FEE_Et)

()eT142010
NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
COURT
IN TIIE COURT OF CTVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

DMISION II
c;or.riir
o#'iiuilopFEAr-s
STATE OFOtilAt-totuit
MIDWEST CITY/DEL CITY )
OcT1 g hUA
SCHOOLS,OWN RISK # I6LO2 )
InsuranceCarrier, Mle6661s' RleHIE
) T,tERK
)
Petitioners, ; w . c . c . / f2OO9-t952Q
)
vs. ) CaseNo. 107,867
)
EN BAI.IC PAIiIEL: J. Eldrldge
REGENIA K. SIMPSON and TIIE ) J. Farrar
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ) J. Grove - DLssents
COURT, )
)
Respondents. )

PROCEEDINGTO REVIEW AN ORDER OF A THREE-JUDGEPAI{EL OF

THE WORKERS' COMPENSATIONCOURT

HONORABLE JOHN M. MoCORMICK, TRIAL JUDGE

SUSTAINED

W. JeffreyDasovich
DASOVICH LAW OFFICE
OklahomaCity, Oklahoma For Petitioners

JobnD. Valentine
RYANI BISHER RYANI
OklahomaCity, Oklahoma For Respondent
OPINION BY JOHN F. FISCTIER"PRESIDINGJUDGE:

EmployerMidwest CitylDel City Public Schoolsappealsan orderof a

Court that vacatedthe trial

three-judgepanelof the Workers' Compensation

court's orderand found that the injury sufferedby RegeniaK. Simpson(Claimant)

axoseout of, andwas sustainedin, the courseof her employment.

BACKGROIJNI)

On January21,2009,Claimant,an employeeof the Midwest City/Del City

Public Schootssystenl left her deskat the schoolpremisesto takeher lunch break.

The recordindicatesthat Claimant'slunch breakwas not strictly scheduled,but

takenwhen convenient.Claimantwas intendingto visit her elderly fatherduring

her lgnch break. As was the normalpracticeat herjob, Claimantdid not punch-

out her timecardbefore leaving for lunch. As Claimantwalked directly from the

building and approachedher car,which wasparkedapproximatelythreespaces

from the front door of the building, sheslippedoffa curb and fracturedher right

ankle, requiring surgery.

The trial court deniedClaimant'srequestfor benefitson the groundsthat

her injury did not ariseout of and in the courseof her employment.Claimant

appealedthis decisionto a three-judgepanel,which found her injury compensable,

andvacatedthe trial court's orderascontraryto law. Employerseeksreview of

this decision. The singleissueon appealis whetherthe three-judgepanelerredin

finding that Claimant's injury aroseout of, and was sustainedin, the courseof her

employment.

STAIIDARD OF REVIEW

Generatly,the issueof whethera claimant'sinjury aroseout of andin the

courseof employnentis a questionof fact for the Workers' CompensationCourt,

standardof review applies. City of Edmond.v.

andthe any-competent-evidence

Monday,1995OK L32,n4,9\O P.2d980,982. However,wherethe relevantfacts

an appellatecourt reviewsthe lower court's decisionas a matterof

areundisputedn

law, "dishubing it only if the undisputedmaterial facts do not supportthe

Workers'CompensationCourt's order." Amosv. Spiro Pub- 9chs.,2004OK 4' fl

5 , 8 5P . 3 d8 1 3 ,8 1 5 .

It is undisputed,r", when shesrippedon a curb in an

",",--:::;:::.
employer-providedparking lot, approximatelyone minuteafter leavingher deskto

take her approvedlunch break.t "Generally,injuries sustainedwhile going to and

are deemedto have

comingfrom work, when occurringon employerpremisesn

t Employer's brief describesthe injuty as occurring when Claimant "slipped and fell"
while 'bending to opena car door." However, the undisputedtestimony at trial was that
Claimant"slipped offthe curb.o'
arisenout of and in the courseof employment.-Fudgev. Universityof Oklahoma,

requirement
I 983 OK 67, n 4, 673P.2d 149, I 50.2 The arising-out-of-employment

an evaluationof whetherClaimant'spresencein the paxkinglot when

necessitates

leaving for a regular lunch break was causallyconnectedto the duties of her

employment.Id.

The basicparkinglot rule is statedasfollows:

As to parking lots ownedby the employer,or maintainedby the

employerfor its employees,practicallyall jurisdictionsnow consider
thempart of the "premises,"whetherwithin the main company
premisesor separatedfrom it. The rule is by no meansconfinedto
p*kiog lots ownednconfiolled,or maintainedby the employer. The
doctrine hasbeenappliedwhen the lot, althoughnot ownedby the
employer,was exclusivelyused,or risedwith the owiter's special
permission,or just usedby the employeesof this employer.

