Introduction of seeds industry

Keywords: Seed; Private industry; Trade; Technology transfer; Intellectual property

rights.
Correct Sehgal, S. (1996), "IPR Driven Restructuring of the Seed Industry."
citation: Biotechnology and Development Monitor, No. 29, p. 1821.

Until recently, success in the seed business could be traced to the strength of a
company’s classical breeding programme. But with the advent of the first transgenic
plants, such breeding, as well as access to germplasm, genes and biotechnologies
have become of considerable strategic importance. Genetic material, biotechnologies
and their associated intellectual property rights (IPRs) are in fact leading to a new
restructuring of the relations between agrochemical, agrobiotechnological, food
processing, and seed companies.

The seed industry matured due to the introduction of hybrids, especially hybrid maize in
North America, hybrid sugar beet in Europe, and hybrid vegetables in South-East Asia.
Of the US$ 15 billion market in commercial seed at present, hybrids account for
approximately 40 per cent of sales, and most of the profit.
In North America and Europe the hybrid seed industry grew from regionally based family
businesses. The profitability of hybrids far outstripped that of non-hybrid open-pollinated
seeds. This leads to eventual consolidation in the industry and the dominance of several
key companies in particular crops. The attraction of hybrids for the seed industry is
obvious: when double-cross maize hybrids were first commercialized in the USA in the
early 1930s, they were priced at approximately 10 to 12 times the price of commercial
grain. With the introduction of single crosses in the 1960s, hybrid maize seed prices
jumped to between 20 and 25 times the commodity price. In the 1970s these high margins
attracted the attention of several agrochemical companies, waiting to exploit possible
synergies of the seed business with their own line of business. The acquisition of
Northrup King (USA) by Sandoz (Switzerland), of Funk Seeds (USA) by Ciba-Geigy
(Switzerland), of Nickerson (USA) by Shell (UK/the Netherlands), and of Asgrow (USA)
by Upjohn (USA) took place during this period.
In the 1980s agrochemical companies engaged in biotechnology research began to
acquire seed companies. They did so this time in the realization that seed would be the
primary delivery system for their new technologies, particularly biotechnology. They
believed that delivering and capturing value from new input and output traits required
control over the distribution channel. This brought companies such as Dupont (USA), Elf
Aquitaine (Sanofi) (France), ICI (USA), Monsanto (USA), Rohm & Haas (USA), and
Unilever (the Netherlands) into the seed business. Their strategy was to capture margins
along the length of the agribusiness chain from the laboratory to the field.
This strategy did not work for all new entrants. Firstly, the time required to convert the
early new technologies into products took much longer than originally envisioned.
Secondly, there was a conflict between the entrepreneurial management style of the
comparatively smaller seed companies, and the hierarchical style of most large chemical
companies. Thirdly, the learning curve has been longer and more complex than expected
and has led to poor financial performance. Finally, unlike chemicals, seed cannot be
marketed globally, but only in agroclimatic regions similar to where it was developed. As
a result, companies such as Shell, Rohm & Haas, Sanofi, Upjohn, began to divest
themselves of their seed and biotech businesses in the 1990s.

Recent developments
Lately however, there has been a reassessment of the seed industry now that genetically
engineered seed is finally reaching the market. In 1996, roughly 720,000 ha of Bt cotton
(transgenic insect resistant cotton expressing a Bacillus thuringiensis gene), 80,000 ha of
Bt maize and 7,200 ha of Bt potato were planted in the USA. Approximately 20,000 ha of
transgenic canola, tolerant to the herbicide Liberty, were planted in Canada, and
approximately 800,000 ha of transgenic soya beans, tolerant to the herbicide Roundup, in
the USA.
These developments are hastening the convergence of the agricultural biotechnology,
seed and chemical industries. In turn, this convergence is changing the cost structure of
the traditional seed business and product pricing. Therefore, attempts are being made to
separate the value of technology from the value of the seed in the form of a ‘technology
premium’ to be paid by farmers when they purchase a product improved by
biotechnology. For example, in 1996 the technology premium for Bt-based insect
protection in cotton is over US$ 75 per ha, and roughly US$ 25 per ha for maize.
Because most transgenic plant products contain or have been developed with several
biotechnologies, it is very easy for a company owning the IPR on one such technology to
block development of a product. As a result, in order to maximize value recovery,
minimize the threat of litigation, and secure access to technology, several strategic
‘partnerships’ were formed in 1995 and 1996. Monsanto’s acquisitions of 49.9 per cent of
Calgene (USA), 45 per cent of Dekalb (USA) and 100 per cent of Agracetus (USA) were,
to a large extent, driven by technology and IPR issues. The acquisition of Plant Genetic
Systems International (PGS, Belgium) by AgrEvo GmbH (Germany) in August 1996 for
approximately US$ 750 million is perhaps the noteworthy strategic partnership. Both
Monsanto and AgrEvo have invested heavily to gain access to technologies that were
subject to IPRs held by PGS and others. Similarly, Empresas La Moderna’s (ELM,
Mexico) acquisition of DNA Plant Technology (USA) was driven by the latter’s
technology and portfolio of delayed fruit-ripening patents. Dow Elanco’s 46 per cent
participation in Mycogen (USA) was driven by the former’s desire to secure access to Bt
technology and other patents. On the other hand, the Zeneca (formerly ICI, UK) and
Vanderhave (the Netherlands) merger was triggered more by geographical convenience
and other considerations than by IPR considerations. The Ciba and Sandoz merger was
also to a large extent driven by their mutual interests in the chemical and pharmaceutical
business.
With the seed industry in a state of flux, new competitive strategies are expected to
emerge. These strategies are likely to focus on four areas: (1) pricing based on separating
the value of technology from the value of the seed; (2) market segmentation; (3) product
development using classical breeding, genetic engineering, and technologies to reduce
‘cycle time’; and (4) sales and distribution.
In the flagship USA maize seed market, for example, it is anticipated that within the next
five years the seed distribution system will undergo significant changes to meet farmers’
expanding needs for more sophisticated technology and information. There will be a
growing trend towards multi-channel distribution rather than the existing farmer-dealer
system alone. In hybrid seed maize, the very existence of many local and regional US
companies will depend upon the success of Holden’s Inc., a major supplier of foundation
seed, in integrating new technologies in its proprietary germplasm. Through foundation
seed (or parent seed) Holden’s is essentially the supplier of genetic material to most of
the local and regional US maize seed companies. Unless Holden’s can access the new
biotechnologies, those companies will be excluded from the current shift in the
competitive landscape and will continue to lose market share.

