Crim Pro Briefs

WEEKS v.
UNITED STATES
No. 461
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
232 U.S. 383; 34 S. Ct. 341; 58 L. Ed. 652; 1914 U.S. LEXIS 1368
Argued December 2, 3, 1913

February 24, 1914
PRIOR HISTORY:
ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was charged with the use of the mails
to transport coupons or tickets representing chances or shares in a lottery.
The District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri
denied defendant's pretrial petition to suppress the evidence seized in a
warrantless search of his room and to return the seized property. The
district court retained jurisdiction of the property. Defendant appealed the
denial of his petition.
OVERVIEW: In review of defendant's contention that the warrantless

seizure of his private correspondence violated his Fourth Amendment rights,
the Court held: 1) that the letters in question were taken from defendant's
house by an official of the United States acting under color of his office in
direct violation of the constitutional rights of defendant; 2) that having
made a seasonable application for their return, which was heard and passed
upon by the court, there was involved in the order refusing the application a
denial of the constitutional rights of defendant; and 3) that the district court
should have restored the letters to defendant. In holding the private
correspondence and permitting their use at trial, prejudicial error was
committed. The police did not act under any claim of federal authority such
as would make the Fourth Amendment applicable to such unauthorized
seizure as they acted before the finding of an indictment in the federal
court. The Court did not inquire as to what remedies were available to
defendant, as the Fourth Amendment was not directed to individual
misconduct of such officials. Its limitations reached only the federal
government and its agencies.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the district court and
remanded the case.
ISSUE: Should the illegally gained evidence be admissible

MAPP v. OHIO
No. 236
367 U.S. 643; 81 S. Ct. 1684; 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081; 1961 U.S. LEXIS 812; 86 Ohio L.
Abs. 513; 16 Ohio Op. 2d 384; 84 A.L.R.2d 933
March 29, 1961, Argued

June 19, 1961, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
DISPOSITION: 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N. E. 2d 387, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed from a judgment of the

Supreme Court of Ohio, which affirmed her conviction for possessing
obscene literature in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.34. Defendant
contended that the evidence seized during a search and that was introduced
at the trial was prohibited under U.S. Const. amend. IV.
OVERVIEW: It was apparent that the materials introduced into evidence in

the prosecution of defendant were seized during an illegal search of
defendant's residence in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless,
the state supreme court affirmed defendant's conviction for possessing lewd
material in violation of Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2905.34 on the basis that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not apply in the state court prosecution of
defendant for a state crime to forbid the admission of evidence obtained by
an unreasonable search and seizure. On appeal, the Court reversed the
state supreme court's decision. The Court held that the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to the States the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. And, as
necessary to ensure such rights, the exclusionary rule, which prohibited the
introduction into evidence of material seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, likewise applied to the State's prosecution of state crimes.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the state supreme court
and remanded the cause for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
Court's opinion.
POSSEORY INTREST AND PRIVACY INTRENCE ARE VIOLATED BY THE COPS
STATE ACTOR…
OVERTURNS WOLF…THAT SAID THAT THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE DID NOT
APPLY…HISTORICAL POINTS: MORE STATE ARE USING THE RULE, OTHER
REMIDIES ARE NOT WORKING
THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE: DETURANCE; NOT CORRECTION [VIOLATION

OCCURS AT THE TIME THE POLICE TAKE YOUR STUFF OR INTFREAR W/ PLP
INTRESTS
ARGUMENT IS A LITTLE TRICKY…

DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED AT THE TRIAL, WHEN CORRECED
CONFESSIONS ARE LET INTO COURT…COURT SAID THAT THIS
EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD WORK THE SAME
THE ASSUMPTION UNDER QUESTION IS THAT THE EXCUSIONARY RULE

COMES FROM THE CONSTIUTION, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT EXPRESSLY IN THE
CONSTIUTION AND THUS SHOULD NOT BE PUT UPON THE STATES
4TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION CAN NOT BE FIXED, IT HAPPENED, IT IS

ALREADY THERE, THUS, IT CAN ONLY HAVE THE EFFECT OF DETURANCE
BY NOT ADMITTING IT AT TRIAL
DECENT: IT IS MERLY A SUPERVISORY RULE, AND THUS CAN NOT BE

FORCED UPON THE STATES
HARLEM: SAYS THE FED GOVT SHOULD NOT BE FORCEING SUCH
SUPERVISORY RULS UPON THE STATES
COURT CAN NOW WIDDLE AWAY AT THE EXCSIONARY RULE…THE SC HAS

NOT SAID THAT IT IS GOING TO APPLY THE EXCUSIONARY RULE; NEVER
OVERTRUN WEEKS OR MAPP
KATZ v. UNITED STATES
No. 35
389 U.S. 347; 88 S. Ct. 507; 19 L. Ed. 2d 576; 1967 U.S. LEXIS 2
October 17, 1967, Argued

December 18, 1967, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION: 369 F.2d 130, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant sought review of a judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which, in affirming
defendant's conviction for transmitting wagering information by telephone in
violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 1084, rejected the contention that the recordings
had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment because there was
no physical entrance into the area occupied by defendant.
OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering information

by telephone in violation of a federal statute. At the trial, the government
was permitted, over defendant's objection, to introduce evidence of
defendant's end of telephone conversations, which was overheard by FBI
agents who had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the
outside of the public telephone booth where he had placed his calls. A court
of appeals, in affirming his conviction, rejected the contention that the
recordings had been obtained in violation of U.S. Const. amend. IV because
there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by defendant. The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that a person in a telephone booth could
rely upon the protection of U.S. Const. amend. IV. One who occupied a
telephone booth, shut the door behind him, and paid the toll that permitted
him to place a call was entitled to assume that the words he uttered into the
mouthpiece would not be broadcast to the world. The Court determined that
the government agents ignored the procedure of antecedent justification,
which was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance
involved in the case.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed defendant's conviction.
WHETHER THERE WAS A SEARCH WHEN A DEVICE WAS PUT OUTSIDE A

