on the idea that even
though the brotherhood and unity had been in the centre of history education in
the former Yugoslavia, its effect was questioned considering everything that
happened in the 1990s.9
It is true that school history can hardly compete with the other media channels
transmitting the knowledge of the past. What the argument in my view fails to take
into account, however, is that in the Bosnian post-war situation, textbooks and
others channels of influence enforce one another because their interpretations and
presentations are similar. Thus schoolbooks enhance the effect of other media, and
vice versa, because their presentations resonate together, as was concluded at the
end of chapter six. This was most likely different in the former Yugoslavian case
when at least family stories often contradicted the stories of school history
textbooks, thereby reducing the effect of the textbooks.
8.1 The Power of History Politics

These results demonstrate the power of history politics. As a result of history
politics, Bosnian society has undergone rapid and dramatic changes in 10–15 years,
and the entire history culture has been altered and thereby divided into three
separate, even opposing cultures. We have seen how the representations of the three
history textbooks compete fiercely: 500-year-old history has been “cleansed”,
interpretations of the key periods of national history have been “revised”. The
6
Katz, Vera 2001. Workshops for the Future. In: Koulouri Christina (ed.) 2001. Teaching the History of
Southeastern Europe. Thessaloniki: Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe, 64.
7
Najbar-Agičić 2002, 232-248.
8
Höpken 1997, 93, 96-97.
9
Koren 2002, 201.
327
“professionals of collective memory” – journalists, historians, sociologists,

anthropologists and so forth – have failed to “democratise” the collective memory
and instead have participated in the process leading to dramatic social changes
based on the nationalist ideology.10
Mary Kaldor has defined one form of such politics as identity politics, referring
to movements mobilising around ethnic, racial or religious identity for the purpose
of claiming state power. In contrast to the politics of ideas, which for Kaldor involves
forward-looking projects, identity politics tends to be fragmentive, backward-
looking and exclusive. Such politics are based on the reconstruction of a heroic past,
a memory of injustices, and sometimes involving psychological discrimination
against those labelled differently from ”us”.11
The success of such identity politics in Bosnia is all the more dramatic when we
remember that Bosnia was about to succeed in reconciling three or four different
conceptions of history as part of the modernisation process. This was argued in
chapter four, and it has been repeatedly argued by most of the Yugoslav scholars.
Bosnia appeared as the most pluralistic of all Yugoslav republics.
The power of history politics in Bosnia demonstrates how important it would
be to recognise its mechanisms, especially in crisis situations. It has been noted how
war-like conflicts and big changes bring forth the role of historical consciousness:
people feel the need for myths that can explain and legitimise the situation.12 It is
difficult to change the deeply divided situation based on the manipulation of
history if actions are not taken into the process of change when the role of historical
consciousness is emphasised.
The deeply divided situation is most problematic for traditionally multi-
cultural communities where living together is ”objective inevitability”13, as is the
case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to creating mental barriers and hatred,
the division created by history politics has also had immense practical
consequences. For instance, the divided schooling and history teaching are among
the factors that greatly inhibit the return of refugees to their pre-war homes in post-
war Bosnia.14 Parents have not wanted to return to areas where the children would
be subject to history teaching suggesting that their own national group is evil or
inferior. The ethnic maps of Bosnia before and after the war, together with the
figures of returned refugees presented in section 4.4.3, demonstrated how the
return of refugees has been one of the central problems of the Bosnian peace
process.15 Therefore, solutions for schooling and history teaching relate to”the
10
See Le Goff 1979/1992, 99.
11
Kaldor 1999, 78.
12
Aronsson 2000, 8-9.
13
The term has been used by Kržišnik-Bukić when she argued that awareness of objective inevitability of living
together in Bosnia and Herzegovina has ripened in the years after the Dayton Agreement. Kržišnik-Bukić 2001, 113.
14
We can remember here that the ideal of unification is at the heart of the Dayton agreement, and therefore among
the major goals of the international community in Bosnia. Naturally the return of refugees is crucial to such an ideal.
15
The Bosnian Youth and History sample demonstrated that the pupils were almost perfectly divided along to entity
and national lines.
328
objective inevitability” of living together. Schooling among other institutions must

be arranged in such a way that it supports the viable society rather than deepens the
divisions, which in turn makes the functional society impossible.16
The importance of opposing the diverging tendencies in education in a multi-
cultural society is supported by the experiences and research performed in Northern
Ireland. In Northern Ireland, schools have been segregated since the 1930s. Initially
the segregation resulted from the demand of the Catholic and Protestant churches.
The writing of separate histories and the construction of “our” heroes and the
demonising of the others, however, only intensified when the violence increased in
the early 1970s. A study from the late 1990s has concluded that the segregation of
education and prejudices in teaching have long been suspected of playing key roles
in sustaining the conflict. Through exposure to a history of troubles, children have
learned of their otherness. Many educationalists have even argued that schools are
the main contributory factor to the conflict through their institutionalised
segregation.17
Thus the research in Northern Ireland would suggest that in the long-term,
nationally-divided schooling and teaching of history through “us” and “them” as
hostile groups and with great emphasis on wars, can even become the most central
factor in maintaining the conflict, for school is a central form of political
socialisation for young people. This further emphasises the importance of
acknowledging the power of history politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
elsewhere with similar conflicting tendencies inside the society, when the aim is to
find solutions to the conflict.
What measures could be taken? After decades of segregation, the spirit in
Northern Ireland in the 1990s emphasised the need to improve the communication
between the schools, and the government’s commitment to bring about that change
has been stronger than ever. Three main strategies have been advanced: curricula
initiatives, inter-school links, and the development of integrated schools. Education
for Mutual Understanding and Cultural Heritage have also become compulsory
cross-curricular themes.18 Unfortunately, however, very little research has been
conducted on the impact of new strategies, and no systematic evaluation of the
consequences of the contact programs exists.19 Of the three mentioned strategies,
integrated schools can be assessed based on the level of attendance. The first
16
Sociologist Keith Doubt has accurately noted how the functional society was killed as a result of the Bosnian war.
Rather than emphasising the genocide he would call the war as a “sociocide”. Doubt, Keith 2000. Sociology after
Bosnia and Kosovo. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 143.
17
Brocklehurst, Helen 1999. The nationalisation and militarisation of Children in Northern Ireland. Chapter from
PhD Thesis in International Politics “Children as Political Bodies: Concepts, Cases and Theories”. University of
Wales. In: http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/children/brocklehurst/brocklehurst99.htm. 7th May 2003.
18
Gallagher, A. M. 1995. Majority Minority Review 1: Education in a Divided Society. Second edition. Coleraine:
University of Ulster. Section ten: Schools and Community relations. In:
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/majmin1s.htm#contents. 7th May 2003.
19
Gallagher, A. M. 1995. Majority Minority Review 1: Education in a Divided Society. Second edition. Coleraine:
University of Ulster. Internet publication: Section ten: Schools and Community relations. Internet source:
<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/majmin1s.htm#contents>. 7th May 2003.
329
integrated school in Northern Ireland was established in 1981. Until January 2002,
the number of integrated schools had increased to 46. About 4% of the school
population of Northern Ireland attended such schools in 2002.20
Thus the experiences in Northern Ireland suggest that measures can be taken
even after a long tradition of hostile segregation if the serious consequences of the
segregated education are acknowledged. It coincides with the realisation of the
“objective inevitability” of living together mentioned earlier. The need for research
that assesses the impact of the measures taken would be crucial in Northern Ireland
to suggest which strategies would appear as the most promising ones to be further
pursued in other contexts also.
In Bosnia, the city of Brčko has followed a joint curricula since the late 1990s
and Bosniac, Croat and Serb children go to the same schools. However, the
national subjects (history, geography, music, language and literature) are taught
separately. It has been suggested that the Brčko model should be applied
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.21 Before that, however, it would be important
to evaluate the Brčko model carefully through independent research to determine
whether it really has been successful and whether the model as such could or should
be applied, or whether modifications would be required.
In 2003, the political discussion about the reformation of education has
continued in Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing mainly on curricula development.
OSCE has publicly suggested that a common state-level core curriculum should be
implemented throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 2003–2004 school
year. New laws on primary and secondary education were passed by the entity
parliaments by September 2003. The core curricula does not, however, include
national subjects such as history teaching.22 The results of this research suggest that
history teaching would urgently require changes to implement the common
curricula in other subjects. It is hard to imagine pupils learning mathematics
together as long as their history books separate them as violently as was presented.
The experiences in Northern Ireland also demonstrated that the integration of
schooling has been a slow process after a long separation of children: in 20 years,
only 4% of children have started attending integrated schools even though the
number has continuously increased. Thus, it has to be tolerated and accepted in
Bosnia that when the ”educational apartheid” has been practised for more than ten
years, it cannot be changed overnight.
Finally, based on the Youth and History results, we can we can suggest that
even after ten years of division and opposing history politics, there seems to be
room for a shared identity dimension among young Bosnians. The Youth and
20
Conflict Archive in the Internet (CAIN) Web Service. Background Information on Northern Ireland Society –
Education. Internet source: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/ni/educ.htm>. 20th May 2003.
21
Education in Brčko could be the model for the entire country. Dnevni Avaz. 14th February 2003. Internet source:
www.oscebih.org/ppi/from/press_article.asp?no=241>. 15th May 2003.
22
Education in Brčko could be the model for the entire country. Dnevni Avaz. 14th February 2003. Internet source:
www.oscebih.org/ppi/from/press_article.asp?no=241>. 15th May 2003.
330
History survey results suggested that the attitudes of young Bosnians formed one
group instead of being nationally separated. Bosnian Croats belonged together with
Bosniacs and Bosnian Serbs more than with Croatians. That indicates that attitudes
of a general nature do not change as fast as the surrounding society and the surface
of the culture. In fact, the Youth and History results question many underlying
justifications behind the present, nationally-divided Bosnia; even after years of
segregated schooling and life in the midst of the nationally-divided war and post-
war history culture described in chapter five, young Bosnians revealed that such a
thing as ”Bosnianhood” seems to exist also somewhere other than in the pages of
the Dayton agreement.
The greatest differences in the attitudes towards Hitler, however, indicated the
possibility that great changes in the interpretations of the Second World War that
have persisted in the divided history culture of Bosnia, could already be seen as
reflected in the historical thinking of the youth. Based on this, we could warily
suggest that while the attitudes related to the issues with national emphasis are
likely to differ among young Bosnians, the universal similarity of their thinking
changes slowly. As two separate Bosnian scholars, one of Bosniac background, the
other of Croat background, have stressed: the Bosnian heritage and identity
characteristically include simultaneously shared and separate traditions. Both
conclude that the exclusive tendencies which do not recognise the shared Bosnian
identity with separate Bosniac, Croat or Serb identities, lead to the
”impoverishment of one’s own being”.23 The shared identity dimension is also
necessary if Bosnia and Herzegovina is to have a future as a state.
The Hitler question may in fact suggest that one should not be too optimistic
about the universal similarity of the Bosnian national groups as a potential for
peace-building and reconciliation. Severe hatred can be cultivated between very
similar groups provided that the historical difference – even a tiny one – is sensitive
enough. In the case of Bosnia, the Hitler question suggests the Second World War
as just such a sensitive issue. Moreover, we have seen that the parallels between the
Second World War and the war of the 1990s in popular culture and history
textbooks have likely turned the recent war into another sensitive historical
difference among young Bosnians.
From the perspective of universal similarity, parts of the Youth and History
survey should perhaps be repeated in the coming years to see whether the three
groups show a growing tendency of differentiation or whether a general similarity
in attitudes remains. This will be particularly relevant if the educational system is
revised and becomes more unified. It would also be interesting to see whether the
belief in future peace continues among young people.
23
Lovrenović 2001, 224, Karić, Enes 2001. Identities: Bosnian and European, Bosniac and Muslim. Translated by
Danijela Valenta and Anthony Vivis. In: Lovrenović, Ivan and Jones, Fransis R. (ed.) 2001. Life at the Crossroads.
Forum Bosnae culture-science-society-politics quaterly review 11/01. Sarajevo: International Forum Bosnia, 127.
331
The main results of the research leave us both wondering whether there is any
room for the change in the field of history culture or history teaching in the near
future, and whether the attitudes of young people have a chance to survive and
become a societal reality. What seems clear, however, is that as long as the most
recent history is not dealt with publicly, the history will continue to haunt the
Bosnian society and its youth. Therefore, research projects relating to the problems
of the manipulative and destructive use of history stemming from the new
situations and political decisions of the society will still be needed for they can help
the society to address questions that can help its members to orientate themselves
towards the future.
8.2 Youth and History as a Method and the Dilemma with