I Larson'sWorkers' CompensationLaw $ 13.04(2)(a)(2000)(footnotesomitted)'

The treatisefurther explainsthat "[o]nce a parking lot hasachieved,underthese

standards,the statusof a portion of the employerlspremises,compensation

on the main premises."

coverageattachesto any injury that would be compensable

Id. at$ 13.04(2)(b).Pursuantto Oklahomaworkers' compensationlaw, the

2Although Fudge involved an injury sustainedwhile crossingthe streetto reachan

employer-spons6red
'nu purt iog lot, rather than in the parking lot, the holding in Fudge is not limited
to tle taof fiaffic, but insteadstandsfor the proposition thal when a parking lot constitutes
part of the employer's premises,an employee'sinjury zustainedwhen taveling to or from the lot
io the office arisesout of andin the courseof emplolmett. SeeVeithv. Ogbum,2006 OK CfV
APP 75,nzl,136 P.3d1080,1085.
parking lot in this caseconstitutesEmployer'spremises.Turnerv. B SewInn,

18 P.3d1070,1072.
2ooooK97,.1T9,

"Since 1944,[the OklahomaSupreme]Court hasconsistentlyrecogpized

that when an injury occurson premisesownedor controlledby the employerwhile

going to and comingfrom work, it is deemedto havearisenout of and in the

conrseof employment."Id. at!f 16, l8 P.3d at1074. However,the Courthas

..limitedthe appticationof this rule by requiringa causalconnectionbetweenthe

injury and employmentor that the precipitating risk of harm was createdor

maintainedby the employer." Id. (footnotesomitted)'

Employer axguesthat the parking lot rule of Turner doesnot apply in this

casebecauseClaimantintendedto visit her elderlyfatherduring her lunch break.

o'purelypersonal"missionmotivatedClaimantto
Employerarguesthat,becausea

leaveher desk,Claimant'sinjury is non-compensable.Employer citesCorbettv.

ExpressPersonnet,lggToK 40, g36P.2d932,insupportof this argument.A

similarrule is foundin Thomasv. Keith HenselOpticalLabs,1982OK 120,653

P.2dz}l, andFloyd v. TacoMayo,2OO2OK 58, 58 P.3d 197. However,these

casesare distinguishablefrom the situationat hand. In thesecases,the claimant

was involved in a personalmission,eitheroutsideof the regularlyscheduledlunch

breakor after the work shift ended. Corbettinvolved a claimantwho was injured
whenhe lost control of his motorcyclewhile attemptingto pull out of his

employer'sparking lot. Ihe SupremeCourt specificallynotedthat "Corbettleft

the workplaceshortly beforehis lunch breakbeganin orderto conductpersonal

businesswith his bank." Corbett,1997OK 40 attl9, 936P.2dat934.3In

Thornas,theCourt specificallynotedthat the claimantleft his work'oaboutftve

minutesbeforeo'thescheduledlunchbreakto removeicb from his windshield.

Thomas,l982OK 120 atnz,653 P.2d at202. T\e SupremeCourtdistinguished

thesenon-habitgaland unusualdeparturesfor personalpurposesfrom regular

lunchbreaks. Similarly, in Floyd,the claimant'sshift at a fast-foodrestauranthad

endedand shehad signedout for the day. Floyd,2002OK 58 at\12-3,58 P'3d at

196-97.Shewas injured,aboutfifteen minutesafter signingout, when shefell

while refilling her drink. Id. Here,Claimanthad not clockedout andwas taking

her regular lunch break. Her leaving the work areato take an establishedlunch

breakwas not a purely personalmission. SeeRicheyv. CommanderMills, Inc.,

805.
1974o.K47,521P.2d

3 See alsoHamiltonv.Dub RichardsonFord, 1998OK CIV APP 180,n3,970P.2d

'Corbett left the workplace
I 196, I lg1-g1("The supremecourtbasedits decisionon the fact that
shortiy before his lunchbreak beganin order to conductpersonalbusinesswith his bank [and
tfrisl exit from the premiseswas not within his employer'sestablishedbreaktime for lunch.")'
 The undisputedevidencein this caseis that Claimantfell on Employer's

premisesduring a normal lunch break, approximatelyone minute after leaving her

surroundingher injury areanalogousto those

desk. The factsandcircumstances

in Tumer, and supportthe finding that her presencein the parking lot was

employmentrelatedandher injury axoseout of and in the courseof her

employnent.Turner,2000OK97 atl25,18 P.3dat1076.

CONCLUSION

The undisputedfactsof this casefall underthe "parking lot" rule of Tumer,

and the Tumerrule is not limited pursuantto thesefactsby Corbettv. Express

personnet,lggT OK 40, 936P.2d932,or similar cases.Accordingly,we find the

three-judgepaneldid not err, and sustainthe orderappealed.

SUSTAIIIED.

WISEMAN, C.J.,andBARNES,J., concur.

October13,2010