Why do resource managers make

links to stakeholders at other scales?

W. Neil Adger, Katrina Brown

and Emma L. Tompkins

November 2004

Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research Working Paper 65

 Why do resource managers make
links to stakeholders at other scales?

W. Neil Adger1,3, Katrina Brown1,2

and Emma L. Tompkins3

(1) CSERGE, (2) School of Development Studies, and (3) Tyndall Centre for
Climate Change Research, University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK
Email: n.adger@uea.ac.uk
Tyndall Centre Working Paper No. 65
November 2004

Please note that Tyndall working papers are "work in progress". Whilst they are
commented on by Tyndall researchers, they have not been subject to a full peer
review. The accuracy of this work and the conclusions reached are the
responsibility of the author(s) alone and not the Tyndall Centre.
Summary
This paper investigates the structure of interplay in cross-scale linkages between stakeholders
in resource management. Cross-scale interactions emerge because of the benefits of
individual stakeholder groups in undertaking them. Hence there are uneven gains from cross-
scale interactions. The political economy framework outlined in the paper suggests that
inequality in power-weighted decision-making has consequences for winning and losing
groups within cross-scale interactions. Cross-scale interactions by powerful stakeholders have
the potential to undermine trust in resource management arrangements. If government
regulators, for example, mobilise information and resources from cross-level interactions to
reinforce their authority, this often disempowers other stakeholders such as resource users.
Offsetting such impacts, some cross-scale interactions can be empowering for local level user
groups in creating social and political capital. These issues are illustrated with observations
on a fragile co-management system for resource management in a marine protected area in
Tobago in the Caribbean. The case study illustrates that the structure of the cross-scale
interplay in terms of relative winners and losers, determines its sustainability.

Introduction
This paper addresses the political economy of the evolution of cross scale linkages. We
suggest that cross-scale linkages evolve and are maintained by the organisations and
institutions involved in resource management to further their own agendas. In a rational
choice sense, collective action between directly interested parties does not come about
without perceived gain, given the power relations between stakeholders in any bargain. By the
same logic, cross-scale interactions come about only because it is in the interest of one or
other of the parties to develop and maintain these linkages. Such an explanation does not
explain all social interaction, of course. Nor can self-interest predict the shape of interactions
in every context (see Richerson et al., 2002 on evolutionary theories of commons
management). Yet we argue that it is important to recognise the winners and losers from
cross-scale interactions. The nature of these interactions partly explains the structure of the
interplay and perhaps also gives insight into the role of knowledge and construction of crisis.
These issues have been hypothesised as central to understanding cross-scale linkages in the
overview paper (Cash et al. 2004).

An understanding of cross-scale linkages is important in managing multiple use resources. By

linkages we mean direct interactions through networks to provide information or tangible
resources related to the management system. Of course almost all possible natural resources
systems involve multiple direct users. Even when direct users of resources are small in
number or strictly limited, there are inevitably multiple external stakeholders making claims
and calls on natural resources at numerous scales. Cross-scale institutional linkages are the
norm and even universal in natural resource management (Berkes, 2002).

Part of this trend towards multiple competing claims stems from processes of globalisation. In
a globalised world, environmental services and functions are increasingly seen as public
goods with claims to them at national and global levels. Carbon sequestration functions, the
location of the world’s stock of genetic biological resources, and shared water resources are
all portrayed as public goods with a value to global society (Dietz et al. 2003). Inevitably
then, markets are created to generate incentives for conserving the atmosphere, water, habitats
or species, for the benefit of stakeholders remote from the resources. Direct resource users are
drawn into market exchanges where previously their relationship to resources may have been
based on stewardship, self-interest, or other forms of value.

2
In effect in this paper we question whether integrated and well-linked resource systems,
nested within national and international agendas, regimes, networks and legal systems, are a
priori more successful than those with greater autonomy and less linkages. Success in this
context would be judged by the persistence and resilience of a management system and the
ability to command legitimacy among its major stakeholders. In empirical research in the
second part of this paper we examine the structure of interplay of cross-scale linkages in the
context of a marine protected area in Tobago in the eastern Caribbean. We argue that the
benefits from emerging and dynamic linkages are often uneven, often reinforcing existing
inequalities. But at the same time offsetting linkages facilitate the empowerment of local user
groups.

