G.R. No.

188002 February 1, 2010

GOODRICH MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs.
EMERLINA ATIVO
Facts:

Respondents are former employees of petitioner Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation assigned as

machine or maintenance operators for the different sections of the company. Because of lingering
financial constraints, Goodrich gave all its employees the option to voluntarily resign from the company.
Several employees, including respondents, decided to avail of the voluntary resignation option, were
paid their separation pay, and executed their respective waivers and quitclaims.
The following day, respondents, filed complaints against Goodrich for illegal dismissal with prayer for
payment of their full monetary benefits before the NLRC. Despite several conferences, no amicable
settlement was reached by the parties.
Labor arbiter decided that there was no illegal dismissal but held that petitioners were still liable to the
respondents for their unpaid emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA), 13th month pay, service
incentive leave (SIL), and found the separation pay paid by Goodrich to be insufficient. Both parties
appealed to the NLRC which decided in favor of Goodrich. Appealed to Court of Appeals also resulted
defer of labor arbiters decision. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the release, waiver and quitclaim signed by respondents are valid and binding.

Held:

Yes, the release, waiver and quitclaim signed by respondents are valid and binding.
It is true that the law looks with disfavor on quitclaims and releases by employees who have been
inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal
responsibilities and frustrate just claims of employees. In certain cases, however, the Court has given
effect to quitclaims executed by employees if the employer is able to prove the following requisites, to
wit: (1) the employee executes a deed of quitclaim voluntarily; (2) there is no fraud or deceit on the part
of any of the parties; (3) the consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (4) the
contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily
entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its
face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the
person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid
and binding undertaking.
In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled that respondents executed the quitclaims
absent any coercion from the petitioners following their voluntary resignation from the company.

Serrano vs. Gallant

Antonio Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment which stated that he would be taking on the
position of Chief Officer with a salary of $1,400per month. However, on the date of his
departure, or on 19 March 1998, he had to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer with a salary o f$1,000 with the assurance by Gallant and Marlow that
he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

When Serrano was not promoted as promised, he refused to stay on as a Second Officer and
was repatriated to the Philippines on 26 May 1998. The unexpired term on his contract was 9
months and 23 days. Serrano then filed a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter against Gallant and
Marlow for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims for the total amount of
$26,442.73—covering his salary for the entire unexpired term of his contract.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Serrano, declaring his dismissal as illegal and awarding him
monetary benefits to the tune of $8,770—representing his salary for three months of the
unexpired portion of his contract. The LA applied Section 10 of RA 8042.
Upon appeal to the NLRC, th edamages awarded by the LA were lowered because RA 8042 does
not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually
performed, and for vacation leave pay

W/N the clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less”
found in Section 10 of RA 8042 is constitutionally valid.

Held:

The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that
precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also his
right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. The subject
clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period
of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to the law and jurisprudence
to the enactment of RA No. 8042.

EX-BATAAN VETERANS SECURITY AGENCY, INC., VS.THE SECRETARY

OF LABOR BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
Facts:
Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. (EBVSAI) is in the business ofproviding security
services while private respondents are EBVSAI’s employeesassigned to the National Power
Corporation at Ambuklao Hydro Electric Plant, Bokod,Benguet (Ambuklao Plant). Private
respondents instituted a complaint for underpaymentof wages against EBVSAI before the
Regional Office of the Department of Labor andEmployment (DOLE). EX-BATAAN VETERANS
SECURITY AGENCY is ORDERED topay the computed deficiencies owing to the affected
employees.
EBVSAI filed a motion for reconsideration and alleged that the Regional Directordoes not
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the money claimof each private
respondent exceeded P5,000.EBVSAI pointed out that the RegionalDirector should have
endorsed the case to the Labor Arbiter

Issue:
1. Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives
acquired jurisdiction over EBVSAI; and
2. Whether the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives have
jurisdiction over the moneyclaims of private respondents which exceed P5,000.
Held:
EBVSAI claims that the Regional Director did not acquire jurisdiction over
EBVSAI because he failed to comply with Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

