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Leslie Marsh 7
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# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2007 9
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Michael Wheeler is the latest in a new wave of philosophical theorists that fall within a
loose coalition of anti-representationalism (or anti-Cartesianism): Dynamical –, 13
Embodied –, Extended –, Distributed –, and Situated –, theories of cognition 14
(DEEDS an apt acronym). Against this background, cognition for Wheeler is, or 15
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should be, a more ecumenical concept. This ecumenical approach would still be 16
amenable to making theoretical distinctions, the central one being the notion of 17
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offline and online styles of intelligence, a distinction that makes conceptual space for 18
another closely related notion, that of propositional knowledge (knowing that) and 19
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Q1 L. Marsh (*)
Centre for Research in Cognitive Science, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QH, UK
e-mail: l.marsh@sussex.ac.uk
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JrnlID 11097_ArtID 9062_Proof# 1 - 13/08/2007
L. Marsh
(pp. 184–185). Wheeler, unlike many DEEDS theorists is not content to use 37
Descartes as the philosophical whipping boy: he is of the view that an extreme 38
mind–body dualism has been unfairly pinned on the historical Descartes. This has, 39
perhaps inadvertently, given rise to, despite their endorsement of physicalism, 40
covert Cartesians. They are committed to a specific notion of Cartesian 41
representationalism: a physical rather than immaterial ontology. This is what 42
Dennett has disparagingly termed Cartesian materialism. Wheeler sets out eight 43
Cartesian principles that comprise Cartesian psychology. They divide into two 44
interpretations: the narrow and the broad. The former identifies the faculty of reason 45
as a wholly mental capacity with the upshot that there is a denial of non-intellectual 46
psychological processes, typically sensory experiences. The latter has a place for 47
both the intellectual and non-intellectual (non-conceptual content) psychological 48
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phenomena. 49
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In much the same way as he approaches Descartes, Wheeler approaches 50
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Heidegger. The reasons here are somewhat more complicated. First, interpretation
of Heidegger has been notoriously divergent: though there is no such thing as a 52
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“definitive” commentary on Heidegger, there are less contentious ones (Taylor 53
Carman and Richard Polt are two commentators that spring to mind but are not at all 54
referenced by Wheeler.) Second, Heidegger is a philosopher that has been (mis?) 55
appropriated in areas where there is no philosophical culture. This has given rise to a 56
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caricatured Heidegger: the paradigmatic anti-realist, anti-naturalist, relativist and 57
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social constructivist pressed into service for those promoting some ideological sub- 58
text (pp. 152, 156). This does no favors for Heidegger in particular and so-called 59
Continental philosophy in general – more on this later. Last but by means not least, 60
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Wheeler has the influential work of Hubert Dreyfus to negotiate (pp. 166–191), 61
again a very distinctive Heideggerian on offer. 62
Wheeler’s overall task is to reject the view that Heidegger’s philosophy is 63
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epistemic access to the word and takes epistemic primacy over knowing-that 67
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always operates within a context of activity. Wheeler concedes that Heidegger’s pure 70
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engagement with Heideggerian ideas, but as response to empirical questions faced 96
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within science itself (p. 188). These two observations suggest then that the sub-title 97
of Wheeler’s book “The Next Step” is redundant – conceived thus we are all already 98
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Heideggerians! On a related issue there is a tension in Wheeler’s avowed approach 99
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in his so-called generic presentation of the two titans – Descartes and Heidegger. 100
Wheeler’s own reading of these thinkers, ostensibly to present an unvarnished 101
interpretation is a misnomer. If by “generic” he intends an impressionistic Cartesian 102
and Heideggerian approach, then though perfectly legitimate, it is hardly any more 103
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“reliable” than Heidegger or Dreyfus. 104
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The frame problem looms large; discussion of this issue Wheeler judiciously defers 105
towards the end (chapter 10). Wheeler presents an ambitious three-step strategy that 106
assimilates both Cartesian and Heideggerian insights, the critical third step being the 107
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continuous reciprocal causation combine to produce online intelligence?” (p. 280). 111
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Perhaps this should, as Wheeler here implies, be “The Next Step.” 112
If ever there were a book that meets the central aims and scope of this journal, i.e. 113
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philosophy of mind, then this book fits the bill perfectly. It speaks to the health of 115
Anglophonic philosophy, at least as practiced under the aegis of cognitive science, that 116
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This should not be taken as chauvinistic – Wheeler is merely someone trained in one 118
“style” of philosophising and who deeply appreciates another – there is no 119
incompatibility. Those who insist on maintaining the “continental (hermeneutic)/ 120
analytical” divide are ideological, rather than philosophical: subscribing to this 121
fault-line is as perverse as “dividing America into Business and Kansas.”1 122
I have barely scratched the surface of Wheeler’s concerns. Despite a residual 123
doctoral denseness, he excels in making difficult notions clear without ever 124
vulgarising them. Wheeler is a theorist to watch: there is the promise that his best 125
is yet to come. 126
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Attributed to John Searle.
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