Mind Association

Vague Objects
Author(s): Michael Tye
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 99, No. 396 (Oct., 1990), pp. 535-557
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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 VagueObjects
MICHAEL TYE

I believethattherearevagueobjects.This viewapparently is notshared

by verymanyotherphilosophers. It is oftensaid thattheworlditselfis
perfectly preciseand thatvaguenessresidesonlyin language.On theface
ofit,thisis a deeplypuzzlingposition;forcommonsensehas it thatthe
worldcontainscountries, mountains, deserts,and islands,forexample,
and theseitemscertainly do notseemto be perfectly precise.
Still it cannotbe deniedthatpowerfularguments have been levelled
againsttheexistence ofvagueobjects.My primary aimsinthispaperareto
clarifythethesisthattherearevagueobjects,as I acceptit,and to defend
thisthesisagainstthetwomostinfluential arguments. I shallalso make
some criticisms of the opposingthesisthatthe non-linguistic worldis
precise.

i. Whatcan it meanto say thatthereare vague objects?

ConsiderMountEverest.It seemsobviousthatthereis no line which
sharplydividesthemattercomposing Everestfromthematteroutsideit.
Everest'sboundariesare fuzzy.Some moleculesare insideEverestand
somemoleculesoutside.But somehavean indefinite status:thereis no
objective,determinate factofthematteraboutwhether theyareinsideor
outside.Arethereanyremaining molecules?To supposethatitis truethat
this is the case is to postulatemorecategoriesof moleculesthanare
demandedby ourordinary, everyday conception ofEverestand henceto
involveourselvesin gratuitous metaphysical complications. It is also to
createtheneedto facea potentially endlessseriesof suchquestionsone
aftertheotheras newcategories ofmoleculesare admitted. On theother
hand,to supposethatit is falsethatthereare anyremaining moleculesis
toadmitthateverymoleculefitscleanlyintooneofthethreecategories so
thatthereare sharppartitions betweenthemoleculesinsideEverest,the
moleculeson the border,so to speak,and the moleculesoutside.And
intuitively,
pretheoreticallyitis nottruethatthereareanysharppartitions
here. What, I think,we should say, then,is that it is objectively
indeterminate as to whetherthereare any remaining molecules.In the
waysI havejustdescribed, Everestis, I maintain, a vagueobject.
I proposetogeneralize fromthisexample.Let us holdthatsomething x
is a borderlineF justin case x is suchthatthereis no determinate factof
thematter aboutwhether a concrete
x is an F. Then I shallclassify objecto
Mind, Vol. 99 . 396 . October I990 ? OxfordUniversityPress I990

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536 MichaelTye
as vague(in theordinary sensein whichEverestis vague)if,and onlyif,
(a) o has borderline spatio-temporal partsand (b) thereis no determinate
factof thematteraboutwhether thereare objectsthatare neitherparts,
borderline parts,nornon-parts ofo.1
Some abstractobjectsare vague too, or so I believe.Consider,for
example, thesetoftallmen.Men whoareover6 feet6 inchesarecertainly
members of thissetand menwhoare under5 feet6 inchesare certainly
not. Intuitively,however,some men are borderline members.It is, I
believe,a mistake toassertthatitis truethattherearefurther menwhoare
neithermembers, borderline members, nornon-members.2 On theother
hand,it seemsno lessmistaken to assertthatit is falsethatthereare such
men:intuitively it is nottrue that thedividing linesbetweenthecategories
aresharp.I maintain, then,thatit is indeterminate. In general,I classify a
setS as vague,if,andonlyif,(a) ithas borderline members and (b) there is
no determinate factofthematter aboutwhether thereareobjectsthatare
neithermembers, borderline members, nor non-members. This character-
izationofvaguesets may seem to entailthatone of the basicaxiomsofset
theory, namely the Axiom ofExtensionality, is But
false. in reality it does
no suchthing.I shallelaborateuponthispointlater.
Like sets,some properties or conceptsare vague.3The property of
baldness,forexample,is neitherclearlya featureof some people nor
clearlynot a featureof thosepeople.Baldness,moreover, would have
remained vague,eveniftherehad beenonlyveryhairyor whollyhairless
people.In generalI takea property P to be vagueonlyif(a) it couldhave
borderline instancesand (b) thereis no determinate factof the matter
aboutwhether therecouldbe objectsthatare neither instances,borderline
instances, nornon-instances. I includeclause(b) hereforessentially the
samereasonsas thoseI gavein connection withtheearlier(b) clauses.
It maybe wondered whytheconditions I havejuststatedare notboth
necessaryand sufficient forproperty vagueness.The explanation is as
follows.Considertheproperty ofbeing2000 feetin height.Intuitively this
is a preciseproperty. But it could have a borderline instance,to wit,a
vagueconcreteobjectwhoseboundaries are suchthatit is indeterminate

1 If therecan be non-spatial concrete objects,thisaccountwillneedto be revisedminimally, e.g.,

by replacing'spatio-temporal part'withthe moreneutral'constituent'. For somecomments on the
analysisoftheordinary locution'thereis no determinate factofthematter aboutwhether' and alsoon
its relationship or 'is neithertruenor false',see pp. II-I2 and n. 22
to the predicate'is indefinite'
below.
2 My reasons formakingthisclaimareessentially thesameas thosepresented in theEverestcase.I
mightadd thatI do not denythatsome borderline tall men are closerto beingtall thanother
borderline tallmen.
3 I speakhereand elsewhere as ifI believethattherearevagueproperties. This is notexactly my
view.WhatI reallybelieveis thatif thereare such non-linguistic entitiesas properties thensome
propertiesare vague.However,I am inclinedto denythat,in thefinalanalysis, theantecedent ofthis
conditional is true.For a discussionofontological commitment to properties,
see myTheMetaphysics
ofMind,New York,Cambridge University Pres,I989, pp.43-5.

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 VagueObjects 537
whether itis 2000 feetin height.So condition (a) willbe met.It seemsto
me thatcondition(b) willbe satisfied too,if whatI say twoparagraphs
henceaboutvaguelyvagueobjectsis correct.
Still,it is possible,I believe,to constructa defensible equivalence(or
ratherseriesof equivalences)forthe case of vague properties, given
suitablequalifications. SupposethatP is a property of concreteobjects.
Then we mayholdthatP is vagueif,and onlyif,(a) P couldhaveas a
borderline instancea concreteobjectthatdoesnothaveborderline spatio-
temporalparts,and (b) thereis no determinate factof thematterabout
whether therecouldbe an objectofthissortwhichis neither a
an instance,
borderline instance,nora non-instance ofP. WhereP is a property ofa
property ofconcreteobjects(i.e., a second-order property), we mayhold
thatP is vagueif,and onlyif,parallelconditions are metin whichthe
relevantinstances arenowfirst-order propertiesthatarenotvague.Andso
on at higherlevels.4
I hopethatI havenowmanagedto providean informal of
clarification
myuse of theterm'vague' in applicationto concreteobjects,sets,and
concepts.I do not denythatotherkindsof objectsmay properlybe
classifiedas vaguebutI shallnotconcernmyself withsuchobjectsin this
paper.Nor do I denythatobjectsofthethreecategories I havecitedmay
be vague in other senses of the term 'vague'. For example,some
philosophers maybe willingtoclassify a materialobjectas vagueifitmeets
condition (a) alone.Nor finally(and relatedly)do I wishto claimthatall
concreteobjects,properties, and setsthatare notvague,as I understand
'vague',are precise.To see this,it suffices to realizethatno conceptual
barrierexiststo theadmissionofproperties, forexample,whichare such
thatthereis no determinate factofthematteraboutwhether therecould
be any objectsthatare borderline instances.Such properties, some of
whichwillconcernus later,mightbe called'vaguelyvague'or'indefinitely
vague'.5And whatgoes here forproperties goes mutatismutandis for
concretaand sets.
Later on in thispaperI shall presenta sketchof the logicof vague
discoursethatis compatiblewithwhatI have said above about vague
objects.For themomentI wantto considerthreealternative characteriza-
tionsaboutwhatone is committing oneselfto whenoneacceptsthethesis
thatthereare vagueobjects.The firstof theseis widelyheld.To assert

4 Where P is a propertyofsetsora higher-order ofsucha property,

property theaccountproceeds
in the same way exceptthatthe relevantinstancesat the lowestlevel are sets thatdo not have
borderline members.
5 Therealso seemsto be no immediate conceptualbarrierto theadmissionof propertiesthatare
suchthat(a) theycouldhaveborderline instancesand borderlineborderline and (b) thereis
instances,
no determinate factof thematteraboutwhethertherecould be objectsthatare neitherinstances,
borderline instances, borderlineborderline nornon-instances.
instances, These propertiesmightbe
called'second-level vague'.Stillhigherlevelsofvagueness However,I canthinkof
maybe intelligible.
no clearcommonor gardenexamplesofproperties exhibitingevensecond-levelvagueness.

