Review: Tradition and Change on the North-West Frontier

Author(s): R. O. Christensen
Reviewed work(s):
Millenium and Charisma among Pathans: A Critical Essay in Social Anthropology by Akbar
S. Ahmed
Pukhtun Economy and Society: Traditional Structure and Economic Development in a
Tribal Society by Akbar S. Ahmed
Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1982), pp. 159-166
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/312278
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ModernAsian Studies, I6, I (1982), pp. 159-I76. Printed in Great Britain.

Reviews
Traditionand Changeon the
North-WestFrontier
Millenium and Charismaamong Pathans: A Critical Essay in Social Anthropology.By
AKBAR S. AHMED. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, Boston and
Henley, 1976. Pp. xvii, 173- ?4-50. (Paperback edition, I980. ?3.95.)
Pukhtun Economyand Society: Traditional Structureand EconomicDevelopmentin a
Tribal Society.By AKBAR S. AHMED. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London,
Boston and Henley, i980. Pp. xvi, 406.
?15.
Although the Pakhtuns' of the North-West Frontier constitute the largest tribal
grouping in the world, and historically have occupied a position of high
strategic importance, they have, nevertheless, received relatively little aca-
demic attention. Even today, the images generated by a century of frontier
conflict during the British period persist, and the tribes continue to be noted
above all for their raiding and feuding propensities. But the traditional
perception of Pakhtun society as warlike and anarchic is essentially that of
outsiders, in particular those concerned with the intractable problem of 'tribal
management'. Perhaps not surprisingly, in view of their record of successful
resistance to encroachments on their autonomy, the tribes have been seen in the
historiography of the frontier chiefly in terms of their relations with centralized
state systems, Mughal, Sikh and British. Knowledge of the social, economic and
political organization of the Pakhtuns remains very incomplete.2
In the two books under review, Dr Ahmed has done much to make good the
gaps in our knowledge and understanding of the tribal society of the
North-West Frontier. As a Pakhtun by descent, as a frontier administrator, and
as an academic anthropologist, Dr Ahmed is perhaps uniquely qualified for the
task. He has been able to collect much material that would be inaccessible to
other scholars, has provided some important theoretical insights, and has also
overturned many received notions about the Pakhtuns. His work represents,
indeed, a very substantial contribution to the study of frontier society, both in
its opening up of new ground, and in its critical appraisal of earlier analyses of
Pakhtun social organization.
The first of Ahmed's books, Millenium and Charisma among Pathans, is
concerned mainly with theoretical issues raised by Fredrik Barth's classic work
on ths structure of political relations among the Swat Yusufzai.3 Using an

1 The Pakhtu/Pashtu-speaking tribes have usually been referred to by English-lan-

guage writers as 'Pathans', an Urdu/Hindi corruption of Pakhtun which is regarded as
demeaning by the tribesmen themselves.
2 The two standard historicalworks on the North-West Frontier are: Olaf Caroe, The
Pathans(London, I958); James W. Spain, The PathanBorderland(The Hague, I963).
Neither deals with Pakhtun society in more than a very cursory manner.
3 Fredrik Barth, PoliticalLeadership
amongSwatPathans(London,
1959).
'59
I6o REVIEWS

