I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND CONTRACT CLAUSES AS e.
e. The evidence must have been presented at the hearing or at least contained in the
LIMITATIONS ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Art. III, Sec. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 502-562 (2d ed., 1977.)
LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Inherent in sovereignty, and therefore not even required to be conferred by the
Constitution, are the police, eminent domain, and taxation powers. The Bill of Rights, notably
the due process, equal protection and non-impairment clauses, is a means of limiting the
exercise of these powers by imposing on the State the obligation to protect individual rights.
The Bill of Rights is addressed to the State, notably the government, telling it what it cannot do
to the individual.
A. Due process - Procedural and Substantive
Civil Procedural Due Process
In civil cases, the SC laid down its elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino v.
Palanca:
a. Court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
b. Court with jurisdiction over the party-defendant
c. Judgement rendered according to law.
d. Defendant given the oppotunity to be heard (requirement on notice and hearing)
Criminal Due Process
In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People:
a. Accused is informed why he is proceeded against, and what charge he must
answer.
b. Judgment of conviction is based on evidence that is not tainted by falsity, and after
the defendant was heard.
If the prosecution produces the conviction based on untrue evidence, then it is
guilty of depriving the accused of due process. Thus false testimony can be questioned by
the accused regardless of the time that lapsed.
c. Judgment according to law
d. Tribunal with jurisdiction
Administrative Due Process
In administrative proceedings, the elements were laid down in the case of Ang Tibay
v. CIR as the "seven cardinal primary rights" in justiciable cases before administrative
tribunals:
a. There must be a hearing, where a party may present evidence in support of his
case.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented by a party.
c. While the tribunal has no duty to decide the case correctly, its decision must be
supported by evidence.
d. The evidence supporting the decision must be substantial. Substantial evidence is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
record and known to the parties affected.
f. The tribunal must rely on its own independent consideration of evidence, and not
rely on the recommendation of a subordinate.
g. The decision must state the facts and the law in such a way that the parties can
know the issues involved and the reasons for the decision.
Substantive Due Process
Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 S 27 (1985)
F: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not a
sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question
contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is
indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC.
HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of said
article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-- for then the date
of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day following its
publication-- but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws w/ the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to
the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
W/o such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents. RAM.
Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 S 446 (1986). Motion for reconsideration. xxx [T]he clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, w/c cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, w/o its previous
publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed w/
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
Conclusive presumption of knowledge of the law.-- The conclusive presumption that
every person knows the law presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is
to have any legal justification at all.
The term laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
Pres. Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization.
RULE: All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, w/c shall begin 15 days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Coverage.-- Covered by this rule are PDs and EOs promulgated by the Pres. in the
exercise of legislative powers. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e., regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. The mere mention of the number of the PD, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts, the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the OG
cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. RAM.
Notes: In the original case, the SC ruled that as a matter of substantive due process,
any law must be published before the people can be expected to observe them. But,
according to a split decision, publication need not be made in the Official Gazette. It is
enough that it be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
After the EDSA revolution, upon the reconstitution of the SC, the original
judgment was reconsidered, and the SC now ruled that publication must be made in the
Official Gazette, pursuant to CA 638 and the Civil Code, unless a law "provides otherwise"
that is, a different mode of publication.
What must be published are (1) all laws of general application, and even those not of
general application like (2) private laws affecting only particular individuals, e.g., legislative
grant of citizenship, (3) laws of local application, and (4) rules and regulations of a
substantive character. This means not only the title but the entire law. When? Forthwith, that
is, immediately. Where? Only in the Official Gazette. (See discussion under Administrative
Law)
In his concurring opinion, Justice Feliciano noted that even if a statute or decree states
that it shall take effect "immediately upon approval", this should be construed to mean
"immediately upon publication"; otherwise, a literal interpretation would render the law
unconstitutional. For the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in Art. 2 of the Civil Code
refers not to the necessity of publication (which is constitutionally mandated by the due process
clause and therefore cannot be provided otherwise by a mere law) but to the effectivity of
the law. The general rule is that the law will take effect 15 days after its in the Official Gazette
(pursuant to CA 638 and the Civil Code). The law, however, may "provide otherwise", e.g.
(i) immediately, which means immediately upon publication, or (ii) one year after publication,
like the Family Code.
Likewise, he contended that if the law provided for a different mode of publication,
that is, in a newspaper of general circulation, then the requirements of due process would have
been satisfied.
E.O. 200 took the cue and amended Art. 2 of the Civil Code: Laws take effect 15
days after publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless
otherwise provided by law.
Executive Order No. 200, June 18, 1987
PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN
A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT
FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY.
WHEREAS, Art. 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided xxx;"
WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in
the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme
Court in Tanada v. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. 63915, Deceber 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here
is much to be said of the view that publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic release and limited readership;"
WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly;" and
WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Art. 2 of the Civil Code should
accordingly be amended so that laws to be effective must be published either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order:
Section 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Section 2. Art. 2 of the Republic Act 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the
Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Section 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in
the Official Gazatte.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nine
hundred and eithty-seven.
So the state of the law at the present is as follows:
1. Laws must be published as a requirement of substantive due process.
2. These laws include (a) laws of general application, (b) private laws, (c) laws of
local application, (d) rules and regulations of administrative agencies of a
substantive character, and (e) circulars that carry penalty for their violation.
3. The publication can be made in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation.
4. The law shall take effect 15 days after publication, unless it provide otherwise,
which could be anytime after publication (e.g. immediately, or one year or any other time).?
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
F: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported
from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging
the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and
declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its
decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review.
HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower
courts" in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass
upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.
(2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where
there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary
permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion. We do not see, however, how the prohibition of the interprovincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be
killed any where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is
made to apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply
killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to
prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
(3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and
given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the
carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, w/c was carried out forthright. The measures
struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be heard, thus
denying him elementary fair play.
(4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable
institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as
the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase may see fit is
an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must
observe when they make their distribution. VV.
Montemayor v. Araneta University, 77 SCRA 321 (1977)
Lack of Due Process in Termination of Employment Remedied by Hearing in the NLRC.
F: Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On 7/8/74, he was
found guilty of making homosexual advances on one Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investating
committee. On 11/8/74, another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a
similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through cousel, asked for the postponement of the
hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the w/c motion was denied. The committe then
proceeded to hear the testimony of the complainants and on 12/5/74, submitted its report
recommending the separation of petitioner from the University. On 12/12/74, the University
applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to terminate petitioner's employment. Meanwhile, petitioner
filed a complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages. Judgement was rendered in
petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor, the latter found petitioner's dismissal to be
justified. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: The Consti. assures to workers security of tenure. In the case of petitioner, this
guarantee is reinforced by the provision on academic freedom. In denying petitioner's motion for
postponement of the hearing, the committee did not accord procedural due process to the
petitioner. This was, however, remedied at the mediation conference called at the Dept. of
Labor during w/c petitioner was heard on his evidence. There he was given the fullest
opportunity to present his case. Petition dismissed.
Petitioner filed a MFR contending that the hearing in the NLRC did not conform to ther
requirements of due process as the witnesses against petitioner were not called so that
petitioner could cross-examine them.
HELD: Pettioner did not object to the presentation of the testimony of the complainant and the
witnesses at the school investigation and did not assert his right to cross-examine them.
Petitioner waived his right to confront the witnesses, relying solely on the strength of his
evidence. Nor was it incumbent on resp. to present the witnesses in the NLRC. Petitioner's only
right is to be heard. VV.
Tanada v. Phil. Atomic Energy Commission, 141 SCRA 307 (1986)
Bias as Disqualification in Administrative Investigations
F: Petition for prohibition brought by taxpayers, questioning the competence of members
of the PAEC to pass judgment on the safety of the Bataan Power Plant and charging them w/
bias and prejudgment, based on their publications stating that the plant was safe.
HELD: (1) Where the validity of an appointment is not challenged in an appropriate proceeding,
the question of competence is not w/in the filed of judicial inquiry. The question of competence
is a matter addressed to the appointing power.
(2) In these publications, PAEC clearly indicated its prejudgement that the nuclear
plant is safe. The first was published in 1985. The other 2 were issued earlier, but as the
majority of the PAEC commissioners even then were already occupying responsible positions in
the PAEC, they cannot escape responsibility for these publications.
Petition granted and PAEC restrained from acting in the proceedings for issuance of
license. VV.
B. Due Process and Police Power
Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)
Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid.
F: LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in
view of the energy crisis. It excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL
(Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC (Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works,
Transportation, issued memo. providing penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine, confiscation
of vehicles, and cancellation of registration. The petitioners brought suit questioning the validity
of the LOI on the ground that it was discriminatory and a denial of due process. The resps.
denied the petitioner's allegations and argued that the suit amounted to a request for advisory
opinion.
HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy's Kaiser
Jeep. The enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. They, therefore, have
standing to challenge the validity of the LOI.
(2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face. It has behind it the presumption
of validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. As underlying
the questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity
must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record overthrowing the statute. The
LOI is an energy conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a problem.
(3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to w/c
the petitioner belongs the LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not include
others does not render it invalid. The govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none."
(4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. Code does not authorize the impounding of
vehicles as a penalty, to that extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires. VV.
Ynot v. IAC, supra.
Anglo-Fil Trading Corp. v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 (1983)
Property Rights Are Subject to the Exercise of Police Power.
F: The petitioners were among 23 stevedoring and arrastre operators at the Mla South
Harbor. Their licenses had expired but they were allowed to continue to operate on the strength
of temporary permits. On May 4, 1976, the resp Phil Ports Authority decided to allow only one
org. to operate the arrastre and stevedoring services. On April 28, 1980, based on the report
and recommendation of an evaluation committee, the PPA awarded the exclusive contract for
stevedoring services to the Ocean Terminal Services Inc (OTSI). The petitioners brought suit in
the CFI to annul the contract for exclusive service. On motion, Ct issued a TRO enjoining PPA
and OTSI from implementing the exclusive contract. Later, the ct lifted the TRO prompting the
petitioners to file an action for certiorari with the SC contending that: (1) ex parte lifting of TRO
constituted grave abuse of discretion; (2) the award would impair the petitioners' contracts with
foreign customers.
HELD: (1) Considering that the previous grant of TRO in favor of pets. was made ex parte and
w/o bond, notice and hearing of the lifting were not necessary, much less mandatory.
(2) Stevedoring services are subject to regulation and control for the public good and
in the interest of the general welfare. A single contractor furnishing the stevedoring requirements
of a port has in its favor the economy of scale and the maximum utilization of equipment and
manpower. In return, effective supervision and control as well as collection and accounting of
the govt share of revenues are rendered easier than where there are 23 contractors to oversee.
As resp ct found from the evidence, the multiple contractor system has bred cut-throat
competitions in the port . Understandably, most contractors had been unable to acquire
sufficient modern facilities , observe labor standards, maintain efficiency, and pay PPA dues.
The contention of pets. that due process was violated resulting in a confiscation of
private property is likewise without merit. In the first place, the pets were operating merely on
"hold over"permits. In the second place, the award of OTSI was the result of a evaluation of
performance of existing contractors made by a special committee created by the PPA. VV.
Notes:
The policy adopted by the Philippine Ports Authority to allow only one organization to
operate the arrastre and stevedoring services of each port was upheld by the SC as a valid
exercise of police power. For the "one port, one operator" rule makes possible the better
supervision, collection, efficiency and improvement of services, and prevent cut-throat
competition and non-maximal utilization of equipment and manpower. However, in the awarding
of contracts, the procedures must allow only the capable operator to get the franchise.
In this case, a temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued without notice to the
other party. As the TRO was lifted also without hearing, the person in whose favor it was
originally issued cannot complain of the lifting of the TRO without prior hearing.
Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983)
Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from Rendering Massage Services Valid.
F: The ordinance was enacted for a two-fold purpose: (1) To enable the City of Mla. to
collect a fee for operating massage clinics separately from those operating barber ships and (2)
To prevent immorality w/c might probably arise from the construction of separate rooms.
HELD: The SC has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on general welfare clause.
VV.
Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983)
F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition
suits to stop the Mun. of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of
nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to operate them.
The CFI upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated
but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted, granted
municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs
and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to
give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of
nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to
municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as
granting mun. corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to
construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC
(BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard
pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted.
VV.
C. Due Process and Eminent Domain
The taking by the State of private property in an expropriation proceeding must be:
(1) for public use, (2) with just compensation, and (3) upon observance of due process.
Article III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not be take for public use without just
compensation.
Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense,
establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government.
1. Taking either for public use or public purpose.
Public Use
Public use is equivalent to public purpose. It is not confined merely to use by the
public at large (e.g. roads). It is enough that it serves a public purpose, even if it benefit a large
group of people short of the public in general (e.g. expropriating property for the relocation of
squatters).
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220
F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in
Barangay Malubog and Babag in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the
value of the property, the CFI authorized the PTA to take immediate possession of the property.
The charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through condemnation proceedings lands for
tourist zone development of a sports complex. The petitioners who are occupants of the lands,
filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the taking was not for public use;
(2) the land was covered by the land reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the
obligation of contracts.
HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of
roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been
discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially
employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The petititioners have
not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the affected persons have
been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has never
been regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain.
VV.
Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)
F: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the
expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the
expropriation of private lands for socialized housing. Among those lands sought to be
expropriated are the petitioners' lands. They brought this suit in the SC challenging the
constitutionality of PD 1224.
HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation
proceedings is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use"
requirement is an evolving concept influences by changing conditions. Urban renewal or
redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not
only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in
the Constitution. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general welfare.
Petitioners claim that there are vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are
owned by a few landowners only. Why should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not
confined to landed estates. The test to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was
the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting
through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the property. The property owner
may not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have
been more suitable. The provisions on just compensation found in PD 1224, 1259, and 1313 are
the same provisions which were declared unconstitutional in EPZA v. Dulay (1987) for being
encroachments on judicial prerogatives. VV.
2. Just compensation must be judicially determined
Just Compensation
Just compensation is the fair and reasonable equivalent of the loss sustained by the
owner of the property due to the taking; it is the fair market value of the property measured at
the time of the taking, no matter how long ago it was taken (e.g. the time of the taking was in
the 1920's, the time of payment was in the 1960's, in the Ministerio and Amigable cases, supra),
and using the conversion rates at the time of taking (because according to those cases, Art.
1250 of the Civil Code applied only to contractual obligations).
EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)
F: The San Antonio Development Corporation was the owner of a piece of land in Lapu-
Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in 1979. The commissioners appointed by the trial court
recommended that the San Antonio Development Corp. be paid P15.00 per square meter. EPZA
filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533 the compensation should be the fair and
current market value declared by the owner or the market value determined by the assessor,
whichever is lower.
HELD: The method of ascertaining just compensation under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Although the court technically would still have the power
to determine the just compensation for the property, following the decree, its task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the
assessor. Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means
a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property
and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be considered. In this case, the
tax declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long before the declaration
of martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of
those documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory. VV.
Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)
F: Petitioners are the owners of two large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and
Sunog-Apog in Tondo, Manila, both of which were declared expropriated in two decrees issued
by President Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. The petitioners contend that the decrees violate
their constitutional right to due process and equal protection since by their mere passage their
properties were automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the
ownership and possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation.
The government on the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain is inherent in the
State and when the legislature or the President through his law-making powers exercises this
power, the public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the fixing of the just
compensation become political in nature and the courts must respect the decision.
HELD: The challenged decrees are unfair in the procedures adopted and the powers given to
the NHA. The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly
expropriated by decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding
whatsoever. The expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the
signing of the decree. No deposit before the taking is required. There is not provision for any
interest to be paid upon unpaid installments. Not only are the owners given absolutely no
opportunity to contest the expropriation, or question the amount of payments fixed by the
decree, but the decision of the NHA are expressly declared beyond judicial review. PD 1669 and
1670 are declared unconstitutional.
Teehankee, CJ, concurring: The judgment at bar now learly overturns the majority ruling in JM
Tuason v. LTA that the power of Congress to designate the particular property to be taken adn
how much may be condemned thereof must be duly recognized, leaving only as a judicial
question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party adversely affected is the victim
of partiality and prejudice. The SC now rules that such singling out of properties does not
foreclose judicial scrutiny as to whether such expropriation by legislative act transgresses the
due process and equal protection and just compensation guarantees of the Constitution. VV.
Tuason v. Register of Deeds 157 SCRA 613 (1988)
F: Petitioners bought in 1965 from Carmel Farms Inc. a piece of land in Caloocan City by
virtue of which they were issued a title in their names and they took possession of their property.
In 1973, President Marcos, exercising martial law powers, issued PD 293 cancelling the
certificates of titles of Carmel Farms and declaring the lands covered to be open for disposition
and sale to members of the Malacañang Association Inc.
HELD: The Decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. Since he
was never vested with judicial power -- such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the SC
and such inferior courts as may be established by law -- the judicial acts done by him were
under the circumstances alien to his office as chief executive. VV.
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987), supra.
3. Due process must be observed
De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980)
F: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite
Coastal Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue
in Pasay City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed
extension pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of
residents of the latter, the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to
the original plan, but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the government P2 million.
The government filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del
Pan streets, among whom was petitioner.
HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrayr and should not receive
judicial aprpoval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so
minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of
functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while
the factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue.
While the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and
progress and development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development
are carried out for the benefit of the people. VV.
Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990)
F: De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del
Pan streets which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA
and the construction of drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the Government
from proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower court but upon
certiorari, the SC reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief asked for by De
Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. The case was remanded to the lower court.
No further action was taken despite the SC decision until two years later, in 1983,
when the Government moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature
has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. The lower
court denied tthe motion. Appeal.
RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of
the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private
properties for public use upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution
and the laws. Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by
voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by
legislation.
When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was based on supervening events that
occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The social
impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary had
disappeared.
Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in
thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then pravailing as to
the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and thereafter by
enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and
necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must yield to the
subsequent legislative fiat. Charo.
NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)
F: For the construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, Napocor's lines
have to pass the lands belonging to respondents. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the
acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain
proceedings.
ISSUE: W/N petitoner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the
land traversed by its transmissin lines.
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent domain results in
the taking or appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, but no
cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burrden upon the
owner of the condemned property, without loss of title or possession. It is unquestionable that
real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way." In this
case, the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the
nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC
against the use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an
indefinite period deprives private respondents of ts ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation which should neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said property. Just equiivalent has always been
understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or value of the land and its
character at the time of taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just cmpensation.
Charo.
D. Equal Protection
Art. III, Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measure
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of
property and its increments.
1. Economic equality
Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment oppor-
tunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining
and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance
with law. They shall be entitle to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making process affecting the rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and
employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes including conciliation,
and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing
the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to
reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and
planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments.
The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation enterprises
whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
Id., Sec. 2. xxx
 The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino
citizens.
Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate
legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rights of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
There are areas of economic activity which can be limited to Filipinos. The
Constitution itself acknowledges this in various places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII,
Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas of investment (Art. XII, Sec. 10), to name a few.
In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the SC upheld the validity of the law
which nationalized the retail trade. For the protection of the law can be observed by the national
interest.
Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937)
But there are areas where aliens cannot be kept away for the simple reason that they
cannot be deprived of a common means of livelihood, especially when they are admitted to the
country as immigrants.
In Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Isai Po Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978), the SC invalidated a city
ordinance imposing a P500 permit fee for aliens who wish to engage in the pursuit of an
occupation. The SC noted that this violated the uniformity of taxation, and deprived aliens of the
right to earn a common livelihood.
Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978)
F: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the employment of aliens in any
occupation or business unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Manila and paid a
fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, employed in Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment
from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void.
HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a flat rate of P500, it failed to consider
substantial differences in situations among aliens and for that reason violates the rule on
uniformity of taxation. It also lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and therefore
permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance denies aliens
due process and the equal protection of the laws. VV.
In Vera v. Cuevas, 90 SCRA 379 (1979), Sec. 169 of the NIRC requiring
manufacturers of skimmed milk (non-fat) to put on its label the warning that the milk is harmful
for infants, was struck down as unconstitutional on the ground that it did not require the same
labeling in the case of filled milk (coco-fat added)
At that time of the decision thought, the law was already inoperative.
Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979)
F: Respondents are engaged in the manufacture and sale of filled milk products. They
brought an action in the CFI for a declaration of their rights in respect of section 169 of the Tax
Code. This provision required that "all condensed skimmed milk in whatever form, from which
the fatty part has been removed totally or in part or put on sale in the Philippines shall be clearly
and legibly marked on its immediate containers with the words: This milk is not suitable for
nourishment for infants less than one year of age.
HELD: Sec. 169 of the Tax Code has been repealed by RA 344. At any rate, Sec. 169 applied
only to skimmed milk and not to filled milk. Sec. 169 is being enforced only against respondent
manufacturers of filled milk but not against manufacturers of skimmed milk, thus denying them
the equal protection of the laws. VV.
2. Political equality
Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political
beliefs and aspirations.
Art. IX, C, Sec. 10. Bona fide candidates to public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.
In Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), the SC upheld the validity of sec. 4 of
Batas Blg. 52 disqualifying retired elective local officials who have received retirement benefits
and would have been 65 years old at the start of the term. It does not violate equal protection,
for it gives younger blood the opportunity to run the local government.
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
F: Sec. 4 of BP 52 provides in part that "any retired elective provincial, city ot municipal
official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law
and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he
seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired." Petitioner, Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of
the law on the ground that it was contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantee of
the Constitution.
HELD: Dumlao has not been injured by the application of the provision. No petition seeking his
disqualification has been filed against him. His petition is a mere request for advisory opinion.
Nevertheless, because of public interest, the question should be resolved. The purpose of the
law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments and therefore, not invalid.
The retired employee in effect declares himself tired and unavailable for the same government
work. VV.
In Igot v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), however, the disqualification of candidates
convicted or simply charged with national security offenses was struck down as unconstitutional,
for violating the presumption of innocence and thus ultimately the equal political protection.
Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)
F: Romeo Igot, as taxpayer, voter and member of the bar, and Alfredo Salapantan Jr., as
taxpayer and voter, sued for prohibition to enjoin enforcement of BP 52, sec. 4 of which provides
for the disqualification as candidate of any person convicted of subversion, insurrection or
rebellion or similar offenses.
HELD: Neither petitioner has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified
from being candidates for local elective positions. They have no personal or substantial interest
at stake and therefore no locus standi. Neither can they sue as taxpayers because the statute
does not involve disbursement of public funds. VV.
3. Social equality

Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measure
that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political
power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of
property and its increments.
II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE
A. Arrests, Searches and Seizures
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed
by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section, shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
1. Requirements for Search Warrants
Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940)
F: By virtue of the sworn application of Almeda, the Chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board,
a SW was issued to search the store and premises of the petitioner, accused of violating the
Anti-Usury Law. Receipt books, PNs and other articles were seized and retained in the
possession of the Anti-Usury Board.
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW were complied with.
RULING: YES. The applicant, Almeda, in his application, swore that "he made his own personal
investigation and ascertained that petitioner is lending money without a license, charging
usurious rates." The witness he presentted testified before the judge and swore that he knew
that YEE was lending without a license because he personally investigated the victims who
secured loans from the petitioner. Their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they could be
held liable for perjury. The existence of probable cause has been determined by the justice of
the peace before issuing the warrant complained of, as shown in the warrant itself. Charo.
Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938)
F: This is a petition for mandamus presented to secure the annulment of a search
warrant (SW) & 2 orders of the resp. judge, & the restoration of certain documents alleged to
have been illegally seized by an agent of the Anti-Usury Board.
Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of
Tarlac, Tarlac, a SW, commanding any officer of the law "to search the person, house or store of
the petitioner for certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents & other papers relating to her
activities as userer."
On the same date, Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the PC, went to the office of
the petitioner, and after showing the SW to the petitioner's bookeeper, Salas, & w/o the
presence of the petitioner, who was ill and confined at that time, proceeded w/ the execution
thereof. Two packages of records & a locked filing cabinet containing several papers and
documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt thereof issued by him to Salas. Separate
criminal cases were filed against petitioner. Petitioner demanded the return of the documents
seized. Bu motion, pet. challenged the legality of the SW and the devolution of the documents
demanded. By resolution, the resp. judge of CFI denied the petitioner's motion for the reason
that though the SW was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the petitioner.
The resolution of 10/5/37 & the order of 1/3/38 are sought, together w/ the SW, to be
nullified in these proceedings.
HELD: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a
SW to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or another; (3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; & (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.
In the instant case, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge
himself but by the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by
agent Almeda. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any.
Even accepting the description of the prop. to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption
that the receipt issued is sufficiently detailed w/in the meaning of the law, the prop. seized were
not delivered to the court w/c issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned
over to the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against petitioner.
Considering that at the time the warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the
petitioner, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not w/o
basis.