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538 MichaelTye
thatthereare vagueobjects,accordingto manyphilosophers, is to assert
thatthereareobjectswhoseidentity is indeterminate. I rejectthisviewfor
tworeasons.First,toassertthattheidentity ofan objecto is indeterminate
cannotbe to assertthato is notdeterminately identicalwitho. For surely
wecanall agreethatthislatterassertion is false,whatever o maybe. Rather
itmustbe to assertthatthereis an objecto' suchthatitis notdeterminate
whether o is identicalwitho'. Butthisclaimdoesnotseemstrongenough
to guarantee thato is vague,if'vague'is used in theordinary way.For it
couldbe thecasethatthevagueness residesin o' (Everest,say)andthato is
a preciseobjectwhichis indeterminately identicalwitho' (forexample,a
precisification of Everest),assumingaguendothatidentity is sometimes
indeterminate.6. So theclaimthato is vagueis notimmediately reducible
to the claimthatthe identity of o is indeterminate. Second,thereis an
argumentgivenby GarethEvans and also independently by Nathan
Salmon7whichI taketoshowthatidentity statements areneverindefinite
in truth-value (so longas thecomponent singulartermsarerigidnames).
But nothing in thisargument undermines theintuitiveclaimthatEverest,
forexample,is a vagueobject.I shalladdressthisissuefurther in Section
IV.
The secondviewI wantto mentionis theviewthatto characterize an
objectas vagueis to characterizeit as an objectthatis capableof being
made moreprecise.This viewhas a certainplausibility forthe case of
concreteobjects such as Everest.For it is not difficult to imagine
circumstances in whichEverestis made more precise.Suppose, for
example,thatextremely powerful bombsaredetonated aroundthebaseof
Everestand thatas a resultoftheexplosions Everest'sbase is muchmore
clearlydefinedthanbefore.In thesecircumstances, Everesthas fewer
indefinite
spatio-temporal parts.So Everestis moreprecise.8
In the case of sets,the view is also not withoutsome plausibility.
Consider,forexample,theset of tallmen.How couldthisset be made
moreprecise?Well,supposethata significant numberof borderline tall
menarekilledall at once.Then,itmightbe said,thesetoftallmenwould
moreprecisethanit actuallyis. As faras properties
be significantly or
conceptsare concerned, however, theviewunderconsideration seemsto
6
It is perhapsworthnotinghere thaton supervaluationist approachesto the logic of vague
discourse,thereclearlycan be indefinite
identity
statements in whichtheidentity signis flanked
bya
singulartermfora vagueobjecton one sideand bya singulartermfora preciseobjecton theother.
See heremylaterdiscussionofsupervaluationism, especiallyp. 23.
7 See GarethEvans,'Can ThereBe VagueObjects?', Analysis, I978, p. 208; also NathanSalmon,
'Modal Paradox:Partsand Counterparts, Pointsand Counterpoints', MidwestStudiesin Philosophy,
I986, pp. iio-ii.
8 This argument alsoshowsthatEverestis notidenticalwiththemereological sumofitsparts.For
supposethatt is one ofthechunksofmatter Everestwouldhavelosthad thebombsbeendetonated.
Then itis truethatEverestmighthaveexistedwithout t. But thesameis nottrueofthemereological
sumofEverest'sparts.Hence Everestand thesumdiffer in a modalproperty. Of course,I am not
denyingherethatEverestis a materialentity.

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 VagueObjects 539
me ratherimplausible. I do notdeny,ofcourse,thatwe can sharpenthe
meanings ofvaguepredicates. Butthispossibility doesnotpresuppose that
theconceptsthatare,in fact,expressed bythesepredicates canthemselves
be mademoreprecise.Ratherwhatis presupposed is thatthepredicates
can be madeto expressmorepreciseconcepts.
I am notconvinced, then,thatall vagueobjectsare capableof being
made moreprecise.I shouldalso note that,on my account,it is not
necessary thatall objectsthatarecapableofbeingmademorepreciseare
vague.Take, forexample,a materialobjectwhichhas borderline spatio-
temporal partsbutwhichis suchthatthelinesdividingthosepartsfrom
the matterclearlyinsidethe objectand the matterclearlyoutsideare
sharp.This objectcan be mademorepreciseby diminishing thenumber
of its borderline parts.But it is notindeterminate enoughto countas a
vagueobject,as I use 'vague'.
The thirdview I rejectis one whichadmitsthatthereare vague
concreteobjectsand setsbut whichinsiststhattheirvaguenessis to be
understoodsolely by referenceto the vaguenessof the appropriate
conceptsor properties. On thisview,therootofnon-linguistic vagueness
is alwaysconceptual:to say thatan entityin the non-linguistic, non-
conceptualworldis vagueis just to say thatthereis some appropriate
concepttheentityinstantiates thatis itselfvague.
To see whatis wrongwiththisposition,consideragaintheset of tall
men.Call thisset S. Whichever vagueproperty of S is chosen,thefact
thatit is vaguedoes notentailthatS is vague.For thevaguenessofthe
property is connected withthefactthatitcouldhaveborderline instances,
thatis, thattherecouldbe a set(or someotherobject)whichis suchthat
thereis no determinate factofthematteraboutwhether it is an instance.
Andfromthisfactit evidently doesnotfollowthatthereactuallyareany
borderline tallmen.
The generalpoint,then,is thatthevaguenessofconceptsor properties
requiresthattherecouldbe borderline instanceswhereasthevaguenessof
setsrequiresthattherein factbe borderline members. No counterfactual
borderline caseentailsanyactualborderline case.It is,therefore, a mistake
to claim that non-conceptual vaguenesscan be analysedin termsof
conceptualvaguenessin theabovemanner.9
BeforeI close thissection,I wantto makea fewcommentson the
vaguenessoflanguage.It is sometimes supposedthatlinguistic vagueness
alwaysderivesfrompredicatevagueness.On thisview,namesare never
vague and descriptions are vague only insofaras theycontainvague
predicates. I denythatlinguistic vaguenessstemsfromor is restricted to
9 It doesnothelpto revisetheproposal,I mightadd,so thatan object(e.g.,Everest)is countedas
ofan appropriate
vaguejustin caseitis an instance vaguesortalconcept(e.g.,mountain);
extensionally
fortherearepossibleworldsin whichEverestis a vagueobjectand in whichthereareno borderline
mountains.

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540 Michael Tye

the realm of predicates,just as I denied above that non-linguistic

vaguenessis rootedin the realmof concepts.On my view,the name
'Everest'is no less vaguethanthepredicate'is bald', say. In classifying
theselinguisticitemsas vague,whatI am reallyclaimingis thattheir
meanings are vague.In thecase of'Everest',itsmeaningis, I believe,its
reference. And its referenceis the vagueobject,Everest.In thecase of
'bald',itsintensionalmeaningis theproperty or conceptit expressesand
itsextensional meaning(assumingthatmeaningcan havean extensional
sense)is thesetofbaldmen.These,too,arevague.Linguisticvagueness,
then,is as widespread vagueness.Neither,I maintain,
as non-linguistic is
confined to a narrowdomain.

