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Army
The definitive feature of Jomini’s theories of war rests with the scientific
nature of their application. Though Jomini goes to great lengths to
discourage those who would critique his maxims as simple reduction of the
drama of war to mathematical calculations,1 there is a strong element of
truth to his critics. For Jomini, war is a winnable endeavor; winnable if
one follows his few simple truths. The U.S. Army, in its doctrinal attempt
to encode Jomini, developed its well-known Principles of War. Jomini’s
influence readily shines in these principles (Dr. Thomas Huber describes
the Principles of War as “Jomini writ short”2). The Army’s application of
them at all levels of operations suggests that, as an institution, it agrees
with Jomini. War can be mastered by adherence to maxims that can guide
the commander to victory on the battlefield.
The reliance of the U.S. Army upon the promises of the MDMP represents
its hope that properly trained commanders and staff officers can control the
complexities and the violence of warfare. The MDMP represents the
egalitarianism of the U.S. Army as it allows the planning and execution of
military operations without the need for singular military genius in the
mind of the commander. All who come to the staff can participate and
provide valuable contributions to the success of a mission through the use
of the MDMP. Certainly, the commander plays an important role in the
process, but his role in the U.S. Army is more diffused than Clausewitz
would require of the military genius capable of cutting through the fog of
war. The theories and calculations of MDMP are more agreeable to Jomini
as he states in his introduction to Summary of the Art of War:
Protecting against the absence of Jomini’s “natural genius,” the U.S. Army
has a developed an intricate, encompassing, and ubiquitous method of
deriving appropriate solutions to military puzzles. The Army follows
Jomini’s prescription and, through the MDMP, the Principles of War, and
the Tenets of Army Operations, has provides the framework for
commanders and their staffs that has become a fundamental system of
Army tactical and operational planning, limiting the need for natural
military genius.
Further evidence of the U.S. Army’s Jominian character lies in its espousal
of Lines of Operation. FM 3-0 devotes large sections of Chapters 5 and 6 to
this major Jominian concept.11 The U.S. Army has developed the concept
further to include both temporal and spatial lines, but the idea of solution of
a military problem through the application of logical threads of continuity
remains Jominian at its core. Jomini’s original concept suggested purely
contiguous lines of operation focusing on the advantages of interior versus
exterior lines of operation, and the U.S. Army continues to show a desire to
maintain that orientation. Doctrinal planners have expressed the need to
find solutions to operations that demand mastery of non-contiguous and
non-linear battlefields,12 but most instructors of tactics seem to rely more
readily on the previous methods of describing the battlefield framework.
A final and perhaps most telling indicator that the U.S. Army is a Jominian
institution lies in the Army’s optimistic approach to combat operations.
The Army, especially in its recent history, holds full expectations of
winning its battles. Doomsayers continue to predict extended operations,
massive casualties, or expansion of operations beyond control of the
players, but rarely has the Army entered into an operation without the
sincere belief that it would dominate and succeed. Jomini would be proud
of this sanguine approach to war. He allowed for a prescription for a
winnable war of limited nature. Under the control of skilled commander
and a trained staff, Jomini considered war scientifically manageable.
Clausewitz however warned against the dangers of the inherent
uncontrollability of war.14 In the U.S. Army’s confidence of tactical and
operational dominance of current and future battlefields, it falls firmly in
the Jominian camp at the expense of Clausewitz’s fears.
The U.S. Army’s doctrinal application of the theories of war at the tactical
and operational levels shows that, at its core, it is a Jominian institution. Its
scientific approach to the complexity and confusion of war eschews the
fears of Clausewitz for the promises of his Swiss counterpart. The Army’s
universal application of the Principles of War demonstrates its Jominian
heritage; its reliance on the Military Decision Making Process exhibits its
faith in the idea that the need for military genius can be mitigated by strong
staff work using cold, calculative science. Currently, the Army’s struggle
with lines of operation and non-contiguous operations as a potential future
of war displays more clearly a desire to maintain its ties to Jominian
theoretical concepts. While leaders of the Army and self-proclaimed
civilian experts of military thought prefer to quote Clausewitz when
describing current and future operations, it is to the comfort and optimism
of Jomini that the U.S. Army continually returns.
Notes
3. Jomini, p. 284.
7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Ed. and Trans. by Michael Howard and
Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.
77.
8. Jomini, p. 284.