other Sources
The starting point of this research was the Youth and History survey. Around the
survey material I sought to build a research project that would be as societally
relevant as possible. The feedback I have received in several seminars and
conferences in Bosnia when presenting different parts of this research project have
indicated that the research has had at least some relevance to the society on which it
focuses. Simultaneously, however, the monographic form of the final presentation
was perhaps not the most convenient way of presenting results related to topics
currently relevant to political processes, and many conclusions and
recommendations of the research would have been more relevant had they been
published earlier. Therefore, in the future I hope to see quick research responses to
situations where history is being used for certain purposes and where young people
are subject to changing political and social realities.
The methodological comments here are related to the Youth and History
survey and to the selection of source materials for the analyses on the presence of
history.
The original Youth and History survey was characterized, among other things,
as a study of identities, the meaning of nation, and the societal meanings of history.
Thus, when I was seeking a method to investigate youth and meanings of history in
Bosnia in the late 1990s, the Youth and History survey provided an attractive
possibility: it was a comparative research which would place Bosnia in a larger
context. We have seen that the comparison possibility indeed was important, and
led us to question some of the conclusions of other similar surveys done without
the comparative approach.
I did not include additional questions designed particularly for Bosnia for the
Youth and History survey for they could have resulted in denial of research
permission. When conducting the analyses, however, I occasionally regretted this
decision. Open questions would have provided additional possibilities for
interpretation. Therefore, if I were to repeat the research now, I would still choose a
332
vehicle such as the Youth and History survey, which provides the possibility of
comparability. But I would also try to include national elements and open
questions.24
Finally, some of the questions were perhaps too difficult or too conceptual for
14-year-old Bosnian respondents.25 This resulted in high standard deviations and
the general quality of the data was not as good as it could have been. As a result, the
differences between the groups were difficult to detect and often at the threshold of
being significant.
Overall, however, the indirect and general nature of the questions characteristic
of the international survey showed its strength in this research. As mentioned, war
has been one of the central concepts in the public sphere of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and therefore the pupils were likely to know how they are supposed
to perceive the war if they want to be politically correct in their national context.
The indirect questions of the survey, however, did not provoke politically desirable
answers, for the pupils most likely did not see the questions as connected to the on-
going political debates of their country. Instead, we can assume that they answered
the questions reflecting their own, “real” thoughts, and thus we can be sure to have
indeed obtained reliable, and therefore valuable, information on their thoughts.
The respondents’ standing would for sure have been different had the survey been
titled “Youth and War”, or even worse, “Youth and the Bosnian war”. Now they
answered questions in “Youth and History”, which we assume provided a neutral
answering attitude and atmosphere. In addition, based on the feedback from a few
schools, the pupils were enthusiastic about the survey precisely because it was
European, and therefore universal, not just Bosnian.
From a methodological point of view, chapter five presented the greatest
dilemmas of the research. I wanted to analyse the presence of history in post-war
Bosnian society as broadly as possible. Based mainly on the approach of a few
Finnish historians into what they have called “daily history”, I decided to include
all kinds of materials that would illustrate and reflect the presence of history in the
society. On the other hand, I knew from the beginning that it would be impossible
to cover all the fields of culture from the perspective of using history. The post-war
Bosnian working conditions also presented challenges. As a result, the incidental
non-systematic nature of sources challenges the traditional requirements held for
resources in history research and emphasises the need to understand chapter five as
a descriptive (as opposed to systematic) analysis. Yet, I do believe that only through
such an unorthodox approach to resources available was it possible to establish a
meaningful description of the prevailing history culture in the Bosnian context.
24
In a study on the social representation of history among university students in Malaysia and Singapore, the
students were, among other things, asked to list the ten most important events in Malaysian and Singaporean history.
Similar open questions would be interesting in the Bosnian context too. Liu, Lawrence and Ward 2002, 11.
25
Originally, the target group of the Youth and History research was 15-year-old pupils who would have received the
maximum amount of obligatory schooling. In the Bosnian case, this meant conducting the survey during the last year
of obligatory schooling in the 8th grade during which the pupils are 13 to 15 years old. See Angvik and von Borries
(ed.) 1997, A27.
333
I hope that the research has managed to demonstrate why I believe this type of
history research has a concrete political and societal dimension. The matters
addressed as part of this research are matters that should be understood and taken
into account by those working in the fields of conflict prevention and conflict
resolution. At the same time, however, it must be said that the unstable working
conditions in a post-crisis region create additional difficulties not only for the
research process but also for the usability of research results, for systems function
inefficiently and people change and leave the country and therefore contacts are
easily lost.26 I feel I should have fought harder in order for this research to have
greater political and societal significance in Bosnia.
8.3 Looking Forward

Finally, I wish to close with five suggestions stemming from this research. They are
based on the ideal of an open and democratic society able to tolerate and celebrate
multi-culturalism and mutual differences. Such suggestions can function on two
levels: on the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the level of other post-
conflict areas or regions where separatism creates similar problems.
Suggestion 1:
Education should be recognised as a long-term building block of a functional civil
society. As a consequence, schooling, and in particular the teaching of subjects such
as history and religion, should be subject to public interest and decision-making.
Thus, schooling should be an integral component of such political documents as
the Dayton Peace Agreement. Mary Kaldor has argued that investment in free
media and education is essential to stop relentless particularistic propaganda in the
process of constructing an active civil society. ”These conditions are much more
important than the formal procedures of democracy”, Kaldor states and concludes
how without such preconditions, elections can end up legitimising the warring
parties just as happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton.27 Based on a
study of the effects of civic education on the attitudes and behavior of youth in
Bosnia, it has also been suggested that civic education can foster positive changes in
youth’s skills, attitudes and values.28
Suggestion 2:
The power of history and its presentations should be acknowledged. It is no
coincidence that the Hindu-minded leading party in India has recently changed the
26
Vera Katz has pointed out how those working in ministeries of education and pedagogical institutes in Bosnia and
Herzegovina do not seem to be using existing textbook research. Katz 2002, 163.
27
Kaldor 1999, 134-135.
28
Soule 2000, 21.
334
history curricula to support its politics.29 Based on a survey, it has been argued that
the most effective tools in constructing and strengthening the negative image of
Germans in Poland after the Second World War were elementary and secondary
schools.30 The most recent example of acknowledging the power of history
presentations comes from Iraq where history textbooks were revised in November
2003 under the leadership of American-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
The texts were not only totally “deSaddamised”, but all potentially controversial
topics were also deleted. This deletion included anything critical of America, and
generally most of the modern history of the Middle East that has affected Iraq.31
This research has shown how history can be used as much for ”unscrupulous
exploitation and manipulation as for analytical and critical orientation for the
future”.32
Suggestion 3:
History culture in general, and school textbooks and mass media products in
particular, should be monitored in potential crisis areas. Such monitoring could
serve as pre-emptive action to help avoid conflict, for the changes in textbooks and
media can reveal a hidden political agenda within the society before it develops into
an open conflict.
Suggestion 4:
Local cosmopolitan initiatives of schooling should be supported. My definition of
cosmopolitanism relies on the definition of Mary Kaldor: it is not a denial of
identity but the celebration of the diversity of identities and enthusiasm for
multiple overlapping identies. The term refers, on the one hand, to a positive
political vision which embraces tolerance, multi-culturalism, civility and
democracy, and on the other hand, to a legitimate respect for certain universal
principles (e.g. liberalism and democracy) which should guide political
communities. Kaldor argues that Western political leaders often dismiss the local
cosmopolitan initiatives as worthy but insignificant, and continue to negotiate with
the representatives of warring parties.33 We have seen this happening in post-war
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yet, in the field of education, for instance, there have
been numerous active Bosnian teachers and other individuals with cosmopolitan
approach. They themselves have been subject to nationalistic politics and have
therefore been unable to express their views and ideas, except in some occasional
29
Rama 2002.
30
Sander, Richard P. 1995. The Contribution of post-World War II schools in Poland in Forging a Negative Image
of the Germans. East European Quaterly 2/29, 185-196.
31
Teaching history in Iraq. Another vacuum opens up. What sort of history, if any, will Iraqi children have to learn?
The Economist. November 8th-14th 2003, Vol 369, No 8349, 41.
32
Immonen 1996, 165.
33
Kaldor 1999, 87-88, 115-116, 121-122.
335
seminars. The extensive support of the Western leaders for these people may have
fostered a different educational reality than what is prevalent now.
Suggestion 5:
Society should not ignore young people as was the case, for instance, in the former
Yugoslavia. The collective voice of Bosnian youth stated in 2000: “we are uniquely
positioned in BiH in its transition towards greater stability and prosperity, if we
would be given a chance. We have an advantage over older generations because the
older generations in BiH are more burdened with a negative attitude about history
than youth. Their burden lies in the need to protect their identity, which can create
dangerous, negative emotions among people of BiH. We, on the other hand, were
raised in different climate. We were raised in pluralist society with more open-
mindedness towards those who are different. If given more responsibility and a
place in society, we think that we can help bring about peace and reconciliation.”34
The results of the Youth and History survey in Bosnia suggest that at least
unconscious peace-building potential among the young people continues. This
potential should be nurtured and embraced, not politically manipulated or
neglected.
34
336
SOURCES AND LITERATURE
Sources and Literature
YOUTH AND HISTORY SURVEY DATA

Bosnian data in the SPSS format in the accompanying CD-ROM. File ”Bosnianstu.por”.
Data of the original Youth and History is available on a CD-ROM attached to the Angvik, Magne and von
Borries, Bodo 1997 (ed.). Youth and History, A Comparative European Survey on Historical
Consciousness and Political Attitudes among Adolescents. Volume B Documentation. Hamburg: Körber-
Stiftung.
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Perić, Ivo 1995. Povijest za VIII. razred osnovne škole. IV izdanje. Zagreb: Školska knjiga.
Гаћеша, Младеновић, Максимовић & Ѕивковић 1997, Историја ѕа 8. раѕред основне школе.
Београд: Завод ѕа уджбенике и наставна средства.
Пејић, Ранко 1997. Додатак уџбенику историје за 8. Разред основне школе. Српско Сарајево:
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350
INDEX
Index
1974 constitution, 153, 169, 204, 229, 231, 236 142, 150, 151, 152, 154, 156, 164, 165,
Ahonen, Sirkka, 20, 23, 26, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 169, 186, 210, 239, 240, 272
48, 49, 50, 60, 243, 316 Baranović, Branislava, 18, 32, 166, 167, 208,
Al Qaida, 150 308
Alasuutari, Pertti, 55, 162 Belgian, 294
Albania, 63, 79, 232, 235, 236, 252 Bihać, 81
Albans, 123, 124, 197, 223, 225, 228, 231, 232, Billig, Michael, 116, 123, 126, 128
235, 236, 246, 247, 252 Bleiburg, 87, 88, 179, 218, 222, 245, 256
Alkula, Tapani, 259, 369, 370, 372 Bogomil-theory, 121, 127, 144
Allies, 81, 172, 174, 177, 178, 183, 189, 193, Bonn conference, 154
213, 214, 226 Borba, 142
Almond, Mark, 70, 71, 80, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, Borries, Bodo von, 13, 34, 35, 41, 50, 61, 64,
91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 99, 123, 138, 141, 146, 73, 257, 259, 261, 263, 265, 266, 268, 270,
184 272, 273, 276, 280, 283, 284, 288, 289,
American, 33, 39, 71, 154, 319, 335 292, 294, 295, 296, 298, 299, 301, 303,
Andersson, Benedict, 25 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 315, 317, 325,
Angvik, Magne, 13, 34, 35, 41, 50, 61, 64, 73, 333, 372, 373, 375
257, 259, 261, 263, 265, 266, 268, 270, Bosniac as a term, 252
272, 273, 276, 280, 283, 284, 288, 289, Bosnian army, 97, 101, 102, 130
292, 294, 295, 296, 298, 299, 301, 303, Bosnian Church, 77, 90
304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 315, 317, 325, Bosnian Institute of London, 30, 70, 71, 72,
333, 372, 373, 375 104, 110, 113, 119, 152, 157
Annex 8 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, 122 Bosnian language, 130, 150, 237
anti-fascism, 174, 200, 214 Bosnian question, 17, 62, 201
Anzulović, Branimir, 29, 82, 87, 99, 124, 125, Bosnianhood, 237, 244, 331
138, 145, 148, 225, 241 Bosnians, 14, 41, 59, 61, 73, 77, 78, 79, 81, 96,
Arab Israelis, 13, 299, 304 102, 109, 116, 123, 129, 139, 142, 148,
Arab-Israeli wars, 176 201, 238, 244, 252, 256, 262, 264, 273,
Aronsson, Peter, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 48, 49, 50, 277, 314, 316, 318, 319, 324, 325, 326,
51, 52, 144, 328 330, 331, 357, 369, 372
Ashdown, Paddy, 106 Braembussche, Antoon A van den, 49, 50, 51,
Atlantic Charter, 193 72, 138, 155
Austria-Hungary, 78, 79, 182, 199, 209, 215, Brčko, 150, 267, 330
225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 237, 238, 239, 247 Brčko model, 330
AVNOJ (Antifascist Council for the National British, 24, 34, 69, 88, 98, 115, 123, 179, 193,
Liberation of Yugoslavia), 86, 174, 196, 200, 261, 372
201, 202, 208, 236, 253 Buchenwald, 169, 173
Axis powers, 80, 84, 85, 172, 173, 182 Bugojno, 120
Bakonis, Evaldas, 33, 75 Bulajić, Milan, 87
Balkan, 25, 28, 33, 89, 94, 95, 96, 105, 123, Burke, Peter, 20, 21
124, 151, 161 Carlmichael, Cathie, 29, 124, 125, 129, 130,
ballijas, 83, 151 144, 147, 151
Baltic States, 33 Catholic Church, 82, 95, 123, 169, 170, 193,
Banja Luka, 62, 72, 118, 119, 121, 122, 124, 195, 196, 216, 232, 234, 235, 241, 245,
125, 130, 131, 133, 135, 136, 137, 141, 247, 249, 272
catholicism, 77, 82, 90, 233, 234
351
cd-rom, 263 Entente powers, 171, 182, 183