PHONE BOOTH AND CONVERSTION WAS RECORDED
COURT OVERRULES THE TRESPASS DOCTRINE; THUS CAN VIOLATE THE 4TH
EVEN IF THERE HAS NOT BEEN A PHYSICAL TRESPASS.
ESTABLISHING A SEARCH DOES NOT START THE 4TH, IT MUST BE AN
UNREASONABLE SEARCH FOR THE EVIDENCE TO BE EXCLUDED
UNITED STATES v. WHITE
No. 13
November 10, 1969, Argued

April 5, 1971, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Reargued October 20, 1970.
PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The government sought review of a decision of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which reversed
the trial court's judgment convicting defendant under two consolidated
indictments charging various illegal transactions in narcotics violative of 26
U.S.C.S. § 4705 (a) and 21 U.S.C.S. § 174 and sentencing him as a second
offender to 25-year concurrent sentences.
OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted under two consolidated indictments

charging him with various illegal transactions in narcotics violative of 26
U.S.C.S. § 4705 (a) and 21 U.S.C.S. § 174 and sentenced as a second
offender to 25-year concurrent sentences. The lower appellate court
reversed respondent's conviction, and the government sought writ of
certiorari. The Court concluded that the lower appellate court misinterpreted
both Katz and U.S. Const. amend. IV and erred in applying Katz to events
that occurred before that decision was rendered by the court. The Court
concluded that under pre-Katz law, the electronic surveillance of defendant
involved did not violate his rights to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not bar from
evidence the testimony of governmental agents who related certain
conversations which had occurred between defendant and a government
informant, and which the agents overheard by monitoring the frequency of a
radio transmitter carried by the informant and concealed on his person.
OUTCOME: The lower appellate court's judgment reversing defendant's

conviction for various illegal transactions in narcotics was reversed because
the testimony of governmental agents who related certain conversations
which had occurred between defendant and a government informant, and
which the agents overheard by monitoring the frequency of a radio
transmitter carried by the informant and concealed on his person was not
precluded by the Fourth Amendment.
GOVERNMENT ACTION IS HEARING THE CONVERSTATIONS…IS THIS A

SEARCH
NO, THIS IS NOT A SEARCH. [POLICY CONSIDERATION: PEOPLE NEED TO

HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THE COMUNICATION IS CONFIDENT…IN THIS
CASE, IT FAILS ON THE SECOND PRONG OF THE TEST. YOU SHOULD BE
ABLE TO TRUST WHAT YOU SAY]
ARE PRIVACY INTRESTS MORE IMPLICATED WHEN THE POLICE OUT IN A

CAR RECORD THE INFORMATION…PIVACY INTRESTS WOULD NOT BE
IMPLICATED IF A INFORMANT ACTUALY CAME IN
SMITH v. MARYLAND
No. 78-5374

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
DISPOSITION: 283 Md. 156, 389 A. 2d 858, affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner challenged an order of the Court of

Appeals of Maryland that determined that the use of a pen register without a
warrant to obtain the identity of numbers petitioner dialed from his home
telephone did not violate petitioner's U.S. Const. amend. IV rights.
OVERVIEW: After the victim of a robbery began receiving phone calls from
the person who claimed to be the robber, the police installed a pen register,
without a warrant, at the central telephone system in order to determine the
identity of the numbers that petitioner, a suspect, was dialing. After the
police discovered that petitioner had called the victim, they charged him
with robbery. Petitioner alleged that use of the pen register constituted an
illegal search within the meaning of U.S. Const. amend. IV. On review of the
state court's decision that it did not, the Court determined that petitioner's
U.S. Const. amend. IV rights were not violated. The Court found that
petitioner did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy regarding the
numbers he dialed on his phone because those numbers were automatically
turned over to a third party, the phone company. The Court also ruled that
even if petitioner did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone
numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation was not one that
society was prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus, the Court
concluded that installation of the pen register was not a "search" and no
warrant was required.
OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the order from the state court, ruling that
petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by warrantless use
of a pen register.
OLIVER v. UNITED STATES
No. 82-15
466 U.S. 170; 104 S. Ct. 1735; 80 L. Ed. 2d 214; 1984 U.S. LEXIS 55; 52 U.S.L.W.
4425

April 17, 1984, Decided *
* Together with No. 82-1273, Maine v. Thornton, on certiorari to the Supreme

Judicial Court of Maine.
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION: 686 F.2d 356, affirmed; 453 A. 2d 489, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Writ of certiorari was granted from judgments of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which ruled that the
open fields doctrine permitted introduction of evidence of the discovery of a
marijuana field located in a field surrounded by no trespass signs a mile
from petitioner's home, and of the Supreme Judicial court of Maine, which
suppressed evidence obtained under similar circumstances.
OVERVIEW: Petitioner was arrested and indicted after police officers,

without a warrant and without probable cause, investigated and discovered
a marijuana field a mile from petitioner's home that was surrounded by "no
trespass" signs. Applying the open fields doctrine, the lower court held that
petitioner's rights under U.S. Const. amend. IV had not been violated. In a
second similar case, evidence of marijuana found on respondent's property
was suppressed by the lower court as a violation of respondent's privacy.
Noting that the U.S. Const. amend. IV protection against unreasonable
searches did not extend to intrusions into open fields, the court affirmed the
introduction of the evidence in petitioner's case and reversed the
suppression of evidence in respondent's case. Because the court found that
there was no reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy in open fields,
the officers' actions in entering such open fields without a warrant or
probable cause did not violate the Constitution. Because privacy for outdoor
activities conducted in fields only extended to the area immediately
surrounding the home, the court affirmed the validity of the open fields
doctrine.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment, and remanded for further
proceedings.
CALIFORNIA v. CIRAOLO
No. 84-1513
4471
December 10, 1985, Argued