IS THERE A WAIVER? No express waiver.
IS THERE AN IMPLIED WAIVER? None.
To constitute a waiver of constitutional right, it must appear first that (1) the right
exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; (3) that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
It is true that the petitioner did not object to the legality of the search when it was
made. She could not have objected bec. she was sick & was not present when the warrant was
served upon Salas. Certainly, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except by the person whose rights
are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf. The failure on the
part of the petitioner and her bookkeeper to resist or object to the execution of the warrant does
not constitute an implied waiver of the consti. right. It is but a submission to the authority of the
law. The delay in making the demand for the return of the documents seized is not such as to
result im implied. waiver. RAM.
Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984)
Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom
F: On the basis of two warrants issued by the RTC of QC, the offices of the Metropolitan
Mail and the We Forum were search and printing machines, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the newspapers as well as
papers and other literature seized on the ground that they were used in the commission of the
crime of subversion. Petitioners brought and action to annul the warrants and compel the return
of the things seized.
HELD: Petitioners' thesis is impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. When addressed to a newspaper publisher or
editor, the application for a warrant must contain a specification stating with particularity the
alleged subversive materials he has published or intending to publish. Broad statement in the
application is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause.
Another factor that makes the search warrants constitutionally objectionable is that they are in
the nature of general warrants. In Stanford v. State of Texas, the US SC declared this type of
warrant void. VV.
Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985)
F: Respondent Judge issued a search warrant for the seizure of articles allegedly used
by petitioner in committing the crime of sedition. Seized were printed copies of the Philippine
Times, newspaper dummies, typewriters, mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video
machines and tapes. The petitioner moved to quash the warrant but his motion was denied.
HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause. The language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable
words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable. VV.
Bache & Co. (Phil.) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971)
F: The Com. of Internal Revenue through Rev. Examiner de Leon filed an application for
a SW against Bache & Co. and its pres., Seggerman for violation of the provisons of the NIRC.
As Judge Ruiz was then conducting a hearing, the deposition of de Leon and his witness,
Logronio, was taken by the Dep. Clerk of Court. The deposition was later read to the judge who
asked the witness to take an oath as to the truth of his statements. The judge then signed the
SW and accordingly issued the same.
ISSUE: W/n the requirements for the issuance of valid SW were complied with.
RULING: NO. The judge did not personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The
judge did not have the opportunity to observe tthe demeanor of the deponents and to propound
initial and follow-up questions which his judicial mind, on account of his training, was in the best
position to conceive. This is important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-importatnt
question of w/n there was probable cause. Charo.
Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1990)
F: Judge Dayrit, upon applicatin of P/Maj. Dimagmaliw, supported by a "Deposition of
Witness," executed by P/Lt. Angeles, issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of
arms, ammunitions and explosives in the premises of the PUP which were supposed to be in
possession of Dr. Prudente. In enforcing the warrant, 3 fragmentation grenades were found in
the bathroom of the office of Dr. Prudente.
ISSUE: W/n the searrch warrant was valid.
RULING: NO.
(1) The warant was not issued on the basis of personal knowledge of the applicant
and his witness. The probable cause required under the Constitution for the issuance of a
search warrant must be in connection with one specific offense, and the judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavit
submitted. However, in the case at bar, Dimagmaliw merely stated in his application that his
knowledge was based "on gathered infrmation from verified sources." The same holds true for
the affidavit of Angeles.
Moreover, the judge did not examine Angeles in the form of searching questions and
answers. What appears on the record are leading questions answereable by yes or no.
(2) As to the claim that the SW failed to particularly describe the place to be searched,
the SC ruled that the description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.
Here, the SW described the place as PUP, with its address and specifically mentioned the
offices of the "Dept. of Military Science and Tactics on the ground floor and the Office of the
President at the 2nd floor and the other rooms in that floor." This is deemed sufficient.
(3) There was also an issue as to w/n the SW was issued for one specific offense. The
warrrant was issued for violation of PD 1866 which punishes several offenses. While there was
failure to state the particular provision of the law violated, the warrant itself qualified the
description of the offense as "illegal possession of firearms, etc." This suffices to cure the defect.
The fact that the word "etc." was added to refer to ammunitions and explosives did not
violate the rule on single offense, for notwithstanding that possession of firearms, explosives and
ammunitions are punished in different sections of the PD, they are treated as belonging to a
single specie. An exception to the rule that a warant shall be issued for a single offense is when
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses. Charo.
Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987)
F: Petitioners claim that the SW issued by resp. judge was invalid. They also question
the extrajudicial confession taken from them without according them the right to assistance of a
counsel. The articles seized by virtue of the SW consisting of dried marijuana were admitted as
evidence for violation of RA 6425 or Dangerous Drugs Act.
RULING: While it is true that the caption of the SW states that it is in connection with "the
violation of RA 6425," it is clearly recited in the text thereof that "there is probable cause to
believe that Olaes of Olongapo City has in his possession and control, marijuana dried stalks
which are suject of the offense stated above." Although the specific section of the law is not
stated, there is no question at all that the specific offense alleged to have been committed as
basis for determining probable cause is alleged. Furthermore, the SW specifically described
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
As to the extrajudicial confessions of the accused, the same are deemed inadmissible
against them. In People V. Galit, the Court declared that: " At the time the person is arrested, it
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrrest and he must
be shown the warrant of arrest, if any; he shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means - by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by
the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either
of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the
wiaver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence."
These requirements were even made stricter under the 1987 Constitution which
provides that the rights of a person under custodial investigation cannot be waived except when
made in writing and in the presence of counsel. Charo.
Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA, 171 SCRA 348 (1989)
F: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to serve as the President's arm called
upon to combat the vice of dollar salting or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange.
ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be authorized by law" to issue warrants
under the 1973 Constitition.

RULING: NO. The Court, in reviewing the powers of the PASTF under its enabling law, sees
nothing that will reveal a legislative intendement to confer upon the body, quasi-judicial
responsiibilities relative to offenses punishable by PD 1883. Its undertaking is simply to
determine w/n probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court,
meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend
action of appropriate authorities.
The Court agrees that PASTF exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial
powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached judge to determine
the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a
prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see to it
that justice if done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the accused," he stands
invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue warrrants and
indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is
neither. This makes to our mind and to that extent, PD 1636 as amended by PD 2002,
unconstitutional.
The "responsible officer" referred to under the Cosntitution is one not only possessing
the necessary skills and competence but more significantly, the neutrality and independence
comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. Charo.
Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
F: Pursuant to the powers vested by PD 1920 and EO 1022, POEA Administrator
Achacoso ordered the closure of the recruitment agency of Horty Salazar, having verified that
she had no license to operate a recruitment agency. He further ordered the seizure of the
documents and paraphernalias, being used or intended to be used as the means of commiting
illegal recruitment. This order was enforced on 26 January 1988. Petitioner filed this suit for
prohibition.
Issue: May the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) validly issue warrants of serach and seizure (or
arrest ) under Art. 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of PD 1920 and EO 1022, now embodied in Art. 38 of the Labor Code,
are the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilights moments. Under Art. III, Sec 2 of the
1987 Constitution, it is only judges and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search.
The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President of
the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for
the purpose of deportation. The Sec. of Labor , not being a judge. may no longer issue search
or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent,
we declare Art. 38, par. C of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
Suzette.
(not in VV's revised outline)
a. Existence of probable cause.
Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as would reasonably make a prudent
man believe that a crime have been committed and that the documents or things sought to be
searched and seized are in the possession of the person against whom the warrant is sought.
Without probable cause, there can be no valid search warrant.
See Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938)
In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385 (1967), 42 search warrants were issued for
alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC, and the
Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the warrants on the ground that it was impossible for the
judge to have found probable cause in view of the number of laws alleged to have been violated
by the petitioner. How could he even know what particular provision of each law had been
violated? If he did not know this, how could it be determined if the person against whom the
warrant was issued was probably guilty thereof? In truth, this was a fishing expedition, which
violated the sanctity of domicile and privacy of communications. To establish the requirement of
probable cause, the rule is: One crime, one warrant.
b. As determined by a judge
Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue a warrant; the offensive and
much abused phrase "and other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the 1973
Constitution has been removed
In Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963), the SC doubted the power
of the President to issue an order of arrest, even assuming the grant of such power under sec.
39 of the Rev. Admi. Code since under the 1935 Constitution, the power to order the arrest of a
person has been unmistakably a judicial power. It was even more doubtful if the President could
delegate such a power to the Deportation Board.
The Court noted that unlike in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 in
which the right to be secure is one's person, house, papers and effects was granted only to
citizens; under the 1935 Constitution, it became a popular right available to citizens and aliens
alike.
It was not until the case of Viva v. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 (1968) that the SC settled
the doubt and ruled that the Deportation Board could only issue an order of arrest to carry out a
deportation order, and not, to summon an alien in order to answer charges filed against him, a
distinction already hinted at by the Qua Chee Gan ruling. In other words, while it can issue a
warrant for the purpose of implementing an order, it cannot issue a warrant for the purpose of
prosecution.
Under the 1973 Constitution, the Deportation Board was deemed included in the
phrase "other responsible officer authorized by law."
The effect of the 1987 Constitution on this power is still uncertain, for although it
restores the 1935 provision, its intent seems clearly to confer the power of issuing warrants to
judges alone.
c. After personally examining under oath or affirmation the
complainant and his witness.
The examination conducted by the judge takes the form of searching questions.
The requirement that the judge must personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses means that the actual examination cannot be delegated to someone else, like the
clerk of court.
So said the Court in Bache and Co. (Phil) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971). In this case,
when the BIR agent and his witnesses arrived in court in the middle of a hearing, the judge
suspended the hearing and directed the branch clerk to examine and take the testimony of the
witnesses in his chambers. After he was through with the hearing, he went back to his
chambers and finding that the examination was finished, asked the BIR agent and his witnesses
if they affirmed what they what they testified to, after which he issued the search warrant in
question.
d. On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts that they
are testifying to.
 The determination of the reasonableness of the judicial warrant must be based on the
affidavit of one who has personal knowledge of the facts to which he testifies. The testimony
cannot be based on mere belief. Neither can it be based on a report. Otherwise, the warrant is
void.
Thus, in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984), reiterating the 1937 case of
Rodriguez v. Villamiel, the testimony based on a military report that the newspaper We Forum
was used for subversive were held to be not a personal knowledge and so was inadmissible.
Likewise, in Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 (1985), the testimony based on
investigation reports that certain items in the Philippine Times were subversive were held to be
not personal knowledge, and thus the search warrant issued was not valid.
e. The search warrant must describe particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Failure to state with particularity the place to be searched and items to be seized
makes the warrant used for fishing evidence (a general warrant) which is void.
In Burgos v. Chief of Staff, the description which read "subversive documents, leaflets,
papers to promote the objective of the Movement for a Free Philippines, the Light a Fire
Movement, and the April 6 Movement" were held not to be particular descriptions, thus making
the warrant a general warrant.
In Corro v. Lising, the search and seizure of "printed copies and dummies of Philippine
Times, subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, and
typewriters, tape recorders, etc." was again invalidated for the description was not at all
particular or specific, thus making the warrants general warrants.
When it comes to printed matters, the offensive material need not be set out in full. It
is enough if it specifies the issues and the title of the articles. The instruction to seize
"subversive materials" is not valid because the determination of whether a material is subversive
or not is not for the police officer to decide; no unfettered discretion must be granted to him.
The matter is different if goods were searched and seized because of their intrinsic
quality (as when they are stolen or smuggled), than if the goods were searched for the ideas
they contain (as when a "subversive newspaper is sought). In the latter case, a more detailed
description of the physical features of the item is required to avoid delegating the appreciation of
ideas, and thus threaten free expression. Mirasol Notes.
2. When Search May Be Made without a Warrant
(a) When search is made of moving vehicles
The reason is the person may escape easily if a warrant has to be applied for the
mean time. In the Tariff and Customs Code, customs agents are specifically authorized to
search and seize vehicles even without a warrant.
Checkpoints are valid in some instances depending on the purpose (e.g. apprehend a
suspected criminal) and the circumstances (e.g. probable cause that the criminal is inside the
car). There is no question that when a child has been reported kidnapped in a community, the
police can stop all cars and check if the detained child is in any one of them.
Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857 (1968)
F: This is an orig. action for prohibition, & certiorari w/ prel. injunction, filed by Papa, et.
al., praying for the annulment of the order issued by resp. judge, w/c authorized the rlease under
bond of certain goods w/c were seized & held by petitioners in conncection w/ the enforcement
of the Tarrif and Customs Code (TCC) but w/c were claimed by resp. Mago, & to prohibit resp.
judge from further proceeding in any manner whatsoever in said case. Pending the
determination of this case, this Court issued a writ of prel. inj. restraining the resp. Judge from
executing, enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order.