chetnik movement, 71, 206, 208, 210, 221, 222 Estonia, 33, 34, 273
China, 185 ethnic cleansing, 29, 85, 90, 101, 103, 107, 175,
cluster analysis, 315 324
Collin, Finn, 39, 40 ethnic group, 109
Committee for History Science in Bosnia, 69 ethnicity, 89, 107, 123, 316
Communist Party, 84, 93, 95 Euroclio, 33
Conze, Werner, 21, 22 European Community, 63, 100, 102, 117, 298
Council of Europe, 117, 118, 119, 120, 131, European Community Monitoring Mission
132, 157 (ECMM), 63, 64, 65, 67, 117, 118
Creswell, John W., 55, 57 European integration, 175, 287, 288, 289, 307,
Croat Army Forces (HVO), 99, 101, 102, 119, 308, 311, 312, 314, 316
128, 153 European Union, 29, 32, 175
Croat Peasant Party, 214, 216, 217 Evans, Richard, 18, 21, 37
croathood, 83, 134, 212, 215, 216, 217, 218, fascism, 141, 189, 213, 227, 231
245, 255, 317 Federal Nations’ Republic of Yugoslavia, 166,
Croatia, 14, 29, 31, 32, 36, 61, 68, 76, 78, 80, 186, 196, 220, 221
86, 87, 88, 97, 98, 99, 100, 107, 111, 113, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 13, 59,
117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 126, 62, 68, 97, 105, 106, 110, 114, 122, 126,
131, 132, 134, 139, 142, 147, 148, 151, 127, 128, 129, 133, 141, 154, 155, 165,
153, 155, 161, 166, 170, 174, 178, 179, 195, 263, 266, 298, 299, 305, 318
180, 186, 187, 193, 197, 201, 203, 205, Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka, 119
208, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, First World War, 13, 30, 68, 79, 81, 91, 113,
220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 226, 228, 231, 162, 163, 166, 167, 170, 171, 172, 176,
233, 235, 237, 241, 244, 245, 246, 247, 177, 182, 192, 193, 198, 201, 202, 206,
252, 256, 261, 262, 272, 298, 311, 315, 208, 209, 211, 217, 225, 226, 227, 229,
317, 318, 327 232, 236, 238, 240, 241, 246, 247, 256, 324
Croatians, 14, 94, 244, 262, 264, 270, 273, 274, Firth, Raymond, 128, 129
276, 288, 331 Fleming, Dan, 33, 45
crosstabulations, 260, 262, 369, 370 Foča, 81, 85, 119, 123, 130, 132, 210, 252
curricula, 14, 34 Former Yugoslavia, 99, 151
Cyrillic alphabet, 61, 62, 68, 124, 129, 133, Forum of Bosnia, 17, 30, 70, 108, 129, 331
135, 165, 228, 239, 257 Frankfurt school, 23
Czechs, 284 Franz Ferdinand, 78, 79, 113, 132, 171, 182,
Dachau, 234 202, 208, 209, 238, 239, 241
Dayton Peace Agreement, 32, 66, 71, 74, 104, Füredi, Frank, 23, 24, 27
105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, future orientated history, 28
122, 127, 133, 143, 150, 153, 154, 155, genocide, 81, 83, 85, 102, 120, 124, 134, 142,
156, 188, 195, 196, 249, 290, 293, 301, 148, 174, 179, 205, 206, 208, 210, 222,
328, 331, 334 224, 227, 229, 234, 241, 252, 255, 282, 329
De Vaus, D. A., 54, 259, 260, 369, 372 Georg Eckert Institute, 30, 33, 75
Denmark, 27 Germany, 21, 22, 25, 27, 28, 34, 36, 47, 50, 52,
Derventa, 123 53, 80, 84, 85, 87, 100, 161, 171, 172, 173,
Donia, Robert, 70, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 176, 177, 178, 183, 184, 197, 206, 212,
83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 213, 227, 228, 231, 232, 233, 235, 243, 245
95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, Gerner, Kristian, 29
125, 141, 142, 144, 147, 148, 317, 318 Gipsies, 82, 88, 96
Durkheim, Émile, 41 Glin, 224
Eastern Europe, 30, 32, 40, 103, 175, 264, 265, Goražde, 67, 210, 252
309 Great Albania, 235
Education for Mutual Understanding and Great Britain, 16, 27, 33, 172
Cultural Heritage, 329 Great Powers, 176, 177, 181, 190, 194, 195,
elections, 98, 105, 106, 107, 122, 126, 147, 196, 232, 249, 251
156, 223, 241, 303, 334
elitism, 140
352
INDEX
Great Serbia, Great Serbs, 85, 86, 104, 105, Islam, 78, 83, 89, 90, 95, 96, 109, 118, 119,
146, 170, 175, 180, 209, 211, 212, 215, 121, 122, 127, 133, 147, 149, 151, 152,
218, 219, 220, 221, 223, 224, 225, 246 176, 187, 190, 191, 202, 242, 249, 250, 253
Greece, 33, 79, 299 islamisation, 78, 90
Greek, 292, 298, 304 Israel, 35, 176, 181, 270, 283
Gulf war, 181 Italians, 71, 80, 84, 288
Habermas, Jürgen, 23, 52 Izetbegović, Alija, 97, 148
Habsburgs, 79, 89 Jajce, 81
Hacking, Ian, 39, 40 Janjetović, Zoran, 31
Halbwachs, Maurice, 24, 51 Japan, 27, 171, 172, 173, 178
HDZ party (Croat Democratic Union), 97, 98, Jasenovac, 82, 87, 131, 169, 184, 213, 222, 223,
113, 119, 126, 128, 151, 153, 154, 187, 241 228, 229, 234
Hebrang, Andrija, 214 Jews, 23, 53, 82, 84, 88, 96, 123, 124, 147, 173,
hegemonic representation, 325 174, 184, 185, 202, 206, 213, 227, 229,
Hentilä, Seppo, 22, 23, 28, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 233, 243
53 JNA (Yugoslav People’s army), 63, 84, 93, 99,
Herceg-Bosna, 100, 105, 113, 119, 127, 148, 100, 101, 103, 143, 147, 175, 180, 181,
154, 298, 311 187, 228, 233, 242, 246, 253
Herderian, 294, 311 Kalela, Jorma, 26, 28, 29, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52,
hetero-stereotypes, 248 116
Hietala, Marjatta, 34, 160 Kallay, Benjamin, 237
historical consciousness, 50, 54, 116, 140, 145 Karadžić, Radovan, 104, 105, 138, 147, 148,
historical constructivism, 40 149, 281
historical Museum, 132 Karadžić, Vuk, 124, 131
Historikerstreit (history debate), 23 Karge, Heike, 32, 165, 170, 211, 243, 253, 326
historiography, 24, 25, 28, 29, 69, 70, 71, 90, Katz, Vera, 326, 327, 334
141, 144, 153, 227 Kettunen, Pauli, 25, 47, 49, 52, 53, 103
history culture, 26, 47, 48, 49, 116, 335 King Alexander, 92, 93
history didactics, 22, 27, 34, 58 Kingdom of Bosnia, 78
History Education Committee of the Centre for Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 91, 199
Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes or
Europe (CDRSEE), 31, 33, 326, 327 Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 91, 92, 98, 104,
history mediation, 27, 29, 30, 38 124, 147, 152, 198, 199, 204, 205, 207,
history politics, 52, 54 215, 219, 220, 226, 230, 231, 232, 240, 246
history textbooks, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 27, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, 80, 92, 204
31, 32, 33, 34, 43, 45, 53, 60, 68, 69, 73, Klein, Jacques, 151
74, 144, 152, 153, 159, 161, 162, 165, 166, Knin, 224
169, 170, 188, 208, 211, 248, 253, 254, Körber, Andreas, 13, 24, 74, 293, 294, 369
256, 257, 258, 259, 273, 308, 319, 320, Korean war, 176, 181
324, 325, 327, 331, 335, 357 Koren, Snjezana, 31, 326, 327
Hitler, Adolf, 80, 85, 169, 172, 173, 213, 233, Koselleck, Reinhard, 21, 23
243, 264, 281, 282, 309, 314, 320, 325, 331 Kosovo, 94, 105, 112, 123, 124, 127, 146, 154,
Hobsbawm, Eric, 25, 139, 140 223, 228, 231, 232, 235, 236, 329
Holbrooke, Richard, 138, 195, 236 Kosovo Albans, 94
Höpken, Wolfgang, 33, 94, 127, 141, 153, 327 Kozara, 184, 234
Iggers, Georg G., 20, 21, 57 language, 15, 129, 197
India, 17, 176, 181, 334 Le Goff, Jacques, 24, 328
Institute for the Protection of the Cultural, League of Nations, 30, 191, 193, 212
Natural and Historical Heritage of Bosnia Lehto, Anna-Maija, 55, 56
and Herzegovina, 118 Lepa sela, lepa gore, 138
International Crisis Group (ICG), 106, 107, Lithuania, 33, 270
108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 150, 290 Lithuanians, 284
International Monetary fund, 112 Lovrenović, Ivan, 17, 30, 70, 71, 77, 78, 79, 80,
Iraq-Iran war, 176 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94,
353
95, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, Northern Ireland, 128, 329, 330, 342
119, 120, 129, 142, 143, 147, 148, 156, 331 Nyyssönen, Heino, 29
Lowenthal, David, 27, 51 Office of the High Representative (OHR), 106,
Macedonia, 32, 94, 186, 228, 235 111, 112, 122, 127, 151, 155, 198
Malcolm, Noel, 69, 70, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, Ollila, Anne, 26, 51
82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, Organisation for Stability and Cooperation in
94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, Europe (OSCE), 112, 126, 156, 330
105, 115, 144, 147, 148, 149, 252 orientalism, 148
marxism, 130 Orthodox Church, 124, 234
Matica Hrvatske, 217, 221 Ottoman empire, 78, 90, 136, 188, 237, 238
media, 111, 113, 150, 151 Pakistan, 176, 181
Medjugorge, 125 Palestine, 128, 264, 270, 283
Memorandum, 99 Palestinians, 176, 268, 273, 298, 299, 304, 315,
Metohija, 228, 232, 235, 236 316, 319
Mihailović, Draža, 81, 84, 85, 124 partisan movement, 85, 86, 93, 113, 143, 178,
Mitterrand, Francoise, 138 185, 196, 214, 216
mixed marriages, intermarriages, 78 Patriarch Pavle, 124
Mlada Bosna, 78, 132, 209 Patriotic League, 127, 175
Mladi Muslimani, 130, 203, 205 Pavelić, Ante, 80, 83, 88, 169, 213
Montenegro, 79, 146, 161, 166, 175, 182, 183, Pearson correlation, 262, 286, 299, 370, 375
211, 223, 226, 229, 235, 238, 242 Pearson correlation (r), 262, 286, 299, 370, 375
Moscovici, Serge, 42, 43, 44, 45, 135, 157, 325 Pekkala, Leo, 13, 30, 34
Mostar, 64, 72, 80, 82, 100, 109, 118, 119, Perić, Ivo, 31, 68, 162, 164, 165, 177, 178, 179,
120, 121, 122, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 180, 181, 192, 193, 196, 212, 213, 214,
133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 142, 151, 156, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222,
239, 290, 300, 326 223, 256
Mujahedins, 187, 247 Petritsch, Wolfgang, 106
multiculturalism, 103, 256 Petrovac, 174, 240
Museum of Revolution, 132, 141 Petrović Njegos, Petar, 124
museums, 131, 132, 133, 139, 141 Pingel, Falk, 74, 159, 160, 162
Muslim militias, 81 Počitelj, 119, 120, 121
Mussolini, Benito, 80 polemic representation, 325
national group, 270, 294 Poles, 185, 268, 288
National Liberation Movement, 85, 200 Portuguese, 41, 257, 288
nationality, 109 Prince Lazarus, 223
NATO, 59, 104, 111, 112, 150, 186, 187, 189, Princip, Gavrilo, 132, 169, 209
190, 235, 243, 249, 290, 317 propaganda, 14, 29, 33, 52, 83, 97, 98, 103,
naturalism, 25, 140 147, 148, 169, 172, 173, 179, 206, 234,
NDH state, 71, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 95, 293, 324, 326, 334
134, 138, 143, 169, 184, 200, 204, 208, questionnaire, 61, 62, 65, 73, 74, 259, 260, 263,
212, 213, 214, 228, 233, 234, 241, 243, 264, 265, 289, 298, 305, 313, 359, 375
245, 247 Red Army, 178
Neumann, Iver B., 161 Redžić, Enver, 71, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 90, 252
Nevesinje, 210 reliability, 61, 65, 279, 299, 372
new war, 103 Richter, Melvin, 37
Newland question, 268, 269, 271, 300, 301, Rogatice, 210, 252
302 Romania, 175
Nielsen, Vagn Oluf, 24 Rüsen, Jörn, 23, 28, 35, 47, 48, 50
Nigerian war, 176 Russia, 29, 33, 64, 84, 171, 175, 176, 178, 215
No man’s land, 138 Russians, 283
non-governmental organisations, 14, 112, 154, Samuels, Raphael, 27
155 Sandžak, 135, 207, 210
Nora, Pierre, 18, 24 Sarajevo, 15, 17, 28, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70,
Nordic, 13, 34, 49, 283 71, 72, 78, 79, 80, 82, 89, 90, 98, 99, 100,
Normandy, 177 101, 102, 108, 111, 118, 119, 121, 122,
354
INDEX
123, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, Soviet Union, 89, 94, 144, 172, 173, 181, 185,
134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 142, 194
143, 145, 147, 151, 153, 156, 157, 164, Srbinje, 123, 130, 132
165, 167, 171, 175, 182, 201, 203, 209, Srebrenica, 102, 133, 210, 252
239, 240, 242, 331 standard deviation (SD), 333, 368, 369, 373,
Sarajevo city museum, 131 375
Sarajevo Declaration, 157 standard error (SE), 368
Sarajevo Krug, 138 Stepinac, the Bishop, 216
Scottish, 41, 257 Stolac, 119, 122, 135, 136
SDA party (Socialdemocratic Action), 98, 101 structuralism, 191, 251
SDS party (Serb Democratic Party), 97, 98, 175, Svensson, Birgitta, 28
211 Sweden, 25, 26, 27, 29, 64, 161
Searle, John R., 39, 320 Swiss model, 155
Second World War, 20, 30, 40, 53, 71, 74, 80, third world, 98
81, 83, 85, 86, 87, 93, 95, 96, 113, 119, Tito, 71, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 94, 95, 96,
120, 124, 125, 130, 137, 138, 141, 142, 97, 98, 103, 105, 113, 130, 132, 141, 153,
143, 144, 146, 148, 161, 163, 164, 166, 184, 196, 200, 221, 223, 249, 327
167, 170, 172, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, titoism, 93
179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 188, 189, Tokyo, 179
191, 192, 193, 194, 199, 203, 204, 205, Tomaševo, 210, 252
206, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, Töttö, Pertti, 57
216, 217, 222, 223, 226, 228, 229, 230, tourist guides, 136, 323
231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 244, 245, 246, Trebinje, 122
247, 252, 253, 255, 271, 272, 281, 309, Tuđjman, Franjo, 87, 97, 125, 148, 149, 169,
314, 317, 320, 324, 325, 331, 335 318
Sells, Michael, 81, 87, 88, 90, 96, 100, 101, Tunnel Museum, 132
102, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 142, 149 Turkey, 85, 91, 207, 237, 252, 264, 299
Serb Academy of Sciences, 99 Turkish, 70, 78, 90, 119, 120, 129, 130, 135,
Serb Civil Council, 101 136, 137, 138, 147, 188, 199, 238, 298, 304
Serb Republic, Bosnian, 13, 59, 61, 62, 63, 65, UN Security Council, 186, 232
68, 69, 101, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, unemployment, 98, 110, 111
113, 119, 122, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129, Unesco, 17, 30, 32, 34, 73, 122
130, 132, 133, 136, 137, 138, 147, 150, United Nations, 14, 16, 100, 101, 102, 105,
154, 155, 156, 162, 164, 165, 169, 187, 112, 123, 138, 151, 180, 181, 186, 191,
195, 236, 241, 249, 263, 290, 299, 302, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 232, 249, 252,
311, 317, 318 255, 287, 289, 290, 306, 311, 314, 318
Serb Sarajevo, 134 United Nations Development Program
serbhood, 222, 225, 236, 246, 257 (UNDP), 16, 59, 61, 64, 71, 96, 108, 109,
single item level analysis, 368 110, 111, 112, 129, 150, 264, 277, 299,
Skinner, Quentin, 196, 197, 202 306, 326, 336
Slavonia, 241 United Nations Protection Force
Slovenes, 91, 93, 181, 197, 199, 201, 204, 205, (UNPROFOR), 102, 180
209, 215, 217, 219, 221, 230, 240, 244, United States, 27, 28, 33, 36, 102, 104, 146,
263, 264, 273, 294 150, 169, 171, 172, 173, 177, 178, 183,
Slovenia, 32, 36, 63, 78, 86, 100, 131, 165, 167, 186, 195, 215, 216, 232, 265
174, 181, 186, 235, 261, 270, 272, 317, 338 urbanisation, 90, 142
Smith, Anthony, 25, 140 ustaša movement, 82, 119, 138, 144, 213, 232
social fact, 40 Versailles treaty, 183, 192, 216
social memory, see also collective memory, 44 Vidovan constitution, 218
social representation, 42, 44 Vietnam, 33, 45, 176, 181, 319
Soros foundation, 113 Vietnam war, 33, 45, 176, 181, 319
South East European Stability Pact, 15, 30, 31, Višegrad, 210
32 Vojvodina, 94, 146, 231
Southeast Europe, 17, 18, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, Vukovar, 224
265, 326, 327 Wahhabi-style, 121, 122
355
Welsh, 276, 294 332, 333, 336, 357, 359, 368, 369, 370,
Western Herzegovina, 134 371, 372, 373, 375
World Bank, 112, 157 Yugoslavian Muslim Organisation (JMO), 83,
Youth and History central analysis group, 293 92, 201, 204
Youth and History research, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, Yugoslavism, 78, 104, 246, 317
18, 23, 24, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, Zagreb, 68, 70, 82, 94, 98, 101, 107, 111, 117,
45, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 118, 126, 130, 131, 134, 136, 137, 216,
67, 68, 73, 74, 75, 105, 116, 162, 259, 260, 220, 317
261, 262, 263, 264, 270, 271, 272, 276, ZAVNOBiH (Antifascist Council for the
279, 281, 282, 283, 285, 287, 290, 291, National Liberation of Bosnia and
293, 294, 296, 298, 300, 301, 303, 304, Herzegovina), 86, 200, 202
306, 308, 309, 312, 313, 315, 316, 319, Zerubavel, Yael, 25
320, 321, 324, 325, 326, 328, 330, 331, Zvornik, 119
356
SUMMARY
Summary in English
The task of the research was binary: to determine the use of history in the post-war
Bosnia and Herzegovina from the perspective of young people, and to define the
historical thinking of youth among Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs.
The task coalesced into three main analyses. The first analysis discussed the
general presence of history in post-war Bosnian society. The analysis was organised
around history-related phenomena: history culture, historical consciousness and
history politics. Three separate 8th-grade (the 8th grade is the last year of obligatory
schooling) history textbooks used by the three Bosnian national communities were
the subject of the second analysis, which focused on the representations of three
socio-historical concepts central in post-war Bosnian society: war, peace and nation.
The third analysis of the historical thinking of the youth was based on the
international Youth and History survey which I conducted among 8th-grade pupils
in Bosnia in 1999-2000. The descriptive statistic analysis of the answers of 907
pupils concentrated on the representations of the same three concepts as in the
textbooks analysis. The answers of the Bosnian national groups were compared to
each other and to other European country samples.
The description of the presence of history illustrated the division of history
culture into three separate – and even opposing – cultures in post-war Bosnia and
Herzegovina. History textbooks further demonstrated how presentations of the past
among the three communities create hostile images of the country’s other national
groups. They construct three different interpretations of the past within a society of
four million people often equating the past with the present. Finally, the Youth and
History survey analysis showed that in most questions, the national groups differed
only marginally in their thinking. In the European comparison, Bosnians formed a
single group and demonstrated great belief in future peace and did not consider
wars important factors of change in history.
357
Summary in Finnish
Tutkimuksen tavoite oli kaksiosainen: historian käytön analysointi sodanjälkeisessä