May 19, 1986, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO COURT OF APPEALS OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT.
DISPOSITION: 161 Cal. App. 3d 1081, 208 Cal. Rptr. 93, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff, the State of California, petitioned for

writ of certiorari from decision of the Court of Appeals of California, First
Appellate District, which reversed trial court's denial of defendant's motion
to suppress evidence of search on ground that the warrantless aerial
observation of defendant's yard violated U.S. Const. amend. IV.
OVERVIEW: The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence

of a search, and defendant pled guilty to a charge of cultivation of
marijuana. The appellate court reversed on the ground that the warrantless
aerial observation which led to the issuance of a search warrant violated
U.S. Const. amend. IV. On certiorari, the Court held that, although
defendant's yard was within the curtilage of his home, this did not bar police
observation. The Court stated that Fourth Amendment protection of the
home had never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield
their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares. Nor did the
mere fact that defendant had erected a 10-foot fence around his yard
preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he had
a right to be and which rendered activities clearly visible. Defendant's
expectation that his yard was protected from observation was unreasonable
and not an expectation that society was prepared to honor.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the appellate court's judgment and found
that defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied.
STEVEN DEWAYNE BOND v. UNITED STATES
No. 98-9349
529 U.S. 334; 120 S. Ct. 1462; 146 L. Ed. 2d 365; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 2520; 68
U.S.L.W. 4255; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2877; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 3853;
2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 2053; 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 247
February 29, 2000, Argued

PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner challenged the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit convicting him of conspiracy to
possess, and possession with intent to distribute, methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C.S. § 841(a)(1), on grounds that the court improperly
affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress the drugs.
OVERVIEW: Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to possess, and

possession with intent to distribute, methamphetamine in violation of 21
U.S.C.S. § 841(a)(1), after the lower courts denied his motion to suppress
the drugs on grounds that they were seized in an illegal search violative of
U.S. Const. amend. IV. Petitioner was a passenger on a bus boarded at a
permanent checkpoint by a border patrol agent who found the drugs in
petitioner's carry-on luggage, stored in an overhead rack above his seat, by
physical manipulation of the luggage. The court reversed the lower court's
judgment, holding that the agent's manipulation of the bag was a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; petitioner's personal luggage
was protected by the Amendment because he had a privacy interest in it.
The court held further that the search violated the Fourth Amendment
because petitioner sought to preserve privacy in the luggage by using an
opaque bag and placing that bag directly above his seat and because the
agent's physical manipulation of the bag went beyond the handling that
petitioner could reasonably have expected.
OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed because petitioner's motion to

suppress evidence should have been granted.. The search by which the
drugs were obtained was illegal because the physical manipulation of
petitioner's carry-on luggage violated his reasonable expectation of privacy.
RAKAS ET AL. v. ILLINOIS
No. 77-5781

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Petition For Rehearing Denied January 15, 1979.
PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,

THIRD DIVISION.
DISPOSITION: 46 Ill. App. 3d 569, 360 N. E. 2d 1252, affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners sought review of a decision from the

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third Division, which affirmed their convictions for
armed robbery on the ground that their motion to suppress evidence was
properly denied because they lacked standing to object to the unlawful
search and seizure of a vehicle under U.S. Const. amend. IV.
OVERVIEW: The Court affirmed petitioners' convictions for armed robbery

because their motion to suppress a sawed-off rifle and shells seized by the
police during the search of a vehicle in which petitioners were passengers
was properly denied. Noting that the inquiry was essentially the same, the
Court expressed that the preferred analysis for determining the scope of
constitutional rights protected by the exclusionary rule focused on the
substantive question of whether petitioners had their own rights infringed by
the police's search and seizure, rather than on the concept of standing, as
previously decided. Further, the Court determined that the appropriate
measure of rights was no longer guided solely by whether petitioners were
legitimately on the premises that the police searched. Without holding that a
property interest was required, the Court decided that U.S. Const. amend.
IV protected only those places in which petitioners themselves had a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Using this analysis, the Court found that
petitioners' rights were not violated where they had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in areas of a car in which they claimed no property or
possessory interest.
OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the judgment convicting petitioners of

armed robbery because their motion to suppress evidence was properly
denied where petitioners' own rights were not violated. Petitioners had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in areas of a car in which they claimed no
property or possessory interest.
• Seizure of the Defendants…they stopped the car [they had

standing to challenge this, however they did not…you always have
standing to object to the seizure of ones own stuff or person]
• Question is
o Search for glove box
o Search under seats
• JONES CASE: A person invited has standing; however court
overtruns this rule and inacts a new rule [uner Jones if you owned or
were on the premises you had auto-standing THIS WAS A BRIGHT LINE
RULE]=whether a person has a reasonable/legitimate expectation of
privacy [katz test]
• Relationship of passenger to car…if there in a place where they
don’t have control no standing
• This case does not provide a bright line rule…now you are basing
it on property law concepts [in katz we rejected the physical trespass
doctrine
o And this decreases the amount of people who have
standing
MINNESOTA, PETITIONER v. WAYNE THOMAS CARTER
No. 97-1147
U.S.L.W. 4017; 98 Cal. Daily Op. Service 8754; 98 Daily Journal DAR 12129;
1998 Colo. J. C.A.R. 5991