individualist framework of analysis, Barth constructed an equilibrium model of

great elegance and persuasive power to show how Khans ('chiefs') and religious
leaders ('saints') acquired a following through dyadic, contractual relation-
ships. The fundamental assumption of this model, that all individuals had
freedom of choice in entering into such relationships, and that therefore there
was no systematic structure of dominance by any one group, was open to
question, however. It has been pointed out by Asad, for example, that Barth's
data could be used to support a very different interpretation of the political
structure in Swat.4 Swat society is marked by a clear system of stratification: at
the highest level are the Khans, owning and controlling most of the land; below
them are the small-holding Pakhtuns, having in many respects a client status
vis-a-vis the Khans; and finally there are the landless non-Pakhtuns, engaged in
service occupations. The concentration of political power in the hands of the
Khans, and the latent conflict existing between them and subordinate groups,
suggested that Barth's characterization of the structure of political relations as
one of equilibrium based on free individual choice was misleading. In short,
horizontal class divisions could be seen as more important than vertical
divisions between factional blocs formed by the Khans and their followers.
This stricture concerning the stratified nature of Swat society is one of the
basic themes of Millenium and Charisma, but Ahmed has extended the critique
much further. First, the Barthian model is ahistorical, and fails to take into
account changes in the structure of political power over time, and especially
since the foundation of a centralized state in the valley during the period
1917-26. Before the emergence of Swat State (a process given discreet
encouragement by the British, anxious to ensure stability on a sensitive part of
the frontier) power was dispersed among the 'islands of authority' represented
by the Khans. But with the centralization of power under Miangul Abdul
Wadud, who was given the title of Wali of Swat by the British, the political
structure was radically altered, and the Khans' autonomy greatly reduced. The
Wali appropriated the most important sources of patronage, restricted the
holding of arms to those whose loyalty could be depended on, and, by
abolishing the practice of vesh, the periodical redistribution of land, removed
one of the most important of the Khans' traditional symbols of power.5 From
1926, therefore, the Khans ceased to command the resources which had
previously enabled them to build up a substantial political following, and
instead became landlords whose authority was largely supplanted by that of the
state. This extensive shift in the balance of power is, however, ignored in Barth's
analysis, which treats the structure of political relations in a static manner and
with little reference to the development of Swat State.
Ahmed argues, further, that Barth has misunderstood the status and function
of religious leaders. Mullahs, Mians and others recognized as having holy status
do not, either in Swat or in other Pakhtun societies, provide an alternative role
of leadership to the Khans. For the most part their role is routine, and confined
mainly to prayer-leading, the interpretation of Koranic law, and officiation at
4 Talal Asad, 'Market Model, Class Structure and Consent: A Reconsideration of
Swat Political Organization', Man, N.S. 7 (1972).
5 The best account of the emergence of Swat State is to be found in Maj. W. R. Hay,
Monograph on SwatState(confidential) (Simla, 1933).
 REVIEWS 161

rites de passage. Only in exceptional circumstances, such as the uprisings which

occurred along the frontier in 1897-98, do religious leaders emerge at the head
of movements which provide them with an opportunity to utilize Islamic
symbols and concepts, often in opposition to the Khans. But the authority
acquired on such occasions by holy men is short-lived; they lack the resources
which would allow them to sustain their position of leadership over time. There
is, nevertheless, the apparent anomaly that in Swat the authority of the Wali
derived largely from the religious prestige conferred on him as the descendant of
the Akhund, celebrated in Edward Lear's irreverent couplet:
Who or why, or which or what
is the Akond of Swat?
In one of the most original chapters of Millenium and Charisma,Ahmed proposes
that the emergence of a stable political leadership legitimized by religious
charisma6 can be explained only by looking outside the orthodox traditions of
Islam, at the mystical Sufic tradition to which the Akhund belonged. The
expansion of the British colonial presence in the nineteenth century brought
about a crisis in Islam, particularly in its formal, orthodox and urban-based
aspects, and this in turn gave impetus to a heterodox revivalism which won a
widespread following among the rural population. Thus the Akhund acquired
the prestige which subsequently devolved to the Wali in the context of an
informal religious movement which arose in historically specific circumstances;
and the type of leadership which he represented was very different from that of
the more orthodox 'saints' described by Barth.7
There is another, broader issue taken up by Ahmed, one which reflects, in
part, the considerable influence that Barth's model has enjoyed. For the Swat
paradigm has been widely employed with reference to Pakhtun society in
general, without recognition of the fact that the social and political organiza-
tion to be found in Swat is in many important respects highly atypical of that
elsewhere on the frontier. Ahmed argues that the problem arises because
Barth's analysis is both reductionist and synechdochic, in identifying the Swat
Yusafzai with the whole of Pakhtun society, and in taking the Yusufzai Khans to
represent the whole of Swat society. There is much substance to these charges,
though, in fairness to Barth, he makes no claim that his model is applicable to
other Pakhtun societies; yet neither does he acknowledge that Swat is an
anomalous case, which falls outside the general tribal pattern. Indeed, Swat,
with its intensive irrigated agriculture, stratified society and centralized polity,
has little in common with most tribal areas, with their transhumant pastoralism
and acephalous, egalitarian socio-political structure. Nevertheless, even if
Barth is not himself guilty of synechdoche, others, who have used his analysis