2. Is theworlditselfprecise?
The claimthatvaguenessis notto be foundin theworldis primafacie
veryperplexing. Consider,forexample,thestatements 'Therearemoun-
tainsin California'
and 'Some mountains areeasierto climbthanothers'.
Thesestatements aresurelytrue.Moreovertheirtruthcertainly appearsto
requirethattherebe vagueobjects,namelymountains and the stateof
California.Admittedly grammatical formis sometimes misleading. Stillit
is veryhardto see howtheabovestatements can be reconstructed so as to
avoidquantificationovermountains and,in theformer case,reference to
California.
Thereis a proposal(knownas supervaluationism) thatis oftentakento
avoidvagueobjectsand thatpermitsvaguesentencesto retaina logical
formcloselyrelatedto theirgrammatical form.'0Accordingto this
proposal,a vaguesentenceP is trueif,and onlyif,P is trueunderall
(eligible)waysofmaking P completelyprecise." So, forexample,a vague
singularsentenceis truejustin case,undereacheligibleprecisification of
itscomponent vagueterms, thepreciseobjectreferred tobyitssubjecthas
the precise propertyexpressedby its predicate.Similarly,a vague
quantified sentence,forexample,(]x)Fx, is truejustin case,undereach
ofF, thereis at leastone preciseobjectwhichhas
eligibleprecisification
10 For a clearpresentation of supervaluationism, see Kit Fine, 'Vagueness,Truth,and Logic',
Synthese, I975, pp. 265-300.
1l The following objectionto supervaluationism (as stated)mightbe raised:Considerthesentence
'Smithis bald'. If thissentenceis trueif,and onlyif,it is trueunderall (eligible)waysofmakingit
completely precise,thenit is trueonlyifit is trueunderthemostextreme (eligible)wayofmakingit
completely precise.It followsthenthat'Smithis bald' is trueonlyifSmithhas no hairwhatsoever,
i.e.,thatif'Smithis bald' is truethenSmithis completely hairless(assumingforsimplicity that'bald'
is theonlyvaguetermin thesentence).This is evidently false.So theabovesupervaluationist view
mustbe rejected. This objectioncontainsa nonsequitur. No eligible of'bald' canexclude
precisification
fromitsextension anypeopleto whom'bald' clearlyappliespriorto precisification. So, 'without any
hairwhatsoever' is notan eligibleprecisification
of'bald'. So, theclaimthat'Smithis bald' is trueonly
ifitis trueunderthemostextreme doesnotentailthatitis trueonlyifSmithis
eligibleprecisification
completely hairless.

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 VagueObjects 541
the preciseproperty expressedby F. All thatis required,then,forthe
truthof a vaguesentence,accordingto mostsupervaluationists, is that
thereexisttheappropriate preciseentities appropriately related.No vague
objectsare necessary.
There are severaldifficulties withthe above metaphysically reductive
versionofsupervaluationism. To beginwith,itshouldbe notedthatthereis
nothing in theinitiallogicalproposalfortruth-conditions whichentailsthat
thereareno vagueobjects.To see this,it suffices to realizethatthereis no
inconsistency in holdingthata vaguesentence, Fa, (in whichbothF and a
arevague)is trueif,and onlyif,thevagueobjectreferred to bya has the
vagueproperty expressed byF andalsothatthisobjecthasthisproperty if,
andonlyif,undereveryeligibleprecisification ofa andF, thepreciseobject
thenreferred to bya has thepreciseproperty thenexpressed byF."2 The
pointhereis simplythata can referto something, priorto precisification,
whichis vaguewhilealsoreferring tosomething, afterprecisification, which
is precise.Andthesamegoes,mutatis mutandis, forF.
Now notonlyis itthecasethatsupervaluationism is consistent withthe
thesisthatthereare vagueobjectsbut it is also thecase, I suggest,that
supervaluationism is actuallycommitted to thatthesis,at least if it is
agreedthattherearesuchentities as sets;for,according tothesupervalua-
tionisttruth-conditions, anyvaguetermhas an associatedset of eligible
precisifications,each withitsownprecisemeaning.These sets,however,
arevague.For example,someprecisifications oftheterm'bald' areclearly
members ofthesetofeligibleprecisifications andsomeareclearlynot.But
somehavea borderline status.Furthermore, it is surelynottruethatthe
dividinglinesbetweenthethreegroupsaresharp.So vagueentitieshave
notbeenavoided.
A further difficultyarises,oncewe reflect uponwhatis involvedin,and
presupposed by,theprocessofprecisification. Precisification is a process
thatsharpensthemeaningof a sentenceor term.This seemsto require
thattherebesomething, namelya meaning, whichis capableofbeingmade
precise.13But nothingthatis alreadyprecisecan be made precise.So
againit appearsthatvagueobjectsor at leastobjectsthatare notprecise
are needed.
Perhapsit willbe repliedthatpriorto precisification thereis no single
objectwhichconstitutes themeaningofa vagueexpression and whichis
then sharpened.Instead thereare indefinitely manydifferent precise
objectsassociatedwitheachvagueexpression. Precisification theninvolves
selectinga singleobjectfromamongtheseas thecontent oftheexpression
justas, forexample,disambiguation involvesselectinga singlemeaning.
12 In recentconversations
on vagueness, Kit Fine has adoptedsucha view.
13
Another problemhereis that,as I notedearlier,it is notclearthatsuchan entity
as a meaning
canitselfbe mademorepreciseanyway (unlesstherelevant termis a propernameandthemeaning is a
concreteobjectsuchas Everest).

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542 Michael Tye

This responsefacestwoobjections. First,it seemsto requireonceagain

thattherebe vaguesetsof preciseentitiesassociatedwithvagueterms.
Secondly,theresemsto be no clearwayto delineatethesesets.Let me
explain.Precisification is conceivedofaboveas a processofselection. One
preciseobjectis selectedfromthesetofpreciseobjectsassociated withthe
giventerm.Now whatdetermines membership in therelevant set?In the
case of 'Everest',forexample,it cannotbe said thattheappropriate set
consistsof thosevariousobjectsthatresultfrommaking thereference of
'Everest'completely precise.For this assumesthatthereis something
imprecise that'Everest'refers topriorto precisification. Nor can it be said
thattherelevant setis theonethatconsists ofall thoseobjectsthat'Everest'
can referto afterit has beenmadecompletely precise.For theprocessof
precisificationis now opaque: it involvesselectingan objectfroma set
comprised ofthoseobjectsthatcanbe selectedviaprecisification. Unfortu-
nately,I see no otherwaysofdelineating therelevant set.It seemsto me,
then,thatsupervaluationism doesnotsuccessfully eschewvagueobjects.14
Another approachto riddingtheworldofvaguenessis to maintain that
mountains and othersuchconcrete objectsarenotreallyvagueafterall.15
Insteadtheyare to be takento haveprecisebut unknowable boundaries
(unknowable, at any rate,by us). On thisapproach,the advocateof a
preciseworldneed not denythatstatements putatively committed to
mountains, rivers,corporations, etc. actuallyhavesuchcommitments.
Whatgoes forcommonor gardenconcreteobjectshereis sometimes
held to go forcommonor gardenconcepts.Justas concreteobjectsare
reallypreciseso too are concepts.On this broaderview,not onlyis
vaguenessnotfoundin thespatio-temporal worldbutit is also notfound
in theconceptualdomaineither.The claimthatentitiessuchas Everest
andtheproperty ofbeingbaldarereallypreciseis,I think, highly counter-
intuitive.It requiresus tobelieve,forexample,thattheremovalofa single
hair in a successionof such removalsmustmake a difference to the
questionofwhether it is correctto applytheterm'bald' althoughwe can
neverknowwhichhairthisis,and thattheremovalofa singlemoleculein
a successionof moleculeremovalsmustfinallydestroyMountEverest
thoughagain we can neverknow whichone will be responsiblefor
Everest'sdestruction. To holdbeliefslikethese,wemustbelievethatthere
is an extraordinary underlying sensitivityin theconditions ofapplication
of ordinary namesand predicates, a sensitivity whichis inaccessibleto
competent languageusers.Ordinary non-philosophers do notbelieveany
suchthing,ofcourse.And why,on earth,shouldtheybelieveit?
14
Thereare also moregeneralobjectionsto supervaluationism.In particular,
I am doubtfulthat
supervaluationism(withorwithout vagueobjects)canhandlesoritesarguments and,as I
satisfactorily;
showin Section4, thereis a highpricetobe paidbythesupervaluationist
responsetowhatI call'the
Argument fromIdentity'. andtheLaw ofExcludedMiddle',Analysis,
See alsomy'Supervaluationism
JuneI989.
15 See, e.g.,Roy Sorensen, BlindSpots,Oxford,OxfordUniversity Press,I986.

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 VagueObjects 543
One standardanswerto thisquestionis thatthe admissionof vague
concretaandconcepts, howevernaturalitmayseem,encounters insupera-
blephilosophical This
objections. toois theviewofstill advocates
other of
a preciseworld,namelythose philosopherswho maintainboth that
ordinarystatements reallyarevagueand thatthesestatements arefalse.'6
This positionis,ofcourse,evenhardertoswallowthanthelastone.In the
remainderof the paper,I want to examinethe two most important
tovagueentities:
objections theSoritestypeofparadox,andtheArgument
fromIdentity.What I shall tryto show is thatthese objectionsare
unsound.