A political economy of linkages

The structure of interplay
The overview paper to this special issue explores how cross-scale and cross-level dynamics
can take different forms (Cash et al., 2004). From the realm of international agreements,
through to local level governance of institutions, there are particular patterns or syndromes of
interaction. These interactions between stakeholders are widely observed (Berkes, 2002). But
they are also widely promoted as solutions to sustainability of community-based management
(see discussions in Brown, 2003 and Berkes, 2004). They are promoted because shared
responsibility for management of resources creates positive incentives for sustainable use and
overcomes problems of legitimacy from traditional resource management. Such ‘traditional’
top-down resource management is illustrated in Figure 1. In this scenario government
agencies of the state define social and environmental goals for resource management. They
impose a traditional regulatory framework on resource users, often impervious to feedback or
learning from resource users and civil society. Local level linkages for resource management,
illustrated in Figure 1 as the arrows between individual agents in the communities, are
independent of the regulatory framework and indeed often act to circumvent it (Pretty and
Ward, 2001; Pretty, 2004).

3
Figure 1 A representation of traditional resource management interactions between
government and resource users.

The promotion of community-based management through decentralisation is to the fore in

resource management. There are particular areas of resource conservation where participatory
management is, in effect, a new received wisdom. But the devolution of responsibility often
comes without devolution of rights and can consist of the promotion of inappropriate cross-
scale interaction (Brown, 2003; Adams et al., 2003). In the developing world in particular, the
popularity of community-based management may have arisen because of the reduction of the
resources and effectiveness of the state and its inability to mobilise resources to undertake
public services (see Ribot, 2001). Thus the cross-scale interactions occur as a substitute rather
than as a complement to good governance (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).

In the ideal situation, co-management of resources, shared responsibility between institutions

of the state and of local resource users, leads to reduced enforcement costs, the sharing of
knowledge and information on the resource, and systematic learning between all parties. This
situation is portrayed in Figure 2, contrasting with ‘traditional’ resource management depicted
in Figure 1, with the two main protagonists being institutions of the state (top) and the
community (bottom). Under this scenario, the resource users retain their internal linkages and
horizontal linkages to other resource users and markets. But with an approriate structure for
sharing rights and responsibilities for management, there are more direct linkages between
agents of government and resource users and information and learning processes flow
between them (Figure 2). There is no agreed set of contributing factors among the successful

4
examples of co-management (see for reviews Berkes et al. 2001; Brown et al. 2002) on the
patterns of interaction and other factors that explain their persistence and sustainability
sustainable co-management examples. At present Olsson et al. (2004) and Tompkins et al.
(2002) have hypothesised pre-requisites for sustained interaction that include a) enabling
constitutional order and legislation; b) the ability for organisations to monitor and adapt their
co-management experiments; and c) the presence of leaders and agents for change.

Figure 2 Interactions between government and civil society in co-management

arrangements
Source: Adapted from Brown et al. (2002).

But design principles for cross-scale interaction are only part of the story. Berkes (2002) has
set an ambitious agenda for research on cross-scale institutions arguing that virtually all
resource management systems have some external linkages and drivers at different scales. He
argues that a failure to recognise these linkages is a central reason for some unsuccessful
interventions in resource systems and that the persistence of resource degradation may be in
part related to ‘cross-scale institutional pathologies’:
‘it is useful to start with the assumption that a given resource management system is
multi-scale and that it should be managed at different scales simultaneously’ (Berkes,
2002, p. 317).

Interactions are sat different scales are of a different nature. They are contingent on the levels
they are found within institutional interactions. The mechanisms for interaction and exchange
depend on the relationship between actors at the different scales. So that, for example,
jurisdictional scales are inclusive (the higher scale subsumes all elements in lower scale)

5
while others scales are constituitive (villages and cities make up a national population) (see
Gibson et al. 2000).