Bosnia ja Hertsegovinassa erityisesti nuorten näkökulmasta sekä Bosnian serbi-,
kroaatti-, ja bosniakkinuorten historiallisen ajattelun tarkastelu.
Tutkimustavoite konkretisoitui seuraavaan kolmeen pääanalyysiin:
Analyyseista ensimmäinen käsitteli yleistä historian läsnäoloa sodanjälkeisessä
Bosniassa. Jäsentelin analyysin historiallisten ilmiöiden, kuten historiakulttuurin,
historiatietoisuuden ja historiapolitiikan ympärille.
Toinen pääanalyysi keskittyi kolmeen erilliseen 8. luokan historian oppikirjaan
(8. luokka on peruskoulun viimeinen luokka), joita Bosnian kolme kansallista
ryhmää ovat käyttäneet sotavuosista lähtien. Koulukirjakäsittely rakentui sodan,
rauhan ja kansakunnan käsitteiden ympärille. Keskuskäsitteiden katsotaan olevan
keskeisiä yhteiskuntahistoriallisia käsitteitä sodanjälkeisessä Bosniassa.
Kolmas pääanalyysi käsitteli kansainvälistä Nuoret ja Historia -tutkimusta,
jonka keräsin kahdeksasluokkalaisilta bosnialaisilta 1999–2000. Nuorten
historiallista ajattelua ja käsityksiä kuvannut tilastollinen analyysi perustui 907
oppilaan vastauksiin ja keskittyi samojen kolmen pääkäsitteen representaatioihin
kuin oppikirja-analyysi. Bosnian kansallisten ryhmien vastauksia verrattiin muiden
maiden tuloksiin sekä keskenään.
Analyysi historian läsnäolosta kuvasti historiakulttuurin jakautumista kolmeen
erilliseen ja osin jopa vastakkaiseen kulttuuriin sodanjälkeisessä Bosniassa. Historian
oppikirjat havainnollistivat, kuinka kolmen kansanryhmän esitykset menneestä
luovat viholliskuvia muista kansanryhmistä maan sisällä. Kirjat rakentavat kolmea
erilaista historiantulkintaa neljän miljoonan asukkaan yhteiskunnan sisällä ja
rinnastavat usein menneen ja nykyisen. Samaan aikaan Nuoret ja Historia –
tutkimus osoitti, että valtaosassa kysymyksiä Bosnian kansalliset ryhmät erottuivat
toisistaan vain marginaalisesti. Eurooppalaisessa vertailussa Bosnian nuoret
muodostivat oman yksittäisen ryhmänsä: he uskoivat vahvasti rauhaan
tulevaisuudessa eivätkä pitäneet sotia tärkeinä historian muutosvoimina.
358
ANNEX 1
Annexes
Annex 1: Youth and History questionnaire
359
360
ANNEX 1
361
362
ANNEX 1
363
364
ANNEX 1
365
366
ANNEX 1
367
Annex 2: The methods applied in the

quantitative analysis
The principles of the Youth and History survey analysis were presented as part of
the analysis in chapter seven. In the following the different analyses applied in the
research are presented in greater detail. The presentation is divided into single item
level analyses and constructs of several items.
Single item level analyses
MEANS
The means were presented in tables that included the overall mean of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the means of the three national groups of the country (Bosniacs,
Croats and Serbs). The tables appeared as follows:
Table 1: Example of a mean table

Bosnian total Bosniacs Croats Serbs
M SD SE N M SD SE N M SD SE N M SD SE N
Item1
3.92 1.14 .04 907 3.90 1.19 .06 360 4.06 1.04 .07 218 3.84 1.14 .07 311
Item2
3.18 1.06 .04 907 3.15 1.09 .06 360 3.30 1.01 .07 218 3.10 1.06 .06 311
Item3
2.57 1.15 .04 907 2.59 1.17 .06 360 2.53 1.09 .07 218 2.56 1.15 .07 311
Item4
3.08 1.08 .04 907 3.09 1.11 .06 360 3.08 .96 .07 218 3.08 1.14 .07 311
The statistics displayed in the tables, standard deviation (SD) and standard error
(SE), help us to estimate the variance within the sample for this particular item, and
how close the mean is likely to be true in a true population. Standard deviation is
the square root of the variance and tells us how much the sample varies from the
mean; in other words, how well the mean describes the values of the sample. The
lower the SD, the less variations in the sample. Standard error is calculated by
dividing the standard deviation by the square root of the total number in the
368
ANNEX 2
sample (N). The probability theory tells us that for 95% of the population, the
population mean will be +-2 standard errors of the sample mean.
Thus the SD and SE statistics help us to define the quality of the data: the
smaller the SE, the more reliably the mean describes the whole population (in our
case, all 14-year old Bosnians). The SE can be lowered by increasing the size of the
sample, which in the Youth and History survey has been taken into account when
deciding to collect as large as 800- to 1200-pupil country samples. Consequently, as
in our Bosnian country sample, the SE is always as low as 0.02–0.05, and when the
sample is divided into three national groups, the SE does not exceed 0.05–0.08.1
Standard deviation is also used to analyse the strength of the differences
between the different groups. Following the principles set by the Hamburg analysis
centre, differences of less than 0.3 standard deviation were considered weak
differences, while those between 0.3 and 0.5 standard deviation were considered
intermediate, and those over 0.5 standard deviation were considered strong
differences.2 The SD naturally varies significantly between different items. As a rule
of thumb, in the analysis I have considered a difference 0.15 between the mean
values as a limit for noting differences.
CROSSTABULATIONS
Crosstabulations were useful when presenting the general characteristics of the data
and the associations in the tables between a few sub-groups. If we want to present
European-wide comparisons, however, the mean values are more practical, for
crosstabs become too complicated when there are more than 7–8 categories.3
Therefore crosstabulations were used only to illustrate a few specific feature(s) of
the data while the mean value analysis was the basic single item level analysis
applied.
In presenting the crosstabulations, the analysis followed the practise that de
Vaus calls conventional: the independent variables (in this case, usually nationality)
are put across the top and the dependent variables (usually different arguments)
form the rows.4
When building the crosstabulation for the analysis, some of the items could be
combined. If the pupils had answered on the 5-step scale (very little-little-some-
much-very much or very unlikely-unlikely-possible-likely-very likely), we could
present the crosstabulations by considering ”very little” and ”little”, or ”much” and
”very much” together. Depending on the item, even combining ”possible”, ”likely”
and ”very likely” was sometimes a meaningful way to present the thinking of the
youth.
1
Alkula, Pöntinen and Ylöstalo 1994, 115-116.
2
Körber Andreas 2001. Email to Pilvi Torsti. May 2001.
3
De Vaus 1996/1985, 164.
4
De Vaus 1996/1985, 162.
369
Thus, the crosstabulations used in the analysis were ”reduced” in the sense that
they did not display all the information about the frequencies. Instead, the
frequencies meaningful for the analysis were displayed, and associations were
analysed based on those values.
CORRELATIONS
With some items I found it reasonable to compare the strength of associations
between variables x and y to that of y and z, or to look for associations between
several variables related to the evaluation of peace. As a correlation coefficient, I
used the Pearson correlation (r). Interesting associations usually indicated an r value
between 0.15 and 0.4. Usually, the 0.5 represents the limit for moderate
correlation, and thus the correlations found were typically weak.
Constructs of several items
FACTORS
In the factor analysis, several items were analysed together to form factors that show
which items were associated. Factors can thus show thinking dimensions and
thinking patterns.
There are some statistic principles I have followed in the factor analysis. First, I
used the varimax rotation, which was also used in the original Youth and History
report. The benefit of the varimax rotation is that it aims to maximise the
differentiation of the loadings of different items on different factors, thereby
producing factors that clearly differ from one another.5
The interpretation of the factors and the number of factors that would be
analysed from the solution was based on some basic rules: the interpretation was
based on loadings which are <0 and >1. As a basic assumption for the strength of
loadings, Alkula advises using 0.5: loadings less than that cannot really form a basis
for interpretation, and can only support items having higher loadings. In short: we
are interested in the highest loadings and the opportunities to analyse the factor
with those item-loadings.
The number of factors can be decided using two rules: the amount of the
variance explained by the factor, with total variance being the variance of all the
items in the factor solution; and the eigenvalue of the factor. As a rule of thumb
Alkula suggests that a single factor should explain at minimum 5% of the variance
and have an eigenvalue greater than or equal to one.6 In practise, the factor analysis
involves plenty of analytical thinking from selecting the items to interpreting and
naming the factors. In the analysis of the factor solution, it is important to
5
Alkula, Pöntinen and Ylöstalo 1994, 272.
6
370
ANNEX 2
remember that loadings indicate nothing about the strength of the argument; they
only show which kinds of items belong together in people’s thinking. Thus, if on
the basis of the single-item-level analysis we know that certain items are more
strongly supported than others, the factor analysis can then further clarify the
dimensions and structures of the strong arguments.
Following the Youth and History principle, the minimum eigenvalue was set at
1.0; the solutions of this research included only such factors. Typically the variance
explained by factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 was 40% to 60%. Thus
when saying in the context of this research ”the factor solution resulted” we mean
”the factor solution that includes the factors with an eigenvalue greater than or
equal to 1.0”. Strictly speaking, factor solutions always explain 100% of the
variance when all possible factors are included. Yet, for the analysis, usually those
with an eigenvalue under 1.0 are insignificant. The factors were presented in the
following tables. Below the table, the eigenvalue and the percentage of variance
explained by each factor appear with the total variance explained by the factors of
the table.
Table 2: Example of Factor table