3. The soritesparadoxes
fromvaguenessin somecentralexpres-
Soritesparadoxesare generated
sion. Consider,for example,the followingargumentwhichallegedly
derivesfromEubulides:
(i) A manwithno hairson his head is bald.
(2) n,ifa manwithn hairson hisheadis baldthena
For anynumber,
manwithn+ i hairson his head is bald.
So,
(3) A manwitha millionhairson his head is bald.
The conclusion is derivedfromthepremisses via a millionapplicationsof
modusponensand universalinstantiation. Now premiss(i) is certainly
trueand theconclusion, (3), is certainly
false.Therefore, premiss(2) iS
false.Therefore, thereis an n suchthata manwithn hairson hisheadis
bald and a manwithn+ i hairson his head is notbald. Therefore, the
predicate'bald' is precise,contrary to appearances.And whatis truein
this one case is trueby parallelreasoningforany predicatewhichis
ordinarily classified
as 'vague'.
An argument alongthe samelinescan be givento showthatMount
Everestis notvague.Here is theargument: SupposethatL is a straight
pathextending frominsideEverestthrough theearthto New YorkCity.
SupposealsothatEverestis vague,as is ordinarily assumed.Thenitis not
thecase thatthereis a verytiny,precisechunkofmatterwhichlies on L
withinEverest'sboundaries and whichtouchesanothersuchchunkwhich
lieson L outside.So, foranytwoverytiny,precisechunksofmatter that
lie on L andthattouchoneanother, ifoneis insideEverestthentheother
is too.So, byan appropriately extendedsequenceofmodusponenssteps,
itfollowsthata verytiny,precisechunkofmatter lyingwithinNew York
Cityis insideEverest.So Everestis not vague(or alternatively Everest
does notexist).
16 E.g., PeterUnger,'There Are No Ordinary Things',Synthese,I979, pp. II7-54; Samuel
I979, pp. I55-73.
Wheeler,'On That Whichis Not', Synthese,

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544 MichaelTye
I am notpersuadedby thesearguments. Let me beginmyresponseby
sketchingoutwhatseemsto me to be an attractive
and simplelogicwhich
maybe appliedto vaguestatements. There are threetruth-values:
true,
false,and neithertruenorfalse(or indefinite).
The thirdvaluehereis,
strictly nota truth-value
speaking, at all butrathera truth-value
gap. In
myview,thereare gapsdue to failureofreference or presupposition
and
gapsdue to vagueness.'7Correspondingto thetwo-valued connectives ,
&, v, D, and are the three-valuedconnectivesr, A, v, ->, and .
These connectives
havethefollowing
tables:

PAQ PvQ P->Q P*-*Q

P rP P\Q TIF TIF TIF TI F

T F T T IF TTT T IF T I F
I I I I IF T II T II I I I
F T F FFF TI TTT F I T

The guidingprinciplesin the construction of these tables are easily

explained.'8 (i) the negationof a statement of giventruth-value is its
oppositein truth-value. (2) A conjunction is trueifbothitsconjuncts are
trueand falseif eitherconjunctis false.Otherwise it is indefinite.(3) A
disjunctionis trueifeitherdisjunctis trueand falseifbothdisjuncts are
false.Otherwise it is indefinite.
(4) The truth-value ofP-+Q is to be the
sameas thatofr P v Q. (5) The truth-value ofP*-+Qis tobe thesameas
thatof(P-*Q) A (Q-P).
The tablespresented aboveagreewiththeusualtwo-valued oneswhen
only Ts and Fs are involved.However,there are no three-valued
sincetwo-valued
tautologies, tautologiescan takethevalueI in thethree-
valuedcase. For examplethe Law of ExcludedMiddle,thatis, p v rp,
takeson thevalueI whenp doesso. Let us saythata statement formis a
quasi-tautology justin case it has no falsesubstitution instances. Then the
Law of ExcludedMiddleand all othertwo-valued tautologies are quasi-
in theabovesystem.
tautologies
It mayperhapsbe chargedthatthe proposedtruth-tables yieldsome
implausibletruth-value assignments in connection withcertaincompound
sentenceshavingindefinite components. In particular, if A is indefinite,
17 Wherea gap is due to vagueness, I maintain thatsomethingis said whichis neithertruenor
false.I deny,however,thatanythingis saidin thecase wherea gap is due to failure
ofreference. I am
inclinedto extendthelatterviewto gapsdue to failureofpresupposition.
18 The tablesare due to S. C. Kleene (although Kleene himselfdid not applythemto vague
statements).See thisIntroduction
toMetamathematics, AmsterdamandPrinceton, 1952, pp. 332-40.
For an applicationof Kleene'sapproachto theParadoxof theLiar, see Saul Kripke,'Outlineof a
TheoryofTruth',Journal ofPhilosophy, I975, pp. 690-7I6.

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 VagueObjects545
thenA -?A is indefinite as is A A rA. I concedethatthe tableswould
certainly be mistaken, iftheypermitted A A to be falseand A A rA to
be true.Buttheydo no suchthing.A -?A is a quasi-tautology andA A rA
is a quasi-contradiction. So, whilethe former statement cannotbe false
and thelattercannotbe true,bothcan be indefinite. This seemsto me
entirelypalatable.After all,itis surelyreasonable torequirethatsentences
oftheformP-+Q be equivalentto sentences oftheformrP v Q and also
thatP v rP be equivalent to r(P A rP). It is alsosurelyreasonable todeny
thatsentences oftheformP v rP mustalwaysbe true,giventheexistence
ofborderline cases.'9Thereis,then,goodreasontodenythatA-+A must
be trueand also goodreasonto denythatA A rA mustbe false.20
Turningnextto predicates, I suggestthatforthepurposesof formal
semanticsthe following treatment suffices forany extensionally vague
monadicpredicateF: givena non-empty domainD, F is assignedan
extension S anda counter-extension 5'. S is thesetofobjectsofwhichF is
true;5' is thesetofobjectsofwhichF is false.SinceF is vague,S and S'
are vaguesets.Here theterm'vagueset' is to be understood in theway
explainedin Sectioni.
For anyindividualconstantc, let i4be the objectin D assignedto c.
Then Fc is trueificbelongsto S; Fc is falseificbelongsto S'; and Fc is
indefinite if thereis no determinate factof thematteraboutwhetheric
belongsto S (or to 5).21 The generalization to n-placepredicatesis
straightforward.
It maybe objectedthatmyuse ofthelocution'thereis no determinate
factofthematteraboutwhether' introduces a viciouscircularity intothe
abovetruth-conditions. But I denythatthisis reallythecase. The truth
conditions stateconditions fortheapplication ofthepredicates 'is true','is
false',and 'is indefinite'.By contrast, thewords'thereis no determinate
factofthematteraboutwhether'forma sentence operator.This sentence
operatorcannotbe analysedas, noris it equivalentto, the predicate'is
indefinite' or 'is neithertruenorfalse'.For one thing,a sentencesuchas
'Everything Jamessays is indefinite' may be true but 'There is no
determinate factof thematteraboutwhethereverything Jamessays' is
unintelligible. For another,it seemsto me no moreplausibleto classify
assertions of the type'There is no determinate factof thematteras to
whether p' as covertlymeta-linguistic than it is to assertions
classify ofthe
19
See heremy'Supervaluationism and theLaw ofExcludedMiddle',op. cit.
20 The claimthatA -+ A is sometimes indefiniteis,ofcourse,compatible withtheclaimthatA is a
ofA, sinceonesentence
logicalconsequence willbe a logicalconsequenceofanother so longas itis not
possibleforthe firstto be anything otherthantruewhenthe latteris true.Withinthe above
framework, then,thedeductiontheorem no longerholds.
21 The term'if, as it is used in theseand thelatertruth-conditions, is to be takento indicatea
relation So, e.g.,' 'Fc' is trueifi4belongsto S' is trueon myview,since' 'Fc' is true'
ofentailment.
mustbe truewhen'i, belongsto S' is true.The factthat'i, belongsto S' is sometimes indefiniteis
irrelevant.