The emergent properties of the linkages between resource stakeholders at different scales are
then determined by (following Cash et al. 2004): the structure of the vertical and horizontal
interplay between actors; the characteristics of the resource being managed; aspects of agency
such as the emergence of leadership and the translation of knowledge at different levels; and
the social construction of crisis to overcome inertia and trigger change. These hypotheses
have yet to be formally tested. Some of the determinants of cross-scale interaction are better
understood than others. The nature of the resources being managed clearly affects, to some
degree, the institutional design. The size of the resources, the physical pressure on
exploitation, the cost of enforcement and the static or fugitive nature of resources all play a
part in determining the governance structures of collective resources (Dolšak and Ostrom,
2003). We would expect that these same factors are important in the overall shape of the
cross-scale interactions that emerge in parallel with the institutions of governance.

The structure of the interplay between levels is much less clear, and it is in this area that this
paper offers some hypotheses. Cross-scale interactions can take different forms. Young
(2004) classifies the interactions between institutions at different scales (i.e. vertical interplay
– see also Young 2002) as being in the form of dominance, separation, merger, negotiated
outcome, or systemic change of both parties interacting. Figure 3 portrays the type of cross-
scale interaction that is additional to the linkages between state and local community common
to co-management arrangements portrayed in Figure 2. Thus local level resource users often
make common cause with communities in the same situation (horizontal linkages between
resource users and other civil society groups in Figure 3). Equally government agencies
involved in resource management frequently have horizontal linkages to cognate departments
and organisations. Vertical external linkages portrayed in Figure 3 include those by both
communities and agencies to government and regulatory agencies at other levels as well as to
scientific organisations, media and advocacy organisations both within and external to the
locality and jurisdiction of the resources.

6
Figure 3 Cross scale linkages in resource management. Co-management institutions
instigate linkages to other regulators and users. They also promote vertical linkages
to access knowledge, resources and other forms of legitimacy.

Vertical linkages tend to have higher transactions costs: it is costly for local resource users to
co-ordinate and learn from international conservation organisations, for example, both in
terms of direct resources, but also in terms of the scientific language and objectives of
disparate organisation. But there are further costs and risks associated with vertical cross-
scale linkages. The case of rubber tappers in Amazonia provides a salutary lesson. Brown and
Rosendo (2000) outline the strategies of community-based organisations of small scale
rubbers tappers in Rondonia in Brazil. They show that the rubbers tappers successfully
recruited the resources of international organisations, including the World Bank in ‘levelling
the playing field’ with state and federal government agencies. But such international alliances
are potentially fragile and posed, in this case, political risks domestically for the grassroots
organisations in their dealings with government, with their ultimate sustainability (Conklin
and Graham 1995).

Winners, losers and knock-on effects in interplay

The range of potential interactions outlined by Young (including coercive dominance and
systemic change) highlights that the incentives and potentially the benefits from the
interactions are uneven. Dominance of an institution of one at one level clearly leads to
winners and losers. Institutions at all levels, however, from resource users to international
organisations, utilise cross-scale linkages to further their own interests and agendas within

7
their management systems. Where there are material conflicts over the distribution and
allocation of resources cross-scale linkages provide a platform for their resolution. Yet we
argue below that that the change in circumstances brought about by winning and losing in
cross-scale interactions often results in feedback effects that further tilts the playing field of
negotiated rights and outcomes away from the level.

Inevitably the development of cross-scale interactions for institutional benefit and positioning
leads to potential conflict and misconceptions of stakeholders on the objectives of the
linkages. Differences in knowledge, priorities, and pre-conceptions of the ‘right way of doing
things’ are hidden in dialogues between stakeholders at different scales (Adams et al., 2003).
The presence of cross-scale linkages represent evidence that material conflicts may have been
overcome to mutual benefits of the linking parties. Yet cognitive conflicts (Adams et al.,
2003) can still be real. Brown and Corbera (2003), for example, outline the cognitive
dissonance in the creation of markets for carbon credits in land use and forestry. While the
biological carbon sequestration function of forests is universal, its appropriation by
governments and private agents through carbon credits results in conflict and often reinforces
local inequalities.