Factor Factor 1 Factor 2
Name “Name of the factor 1” “Name of the factor 2”

Item 1 .698 -.283
Item 2 -.125 .635
Item 3 .807 -.07678
Item 4 .741 .06152
Item 5 -.04191 .755
Item 6 -.04527 .797

1: 2.063, 34.4%
2: 1.342, 22.4%
TOTAL: 56,8%
Two different factorising possibilities were considered. First, there was the method
applied in the original Youth and History study: the overall sample with all the
countries was used, and constructs calculated. Then every single country sample
was compared with the overall solution by calculating the same factors in each
sample and then correlating them with the overall factors. This type of comparison
would have been possible with the Bosnian sample as well. The only difference was
that the Bosnian values were not included in the overall calculation, which would
have made the correlation a bit more likely (as the country would have been
represented by about 1/30 of the values that form the overall value). It could,
371
however, be assumed from a similar practise used for the Dutch sample that this
difference is insignificant.7
The advantage of this kind of analysis is that it enables comparisons between
the overall solution and Bosnia. For comparisons between the different countries,
however, we still would have needed to calculate the correlations between the
respective countries – in other words this procedure would only allow comparison
of Bosnian to European artefacts, not to these of other countries.
The comparison potential for only European artefacts was considered
irrelevant, and the second option was chosen for the use of factors: to study the
combinations and dimensions only in the Bosnian data itself. The position of
Bosnians on the international comparison level could already be concluded from
the single item level analysis (and scales as well, if needed). Therefore, after the
single item level analysis, we could concentrate on analysing the characteristics of
the Bosnian sample in particular, and make use of its combined statistical
measurements. This option also retains the potential for comparison: we can
analyse the differences in the structures and search for possible semantic reasons for
them. The British national coordinators carried out this type of analysis in the
Youth and History research report.8
SCALES
The scales make comparison easier: because the scales are simply combined items
with no weighting (as with the factor loadings), they allow comparison without
difficulty both at the international level as well as within the Bosnian sample.
The use of scales can be reasoned e.g. using the argument of de Vaus, who
states the reasons as follows: 1) using multiple indicators helps to determine the
complexity of the concept, 2) it assists in developing more valid measures
(particularly relevant when measuring complex concepts with single-items, as is the
case in Youth and History), 3) it helps to increase the reliability (e.g. the effects of
translation mistakes, misunderstandings, etc., can be minimised), 4) it enables more
precision, 5) the analysis is simplified by summarising the number of items into one
scale-item.9
Alkula provides similar reasoning for using the scales. He adds that it is crucial
for the researcher to show and reason openly the process of building the scales, and
deciding on the variables, etc., as there are always several assumptions and analytical
decisions involved.10
The reliability of a scale is measured by the coefficient alpha, which can obtain
values between 0 and 1. There is no absolute value that can be considered the limit,
yet both de Vaus and Alkula mention 0.7 as a trendsetting value. In the Youth and
7
8
9
De Vaus 1996/1985, 249-250.
10
372
ANNEX 2
History survey, the limit was set at 0.6, but countries having lower reliabilities were
also considered part of the analyses. Thus in my own analysis I relied on the model
set by the original Youth and History study and considered the reliability of scales
constituted by more than two items good if alpha exceeded 0.60, and tolerable if
alpha exceeded 0.50. With the scales constituted by two items, the reliability of the
scale was considered good if alpha exceeded 0.50, and tolerable if 0.45 or over.11
With the scales, the statistics SD (standard deviation) and SE (standard error) were
used similarly as with the means analyses.
11
Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, B22, footnote 9.
373
374
ANNEX 3
Annex 3: Tables of Youth and History

analysis
The terms used in the tables follow the principles of the original Youth and History
report. The term M refers to the statistical mean value, SD to standard deviation,
SE to standard error and N to total number of the sample. The item number of the
Youth and History questionnaire is displayed in the title of each table (e.g. 41a).
The item-variable names used in the tables are the same ones used in the original
Youth and History report.1 Thus e.g. ABN_A refers to the question 41A.
R refers to the Pearson correlation between two items and F to a factor score.
1
Variable names are listed in Angvik and von Borries (ed.) 1997, A469.
375
Table 1: Trust on historical presentations (question 4)
Item M SD SE N M SD SE N M SD SE N M SD SE N
TRUST_A 3.49 1.00 .03 907 3.49 1.03 .06 360 3.53 .96 .07 218 3.52 .96 .06 311
TRUST_B 3.69 1.08 .04 907 3.67 1.07 .06 360 3.76 1.10 .08 218 3.71 1.08 .06 311
TRUST_C 2.69 1.05 .04 907 2.57 1.06 .06 360 2.82 1.00 .07 218 2.74 1.08 .06 311
TRUST_D 2.66 1.13 .04 907 2.60 1.15 .06 360 2.89 1.13 .08 218 2.55 1.07 .06 311
376
TRUST_E 3.32 1.18 .04 907 3.20 1.24 .07 360 3.72 1.03 .07 218 3.18 1.12 .07 311
TRUST_F 4.00 .99 .03 907 3.98 1.05 .06 360 4.10 .97 .07 218 3.99 .94 .05 311
TRUST_G 3.37 1.17 .04 907 3.27 1.18 .06 360 3.46 1.19 .08 218 3.43 1.15 .07 311
TRUST_H 3.85 1.24 .04 907 3.75 1.33 .07 360 3.96 1.17 .08 218 3.89 1.19 .07 311
Table 2: Associations with the changes in Eastern Europe since 1985 (question 30)
Item M SD SE N M SD SE N M SD SE N M SD SE N
ASEE_A 3.25 1.00 .03 907 3.16 1.00 .05 360 3.34 .87 .06 218 3.31 1.09 .06 311
ASEE_B 3.20 .88 .03 907 3.26 .89 .05 360 3.14 .88 .06 218 3.21 .87 .05 311
ASEE_C 3.13 .89 .03 907 3.16 .91 .05 360 3.17 .79 .06 218 3.08 .94 .06 311
ASEE_D 3.13 1.07 .04 907 3.25 1.03 .05 360 3.16 .99 .07 218 2.96 1.13 .07 311
377
ASEE_E 3.08 .89 .03 907 3.05 .86 .05 360 3.05 .83 .06 218 3.13 .97 .06 311
ASEE_F 3.29 1.02 .03 907 3.25 .99 .05 360 3.23 .98 .07 218 3.40 1.08 .06 311
ASEE_G 3.34 .96 .03 907 3.33 .95 .05 360 3.17 .88 .06 218 3.46 1.01 .06 311
ANNEX 3
Table 3: Conception of the life in BiH 40 years ago (question 35)
Item М SD SE N M SD SE N М SD SE N М SD SE N
PAST_A 3.11 1.14 .04 907 3.27 1.17 .06 360 2.81 1.08 .07 218 3.15 1.09 .06 311
PAST _C 3.07 1.08 .04 907 3.10 1.10 .06 360 2.97 .97 .07 218 3.10 1.11 .07 311
PAST_D 2.69 1.16 .04 907 2.84 1.14 .06 360 2.20 .94 .07 218 2.85 1.25 .07 311
PAST_E 2.95 1.06 .04 907 3.15 1.11 .06 360 2.71 .95 .07 218 2.88 1.02 .06 311
378
PAST _G 2.99 1.05 .04 907 2.98 1.07 .06 360 2.93 .95 .07 218 3.06 1.10 .06 311
PAST _H 3.11 1.06 .04 907 3.04 1.03 .05 360 3.05 1.01 .07 218 3.27 1.11 .06 311
Table 4: Conception of the life in BiH in 40 years (question 36)
FUTUR_A 3.42 1.10 .04 907 3.68 1.07 .06 360 3.26 .98 .07 218 3.24 1.16 .07 311
FUTUR_C 2.74 1.08 .04 907 2.57 1.04 .06 360 2.64 .91 .06 218 3.01 1.19 .07 311
FUTUR_D 3.41 1.01 .03 907 3.66 1.02 .05 360 3.15 .85 .06 218 3.32 1.04 .06 311
FUTUR_E 3.40 1.05 .04 907 3.61 1.11 .06 360 3.25 .93 .07 218 3.26 1.01 .06 311
FUTUR_G 2.69 1.10 .04 907 2.56 1.13 .06 360 2.65 1.06 .07 218 2.85 1.09 .06 311
379
FUTUR_H 2.83 1.04 .04 907 2.72 1.08 .06 360 2.76 .96 .07 218 3.01 1.05 .06 311
ANNEX 3
Table 5: Conception of the life in Europe in 40 years (question 37)
FEURO_A 3.42 1.07 .04 907 3.60 1.06 .06 360 3.40 1.04 .07 218 3.25 1.07 .06 311
FEURO_B 3.40 1.06 .04 907 3.27 1.06 .06 360 3.31 .92 .06 218 3.61 1.11 .06 311
FEURO_C 3.77 .94 .03 907 3.98 .89 .05 360 3.62 .94 .06 218 3.65 .93 .05 311
FEURO_D 3.41 1.02 .03 907 3.61 1.06 .06 360 3.39 .94 .07 218 3.17 .96 .06 311
380
FEURO_E 2.94 1.06 .04 907 2.87 1.07 .06 360 2.89 .95 .07 218 3.05 1.12 .07 311
FEURO_F 2.94 1.05 .04 907 2.87 1.09 .06 360 2.83 .91 .06 218 3.07 1.08 .06 311
Table 6: Views on nations and the national state (question 45)
NATIO_A 3.29 1.00 .03 907 3.38 1.00 .05 360 3.27 .87 .06 218 3.24 1.09 .06 311
NATIO_B 3.43 .88 .03 907 3.39 .89 .05 360 3.52 .88 .06 218 3.42 .87 .05 311
NATIO_C 3.31 .89 .03 907 3.32 .91 .05 360 3.31 .79 .06 218 3.29 .94 .06 311
NATIO_D 3.33 1.07 .04 907 3.36 1.03 .05 360 3.30 .99 .07 218 3.33 1.13 .07 311
381
NATIO_E 3.14 .89 .03 907 3.05 .86 .05 360 3.19 .83 .06 218 3.24 .97 .06 311
NATIO_F 3.21 1.02 .03 907 3.22 .99 .05 360 3.28 .98 .07 218 3.11 1.08 .06 311
ANNEX 3
Table 7: The weight for arguments getting the country B from Newland to your home country A (question 41)
ABN_A 3.15 1.06 .04 907 3.21 1.04 .05 360 3.19 .89 .06 218 3.06 1.17 .07 311
3.19 1.04 .04 907 3.34 .98 .05 360 3.27 1.09 .08 218 2.97 1.03 .06 311
ABN_B
ABN_C 3.20 1.01 .03 907 3.22 .98 .05 360 3.21 1.02 .07 218 3.14 1.03 .06 311
ABN_D 3.41 1.11 .04 907 3.40 1.12 .06 360 3.35 1.08 .08 218 3.46 1.10 .06 311
382
ABN_E 3.44 1.14 .04 907 3.50 1.14 .06 360 3.44 1.08 .08 218 3.38 1.16 .07 311
ABN_F 3.51 1.07 .04 907 3.57 1.09 .06 360 3.45 1.11 .08 218 3.47 1.03 .06 311
ABN_G 3.23 1.26 .04 907 3.25 1.24 .07 360 3.25 1.27 .09 218 3.16 1.25 .07 311
Table 8: Scale: Annexational arguments based on inhabitants’ Table 9: Scale: Annexational arguments based on traditional
rights (ABN_A,_D,_E,_F) possessions (ABN_B, ABN_C)
Subsample Alpha M SD SE N Subsample Alpha M SD SE N
Bosnia 0.6184 3.38 0.74 0.03 828 Bosnia 0.5670 3.20 0.85 0.03 851
Bosniac 0.6371 3.43 0.76 0.04 344 Bosniac 0.4917 3.28 0.80 0.04 346
Croat 0.6916 3.36 0.75 0.05 202 Croat 0.6261 3.25 0.90 0.06 207
Serb 0.5474 3.34 0.72 0.04 268 Serb 0.6239 3.07 0.87 0.05 282
European overall 0.6107 3.47 0.74 0.00 28825 European overall 0.6086 3.00 0.69 0.01 28682
383
ANNEX 3
Table 10: Scale: Annexational arguments based on historical- Table 11: Scale: Annexational arguments based on justice and
cultural common tradition (ABN_A,_B,_C) democratic decisions (ABN_E,_F,_G)
Subsample Alpha M SD SE N Subsample Alpha M SD SE N
Bosnia 0.6108 3.18 0.77 0.03 845 Bosnia 0.5841 3.46 0.82 0.03 831
Bosniac 0.5853 3.26 0.73 0.04 345 Bosniac 0.5685 3.50 0.82 0.04 345
Croat 0.6821 3.23 0.79 0.05 207 Croat 0.6684 3.42 0.84 0.06 202
Serb 0.5982 3.05 0.79 0.05 278 Serbs 0.5528 3.44 0.80 0.05 270
384
Table 12: Rotated factor matrix on ABN-question among of all Bosnians
Factor Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
“Arguments based on historical “Arguments based on justice and “Arguments based on military power”
Name
dominance and common identity “ negotiations”
ABN_A .671 .176 -.02027
ABN_B .727 .06448 .252
ABN_C .749 .114 .05424
ABN_D .508 .540 -.263
385
ABN_E -.02577 .801 .177
ABN_F .310 .714 .07693
ABN_G .132 .143 .924
Factor 1: 36%, eigenvalue 2.5

