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THE PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010.
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SEPARATE OPINION
BERSAMIN, J.:
I
Locus Standi of Petitioners
Justice Mendoza’s main opinion, which well explains why the petitioners
have locus standi, is congruent with my view on the matter that I expressed in De
Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al.,[2] viz:
Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a
mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise of its
discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Court liberalized
the approach when the cases had “transcendental importance.” Some notable
controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed to
be treated in the same way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.
II
The President Has No Power to Create A Public Office
Yet, the Solicitor General contends that the legal basis for the President’s
creation of the Truth Commission through E. O. No. 1 is Section 31, Chapter 10,
Book III, of theAdministrative Code of 1987.
Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of the Administrative Code of 1987, which
reads:
2. Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President
from other Departments and Agencies; and
3. Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President
from other departments or agencies.
nowhere refers to the creation of a public office by the President. On the contrary,
only a little effort is needed to know from reading the text of the provision that
what has been granted is limited to an authority for reorganization through any of
the modes expressly mentioned in the provision.
The Truth Commission has not existed before E. O. No. 1 gave it life
on July 30, 2010. Without a doubt, it is a new office, something we come to know
from the plain words of Section 1 of E. O. No. 1 itself, to wit:
If the Truth Commission is an entirely new office, then it is not the result of
any reorganization undertaken pursuant to Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of
theAdministrative Code of 1987. Thus, the contention of the Solicitor General is
absolutely unwarranted.
Neither may the creation of the Truth Commission be made to rest for its
validity on the fact that the Constitution, through its Section 17, Article VII,
invests the President with the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
In my view, the duty of faithful execution of the laws necessarily presumes
the prior existence of a law or rule to execute on the part of the President. But,
here, there is no law or rule that the President has based his issuance of E. O. No.
1.
I cannot also bring myself to accept the notion that the creation of the Truth
Commission is traceable to the President’s power of control over the Executive
Department. It is already settled that the President’s power of control can only
mean “the power of an officer to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties, and to substitute the judgment of
the former for that of the latter.”[4] As such, the creation by the President of a
public office like the Truth Commission, without
either a provision of the Constitution or a proper law enacted by
Congress authorizing such creation, is not an act that the power of control
includes.
III
Truth Commission Replicates and Usurps the
Duties and Functions of the
Office of the Ombudsman
I find that the Truth Commission replicates and usurps the duties and
functions of the Office of the Ombudsman. Hence, the Truth Commission is
superfluous and may erode the public trust and confidence in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
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SPONSORSHIP SPEECH
OF COMMISSIONER MONSOD
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SPONSORSHIP SPEECH
OF COMMISSIONER COLAYCO
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xxx
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SPONSORSHIP SPEECH
OF COMMISSIONER NOLLEDO
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Madam President, the creation of the Ombudsman x x x is in answer to the
crying need of our people for an honest and responsive government. The office of
the Ombudsman as proposed by the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers x x x is really an institution primarily for the citizens as against the
malpractices and corruption in the government. As an official critic, the
Ombudsman will study the law, the procedure and practice in the
government, and make appropriate recommendations for a more systematic
operation of the governmental machinery, free from bureaucratic
inconveniences. As a mobilizer, the Ombudsman will see to it that there be a
steady flow of services to the individual consumers of government. And as a
watchdog, the Ombudsman will look after the general, as well as specific
performances of all government officials and employees so that the law may
not be administered with an evil eye or an uneven hand.[7]
xxx
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding
certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to
put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those
involved, if warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the
people’s faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292,
otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, gives the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby
order:
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
[1]
Philippine Constitution Association v. Hon. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 and 113888,
August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506.
[2]
G.R. Nos. 191002, 191032, 191057, 191149, 191342 and 191420, and A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, March 17, 2010.
[3]
Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications v. Malabot, G.R. No. 138200, February
27, 2002, 378 SCRA 128.
[4]
Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143.
[5]
Record of the Deliberation of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, R.C.C. No. 40, Saturday, July 26, 1986,
pp. 265.
[6]
Id., at 265-266.
[7]
Id., at 267.