At the same time there has been much analysis of the role of heterogeneity of benefits and
outcomes on the sustainability of resource use. Much of that literature argues that material
conflicts matter. Asymmetric information or persistent and uncompensated inequalities within
the disbursement of benefits of commonly managed resources, can eventually undermine the
governance structures (for differing views see Arnold, 1998; Baland and Platteau, 1999;
Agrawal, 2001). Hence we argue that in exactly the same way, asymmetries in information
brought about through linkages to outside advocacy groups, scientific networks, funding
sources and other sources of power, can potentially represent barriers to successful co-
management. Horizontal and vertical linkages may simply promote the individual institutions
without promoting the resilience, flexibility or trust of the overall management structure or its
adaptability.

There is one further stage which makes the role of inequality in cross-scale more critical. This
is the impact of the vertical cross-scales linkages on the power relations between different
stakeholders. In short, we hypothesise that if wealth and resources of the stakeholders are
correlated with their power and status at individual and collective levels, then inequality in
itself leads to less co-operative linkages and less desirable outcomes for the linkages that
actually emerge.

This hypothesis is based on the political economy work of Boyce (1994) and draws on the
analysis of Baland and Platteau (1999) and others. Boyce (1994) demonstrates theoretically
that in resource allocation decisions, the unequal power relationships that are inherent in
unequal distributions of wealth lead to undesirable outcomes. If it is, in general, the powerful
who gain most from environmentally damaging activities, then the bargained solution
between these winners and the less-well off losers (sufferers of the impacts of the
environmentally damaging activity) will be skewed towards the benefits of the powerful. This
occurs for a number of reasons including the additional transactions costs of the bargaining on
the less well off group. Power in decision- making is,. Of course, related to more than simply
wealth or resources: it is circumscribed by cultural and other determinants of governance
(Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Scott, 1998). Whatever the source of power, in other words, the
powerful tend to get their way.

8
The impacts of inequality and ‘power-weighted decisions’, however, have knock-on
implications. The more powerful stakeholders in any situation have the incentives to change
the playing field and move the power weighted decisions in their own favour. They can do so
by changing information environment further strengthening the asymmetry in access to
knowledge. The income effects of retrogressive changes in power also mean a change in
effective demand for environmental quality – users are forced to accept undesirable outcomes
in the struggle to meet more immediate needs. This architecture of decision-making is played
out at different scales. The selective enforcement of WTO rules on countries that do have the
power to lobby within the system is a case in point.

The observations by Boyce (1994) on the implications of inequality of power on standard

bargaining and the transactions costs involved are also relevant for cross-scale linkages. This
is the reality of the coercive dominance type of interplay identified by Young (2004). More
powerful stakeholders may engage in cross-scale linkages to further strengthen their position.
This is most striking in the use of linkages to gain access to scientific knowledge and
information and to media and other institutions )see also Lebel, this volume).

The negative implications of cross-scale linkages can, however, be offset by other types of
linkage. Some forms of both vertical and horizontal interaction promote and facilitate so-
called ‘political capital’ (Birner and Wittmer, 2003). Community interactions in co-
management and in vertical interplay with other institutions have been shown in particular
circumstances to side benefits of politicising and empowering the local level institutions.
Hence the vertical interplay, depending on its structure, can change the nature of the bargain
and power relations between stakeholders. Birner and Wittmer (2003) argue that the high
level of political mobilisation of the rural population of Thailand who were involved in
community forestry practices was so significant that it helped to strengthen the nation’s
democratic institutions at crucial periods over the past decades (though see Sneddon (2003)
on the contested definitions of political power in this context). Birner and Wittmer (2003)
show that social capital built through shared resource management can give impetus to
political action through a number of mechanisms. Social interaction in resource management
provide platforms for political participation, foster political ideas, as well as more
fundamental issues of building skills for public debate, and knowledge of political processes.
These potential gains from vertical interplay for the less powerful stakeholder groups are a
counterpoint to the coercive dominance of some forms of linkage. The institutions of co-
management, in effect, exhibit cross-scale linkages that can potentially subvert assumed
power hierarchies from top to bottom in institutional scale.

