The Economic Origins of Paternalism: Lancashire Cotton Spinning in the First Half of the

Nineteenth Century
Author(s): Michael Huberman
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Social History, Vol. 12, No. 2 (May, 1987), pp. 177-192
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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 Michael Huberman

The economic origins of paternalism.

Lancashire cotton spinning in the
first half of the nineteenth century

In Work,Society and Politics, PatrickJoyce maintainsthat in the quartercentury after I850

there was general acceptance in many Lancashire textile districts of the 'wider social
order of capitalist industry'.1 The origins of this accommodating and quiescent attitude
were twofold. First, accompanying the near completion of the mechanization of spinning
and weaving was the emergence of a workforce cut off from its artisan and craft roots;
second, with the end of rapid population movements in cotton textile towns, the period
after I850 witnessed the reconstitution of the family economy in the factory. The
attitudes of employers to their workforces also changed in this period. Such was the shift
that Joyce refers to the policies and strategies pursued as the 'new paternalism'because,
unlike the old, it cut deeply into the lives of operatives inside and outside the factory.
Joyce has made an important contribution in his attempt to describe the experiences
of a majority of workers in the industry and not its labour aristocracy. Despite this
strength, Joyce's analysis of the subordination of workers is flawed because its historical
weaknesses have led to serious theoretical limitations. Among the leading proponents of
this view is Richard Price, who argues that Joyce's analysis cannot account for the
origins and continuity of labour market strategies.2 The shift from old to new
paternalism was not a'sdramatic as Joyce proposes, because the transition from artisan
to craft status and finally to factory operative was a long process.3 In fact, it is likely that
some of the policies of the new paternalism, such as a seniority system among spinners,
and those strategies which Joyce ignores, such as short-hour working, reflected the
resolution of earlier conflicts between workers and employers. According to Price this
inadequacy calls into question Joyce's central thesis of subordination.
Recognizing that he 'overemphasize[d] the degree of textile operatives' internalization

* An earlier version of this paper was
presented at the Social Sciences Historical
Association Meetings, Chicago, I985.
P. Joyce, Work, Society and Politics: The
Culture of the Factory in Later Victorian
England (Brighton, 1980), xv.
2 R. Price, 'The labour process and labour
history', Social History, VIII, I (January
1983); idem., 'Conflict and co-operation: a
reply to Patrice Joyce', Social History, IX, 2
(May I984). Further criticism of Joyce is found
in N. Kirk, The Growth of Working Class
Reformismin Mid-Victorian England (Urbana,
I985).
I W. Lazonick, 'Industrial relations
and
technical changes: the case of the self-acting
mule', CambridgeJournal of Economics, III, 3
(September 1979).
178 Social History VOL. I2: NO. 2

of the paternalistethos',Joycenow prefersto describethe relationshipbetweenworkers

and employersas 'reciprocal',the areaof accord'a terrainof compromise',and the final
outcomean 'implicitsocial contract'.4 Nevertheless,Joyce still expressessome doubts
about the continuity of these arrangementsthroughoutthe nineteenthcentury. In
partialsupportof this view, Dutton and King havesuggestedrecentlythat paternalism
wasnot widespreadin the periodbeforeI850 simplybecauseemployerscouldnot afford
it.5
I would argue that in the case of cotton spinning the origins of Joyce's new
paternalismcan be tracedto the labourmarketconditionsof the firsthalfof the century.
In the absenceof supplementary or non-wageincome,suchas unemploymentinsurance,
it wouldbe expectedthatworkers,andespeciallyolderones, wouldseeksomeguarantee
of earningsby demandingsome combinationof fixed piece rates, short-hourworking
and layoffs based on seniority. It appearsthat employerswere willing to meet these
demandsbecausethey faceda supplyof labourwhichvariedin qualityandbecausethey
wished to reduce turnover. If an employerkept his commitmentsabout earnings,it
would be expectedthat workerswould continuein his employment,and providethe
basisof a stable and reliableworkforce.
The behaviourof workersand firmsis consistentwith contractmodelswhichattempt
to explainthe existenceof long-termattachments,the stabilityof wages,andthe pattern
of layoffs.In one modelit is arguedthatif the laboursupplyvariesin quality,then both
workersand firmswill incur set-up costs, the formerassociatedwith trainingand the
latterwith findingout which workersare good. Under these conditions,a firmwill be
preparedto makesome guaranteeabout wages in exchangefor a stable labourforce.
These guaranteesor contracts,as they are referredto in the literature,are most often
implicit,'invisiblehandshakes',becauseboth partieswantto protectthemselvesagainst
brokencommitments.6Workersmay find that employersdo cut wages and firmsmay
discover that workers are unreliable, but associationsare usually not broken and
implicitcontractsare binding. In a competitivemarketall firmsmust playby the rules
to survive.A firmthat does not honourits commitmentswill earna bad reputationand
have difficultyin recruitinga stable labourforce.
The distinguishingfeature of contract theory, unlike Joyce's approach,is that
bargainingpositions or market power may play a decisive role in determiningthe
strategiesemployerspursuein the labourmarket.This is clearlyevidentin the policies
pursuedby rural and urban millowners.7Many employersin both regionsshareda
common social, religious and intellectualbackground.In Manchesterthe Gregs, a
family of ruralmillowners,and the McConnels,of the urbanfirm of McConneland
4 P. Joyce, 'Labour, capital and compromise: 6
A. M. Okun, Pnces and Quantities: A
a response to Richard Price', Social History, Macmeconomic Analysis (Washington, 198I);
IX, I (January I984), 69-71; idem., 'Lan- M. Huberman, 'Invisible handshakesin Lanca-
guages of reciprocity and conflict: a fur- shire: cotton spinning in the first half of the
ther response to Richard Price', Social nineteenth century', Journal of Economic His-
History, IX, 2 (May I984), 225. tory, XLVI, 4 (December I986).
5 H. I. Dutton and J. E. King, 'The limits of 7
Rural mills were a decreasing minority. By
paternalism: the cotton tyrants of northern I850 nearly 8o per cent of yam output was
Lancashire, I836-54', Social History, VII, I produced in urban centres.
(January I982); Kirk, op. cit., 296.
May 1987 Economic origins of paternalism 179