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546 MichaelTye
type'It is notthecasethatp' inlikemanner.Finally,andrelatedly, on my
view,itmakesgoodsenseto saythata givensingular sentenceis indefinite
becausethereis no determinate factof the matterabout whetherthe
appropriate individualbelongsto theappropriate setbutnotto saythatthe
converseis thecase.22So, I rejecttheabovechargeofviciouscircularity.
Turningnow to the quantifiers, we may introduce(]x) and (x) as
follows:(3x)Fx is to be trueifFx is trueforsomeassignment ofan object
ofD to x; falseifFx is falseforall assignments;and indefiniteotherwise.
(x)Fx is tobe trueifFx is trueforall assignmentsofobjectsofD tox; false
ifFx is falseforsomeassignments; and indefiniteotherwise.
Giventhesedefinitions, we canseewhymyclaimin Sectioni thatsome
setsare vaguedoes not entailthattheAxiomof Extensionality is false.
Whattheaxiomassertsis this:whereS and S' areanysets,S is identical
withS' if,and onlyif,foranyobject,x, x belongsto S if,and onlyif,x
belongsto S'. TroublefortheaxiomlieswiththecasewhereS and S' are
vaguesetswhichare identical(or whichdiffer onlywithrespectto their
borderline members).Here, the statement schema-call it 'A'-that x
belongsto S if,and onlyif,x belongto S' hasassignments underwhichit
is nottrue,sincethereareobjectsthatareborderline members ofS and5'.
However,A is notfalseundertheseassignments. Rather,by thetruth-
table for *-+, it is neithertrue nor false. So, the universallyquantified
statement truenorfalse.So, thestatement,
(x)Axis neither S = S'(x)Ax,
has an indefinite righthand side in the above case. So, the Axiomof
Extensionality comesoutas indefiniteundertheproposedsemantics.
Justas theAxiomofExtensionality is notfalse,on myview,so tooare
none of the otheraxiomsof set theory.Moreover,it is not merelya
contingent factthattheAxiomofExtensionality is notfalse.Ratherit is
necessary. My positionherewithrespecttotheAxiomofExtensionality is
parallelto theone takenabovewithrespectto two-valued tautologies.In
the three-valued case, thesetautologiesbecomequasi-tautologies. Like-
wise,theAxiomofExtensionality becomesa quasi-(necessary truth).Of
course,iftheAxiomis qualifiedby a clausewhichrestricts S and S' to
precisesetsthenit remainsa full-blooded necessary truth.
If, as I am claiming,theAxiomof Extensionality is neithertruenor
false,it cannotbe used to demonstratethattwosetsthatdiffer onlywith
respectto theirborderlinemembersare not identical.This need not
concernus, however.For the sets can be distinguished by meansof
22 The only worthwhile equivalenceI can providefor sentencesof the type 'There is no
determinate factofthematter aboutwhether thatp andit
p' is 'It is notthecase thatitis determinate
is not the case thatit is determinate thatnot-p'.This equivalencedoes not constitute a reductive
analysis,sinceitintroduces anothercomparable sentenceoperator, that',or,
namely'it is determinate
abbreviated, Det. Truth-conditions forDet maybe statedas follows:Detp is trueifp is true,andfalse
ifp is falseorindefinite.These truth-conditionsdo notanalysethemeaningofDet anymorethanthe
truth-conditions forv or (3x) analysethemeanings of'or' or 'some'.See heremycomments on truth-
conditions on thenextpage.

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 VagueObjects 547
Leibniz'Law: one sethas a property thattheotherlacks,namelyhaving
such-and-such an objectas a borderline member.23
At thisstage,it mightbe objectedthatthereis anotherproblemof
circularitywithmyproposal.Vaguesetsare essentially governedby the
logicI havepresented. So, theconceptofa vaguesetcannotbe understood
unlessthelogicitselfis alreadyunderstood. Butthelogicmakesreference
to vaguesets.So theconceptofa vaguesetcannotreallybe understood at
all.
The claimthatI rejecthereis theclaimthattheconceptofa vagueset
cannotbe understood unlessthelogicis alreadyunderstood. Considera
parallel.The conceptofdisjunction is essentiallygoverned bythelogicof
disjunctive sentences. But thislogicusestheconceptofdisjunction: 'p or
q' is truejustin case 'p' is trueor 'q' is true.So, understanding thelogic
cannotbe a precondition forunderstanding the concept.It is, then,a
mistaketo supposethatthe truth-conditions fordisjunctivesentences
analysethemeaningoftheterm'or'. Ratheris is because'or' meanswhat
itdoesthatthetruth-conditions obtain.One whounderstands theconcept
willuseitinaccordance withthelogicbuta fullgraspofthemetalinguistic
sentenceswhich utilize the conceptin the logic is no part of that
understanding.
Whatis trueherefordisjunction is true,on myview,fortheconceptof
a vagueset.This conceptcan be explainedin an intuitive, pretheoretical
way,as it was in Section i. Graspingthisexplanationdoes not itself
presuppose a fullunderstanding ofthemetalinguistic sentencesspecifying
the conditionsof applicationof the truth-value predicatesfor vague
sentences-unless, ofcourse,theoperator'thereis no determinate factor
of the matterabout whether'is to be analysedin termsof the
metalinguistic predicate'is indefinite', a positionI havealreadyrejected.
So againI denythatthereis anytroublesome circularity.24
Withtheabovesemanticframework in place,let us nowreturnto the
soritesofthebaldman.I havethreeobjections to thissorites.First,since
premiss(i) is trueand theconclusion, (3), false,whatfollowsis thatthe
premiss(2) is nottrue,thatis, that(2) is eitherfalseor indefinite and not

23 I might add thatthetwooccurrences of 'ifand onlyif in theAxiomofExtensionality do not

havetobe takenas instances oftheconnective+-+.If,e.g.,theyaretakentoexpressa relation ofmutual
entailment,whichis suchthatp if,andonlyif,q is countedas trueifp andq necessarilyagreeintruth-
valueandas falseotherwise, theAxiomofExtensionality willremaintrue.In thisformtheAxiomwill
distinguishvaguesetsthatdiffer onlywithrespectto theirborderline members.
24 I also denythatthetruth-conditions forvaguesentencesmustbe statedin a languagethatis
governed byclassicallogic.IndeedI holdthatit is crucialthattheynotbe so stated.The purposeof
formalsemantics is notto givereductiveexplanations or analysesofthemeaningsofvarioussortsof
sentencesin classicalterms(or in anyothertermsforthatmatter).One who lackstheconceptof
disjunction,forexample,willnot come to understand it by beingshownthe truth-conditions for
disjunctivesentences.Ratherthe purposeof a formalstatement of truth-conditions
is to explain
rigorouslyhowthetruth-value are to be applied,and to do so in a waythatis compatible
predicates
withourprior,ordinary understanding oftherelevantconceptsand sentences.

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548 MichaelTye
thatit is falseas theclassicalreasoning
supposes.Secondly,(2) is,in fact,
indefinite in truth-value.Let me explain.It is nottruethatthereis any
assignment ofobjectsto thestatement schema
(4) If a manwithn hairson his head is bald thena manwithn + i
hairson his headis bald
underwhichit is false.However,thereareassignments underwhichboth
itsantecedent
and itsconsequent areindefinite,
sincethereareborderline
baldmenwhowouldnotceasetobe borderline bygaininga hair.So, there
are assignmentsunderwhich(4) is indefinite.So, theuniversally quan-
tified (2), is itself
statement, indefinite. if(2) is indefinite
Thirdly, thenthe
statement
(5) It is notthecase thatthereis a numbern suchthata manwithn
hairsis bald and a manwithn + I hairsis not,
whichis equivalent to (2), mustalso be indefinite.So thenegation of(5) is
indefinite.So it has notbeenshownthatis is truethatthereis an n such
thata manwithn hairsis bald and a manwithn+ i hairsis not.So the
argument certainlydoes notshowthat'bald' is precise.
A parallelresponseis appropriate if the argument is revisedso as to
proceedindirectly. In thiscase thederivation ofa contradiction fromthe
statement (5) does not demonstrate thatthe negationof (5) is trueand
hencethat'bald' is precise.Ratheritdemonstrates that(5) is nottrue,that
is, that(5) is eitherfalseor indefinite. So whatis established is thatthe
negationof(5) is eithertrueor indefinite. And,in fact,as I notedabove,
thenegationof(5) is indefinite on myproposal.
A similarapproachmay be takento the soritesargument involving
Everest.GiventhatL is a straight pathextending frominsideEverest
through theearthtooutside,theclaimthatEverestis vagueentailsthatthe
statement
(6) Thereis a verytiny,precisechunkofmatter
whichliesonL within
Everest'sboundariesandwhichtouchesanother
suchchunkwhich
lies on L outside
is nottruebutnotthatit is false.For ifEverestis vaguethentheschema
(7) x is a verytiny,precisechunkofmatterA X lies withinEverest's
boundaries A x touchesanothersuch chunky Ay lies outside
Everest
hassomeassignments underwhichit comesoutindefinite (sincethereare
casesin whichthefirst
certainly andthirdconjuncts arebothtruewhereas
thesecondand fourth are bothindefinite),
butit is nottruethatthereare
anyassignments underwhichit comesout true.So, (6) is indefinite.
So,
thenegationof(6) is indefinite.So,