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: As Amended October 21, 1999.
PRIOR HISTORY: MINNESOTA V. MELVIN JOHNS ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA.
DISPOSITION: 569 N. W. 2d 169 (first judgment) and 180 (second

judgment), reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner, the State of Minnesota, sought review

by a writ of certiorari a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court that held
that respondents, defendants who were charged with conspiracy to commit
a controlled substance crime, had standing to assert a U.S. Const. amend.
IV claim based on their alleged legitimate expectation of privacy.
OVERVIEW: A police officer looked through a window blind in a lessee's

apartment based on an informant's tip. The officer observed respondents
bagging cocaine in the apartment. Based on that observation, a warrant was
issued, and respondents were arrested and charged with conspiracy to
commit a controlled substance crime. Respondents made a motion to
suppress the evidence, contending that the officer's observation was an
unreasonable search. Ultimately, the state supreme court determined that
respondents had standing to assert a U.S. Const. amend. IV legitimate
expectation of privacy claim. The court reversed and remanded, holding that
an overnight guest in a home could claim the protection of U.S. Const.
amend. IV, but one who was merely present with the consent of the
householder could not. In addition, property used for commercial purposes
was treated differently for U.S. Const. amend. IV purposes than residential
property.
OUTCOME: The court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision,
holding that property used for commercial purposes was treated differently
for Fourth Amendment purposes than residential property. One who was
merely present with the consent of the householder could not claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment.
Substantive Argument: They said the initial search was illegal…thus everything
that followed was unlawful
Govt. Action:
--Police looked in window
--Police stopped car
--looked in car
--Arrested the people
--latter searched car
--obtained warrant and searched house
==evidence gained was stuff from the car , statements the arrestes made, stuff from
the apartment
Was it a search, was it legal?
Standing: defendant had no standing to claim of 4th Amendment violation the issue
whether all of the evidence c`ould be excluded if the looking into the window was
unlawful. If the look into the window was unlawful then all the other evidence
would have been tainted. Thus, all the evidence would be excluded. The trial court
said the defendant had no standing in any case the looking into the window was not
a search .
The court of appeals reversed finding that thye had standing and it was a search
1. Not Their Apt
2. Purpose of Visit=Business
3. Couple of Hours
4. No prior Connection
Scalia: Textual, literal reading…Their house, their effects
Breyner: Standing but no search

Kennedy: Almost all social guest have standing but not commercial guests
3 dissent…anyone you’ve invited has standing
RULE: SOCIAL GUESTS HAVE STANDING

DRAPER
Based on totality of the circumstances…would lead officer to reasonable

conclude that the person is committing the crime. It didn’t provide a test, said
hearsay can from the basis to form probable cause
Court says: this is enough to arrest

SPINELLI v. UNITED STATES
No. 8
October 16-17, 1968, Argued

January 27, 1969, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH

CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION: 382 F.2d 871, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was convicted of traveling across the

state line from Illinois to Missouri with the intention of conducting gambling
activities proscribed by Missouri law. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit rejected his contention that the search warrant that led to
incriminating evidence against him was not supported by probable cause
and affirmed his conviction. The Court granted certiorari of that decision.
OVERVIEW: Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the warrant that

authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) search, which
uncovered the evidence necessary for his conviction. The warrant was
granted by a magistrate judge upon an affidavit stating that the FBI had
observed defendant's travels to and from an apartment and that a
confidential reliable informant had informed the authorities that defendant
was operating a gambling operation. On certiorari, the court found that the
application for the warrant was inadequate because it failed to set forth the
underlying circumstances necessary to enable the magistrate to
independently judge the validity of the informant's information. Also the
affiant-officers failed to support their claim that their informant was
"credible" or his information "reliable." The bald assertion that defendant
was "known" as a gambler was entitled to no weight in appraising the
magistrate's decision and the Court rejected as imprecise the "totality of
circumstances" approach embraced by the court of appeals. Thus, the
affidavit fell short of providing probable cause as necessary to support the
issuance of the search warrant.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment from the court of appeals,
which affirmed the petitioner's conviction after finding the search warrant
supported by probable cause. The court remanded the case to the court of
appeals for further proceedings.
AGULARA TEST: [1] RELIABILITY--- IN THIS CASE WE NEED TO KNOW
WHY THE INFORMATN IS RELIABLE, A TRACK RECORD WOULD HELP,
(can be coroberated (helps w/ great details), track reckord, veracity) [2] BASIS OF
KNOWLEDGE ---IN THIS CASE WE DON’T KNOW HOW THE INFORMAT
GOT THE INFO
ILLINOIS v. GATES ET UX.
No. 81-430
U.S.L.W. 4709

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Reargued March 1, 1983.
PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.
DISPOSITION: 85 Ill. 2d 376, 423 N. E. 2d 887, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner state appealed a judgment from the

Illinois Supreme Court, which affirmed the decisions of lower state courts
granting a motion to suppress evidence against respondents, a husband and
wife, as having been obtained pursuant to a search warrant improperly
issued on the basis of a confidential informant's tip in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
OVERVIEW: A state supreme court ruled to suppress evidence against

respondents, a husband and wife, reasoning that the search warrant was
based on a confidential informant's tip that did not satisfy the purported
"veracity" and "basis of knowledge" prongs for probable cause. Holding
instead that probable cause was determined by a traditional totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis, the Court reversed. The Court held that probable
cause determinations were not susceptible to the rigid, technical
methodology that had been read into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
Court held that the elements of an informant's veracity and knowledge
should be understood simply as issues that could illuminate the
commonsense inquiry of whether there was probable cause to issue a search
warrant. The Court held that this approach comported with the standard of
proof for a warrant, which required only the "probability," and not a prima
facie showing, of criminal activity. The Court held that the informant's
recitation of detailed facts, though relating to innocent activities, when
corroborated by observation by police officers, afforded probable cause to
believe that respondents had drugs in their possession.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment that suppressed evidence

against respondents, a husband and wife, because the suppression was
based on an erroneous application of an overly rigid and technical standard
for determining whether a confidential informant's tip established probable
cause; under the proper, commonsense approach, the corroboration by
police of the facts of the tip established probable cause to believe that
respondents possessed drugs.
1They have an annomous letter