Kennedy, were part of the generation of 'new capitalists and industrialists' that
congregated at the Unitarian Chapel on Mosley Street and that shaped the culture of the
liberal middle class.8 But even as they shared these interests, urban and rural employers
differed in their approaches to reducing turnover, because the market power of workers
varied in the two regions. In urban Lancashire spinners had the opportunity of moving
quite readily from factory to factory, and to reduce turnover firms had to meet workers'
demands. In the rural sector alternate employment opportunities were scarce, turnover
was less of a problem, and thus workers had relatively weaker bargaining positions to
enforce demands. The composition of the labour supply in the two regions also affected
turnover. In the urban sector workforces were mainly composed of individuals, but in
rural areas the basic unit of supply was the family. Since the mobility of rural families
was limited, individual workers in the urban districts had relatively more success in
negotiating and enforcing their demands.

Employers in both rural and urban sectors of the industry made a sharp distinction
between the quantity and quality of labour available. The labour queue outside the
factory was long, and although during lboom periods employers occasionally had
difficulty finding workers, for the most part there was no shortage of workers. As one
observer put it: '[more] piecers were produced in Lancashire than spinning mules.9
Despite the availability of labour, the queue contained a range of worker types from
the completely reliable spinner, whose attendance and conduct were steady and
dependable, to the unreliable spinner whose attendance on Monday morning could not
be assured. In their testimony before parliamentary commissions and in their letter
books, rural and urban employers complained regularly about the variability of worker
types.10 These complaints arose because Lancashire millowners, unlike twentieth-
century employers, could not rely on schools, training programmes or employment
centres to begin the screening process. Managerial methods were undeveloped." To
reduce the costs of poor attendance, the general practice, according to Henry McConnel,
the Manchester fine-cotton spinner, was to 'avoid engaging strangers'.'2 Samuel Greg,
whose enterprise consisted of four rural mills in Lancashire and Cheshire, concurred:
'The manufacturers of this district are generally unwilling to encounter the personal
responsibility of making efforts to procure a supply of labourers whose condition and
character they could offer no positive guarantee.'"3
The demand for a stable workforce was related to the competitive nature of the

B
J. Seed, 'Unitarianism, political economy
and the antinomies of liberal culture in Man-
chester, I830-50', Social History, VII, I (Jan-
uary I982), 7. Intellectual and social discourse
among employers crossed religious boundaries.
Unitarians were among the closest associates
of the rural millowner Henry Ashworth, a
leading member of the Quaker community. R.
H. Boyson, The Ashworth Cotton Enterprise
(Oxford, 1970), 248.
9 British Library of Economics and Political
Science, Webb Trade Union Collection,
XXXIV, 6o.
10 For a complete list of references, see M.
M. Huberman, 'Auction or Contract? The
Cotton Spinning Labour Market in Lancashire'
(unpublished Ph.D., University of Toronto,
I985), 39-43.
" S. Pollard, 7he Genesisof Modem Manage-
ment (X965).
'? BPP, Reporton the Emplyment of Children
in Factories, 1833 (450), XX, E8.
1" BPP, First Annual Report of Poor Law
Commissioners, 1835 (500), XXXV, 184.
i8o Social History VOL. 12: NO. 2

industry.Firms workedwith narrowmargins,that is, the differencebetweenyarnand

cotton priceswas small. An increasein wastagecosts causedby badworkmanship,or a
risein inventorycosts due to slow turnaroundtimes,couldspellthe differencebetweena
comfortableprofitand loss. To survive,firmsneededa reliablelabourforce.
In roughlyparallelfashion, workerssought a reliableemployer.The skills spinners
picked up in their trainingperiods, which may have lastedas long as six years, were
transferableacross firms.'4 While this enhanced their mobility, it also meant the
spinnersandnot the employerspaidfor training.In addition,paymentwasby the piece,
so that spinners were forced to assume some of the risks associatedwith business
fluctuations.To counterthese costs and risks,spinnerswantedsomeguaranteeof stable
earnings.This guaranteewas the spinners'majorsourceof insurance.The poor law,
under both old and new regimes, did not provide adequate protection against
unemployment,andthis lackof non-wageor supplementary incomemeantthatworkers,
especially older ones, had a special interest in finding reliable employers.15 The
guaranteeworkerssought could take the form of some combinationof fixed or sticky
piece rates, short-hourworking,and layoffswhich were inverselyrelatedto seniority.
Workersdid not wantto be disappointedandfindthatgainsin earningsmadewiththeir
move from piecing and with their increasingproficiencyas spinnerswere nullified
becausetheiremployercut theirrateof paymentor did not providesomework.It was in
their interestto find and to remainattachedto a firmthat did not arbitrarilycut piece
rates and that offered some employmentstability.These firms are referredto in the
literatureas 'good'or 'fair'employers.'6
Employershad good reasonsfor fulfillingtheir commitmentaboutearnings.Along
with their interestin preservingtheir reputationsin the labourmarket,firmswerealso
concernedaboutthe productivityof their currentlabourforce. Arbitraryand frequent
piece-ratecuts encouragedspinnersto restrictoutput,and henceto lowerproductivity.
Yet if wage cuts did go through, there was the tendencyfor individualworkersto
increase output at the expense of quality. This was an especially important
considerationamongfine spinnerswho only underextremeconditionschangedratesof
pay.17
Thus both firmsand workershad incentivesto establishlong-termrelations.On the

'4 Huberman, 'Invisible handshakes'.