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 VagueObjects 549
(8) For anytwoverytiny,precisechunksofmatterthatlie on L and
thattouchoneanother, ifonelieswithinEverest'sboundaries
then
theotherdoes notlie outsidethoseboundaries
is indefinitetoo.So thesoritesargument fails.
I amsurethatitwillnowbe objectedthatwhilemyproposalmayhandle
thesorites argument I havediscusseditencountersanother soritesproblem
at themeta-linguistic level.For considerthesequenceofstatements whose
members areoftheform'A manwithn hairsis bald',wheren rangesfrom
o to i,o00,ooo. Callthesestatements Mo0Ml,...Mloooooo.Surely, itmaybe
said,itcan be demonstrated thatthereis somestatement,Mk, suchthatMk
is trueand Mk+ 1 is nottrue.For supposethatthereis no suchstatement.
Thenitfollows thatforanystatement, Mk, ifMk is truethenMk+ 1 is true.
Andfromthis,giventhatMo is true,byrepeatedapplications ofuniversal
instantiationand modusponensit maybe inferred thatM1oooooois true.
But M1oooooois false.So, thereis a sharptransition fromthe true
statements in thesequenceto theindefinite ones.This claimis no more
plausible,however, thanthealreadyrejectedclaimthattheadditionof a
singlehairchangesa baldmanintoa manwhois notbald.
Whatthisargument shows,in myview,is thatthestatement
(g) It is notthecasethat,forsomek,thereis a statement
Mk suchthat
Mk is trueand Mk+1 is nottrue
is nottrue.But thisdoes notentailthat
(io) For somek, thereis a statement Mk such thatMk is trueand
Mk+ 1 is nottrue
is true,since(9) maybe indefinite.And,in fact,in myview,both(g) and
(io) are indefinite.My defenceof thisclassification is as follows:in the
sequenceofstatements Mo0Ml,...Mloooooo there are truestate-
initially
ments,thenlaterthereareindefinite statements, andthenfinally thereare
falsestatements. It seemsclearthatcompetent languageuserswill not
agreeuponprecisely wheretheboundaries aretobe drawninthesequence
betweenthetrue,theindefinite, andthefalsestatements. Ofcourse,thisis
notto saythatsuchpeoplewillnotspecify precisepointsiftheyareforced
to assigneither'true' or 'false' or 'neither'to each of the statements
M0,M1....Mloooooo oneafter another.25 Stillitseemshighly unlikelythat
evenoneandthesamepersonwillpickexactly thesamepointson different
25 Indeed, one can imaginepeople changingtheirviewswithinthe space of a few seconds.

Consider,forexample,thefollowing imaginary exchange:'You said thatM130 is true.Now thatyou

haveclassified
M131as neithertruenorfalse,do youstillthinkthatM130is true?''Well,I guessnot.'
'So, M130is neithertruenorfalsethen?'I supposeso.' 'WhatofM129? Is thatneithertruenorfalse
toooris ittrueas youheldbefore?'Oh, I justdon'tknowwhattosay.''Butifyoudon'tknowhowto
classifyM129, do you stillwantto classifyM130 as neithertruenor false?''Yes ... No ... I'm
befuddled.'

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550 MichaelTye
occasions.I grantthen,thatit is nottruethatthetransitions fromtrueto
indefinite statements and fromindefinite to falsestatements are sharp.
Considernow the sequenceof statements 'MO is true','M1 is true',
...'M1oooooois true'. Given thatit is not truethatthereis a sharp
transition fromtrueto indefinite statements in the objectlanguage,I
maintain thatitis nottruethatanyconjunction ofthetype'Mnis trueA
Mn+ 1 is not true' is itselftrue. So, (io) is nottrue.Butif(i O) is falsethen
(9) is true. And (g) is certainly not true. So (io) is indefinite, as is (9).
It maybe objectedthat(io) cannotbe indefinite unlesssomestatements
oftheform'Mnis true'arethemselves indefinite. And,on myaccount,itis
falsethatsomesuchstatements are indefinite. For ifanygivenstatement
Mi is truethen'Mi is true'is certainly true;and if Mi is eitherfalseor
indefinite thenit is falsethatMi is true.Eitherway,then,'Mi is true'is
notindefinite.
My responseto this objectionis twofold.First,what my position
commits me to is theclaimthatthereis no determinate factofthematter
aboutwhether thereare anystatements oftheform'Mn is true'thatare
indefinite andnottotheclaimthatitis falsethattherearesuchstatements.
To see this,supposethatthereis a statement 'Mj is true'thatis indefinite.
ThenMj itselfcan be neither truenorfalsenorindefinite. So itis nottrue
thatthereis a statement 'Mj is true' that is indefinite.So itis eitherfalseor
indefinite. If it is falsetheneverystatement of the type'Mn is true'is
eithertrueof false.And thismeansthattherewillbe sharptransitions
fromthe true statements of the type 'Mn is true' to the falseones.
Intuitively, itis nottruethattherearesuchtransitions. So itis,I maintain,
indeterminate whether therearestatements ofthetype'Mn is true'thatare
indefinite.
Secondly,nothing in theearliersemantics requiresthatan existentially
quantified sentence, (]x)Fx, be indefinite onlyifFx comesoutas indefinite
undersomeassignments. If thereis no determinate factaboutwhether Fx
is indefinite undersomeassignments thenitwillnotbe truethatFx is false
underall assignments. So ifit is also nottruethatFx is trueundersome
asignments, (]x)Fx will countas indefinite. So (io) can be indefinite
withoutit beingtruethatsomestatements of the form'Mn is true'are
indefinite.
It is sometimes supposedthattheviewthatit is nottruethatthereare
sharptransitions betweenthetrueand theindefinite statements and the
indefinite and thefalsestatements in sequenceslikeMo0M1,...M1000000
is thesameas or partand parceloftheviewthatthepredicates'is true',
'is indefinite', and 'is false'are extensionally vague.This is notcorrect,
however,at leaston myaccount.For if 'is true'is extensionally vague
thenit followsthatthe set of truesentenceshas borderlinemembers.
This requiresthattherebe sentenceswhichare such thatit is neither
truenorfalsethattheyare true.Andthis,in turn,requiresthattherebe

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 VagueObjects 55I
sentences thatare neithertruenorfalsenorindefinite. I maintainthatit
is nottruethatthereare suchsentences.So 'is true'cannotbe classified
as extensionally vague.And thesamegoes mutatis mutandis for'is false'
Of course,in takingthisviewI am not committing
and 'is indefinite'.
myselfto the positionthatthesepredicatesare precise.Indeed, it is
crucialto my accountthattheynotbe precise.For if theywerethen
everysentencewouldbe eithertrueor falseorindefinite, and thatwould
notonlygeneratesoritesdifficulties of its own (as we shallshortlysee)
but also run counterto my claim that it is indefinitewhetherno
statementof the form'Mn is true' is indefinite.26 Rathermy view
on the truth-value predicatesis that theyare vaguelyvague: there
simplyis no determinate factofthematteraboutwhether theproperties
theyexpresshave or could have any borderlineinstances.So, it is
indefinitewhether thereare anysentencesthatare neithertruenorfalse
norindefinite.
Givenmypositionon 'true'and theothertruth-value predicates in the
firstmetalanguage, whatshouldbe said aboutthetruth-value transitions
in thehighermetalanguages? The answermustbe thatin thehigherlevel
sequencesit is nevertruethatsuchtransitions are sharp.Let me explain.
Consideragain the sequenceof statements, 'Mo is true','M1 is true',
...'M1oooooois true'.Supposethatforsomen thereis a statement ofthe
form'Mnis true'whichis trueandwhichis suchthat'Mn+ 1 is true'is not
true. If any statementof the form'Mn is true' is true then the
corresponding objectlanguagestatement of theformMn is true.Also if
anystatement oftheform'Mn+1 is true'is nottruethenthecorrespond-
ingstatement oftheformMn+ 1 is nottrue.For obviously if,foranygiven
n,Mn+ 1 is truethenit is truethatMn+ 1 is trueand hencethat'Mn+1 is
true'is true.So iftheinitialsuppositionis true,thenthereis a statement of
theformMn whichis trueand whichis followedby a statement of the
formMn+l whichis not true.But the consequenthere is not true,
according tomyviewearlier.So, itis nottruethattheinitialsupposition is
true.So, it is nottruethatthetransition from'true'to 'nottrue'in the
secondlevelsequenceis sharp.Clearly,thisargument maybe generalized
toshowthatitis nottruethatthetransitions from'true'to 'indefinite'and
from 'indefinite'to 'false' are sharp in any of the higher level
metalinguistic sequences.
I wantnowtoconsiderbriefly twofurther soritesarguments whichmay
seemtopresent fortheframework
specialdifficulties I havesketched. The
firstofthoseinvolveswhatI taketo be vaguelyvaguepredicate, namely
thepredicate'is borderline bald'. The argument goesas follows:
(i i) Ruperthas fewerthanone hundredhairson his head and is
bald.
borderline
26 Unlessa disquotational 'is true'is adopted.I rejectanysuchapproach.
approachtothepredicate