2have coroberating evidence
--wife drive to FL
--husband flys donwn
--husband stars flying back
We have something on basis of knowledge, but we don’t know about reliability
So they want to put these two away, so the court uses totality of the circumstances
--lay people Magistrates and Police, can not understand A/S

--thy will instead just do warantless searches
--if its two narrow then criminals will get away with it
Disent:
--now Magistrates have no guidelines
MICHAEL A. WHREN AND JAMES L. BROWN, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES
No. 95-5841.
U.S.L.W. 4409; 96 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4123; 96 Daily Journal DAR 6635; 9
Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 652
April 17, 1996, Argued

PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT

OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION: 311 U.S. App. D.C. 300, 53 F.3d 371, affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: On grant of certiorari, defendants challenged a

judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that
upheld their convictions for various federal drug law violations after holding
that defendants' motion for suppression was justifiably denied by the trial
court. Defendants had sought suppression of evidence that was seized
following a traffic stop.
OVERVIEW: Plainclothes vice-squad officers were patrolling "high drug

area" in an unmarked car. An officer who had observed traffic violations
approached a vehicle that was occupied by defendants. When the officer
approached defendant driver's car window, he observed two large plastic
bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine in defendant passenger's hands.
Defendants were arrested and illegal drugs were retrieved from the vehicle.
On appeal, defendants accepted that the officer had probable cause to
believe the traffic code was violated, but argued that the test for traffic
stops should have been whether a police officer, who acted reasonably,
would have made stop for the given reason. Court disagreed because the
officer's motive did not apply outside the context of inventory search or
administrative inspection, and performance of balancing analysis was
unnecessary where probable cause existed and a traffic stop out of uniform
did not remotely qualify as an extreme practice.
OUTCOME: Judgment affirmed; officer's probable cause to believe

petitioners violated traffic code rendered the vehicle stop reasonable and the
evidence seized admissible.
We don’t use officers subjective defense, and we are not going to establish a
reasonable officer clause
Defense says that the stop was unreasonable and pretextual…should look at what a
reasonable officer would have done
JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
No. 329
333 U.S. 10; 68 S. Ct. 367; 92 L. Ed. 436; 1948 U.S. LEXIS 2583

February 2, 1948, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
Petitioner was convicted in a Federal District Court on evidence obtained by a search

made without a warrant. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 162 F.2d 562. This
Court granted certiorari. 332 U.S. 807. Reversed, p. 17.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant sought a writ of certiorari to

review a judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which affirmed her conviction on four counts of violating federal
narcotics laws, including I.R.C. § 2553(a) and the Narcotic Drugs
Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C.S. § 174.
OVERVIEW: Police received information from a confidential informer

that unknown persons were smoking opium in a hotel. The police went
to the hotel with federal narcotics agents, and they all recognized the
strong odor of burning opium, which led them to defendant's room. The
officers knocked on the door, talked to defendant, and asked her about
the opium smell, which defendant denied noticing. The officers arrested
her and searched the room, turning up incriminating opium and
smoking apparatus. The evidence was admitted at trial over
defendant's objection, she was convicted, and her conviction was
affirmed on direct appeal. On defendant's petition for certiorari review,
the United States Supreme Court reversed the convictions for violating
I.R.C. § 2553(a) and the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 21
U.S.C.S. § 174. The Court held that the warrantless arrest and search
violated the Fourth Amendment, even though officers may have had
probable cause to obtain a search warrant. The Court found no exigent
circumstances. Nor was the inconvenience and slight delay in preparing
papers and presenting the evidence to a magistrate a sufficient basis to
justify bypassing the warrant requirement.
OUTCOME: The Court granted the petition and reversed, holding that
the warrantless arrest and search violated the Fourth Amendment even
though the officers may have had probable cause to obtain a warrant.
Government Action: Not go into the hall/ Not smell Opium; but Entry into the room and
looking around
Probable cause: Tip + Coroberated Circumstances
But the Court says that we generally need warrants b/c it protects privacy
It is important b/c the warrant is then at the suppression hearing, thus frezzing the
probable cause determination, prevents form ad hoc additions to building probable
cause
What Johnson says is that if the police are ingaging in a search, The presumption is
that there is a warrant requirement…prevents from police getting to wraped up and
ad hoc probable cause
Exception: Emergency has to be specific artulated facts

UNITED STATES v. WATSON
No. 74-538
Argued October 8, 1975

January 26, 1976
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The government sought review of a

judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
which reversed defendant's conviction for possession of stolen mail in
violation of 18 U.S.C.S. § 1708.
OVERVIEW: Defendant's conviction for possession of stolen mail, 18

U.S.C.S. § 1708, was reversed when the appellate court determined
that the warrantless arrest of defendant violated his Fourth
Amendment rights and that the post-arrest search of defendant's car
was coerced. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court first ruled that defendant's arrest did not violate the Fourth
Amendment because (1) it was based upon probable cause, as the
government acted upon information from a reliable informant that
defendant possessed stolen cards; and (2) the arrest was made
pursuant to 18 U.S.C.S. § 3061(a)(3) and 39 C.F.R. § 232.5(a)(3),
which authorized the government to make warrantless felony arrests
upon reasonable grounds. Therefore, the Court ruled the post-arrest
search of defendant's car to which defendant consented to, and which
yielded the credit cards upon which his conviction was based, had not
been the product of an illegal arrest. That defendant was not informed
of his right to refuse consent to the search did not render the search
invalid.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.
Government action: Arrest, and Seach of Car [but this was concentual]
Fruit of Poisiones Tree (FOPT), so the issue is whether the arrest is invalid
Did they have probable cause? They have an informant, and gives signal,
and informant gives probable cause to past crimes
Issue is if you need an areest warrant for past crims/fellonies, b/c everyone
agrees that seeing a crime in front of her you don’t need an arrest warrant.
Justification:
There is a statute that says this is ok
There is also a Historical Analysis [common law arrest is ok for felonies]
Hampering Law Enforcement
Citing Precedent [we got cases that says this is ok]
It is also the current state practice
Concurring:
Undercuts Historical Analysis…it has never been before us before, but says
that it is good
RULE: Can always arrest someone for a mister meaner of felony committed
in presence and can arrest someone for a past felony w/o a arrest warrant
[b/c felons pose a public danger]
ANDRESEN v. MARYLAND
No. 74-1646
Argued February 25, 1976