A case study of gainers and losers from interplay

The foregoing discussion suggests that not all interplay is equal in terms of its influence on
action or in terms of its contribution to sustainable and resilient management of natural
resources. Whether or not cross-scale vertical linkages are in fact sustainable in reality can be
deduced from cases of where such interactions occur. The issues raised are examined in this
case with respect to co-management arrangements of a marine protected area in Tobago in the
eastern Caribbean. The decline of coral reef, water quality and fisheries resources over recent
decades spurred the government of Trinidad and Tobago to initiate a marine protected area,
the Buccoo Reef Marine Park, in the 1990s. Efforts to share responsibility and promote co-
management were also initiated and partially supported through action research in the late
1990s. The research attempted to identify conflicts and trade-offs between users of the Park
and to seek consensus on ways forward in co-management. Both government and local user
groups engaged in outreach activities making linkages to both the research and management
processes and to other institutions at various levels (as portrayed in Figure 3).

9
The research, carried out over four years, involved investigation of the techniques for
identifying trade-offs and building consensus for co-management of the Park (see Brown et
al., 2001, 2002). One of the identified constraints to co-management in the twin-island state
of Trinidad and Tobago is that various levels of government involved in management of
coastal resources are often conflicting in their aims and in their attitudes to co-management
and sharing responsibility. Thus we further investigated pre-requisites for sustainable and
successful co-management at the scales involved in managing the marine park within its
multiple jurisdictions. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 1 (based on Tompkins et
al., 2002).

Table 1 Pre-requisites for successful co-management across scales

Institutional scale Internal spaces of External spaces of

dependence engagement

I Constitutional order Relevant laws and socially- International treaties,

sanctioned norms influence of international
agencies and civil society

II Organisational structures Agency duties, other Cross-departmental duties

regulations and integration in
government; co-option and
advocacy coalitions

III Operational arrangements Resource user organisations Contacts to international

and power relations – local councils, interest and media, advocacy groups and
trade groups information Source:

Adapted from Tompkins et al. (2002).

Three relevant levels are important in the co-management efforts in this case. These are the
constitutional, the organisational and the operational levels (Ostrom, 1990). The constitutional
level reflects the requirement that co-management meets external requirements and has an
enabling legal framework within which action can be taken. Organisational structure
represents the level of agencies, the availability of resources to monitor and implement
change, and the desire of those agencies to share responsibility and power as a set of pre-
requisites for co-management. The operational level includes the local-level institutions of
participation in everyday decision-making.

The immediate networks between actors at the same level are augmented by wider networks
between institutions and organisations at various levels. In the terminology developed by Cox
(1998) and others, the on-site everyday interactions represent spaces of dependence for
stakeholders at each level. External linkages represent their spaces of exchange. Thus the co-
management of specific localised and bounded resources are subject to cross-scale constraints
and influences as outlined in Table 1. While Trinidad and Tobago law outlines the rules
governing National Parks and protected areas within the country, for example, the legal
framework is increasingly steered and constrained by international guidelines and initiatives
on protecting biodiversity and various other international agreements and aid donors. Indeed
in the Trinidad and Tobago case the orthodoxy on participatory consultation on the

10
establishment of new protected areas promoted by mutli-lateral donor agencies can be seen as
a major driver of environmental legislation within the country.

There are a large number of cross-scale linkages within the system of co-management of the
local resource of Buccoo Reef Marine Park. Some of these are summarised in Table 2. Table
2 also demonstrates the level which these linkages cross and attempts to show how the
linkages between the scales do not benefit all stakeholders equally.

Table 2 Differential benefits of cross-scale linkages in Buccoo Reef Park

Linkages Levels crossed* Who benefits?

1. Regulator-community forum to facilitate Organisational (II) Regulators and user

co-management and Operational (III) groups equally

Links to resources for implementing Organisational (II) User groups

participatory process and Operational (III)

Links to regional civil society examples of Horizontal linkages at User groups

practice Operational (III) level

Links to scientific information that: Mainly:

Validates lay knowledge Operational (III) Specific user groups
Attributes causal effects Operational (III) Regulators

Access and influence over external Mainly within the Regulators

regulatory frameworks Constitutional (I)
level

Notes:
* Levels refer to I Constitutional order
II Organizational structure
III Operational arrangements

as outlined in Table 1.

