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Existential Empathy:
by Marco Iacoboni
Neuropsychiatric Institute
neural systems, the superior temporal cortex, the rostral part of the posterior
parietal cortex, and the inferior frontal cortex. This circuitry is connected to the
limbic system via the anterior sector of the insular lobe. This chapter reviews
empirical findings that suggest that imitation is a fundamental building block for
empathy and that in order to understand the emotional states of others we have
to activate the same neural systems activated by our own emotions. In principle,
which the subject witnessing emotions in others runs offline the same neural
any sort (thus, understanding emotions too) can emerge only through the
thrown into. Thus, empathy via imitation is not a simulation made by an agent of
agents.
Iacoboni. 3
Empathy is the ability to imagine oneself in another's place, and understand the
corresponding to that which another feels. How does this understanding occur?
not exclusively mental but is essentially corporeal as well. The other central
aspect of the definition of empathy is that it requires a sense of self and a sense
of the other. Without self awareness and awareness of the other, one cannot
are a sense of self, a sense of the other, and an embodied relational process
between self and other. Such embodied relational process between self and
dyads and triads of children of different ages interact in settings with two or three
between eighteen and thirty months of age (Nadel, 2002). The communicative
setting – where identical objects are located such that imitation is favored – in
older children, for instance three-year-olds with verbal abilities (Nadel, 2002).
of the Chameleon effect has been described repeatedly and studied in several
labs (Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003; Hatfield, Cacioppo, &
expressions of people while they interact in a social situation (Chartrand & Bargh,
1999; Hatfield et al., 1994). A series of experiments has shown not only that
strangers, but also that being imitated facilitates interactions and increases liking,
and that individual variability in the tendency to imitate others correlate with
scores on empathy (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). What are the neural bases of
these phenomena?
In our lab, we have investigated in the last few years the neural
findings in single cell recording studies in macaques. These studies had revealed
mirror neurons, fire when the monkey performs object-oriented actions such as
grasping, holding, manipulating, tearing, and when the monkey sees somebody
else performing the same actions (diPellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, &
mirror neurons will not fire at the sight of a pantomimed action (Gallese et al.,
1996). However, mirror neurons fire even when the actual grasp of the object is
occluded from vision, as long as the animal has witnessed the initial reach of the
Iacoboni. 5
hand going to grasp the object (Umilta et al., 2001). Moreover, mirror neurons
also fire, in complete darkness, at the sound associated with an action (Kohler et
al., 2002). The motor properties of these neurons are also interesting. In fact,
some of these neurons fire when the monkey grasps an object with the left hand,
or with the right hand, or with the mouth (Gallese et al., 1996). Taken together,
these data suggest that the firing of these neurons is associated with achieving
the parietal lobe have complex properties that seem relevant to some higher
order aspects of motor behavior, for instance sequencing. It has been shown that
some parietal mirror neurons fire at the sight of a hand grasping an object and
fire also while the monkey bites the objects with the mouth (Gallese, Fogassi,
neurons in the ventral premotor cortex are located in a cortical area called F5
(Matelli, Luppino, & Rizzolatti, 1985), whereas parietal mirror neurons are located
in a rostral inferior parietal area, area PF (Gallese et al., 2002). Area F5 and area
inferior parietal lobule is in turn connected with the superior temporal cortex
(Seltzer & Pandya, 1994). In the superior temporal cortex, and precisely in the
superior temporal sulcus (STS), there are higher order visual neurons that fire at
the sight of object-oriented actions (Perrett et al., 1989). Similarly to the visual
properties of mirror neurons, these STS neurons do not fire at the sight of a hand
approaching a graspable object but not grasping it. The STS-PF-F5 circuit has
cortical circuit dedicated to the understanding of actions of self and other. Thus,
this circuit of the macaque brain seems a good candidate for being a precursor of
a similar system in the human brain relevant to imitation, a process that requires
the studies was the following: if one looks at the activity in mirror neurons during
approximately half the firing rate recorded during execution of action (Gallese et
al., 1996). Thus, we predicted that areas with mirror properties in the human
resting baseline - twice as large as the one obtained during observation of action.
Moreover, given that imitation yields both observation and execution of an action,
we posited that in mirror areas the increased signal during imitation should
amount to approximately the sum of the increased signal during execution only
and observation only. This profile of activity was observed in pars opercularis of
the inferior frontal gyrus and in the rostral part of the posterior parietal cortex
during imitation of finger movements (Iacoboni et al., 1999). These two regions
are anatomically compatible with the macaque regions containing mirror neurons,
area F5 in the inferior frontal cortex and area PF in the rostral part of the
posterior parietal cortex. With regard to the human homologue of macaque STS,
several labs have independently reported that posterior STS in the human brain
responds to biological motion (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; Puce, Allison,
Iacoboni. 7
Bentin, Gore, & McCarthy, 1998; Puce & Perrett, 2003). In our imitation studies
mirror areas (Iacoboni et al., 2001). Efferent copies of motor commands are
useful to predict the sensory consequences of planned actions. Given that STS
proposed that when STS receives efferent copies of motor commands during
action and the predicted sensory consequences of the planned imitative action
We have also proposed that the activity in the inferior frontal region with
mirror properties, most likely Brodmann area 44, is associated with the goal of
the imitative action (Iacoboni et al., 1999). In fact, the activity in Brodmann area
actions with no visible goal, even though the motor aspect of the action is
identical in both cases (Koski et al., 2002). Interestingly, Brodmann area 44 also
shows higher activity during imitation of action as in a mirror – for instance, when
model and imitator are face to face, the model is using the left hand while the
imitator is imitating with the right hand - compared to imitation of the same action
with the anatomically corresponding hand - for instance, when model and imitator
are face to face, the model is using the right hand while the imitator is imitating
Iacoboni. 8
with the right hand. Imitating as in a mirror is the predominant form of imitation
early in development (Wapner & Cirillo, 1968). In this form of imitation, the model
and the imitator share the same sector of space, they get physically closer.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that one of the goals of the imitative
process is to create some form of intimacy between the model and the imitator.