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552 MichaelTye
(I2) Foranyn,ifRuperthasn hairson hisheadandis borderlinebald
thenhe willremainborderline
bald ifhe gainsa singlehair.
Therefore,
(I3) baldifhe gainsa millionhairsone
Rupertwillremainborderline
by one.
(I3) follows from(i i) and(I2). (i i) is true,wemaysuppose.Whatof(I2)?
Well, (I2) differsin an important respectfromthe earlieruniversal
statement, (2), involvingthevaguepredicate'is bald'. For howevermany
hairsRupertgainsthrough time,it is nottruethattheschema
(I4) If Ruperthas n hairson his headand is borderline
bald thenhe
willremainborderline bald ifhe gainsa singlehair
has anyassignments underwhichit is indefinite. So, itmayseemthatmy
approach compels metoadmitthat(I2), unlike (2), is notindefinite.(I2),
then,mustbe false,since(I3) is false.So, 'is borderline bald' mustbe
classifiedas precise,contrary to theinitialassumption.
My responseto thisargument is to insistthat(I2) is indefinite on my
semanticanalysis.Accordingto whatI said earlier,givena non-empty
domainD, (x)Fx is trueifFx is trueforall assignments ofobjectsofD to
x; falseifFx is falseforsomeassignments; and indefinite otherwise. Now,
'is borderlinebald' is vaguelyvague by hypothesis.So, thereis no
determinate factofthematteraboutwhether (I4) is indefiniteunderany
assignments. So, it is nottruethat(I4) is trueunderall assignments. Nor
is it truethat(I4) is falseundersome assignments. For thereis no
determinate factof thematteraboutwhetherthereare anyassignments
underwhich(I4) has a trueantecedent and a falseconsequent.So, (I2)
mustbe classified as indefinite.The pointto note,then,is that,on the
statedsemantics, (x)Fx can be indefinite evenifit is nottruethatFx has
anyindefinite assignments. This pointparallelsthepointI madeearlier
about(]x)Fx in responseto an objectionto myclassification of (io) as
indefinite.27
The finalSoritesargument I shallconsidertakesus backto thecase of
Mount Everestand othersuch vague concreteobjects.Suppose that
ao,a1,.. .,anaretinychunksofmatterlyingon a straightpathL whichruns
frominsideto outsideMountEverest.Supposealso thatao touchesa1,
thata1 touchesa2, and so on. Assumingthatao is well insideMount
Everest,it is evidentthatthefollowingconditionalis true:
(I5) If ao touchesa1 andao anda1 aretinychunksofmatter
andao is
insideEverest,thena1 is insideEverest.
27
SinceI takethepredicates to be vaguelyvague,I maintain
'is true','is false',and 'is indefinite'
forparallelreasonstothosegivenaboveinconnection with(I2) thatthegeneralization, '(x)(xis truev
x is false v x is indefinite),'
wherethevariable'x' is restricted to sentences,is indefinite.

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 VagueObjects 553
So, we mayinferby modusponensthata1 is insideEverest.But ifa1 is
insideEverestthensurelythefollowing
conditional
is also true:
(I6) If a, touchesa, anda, anda2 aretinychunksofmatter
anda, is
insideEverestthena2 is insideEverest.
This givesus by modusponensthata2 is insideEverest.Repeatingthis
styleofargument an appropriate numberoftimeswe eventually arriveat
theconclusionthatan is insideEverestwhich,by hypothesis, it is not.
What,then,hasgonewrong? According tosomephilosophers, itis entirely
implausibleto hold that somewherein the sequence of conditionals
starting with(I5) and (i6) thereis a firstconditionalthatis nottrue.Our
onlyalternative, to
then,is denythatEverestexistsandhenceto denythat
eventheassumption thatao is insideEverestis true.
My responsetothissoritesshouldnotbe difficult toanticipate: weneed
notholdeitherthatthereis a firstconditional in thesequencethatis not
trueorthatEverestdoesnotexist.Instead,giventheproposedsemantics,
we shouldhold thatit is neithertrue nor false thatthereis a first
conditional thatis nottrue.Thus,therearetrueconditionals initially,and
indefinite conditionalslater,but it is not true that thereis a sharp
transitionfromtheformer tothelatter.Thatthisis thecaseis evidenced, I
suggest, bytwofacts:(a) competent languageuserswillnotbe preparedto
grantthatall oftheconditionals aretrue;(b) thesamelanguageuserswill
thinkthatthereis something improper aboutdissenting fromanygiven
conditional CN in thesequencehavingjustassentedto conditional CN-1.
It mayseemthatthereis a difficulty lurking herethatI havenotfully
put to rest.If, as I maintain, the conjunction of conditionals beginning
with(I5) and (I6) is nottruethenit followsthateither(I5) is nottrueor
(i6) is nottrueor somelaterconditional is nottrue.Surelythenat some
pointin thesequencetheremustbe a pairof adjacentconditionals such
thatthefirstis trueand thesecondis not.
There is an unstatedassumption in thisargument, namelythateach
conditionalin the sequence is eithertrue or not true. Withoutthis
assumption, the reasoningis invalid.To see why,considerhow the
argumentmust go. (I5) is true. So (16) or some later conditionalis not
true.Suppose(I6) is true.Then eitherthenextconditional is nottrueor
theone afterthatis nottrueor.... On theotherhand,suppose(I6) is not
true.Then (I5) and (i6) differin truth-value and thereis a pair of
conditionals suchthatthefirstis trueand thesecondis not.It is obvious
thatrepeating thisstyleofargument an appropriate numberoftimeswill
not generatethe overallconclusionunless it is assumed that each
conditional is eithertrueor nottrue.
I refuseto acceptthisassumption. Since,on myview,thetruth-value
predicatesare vaguelyvague, I maintainthat the claim that every
conditionalin the sequence is eithertrue or not true (i.e., false or

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554 MichaelTye
indefinite) So, I am notpersuadedthattherereallyis any
is indefinite.28
difficulty.
BeforeI closethissection,I wanttoaddressa complication whicharises
in connection withwhatI calledearlier'second-level vague'entities.29 If
therecanbe suchentities thenthesemantics I havesketched willnotapply
to them.To see this,supposethatQ is a second-level vagueproperty and
thata is oneofitsborderline borderline instances. Thenthestatement that
a has Q willbe suchthatit is neither truenorfalsethatit is neither true
norfalse.So therewillbe a statement thatcannotbe assignedone ofthe
threetruthvalues:true,false,indefinite.
The factthatthe semanticsI have presenteddoes notcovercases of
higherlevelvagueness is ofno greatconcerntome.I amunconvinced that
thereare any higherlevel vague entities.My interestin thispaperis
primarily withthevagueand thevaguelyvague,as I havecharacterized
them.Still it seemsto me thatmy semanticscan be extendedto the
higher-level vaguewithout greatdifficulty. I shallnotattempt toshowthis
inthegeneralcase.InsteadI shallbriefly layouthowsemantics willgo ifit
is to coversecond-level vagueobjects.
In additiontothevaluestrue,false,andindefinite, thereis nowa fourth
truth-value: indefinite.
indefinitely This valueis suchthata statement, P,
has it just in case it is neithertruenor falsethatP is neithertruenor
false.30The guidingprinciples in theconstruction of truth-tables are as
follows: (i) The negation ofa statement ofgiventruth-value is itsopposite
in truth-value.31(2) A conjunction is trueifbothconjuncts aretrue,false
ifeitherconjunctis false,andindefinite ifeitheroneconjunctis indefinite
and the othertrue or both conjunctsare indefinite. Otherwiseit is
indefinitely (3) A disjunction
indefinite. is trueif eitherdisjunctis true,
falseifbothdisjuncts arefalse,andindefinite ifeitherdisjunctis indefinite
andneither true.Otherwise itis indefinitely indefinite.(4) The truth-value
ofP -Q is tobe thesameas thatofr P v Q. (5) The truth-value ofP*-+Q
is to be thesameas thatof (P--Q) A (_p).32
Second-levelvague predicatesare assignedvague extensionsand
counter-extensions justas first-ordervaguepredicates wereearlier.Truth
28 See herethe last footnote. It shouldbe notedthatfora finitesequencetheclaimthateach
conditional is eithertrueor nottrueis equivalentto a conjunction thefirstmemberofwhichis that
(I5) is trueornottrue.This conjunction is indefiniteeventhough, on myview,itis nottruethatthere
is an indefinite conjunct.No problemarisesherein connection withtheearliertruth-tables, sincethe
principle I statedforthecaseofconjunction wasas follows: a conjunction is trueifboth(all) conjuncts
are true,falseifat leastone conjunctis false,and indefinite otherwise.
29 See n. 5.