Total: 63% of the variance
ANNEX 3
Table 14: Rotated factor matrix on ABN-question of Croats
Table 13: Rotated factor matrix on ABN-question of Bosniacs
“Arguments based on “Arguments based on
Name
justice and negotiations” traditional domination and
“Arguments based on “Arguments based on violence”
Name
shared identity & past decicions made by weapons
and self-determination” and peace conference” .384 .570
ABN_A
ABN_A .655 .228

ABN_B .304 .740
ABN_B .623 .122

ABN_C .376 .570
ABN_C .728 -.04197

ABN_D .733 .285
386
ABN_D .695 .177
ABN_E .689 .05559
ABN_E .303 .427

ABN_F .776 .200
ABN_F .397 .669

ABN_G -.08190 .780
ABN_G -.153 .831

Factor 1: 35%, eigenvalue 2.4 Total: 56% of the variance
Total: 50% of the variance
Table 16: Rotated factor matrix on ABN-question and NATIO-
Table 15: Rotated factor matrix on ABN-question of Serbs
question
“Arguments based “Arguments “Arguments
Name ”Arguments for ”Mixed concept “Nations right for
on identity and based on justice based on Name
common past“ and military power identity and of Nation” military use in forming
negotiations” and unjustice” negotiations” its own state”
.693 .06718 -.161 ABN_A .593 .164 0.067

ABN_A
.735 .121 .192 ABN_B .634 -0.013 .177

ABN_B
ABN_C .698 -0.018 -0.036

ABN_C .724 .231 .228
ABN_D .700 0.084 -0.064

ABN_D .357 .653 -.295
ABN_E .430 .180 .192
387
ABN_E -.125 .736 .376
ABN_F .644 .156 .159
ABN_F .288 .745 .03455
ABN_G .230 -0.085 .699
ABN_G .153 .05902 .833

NATI_A -0.086 .656 .102
Factor 2: 16%, eigenvalue 1.1 NATI_B .149 .639 0.018
Total: 65% of the variance 0.077 .612 -0.012
NATI_C
NATI_D .179 .433 0.039
NATI_E -.136 0.051 .799
NATI_F .141 .125 .372
Factor 1: 21.5 %, eigenvalue 2.798; Factor 2: 10.3%, eigenvalue 1.338;

ANNEX 3
Factor 3: 9.6 %, eigenvalue 1.253; Total: 41.5% of the variance

Table 17: How much weight for the argumentation of preservation when the motorway planned? (question 43)
PRSRV_A 3.20 1.27 .04 907 3.10 1.26 .07 360 3.28 1.24 .09 218 3.27 1.31 .08 311
PRSRV_B 3.37 1.28 .04 907 2.75 1.20 .06 360 3.76 1.20 .08 218 3.82 1.12 .07 311
PRSRV_C 3.20 1.18 .04 907 3.03 1.20 .06 360 3.29 1.19 .08 218 3.32 1.13 .07 311
388
PRSRV_D 2.95 1.12 .04 907 3.10 1.17 .06 360 2.77 1.10 .08 218 2.90 1.06 .06 311
PRSRV_E 3.65 1.16 .04 907 3.53 1.20 .06 360 3.59 1.10 .08 218 3.83 1.16 .07 311
PRSRV_F 3.40 1.21 .04 907 3.31 1.25 .07 360 3.27 1.21 .08 218 3.58 1.16 .07 311
PRSRV_G 3.30 1.17 .04 907 3.11 1.11 .06 360 3.17 1.13 .08 218 3.61 1.20 .07 311
PRSRV_H 3.40 1.28 .04 907 3.42 1.28 .07 360 3.38 1.33 .09 218 3.38 1.22 .07 311
Table 18: Interest in differents kinds of history (question 22)
KIND_A 3.04 1.15 .04 907 3.01 1.15 .06 360 3.14 1.15 .08 218 3.00 1.15 .07 311
KIND_B 3.24 1.21 .04 907 3.32 1.24 .07 360 3.31 1.14 .08 218 3.11 1.20 .07 311
KIND_C 4.03 1.07 .04 907 3.93 1.17 .06 360 4.22 .83 .06 218 4.05 1.06 .06 311
KIND_D 3.17 1.32 .04 907 3.07 1.32 .07 360 3.41 1.25 .09 218 3.13 1.34 .08 311
KIND_E 2.86 1.16 .04 907 2.86 1.14 .06 360 2.91 1.13 .08 218 2.82 1.16 .04 907
KIND_F 3.13 1.19 .04 907 3.21 1.18 .06 360 3.08 1.17 .08 218 3.07 1.23 .07 311
3.10 1.35 .05 907 3.38 1.37 .07 360 3.08 1.23 .08 218 2.78 1.32 .08 311
389
KIND_G
KIND_H 3.35 1.17 .04 907 3.32 1.18 .06 360 3.68 1.10 .08 218 3.16 1.17 .07 311
KIND_I 3.18 1.13 .04 907 3.23 1.13 .06 360 3.19 1.06 .07 218 3.13 1.17 .07 311
KIND_J 3.66 1.19 .04 907 3.51 1.20 .06 360 3.95 1.06 .07 218 3.62 1.24 .07 311
KIND_K 4.29 1.03 .03 907 4.23 1.10 .06 360 4.30 .99 .07 218 4.37 .96 .06 311
ANNEX 3
Table 19: Rotated factor matrix on interest in kinds of history
”Interest in national and democratic ”Interest in exciting stories, personalities ”Interest in daily lives and activities of
Name
processes and wars in history” and family in history” people in history”
KIND_A -.06237 .267 .655
KIND_B .02519 .638 .149
KIND_C .169 .731 -.009046

KIND_D .592 .285 -.195
KIND_E .540 .345 .104
390
KIND_F .784 .08976 .197
KIND_G .713 -.125 .265
KIND_H .155 .228 .699
KIND_I .242 .04802 .715
KIND_J .121 .548 .191
KIND_K .06198 .514 .252
Factor 1: 27.6%, eigenvalue 3.041

Total: 49.6%
Table 20: Factors of change up to today (question 24)
NOW_A 4.05 1.09 .04 907 3.97 1.14 .06 360 4.19 .96 .07 218 4.04 1.11 .06 311
NOW_B 3.24 1.06 .04 907 3.23 1.05 .06 360 3.32 .97 .07 218 3.16 1.12 .07 311
NOW_C 2.95 1.09 .04 907 2.89 1.13 .06 360 2.95 .95 .06 218 3.01 1.13 .07 311
NOW_D 3.17 1.09 .04 907 3.13 1.09 .06 360 3.24 1.02 .07 218 3.16 1.13 .07 311
NOW_E 3.52 1.12 .04 907 3.48 1.14 .06 360 3.59 1.06 .07 218 3.56 1.12 .07 311
NOW_F 4.21 1.00 .03 907 4.29 .94 .05 360 4.18 .90 .06 218 4.14 1.11 .06 311
391
NOW_G 3.06 1.40 .05 907 3.10 1.47 .08 360 3.18 1.32 .09 218 2.94 1.37 .08 311
NOW_H 3.11 1.08 .04 907 3.12 1.06 .06 360 3.24 1.05 .07 218 3.02 1.12 .07 311
NOW_I 3.67 1.20 .04 907 3.73 1.20 .06 360 3.66 1.15 .08 218 3.64 1.21 .07 311
NOW_J 3.12 1.13 .04 907 3.06 1.11 .06 360 3.27 1.07 .07 218 3.11 1.19 .07 311
NOW_K 3.46 1.13 .04 907 3.37 1.16 .06 360 3.71 1.02 .07 218 3.37 1.13 .07 311
NOW_L 3.06 1.25 .04 907 3.00 1.23 .07 360 3.25 1.29 .09 218 2.94 1.20 .07 311
NOW_M 3.08 1.36 .05 907 3.07 1.33 .07 360 3.24 1.40 .10 218 2.94 1.34 .08 311
NOW_N 3.22 1.28 .04 907 3.34 1.27 .07 360 3.20 1.20 .08 218 3.11 1.33 .08 311
NOW_O 3.08 1.13 .04 907 3.08 1.12 .06 360 3.16 1.04 .07 218 3.03 1.22 .07 311
ANNEX 3
Table 21: Scale: Influence of Ecological, Demographic and Table 23: Scale: Influence of Technology, Science and Thinkers
Military Processes in the Past (NOW_G, _L, _M, _N) in the Past (NOW_A, _F, _I)
Group Alpha M SD SE N Group Alpha M SD SE N
Bosnia 0.7858 3.12 1.03 .04 811 Bosnia 0.6344 3.98 .83 .03 837
Bosniac 0.7870 3.14 1.03 .06 334

Bosniac 0.6614 3.99 .84 .05 339
Croat 0.8300 3.22 1.06 .08 200

Croat 0.6465 4.01 .77 .05 205
Serb 0.7531 3.01 .98 .06 263
Serb 0.6166 3.94 .86 .05 279
392
Table 22: Scale: Influence of Events and Persons in the Past
(NOW_B, _C, _D, _E, _H, _J)
Group Alpha M SD SE N
Bosnia 0.7042 3.18 1.04 .04 798
Bosniac 0.6946 3.15 1.03 .06 328
Croat 0.7284 3.26 1.00 .07 198
Serb 0.6973 3.17 1.07 .07 257

Table 24: Rotated factor matrix on factors of change up to now (NOW_) of all Bosnians
”Influence of the ecology, ”Influence of persons and ”Influence of technology

Name
demography and wars in politics in the past” and rationality in the past”
the past”
NOW_A .105 .194 .650
NOW_B .351 .486 .143
NOW_C .09005 .577 .188
NOW_D .165 .662 .268
NOW_E -.02809 .680 .158
393
NOW_F .002393 .199 .736
NOW_G .562 .515 -.160
NOW_H .289 .411 .360
NOW_I -.02361 .136 .758
NOW_J .305 .554 .159
NOW_K .353 .121 .463
NOW_L .794 .203 .08053
NOW_M .809 .106 .06278

NOW_N .766 .08976 .136 Factor 3: 6.7%, eigenvalue 1.004
Total: 50.1% of the variance
NOW_O .376 .278 .370
ANNEX 3
Table 25: Rotated factor matrix on factors of change up to now (NOW_) of Bosniacs
”Influence of ecology, ”Influence of techonology and ”Influence of persons in the

Name
demograohy, armed, political rationality in the past” past”
and social conflicts in the
past”
NOW_A .05753 .670 .190
NOW_B .525 .08691 .442
NOW_C .195 .189 .660
NOW_D .316 .356 .446
NOW_E .03260 .146 .795
394
NOW_F -.003298 .765 .152
NOW_G .678 -.09846 .358
NOW_H .340 .445 .237
NOW_I .009136 .796 -.01907
NOW_J .515 .256 .187
NOW_K .289 .375 .220
NOW_L .782 .04296 .161
NOW_M .768 .08239 .09908

NOW_N .801 .134 -.07812 Factor 2: 12.6%, eigenvalue 1.885
NOW_O .422 .406 .113 Total: 50.1% of the variance
Table 26: Rotated factor matrix on factors of change up to now (NOW_) of Croats
Factor Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Name ”Influence of ecology, ”Influence of political ”Influence of -

demography and wars changes and technology and social
in the past” economics in the past” changes in the past”
NOW_A .157 .08468 .761 .152
NOW_B .121 .403 .680 -.07686
NOW_C .08526 .318 .388 .278
NOW_D .103 .749 .213 .160
NOW_E .02262 .445 .207 .109
NOW_F -.01053 .128 .646 .435
395
NOW_G .536 .403 .192 -.311
NOW_H .175 .528 .384 .218
NOW_I -.09383 .193 .298 .723
NOW_J .184 .749 .106 .06510
NOW_K .177 .173 .150 .749
NOW_L .852 .190 .115 .07125

NOW_M .886 .136 .07770 -.01073 Factor 2: 14.0%, eigenvalue 2.107
NOW_N .843 .03524 .05384 .199 Factor 4: 6.9%, eigenvalue 1.041
NOW_O .278 .552 -.209 .432
ANNEX 3
Table 27: Rotated factor matrix on factors of change up to now (NOW_) of Serbs
”Influence of political ”Influence of ecology and ”Influence of technology ”Influence of social &
Name
changes and rational demography in the past” and religion in the past” economic factors and wars
thinkers in the past” in the past”
NOW_A .164 .247 .765 -.114
NOW_B -.123 .210 .469 .660
NOW_C .397 .286 .257 -.02893
NOW_D .647 .180 .239 .164
.314 .153 .510 .128

NOW_E
NOW_F .169 -.03963 .769 .181
396
NOW_G .183 .347 -.08119 .748
NOW_H .416 .02283 .08853 .636
.647 -.127 .394 -.01017 Factor 1: 4.703, 31.4%

NOW_I Factor 2: 1.606, 10.7%
Factor 3: 1.099, 7.3%
NOW_J .655 .150 -.03294 .359 Factor 4: 1.100, 6.7%
NOW_K .436 .439 .07406 .01244
NOW_L .236 .623 .06465 .369
NOW_M .003984 .754 .08981 .218
NOW_N .185 .753 .131 .06574
NOW_O .530 .309 .162 .157