Pet. Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Mla. Police Dept., acting upon
a reliable info. as to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, already misdeclared
and undervalued, would be released the ff. day from the customs zone of the port of Mla. &
loaded on 2 trucks, & upon orders of petitioner Papa, chief of police of Mla., & duly deputized
agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate no. 1 of the customs zone. The
load of 2 trucks, consisting of 9 bales of goods, & the 2 trucks, were seized on instructions of the
Chief of Police.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure & detention of the 2 trucks & their
cargo, Mago & Lonopa filed w/ the CFI-Mla. a petition for mandamus w/ restraining order or prel.
inj., alleging among others, that the goods were seized by members of the Mla. Police Dept. w/o
SW issued by a competent court.
HELD: Pet. Martin Alagao & his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure w/o
any SW issued by a competent court. The TCC does not require said SW in the instant case.
The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Sec. 2703 "to enter, pass through or
search any land, inclosure, wharehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also
to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope,
or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduec into the Phils.
contrary to law, w/o mentioning the need of a SW. xxx" Except in the case of a search of a
dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the Customs law may effect search
and seizure w/o a SW in the enforcement of customs law.
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Alagao, & his companion policemen did not
have to make any search before they seized the 2 trucks and their cargo.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no SW would be
needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case.
"The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as
recognizing a necessary difference before a search of a dwelling house or other structure in
respect of w/c a SW may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon or
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure the warrant bec. the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in w/c the warrant must be
sought."
"xxx Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other
public place, w/o a SW is unreasonable is in its final anaylysis to be determined as a judicial
question in view of all the circumstances under w/c it is made." (Peo. v. Case.) RAM.
People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122
F: Peter Lo , together with co-accused Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo
Tia, were charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, for the transport of
metamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as "shabu". The drug was contained in tea
bags inside tin cans which were placed inside their luggages. Upon arrival from Hongkong, they
boarded the taxis at the airport which were apprehended by CIS operatives. Their luggages
were subsequently searched where the tea bags were opened and found to contain shabu. Only
Lo and Lim were convicted. Tia was discharged as a state witness, who turned out to be a "
deep penetration agent" of the CIS in its mission to bust the drug syndicate .
Issue: W/N the search and seizure was legal.
HELD: YES
That search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.
One of the exceptions thereto is a search of a moving vehicle. The circumstance of the case
clearly show that the serach in question was made as regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a
valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.
 It was firmly established from the factual findings of the court that the authorities had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and transport
within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance
activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be amember. Aside from
this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China
via Hongkong. But such knowledge was insufficient to enable them to fulfill the requiremnents
for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that there was probable
cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in the case. Suzette.
(b) When search is an an incident to a valid arrest.
Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.-- A person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense, without a search warrant. (Rules of Court.)
A person arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything that proves
the commission of the offense. It follows that the search can only be made within the area of
control of the arrested person, and within the time of the arrest.
In Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, 139 SCRA 152 (1985); Milagros Roque and Cynthia
Nolasco were arrested at the intersection of Mayon and Margal Streets in QC at 11:30 a.m.,
having been wanted as high officers of the CPP. At 12:00 noon, Roque's apartment located 2
blocks away, was searched and some documents seized. The SC at first held that the search
was valid even if the warrant issued was void for failing to describe with particularity the things to
be seized, because it was an incident of a valid arrest.
But after the EDSA revolution, the reconstituted SC granted the motion for
reconsideration and held that just because there was a valid arrest did not mean that the search
was likewise valid. To be valid, the search must be "incidental" to the arrest, that is, not
separated by time or place from the arrest. If the basis for allowing incidental searches is looked
into, one can see that this situation is not one involving a valid incidental search.
The law allows the arresting officer to search a person validly arrested (by frisking him
for instance) because (a) a weapon held by the arrested person may be turned against his
captor and (b) he may destroy the proof of the crime, if the arrested officer has to first apply for a
search warrant from a judge.
If, in the Nolasco case, the search was conducted 30 minutes after the arrest, there is
no longer any danger that the captured may turn against the captor; and if the documents in the
apartment were 2 blocks away, the search would no longer be justified since there is no way for
Roque to go back to the apartment and destroy the documents, having been arrested already.
Nolasco v. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985)
F: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the
Constabulary Security Group. Milagrso had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP.
The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises
were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that
day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant for rebellion against Milagros. On the basis of
the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion were filed but the fiscal's office
merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Milagros asked
for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained. The search warrant
described the things to be seized as "Documents, papers and other records of the CPP, NPA
and NDF, xxx".
HELD: The search warrant is void because it fails to describe with particularity the things to be
seized. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are and what the manuals
not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive. There is absent a definite
guideline as to what items might lawfully be seized, thus giving the officers discretion regarding
what articles they should seize. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant. But the seizure of
the articles could be justified as an incident of a valid arrest. It is a general rule that, as an
incident of an arrest, the place of premises where the arrest was made can also be searched
without a search warrant. VV.
Nolasco v. Cruz Pano, Reconsidered, 147 SCRA 509 (1987)
Previous ruling reconsidered
F: Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the decision, contending that Milagros
Aguilar Roque was not lawfully arrested, a search warrant could not be made.
HELD: Considering the positions of the parties (Sol-Gen offered no objection), the motion for
partial reconsideration is granted.
Teehankee, CJ., concurring: The better rule is to limit a warrantless search of a person who is
lawfully arrested to his person at the time of and incident to his arrest and to "dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." (Rule 126,
Sec. 12) Since the search was not an incident of an arrest as it was in fact made under a void
general warrant, the seizure of documents could not be justified as an incident of an arrest. VV.
(c) When things seized are within plain view of a searching party
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)
F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner's house
was searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. The
officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they
confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner.
RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby declared null and void and
accordingly set aside.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp. judge in accordance
w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of the
complainant's 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say,
however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.
By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt. Quillosa on the
contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the same,"
and only bec. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to." The suggestion is that he
would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it
was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited
himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant's deposition in writing and
attach them to the record, together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-
existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found
later that his declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.)
The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay
and not of info. personally known to him. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to
justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses
themselves, by their own personal info., to establish the applicant's claims.
Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the
witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their
depositions.
A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida,
who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere
restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of
answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge.
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness
could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or
whether it was on the first floor or second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if
the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these
acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were
injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the
warrant sought was issued forthwith.
SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE
PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS
CONFORMITY IN WRITING.
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities,
who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaranty against a
possible challenge later to the validity of the search they were conducting.
Malum Prohibitum.-- It does not follow that bec. an offense is malum prohibitum, the
subject thereof is necessarily illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the
subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply bec. they are prohibited. A
SW is still necessary.
Motion to Quash.-- Petitioner should have, before coming to the SC, filed a motion to
quash the search warrant by the resp. judge. But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural
flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency
of the consitutional issues raised." RAM.
People v. Asio, 177 SCRA 250 (1989)
F: Adio was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for having
attempted to sell, deliver, dispatch in transit or transport 3,500 grams of dried marijuana to A2FC
Cartel during a buy-bust operation. Though he pleaded not guilty, court found the accused guilty
of the crime charged.
Issue: W/N the marijuana leaves were obtained in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III of the 1987
Constitution
HEKD: NO
The rule that a search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute one. There are recognized exceptions to the rule among them (1) a search incidental
to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and (3) the seizure of evidence in plain view. A
search and seizure without a warrant is allowed in buy-bust operations, the circumstances
being among those which can be considered exceptional.
The accused, in this case, was caught red-handed while pushing marijuana. Hence,
he could be lawfully arrested and searhed. Suzette.
Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989)
F: Pursuant to the Anti-Smut Campaign of Mayor Ramon Bagatsng, policemen seized
and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila
sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic, and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public. Among the
publications seized and later burned was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by
plaintiff Leo Pita. After his injunctive relief was dismissed by the RTC and his appeal rejected by
CA, he seeks review with SC, invoking the guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizure.
Issue: W/N the search and seizure was illegal
HELD: YES.
It is basic that searches and seizure may be done only through a judicial warrant ,
otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. In Burgos v Chief of Staff (133
SCRA 800) , the SC countermanded the orders of the RTC authorizing the serach of the
premises WE Forum and Metropolitan Mail, two Metro Manila Dailies, by reason of a defective
warrant. There is a greater reason in this case to reprobate the questioned raid, in the complete
absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap
makes it no different from Burgos, a political case, because speech is speech, whether political
or "obscene".
The authorities must apply for the issuance of the a search warrant from the judge , if
in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order. They must convince the court that the materials
sought to be seized are "obscene" and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive
enough to warrant State interference and action. The judge must determine WON the same are
indeed "obscene": the question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge's
sound discretion. If probable cause exist, a search warrant will issue. Suzette.
(d) Stop and Frisk
Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990)
F: Patrolmans Ungab and Umpar, both members of the INP of the Davao Metrodiscom
assigned w/ the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes, St.,
Davao City. While they were w/in the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges, they spotted
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag & they noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached
the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but
was stopped by the 2. They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found 1
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver, w/ 2 rounds of live ammunition for a .38 cal. gun, a smoke
grenade, & 2 live ammunition for a .22 cal. gun. Petitioner was brought to the police station for
further investigation. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in
the RTC of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty, and trial on the merits, a decision was
rendered finding petitioner guilty. The CA affirmed the appealed decision in toto.
Hence, the petition for review, the main thrust of w/c is that there being no lawful
arrest or search and seizure, the items w/c were confiscated from the possession of the
petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him.
The Sol-Gen argues that under Sec. 12, R 136 of ROC, a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything (w/c may be) used as proof of a
commission of an offense, w/o a SW.
HELD: From Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, it is clear that an arrest w/o a warrant may be effected by a
peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, or when an offense
has in fact, just been committed, & he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it.
At the time the peace officers identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as
he attempted to flee, they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the
offense. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did not know
what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest w/o a warrant.
However, there are many instances where a warrant & seizure can be effected w/o
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of w/c is the 'stop & search' w/o a SW at
military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality of w/c has been upheld by this Court in
Valmonte v. de Villa.
As bet. a warrantless search and seizure (S & S) conducted at military or police
checkpoints and the search thereof in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the
latter is more reasonable considering that, unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a
probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee w/ the buri bag, there was a probable cause that he was concealing something
illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession
of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a SW for the purpose. Such an exercise
may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
As the Sol-Gen said:
"The assailed S & S may still be justified as akin to a 'stop and
frisk' situation whose object is either to determine the identity of suspicious
individuals or to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officers seeks to obtain more info. ... The US SC held in Terry v. Ohio that
"a police officer may in appropriate circumstances & in an appropriate
manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal
behaviour even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." In
such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather than simply to shrug his
shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a suspicious individual briefly in
order to determine his identity or maintaing the status quo while obtaining
more info."
PETITION DENIED. RAM.
(not in VV's revised outline)
(e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and
intelligently.
Waiver cannot be implied from the fact that the person consented or did not object to
the search, for it many happen that he did so only out of respect for the authorities. The waiver
must be expressly made.
BARLONGAY CASE:
People v. De lara
F: After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation was conducted by the police, as
a consequence of which, accused was arrested. The accused already pocketed the marked
money and handed two foils to the police when he sensed the presence of police operatives.
He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was prevented from doing so. He tried to escape by
running inside his house. The police pursued him and were able to subdue him. The accused
admitted that he kept prohibited drugs in his house. He even showed the arresting officers a
blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs. The team, together with the accused, proceeded to
WPD headquarters for investigation. During the investigation, accused was apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. When appellant was
asked to give a written statement, he refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer. Accused
contends that his arrest and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs was null and
void. He also contends that he was not assisted by counsel during custodial investigation,
where he was forced to sign the photocopy of the marked money, the Receipt of Property
Seized, and the Booking and Information Sheet.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the plastic bag were valid.
RULING: YES. The accused was caught in flagrante as a result of a buy-bust operation. There
was no need for a warrant. The policemen were not only authorized but were also under
obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant. The policemen’s entry into the
house of the accused without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught committing
an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid. The seizure of the
plastic bag was the result of the accused’s arrest inside the house. A contemporaneous search
may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate vicinity where the arrest
was made.
ISSUE: Whether the documents signed by the accused during the investigation were admissible
in evidence.