This concept of intimacy fits well with the links between imitation and empathy
and it has been largely neglected in the behavioral studies of imitation of the last
of imitative behavior. But so far we have described cortical areas that are
relevant to imitation and do not seem to belong to the classical neural systems
associated with emotions. So, the question we decided to address was the
following: how does the cortical architecture for imitation composed by STS,
rostral part of the posterior parietal cortex and inferior frontal cortex connect
evidence. In the primate brain there seems to be at least one area connecting the
limbic system with the three cortical systems – superior temporal cortex,
posterior parietal cortex and inferior frontal cortex - that are critical to imitation.
This area is the dysgranular sector of the insular lobe (Augustine, 1996). We
posited that the dysgranular sector of the insula might play a key role in a large-
scale neural network for empathy comprising areas relevant to emotion and to
imitation. This hypothesis fulfilled the original proposal of Lipps (as cited by
others was critical to generate empathy. This hypothesis was also supported by
fibers that respond to caress-light touch and may be relevant to emotional and
empirically this model, we used fMRI while subjects were either observing or
goes through some forms of inner imitation of actions of others, then even the
brain regions used to perform and imitate those emotional facial expressions.
monkey STS, PF, and F5, the insula, and the limbic system due to the
simultaneous encoding of the sensory input and planning of the motor output
(Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003). We did observe such pattern
of activity in this neural circuit (Carr et al., 2003). Of particular interest is that the
limbic area that demonstrated the predicted pattern of activity was the right
Dolan, 1998). This is in line with the kind of unconscious imitation observed in
empathic individuals (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and suggests that the kind of
empathic mechanism we are tapping into here does not require an explicit
different emotions as a single entity, but different emotions are obviously not a
single entity and often are associated with different neural systems. In a large-
interesting preliminary finding of some interim analyses show that when subjects
neutral emotional expression (Figure 1). The medial part of the orbitofrontal
cortex has been associated with monitoring the reward value of different kinds of
reinforcers (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004). Indeed, also the ventral striatum,
strongly associated with reward value, was activated by this contrast. Imitating a
happy face of others seems for the self a rewarding experience. The self enjoys
the intimacy of self and other seems transparent during empathic resonance.
called the morphing technique, according to which the face of self and the face of
various kinds of others are morphed in a single face to varying degrees. This
recognition from our group using fMRI and the morphing technique we observed
made of self. In this experiment, we used morphs composed only of self and
highly familiar others (people that spent several hours a day with the subjects or
were long-time close friends of the subjects). Previous studies of this kind had
mostly adopted the approach of using as others famous people. With this
approach, one controls nicely for familiarity of the stimulus, because presumably
a face of a famous person is a face that subjects had seen several times.
However, this approach does not control for the significance of the other to the
self. If there is no personal relationship with the other, the other is probably
parietal mirror areas in the right hemisphere (Figure 2) for increasing percentage
submitted). That is, the greater the contribution of self in the morph, the greater
highly personally familiar other? After all, mirror areas map actions of others onto
actions of self, and at prima facie they seem to support a mechanism for
assimilating self and other, rather than a mechanism for distinguishing them.
However, it has been shown that even passive viewing of a static face activates
premotor activity (Leslie, Johnson-Frey, & Grafton, 2004). Thus, watching a face
Iacoboni. 12
seems to induce some form of motor imagery. Here, when subjects watch
morphs composed of self and highly familiar and personally close others, mirror
areas are activated due to the highly relevant social relation of self and other and
more so for morphs composed prevalently by self because of the ease with
which one can map oneself onto one's own motor system. What emerges from
this study is a sense that notions like self and other cannot be assimilated to
static representations, but are actually highly dynamic and interdependent. Mirror
collective agency that comes out of social interactions and that is tightly linked to
the ability to form empathic resonance (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Rather than
the product of a Cartesian self that contemplates others and infer their emotional
states, or the other kind of Cartesian self that simulates the emotional states of
others by activating the same neural system that would be activated when
personally feeling those emotions, mirror activity linking self and other
emotionally and empathically seem to support the view of an existential self that
other people's involvement in the world in which the self is thrown into. Thus,
empathy, and especially empathy via imitation, as we have seen above, is not a
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