Genes and enabling technologies

The technology used for the transgenic seeds which are entering the market can be
broadly divided into two major groups: genes and enabling technologies. Genes encode
proteins that are responsible for the (transgenic) trait. The important enabling
technologies include plant transformation systems, selectable markers, gene expression
techniques, and the so-called gene ‘silencing’ technologies. Plant transformation systems
are employed to insert specific genes into plant cells. Methods include using
Agrobacterium as a vector (Ti mediated transformation), electroporation, or particle gun.
The result of these methods is the incorporation of novel DNA into the plant cell’s
chromosomes. Since the incorporation of DNA, i.e. genes, is random, selectable markers
are used to identify the transformed cells.
To be sure that the inserted genes function in their new environment, expression
technology is employed. This technology in combination with specific gene promoters is
used to specify the timing and location of gene expression. By contrast, gene silencing
technologies, such as anti-sense, can be used to suppress gene expression. The Flavr Savr
tomato of Calgene uses anti-sense to suppress one of the genes responsible for ripening,
so that tomatoes can remain on the vine longer, and become sweeter without going soft.

IPR and access to technology

As noted, since virtually all transgenic seeds either contain several technologies or
depend on them for their development IPR issues have become a new competitive
element in the seed industry. Even in cases where a technology is novel and patented, it
may be dependent on earlier developments, and so cannot be freely used even by the
inventor. Therefore, from these first transgenic seeds a rather complicated IPR pedigree
emerges. At issue is the so-called ‘freedom to operate’, which can be defined as legal
access to all the technologies required to launch a product.
Already with a single-trait transgenic plant, the IPR issues are extremely complex. For
example, a transgenic insect-tolerant plant may involve Plant Variety Rights (PVR), plant
patents, as well as several patents relating to transformation technology, the selectable
marker employed, the gene coding for the insecticidal protein, the promoter, and various
regulatory elements and modifications needed to express genes adequately in plant cells
(see table).
Any IPR holder of even one element could block the commercialization of an insect-
tolerant variety based on this package of technologies. Alternative packages are equally
complicated. Because of the difficulties of sorting through various IPRs, the cost of doing
seed business will increase, as will the likelihood of litigation.
Freedom to operate will become even more complicated as companies seek to bundle
traits to gain competitive advantage. A second generation of transgenic crops are likely to
contain both input traits, such as insect resistance and herbicide tolerance, and output
traits like altered oil and protein quality.

Example of multiple IPRs related to the development of one

insect protected plant
Subject Components Example IPR
Protected Plant variety
Plant Variety Germplasm
Variety right
Selectable marker gene Promoter 35S Patent
Coding sequence nptII Patent
Trait Promoter TR Patent
Coding sequence cryIAb Patent
TransformationTechnology Ti-plasmid pGV226 Patent
Gene Expression Technology Transcription viral leader Patent
Initiation Joshi -
Translation Initiation AT -> GC Patent
Codon usage
Number of IPRs 8

The rules of the IPR game

The current restructuring of the seed industry is being driven by technology and IPR
issues. The winners in this process will be those companies that are able to deal with the
complexities of IPR and bring their products onto the market. Their ability to do so is
limited by a number of factors:

• There are a large number of technologies involved in developing a product.

• Many products will be dependent on third-party technologies and subject to their
IPRs. Those technologies may be unavailable for licensing or only available on
onerous terms. If the technology owner seeks its maximum value, the cost of
technology acquisition can become prohibitive and its recovery in the market
almost impossible.
• Companies may be required to use their own patented technologies as trading
chips to get access to third-party technology. The more such chips you have, the
more chances you have of obtaining freedom to operate. Therefore, companies
that started early in biotechnology and have a broad technology portfolio are at an
advantage.
• The viability of the company can be affected if commercialization is delayed,
especially if other sources of financing R&D are limited. Some technologies still
have to be tried, tested and mastered. The learning curve this requires can be
longer than anticipated.
Some people predict that the changes taking place are just the beginning and that there is
more to come in the next three to five years. These changes will provide opportunities for
some companies, and nightmares for others. As the process continues, we can expect
many casualties, some survivors, and a few successes.
Suri Sehgal