Is On the availability and amount of relief
from Poor Law authorities, see A. Redford,
Labour Migration in England, i8oo-So (Man-
chester, 1926), 23, 9I; M. Anderson,Family
Structure in Nineteenth Century Lancashire
(Cambridge,1971), 137-8. Andersonsuggests
that among operatives there was a stigma
attached to accepting poor relief. For most
operatives formal assistance was the 'refuge
of last resort' (ibid.). A. Fox, History and
Hentage: The Social Origins of the British
16
A piecer, in testimony before the Commis-
sion of Employment of Children in Factories,
observed that factories that pay low and infre-
quent wages have a 'bad character' and this
reputation 'clings' to them (BPP, I833 (450)
XX, 2o. G. S. Jones, 'The language of
Chartism', in J. Epstein and D. Thompson
(eds), The Chartist Experience: Studies in
WorkingClass Radicalism and Culture 1830-
6o (I980), '5.
17 In most fine spinning mills, it was the

Industrial Relations System (I985), 8I, makes custom 'to keep them [piece rates] as high as
a similar argument. Workerswho accepted poor the mills could possibly afford, in order to be
relief were identified as workers with weak entitled to the best quality work'; A. Ure, The
bargaining positions. Philosophyof Manufacturers (I835), 366.
May 1987 Economic origins of paternalism i8i

demand side, employers needed a stable and productive labour force to remain
competitive. On the supply side, workerswanted some guaranteefrom employers
aboutearnings.The economicconditionswerepresentin the pre-i850 periodfor firms
and workersto come to some agreementaboutwagesand employment.
The mannerof negotiation,the contentand the enforcementof these arrangements
dependedto a largeextenton the marketpowerof the partiesinvolved.Althoughunions
have an erratic history during the first half of the century, informalwork groups
appearedto have playeda permanentand successfulrole in bargaining.'8Those strikes
andwalkoutsthatdid takeplacewerefor the mostpartrestrictedto urbancentreswhere
workers'market power was strongest. Accordingto Factory InspectorHorner, the
mobilityof workersand the transferabilityof their skills gave force to their demands.
'The dangerof [an employer]losing his best workmen'was greatestin urbandistricts
because'there are severalfactoriesnear each other, [and] the workerscan readilygo
from one factoryto anotherwithoutchangingtheir own dwellings.'19In ruraldistricts
limitedemploymentopportunitiesfor workerscurtailedtheirmarketpowerandthe lack
of supplementaryincomerestrictedtheir mobility.
An additionalfactorin the enforcementof demandswas relatedto the compositionof
the laboursupply. In urbanareasindividualswere the basic units of labourin mills.
Andersonhas demonstratedthat young workersin their teens, mostly piecers,earned
enough to pay for their own lodgings, therebybreakingawayfrom parentalinfluence
and gaining some independence in their choice of occupation.20 It was the exception to
find family units working together at an urban mill. The connection between
spinners-fathers and piecers-children was especially weak. Assuming that the average
age of spinners was thirty-five years, and if each spinning mule required two piecers, it
was demographically impossible for spinners to supply their own children and satisfy the
demand for young workers.2' In fact, the gap between the demand for and the supply of
young workers increased in the period with the enlarging of self-actors and the double
decking of common mules.
In the rural sector the family unit persisted and remained the economic decision-
making unit. Families, mainly from the northern counties, negotiated their own terms of
employment and had replaced apprentices as the major source of labour supply.2 The
Gregs used parish overseers to put them in touch with suitable families.23 Using
indicators of the persistence of work relationships, these family units appear to have had
less mobility than individuals. In i844 in Manchester 39.IO per cent of married and
working women were employed in the same mills as their husbands, but in the
surrounding rural areas the figure was 52.12 per cent.24 Family units also persisted
because rural mills were powered mainly by water, and the size of mules was generally
smaller, hence the demand for piecers was not as great as in urban, steam-powered
1" H. A. Turner, Trade Union Growth, 1976), 325.
Structure and Policy (Toronto, I962), 44-79. 12 Redford, op. cit., 29, 33.
'9 BPP, Retxs of the Inspectorsof Factones, z3 F. Collier, The Family Economy of the
I842 (31), XXII, 36I. WorkingClasses in the Cotton Industty, 1784-
20 Anderson,Op. Cit., 124. 1833 (Manchester, I964), 43.
21 See Table 4. Michael Anderson, 'Socio- 24 Bolton Public Library, Heywood Papers,

logical history and the working class family: Misc. The ruraldistricts include Hyde, Glossop,
Smelser revisited', Social History, I, 3 (October Mottram and Heywood.
I82 Social History VOL. 12: NO. 2

mills. It was more likely that a rural spinner could work with his own children and come
closer to satisfying the demand for piecers. In the rural areas around Preston in i8i6,
24.5 per cent of spinners worked with their children while in the town of Preston it was
only i i.6 per cent.35
Urban and rural employers did solve the problems they faced in a workforce that varied
in quality. Turnover was reduced and the tenure of employment was lengthy in both
regions. This may give the impression that, despite differences in bargainingor market
power, workers in the two regions had the same influence in the negotiation and
enforcement of their conditions of employment. This was not the case. Evidence on the
terms of employment, the inflexibilityof piece rates, the pattern of layoffs and short-hour
working is consistent with the view that, at least in the urban sector, workersdid succeed
in enforcing their preferences. Indeed the origins of the new paternalismare found in the
ability of urban workers to influence the policies employers used to reduce turnover.