6 Ahmed overstateshis case, however, when he argues that the Wali was 'as near the
definition of the Weberian charismatic leader as possible' (pp. 13-14; also p. I 15). The
difficulty arises because Ahmed does not distinguish between the Weberian concept of
charismatic leadership, and the concept of religious charisma which Weber borrowed
and modified for his own purpose.
7 As Ahmed points out (pp. 50ff), Barth's use of the term 'saint' is very loose and
misleading. Though 'saint' does not have the same meaning in Islam as in Christianity,
nevertheless only those recognized as exceptionally devout are accorded the title.
162 REVIEWS
and data for purposes of comparison or synthesis, have certainly assumed
uncritically that his Swat model may be taken as the basis for generalization
about frontier society as a whole.
What Ahmed has demonstrated, forcefully and effectively, is that Barth's
equilibrium model describes the social and political organization of Swat State
only very partially; or, rather, that it is an ideal construct which fits the data
only if they are considered in an ahistorical way, and if several important
factors-the stratification of Swat society, the development of a centralized
state, the distinction between orthodox and heterodox religious traditions-are
left out of the account. But while Millenium and Charismais a penetrating essay in
criticism which also provides much material on the process of historical change
in Swat, it goes only part-way towards proposing an alternative to the Barthian
paradigm. And for this reason, however much of its explanatory power has been
lost, Barth's analysis is likely to continue to stand as a classic ethnographic
study.
If Millenium and Charismais largely critical in approach, Ahmed's more recent
book, Pukhtun Economyand Society, is in many respects complementary, being
concerned not so much with theoretical issues, as with providing a detailed
empirical analysis of tribal social organization. It also focuses on an area very
different from Swat, in that the Mohmand lineages who form its subject of study
still conform closely to traditional Pakhtun ideals regarding social and political
behaviour. The contrast between the Swat Yusafzai and the Mohmand is
brought out in the useful ideal-type classification of Pakhtun societies, as
belonging either to the nang (= honour) or to the qalang (= rent or tax) type,
which Ahmed proposes. Conventionally, the frontier tribes have been seen as
divided between those of the hills and those of the plains, or, a broadly identical
classification, between those of the unadministered Tribal Areas and those of
the Settled Districts. While these distinctions based on ecological or administra-
tive boundaries have much validity, however, the nang/qalangtypology provides
a more complete understanding of the main polarities to be found in Pakhtun
society. Put simply, the nang tribes may be characterized as those inhabiting the
hills, not subject to a centralized state system, engaged mainly in pastoral
activities, maintaining an acephalous and egalitarian socio-political structure,
and upholding the traditional values embodies in the Pakhtunwali (the Pakhtun
Code of Honour); the qalang tribes, on the other hand, may be characterized as
those inhabiting relatively densely populated plains or valleys, encapsulated
within a centralized state system and therefore paying taxes, having a
hierarchical socio-political structure, and whose ability to uphold traditional
Pakhtun values has been compromised. While the Swat Yusafzai fall within the
qalang category, the Mohmand, in common with most of the important frontier
tribes, belong to the nang category.
The Mohmand are one of the most isolated of the frontier tribes, and
historically have been very successful in resisting encroachments on their