Table 28: Factors of change in the coming 40 years (question 25)
NEXT_A 3.92 1.14 .04 907 3.90 1.19 .06 360 4.06 1.04 .07 218 3.84 1.14 .07 311
NEXT_B 3.18 1.06 .04 907 3.15 1.09 .06 360 3.30 1.01 .07 218 3.10 1.06 .06 311
NEXT_C 2.57 1.15 .04 907 2.59 1.17 .06 360 2.53 1.09 .07 218 2.56 1.15 .07 311
NEXT_D 3.08 1.08 .04 907 3.09 1.11 .06 360 3.08 .96 .07 218 3.08 1.14 .07 311
NEXT_E 3.22 1.22 .04 907 3.27 1.27 .07 360 3.21 1.08 .07 218 3.17 1.26 .08 311
NEXT_F 4.18 1.01 .03 907 4.30 .96 .05 360 4.22 .97 .07 218 4.02 1.06 .06 311
397
NEXT_G 2.83 1.41 .05 907 2.81 1.42 .08 360 2.99 1.33 .09 218 2.75 1.44 .08 311
NEXT_H 3.12 1.12 .04 907 3.11 1.14 .06 360 3.22 1.04 .07 218 3.07 1.15 .07 311
NEXT_I 3.70 1.16 .04 907 3.76 1.21 .06 360 3.68 1.10 .08 218 3.68 1.13 .07 311
NEXT_J 3.01 1.11 .04 907 3.02 1.11 .06 360 3.11 1.08 .07 218 2.93 1.15 .07 311
NEXT_K 3.52 1.15 .04 907 3.41 1.19 .06 360 3.73 1.07 .07 218 3.48 1.17 .07 311
NEXT_L 3.08 1.33 .05 907 2.99 1.36 .07 360 3.22 1.32 .09 218 3.05 1.29 .08 311
NEXT_M 3.11 1.37 .05 907 3.09 1.36 .07 360 3.32 1.37 .09 218 2.95 1.37 .08 311
NEXT_N 3.12 1.26 .04 907 3.19 1.27 .07 360 3.09 1.15 .08 218 3.05 1.30 .08 311
NEXT_O 3.08 1.14 .04 907 3.10 1.16 .06 360 3.06 1.01 .07 218 3.04 1.19 .07 311
ANNEX 3
Table 29: Scale: Influence of Technology, Science and Thinkers NEXT_D .307 .152 .610
in the Future (NEXT_A, _F, _I)
NEXT_E .02068 .08849 .637
Group Alpha Mean SD SE N NEXT_F .04751 .751 .08373
NEXT_G .661 -.06494 .300

Bosnia 0.6254 3.94 .83 .03 852
NEXT_H .391 .406 .284
Bosniac 0.6520 3.99 .86 .05 348 -.05213 .675 .343

NEXT_I
NEXT_J .394 .06441 .588

Croat 0.6008 3.99 .77 .05 212
NEXT_K .458 .304 .06065

Serb 0.6117 3.85 .84 .05 277

NEXT_L .795 .07329 .147
NEXT_M .818 -.03267 .06238
398
NEXT_N .741 .132 .05395
Table 30: Rotated factor matrix on factors of change in the
future (NEXT_) of all Bosnians NEXT_O .463 .357 .149
Factor Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 3: 8.5%, eigenvalue 1.275
”Influence of the ”Influence of ”Influence of
Name
ecology, technology and persons and
demography rationality in the politics in the
and wars in the future” future”
future”
NEXT_A .207 .732 -.103
NEXT_B .482 .278 .194
NEXT_C .07189 .04960 .678

Table 31: Rotated factor matrix on factors of change in the future (NEXT_) of Bosniacs
Name ”Influence of ”Influence of ”Influence of ”Influence of

ecology and political changes technology and persons in the
demography in and wars in the rationality in the future”
the future” future” future”
NEXT_A .131 .09884 .753 -.207
NEXT_B .361 .440 .318 .09542
NEXT_C .09546 .247 .07743 .680
NEXT_D -.008197 .728 .06683 .346
NEXT_E .139 .05870 .04407 .803
399
NEXT_F .03464 .04762 .715 .139
NEXT_G .442 .615 .01153 .01206
NEXT_H .175 .587 .403 -.08700
NEXT_I .06074 .08887 .739 .244
NEXT_J .254 .717 .004064 .182
NEXT_K .394 .05169 .292 .320
NEXT_L .723 .393 .02811 .07684
NEXT_M .792 .236 -.03207 .07775 Factor 1: 31.0%, eigenvalue 4.646

.804 .06821 .08203 .04413 Factor 3: 8.7%, eigenvalue 1.302
NEXT_N
.563 .116 .284 .172 Total: 57.6% of the variance
NEXT_O
ANNEX 3
Table 32: Rotated factor matrix on factors of change in the future (NEXT_) of Croats
Name ”Influence of ecology, ”Influence of ”Influence of ”Influence of social

demography and wars technology and politics and and technical
in the future” rationality in the religions in the developments”
future” future”
NEXT A .06790 .499 -.01016 .707
NEXT B .286 .06216 .175 .682
NEXT C -.01652 -.05519 .403 .446

NEXT D .190 .352 .561 .180
NEXT E -.09149 .02073 .676 .137
400
NEXT F .06670 .778 -.04010 .226
NEXT G .716 -.122 .358 -.07319
NEXT H .278 .549 .324 -.02489
NEXT I -.112 .720 .286 -.135
NEXT J .242 .259 .693 -.03045
NEXT K .338 .382 -.102 .231

NEXT L .840 .294 .02919 .05909 Factor 2: 12.1%, eigenvalue 1.815
NEXT M .871 .108 -.03580 .165 Factor 4: 7.1%, eigenvalue 1.069
.648 Total: 57.3% of the variance
NEXT N .121 .05874 .395
NEXT O .181 .539 .141 .211

Table 33: Rotated factor matrix on factors of change in the future (NEXT_) of Serbs
Name ”Influence of ecology, ”Influence of persons in the ”Influence of technology and

demography, wars and future” rationality in the future”
politics in the future”
NEXT A .250 -.06659 .724
NEXT B .537 .110 .180
NEXT C .06028 .800 -.006221
NEXT D .474 .480 .09148
NEXT E .07170 .505 .165
NEXT F .01181 .135 .749
NEXT G .701 .240 -.09776
401
NEXT H .459 .385 .276
NEXT I -.06989 .453 .633
NEXT J .429 .561 -.01071
NEXT K .605 -.03858 .282
NEXT L .730 .192 -.002365
NEXT M .735 .09690 -.162 Factor 1: 31.0%, eigenvalue 4.651

NEXT N .767 .117 .107 Factor 3: 8.2%, eigenvalue 1.234
NEXT O .546 .05112 .304
ANNEX 3
Table 34: Scale: The expectation of internal conflicts in the Table 35: Scale: The expectation of internal conflicts in Europe
country (FUTUR_G, _H) (FEURO_G, _H)
Country Alpha M SD SE N Country Alpha M SD SE N
Bosnia .6603 2.76 .93 .03 855 Bosnia .6919 2.94 .92 .03 858
Bosniac .6170 2.64 .93 .05 353 Bosniac .6747 2.87 .93 .05 352
Croat .6303 2.71 .86 .06 212 Croat .6998 2.86 .81 .06 208
Serb .7084 2.94 .94 .06 277 Serb .6919 3.06 .96 .06 283
Slovenia .6835 3.07 1.02 .03 853 Slovenia .6593 3.31 .94 .03 848
402
Croatia .6908 3.05 .93 .03 1024 Croatia .7693 3.33 .92 .03 1023
European .6801 3.13 .97 .01 29464 European .7074 3.30 .92 .01 29361
overall overall
Table 36: Associations with Hitler (question 29)
ADOLF_A 3.97 1.21 .04 907 3.88 1.25 .07 360 3.79 1.15 .08 218 4.24 1.16 .07 311
ADOLF_B 3.43 1.15 .04 907 3.30 1.14 .06 360 3.38 1.09 .07 218 3.64 1.20 .07 311
ADOLF_C 2.46 1.18 .04 907 2.35 1.13 .06 360 2.43 1.06 .07 218 2.62 1.31 .08 311
ADOLF_D 3.15 1.28 .04 907 3.15 1.27 .07 360 3.59 1.05 .07 218 2.83 1.35 .08 311
403
ADOLF_E 3.67 1.29 .04 907 3.56 1.29 .07 360 3.42 1.25 .09 218 3.99 1.24 .07 311
ADOLF_F 2.29 1.18 .04 907 2.31 1.18 .06 360 2.42 1.15 .08 218 2.15 1.20 .07 311
ADOLF_G 3.22 1.21 .04 907 3.19 1.21 .06 360 3.32 1.09 .07 218 3.19 1.29 .08 3.22
ADOLF_H 3.77 1.12 .04 907 3.68 1.13 .06 360 3.67 1.00 .07 218 3.96 1.17 .07 311
ANNEX 3
Table 37: Rotated factor matrix on the expectation of the past of Table 38: Rotated factor matrix on the expectation of the future
own country (PAST_) of all Bosnians of own country (FUTUR_) of all Bosnians
Factor Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor Factor 1 Factor 2
Name “The Expectation of well-being” “The expectation of conflicts “The expectation of conflicts “The expectation of well-being”
Name
and exploitation” and exploitation”
PAST_A .698 -.283 FUTUR_A -.220 .709
PAST _C -.125 .635 FUTUR_C .665 -.125
PAST _D .807 -.07678 FUTUR_D -.171 .779

PAST _E .741 .06152 FUTUR_E .03083 .742
404
PAST _G -.04191 .755 FUTUR_G .829 -.06670
PAST _H -.04527 .797 FUTUR_H .773 -.129
Factor 1: 34.4%, eigenvalue 2.063 Factor 1: 37.7%, eigenvalue 2.259

Total: 56.8% of the variance TOTAL: 58.4% of the variance
Table 39: Rotated factor matrix on the expectation of the future Table 40: The Pearson correlation of the peaceful past
of Europe (FEURO_) of all Bosnians (PAST_A) with the democratic (PAST_E) and prosperous &
wealthy past (PAST_D) of the Bosnian national groups
PAST_D (Own PAST_E (Own
country 40 years country 40 years
Name “Expectation of conflicts and “Expectation of well-being” ago: Prosperous ago: Democratic)
exploitation”
and wealthy)
FEURO_A -.261 .699 PAST_A (Own R=.491**, N=351 R=.307**, n=346
Bosniacs
country 40
.517 .405 years ago:
FEURO_B
peaceful)
FEURO_C .680 .006285 Croats

PAST_A (Own R=.359**, n=206 R=.278, n=209
country 40
years ago:
FEURO_D -.03257 .764 peaceful)
Serbs
PAST_A (Own R=.338, n=287 R=.161, n=282
FEURO_E .06474 .716
405
country 40
years ago:
FEURO_F .648 .05102 peaceful)
**99% significance level (p<=0.01), (2-tailed)
FEURO_G .739 -.174
FEURO_H .682 -.220

ANNEX 3
Table 42: The Pearson correlation of the peaceful future of
Table 41: The Pearson correlation of the peaceful future of own
Europe (FEURO_A) with the democratic (FEURO_E) and
country (FUTUR_A) with the democratic (FUTUR_E) and
prosperous & wealthy future (FEURO_D) of Bosnian national
prosperous & wealthy future (FUTUR_D) of the Bosnian
groups
national groups
FEURO_D FEURO_E
FUTUR_D (Own FUTUR_E (Own (Europe in 40: (Europe in 40
country in 40: country in 40 years: Prosperous and years:
Prosperous and Democratic) wealthy) Democratic)
wealthy)
Bosniacs
FEURO_A R=.338**, N=352 R=.347**, n=348
Bosniacs
FUTUR_A (Own R=.440**, N=346 R=.244**, n=345 (Europe in 40
country in 40 years: peaceful)
years: peaceful)
Croats
FEURO_A R=.392**, n=210 R=.278, n=206
Croats
FUTUR_A (Own R=.359**, n=209 R=.324, n=203 (Europe in 40
406
years: peaceful)
Serbs
FEURO_A R=.311, n=288 R=.197, n=289
Serbs
FUTUR_A (Own R=.390, n=291 R=.188, n=284 (Europe in 40
years: peaceful)
Table 43: Importance of different things (question 31)
IMPO_A 4.82 .56 .02 907 4.82 .58 .03 360 4.85 .50 .03 218 4.83 .48 .03 311
IMPO_B 4.37 .71 .02 907 4.30 .71 .04 360 4.48 .68 .05 218 4.38 .69 .04 311
IMPO_C 3.94 .88 .03 907 3.84 .89 .05 360 4.01 .80 .06 218 4.03 .88 .05 311
IMPO_D 4.24 .89 .03 907 4.23 .87 .05 360 4.29 .90 .06 218 4.23 .90 .05 311
IMPO_E 3.90 1.07 .04 907 3.84 1.04 .06 360 3.98 1.06 .07 218 3.95 1.08 .06 311
3xx
3xx
3xx
IMPO_F 3.57 1.14 .04 907 3.71 1.07 .06 360 3.34 1.15 .08 218 3.55 1.19 .07 311
IMPO_G 4.04 1.05 .04 907 4.01 1.07 .06 360 4.24 1.00 .07 218 3.95 1.04 .06 311
407
IMPO_H 3.46 1.08 .04 907 3.54 1.04 .06 360 3.45 1.06 .07 218 3.35 1.13 .07 311
IMPO_I 3.35 1.32 .05 907 3.60 1.29 .07 360 3.43 1.32 .09 218 2.94 1.26 .08 311
IMPO_J 4.19 1.04 .04 907 4.25 .98 .05 360 4.28 .98 07 218 4.04 1.15 .07 311
IMPO_K 4.61 .79 .03 907 4.62 .71 .04 360 4.61 .82 .06 218 4.60 .85 .05 311
IMPO_L 4.20 .91 .03 907 4.17 .89 .05 360 4.24 .95 .07 218 4.20 .92 .06 311
IMPO_M 3.74 1.06 .04 907 3.74 1.00 .05 360 3.85 1.05 .07 218 3.63 1.14 .07 311
IMPO_N 4.05 .96 .03 907 4.10 .92 .05 360 4.08 .91 .06 218 3.95 1.05 .06 311
IMPO_O 4.29 .96 .03 907 4.32 .93 .05 360 4.40 .88 .06 218 4.16 1.03 .06 311
ANNEX 3
Table 44: Meaning of Europe and the European integration to the adolescents (question 46)
EURO_A 2.14 1.07 .04 907 2.13 1.06 .06 360 1.82 .96 .07 218 2.36 1.07 .06 311
EURO_B 3.27 1.00 .03 907 3.23 1.02 .05 360 3.37 .96 .07 218 3.23 .99 .06 311
EURO_C 2.92 1.05 .04 907 2.92 .97 .05 360 2.73 .98 .07 218 3.05 1.15 .07 311
EURO_D 3.46 1.00 .03 907 3.54 .95 .05 360 3.38 .99 .07 218 3.41 1.06 .06 311
408
EURO_E 2.88 .96 .03 907 2.86 .99 .05 360 2.80 .92 .06 218 2.98 .95 .03 311
EURO_F 3.54 .99 .03 907 3.60 1.00 .05 360 3.64 .89 .06 218 3.39 1.04 .06 311
Table 45: Voting for different controversial issues (question 48)
VOTE_A 2.31 .72 .02 907 2.26 .72 .04 360 2.36 .72 .05 218 2.34 .73 .04 311
VOTE_B 2.41 .74 .03 907 2.33 .75 .04 360 2.53 .70 .05 218 2.41 .74 .03 907
VOTE_C 1.78 .70 .02 907 1.79 .69 .04 360 1.79 .72 .05 218 1.73 .71 .04 311
VOTE_D 2.35 .70 .02 907 2.35 .71 .04 360 2.46 .67 .05 218 2.27 .70 .04 311
409
VOTE_E 2.31 .73 .03 907 2.41 .68 .04 360 2.43 .71 .05 218 2.13 .77 .05 311
VOTE_F 1.75 .64 .02 907 1.72 .65 .04 360 1.75 .62 .04 218 1.78 .65 .04 311
VOTE_G 1.91 .59 .02 907 1.82 .55 .03 360 1.92 .61 .04 218 2.03 .60 .04 311
VOTE_H 2.41 .71 .02 907 2.36 .71 .04 360 2.46 .70 .05 218 2.44 .71 .04 311
VOTE_I 2.01 .63 .02 907 1.91 .60 .03 360 2.07 .56 .04 218 2.08 .68 .04 311
VOTE_J 2.33 .69 .02 907 2.36 .69 .04 360 2.45 .65 .05 218 2.20 .70 .04 311
ANNEX 3
Table 46: Importance of peace at any cost among the Bosnian national groups and Europeans, frequencies
Country Very little/% Little/% Some/% Much/% Very much/% Total/%
Bosnians 1.3 1.8 6.2 15.9 74.7 100
Bosniacs 0.3 1.4 7.6 16.9 73.7 100
Croats 1.4 2.4 5.7 14.6 75.9 100
Serbs 2.4 1.7 4.2 16.1 75.5 100