30 Anystatement has thevalue,indefinitely justin case it is eitherindefinitely

indefinite, trueor
indefinitely false.Those sentences thatlie on theborderbetweenthetruesentences and theindefinite
onesareindefinitely true.Thosesentences thatlie on theborderbetweentheindefinite sentences and
thefalseonesare indefinitely false.For ease ofexposition, in whatfollowsI ignorethefactthatthe
indefinitely indefinite sentencescan be dividedintotwosub-classes.
31 The opposites of 'indefinite'
and 'indefinitely indefinite'are takento be themselves.
A, V, f arenow
32
The connectives -, four-valued.

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 VagueObjects 555

conditionsare also statedin likemannerforsecond-level vaguesingular

sentencesexceptthata fourth F
caseis nowadded:where is a second-level
vaguepredicateand c an individualconstantforobjectic in D, Fc is
indefinite
indefinitely ifthereis no determinate factof thematterabout
whether thereis no determinate factofthematter aboutwhether icbelongs
to S (thevaguesetassignedto F as itsextension).
The quantifier (3x) is introduced as followsin connection withsecond-
level vague predicates:(3x)Fx is to be true if Fx is true for some
assignment ofan object of D to x; false ifFx is false forall assignments of
D
objectsof to x; indefinite if Fx is indefinite for some assignment of an
objectof D to x and trueforno assignment; and indefinitely indefinite
otherwise.(x)Fx is to be true if Fx is true forall assignments of objectsof
if
D tox; false Fx is falseforsome assignments; indefinite if Fx is indefinite
for some assignments and false for none; and indefinitely indefinite
otherwise.
Giventheabovesemantics, soritesarguments againsttheexistenceof
second-level vague objectsmay be countered along parallellinesto those
adoptedinmydefenceof(first-level) vagueobjects.Andwhatis trueatthe
second-level is, I believe,truemutatis mutandis at higherlevels.
So muchforsoritesarguments. In thefinalsection,I examineanother
majorobjectionto vagueobjects:The Argument fromIdentity.

4. fromIdentity
The Argument
This argument, in itsoriginalform,is due to GarethEvans.33According
toEvans,thethesisthattheworldcontainsvagueobjectsorthattheworld
mightcontainsuch objectsrestsin partupon the thesisthatidentity
statements are sometimes vague.Evansmaintains thatthislatterthesisis
false.For supposethat'a' and 'b' are singulartermsand that'a= b' is
in truth-value.
indefinite Then,ifwe let '7' symbolize the
'indefinitely',
followingis true:
(I7) V(a=b).
(20) 'xiV (x = a)', so that
ascribesto b theproperty
(I 8) X' [V (x=a)] b
is also true.Now surelywe have
(i9) r V (a=a)
and hence
(20
_- _'
[ . 7 (x = A) a.1

33 See his 'Can ThereBe VagueObjects?'op. cit.

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556 MichaelTye
By Leibniz'Law, from(i8) and (20),
(2I) r (a=b)
follows. And(2I) contradicts theinitialassumption that'a = b' is indefinite
in truth-value.
This argument is a littleroughand ready,as it stands.For onething,it
is not clearthatEvans is entitledto claimthat(i8) ascribesto b the
property 'x V (x = a)' and that(20) ascribesto a the property 'r x V
(x= a)', unlesshe assumesthattheterms'a' and 'b' arerigidnames.So his
conclusion is besttakentoconcernonlythoseidentity statements in which
theidentity signis flankedby theappropriate designators. For another,
(2I) does not directly contradictthe initialassumptionthat 'a = b' is
indefinite in truth-value. Giventhelogicsketched earlier,however, it is a
trivialmatterto exposea contradiction.
One common response toEvans'sargument byadvocates ofvagueobjects
is toattempt torestrict theapplicability ofLeibniz'Law so that(2I) cannot
be inferred from(i8) and(20). Thisresponse strikesmeas ad hoc.Moreover
it is unnecessary. For one can grantthattheargument demonstrates that
identity statements (in whichtheidentity signis flanked by rigidnames)
cannotbe indefinite in truth-value without admitting thatsuchstatements
cannotbe vague.To saythatan identity statement is vague,on myview,is
tosaythatithasa vaguemeaning. Thiswillbe thecase,I maintain, ifeither
ofthesingular termsflanking theidentity signis vague.Butthevagueness of
'a' or 'b' in 'a = b' doesnotrequirethat'a = b' mightbe indefinite in truth-
value.Take,forexample, thename'Everest'andsupposethat'm'is a name
fora moreprecisemountain thatdiffers fromEverestonlyin thatit lacks
certainchunksofmatter thatare indefinite constituents ofEverest.In my
view,thestatement 'm= Everest'is vague,since'Everest'is vague(as alsois
'm' unlessitnamesan objectthatis completely precise).But'm= Everest'is
notindefinite in truth-value. Ratheritis false.This is shownbytheEvans's
argument. And it mayalso be shownby thefollowing simpleargument:
supposethat't' namesa chunkofmatter whichis an indefinite constituent
ofEverestand whichis definitely nota constituent ofm.Then,where'C'
abbreviates 'is a constituent of',we have
(22) -X[VCtx]m.
'Everest'by 'e', we also have
But ifwe abbreviate
(23) ]e.
[ 17Ctx
So, by Leibniz'Law, we mayconclude
(24) r (m=e).34
3 I might withtheearlierclaimthatEverestis capableofbeingmade
notethat(24) is compatible
moreprecise.The latterwillbe trueifEveresthastheproperty havingchunkofmatter
ofpossibly t (or
somesuchotherindefinite ofEverest)as a definite
constituent Whatdemonstrates
constituent. that(24)
is trueis thefactthatEverest,unlikem,lackstheproperty constituent.
ofactuallyhavingt as a definite

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 VagueObjects557
It is worthnotingherethatifoneadoptsa supervaluational approachto
vagueness,one willnot be able to respondto Evans's argument in the
mannerI have suggested.Accordingto supervaluationists, the identity
statement 'a = b' is true(false)justincaseitis true(false)underall waysof
makingtheterms'a' and 'b' completely precise,and 'a=b' is indefinite
just in case it is trueundersome waysof makingthe relevantterms
completely precisebutfalseunderotherways.Thus,on thisaccount,if'a'
is a vaguenameand 'b' namesoneoftheobjectsthatresultsfrommaking
thereferent of'a' completely precise,'a = b' willbe classified
as indefinite.
So, (I7) willbe true.So, supervaluationists mustchallengetheapplicabil-
ityofLeibniz'Law in theargument. Andtheymustdo likewisewiththe
argument from(22) and (23) to (24). This, I think,is a strongreasonfor
preferring thetruth-value gap approachI haveproposed.
I concludethatneithersoritesargumentsnor the Argumentfrom
Identitypresentany real difficulties forthe thesisthatthereare vague
objects.This resultis, I suggest,unsurprising. Philosophical arguments
rarely,if ever,demonstrate thatfundamental common-sense beliefsare
mistaken or incoherent.35

DepartmentofPhilosophy MICHAEL TYE

TempleUniversity
CollegeofArtsand Sciences
PA I9I22
Philadelphia,

3 I wouldlike to thankKit Fine, TerryHorgan,Gavin Lawrence,HughesLeblanc,Nathan

Salmon,Alan Sidelle,and JerryVisionforhelpfuldiscussionand/orwrittencomments.Earlier
at the
and at a symposium
versionsof thispaperwereread at a colloquiumat BrownUniversity
American Philosophical CentralDivision,SpringI989.
Association,

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