June 29, 1976
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Certiorari was granted to review from a

judgment of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which held that
search warrants were supported by probable cause and did not
authorize a general search in violation of U.S. Const. amend. IV, and
that the search had not violated petitioner's U.S. Const. amend. V
rights because petitioner was not compelled to do anything.
OVERVIEW: The introduction of petitioner's business records into

evidence was not a violation of his U.S. Const. amend. V, self-
incrimination privilege. Petitioner, as the closing attorney, was
convicted of false pretenses for defrauding a purchaser of property.
Investigators obtained a search warrant to search petitioner's offices
for evidence of the crime. Petitioner argued that the admission of his
business records, which contained statements made by petitioner,
compelled petitioner to testify against himself in violation of U.S.
Const. amend. V. The court disagreed, holding that petitioner was not
asked to say or to do anything. Thus, the introduction into evidence of
petitioner's business records seized during an otherwise lawful search
did not offend or undermine any of the policies undergirding the
privilege. The court also rejected petitioner's argument that the
searches were unreasonable because they were based on general
warrants. The warrants referred only to the crime of false pretenses
and were sufficiently specific.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the judgment.
Was there probable cause: yes foot note 9
Warrant was out for 3 months…staleness is not an issue b/c it is business records
Warrants must reasonably descrive the thing or person to be seized [particularity

requirement]. This pertains to the place and the items. Petitioners argument is that
it lacks items received
Thus the case boils down to how you read the word “crime” in the warrant
With looking through papers or compter files the govt. is going to look at a lot of
information before getting to what they want
MARYLAND v. GARRISON
No. 85-759
4190

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
DISPOSITION: 303 Md. 385, 494 A. 2d 193, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was convicted of violating

Maryland's Controlled Substances Act after marijuana and related
paraphernalia were discovered in his apartment. Defendant filed a
motion to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment, which was
denied by the trial court. The state court of special appeals affirmed,
but the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded with
instructions to remand the case for a new trial. Certiorari was granted.
OVERVIEW: The evidence had been seized in a search conducted

pursuant a warrant that specified a location of "the premises known as
2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment." The police reasonably
believed that there was only one apartment on the premises described
in the warrant. However, there were two apartments on the third floor.
Before the officers executing the warrant became aware that they were
in a separate apartment occupied by defendant, they had discovered
the contraband that provided the basis for defendant's conviction. The
question presented to the Court was whether the seizure of the
contraband was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The Court held
that the warrant was valid when it was issued and the manner in which
it was executed was reasonable. The validity of the warrant was
assessed on the basis of the information that the officers disclosed, or
had a duty to discover and to disclose, to the issuing magistrate. The
officers' execution of the warrant reasonably included the entire third
floor, and their conduct was consistent with a reasonable effort to
ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the state court of

appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings not
inconsistent with the Court's opinion.
Had probable cause
Issue: 1 Was the warrant valid, …there is a mistake in the warrant b/c
there is 2 apartmentsbut the mistake was reasonable
2 was it reasaonably excuted, …less clear but reasonable b/c
=================================================
Franks v. Delewarewhen defendat shows that the probable cause
showing was based on an intentional or recklessly false statement the court
hs to take out that evidence from the warrant and still determine if there is
probable cause (notes 101)
Anticipatory Warrant: The requirement of the search warrant is that the

item to be seized is at the place of the place to be searched at the time the
warrant is issued. If it is for the future an Anticipatory Warrant will be
issued if there is no other way to do it. Best example is a drug bust where it
is undetermined where they are going to make the sale.
SHARLENE WILSON, PETITIONER v. ARKANSAS
No. 94-5707
U.S.L.W. 4456; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3823; 95 Daily Journal DAR 6470; 9 Fla. L.
Weekly Fed. S 67

PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF

ARKANSAS.
DISPOSITION: 317 Ark. 548, 878 S. W. 2d 755, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed a judgment of the

Supreme Court of Arkansas that affirmed her conviction for delivery
and possession of drugs, finding no authority for the theory that U.S.
Const. amend. IV required police officers to knock and announce
themselves before entering a residence when executing a search
warrant.
OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted of delivery and possession of

drugs after police officers, in executing a search warrant, entered
through an unlocked screen door without first knocking or announcing
their presence. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress
the evidence seized during the search. The state supreme court
affirmed defendant's conviction on appeal, finding no authority for the
theory that the Fourth Amendment required police officers to knock
and announce themselves before entering a residence when executing
a search warrant. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the common-law knock and announce principle formed a part of
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry and a search or seizure
of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police officers
entered without prior announcement, and remanded the case to
determine whether the unannounced entry was reasonable under the
circumstances.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment and remanded for further
proceedings.
Issue: Whether the Popo is required to knock before they ente

Rule, must knock and announce…it gives the owner the chance for officer to come
in before destruction of house, … also protects privacy interests, and the safety of
the officer
RICHARD V. WISCONSON  not going to allow per se rules for exclusion of

knock and announce
RAMIREZ not going to establish a different rule for when property is destroyed
LAYNE reports coming along w/ the warrant is an addition and unreasonable

invasion of privacy
UNITED STATES v. LEON ET AL.
No. 82-1771
5155
January 17, 1984, Argued