 In this case, EBVSAI does not deny having received the notices ofhearing.In
fact, on 29 March and 13 June 1996, Danilo Burgos and Edwina Manao,detachment commander
and bookkeeper of EBVSAI, respectively, appeared before theRegional Director.They claimed
that the 22 March 1996 notice of hearing was receivedlate and manifested that the notices
should be sent to the Manila office.Thereafter, thenotices of hearing were sent to the Manila
office.They were also informed of EBVSAI’sviolations and were asked to present the employment
records of the privaterespondents for verification.They were, moreover, asked to submit, within
10 days,proof of compliance or their position paper. The Regional Director validly
acquiredjurisdiction over EBVSAI.
EBVSAI can no longer question the jurisdiction of theRegional
Director after receiving the notices of hearing and after appearing before theRegional Director.
EBVSAI maintains that under Articles 129 and 217(6) of the LaborCode, the Labor Arbiter, not
the Regional Director, has exclusive and original jurisdictionover the case because the individual
monetary claim of private respondents exceedsP5,000.EBVSAI also argues that the case falls
under the exception clause in Article128(b) of the Labor Code.EBVSAI asserts that the Regional
Director should havecertified the case to the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission(NLRC) for a full-blown hearing on the merits
  In this case, the Regional Director validly assumed jurisdiction over themoney
claims of private respondents even if the claims exceeded P5,000 because suchjurisdiction was
exercised in accordance with Article 128(b) of the Labor Code and thecase does not fall under
the exception clause.In Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. v.Sec. of Labor, we ruled that while it is
true that under Articles 129 and 217 of the LaborCode, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases where the aggregatemoney claims of each employee exceeds P5,000.00, said
provisions of law do notcontemplate nor cover the visitorial and enforcement powers of the
Secretary of Laboror his duly authorized representative. Rather, said powers are defined and set
forth inArticle 128 of the Labor Code (as amended by R.A. No. 7730).
This was further affirmed in our ruling in Cirineo Bowling Plaza, Inc. v. Sensing, wherewe
sustained the jurisdiction of the DOLE Regional Director and held that “the visitorialand
enforcement powers of the DOLE Regional Director to order and enforcecompliance with labor
standard laws can be exercised even where the individual claimexceeds P5,000.” However, if the
labor standards case is covered by the exceptionclause in Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, then
the Regional Director will have toendorse the case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC

Golden Ace Builders and Arnold Azul vs. Jose A. Talde

G.R. No. 187200; 5 May 2010
Facts: In 1990, Golden Ace Builders hired Jose A. Talde (Talde) as a carpenter. In February
1999, the owner-manager, Arnold Azul, stopped giving Talde work assignment due allegedly to
the unavailability of construction projects. Consequently, Talde filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in Talde’s favor and ordered his immediate reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights, with payment of full backwages as well as premium pay for rest days, service
incentive leave pay and 13th month pay. The company brought the case to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) for review. Pending such appeal, the company advised Talde to
report for work within 10 days from notice. Talde, however, manifested to the Labor Arbiter
that due to actual animosity between him and the company and threats to his life and his
family’s
safety, he opted for payment of separation pay. The company denied there was such an
animosity. The NLRC later dismissed the company’s appeal. The company’s appeal to the
Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed. The Court of Appeals’ decision attained finality.
The monetary award, as recomputed by the NLRC’s Fiscal Examiner, was approved by the
Labor Arbiter who thereupon issued the writ of execution. The company questioned the
recomputation
before the NLRC, arguing that since Talde refused to report back to work as the
company advised, he should be deemed to have abandoned the same, thus, the re-computation
should not be beyond 15 May 2001, the day he manifested his refusal to be reinstated.
The NLRC vacated the re-computation, holding that since Talde did not appeal the Labor
Arbiter’s decision granting him only reinstatement and backwages, not separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, he may not be afforded affirmative relief, and since he refused to go back to
work,
he may recover backwages only up to 20 May 2001, the day he was supposed to return to the
job
site. When Talde’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC, he filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC findings and held that Talde was entitled to both
backwages and separation pay, even if separation pay was not granted by the Labor Arbiter, in
view of the strained relations between the parties. Consequently, the company filed a petition
for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: (1) Whether or not Talde was entitled to separation pay in lieu of actual reinstatement on
account of strained relations between him and the company; and (2) Up to what date should
Talde’s backwages be computed?
Held: An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement.
The two reliefs are separate and distinct. When reinstatement is no longer feasible because of
strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of
separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages. In effect, an illegally dismissed
employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no
longer viable, and backwages. (Citing Macasero vs. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, G.R.
No. 178524; 30 January 2009)
Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of separation pay is considered an
acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable.
On
one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work
environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable
obligation
of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.
Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact and must be supported by substantial
evidence
showing that the relationship between the employer and the employee is indeed strained as a
necessary consequence of the judicial controversy. In this case, the Labor Arbiter found that
actual animosity existed between the owner-manager Azul and Talde as a result of the filing of
the illegal dismissal case. Such finding, especially when affirmed by the appellate court as in the
case at bar, is binding upon the Supreme Court, consistent with the prevailing rules that the
Supreme Court will not try facts anew and that findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies are
accorded great respect, even finality.
Thus, Talde was entitled to backwages and separation pay as his reinstatement had been
rendered impossible due to strained relations. His backwages must be computed from the time
he was unjustly dismissed until his actual reinstatement, or from February 1999 until 30 June
2005 when his reinstatement was rendered impossible without fault on his part.
The Court of Appeals erroneously computed his separation pay from 1990 (when he was hired)
to 1999 (when he was unjustly dismissed), covering a period of 8 years. He must be considered
to have been in the service of the company not only until 1999, but until 30 June 2005, the day
he is deemed to have been actually separated (his reinstatement having been rendered
impossible) from the company, or for a total of 15 years.