The linkages include regular links to implement the organisations of co-management between
the regulators and the resource users (linkage 1 in Table 2); links from newly empowered user
groups to other best practices in the Caribbean (3) and to the facilitators of the participatory
processes (2); and important links to sources of scientific information that validated lay
knowledge (4) of processes of degradation and renewal within the reef system. The co-
management efforts, although fragile, spurred the formation of local user groups of the Park.
These groups engaged in dialogue with other reef user groups in the Caribbean region (see
Geoghegan et al., 1999 for a review of experience). Although such civil society links
ostensibly represents a horizontal linkage at the operational level (Table 2), these linkages
enabled access to resources and information beyond the direct interaction.

The research project itself, and the trade-off analysis undertaken, represent a major source of
linkage for both civil society groups and government agencies. Access to information became
a key aspect of the power relations between stakeholders. To take an example, the blame for

11
existing degradation of reef flats had for over twenty years been attributed the reef tour
operators who take tourists to the reef. This was the highest profile and most visibly obvious
reef degradation problem. Despite their previous marginalisation, the reef tour operators
group became involved in the co-management process. Previous scientific information
collated as part of the research process showed that the long-term health of the reef was more
dependent on reducing pollution loadings from coastal development, than on changes in
tourism practices that had very localised impacts (see Brown et al., 2001; Kumarsingh, 1998;
Pastorok and Bilyard, 1985; Rajkumar and Persad, 1994; Rawlins et al.,1998; Siung-Chang,
1997). In this case the cross-scale linkage empowered a previously disparate local user of the
resource to engage in the co-management process and altered the blame culture of the
discourse.

Other linkages appeared to have reinforced the unequal relations between regulators and
community groups. The regulatory stakeholders retained a gatekeeper role to higher-level
regulatory change throughout the negotiation and renegotiation of co-management
responsibilities. The fisheries and planning authorities had exclusive knowledge and some
influence over developments in legislation and planning policy that were the remit of Trinidad
and Tobago national policy agencies. The local stakeholders remained effectively outside of
such processes. Hence cross-level linkages by these powerful agents began to undermine trust
in shared management arrangements. The regulator always appeared, in the perceptions of
resource users, to have a ‘trump card’ of access to central government and higher level rule
making bodies.

There are many examples, in the case of Buccoo Reef Marine Park, of cross-scale linkages
between resource users and external agents and between different levels of regulatory
institutions. Table 2 also highlights examples of differential access to scientific information.
Such linkages build the knowledge base and promote the interests of individual stakeholders.
How do these observations tie with our hypothesis in the previous section on the roles of
inequality and asymmetry in cross-scale linkages? It appears that once engaged in a process
of co-management and rapidly evolving institutional structures, opportunities for cross-scale
interactions and alliances abound. Government agencies tend to be have more resources to
engage in such linkages and hence to benefit from them. This asymmetry may indeed skew
the power relations between groups. They also have the potential to undermine trust between
stakeholder groups. But the offsetting trend, that of empowerment of previously disengaged
stakeholder groups is also apparent in this case. Thus the political economy of cross-scale
linkages requires systematic empirical evaluation, recognising the role of power in all its
manifestations within processes of negotiation.

Conclusions
This paper has attempted to throw light on the structure of interplay as a major shaping force
in cross-scale interactions. Clearly the cross-scale nature of resource management systems is
under-researched. Many, if not all systems, are inherently cross-scale – there are
constitutional, organisational and operational determinants of successful co-management. The
example we outline in the paper, of the linkages that helped to shape a co-management
arrangement for marine park management in Tobago, demonstrates that there many of the
types of linkage identified by Young (2004) and Cash et al. (2004) exist simultaneously and
evolve over time.

The theoretical analysis presented in this paper suggests that the structure of interplay in
cross-scale linkages is intertwined with the political economy of those linkages. There are
winners and losers in cross-scale dynamics, though the linkages are by no means a zero-sum

12
game. In addition some linkages emerge that radically alter the playing field while others
reinforce existing inequalities between powerful and less powerful players.

As linkages across scales and levels emerge, it is important, in terms of prescriptive ‘design
principles’, to ensure that empowerment of cross-scale institutions is matched with the
resources that enable aspirations for sustainable management to be fulfilled. The key is to
identify, within a political economy framework, those linkages that promote the obvious
potential for enhanced management and avoid those that have the potential to undermine
trust between stakeholder groups.