territory. Their relations with the British were punctuated by several major
conflicts, and among their achievements were to prevent demarcation of the
Durand Line through their limits, and similarly to prevent road-building, the
key symbol of imperial penetration on the frontier. When Pakistan took over
administrative responsibility for the region, there was an apparently major shift
 REVIEWS
i63
in policy, with the withdrawal of military forces from tribal areas, and, in 195
i,
the creation of the Mohmand Agency, which gave the tribe more explicit
recognition of their independent status than they had previously enjoyed." For
two decades the Mohmand were in effect left to themselves; then, in the early
I97os, the government embarked on a policy of economic, as opposed to
military, penetration. In recent years roads, schools, hospitals and electricity
supply-lines have all been constructed in the Agency; developmental schemes
are thus breaching the tribal 'purdah' where the coercive measures of half a
century ago failed.
PukhtunEconomyand Societyis primarily an anthropological study of certain
Mohmand lineages during the period of economic change of the mid-I 97os,
based on field-work carried out in part while the author was Mohmand
Political Agent, and thus a central figure in the process of development which
he describes. It is one of the strengths of the book, however, that it is not merely
a cross-sectional analysis of the tribe at a given moment in time, the
'ethnographic present'; as Ahmed insists, a synchronic analysis is inadequate
for understanding the dynamics of tribal society. What he has set out to do,
therefore, is to examine the direction and nature of change among the
Mohmand, especially in the last decade, but also in the longer term, by
providing his study with a historical perspective. He has been able to make
extensive use of Agency records and other material to piece together detailed
case-histories of, for example, intra-tribal feuds and conflicts with government
authorities, some dating back to the nineteenth century. His analysis thus has
a historical depth which few other anthropological works can claim to have
achieved.
A further point of interest in Pukhtun Economy and Society is the use of
comparative method as a means of developing and testing the main arguments.
The Mohmand are divided by an administrative boundary: most sections of the
tribe live in the Agency, and are thus formally independent of government
authority, but some live in the Settled District of Peshawar. As Ahmed shows,
the political-administrative situation has had a considerable influence on the
respective patterns of development of the independent and the encapsulated
sections. The Agency Mohmand, inhabiting an unproductive stretch of hill
country, and traditionally reliant on smuggling activities and government
allowances to supplement a meagre income from the land, have now become
relatively prosperous as a result of schemes to bring about their integration into
the national economy, and new employment opportunities, both in Pakistan
and in the Gulf States, which have recently been opened up to them. Yet so far
these economic changes have not compromised the nang status of the
independent sections of the tribe; indeed, it is precisely because they have
vigorously maintained their political independence that the government has
initiated development projects in their territory. The settled Mohmand, by
contrast, are without political resources which they could manipulate to their
economic advantage, and their area remains a backwater lacking the amenities
8 The Mohmand came under the control of the Commissioner of the
Peshawar
Division in 1896, but did not have their own Agency during the Britishperiod. This was
a source of grievance to the tribe, who saw it as evidence that they were not consideredto
be politically important.
164 REVIEWS