Mariwasa Siam Ceramics vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, et. al.
G.R. No. 183317      December 21, 2009

Facts:

On May 2005, private respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics,
Inc. (SMMSC-Independent) was issued a Certificate of Registration as a legitimate labor
organization by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region IV-A.On June 2005,
petitioner Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration
against private respondent, claiming that the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for
not complying with the 20% requirement and that it committed massive fraud and
misrepresentation in violation of Article 239 of the same code. 

The Regional Director of DOLE IV-A issued an Order granting the petition, revoking the
registration of respondent, and delisting it from the roster of active labor unions. SMMSC-
Independent appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR ruled in favor of the respondent,
thus, they remain in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. The petitioner appealed and
insisted that private respondent failed to comply with the 20% union membership requirement
for its registration as a legitimate labor organization because of the disaffiliation from the total
number of union members of 102 employees who executed affidavits recanting their union
membership. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issues:

1)    Was there failure to comply with the 20% union membership requirement?

2)     Did the withdrawal of 31 union members affect the petition for certification election insofar
as the 30% requirement is concerned?

Ruling:
No.While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from the
union, the fact remains that at the time of the union’s application for registration, the affiants
were members of respondent and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for
purposes of registration as a labor union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20%
minimum membership during the application for union registration. It does not mandate that a
union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all throughout its existence.
On the second issue, it appears undisputedly that the 31 union members had withdrawn their
support to the petition before the filing of said petition. The distinction must be that
withdrawals made before the filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is
convincing proof to the contrary, whereas withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are
deemed involuntary. Therefore, following jurisprudence, the employees were not totally free
from the employer’s pressure and so the voluntariness of the employees’ execution of the
affidavits becomes suspect. 

The cancellation of a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of
labor to self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of
union registration under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be
grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.

Golden Ace Builders vs. NLRC

Facts:

Respondent Jose Talde was hired in 1990 as a carpenter by petitioner Golden Ace
Builders. In February 1999, due to unavailability of construction projects, petitioner stopped
giving work assignments to respondent, prompting the latter to file a complaint for illegal
dismissal. LA ruled in favor of respondent and ordered his immediate reinstatement with full
backwages. Pending appeal of the petitioner to the NLRC respondent was advised to report for
work but he claimed that there is already an animosity between him and petitioner, hence, he
opted for the payment of separation pay.