Europeans 3.9 4.4 12.9 25.5 53.3 100
410
Table 47: Rotated factor matrix of the personal importance of different factors (IMPO_)
Factor Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor3 Factor 4
”Importance of peace, liberty ”Importance of ”Importance of international ”Importance of privatist

Name
and solidarity” sociocentric/ethnocentric cooperation and democracy" values”
values”
IMPO A .511 .382 -.274 0.081
IMPO B .501 0.057 0.0210 .495
IMPO C .216 .127 0.035 .770
IMPO D .155 .705 .191 -0.0099
IMPO E 0.085 .766 .171 0.036
IMPO F -.241 0.027 .137 .710
IMPO G .113 .780 0.074 .129
411
IMPO H 0.086 .117 .760 .167
IMPO I .106 .213 .738 0.0404
IMPO J .605 -0.014 .389 0.0098
IMPO K .695 0.058 0.014 -0.0179
IMPO L .622 .102 .341 -0.036
IMPO M .470 .118 .550 -0.0151
IMPO N .469 .233 .359 .104
IMPO O .518 .276 .143 0.0875

ANNEX 3
Table 48: Agreement on Views on nations and national states, frequencies of Bosnian national groups
Bosniacs Croats Serbs
Do not agree Undecided Agree Do not agree Undecided Agree Do not agree Undecided Agree
NATIO_A 22.5 % 29.9 % 47.6 % 21.5 % 35.9 % 42.6 % 22.8 % 34.4 % 42.7 %
NATIO_B 13.4 % 41.0 % 45.6 % 8.7 % 47.7 % 46.6 % 17.7 % 33.7 % 48.4 %
NATIO_C 13.3 % 47.0 % 39.8 % 13.7 % 47.3 % 39.0 % 15.3 % 48.6 % 36.0 %
NATIO_D 15.2 % 42.0 % 42.8 % 16.5 % 43.7 % 39.8 % 13.9 % 45.1 % 41.0 %
412
NATIO_E 31.1 % 33.4 % 35.4 % 27.2 % 31.2 % 41.6 % 26.8 % 31.2 % 42.0 %
NATIO_F 13.8 % 56.4 % 29.8 % 9.9 % 61.6 % 28.5 % 19.3 % 48.3 % 32.4 %
Table 49: Rotated factor matrix on the views of nations and Table 50: Rotated factor matrix on the views of nations and
national state of all Bosnians national state of Bosniacs
Factor Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor Factor 1 Factor 2
Name “Theoretic-traditional “Problematic Name “Theoretic-traditional “Problematic

concepts of nations” character of concepts of nations” character of
nations” nations”
NATIO_A NATIO_A
.647 -.08046 .515 -.116
NATIO_B NATIO_B
.682 .06747 .748 .07371
NATIO_C NATIO_C
.557 .04629 .552 .251
NATIO_D NATIO_D
.493 .107 .589 -.08252
NATIO_E NATIO_E
.00139 .756 -.05653 .691
413
NATIO_F NATIO_F
.09358 .737 .05488 .779

Factor 2: 18.1%, eigenvalue 1.086 Factor 2: 19.2%, eigenvalue 1.149,
Total: 43.5% of variance Total: 44.3% of variance
ANNEX 3
Table 52: Rotated factor matrix on the views of
Table 51: Rotated factor matrix on the views of nations and
nations and national state of Croats
national state of Serbs
Name “Voluntary-natural “Constructive
Name “Theoretical concept “Problematic concept of nations” concept of
of nations” nature of nations”
nations”
NATIO_A
NATIO_A -.04423 .758
.752 .159
NATIO_B
NATIO_B .574 .323
.616 .03726
NATIO_C
NATIO_C .779 -.285
.692 -.02736
NATIO_D
NATIO_D .469 .170
.210 .542
414
NATIO_E
NATIO_E .148 .571
.03473 .575
NATIO_F
NATIO_F .399 .374
-.09823 .780
Factor 2: 19.3%, eigenvalue 1.159 Total: 43.2% of variance
Total: 45.6% of variance
Table 53: Scale: The Importance of Socio/Ethnocentric Values (IMPO_D_E_G)
Group Alpha M SD SE N
Bosnia .709 4.07 .79 .03 839
Bosniac .6676 4.02 .77 .04 347
Croat .6915 4.18 .77 .05 209
Serb .7292 4.06 .81 .05 267
Slovenia .6474 3.68 .85 .03 856
Croatia .7362 3.84 .87 .03 1024
European .6681 3.51 .93 .01 30848
415
Table 54: The Pearson correlation of the importance of ethnic group (IMPO_E) and religious faith (IMPO_G) with importance of
religious faith (IMPO_G) and my country (IMPO_D) of Bosnian national groups
IMPO_D (Importance of my country) IMPO_G (Importance of religious faith)
Bosniacs
IMPO_E (Importance of ethnic group) R=.335**, n=350 R=.459**, n=349
IMPO_G (Importance of religious faith) R=.402**, n=351 R=1.000, n=352
Croats
Serbs

ANNEX 3
Table 55: Rights of immigrants (question 44)
IMMI_A 2.40 1.19 .04 907 2.37 1.21 .06 360 2.21 1.11 .08 218 2.57 1.19 .07 311
IMMI_B 3.79 .99 .03 907 3.76 1.04 .06 360 3.89 .90 .06 218 3.80 .98 .06 311
IMMI_C 3.86 1.05 .04 907 3.88 1.01 .05 360 3.87 .99 .07 218 3.84 1.12 .06 311
IMMI_D 3.65 1.11 .04 907 3.68 1.13 .06 360 3.76 .98 .07 218 3.54 1.15 .07 311
416
IMMI_E 3.51 1.08 .04 907 3.57 1.08 .06 360 3.46 1.01 .07 218 3.49 1.09 .06 311
IMMI_F 3.12 1.27 .04 907 3.10 1.30 .07 360 3.23 1.17 .08 218 3.07 1.31 .08 311
Table 56: Concentration in History lessons (question 6)
FOC_A 3.83 1.03 .03 907 3.79 1.01 .05 360 3.92 .99 .07 218 3.83 1.05 .06 311
FOC_B 3.04 1.07 .04 907 2.98 1.04 .06 360 3.29 1.07 .07 218 2.95 1.09 .06 311
FOC_C 3.44 1.17 .04 907 3.40 1.23 .07 360 3.56 1.05 .07 218 3.40 1.17 .07 311
FOC_D 3.23 1.26 .04 907 3.10 1.25 .07 360 3.47 1.21 .08 218 3.19 1.28 .07 311
417
FOC_E 3.14 1.19 .04 907 3.14 1.19 .07 360 3.10 1.12 .08 218 3.17 1.22 .07 311
FOC_F 3.06 1.26 .04 907 3.03 1.29 .07 360 3.02 1.17 .08 218 3.16 1.30 .08 311
FOC_G 3.61 1.16 .04 907 3.55 1.11 .06 360 3.75 1.12 .08 218 3.59 1.25 .07 311
FOC_H 3.56 1.21 .04 907 3.54 1.19 .06 360 3.64 1.19 .08 218 3.51 1.22 .07 311
ANNEX 3
Table 57: Interest in history of different geographical areas (question 23)
AREA_A 3.83 1.13 .04 907 3.74 1.18 .06 360 3.98 1.05 .07 218 3.83 1.11 .06 311
AREA_B 3.89 1.03 .03 907 3.93 1.06 .06 360 3.87 1.01 .06 218 3.89 1.03 .06 311
AREA_C 4.18 .97 .03 907 4.39 .90 .05 360 3.89 1.00 .07 218 4.14 .95 .05 311
AREA_D 3.71 1.06 .04 907 3.81 1.04 .06 360 3.86 .99 .07 218 3.49 1.09 .06 311
418
AREA_E 3.55 1.23 .04 907 3.75 1.18 .06 360 3.70 1.20 .08 218 3.19 1.21 .07 311

Divergent Studies Convergent Attitudes

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ISBN 951-581-090-6 (book)

ISBN 951-581-091-4 (http://ethesis.helsinki.fi)

Published by Kustannus Oy Taifuuni (www.taifuuni.com)

My experiences with adolescents from former Yugoslavia and Bosnia and

Helsinki, November 2003

attempt to map history-related ideas and historically constructed values among

textbooks, and in the society in general, seemed an essential component of the

Herzegovina specifically, the projects have produced material relevant to discussions

2 New Openings in History Research

2.1 Conceptual Developments

revaluation of history finally led to the Historikerstreit, (history dispute) among

We have seen his predictions come true in the development of historiography,

The most consistent approach to defining collective/social memory I have seen

2.2 Public Presentations of History

many significant channels, arenas and institutions. 37 Characteristic of both of these

myths and propaganda have been of particular interest to several scholars.45

purposes.51 As part of most of the works relating to former Yugoslavia, however,

2.3 Textbook Research

developments in history teaching after the war in Bosnia based on a Unesco

Other publications closely related to the projects organised by the Eckert

2.4 Reception Research

2.5 This Study and New Openings in History Research

of ‘History’ in many countries as a result of the rise of nationalism in 1990s,

Previous works on historical phenomena from the present perspective have

3 Theoretical and Methodological Scope

3.1 Theoretical Choices

Historical constructivism represents one form or grade of social constructivism.

selected concepts, we study their understanding of those concepts; in other words,

3.1.2 SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS

The works of Dan Fleming merits mention as an example of schoolbook

3.2 Phenomena Related to the Presence of History

understanding we now move to definitions of certain phenomena understood based

active intentional use of history

=influence =influence & making use of

3.2.1 HISTORY CULTURE

3.2.2 HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Both academic history research and history culture influence historical

3.2.3 HISTORY POLITICS

3.2.4 THIS RESEARCH AND THE PRESENCE OF HISTORY

representations of school textbooks and general features of prevailing history culture

3.3 Methodological Pluralism

termed a ”mixed model method”52 for it combines features of qualitative and

3.3.1 COMBINING TWO APPROACHES IN THEORY

Table 1: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches in History Research

Qualitative research Quantitative research

Epistemology: Researcher aims at understanding The researcher aims at explanation of

Rhetoric of the Depending on the personality of Traditional form of reporting therefore

In addition to the mentioned categories, there is yet another common

Table 2: Objectivity and Subjectivity in Qualitative and Quantitative Research

Qualitative research Quantitative research

Objectivity/ Researcher and the subject A central criterion of science is the

3.3.2 COMBINING TWO APPROACHES IN PRACTICE

methodological pluralism and the generally increased emphasis on methods and

typically been analysed as an isolated, ”laboratory” case, which can result in

3.4 Research Material

Preparation of the Survey

ethnic domination, we conducted the survey ourselves to observe in practice the

3.4.2 CHOICE OF HISTORY TEXTBOOKS

3.4.3 MATERIAL ON HISTORY AND THE PRESENCE OF HISTORY IN BOSNIAN

work of a respected historian specialising in the history of Bosnian Muslims was of

3.4.4 THE CHOICE OF CONCEPTS NATION, WAR AND PEACE

4 Past and Present of Bosnia and

4.1 The Origins of Bosnia as a Historical and Geographical