TERMS OF EMPLOYMENT
There is a potential bias in using the available firm records to illustrate labour market
conditions. These firms may have been atypical because they were successful in reducing
turnover. That the records of the vast majority of firms have not survived is indicative
perhaps of the failure of most firms to come to grips with labour market or other
problems. The available records may not be representative in another way. McConnel
and Kennedy and the Ashworths spun fine yarn, while the Gregs produced extremely
coarse yarn. In an opposing way, however, they were typical employers. McConnel and
Kennedy competed with hundreds of employers in the Manchester labour market, and
like most other rural millowners, the Ashworths and Gregs were the major employers in
their surrounding regions.
The evidence which has survived indicates that the average worker held a long-term
attachment to a firm, at least as long as found in pOst-1945 labour markets.26 At
McConnel and Kennedy's and Lee's Manchester fine spinning mills, the average tenure
period was seven years; at Bolling's fine spinning mill in Bolton and at Ogden's fine and
coarse spinning mills in Oldham, it was ten years.27Length of employment at rural mills
was as long if not longer. Henry Ashworth reported that the length of tenure of his

25M. M. Edwards and R. Lloyd-Jones, 'N. MK), Deeds and Documents; BPP, Report on
J. Smelser and the cotton factory family: a State of the ChildrenEmployedin Manufactones,
reassessment', in N. B. Harte and K. G. i8i6 (397), II1, 479; BPP, Second Reportas to
Ponting (eds), Textile History and Economic the Employment of Children in Factories, I833
History (Manchester, I973), 317-19- (5I9), XXI, i9i; Bolton Chronicle, 12 June
26 B. G. M. Main, 'The length of employ- 1841. For other evidence on tenure, see Oldham
ment and unemployment in Great Britain', Public Library, Butterworth Diaries, Io Feb-
ScottishJournal of PoliticalEconomy,XXVIII, 2 ruary 1834; W. P. Crankshaw and Alfred
(June I98I), I46-64. Blackburn, A Century and a half of Cotton
" John Rylands Library, Manchester, Mc- Spinning, 1797-1947: A History of Knowles
Connel and Kennedy Collection (hereafter Limited of Bolton (I 947), 8.
May *987 Economic origins of paternalism I83

workerswas roughly eight years, and the wage books of the Gregs show that some
familiesremainedin the employof the firmgenerationaftergeneration.28
Extendingtenurewasa strategyfirmsin all regionsusedto reduceturnoverin the face
of a laboursupplythat variedin quality.The enforcementof this relationshipdiffered.
The lengthy attachmentsat urban mills did not arise from long-termand written
contracts, and even oral agreements did not last longer than three months.29 Following
the 'invisible handshake' approach, this allowed firms and workers to break associations
if either side was disappointed. There are cases of spinners leaving firms without penalty
even before their three months' term had expired.30 But the persistence of lengthy
attachments suggests that firms were compelled to maintain their wage and employment
offers, if they wanted to retain their reputations and attract a stable labour supply.
Rural employers used explicit written contracts to reduce turnover.31 These contracts
stipulated the number of years of service and the wages workers would receive, and often
included terms of employment for the entire family. Many rural firms generally qualified
the guarantee of employment and frequently used their power of dismissal if workers
performed poorly. It was exceptional for the Gregs to allow their workers to leave their
mill before the agreed time had expired. On most occasions the Gregs levied a fine
against workers if they left their employment.32 Rural firms did not have to worry about
their reputations as good employers. In the absence of alternative employment, and as
long as some members of the family remained employed, isolated rural workers had little
or no redress.
According to Joyce long-term attachments were restricted to the period after I850,
and most noticeably after the great cotton famine, when flows of migrants had receded
and there was some stability in the population of cotton-spinning towns.33 However,
there appears to be no consistent relation between population movements and lengthy
tenure. By I851 in urban Lancashire the vast majority of workers engaged in spinning
worked in the town of their birth. In Bolton 72 per cent of spinnerswere born in the town
(Table 1).34 Inflows of workers were greater in rural regions. Turton, where the
Ashworths' mills were located, was the birthplace of a minority of its workforce. Despite

2' Boyson, op. cit., I02-3; Collier, op. cit.,
44.
29 MK Letter Books, 26 August 1829; Butter-
worth, 27 Feburary I834, 6 June i835; Man-
chester Guardian, z6 June I830.
30Butterworth, 8 November 1831, Io Feb-
ruary I834, 17 October I836; Manchester
Guardian, 9 October I824.
31 An illustration of the differences in labour
markets is the difficulty employers had in
transferringfrom one region to another. Samuel
Greg jun.'s mill in Bollington and James
McConnel's country mill were plagued by
labour problems. M. B. Rose, 'The role of the
family in providing capital and managerial
talent in Samuel Greg and Company, 1784-
I840', Business History, XXVIII (January
1977), 49; BPP, Children's Employment
Commission:Reportsand Evidence, I843 (432),
XIV, b-63.
32 W. Lazenby, 'Social and Economic History
of Styal, 1750-I850' (unpublished M.A.,
University of Manchester, i949), 89.
33 Joyce, Work, Society, 104-5. For a recent
criticism of Joyce's views of populationstability,
see Kirk, op. cit., 44-5.
3 Census sampling indicates that in Man-
chester in i85I, 59.2 per cent of spinners
(N = 204) were born in the town; in OGdham
(N = i89), 66.2 per cent. Note that in all
towns the corresponding figures for all workers
were substantially lower. BPP, Ages, Civil
Condition of the Population in 185I, 1852-53
(/691,), LXXXVIII, 664. The method of
sampling is described in M. M. Huberman,
'Auction or contract?', 154-69.
I84 Social History VOL. 12: NO. 2

these flows of migrants, rural millowners like the Ashworths succeeded in reducing
turnover and extending lengthy tenure.