July 5, 1984, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Petition for Rehearing Denied September 18, 1984

THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner United States appealed the

decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
holding that there was no good faith exception to the U.S. Const.
amend. IV exclusionary rule.
OVERVIEW: This case presented the question whether the

exclusionary rule should be modified so as to allow the use of evidence
obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant
issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be
unsupported by probable cause. During trial, respondents filed motions
to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant and said motions
were granted in part based on the conclusion that the warrant was not
supported by probable cause despite the fact that the police officer was
acting in good faith reliance on what he believed to be a valid warrant.
The lower court affirmed and held that there was no good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
and held that the exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar
the admission of evidence seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on
a search warrant that was subsequently held to be defective. The Court
concluded that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a
subsequently invalidated search warrant could not justify the
substantial costs of exclusion.
OUTCOME: The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that the
exclusionary rule should be modified to allow the admission of evidence
seized in reasonable, good-faith reliance on a search warrant, even if
the warrant was subsequently found to be defective.
LAC OF PROBALBE CAUSE: UNDER STRICT APPLICATION OF AGULAR/SPENILLI
TEST
WARANT WAS HELD INVALID BY LOWER COURTS
WHY DID THE GOVERNMENT NOT ASK THE SC TO REMAND AND HAVE IT DONE
UNDER GATES…THIS IS NOT DONE THOGH B/C THE SC HAS BEEN SIGNALING FOR
A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
WAS THERE A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION, IF SO WERE THE OFICERS ACTING IN

GOOD FAITH…TO DATE THIS EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO WARANTLESS
SEARCHES
IF THE WARANT IS INVALID B/C OF LACK OF PARTICULARITY OR PROBABLE

CAUSE…THE GOOD FAITH RULE STILL APPLIES
WHAT IS THE REASONALING THAT ALLOWS THE MAJORITY TO CREATE THIS

EXCEPTION
BALANCEING: INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY V. THE NEED TO LOCK PEOPLE UP
DETURANCE RATIONEL DOESN’T WORK IF THE POLICE ARE ACTING IN

GOOD FAITH: IF YOU DON’T KNOW YOU ARE BEHAVINING ILLEGALY
YOU CAN BE DETURED FROM ACTING ILLIGALLY
4 THINGS THAT MAKE THE GF NOT WORK:
THE OFFICER CAN NOT DELIBERATELY OR RECKLESSLY [AWARE OF

THE RISK OF PROVIDING FALSE INFORMATION] MISTATED THE
FACTS…B/C THE OFFICER IS NOT ACTING IN GOOD FAITH
WHEN THE MAJISTRATE IS NOT NEUTRAL
WHEN THE INDICIA OF RELIABLITY IS LAKING…NO REASOANALBE

OFFICER COULD THINK PROBABLE CAUSE
OR NO REASONABLE OFFICER COULD THINK THE WARRANT IS

REASONABLY PARTICULAR
CHIMEL v. CALIFORNIA
No. 770

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
DISPOSITION: 68 Cal. 2d 436, 439 P. 2d 333, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner appealed from a judgment of the

Supreme Court of California, affirming judgments from the lower court
convicting him of burglary.
OVERVIEW: Police came to petitioner's home with an arrest warrant

to arrest him for an alleged burglary. When petitioner returned from
work, police arrested him. Police then asked for permission to "look
around." Even though petitioner objected, the officers conducted a
search. They looked through the entire house and had petitioner's wife
open drawers and physically remove contents of the drawers so they
could view items. Police seized a number of coins and medals, among
other things, that respondent State later used to convict petitioner of
burglary. Reversing the appeals court's affirmance of conviction, the
court held that the search was "unreasonable." It found that there was
no justification for searching any room other than that in which the
arrest occurred. Even searching through desk drawers or other closed
or concealed areas of the room where the arrest occurred was not
appropriate. Extending the search to the entire house was not proper,
and the court overturned the conviction.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment.
SICA SEARCH:
--no search warrant, they looked all through the house
--there is a debate about how narrow or broad of an area can the police search,
incient to a lawful arrest
--Rule: Immediate lunging area/ wing span/ grapping area can be searched. [this
would include containters, but a locked containt of which the person does not
reasonably have access is debateable]…if there are facts that raise risks, than they
can reley on the emergency excedption or exigency exception
--CHRISMAN, seach w/in the wingspan of the arreste is ok, but in this case the
arrestee requested this. PAGE 139
UNITED STATES v. ROBINSON
No. 72-936
414 U.S. 218; 94 S. Ct. 467; 38 L. Ed. 2d 427; 1973 U.S. LEXIS 21; 66 Ohio Op. 2d
202

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF

COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION: 153 U. S. App. D. C. 114, 471 F.2d 1082, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States sought review of the

judgment from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, which reversed defendant's conviction for possession and
facilitation of concealment of heroin in violation of 26 U.S.C.S. §
4704(a), and held that a search of defendant's person violated U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
OVERVIEW: Defendant was pulled over by a police officer. The officer

had probable cause to arrest defendant for driving after his license had
been revoked. The officer then searched defendant and felt an object
under defendant's coat. The officer reached into the coat and pulled out
a cigarette package. The officer felt there was something in the
package that was not cigarettes. The officer opened the package and
found what was later determined to be heroin. The Court reversed the
appellate court's decision and found the search permissible under U.S.
Const. amend. IV. A search incident to a lawful arrest was clearly
authorized. The appellate court's decision was incorrect in that it
concluded that even with probable cause for an arrest, an officer was
only allowed to conduct a protective frisk for weapons. When an officer
had probable cause for an arrest, as the officer in the present case did,
a more extensive exploration of the suspect's person was authorized.
This was to protect the officer, but also to preserve evidence. The fact
that defendant was to be arrested for a driving offense did not lessen
the officer's right to search defendant.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the appellate court's decision, finding a

police officer was clearly authorized to reach into defendant's coat as
part of his search because the officer had probable cause to arrest
defendant. Once probable cause to arrest defendant was established, a
full search incident to that arrest was authorized in order to protect the
officer's safety and to preserve evidence.
OHIO V. TERI…Police can do a pat down only during an incouter that is not an
arrest…why, for the officers safty [this is weird b/c it is a warrantless seach w/o
probable cause]
Everyone on the court agrees that the police can pat the guy down for their own
protection
--Pat down= search