and sources of income that have been made available to the Agency sections.
At the same time, however, the constraints of a settled administration have
increasingly forced them to deviate from nang ideals and accept their position as
revenue-paying agriculturalists. Whether this divergence between the two
groups will continue is uncertain, however. Ahmed's comparison is based on
relatively recent developments-the setting-up of the Agency in 195 1, which he
takes as his base-line for comparative purposes, and more importantly the
economic changes of the I970s-and it is quite possible that as the Agency
Mohmand become economically more integrated, their social and political
organization will also be modified.
At the centre of Ahmed's analysis is the Pakhtunwali. The Pakhtun Code has
usually been defined in terms of its associated practices: badal, the taking of
revenge; melmastia, hospitality; nanawati, submission to enemies; and the jirga,
the tribal or sectional assembly whose authority in matters of collective interest
is regarded as final.9 Ahmed argues, however, that this is a superficial
definition, and that instead the Pakhtunwali should be seen in terms of its
underlying principles: tarboorwali,agnatic rivalry, especially between patrila-
teral male cousins; and tor, the question of maintaining female chastity. These
principles are represented as central to the Pakhtuns' own view of their ideal
social organization. There is, nevertheless, a difficulty with this definition, in
that it does not altogether satisfactorily explain the centrality of tarboorwaliand
tor, or the intensity with which they are upheld. Ultimately, it is stated,
tarboorwali(and, presumably, tor also) is based on 'notions of honour' (p. 20o),
but this is to make the definition to some extent tautological: the notion of
honour is, after all, embedded in the word Pakhtunwali. This is perhaps a minor
quibble. More important is that Ahmed demonstrates the structural signifi-
cance of the Pakhtunwali, and especially the principle of tarboorwali,in Pakhtun
social and political organization. The function of the Code is not only to
maintain tribal honour, but also to ensure equality among all members.
Agnatic rivalry, by setting the main contenders for political power in opposition
to each other, serves as a check on the emergence of politically predominant
individuals and lineages. Hence the egalitarianism which distinguishes the nang
tribes; while among the Swat Yusufzai the Khans constitute a politically
privileged minority, among the Mohmand 'every man is a Khan'. Interestingly,
though, Ahmed's tarboorwalimodel is in some respects a mirror-image of Barth's
equilibrium model: agnates and lineages are balanced against each other in a
similar manner to the Khans'factional blocs in Swat. The difference between the
two situations is that whereas among the Mohmand the Pakhtunwali continues
to operate as a set of principles ordering social and political relations, in Swat it
has ceased to do so with the emergence of a centralized state.
If there is a weakness in PukhtunEconomyand Society,it lies in the formulation of
its main hypothesis (misleadingly referred to by Ahmed as his 'thesis'), that the
Pakhtunwali survives encapsulation. In a sense, the statement is a truism: a
value-system as deeply rooted as the Pakhtun Code is unlikely suddenly to
disappear merely because of political-administrative change. At the same time,
however, the evidence presented by Ahmed is inconclusive; or, rather, because
of the way in which he has formulated his hypothesis, his conclusions are
9 See, e.g., Spain, ThePathanBorderland, pp. 64-7.
 REVIEWS 165
ambivalent."' Even if the settled Mohmand still adhere to many of the ideals
embodied in the Code, it is clear that their ability to do so has been considerably
reduced as they have become subject to the legal and political constraints of
formal administration. Besides, whether the comparatively recent develop-
ments which have separated the settled from the unadministered sections of the
tribe provide a sufficient measure of the resilience of the Code is arguable; a
more certain way of testing its survival would have been to consider the patterns
of social and political behaviour of a tribe settled over a longer period. Even
more problematic is the question of how far, and for how long, the as yet
unencapsulated Agency Mohmand will continue to maintain Pakhtun ideals in
conditions of economic and political change. And this raises a wider question.
One of Ahmed's major themes is the predominance of political over economic
status within the tribe, and the overriding importance of the Pakhtunwali in
defining political status. Yet although the Code may be seen as the key
determinant of socio-political organization while the tribe remained indepen-
dent of external political and economic forces, or was able to manipulate them
to its own advantage, there is much to suggest that the changes of the past
decade have begun to undermine traditional values. Thus, one aspect of this
process is that prominent elders and senior lineages are now finding it
increasingly difficult to maintain their political status, as new sources of income
have become available to subordinate Mohmand sections; and this, in turn,
seems to be generating a crisis of authority and leading to the emergence of new
lines of conflict within the tribe. It could be argued, then, that the interaction of
the Pakhtunwaliwith factors making for change is more complex, and is likely to
have more far-reaching consequences, than Ahmed implies.
In many respects PukhtunEconomyandSocietyis a flawed and uneven work. Not
all of its material is of equal value or relevance; some of its arguments are
weakened rather than strengthened through being repetitive; in places it is
laden with unnecessary jargon; and it is far too long. The book would have
benefited greatly from extensive revision and editing before publication. These
are relatively unimportant criticisms, however. Even if Ahmed's analysis of the
Mohmand does not have the neatness or concision of Barth's analysis of the
Swat Yusufzai, it is, nevertheless, the most detailed and comprehensive study
yet produced of Pakhtun society. And it is likely to remain so for many years to
come, given the continuing inaccessibility of the unadministered frontier tribes.
If only for this reason, that Ahmed has opened up an area which has so far been
closed to anthropologists, PukhtunEconomyand Societyis a book which deserves
wide attention,
There are other reasons, however, why Ahmed's work may be considered
important. Taken together, his critique of Barth and his analysis of the
Mohmand represent not only a considerable advance in the study of the
Pakhtun tribes, but also a significant contribution to current theoretical debate
in social anthropology. He has successfully demonstrated the use of a historical
approach as a means of broadening and deepening anthropological analysis.
And he has raised, even if he had not fully resolved, several fundamental
o Ahmed accepts that his material is inconclusive with regard to his central
proposition; as he puts it (p. 356): 'My thesis is ... partly substantiated but partly
disproved.' A different formulation might have produced a much stronger argument.
166 REVIEWS