Acknowledgements
We thank the UK Department for International Development, the ESRC Programme on
Environmental Decision-making in CSERGE, and the Leverhulme Trust for research support.
We also thank the Resilience Alliance and the Initiative for Science and Technology for
Sustainability for organising the meeting on Scale and Cross-scale Dynamics in Montreal,
October 2003. We thank all the participants for stimulation and comments and David Cash in
particular for insights and encouragement. This version remains our own responsibility.

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Tyndall Working Papers are available online at
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Mitchell, T. and Hulme, M. (2000). A Country-by- Köhler, J.H., (2002). Long run technical change
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Hulme, M. (2002). Adaptation to climate
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Policy and Research, Tyndall Centre Working
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Dutton, G., (2002). Hydrogen Energy
Barker, T. and Ekins, P. (2001). How High are
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the Costs of Kyoto for the US Economy?,
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technical systems: implications for hydrogen,
Barnett, J. (2001). The issue of 'Adverse Effects
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and the Impacts of Response Measures' in the
UNFCCC, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 5. Pridmore, A. and Bristow, A., (2002). The role of
hydrogen in powering road transport, Tyndall
Goodess, C.M., Hulme, M. and Osborn, T. (2001).
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The identification and evaluation of suitable
scenario development methods for the Turnpenny, J. (2002). Reviewing organisational
estimation of future probabilities of extreme use of scenarios: Case study - evaluating UK
weather events, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 6. energy policy options, Tyndall Centre Working
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Barnett, J. (2001). Security and Climate
Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 7. Watson, W. J. (2002). Renewables and CHP
Deployment in the UK to 2020, Tyndall Centre
Adger, W. N. (2001). Social Capital and Climate
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Watson, W.J., Hertin, J., Randall, T., Gough, C.
Barnett, J. and Adger, W. N. (2001). Climate
(2002). Renewable Energy and Combined Heat
Dangers and Atoll Countries, Tyndall Centre
and Power Resources in the UK, Tyndall Centre
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Gough, C., Taylor, I. and Shackley, S. (2001).
Paavola, J. and Adger, W.N. (2002). Justice and
Burying Carbon under the Sea: An Initial
adaptation to climate change, Tyndall Centre
Exploration of Public Opinions, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 23.
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Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2002).
Barker, T. (2001). Representing the Integrated
Impact of Integrating Renewables and CHP
Assessment of Climate Change, Adaptation
into the UK Transmission Network, Tyndall
and Mitigation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 11.
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Dessai, S., (2001). The climate regime from
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Dewick, P., Green K., Miozzo, M., (2002).
Brooks, N. and Adger W.N. (2003). Country level
Technological Change, Industry Structure and
risk measures of climate-related natural
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Shackley, S. and Gough, C., (2002). The Use of
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Turnpenny, J. and Warren, R. (2003). Defining
and experiencing dangerous climate change,
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Brown, K. and Corbera, E. (2003). A Multi-
Criteria Assessment Framework for Carbon-
Mitigation Projects: Putting “development” in
the centre of decision-making, Tyndall Centre
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Hulme, M. (2003). Abrupt climate change: can
society cope?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 30
Turnpenny, J., Haxeltine A. and O’Riordan, T.
(2003). A scoping study of UK user needs for
managing climate futures. Part 1 of the pilot-
phase interactive integrated assessment
process (Aurion Project), Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 31
Xueguang Wu, Jenkins, N. and Strbac, G. (2003).
Integrating Renewables and CHP into the UK
Electricity System: Investigation of the impact
of network faults on the stability of large
offshore wind farms, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 32
Pridmore, A., Bristow, A.L., May, A. D. and Tight,
M.R. (2003). Climate Change, Impacts, Future
Scenarios and the Role of Transport, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 33
Dessai, S., Hulme, M (2003). Does climate policy
need probabilities?, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
34
Tompkins, E. L. and Hurlston, L. (2003). Report to
the Cayman Islands’ Government. Adaptation
lessons learned from responding to tropical
cyclones by the Cayman Islands’ Government,
1988 – 2002, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 35
Kröger, K. Fergusson, M. and Skinner, I. (2003).
Critical Issues in Decarbonising Transport: The
Role of Technologies, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 36
Ingham, A. and Ulph, A. (2003) Uncertainty,
Irreversibility, Precaution and the Social Cost
of Carbon, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 37
Brooks, N. (2003). Vulnerability, risk and
adaptation: a conceptual framework, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 38
Tompkins, E.L. and Adger, W.N. (2003).
Defining response capacity to enhance climate
change policy, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 39
Klein, R.J.T., Lisa Schipper, E. and Dessai, S.
(2003), Integrating mitigation and adaptation
into climate and development policy: three
research questions, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
40
Watson, J. (2003), UK Electricity Scenarios for
2050, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 41
Kim, J. A. (2003), Sustainable Development and
the CDM: A South African Case Study, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 42
Anderson, D. and Winne, S. (2003),
Innovation and Threshold Effects in
Technology Responses to Climate Change,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 43
Shackley, S., McLachlan, C. and Gough, C. (2004)
The Public Perceptions of Carbon Capture and
Storage, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 44
Purdy, R. and Macrory, R. (2004) Geological
carbon sequestration: critical legal issues,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 45
Watson, J., Tetteh, A., Dutton, G., Bristow, A.,
Kelly, C., Page, M. and Pridmore, A., (2004) UK
Hydrogen Futures to 2050, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 46
Berkhout, F., Hertin, J. and Gann, D. M., (2004)
Learning to adapt: Organisational adaptation
to climate change impacts, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 47
Pan, H. (2004) The evolution of economic
structure under technological development,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 48
Awerbuch, S. (2004) Restructuring our
electricity networks to promote
decarbonisation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 49
Powell, J.C., Peters, M.D., Ruddell, A. & Halliday, J.
(2004) Fuel Cells for a Sustainable Future?
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 50
Agnolucci, P., Barker, T. & Ekins, P. (2004)
Hysteresis and energy demand: the
Announcement Effects and the effects of the
UK climate change levy, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 51
Agnolucci, P. (2004) Ex post evaluations of CO2
–Based Taxes: A Survey, Tyndall Centre Working
Paper 52
Agnolucci, P. & Ekins, P. (2004) The Adger, W. N., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E. L.
Announcement Effect and environmental (2004) The political economy of cross-
taxation, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 53 scale networks in resource co-
management, Tyndall Centre Working Paper
Turnpenny, J., Carney, S., Haxeltine, A., &
65
O’Riordan, T. (2004) Developing regional and
local scenarios for climate change mitigation
and adaptation, Part 1: A framing of the East
of England, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 54