RULING: NO. There was no showing that accused was then assisted by counsel nor his waiver
thereto put into writing. (The rejection of these evidence would not affect the conviction of the
accused in view of the abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt.) Bam.
People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (July 6, 1994)
F: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in
December, 1989. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate
informations for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and
for attempted homicide. Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance
of rebellion, but was acquitted of attempted homicide.
Surveillance was undertaken by the military along EDSA because of intelligence
reports about a coup. Members of the team were engaged by rebels in gunfire
killing one member of the team. A searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were
able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-
shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain
Col. Matillano. De Gracia was seen inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and
suspiciously peeping through a door. The team arrested appellant. They were then made to sign
an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding
team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team. Accused was found guilty of illegal
possession of firearms.
That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.
Ruling: YES
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not
armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence
reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was
a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group
of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided the place, the
occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby
compelling the former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun
store and it is definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives
and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of
an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even
colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo
which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously
closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were deserted.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case
falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first
place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable
ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more than
sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then
prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the
courts. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be
dispensed with.
There are two separate statutes penalizing different offenses with discrete penalties.
The Revised Penal Code treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or
other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might conceivably be committed in
the course of a rebellion. Presidential Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific
offense, the crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as part of a
rebellion.
Subject to the presence of the requisite elements in each case, unlawful possession of
an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to separate prosecutions for a
violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy in this case cannot be invoked
because the first is an offense punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished
by the Revised Penal Code, 24 with variant elements.
Presidential Decree No. 1866 imposes the death penalty where the illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition is committed in furtherance of rebellion. At the time the offense
charged in this case was committed under the governance of that law, the imposition of the
death penalty was proscribed by the Constitution. Consequently, appellant De Gracia could only
be sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua which was correctly meted out by the
trial court, albeit with an erroneous recommendation in connection therewith. Glynda.
3. Constitutionality of checkpoints and "areal target zonings."
Valmonte v. De Villa, 170 SCRA 256 (1989)
F: On 1/20/87, the NCRDC was activated w/ the mission of conducting security
operations w/in its area or responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an
effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere
conducive to the social, economic and political dev't of the NCR. As part of its duty to maitain
peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela and MM.
Petitioners aver that, bec. of the institution of said checkpoints, the Valenzuela
residents are worried of being harassed and of their sarety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that
their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at
night or at dawn, w/o a SW and/ or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety increased
when Benjamin Parpon, was gaunned down allegedly in cold blood by members of the NCRDC
for ignoring and/ or continuing to speed off inspite of warning shots fired in the air.
HELD: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se, illegal.
No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine
checks, the military, indeed, committed specific violations of petitioners' rights against unlawful
search and seizure of other rights.
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those w/c are reasonable are not
forbidden.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may be considered as a security
measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense
and maintaining peace and order for the benfit of the public. Checkpoints may not also be
regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably
conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the military
in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
occasional inconveninece, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
these abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
an orderly society and a peaceful community. RAM.
Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 (1990)
F: This is a petition for prohibition w/ prel. inj. to prohibit the military and police officers
represented by public respondents from conducting "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives"
in MM.
The 41 petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bona fide residents of MM and
Taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities.
Accdg. to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical
areas pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding.
Petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern of human rights abuses.
Respondents stress 2 points. First, the resps. have legal authority to conduct
saturation drives. And, second, they allege that the accusations of the petitioners about a
deliberate disregard for human rights, are total lies.
Resps. cite Art. VII, Sec. 17 of the Const.:"The Pres. shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed."
They also cite sec. 18.:"The Pres. shall be the Commander-in-chief of all AFP and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. xxx
HELD: The Court believes it is highly probable that some violations were actually committed.
This is so inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents"to
submit themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification." However, the remedy is
not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong
in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot respond to riots or
violent demonstration if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of force is sometimes
necesary as long as the rights of the people are protected and not violated. A blanket
prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one
confrontation where search warrants and warrants of arrest against specific individuals are
easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their
offices bec. all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited.
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a TP's suit. Where
not one victim complains, and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for
the SC. It is basically one for the executive departments and for the trial courts.
Under the circumstances of this TP's suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman
whom we can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly
procedure, no permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners'
charges and a hard look by admin. officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket
prohibition are also warranted.
In the meantime, and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were
probably committed and could be committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily
restrain the alleged baning on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to
assembly areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if these are
humble shanties of squatters, and other alleged acts w/c are shocking to the conscience. RAM.
4. Wire Tapping
Republic Act No. 4200
I. UNLAWFUL ACTS
A. Any person who, without authority from all the parties to the private
communication or spoken word, does any of the following acts: [Sec. 1, par. 1]
1. to tap any wire or cable; or
2. to secretly overhear or intercept such communication or spoken word by
using any other device or arrangment; or
3. to record such private communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.
 B. Any person, whether participant or not in the above penalized acts, who: [Sec. 1,
par. 2]
1. knowingly posseses any tape record, wire, record, disc record or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by law; or
2. to replay the same for any other person or persons; or
3. to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing; or
4. to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person.
C. Any person who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to
be unlawful: [Sec. 2]
D. Any person who shall violate the provisions of Sec. B or the exempted acts below
or of an order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation: [Sec. 2]
II. EXEMPTED ACTS
A. Use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned below: [Secs. 1, par. 2]
B. Any peace officer, who is authorized by the written order of the Court (RTC within
whose territorial jurisdiction the acts for which auhtority is applied for are to be executed), to
execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in cases involving the crimes of: [Sec. 3, par. 1]
1. treason
2. espionage
3. provoking war and disloyalty in case of war
4. piracy
5. mutiny in the high seas
6. rebellion
7. conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion
8. inciting rebellion
9. sedition
10. conspiracy to commit sedition
11. inciting to sedition
12. kidnapping as defined by the RPC
13. violations of CA 616, punishing espionage and
other offenses against national security
The WRITTEN ORDER shall only be issued or granted upon written application with the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and
must show:
a) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated
herein has been committed or is being committed provided, that in cases involving the offenses
of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition,
conspiracy to commit sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a
rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed;
b) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence may be obtained
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of
such crimes;
c) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
Contents: 1. the identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations,
discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of
telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line and the telephone number involved
and its location;
2. the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the
communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words;
3. the offense or offenses sought to be committed or prevented; and
4. the period of the authorization.
Effectivity: The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall
not exceed 60 days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the
court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
Procedure: All recordings made under court authorization within 48 hours after the expiration of
the period fixed in the order:
1. shall be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package;
2. shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority
stating the number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the
number of tapes, discs, or records included in the deposit and certifying that no duplicates or
copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the court;
3. shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in evidence or their
contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except upon
motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose
conversations or communications have been recorded.
III. PENALTY
Any person who violates the provisions of this Act, shall, upon conviction, be punished
by:
A. imprisonment for not less than 6 months or more than 6 years; and
B. with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office
if the offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense; and
C. if the offender is an alien, he shall be subject to deportation proceedings.
IV. ADMISSIBILITY
Any communication or spoken word, or the existence contents, substance, purport,
effect or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained
or secured by any person in violation of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative hearing or investigation. Shirley Alinea Notes.
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct
assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard
by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally
hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an
entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone
conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with
violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such
that iuts use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of
communication between 2 parties using a telephone line.
HELD: NO
 An extension tel. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph,
or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. This section refers to instruments whose
installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because,
by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting, or recording a tel. conversation. The tel. extension in this case was not installed for
that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor
of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on WON an extension tel. is included
in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an
extension tel.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to
discourage, through punishment, persons suchj as government authorities or representatives of
organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to
intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the tel. users. Consequently,
the mere act of listening , in order to be punishable must stricly be with the use of the
enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. Suzette.
5. What may be seized
Rule 126, sec. 2. Personal property to be seized.-- A search warrant may be issued
for the search and seizure of the following personal property:
(a) Subject matter of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
(c) Used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense. (Rules of
Court.)
6. Exclusionary Rule
Art. III, Sec. 3. xxx
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this (privacy of communication and
correspondence) or the preceding section (unreasonable searches and seizures) shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
One of the remedies of one who was victimized by an illegal search is to ask for the
suppression of the things seized and the evidence illegally taken.
The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of any evidence obtained in violation of secs. 2
and 3 (1) of Art. III for "any purpose" and in "any proceeding". The evidence is absolutely
useless. This has not always been the case.
In Moncado v. People's Court (1948), the SC, following the U.S. case of Wolf V.
Colorado, rules that evidence illegally obtained is not necessarily excluded if is otherwise
admissible under the rules of evidence. In such case, the evidence admitted, without prejudice
to any criminal, civil or administrative liability of the officer who illegally seized it. In other words,
the admissibility of the evidence is not effected by the illegality of the means by which it was
acquired.
It was in Stonehill v. Diokno, supra, following the U.S. case of Maop v. Ohio 1969,
when the exclusionary rule was first adopted in the Philippines, the SC noting that the total
suppression of the thing seized is the only effective means of ensuring the constitutional right
which it seeks to preserve. The Court noted, the insufficiency of the other remedies (e.g. action
for damages, criminal punishment, resistance), especially in the Philippines where violations
were committed by those in power and were thus equipped with the pardoning power to water
down the gravity of the other penalties imposed to violators of those constitutional rights.
The victim may or may not get back the thing seized, depending on whether it is
contraband or not. It the thing is contraband, it would not be returned, and only its suppression
can be asked for. But if the thing is legal, the party can ask for its return, even if no criminal
prosecution has yet been filed, as in the Stonehill case.
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)
F: Upon application of the officers of the govt (resp. prosecutors), several judges (resp.
judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners &/ or the corporations of w/c they
were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the perons named and/ or the premises of
their offices, warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize several personal prop. as the
"subject of the offense; stolen or embezelled or the fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to
be used as the means of committing the offense" as violation of CB Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & void, said petitioners filed
w/ the SC this orig. action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus & injunction. The writ was
partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents, and things seized from the officers
of the corporations; but the injunction was maintained as regards those found & seized in the
residences of petitioners.
ISSUES: (1) With respect to those found & seized in the offices of the corporations, w/n
petitioners have cause of action to assail the validity of the contested warrants.
(2) In connection w/ those found & seized in the residences of petitioners, w/n
the search warrants in question and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof
are valid.
(3) If the answer in no. 2 is no, w/n said documents, papers and things may be
used in evidence against petitioners.
HELD: (1) No. Petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and the seizure made in pursuance thereof bec. said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of petitioners. The legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be avalied of by 3rd
parties.
(2) No. Two points must be stressed in connection w/ Art. III, Sec. 2 of the Consti:
(a) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth therein; & (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied w/. It was stated that the natural and
juridical persons has committed a violation of CB laws, TCC, NIRC & RPC. No specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof w/ respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of a probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
General search warrants are outlawed bec. they place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion
of peace officers.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights-- that the things to be seized be particularly described-- as well as
tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. RAM.
7. Civil Action for Damages
A civil case for damages can also be filed pursuant to Article 32 of the Civil Code.
In Aberca v. Ver, the SC held that even if the privilege of the writ is suspended, the
court can nevertheless entertain an action not only against the task force but even against the
top ranking officials who ordered the seizure, to recover damages for the illegal searches and
seizures made in a despotic manner. By so doing, one can indirectly inquire into the validity of
the suspension of the privilege.
Aberca v. Ver, 160 SCRA 590 (1988)
Suspension of privilege of Habeas Corpus not a bar to a damage suit
F: Petitioners brought suit alleging that General Fabian Ver had ordered the Task Force
Makabansa of the AFP to conduct "preemptive strikes against known communist terrorists'
underground houses" in Metro Manila. The TFM raided some places using defective warrants;
they seized personal belongings of petitioners; they had been interrogated in violation of their
right to silence and to counsel; they had been tortured and intimidated. Petitioners asked for
payment of damages for violations of their constitutional rights.
HELD: The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners'
right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention. VV.
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534 (1910)
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, Affirmed, 40 Phil. 1122 (1913)
8. Search and Seizure by Private Persons
People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)
F: Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of Posts,
Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) & husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating procedure,
opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a peculiar order emitted
therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves
and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane
wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof.
Job Reyes reported the incident to the NBI and requested a laboratory examination of
the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper.
It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the
forensic chemist of the Narcotics Section of the NBI.
Thereafter, an information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425.
APPELANT CONTENDS that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his consti. rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and privacy of
communication and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible in evidence.