Table I. Birthplaces of spinners: i85i

Percentage of spinners in region

Distance between birthplace and

workplace

Town Working Under Between More than

in birthplace 5 miles 5 and so miles so miles

Bolton 72.1 6.2 10.1 II.7

(N=204)
Turton IO.I 33.3 28.9 27.7
(N=71)

Sources: PRO/HO 107/2209-2212, 2208.

It is speculation, but the evidence on birthplaces conforms with the position taken by
many urban employers, like McConnel, who avoided hiring 'strangers', workers from
outside their district. If a firm kept its reputation it could reduce recruiting costs and
hire from the local labour supply. Rural employers could not draw upon labour as
readily. The potential supply was small, but perhaps the strategy of hiring from outside
the surrounding region was a consequence of their failure to maintain good reputations
to attract the local population. Neither the Gregs nor the Ashworths paid high enough
wages to attract nearby urban labour and most of their workers came from rural areas.
Only I I.7 per cent of Ashworths' workers came from Bolton, about five miles away. The
majority of workers came from places more than ten miles away.35

PIECE RATE FLEXIBILITY

If urban workers had success in enforcing demands, piece-rate variability would be less
in urban than in rural regions. Since even minor piece- or wage-rate rigidity produces
quantity adjustments, it follows that output changes would be greater in urban than in
rural regions. Firm data cannot reject these hypotheses.
The absolute mean changes of piece rates, output and earnings at McConnel and
Kennedy between I834 and I84I are found in Table 2. The output data are from the
firm's monthly production ledger and the wage series is from its weekly cash ledger. The
period includes good business years, I834-6, and bad business years, 1837-40. Although

1s A similar pattern held at the Gregs' Styal originated in the major spinning towns. Man-
mill. After I830 many of its labourers and chester Central Library, Greg Papers, Cs/&/
apprentices came from the Liverpool area and I-125, C5v/5/4I20; Lazenby,op. cit., 68.
northern Cheshire. Few, if any, appear to have
May i987 Economic origins of paternalism I85

Table 2. Absolute mean changes of selected variables, McConnel and Kennedy (per
cent)

Variable 1834-4 1834-6 1837-40

Earnings 9.22 6.I9 11.44

Piece ratet 14.45 7.97 19.24
Output I8.43 13.67 21 .89

Sources: Earnings - MK Cash Ledger; Output - MK Monthly Production Ledger.

* Monthly statistics.
t Method of calculation: with payment by piece, the average worker's earnings are W = Prq, where W is
earnings, Pr is piece rate per unit of output and q is output per worker. Differentiating with respect to time,
t, and then normalizing, piece-rate changes can be solved: dPr/dt = (dW/dt-dq/dt)/q.

piece-rate changes increase in bad years, for the entire period they are less than output
changes. The firm's policy, it appears, was to reduce output and not to cut rates of pay.
McConnel summarized this strategy duringethe I829-31 crisis: '[It is] highly desirable
... in consequence of the exceedingly depressed state of the fine yarn market. . . rather
than reduce wages to produce less.'36
If the Ashworths' records are representative, then rural employers followed a different
practice. Table 3 is calculated from the Ashworths' New Eagley mill output ledger for
I834-41. Although the data are only available by quarters, and are less precise than the
figures for McConnel and Kennedy, a clear trend does emerge. For the entire period,
and noticeably in the bad years of I837-42, the absolute mean rate of change of output
was less than the rate of change of piece rates. As expected, piece-rate changes are
smaller than output changes in good years, I832-6, x843-5 and i851-2. This pattern of
wage setting is consistent with Henry Ashworth's philosophy of raising or lowering rates

Table 3. Absolute mean changes of selected variables, Ashworth* (per cent)

1832-6,
1843-45, 1837-42
Variable i832-52 1851 -2 1847-8

Earnings 9.63 6.99 I6.67

Piece rate 88.86 4.25 220.43
Output 46. I6 io.i6 105.24

Source: Ashworth Quarterly Stock Account.

* Quarterly statistics.
t Method of calculation: see Table 2.

36 MK Letter Books, 28 October I830.

i86 Social History VOL. 12: NO. 2

of pay accordingto the state of tradeand the supplyof labour.37W. R. Greg was of a
similaropinion. It was not in the interestof an employerto maintain'artificially. . . a
rateavowedlyabovethe marketpriceof labour,for he shallturna deafear to destitute
multitudeswho come to him beggingfor employment'.38
Rural employers admitted that their wage-setting practices were exceptional.
W. R. Gregacknowledgedthat it was the generaltendencyin the tradenot to alterrates
of pay becausean employerwas 'so often expectedto give his men theirusualwages'.39
Ashworthconcurredin his reviewof the practicesof urbanemployersin Preston:'It
must be observedthat the Prestonmastershad long been in the habit of adoptinga
uniformrateof wages, varyinglittle with the state of trade.'40