NLRC also ruled in favor of the respondent. Finding the amount granted to the
respondent as exorbitant, petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration contending that
computation of wages and benefits should start from the time respondent refused to be
reinstated. NLRC granted the motion but upon appeal of respondent, the CA set aside the
decision of the NLRC holding that respondent is entitled to both backwages and separation pay
as ruled by the LA.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA ruled correctly following the principle of doctrine of strained
relations.

Ruling:

Under the doctrine of strained relation the payment of separation pay is considered an
acceptable alternative to reinstatement when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable.
On one hand, such payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive work
environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the grossly unpalatable
obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could no longer trust.

Clearly then respondent is entitled to back wages and separation pay as his
reinstatement has been rendered impossible due to strained relations. As correctly held by the
Appellate Court the back wages due respondent must be computed from the time he was
unjustly dismissed until his actual reinstatement or from February 1999 until June 30, 2005
when his reinstatement is rendered impossible without fault on his part.

Philippine Veterans v NLRC

G.R. No188882 : March 30, 2010

Facts: Respondent Benigno Martinez was the manager of Philippine Veterans Bank Dumaguete Branch
when his supposed resignation from the bank became effective. Such resignation stemmed from a
report published by the Philippine Daily Inquirer regarding the anomalies hounding the petitioner's high-
ranking officials. Respondent was then transferred from Dumaguete to Makati City, petitioner citing the
reason of branch head training for his (respondent) gross inefficiency. No such training ever took place;
he was instead made to do clerical jobs. Hence, respondent tendered his resignation.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent's severance from employment was voluntary or was he
constructively dismissed.

Held: The respondent was constructively dismissed.

Ratio: In constructive dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that its conduct and
action or the transfer of an employee are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business
necessity. Particularly, for a transfer not to be considered a constructive dismissal, the employer must
be able to show that such transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee.
In the present case, the petitioner failed to discharge this burden. It failed to show any urgency or
genuine business necessity to transfer the respondent to the Makati Head Office. The respondent's
transfer from Dumaguete to Makati City is clearly unreasonable, inconvenient and oppressive, since the
respondent and his family are residents of Dumaguete City. The petitioner failed to present any valid
reason why it had to require the respondent to go to Makati Head Office to undergo branch head
training when it could have just easily required the latter to undertake the same training in the VISMIN
area. There was nothing in the order of transfer as to what position the respondent would occupy after
his training; the respondent was effectively placed in a "floating" status.
The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have
felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances.

G.R. No. 152234 April 15, 2010

DIVERSIFIED SECURITY, INC. vs. ALICIA V. BAUTISTA

Facts:

Alicia Bautista was employed by petitioner as an Executive Pool Secretary, but petitioner alleged that
respondent turned out to be incompetent. Petitioner then assigned her to perform menial jobs and was
transferred to their branch office in Makati. Respondent, however, allegedly failed to report for work at
said branch office on the day she was supposed to do so.

Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that petitioner dismissed her without any valid reason, neither
was she given any notice and hearing. Respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal but petitioner
countered that respondent was not dismissed; rather, she was the one who severed her connection
with petitioner by her “voluntary and unequivocal acts.”

The LA, NLRC, and CA all ruled in favor of respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed.

Held:

The law clearly spells out the manner with which an unjustified refusal to return to work by an employee
may be established. Thusly, respondent should have given complainant a notice with warning
concerning her alleged absences (Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V, Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Labor Code). The notice requirement actually consists of two parts to be separately served on the
employee to wit: (1) notice to apprise the employee of his absences with a warning concerning a
possible severance of employment in the event of an unjustified excuse therefor, and (2) subsequent
notice of the decision to dismiss in the event of an employee's refusal to pay heed to such warning. Only
after compliance had been effected with those requirements can it be reasonably concluded that the
employee had actually abandoned his job. In respondent's case, it is noted that more than two (2)
months had already lapsed since complainant allegedly started to absent herself when the latter
instituted her action for illegal dismissal. During the said period of time, no action was taken by the
respondents regarding complainant's alleged absences, something which is quite peculiar had
complainant's employment not been severed at all. Accordingly, we do not find respondents defense of
abandonment to be impressed with merit in view of an utter lack of evidence to support the same.
Hence, complainant's charge of illegal dismissal stands uncontroverted