The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity
and w/o the intervention and participation of state authorities.
ISSUE: May an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights, be invoked against the state?
HELD: We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties
guaranteed by the Consti. cannot be invoked against the State. This constitutional right refers to
the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by govt. xxx (Villanueva
v. Querubin.)
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the govt w/o the
latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable searches and seizures (S & S), the
Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him.
Appellant, however, would like this Court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal
search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting the case. The arguments of
appellant stands to fall on its own weight, or the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that
NBI agents conducted an illegal S & S of the prohibited merchandise. Records of the case
clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made the
search/ inspection. Such inspection was reasonable and a SOP on the part of Mr. Reyes as a
precautionary measure bef. delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or Bureau of Posts.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless S & S proscribed by the Consti. Merely to observe and
look at that w/c is plain sight is not search. Having observed that w/c is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Consti. is not meant to be invoked against acts
of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of the Con Com.: " xxx The Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the relation
between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. xxx" (Sponsorship
speech of Commissioner Bernas.)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful S & S therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the govt and its agencies tasked w/ the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
It the search is made at the behest or inititiation of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and w/o the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked for only the act of
private individuals, not law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable S
& S cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it w/in the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion by the govt. RAM.
9. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST, as distinguished from SEARCH
warrants, the judge may rely simply on fiscal's certification as to probable cause
Compare Rule 112, Sec. 6 (on warrants of arrest) with Rule 126, Sec. 4 (on search warrants.)
Rule 112, Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.-- (a) By the Regional Trial
Court.-- Upon the filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court.-- If the municipal trial judge conducting the
preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable
cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. (Rules of Court.)
Rule 126, Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record.-- The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the records their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
The requirement in the case of warrants of arrest is relaxed in that the judge can rely
on the certification of the fiscal that the latter has conducted the preliminary investigation and
has found probable cause on the part of the accused. The judge can issue the warrant on the
basis of the information filed by the fiscal and the certification of probable cause.
The SC has allowed this practice in Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956), noting that
it has been practice long settled and that a judge can issue an order to arrest on the basis of the
certificate.
 Of course, if the judge is in doubt, he can always ask the fiscal to submit the records
of the preliminary investigation, so he could determine for himself if, on the basis of the
affidavits, there exists probable cause. It he is satisfied with the affidavits, he need not summon
the affiants.
Amarga v. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739 (1956)
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon
a complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay
from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted
the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie
evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge
Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge
Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent
the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed,
he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested.
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue
a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a
clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had
an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in
accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view
of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused
commited the crime charged.
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE
THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER.
Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to
determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine
whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under
oath the complainant and his wirtnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be
satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely
discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is
necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound
judgment or discretion.
The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. Bam.
Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)
F: The Pres. of the Phils. filed a complaint for libel against the petitioners, who were
publisher and columnist of the Philippine Star, based on the following statement in Beltran's
column of Oct. 12, 1987 entitled "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino Administration:" "If you
will recall, during the Aug. 29 coup attempt, the Pres. hid under her bed, while the firing was
going on-- perhaps the first Commander-in-Chief of the AFP to have to do so."
Instead of submitting his counter-affidavit, Beltran moved to dismiss the complaint.
The fiscal deniend his motion after finding a prima facie case against the petitioners and filed the
case in court w/c thereafter issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners. The petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
HELD: The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" (Art. III, Sec. 2) and
the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Consti. to issue warrants to "other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Consti. now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation. What the Consti. underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this
procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden w/ the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed
before their courts.
xxx VV.
Samulde v. Salvani, 165 SCRA 734 (1988)
F: Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation (PI) of Arangale upon
a complaint for robbery filed by complainant Magbanua, alleging that Arangale harvested palay
from a portion of her land directly adjoining Arangale’s land. After the PI, Samulde transmitted
the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that “there is prima facie
evidence of robbery as charged in the complaint”. Fiscal Salvani returned the records to Judge
Samulde on the ground that the transmittal of the records was “premature” because Judge
Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest (WA) against the accused. Judge Samulde sent
the records back to Fiscal Salvani stating that although he found that a probable cause existed,
he did not believe that Arangale should be arrested.
Fiscal Salvani filed a mandamus case against Judge Samulde to compel him to issue
a WA. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the fiscal had not shown that he has a
clear, legal right to the performance of the act to be required of the judge and that the latter had
an imperative duty to perform it. Neverhteless, Judge Samulde was ordered to issue a WA in
accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether it is mandatory for the investigating judge to issue a WA of the accused in view
of his finding, after conducting a PI, that there exists prima facie evidence that the accused
commited the crime charged.
HELD: THE PURPOSE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE
THE ISSUANCE OF A WA BY THE INVESTIGATING JUDGE OR OFFICER.
Under Rule 112 of the 1985 ROC, a PI is conducted on the basis of affidavits to
determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the accused for trial. To determine
whether a WA should issue, the investigating judge must have examined in writing and under
oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; he must be
satisfied that a probable cause exists; and there must be a need to place the accused under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. It is not obligatory, but merely
discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a WA, for the determination of whether it is
necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound
judgment or discretion.
The fiscal should, instead, have filed an information immediately so that the RTC may
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. Bam.
10. When arrest may be made without a warrant
Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.-- A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense, has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment of place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section. 7. (Rules of Court.)
Rule 113, sec. 5 talks of "citizen arrests", cases where an arrest can be made either
by the peace officer or a private person without need of a warrant.
The key element in the first case is that the offense was committed "in his presence".
The key element in the second case is that he has "personal knowledge".
Thus, in People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986), the arrest made by the constabulary
without a warrant of a farmer on the basis of information that he was a subversive was held
unconstitutional, since there was no personal knowledge of the offense itself.
The gun and subversive documents found by the officer and admitted by the former to
be his were likewise held inadmissible because the admission violated the Miranda rule.
a. Strict enforcement of rule
People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986)
F: On the basis of info. given by Cesar Masamlok, the appellant was arrested while
plowing his farm in Tiguman, Davao del Sur, on May 13, 1982, on charges of illegal possession
of firearm in furtherance of subversion. A .38 caliber revolver was found buried under his house.
Subversive documents were also seized from a place near his house. Two arresting officers
testified that the appellant had readily admitted ownership of the gun and the documents. The
appellant was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum, and the gun and documents were ordered
confiscated.
HELD: (1) Under R 113, Sec. 5 (a), the arresting officer must have personal knowledge that the
crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed, in order to justify an
arrest w/o a warrant. The offense must also be committed in his presence or w/in his view.
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Hence the arrest of the appellant was illegal.
(2) Consequently, the incidental search and seizure were likewise illegal and the
firearm and document are inadmissible in evidence.
(3) The prosecution argues that the appellant admitted ownership of the gun and
claims that it was he who pointed to the place where the subversive documents were hidden.
However, as the appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights at that time, his
admission is inadmissible under [Art. III, Sec. 12 (1).] It is true that 6 days later he executed a
confession before the fiscal w/ the assistance of counsel, but it was then already too late.
(4) As the remaining evidence against the appellant is the testimony of Cesar M. and
it is uncorroborated and unreliable, the appellant should be acquitted, but the gun and the
subversive documents must be confiscated. VV.
Go v. CA, 206 SCRA 138 (1992)
BARLONGAY CASE:
People v. Manlulu, 231 SCRA 701
F: Alfaro, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot in a drinking spree. His drinking
companions, Manlulu and Samson were arrested nineteen hours after the incident. Patrolman
Perez arrested Manlulu on the information given by Manlapaz, who was also drinking with the
accused and the victim. Patrolman Perez seized from Manlulu the .45 cal. Pistol and Casio
wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro, without a warrant and without informing Manlulu of his right
to counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and seizure of the gun and the watch was valid.
HELD: The warrantless arrest was invalid. The killing took place at one o’clock in the
morning. The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at around seven o’clock that
evening, some nineteen hours later. This instance cannot come within the purview of a valid
warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b) Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides that the arresting officer must have “personal knowledge” nor was the offense “in fact
just been committed.” While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered the information which
led to the arrest of Manlulu, that is not enough. The law requires “personal knowledge”.
Obviously, “personal gathering of information” is different from personal knowledge. The rule
requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some nineteen
hours later.
However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot in view of the eyewitness
account of Manlapaz which the Court found credible. In spite of the nullification of the arrest of
accused Manlulu, and the exclusion of real evidence, as well as his extra-judicial confession
which was taken in violation of the Constitution, still the prosecution was able to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Bam.
People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April 25, 1989)
F: Pat. Marvin Pajilan received a phone call from the desk officer of Sub-Station I,
namely, Michael Orbeta, who informed him that a person named 'Alyas Allan' was selling
marijuana at No. 8199 Constancia St., Makati, Metro Manila and requested that said person be
apprehended. Acting on this phone call of desk officer Michael Orbeta, a team of policemen
posted themselves about 10 to 15 meters from the house located at 8199 Constancia St.,
Makati. They saw a tricycle with 3 persons on board, a driver and 2 passengers, stop in front of
the house at 8199 Constancia St. They also saw a male person come out of the said house and
approach and talk to the driver of the tricycle. After a while they saw the male person go back to
the house and a little later come back and hand to the tricycle driver 'a suspicious stuff of a
cigarette, a marijuana cigarette', they further saw the tricycle driver in turn give something to the
male person. Pat. Pajilan together with his companions approached the male person and the
tricycle driver and after introducing themselves as police officers, they asked the male person,
the tricycle driver and his 2 passengers to bring out the contents of their pockets, which the male
person, the driver and the passengers of the tricycle did. The male person brought out from his
pockets 2 small plastic bags containing suspected marijuana leaves. The tricycle driver brought
out from his right front pocket 3 sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes. Nothing illegal was
found in the pockets of the 2 passengers of the tricycle.
The appellant contends that the police officers had no personal knowledge that he
was indeed handing marijuana to Enrico Bacod as they were 10-15 meters away from the
alleged sale transaction. The arrest therefore was not valid as the requirements for a
warrantless arrest were not complied with.
Issue: Was the warantless arrest valid?
Ruling: YES.
The warrantless arrest made by the law enforcers was valid since it falls under the
provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the
policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend the drug
pusher even without a warrant of arrest. The police officers were tipped off by an informer about
the illegal trade of the accused. The exact location where this trading in drugs was taking place
was given to them. The 'suspicious stuff' taken from the accused were confirmed to be
marijuana after tests were conducted on them. The attendant circumstances taking place before
their eyes led the police officers to reasonably conclude that an offense was actually being
committed. Glynda.
b. Exceptions to strict enforcement
(1) "Continuous" crimes of subversion
Umil v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311 (1990)
PER CURIAM
These are 8 petitions for habeas corpus (HC) filed bef. the Court. The Court finds that
the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant
their release on HC.
An arrest w/o a warrant, under Sec. 5, pars. (a) and (b) of Rule 113, ROC, as
amended is justified when the person arrested is caught in flagrante delicto, viz., in the act of
committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person making the
arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
The persons in whose behalf these petitions for HC have been filed had freshly
committed or were actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests, w/o
warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further detained by virtue of valid informations
filed against them in court.
I A petition for HC was filed bef. this Court on behalf of Roque and Buenaobra. At the
In Umil v. Ramos, RIOU-CAPCOM received confidential info. about a member of the
NPA-Sparrow unit being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt
Ave., Q.C. It was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as
Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible
for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM.
Upon positive identification by an eyewitness, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City
Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed w/ the RTC-Caloocan City an info. charging
Dural w/ the crime of "Double Murder w/ Assault upon agents of persons in authority."
The petition for HC, insofar as Umil & Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and
academic and is accordingly dismissed, since the writ does not lie in favor of an accused in a
crim. case, who has been released on bail.
As to Dural, he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 soldiers. Nor was
he arrested after the commission of said offense for his arrest came a day after the shooting
incident. However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Dural w/o warrant is justified
as it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested.
The arrest of persons involved in rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or
for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses w/c requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause bef. the issuance of a judicial warrant and the granting of bail if the
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against govt forces, or any other
milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. xxx (Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile.)
Dural was found guilty of the charge and is now serving the sentence imposed upon
him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of HC is no longer available
II
The arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, w/o warrant is also justified.
In view of the revelations made by Rogelio Ramos, a former NPA, the Constantino
house in Marikina Heights was placed under military surveillance and on 8/12/88, pursuant to a
search warrant , a search of the house was conducted at 5 PM by CISC-NCD & CSG. In the
course of the search were found several firearms, regular power supply, antennae, speaker and
subversive documents.