LAYOFFS
Joyce maintainsthat under the new paternalismit was commonpracticeto keep on
older workers. A spinner's work life was short and, even with new advancesin
technology,his manualdexterityand his value to the employerdeterioratedwith age.
But firms may have kept workers on past their peak productivityyears, because
'dependencein old age could offeropportunitiesfor the exertionof employerpatronage
and influence'.4'
Evidencefrom census samplesfor 1841, i85i and i86I suggeststhat the patternof
retainingolderspinnersmay havebeen in placeearlierthanJoycethinks,andfor other
reasons. Between I84I and i85I, a period which saw two major depressions,the
percentageof spinnersolderthan thirty-fiveyearsincreasedin Manchester,Boltonand
Oldham (Table 4). This age is used as a benchmarkbecause, according to
contemporary accounts,it markedthe periodwhenspinningskillsbeganto deteriorate.42 It
appearsthatfirmskepton olderworkers despite the lossesin they
productivity mayhave
incurred.BetweenI85I and i86i, a periodof relativeprosperity,this patternis reversed
and the percentageof youngerworkersincreased.
The lackof extensivefirmrecordsof namesand ages of workersmakesit difficultto
get an accuratepictureof the patternof layoffs,or evento confirmthe censusreturns.As
an indirectaccountof layoffs, the censuseshave some noticeableflaws.Ages for i85I
and I86i wererecordedexactly,but enumeratorsin i84i recordedagesabovetwentyin
quinquennia.(A spinnerrecordedas 25 yearswas in fact somewherebetween25 and
29.) To makecomparisonsfor all yearsthe averageage of spinnerswas calculatedusing
the averageof each age group (22, 27 and so on).
There are otherproblemsin using censusevidenceto describethe outcomeof labour
marketstrategies.Agesof workersreflecteda widevarietyof demographicandeconomic
factors. Spinners could have been getting older because the average age of the
3' Boyson, op. cit., 148-9. The relative and Social Science (1853), 287.
isolation of rural mills is clearly evident from 39 ibid.
Ashworth's wage practices. The wages paid at 40 H. Ashworth, An Inquiry into the Strike of

his New Eagley mill show no pattern with the Cotton Spinners of Preston (Manchester,
wages in Bolton, less than fifteen miles away I837), 8.
(ibid., 103). 4' Joyce, Work,Society, 97.
" W. R. Greg, 'The relation between em- 42 BPP, Empoyment of Childrenin Factories,

ployers and employed', in Essays on Political I834 (I67), XIX, 417.

May 1987 Economic origins of paternalism I87

Table 4. Age distribution of spinners

Town Age distribution (per cent)

184I i851 i86i

Manchester Under 35 S8.o 52.6 54-4

35-44 24.7 27.3 25.4
Over 45 17.3 20.I 20.2
Average 35.4 36.3 34.4
N=203 N=204 N=215
Bolton Under 35 60.7 57.7 56.6
35-44 26.I 27.8 29.3
Over 45 13.3 14.5 14.1
Average 34.7 35.6 35.6
N=2o8 N=zo9 N=I97
Oldham Under 35 52.6 50.2 54.0
35-44 33.3 30.8 23.1
Over 45 14.0 i9.I 23.1
Average 36.7 37.3 36.o
N=i88 N=i89 N=i99
Turton Under 35 7I .4 67.1 45.9
35-44 I6.9 28.9 36.5
Over 45 II7 4.0 I7.6
Average 30.5 30.6 34.2
N=77 N=74 N=74

Sources: I841 - PRO/HO107/576-80, 546, 534-36, 537;

I851 - PRO/HO 107/2225-30, 2241, 2209-12, 2208;
I85I - PRQ/RG9 2927-30, 30I6-20, 2820-26, 2817.

population was increasing, because new firms were expanding, or because young
workers were attracted to other occupations. The rapid expansion of coarse spinning in
Oldham, along with coal mining, may partly explain why the average age of its spinners
was greater than those in Bolton, which did not experience a similar expansion. Another
explanation is that Oldham employers had special reasons for demanding lengthy
attachments. If the description of Oldham as a radical town is roughly accurate, it
would be expected that its employers would be extremely wary of the labour queue
standing outside the factory gate.43 In contrast to conditions faced by mills in Bolton,
considered a relatively untroubled town, employers in Oldham would prefer holding on
to their workers as long as possible. Under these conditions the average age of spinners
should be greater in Oldham than in Bolton. Undoubtedly some of these social,
demographic and economic forces were at work and this is indicated in the levels of ages.
What remains to be explained is why the changes in ages follow a similar pattern in three
41 J. Foster, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution (I974).
I88 Social History VOL. 12: NO. 2

towns that had separatehistoriesand that hadgrownat differentratesand with diverse

specializationsand occupationalstructures.
There aregood reasonsto expecta layoffschedulethatreflectedseniorityin all towns,
even before formal unions had taken hold. If firms did have difficultyin recruiting
childrento workas piecersor scavengers,olderspinnersweremorelikelyto supplymore
assistantsthanyoungerspinners.These olderspinnerswouldhaveprovenworkrecords
and would show up when business improvedor when new marketswere opened up.
Although younger spinners may have achieved higher productivitylevels, their
reliabilitywas less certain,andfirmswouldhavebeenmorewillingto dismissthemfirst.
Workers,too, wouldhavemuchto gainfroma senioritysystem.Withoutunemployment
or old age insurance,and without pensions, it would be reasonableto expect that
workerswanteda guaranteeof incomein theirolderyears.A senioritysystem,with its
implicit notion of fairness, may have demonstratedto all workersthat there was the
possibilityof lengthytenureat the firm.
A senioritysystem was less likely in ruralareas. Older workerswith provenwork
recordsmaynot haveleft the region,if they werethe only memberof the familylaidoff.
The layoff scheduleof ruralfirms would thus reflectthe familycompositionand the
weakbargainingpowerof its workforce.Duringdownturnsfirmswouldfirstlay off the
moreexpensivefamilymembers,the adultmalelabourers,andretainthe cheaperfamily
members,womenand children.Duringthe subsequentboomthe adultmalewouldbe
rehiredand in this fashionfirmswould retaintheircomplementof spinners.
Census evidence for the Turton area is consistentwith this patternof layoffs. It
appearsthat the Ashworthslaid off workersolderthan forty-fiveand preferredto keep
youngerworkersduringthe bad yearsbetween i84I and i85I. As businessrecovered
after I851, the Ashworthsretainedtheir older workers.The problemsin using census
evidencediscussedpreviouslyare exaggeratedin this case becauseof the smallsample
size. Nevertheless, the census results are confirmedby the patternof employment
changesat the Gregs'ruralmills. At QuarryBankin i844, a good year, about30 per
cent of the labourforcewascomposedof malesovereighteenyears.By the endof 1847, a
bad year, the proportionof adult maleswas down to 25 per cent, but in the recovery
period after I849, when adult males were rehired,the figurewas back up to 29 per
cent.44