questions concerning the effects of economic and political change on tribal

society, and the relationship between tradition and change. What Ahmed has
to say is thus of interest not only to anthropologists or the small number of
specialists on the North-West Frontier, but also to historians, political scientists
and development sociologists.

University of Leicester R. O. CHRISTENSEN

Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925. By LYDIA HOLUB-

NYCHY. University Microfilms International: Ann Arbor, 1979. Pp. ix,
503- $24.25.
In the fall of 1966, Lydia Holubnychy and I were both enrolled at Columbia
University in Professor C. Martin Wilbur's graduate seminar on modern
China. She was totally dedicated to research, with an insatiable appetite for
information about Michael Borodin's carreer in China. When I returned to the
East Asian Institute at Columbia in the summer of 1975 as a visiting scholar, I
was saddened by the news of her tragic death a few months earlier. Her doctoral
dissertation on Borodin and the Chinese revolution was 'virtually completed'
(p. v), and Professor Wilbur arranged to have it published in 1979-
The book covers the years of 1923-25, which constituted, according to
Holubnychy, 'the first and quite successful phase ofBorodin's activity in China'
(p. 478). With meticulous details, the author analyzed Borodin's pre-I923
revolutionary experiences, his relations with Lenin and Stalin, his qualifi-
cations for the China mission, and his contributions to the Kuomintang
reorganization prior to Sun Yat-sen's death in March 1925. In her protrayal of
these important aspects of Borodin's career, Holubnychy relied heavily on
Russian sources, most of which have not been generally explored by historians
specializing on China of the 192os. For this reason alone, her book deserves our
serious attention.
The author had spent more than ten years of her life on the study of Borodin's
mission in China, and the book provides ample proof of her hard work. I am,
however, slightly disappointed by her failure to consult the rich collections of
primary materials in the Kuomintang Archives in Taiwan. While I was there
in 1968-70, I studied, among other valuable documents, the minutes of the
meetings of the Central Executive Committee and the powerful Political
Council. Borodin was a participant in many of these meetings. Holubnychy was
fluent in both Russian and Chinese; she could have compared these sources
with the Soviet records and thereby presented a more balanced appraisal of
Borodin's influence on Sun Yat-sen and other Kuomintang leaders.
In spite of its obvious strengths, the book is marred by some major flaws, and
its publication is probably premature. First of all, the work is organizationally
weak. It has eight chapters, with the first two devoted to Borodin's pre-1923
experiences. The author emphasized Borodin's close relationship with Lenin,
and she traced the evolution of the Soviet policy of rapprochement with Sun
Yat-sen. These discussions are undoubtedly relevant, but they are not the
principal concern of the book, and there is no reason whatsoever for them to