When confronted, R. Constantino (RC) could not produce any permit or authority to
possess the firearms, ammunition, radio, etc. He was brought to CIS HQ for investigation.
When questioned, he refused to give a written statement, although he admitted that he was a
staff member of the executive of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International Dept. of
the CPP.
At about 8 PM, same day, Buenaobra arrived at RC's house. When arrested, he
readily submitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/ NPA and that he
went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong," referring to RC and other members of the rebel
group. Also found in Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing the jumbled tel.
no. of Florida Roque, sister of Amelia Roque, aka. "Ka Nelia." They went to the address on
8/13/88 and arrived at the place about 11 AM. After identifying themselves as military agents
and after seeking permission to search the place, w/c was granted, the military agents
conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of
the place.
The military found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/ CPP. They found
firearms, subversive documents, ledgers, journals, vouchers, among others. Amelia admitted
ownership of the documents seized.
Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after w/c an info. charging
her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed. Another info. for viol. of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against Roque and also to Buenaobra.
hearing, Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP stockade at Camp Crame, Q.C.
Accordingly, the petition for HC on his behalf is now moot and academic.
 III
Anonuevo v. Ramos.
The arrest of Domingo Anonuevo (A) and Ramon Casiple (C) w/o warrant is justified.
At about 7:30 PM on 8/13/88, A and C arrived at the house of RC w/c was still under
surveillance. The military noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents
found them to be loaded guns. They were asked to show their permit or license to possess or
carry firearms and ammunitions but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to
PC HQ for investigation.
At the PC stockade, A was identified as "Ka Ted," and C as "Ka Totoy" of the CPP by
their former comrades.
On 8/15/88, an info. charging them w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed bef. RTC-Pasig. On
8/24/88, a petition for HC was filed bef. this Court.
bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner type jeepney. He demanded that his sister be
allowed to accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request.
An info. charging him w/ viol. of Art. 142, RPC (Inciting to sedition) was filed against
him.
In the afternoon of 11/22/88, during a press-con at the NPC "Deogracias E. through
tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to go on nationwide strike on 11/23/88 xxx."
Policemen waited for petitioners outside the NPC in order to investigate him, but he
gave the lawmen his slip. He was next seen at about 5 PM at a gathering of drivers and
sympathizers, where he was heard as saying,
"Bukas tuloy and welga natin ... hanggang sa magkagulo na."
Since the arrest of the petitioner w/o warrant was in accordance w/ the provisions of R
113, Sec. 5 (b), ROC, and the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid info. filed w/ the
competent court, he may not be released on HC.

HELD: The petitioner's claim that they were unlawfully arrested bec. there was no previous
VII
warrant, is w/o merit. The records show that they were carrying unlicensed firearms and
Nazareno v. Station Commander.
ammunitions in their person when apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the info. filed against them are null and
At about 8:30 AM of 12/14/88, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in
void for want of prel. inv. The filing of an info., w/o a prel. inv., having been first conducted, is
Alabang, Muntinglupa, MM. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who was
sanctioned by Rule 112, Sec. 7, ROC.
arrested by the police on 12/28/88. Upon questioning, Regala pointed to Nazareno as one of his
Petitioners refused to sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125, RPC. Nor did
companions in the killing of Bunye II. In view thereof, the officers, w/o warrant, picked up
petitioners ask for prel. inv. after the informations had been filed against them in court.
Nazareno and brought him to the police HQ for questioning.
xxx
IV
On 2/1/89, the presiding judge of the RTC-Binan, Laguna, issued a resolution denying
Ocaya v. Aguirre.
the petition for HC, it appearing that said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents
by reason of an info. filed against him w/ the RTC-Mkti., MM.
On 5/12/88, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation Division of Rizal PC-INP
Command, armed w/ a search warrant, conducted a search of a house located at Marikina
HELD: The arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police w/o warrant pursuant to Sec. 5 (b), R
Green Heights, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the
113, ROC, after he was positively implicated by his co-accused; and after investigation by the
course of the search, Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents
police.
and several rounds of ammunitions for a .45 cal. pistol were found in Vicky Ocaya's car. They
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does
were brought to the PC HQ for investigation, when O. could not produce any permit or
not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a
authorization to possess the ammunition, an info. charging her w/ viol. of PD 1866 was filed w/
crime. For the detention to be perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority
RTC-Pasig. Rivera was released from custody.
making the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
On 5/17/88, a petition for HC was filed on behalf of these 2.
characteristic of a crime and that the same grounds exist to beleive that the person sought to be
detained participated therein." (Peo. v. Ancheta.)
HELD: Vicky O. was arrested in flagrante delicto so that her arrest w/o warrant is justified. No.
prel. inv. was conducted bec. she was arrested w/o a warrant and she refused to waive the
VIII
provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC, pursuant to R112, Sec. 7, ROC.
In all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper
courts against the petitioners. The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
V
in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge
The petitioners Ocaya, Anonuevo, Casiple and Roque claim that the firearms,
had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any
ammunitions and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their possession, when
court, the writ of HC will not be allowed. (Sec. 4, R 102, ROC.)
arrested, did not belong to them, but were planted by the military to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their claim. On
On the Ilagan Doctrine.
the other hand, no evil motive or ill will on the part of the arresting officers that could cause the
said officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown.
As the Court sees it, re-examination or re-appraisal, w/ a view to its abandonment, of
As pointed out by the Sol-Gen, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch
the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to
hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed
limit the function of HC to a mere inquiry as to w/n the court w/c issued the process, judgement
no less than by former comrades of the petitioners.
or order of commitment, or bef. whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to
VI
issue the process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rahter, as the court
Espiritu v. Lim.
itself stated in Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, in all petitions for HC, the court must inquire into every
phase and aspect of petitioner's detention-- "from the moment petitioner was taken into custody
Deogracias Espititu is the Gen. Sec. of PISTON. Petitioner claims that at about 5 AM
up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a
of 11/23/88, while he was sleeping in his home located at Sta. Mesa, Mla., he was awakened by
scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution in fact has
his sister who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he went down
been satisfied." RAM.
to talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the warrant, the men
Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251

PETITION SEEKING SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE COURT'S
DECISION PROMULGATED ON 9 JULY 1990
The decision (on July 9, 1990) did not rule that mere suspicion that one is a CPP or
NPA is a valid ground for his arrest w/o warrant.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
Rolando Dural.-- His arrest w/o warrant is justified as it can be said that, w/in the
contemplation of Sec. 5 (a), R 113, ROC, he was committing an offense, when arrested, bec.
Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed org., where membership is
penalized, and for subversion w/c, like rebellion is, under Garcia v. Padilla, a continuing crime.
Dural did not cease to be, or become less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF
ARREST, simply bec. he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural
was identified as one of several persons who, the day before his arrest, w/o warrant, had shot 2
CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or
would shoot other policemen, anywhere as agents or representative of an organized govt. It is
in this sense that subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base w/c compels the
repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of
overthrowing organized govt is attained.
His arrest was based on "probable cause."
Sec. 5, R 113, ROC, requires 2 conditions for a valid arrest w/o warrant: (1) the
person to be arrested has just committed an offense and (2) the person arresting has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the one who committed the
offense.
It has been ruled that personal knowledge of facts in arrests w/o warrant must be
based upon probable cause, w/c means on actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing
the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled w/ good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
Said confidential info. received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA was
being treated for a gunshot wound was based on actual facts and supported by circumstances
sufficiently to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in said hospital. The actual facts
supported by circumstances are: (1) the day bef., or on 1/31/88, 2 CAPCOM soldiers were
actually killed in Bagong Bo., Caloocan City by 5 "sparrows" including Dural; (2) a wounded
person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javelon" was actually then being treated in said
hospital for for a gunshot wound; (3) "Ronnie Javelon" and his address entered in the hospital
records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Dural.
On good faith.-- The peace officers who arrested Dural are deemed to have
conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly
perform their official duties.
A few days after Dural's arrest, an info. charging him w/ Double murder w/ assault
against agents of persons in authority was filed in RTC-Caloocan City. He was placed under
judicial custody. On 8/31/88, he was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
As to A. Roque., W. Buenaobra, D. Anonuevo, R.. Casiple & V. Ocaya, their arrests,
w/o warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to a warrant issued by a court of
law and were found w/ unlicensed firearms, explosives and/ or ammunitions on their persons.
They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto w/c justified their outright arrest w/o warrant
under Sec. 5 (a), R113, ROC. A few days after their arrests, informations were filed in court
against said petitioners placing them w/in judicial custody and disposition. Buenaobra's petition
is moot bec. he had chosen to remain in detention.
The reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests w/o warrant was
the info. given to the military that 2 safehouses (one occupied by RC and the other by Benito
Tiamson) were being used by the CPP/ NPA for their operations, w/ info. as to their exact
location and the names of RC and BT as residents and occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said
arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), w/c confirmed the belief of the military
that the info. they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of
the commission of certain crimes: first, the search warrant was duly issued to effect the search
of the Constantino safehouse; second, found in the safehouse was a person named RC, who
admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were
unlicensed firearms and communist equipment; third, at the time of their arrests, in their
possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions, and/ or subversive documents, and they
admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/ NPA. And then shortyly
after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades as CPP/ NPA
members.
An arrest is in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest w/o
warrant is w/o limitation as long as the requirements of Sec. 5, R 113 are met. This rule is
founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our community.
"xxx The legality of the detention does not depend upon the fact of the crime, but xxx
upon the nature of the deed, wherefrom such characterization may reasonably be inferred by the
officer or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision for the urgent purpose
of suspending the liberty of the citizen." (US v. Sanchez.)
ESPIRITU was arrested w/o warrant, not for subversive or any "continuing offense,"
but for uttering the words "Bukas tuloy ang welga natin xxx hanggang sa magkagulo na" w/c in
the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as
falling w/in free speech guaranteed by the Consti. But, the authority of the peace officers to
make the arrest, w/o warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still
another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, w/o obviously becomes difficult at
times, the court, has in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the
arrest (not conviction.)
Supervening events made this case moot and academic. for E. had bef. arraignment
asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Case against E.
has been provisionally dismissed and his bail cancelled.
NAZARENO'S ARREST.-- Although the killing of Bunye II occured on 12/14/88, while
Nazareno's arrest w/o warrant was made only on 12/28/88 or 14 days later, teh arrest falls under
Sec. 5 (b), R113, since it was only on 12/28/88 that the police authorities came to know that
Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be
made promptly, even w/o a warrant (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of 14
days to prevent possible flight.
Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION.
These admissions strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon w/c
the arresting officers based their arrests w/o warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e., that
the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance
w/ Sec. 5, R 113, ROC. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the
persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were
predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested w/o warrant is
not proper in a petition for HC. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits.
GARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE and ILAGAN V. ENRILE:

This Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly in
the light of prevailing conditions where national security and stability are still directly challenged
perhaps, w/ greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that every arrest w/o
warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceedings. RAM.
(2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs
People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784
F: Accused Linsangan was arrested after a “buy-bust” operation. The two marked ten-
peso bill were retrieved from him. He was asked to sign his name on the two marked bills. The
ten handrolled cigarette sticks confiscated from the accused were submitted for examination.
After finding these positive for marijuana, a case was filed for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Law. Linsangan denied the charge. The trial court found Linsangan guilty. Upon appeal, one of
the assertions of Linsangan was that the trial court erred in not holding that when the policemen
required him to initial the marked bills, they violated his constitutional right to counsel, to remain
silent, and not to incriminate himself while under custodial investigation.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHEN HE WAS MADE TO SIGN THE MARKED BILLS.
HELD: Although the accused was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that
the police found tucked in his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his
possession of the marked bills did not constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his
act of selling marijuana cigarettes. His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials
on the marked bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the policemen
that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in the selling marijuana cigarettes to a
member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more credence to their categorical
declarations than to the appellant’s denials. That is as it should be for as law enforcers, they are
presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular manner. Their task of
apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult enough without legal and
procedural technicalities to make it doubly so. Bam.
11. Immunity from arrest of members of Congress
Art. VI, Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House shall, in all offenses punishable
by not more than six (6) years imprisonment (prision correcional), be privileged from arrest while
Congress is in session. xxx
B. Rights of Persons under custodial interrogation
Art. III, Sec. 12. (1) Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of
an offense, shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or sec. 17 hereof, shall
be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section, as
well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
Rep. Act No. 7438
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING,
DETAINING, AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATIONS THEREOF.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
Section 1. Statement of Policy. --- It is the policy of the State to value the dignity of
every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.