SHORT-HOURWORKING
An importantomissionin Joyce'saccountof the labourmarketis short-hourworking.45
There was a long traditionamongfactoryoperativesthat short-hourworkingprotected
them againstthe consequencesof overproduction.Naturallyit was in the interestof
individualspinnersto leaveone mill workingshort time for anotherworkingfull time,
but there was a widespreadfear amongall workersthat the latterfirmswould either
close down completelyor cut rates of pay during depressions.As the Prestoncase
44 Greg Papers, C5/i/5, Half-Yearly Ac- Acts; Work, Society, 69. In contrast, Price
counts, September i843-December I859. emphasizes that there was some continuity
41
Joyce's discussion of short-hour working throughout the century to workers' efforts to
concerns employers' observance of the Factory control hours of work; 'Labour process', 58-9.
May 1987 Economic origins of paternalism I89

demonstrated,workers had no assurancethat a rate cut would be restored when

businessrecovered.But workerswere well awarethat it was in the interestof firmsto
restorefull-timehours of work. A commonstrategythus emergedto force short-hour
workingon all firmssince it would reducepressurein the industryto cut ratesof pay.
Along with bringingfluctuationsof productionundercontrolthere was also a general
consensusamong workers,whether in cotton spinning, constructionor mining, that
reductionsin hours would spreadevenly the availableworkand employmentover the
year.46
Employers,on the other hand, had good reasonsto rejectshort-hourworking.Small
firms and those firms without the latest technologiescould not compete unless they
workedlong hours. Cottonspinningwas a largeindustrywith a high turnoverof firms,
so that it was unlikely that firms colluded or co-operated to reduce output.47 If firms did
act independentlyand workedshort time therewas the possibilitythat they would lose
their best workmento full-time firms.48This must have been of special concern to
employersin urbanareas,wherespinnerscouldeasilymovefrommill to mill. Insteadof
workingshort hours during depressions,firms may have preferredto work full time,
thus keepingtheir best spinnersand layingoff the rest.
In urbanareasworkers'preferencesdominatedand firmsdid workshorttime, at least
in minordownturns.To accomplishtheirobjective,operativesblacklistedfirmsthatdid
not abide by the practice of working short time.49 If firms did not abide by this
convention,they would find it difficultto attracta stableand productivelabourforce.
Thus the acceptedcode of behaviourwas thatin 'Manchesterdo as the Mancuniansdo',
and this meantshort-hourworking.
McConneland Kennedy'soutput and employmentrecordsbetween I833 and i839
illustratethe generalpatternof short-timeworkingamong urbanfirms (Table 5). In
Table 5. McConneland Kennedyemploymentstatistics, 1833-9

Year Employment Male workers Spinnersas Numberofmonths*

as percentage percentage workingshorttime
of labour of labour
force force
I835 I488 47.1 54.8 5
I836 I590 45-4 51.3 4
I838 1550 49.9 55.3 6

Source: Employment - MK Deeds and Documents.

* Method of calculation: monthly yarn output was first corrected for counts produced. The series was then
seasonally adjusted, and its logarithm regressed on a constant and time. Deviations below trend were
consideredshort-timemonths.

4* R. Price,Mastern, Unions and Men (I980), Fluctuations in Great Britain (Cambridge,

52-3. 1954), I38-9.
47 Turner, op. cit., 372; J. R. T. Hughes, ^ Manchester Guardian, 14 November I846;
Fluctuations in Trade, Industry and Finance Economist, 28 November I846, 1548, I1 Dec-
(Oxford, I960), go; R. C. 0. Matthews, ember I846, i62I.
A Study in Trade Cycle History: Economic 4" Voice of the People,
24 February I831.
Igo Social History VOL. 12 : NO. 2