Mitchell, T.D. Carter, T.R., Jones, .P.D, Hulme, M.

and New, M. (2004) A comprehensive set of
high-resolution grids of monthly climate for
Europe and the globe: the observed record
(1901-2000) and 16 scenarios (2001-2100),
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 55

Vincent, K. (2004) Creating an index of social

vulnerability to climate change for Africa,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 56

Shackley, S., Reiche, A. and Mander, S (2004) The

Public Perceptions of Underground Coal
Gasification (UCG): A Pilot Study, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 57

Bray, D and Shackley, S. (2004) The Social

Simulation of The Public Perceptions of
Weather Events and their Effect upon the
Development of Belief in Anthropogenic
Climate Change, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 58

Anderson, D and Winne, S. (2004) Modelling

Innovation and Threshold Effects
In Climate Change Mitigation, Tyndall Centre
Working Paper 59

Few, R., Brown, K. and Tompkins, E.L. (2004)

Scaling adaptation: climate change response
and coastal management in the UK, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 60

Brooks, N. (2004) Drought in the African Sahel:

Long term perspectives and future prospects,
Tyndall Centre Working Paper 61

Barker, T. (2004) The transition to

sustainability: a comparison of economics
approaches, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 62

Few, R., Ahern, M., Matthies, F. and Kovats, S.

(2004) Floods, health and climate change: a
strategic review, Tyndall Centre Working Paper 63

Peters, M.D. and Powell, J.C. (2004) Fuel

Cells for a Sustainable Future II, Tyndall
Centre Working Paper 64