Sec. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained, or under Custodial Investigation;
Duties of Public Officers. --- (a) Any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place,
who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the
latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be
allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If
such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating
officer, provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested or
detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him
by his counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or
dialect known to such arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be
null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such persons in the presence of his
counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents,
elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Art. 125 of
the RPC, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the
presence of his counsel; otherwise such waiver shall be null and void and of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed
visits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, or by any national NGO duly accredited by the CHR or by any international NGO duly
accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or
her spouse, fiance or fiancee, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle
or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is under investigation in connection with an offense he is supected to
have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.
Sec. 3. Assisting Counsel. --- Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those
directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary investigation or those
charged with the prosecution of crimes.
 The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the
following fees:
(a) The amount of P150.00 if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;
(b) The amount of P250.00 if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or
grave felonies;
(c) The amount of P350.00 if the suspect is chargeable with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the
custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the municipality or city cannot pay such fee,
the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal
or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel
before the province pays said fees. In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation
shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in
accordance with the provision of Art. 125 of the RPC.
Sec. 4. Penalty Clause. --- (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any
investigating officer who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a fine of P6,000.00 or a penalty of imprisonment of not
less than 8 years but not more than 10 years, or both. The penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously
convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone
acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his place, who fails to provide a competent
and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial inevstigation for the
commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the
immdediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation, or any
medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his counsel, from visiting and conferring
privately chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family with him, or from examining
and treating him, or from minitering to his sppiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent
cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than 4 years nor more
than 6 years, and a fine of P4,000.00.
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with
custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such reasonable measures
as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.
Sec. 5. Repealing Clause. --- RA 857, as amended, is hereby repealed. Other
laws, PDs, EOs or rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 6. Effectivity. --- This Act shall take effect 15 days following its publication in
the OG or in any daily newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Approved, April 27, 1992.
Source: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
According to Chief Justice Warren, when a defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar
atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures, where compulsion is
forcefully potential and his will is likely to be subjugated, the officers must undertake to afford
proper safeguards by the reading of the "Miranda rights" at the outset of the investigation to
ensure that the statements made are truly the product of free choice.
Any person under custodial or police investigation has the right to be informed of the
following rights:
1. Right to remain silent
a) To make him aware of it.
b) To overcome the inherent pressure of the interrogating atmosphere
c) To show the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege
should he choose to invoke his right.
2. Right to be reminded that if he waives his right to remain silent, anything he says can and will
be used against him.
a) To warn him of the consequences of waiving his right to remain silent.
b) To make him aware that this is an adversary system, and that the police are not
acting in his interest.
3. Right to counsel before and during the interrogation
a) To mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness in his testimony, since the inherent
pressures initially overcome by the right to remain silent may again run unless coupled with the
right to counsel.
b) To lessen the possibility of coercion by the police.
4. Right to be reminded that if he cannot afford counsel, then one will be provided for him by the
state.
a) To inform him that if he does not have counsel or cannot afford one, he does not
have to defend himself alone.
b) To inform him that his poverty is no reason why he should lose his right to counsel.
(The reading of these rights is no less indispensable even if the person arrested is a
prominent Constitutional lawyer. Although he may already know these rights, the purpose is not
so much to inform him, as to assure him that his interrogators are willing to respect his rights
amidst the pressure of custodial investigation.)
The reading of these rights is required during "custodial investigation".
A police investigation consists of 2 stages:
1) "General exploratory investigation" - when the investigation consists merely of
general questions to find out who might be the culprit, but without being directed at anyone's
guilt in particular. At this stage, the Miranda rule is not yet applicable; otherwise, people who
could otherwise explain their innocence would be arrested.
2) "Custodial investigation" - when the investigation now focuses on the guilt of a
person such that he is no longer allowed to leave the premise. It is at this stage that the
Miranda ruling is necessary, since the purpose of the interrogation is to evince evidence that can
be used to prosecute the person.
For instance, when A, a policeman, sees X running with a stained knife away from an
apparently dead man, he can rung after X and having grabbed him, ask him for an explanation
as to what he saw without reading his Miranda rights. But once A arrests X and starts
interrogating him in the police precinct, then his rights must now be read, for there can only be
one purpose to the questioning, and that is to elicit evidence to be used to prosecute him.
Mendoza, The Right to Counsel During Custodial Investigations, 2 Law Rev. No. 10, 2 (1988);
61 Phil. LJ 409
I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS PART OF PROTECTION AGAINST
INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS.
Since the introduction of the American accusatorial system of criminal procedure in
the Phils., the rule has been that involuntary confessions are inadmissible in evidence against
the accused.
The question is on whom the burden of proof is placed. The early rule placed the
burden of proving that the confession was voluntary and, therefore, admissible in evidence, on
the prosecution. (Sec. 4, Act No. 619.) It was held that a confession not shown to have been
voluntarily given could be objected to at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on
appeal in the SC.
Act No. 619 was later repealed by the Admin. code of 1916, w/c placed the burden of
proof on the accused to show that his confession was involuntary. Under the new rule, it was
sufficient that the confession was given under conditions w/c accredit prima facie its
admissibility.
In 1953, a further change took place when the SC held in Peo. v. de los Santos that "A
confession, to be repudiated, must not only be proved to have been obtained by force and
violence, but also that it is false or untrue, for the law rejects the confession when, by force or
violence or intimidation, the accused is compelled against his will to tell a falsehood, not even
when such force and violence he is compelled to tell the truth. In the later case of Peo. v.
Villanueva, the Court stated "the admissibility of that kind of evidence depends not on the
supposed illegal manner in w/c it is obtained but on the truth or falsity of the facts or admission
contained therein.
The illegality of the means used in obtaining evidence does not affect its admissibility
(Moncado v. People's Court.)
THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES
The adoption in 1967 of the exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases (Stonehill v.
Diokno) worked a parallel in the law of confession. W/o expressly overruling its decision in de
los Santos and Villanueva, the Court, in Peo. v. Urro, went back to the former rule that
involuntary or coerced confessions, regardless of their truth, are null and void. xxx Involuntary
or coerced confessions obtained by law, w/c proscribes the use of such cruel and inhuman
methods to secure confessions. xxx
Indeed, in the US, it is said that an "unconstitutional coercion will render inadmissible
even the most unquestionably true inculpatory statements." xxx This is not bec. such
confessions are unlikely to be true but bec. the methods used to extract them offend an
underlying principle in the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not
an inquisitorial system -- a system in w/c the State must establish guilt by evidence
independently and freely secured and not by coercion prove its charge against an accused out
of his own mouth xxx." (Rogers v. Richmond, J. Frankfurter.)
THE MIRANDA RULE
The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the def. unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation,
we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken to
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. xxx
II. IN TURN, MIRANDA WARNINGS WERE DEVISED AS MEANS OF SECURING THE RIGHT
TO COUNSEL.
Miranda v. Arizona requires certain warnings to be given by police interrogators bef. a
person in custody may be interrogated, w/c have been adopted by the Phil. SC:
1. The person in custody must be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he
has a right to remain silent. The purpose is to apprise him of his privilege not to be compelled to
incriminate himself, to overcome the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere, and to
assure the individual that his interrogators are prepared to recognize his privilege, should he
choose to exercise it.
2. The person in custody must be warned that anything he will say can and wilol be
used against him. This warning is intended to make him aware not only of the privilege but also
of the consequences of foregoing it.
3. Since the circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very
quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators, it is
indispensable that he has the assistance of counsel.
THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION
At what stage of the police interrogation must the warnings be given? The Consti.
does not state at what stage of the interrogation process they must be made. but in Miranda,
the court specified that it is only at the custodial phase of the interrogation that its ruling applied.
As the Court indicated in Escobedo v. Illinois, it is only after the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect
is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogation that leads itself to
eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
In Gamboa v. Cruz, the accused was arrested, w/o a warrant, for vagrancy. He was
taken to police precint no. 2 in Mla. The next day, he was included in a police line-up of 5
detainees and was pointed to by the complainant as a complanion of the main suspect on the
basis of w/c the accused was ordered to stay and sit in front of the complainant, while the latter
was interrogated. The accused was then charged w/ robbery. The accused moved to dismiss
the case against him on the ground that he had been denied the assistance of counsel during
the line-up. His motion was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: The right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an interrogation, when the police
officer starts to ask questions designed to elicit info. and/ or confessions or admissions from the
accused. As the police line-up in this case was not part of the custodial inquest, the petitioner
was not entitled to counsel xxx.
YAP, J., dissenting: The investigation had commenced the moment the accused was taken
from the police line-up and made to sit in front of the complainant, while the latter made a
statement to the police. The right to counsel must be afforded the accused the moment he is
under custodial investigation and not only when a confession is being exacted from him.
SARMIENTO, J w/ GANCAYCO, dissenting: The accused was in custody so that his
confrontation w/ the complainant became adversarial and not informational. While a police line-
up is not per se critical, bec. in most cases, it is merely part of evidence-gathering process, in
this case, the fact that he stood charged w/ an offense (vagrancy) and had been detained made
the case different.
CRUZ, dissenting: He pointed out the lack of showing that improper suggestions had been
made by the police to influence the witness in the identity of the accused.
III. WAIVER OF RIGHTS.
It is important to distinguish bet. the waiver of rights and the waiver of warnings. The
first can be made provided that the waiver is "voluntary, knowing and intelligent" but the second
cannot. As the warnings are the means of insuring that the suspect is apprised of his rights so
that any subsequent waiver of his rights can be "voluntary, knowing and intelligent," it is obvious
that there can be no valid waiver of the warnings. A waiver of rights will not be presumed.
1. With respect to confessions obtained bef. Jan. 17, 1973, the rule that the suspect
must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel does
not apply. such confessions, even though presented in evidence in a trial after the effectivity of
the 1973 Consti., are admissible, provided they are voluntary, using the traditional test of
voluntariness.
2. With respect to confessions obtained after Jan. 17, 1973, but before March 20,
1985, when the decision of Peo. v. Galit was handed down, the rule is that the voluntariness of a
waiver of the rights to silence and to counsel must be determined on a case-to-case basis,
taking into account the circumstances under w/c the waiver was made.
3. With regard to confessions obtained after March 20, 1985 but before Feb. 2, 1987,
when the present Consti. took effect, the rule is that a waiver of the rights to remain silent and to
the assistance of counsel, to be valid, must be made w/ the assistance of counsel.
 4. With regard to confessions given after Feb. 2, 1987, the present Consti. requires
that the waiver to be valid, must be in writing and w/ the assistance of counsel.

IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE.

Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be

inadmissible in evidence against him, the Consti. says. No distinction is made bet. confession or
admission. Although the previous Consti. spoke of confessions only, I have argued that it was
not so limited but that it also embraced uncounselled statements. For "if a statement made wore
in fact exculpatory, it could ... never be used by the prosecution, in fact, statements merely
intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to
demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by
implication."

EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The phrase "for any purpose in any proceeding" conveys the idea that the rule
excluding evidence illegally obtained is absolute. No similar phraseology is used in the
exclusionary rule implementing the Miranda rule. Does this mean there can be instances, where
uncounselled statements may nevertheless be admissible in evidence, albeit, for a limited
purpose?

In Harris v. US, it was held that although a confession obtained w/o complying w/ the
Miranda rule was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing in chief the confessor's guilt, it
may nevertheless be presented in evidence to impeach his credit. Petitioner, as a def., in a
prosecution for selling heroin, claimed that what he had sold to a police officer was baking
powder, as part of the scheme to defraud the purchaser xxx The shiled provided by Miranda
cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of
confrontation w/ prior inconsistent utterance

In New York v. Quarles, the SC created a "public safety" exception to the Miranda
rule. xxx. "There is public safety exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given
before a suspect's answers may be admitted in evidence." It held that the warnings were not
themselves Constitutional rights but merely "prophylactic" measures to insure the right against
self-incrimination. The Court noted the cost imposed on the public by the rule, namely, that the
giving of warnings might deter suspects from answering questions and this might lead in turn to
fewer convictions. It then ruled that the social cost is higher when the giving of warnings might
deter suspects from answering questions than are necessary to avert an immediate threat to
public safety. When answers are not actually coerced, this social cost outweights the need for
Miranda safeguards. In such exigent circumstances, police officers must not be made to choose
bet. giving the warnings at the risk that public safety will be endangered and withholding the
warnings at the risk that probative evidence will be excluded.