I834-6 fine spinningmarketswere healthy,but afterordersreachedtheirpeakin I836

they rapidlyfell off. Whatfollowedwas a periodof short-hourworkingthatlasteduntil
I839. Productionin I837 wasthe lowestfor the entireperiod,andwhile I838 wasa peak
output year, the variabilityof monthly output indicatesthat short time was worked
duringthis yearas well. Despite these fluctuations,betweenthe boomyearof I836 and
the depressionyearof I838, the numberemployedat the mill fell by only z.s per cent.
Short-hourpractices kept McConnel and Kennedy'slabour force together and its
reputationas a good employerwas preserved.Similarly,in I830, when it was widely
acknowledgedthatshort-hourworkingwas unprofitable,insteadof layingoff workersor
even closingdown, the firm'sstrategywas'to accommodate[itselfl to the market,rather
than throw [its] workpeopleout of their employment'.50 The employmentfiguresalso
indicatethat the firm made a specialeffort to retainits adult malespinners.Although
the absolutenumberof workersshoweda smalldecline,the percentageof maleworkers
increasedat the expenseof womenand children.
McConneland Kennedy'sstrategywas not exceptional.The 'stateof trade'columns
in local newspapersdescribethat demandby workersfor short hours was met in all
urbanregionsof Lancashire,in coarseand fine spinning.Two exampleswill suffice.In
Bolton, in the face of a declinein the demandfor fine yarnin the late I830s, the work
week was reducedto four-and-a-half days.51 In coarsespinningOldham,in I825 and
I847, short time reducedthe numberof hours workedto the equivalentof a four-day
work-week.52 The averagesize of millsdifferedgreatlybetweenBoltonandOldham,but
this had no effect on short-hourworkingin the two towns. Upon reviewingsimilar
evidenceFactoryInspectorSaunderssummarizedthe underlyingprincipleof short-hour
working:'The occupierof everyfactoryendeavoursto keephis best handstogether,and
for this reasonwill then divide the work he has to give out amongall those who are
willing to continuein his employment.'53
In contrastto the experienceof urbanmills, ruralmillsdid not workshorttime. Rural
workershad no leverageto enforcetheir preferencesand employersdid not consider
short-hourworkingas a necessarystrategyeither to hoardlabouror to protecttheir
reputationsas good employers.Both HenryAshworthand R. H. Gregmaintainedthat
it was uneconomicalor wastefulfor theirfirmsto workshorttime.54Accordingto their
productionledgers, short-timeworkingwas restrictedat the Ashworths'New Eagley
mill to limitedperiodsin I84I and I848, and at the Gregs'QuarryBankmill to I833.
Althoughthese practiceswere partlyrelatedto the intermittentnatureof waterflows,
like other ruralemployers,the Gregsand Ashworthshad an alternatesupplyof steam-
poweredenginesin most of their mills, to call upon if waterlevels were low.

so MK Letter Books, 28 October I830. Huberman, 'Auction or contract', 7I-83.

sl Bolton Chmnicle, 27 August I837, 4 May S3 BPP, Repots of the InspectorsofFactones,

x839. I847 (828), XV, 5 I 3. Similarly,the Economist

s2 Manchester Guardian, ii June I825, 25 commented that 'it was a serious loss to break
July i826, 5 May I847, I3 June I847. For up an establishment once formed'; I December
i820-So, yarn output shows significant fluctua- I855, 1314
tions and lends further support to the view .4 Boyson,op. cit., 58-9; Greg Papers,CS/
that a majority of firms worked short-hours; 6IS.
May i987 Economic origins of paternalism I9I

In his analysis of the post-i850 period Joyce comparesthe impact and success of
paternalismin a numberof Lancashiretowns. In Boltonthe successof paternalismwas
relatedto the largesize of its mills and their familyownership;in Oldhampaternalism
was less prominentbecause of the small size of its mills and the advent of limited
liability. Small firms had more difficulty in 'deliveringthe economic goods', and
althoughlimitedliabilityremovedthis constraint,the size of thesefirmsbredfamiliarity
between mastersand men and was not conduciveto the formalizationof paternalistic
relations.55
The originsof the new paternalismareevidentin urbanLancashirebeforeI850. In all
towns, regardlessof the averagesize of firms,bothworkersandfirmshadan incentiveto
set up and preservelong-termattachments.Moreover,contraryto Dutton and King,
economic conditionsdid not constrainpaternalismand it was not restrictedto good
yearsonly. In fact, the accordbetweenworkersand firmsin urbanareaswas in partan
outcomeof economicconditionsin productand labourmarkets.In isolatedruralmills
workers'mobilitywas curtailed,the possibilityof alternativeemploymentwas limited
and, as a result, employerscould determinethat there was no seniority, short-hour
workingor fixed rates of pay. Indeed, Joyce'semphasison the shift from old to new
paternalismafter i85o holds only if the comparisonis with ruralfirms in the earlier
period. Alas, in the earlierperiod, ruralfirmswere a decreasingminority.
The continuityof labourmarketstrategiesis evident as well. Even as the average
quality of the laboursupply firms faced improved,and the varianceof workertypes
declined, owing to improvementsin recruitingand managerialmethods after mid-
century, short-hour working remained the widely accepted method of reducing output.56
The originsof piece-ratelists whichfirmlyestablishedsomestabilityof earningsarealso
foundin the earlierperiod.In Bolton,as earlyas i8I3 accordingto someaccounts,firms
began to meet workers'demand for a common price per pound of yarn spun.57 In
Oldhamthere was a higherturnoverof firms, and regionallists were establishedonly
after i850. Until then firms made 'separatebargains'with their workpeoplebased on
clearlystatedspinningprices.These pricesallowedworkersto realizetheirdemandfor a
'standardweeklywage', the basis of the futureOldhamlists.58
The continuityof these arrangements,froma periodof informalworkerorganization
to unions, is an area for future research.A relatedaspect that remainsneglectedis
senioritybefore i850. The findingthat olderworkerswere favouredover youngerones
has implicationsfor the study of, among other topics, technical change and the
household economy. Finally, if quantity of employment adjustments, short-hour

55Joyce, Work,Society, I58-68. 1904), 263-

56 S. J. Chapman, Unemployment: The
Results of an Investigation Made in Lancashire
(Manchester, 1909), 36-9, 45-9.
17 BPP, Supplementary Report on the
Employment of Children in Factories, I834
(I67), XIX, 466; Bolton Chronicle, IS October
1836, 29 October I836; S. J. Chapman,
The Lancashire Cotton Industry (Manchester,
s8 Chapman, Lancashire Cotton, 266; Man-
chester Guardian, 23 December 1826, 20
January I827, IS April I846. On the 'standard
weekly wage', see British Association for the
Advancement of Science, On the Regulation of
Wages by Means of Lists in the Cotton Industty
(Manchester, I887), 197.
192 Social History VOL. 12: NO. 2

workingand layoffswereas largeand pervasiveas the datasuggest,then unemployment

may not be underestimatedas a problemfaced by all workers,that is spinnersand
weavers,duringthe heydayof industrialization.
TrentUniversity,Ontario