--Takes container= search and seizure
--Take the container out and look inside=search
Officer says that his actions were based on procedure for safety and to look for
evidence
--lower court said couldn’t take it out b/c knew it wasn’t a weapon
--Majority says this is too narrow and adopt [CHIMIAL DOES NOT APPLY B/C
THERE IS NO MORE EVIDENCE NEEDED FOR THE DRIVING W/O A
LICENCE, AND THE RATIONEL ABOUT PROTECTING DANGER DOES NOT
APPLY TO THIS CASE]
THUS, THE RULE ADDS THE POLICE CAN LOOK ANYWHERE
ON ONES PERSON AND IN ANY CONTAINER ON ONE’S PERSON
WHEN THE PERSON IS ARRESTED
THE RATIONELL IS…THAT DURRING A FULL
COSTODIAL ARREST IS MORE DANGERIOUS THAN
THE STOP AND FRISK UNDER TERRIE, ALSO THIS IS
“BRIGHT LINE” AND MAKES IT EASY FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT.
Rationel: p. 129 brightline rule= make it easy for the police
ALL YOU NEED IS A VALID ARREST WHICH IS SUPPORTED BY

PROBABLE CAUSE..YOU DO NOT NEED PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE
SEARCH
KNOWLES…MUST ARREST IN ORDER TO SEARCH
BUT NOW AFTER ATWATER, THE POLICE CAN ARREST FOR ANY TRAFFIC
STOP AND THEN SEARCH THE PERSON, WINGSPAN, AND IN THE NEXT CASE
THEIR CAR
NEW YORK v. BELTON
No. 80-328
4915

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Petition for Rehearing Denied September 23, 1981.
PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
DISPOSITION: 50 N. Y. 2d 447, 407 N. E. 2d 420, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The state sought review of a decision of the

Court of Appeals of New York that reversed a judgment of the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, which upheld the
constitutionality of a warrantless search of the passenger compartment
of an automobile incident to a custodial arrest of defendant, an
occupant thereof.
OVERVIEW: Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that sped

by a police officer at a fast rate. Upon stopping the car, the officer
smelled marihuana smoke and saw an envelope on the car's floor that
was marked with a name for marihuana. He therefore required the
occupants to get out of the vehicle and proceeded to search them. He
opened the envelope and found that it contained marihuana. He also
searched defendant's jacket in the vehicle and found cocaine. In
defendant's subsequent drug prosecution, the trial court denied his
motion to suppress the items seized in the search of the vehicle.
However, the final state appellate court reversed, holding that the
search of the jacket was not incident to defendant's arrest. The state
was granted certiorari, and the Court reversed the decision of the state
court, holding that the items seized in the warrantless search of the
vehicle's passenger compartment, incident to defendant's lawful
custodial arrest, were justifiably seized because of the exigencies of the
situation. Thus, the search did not violate the safeguards of U.S. Const.
amend. IV and U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the lower state court
and held that items seized in the warrantless search of a passenger
compartment of a vehicle, incident to a lawful custodial arrest, were
lawfully seized during the exigencies of the situation and such seizure
did not violate the safeguards of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the constitution.
SIEZURE—DEFENDANT FOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION
LOOKING INTO CAR IS VALID SEARCH
SEARCH
ISSUE, WHAT IS FOUND IN THE JACKET…IS THE COCAIN IN THE JACKET
UNLAWFULLY SIEZED
THEY USE CILA EXCEPTION
WE KNOW THE POLICE CAN LOOK INTO THE GLOVE BOX BUT NOT THE
TRUNK, BUT WE ARE UNAWARE IF THE GLOVEBOX IS LOCKED OR IF THERE
IS A LOCKED CONTAINER IN THE BACK SEAT
HOLD THAT OFFICER CAN LOOK IN THE PASSANGER COMPARTMENT AND

CONTAINERS INSIDE THE PASSANGER COMPARTMENT
RATIONEL: BRIGHTLINE RULE…SOMETIMES SUCH DEFENDANTS CAN

REACH INTO THE CAR; SAME A CHIMMEL
ARREST MUST BE NEAR THE PERSON’S CAR

PAYTON v. NEW YORK
No. 78-5420
March 26, 1979, Argued; October 9, 1979, Reargued

April 15, 1980, Decided *
* Together with No. 78-5421, Riddick v. New York, also on appeal from the same
court.
PRIOR HISTORY:
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.
DISPOSITION: 45 N. Y. 2d 300, 380 N. E. 2d 224, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendants sought review of an order from

the Court of Appeals of New York, which held that N.Y. Penal Law §§
140.15(4), 120.80, authorized police officers to enter a private
residence without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to make a
routine felony arrest. Defendants contended that the statutes violated
the constitutional prohibition against illegal searches and seizures.
OVERVIEW: Two cases on appeal challenged the constitutionality of

N.Y. Penal Law §§ 140.15(4), 120.80. In the first case, police officers
established probable cause against defendant in a murder case, and
went to defendant's apartment to arrest him. Police officers entered
without a warrant and found incriminating evidence in plain view that
was admitted at defendant's trial. In the second case, police officers
entered defendant's house to arrest him without a search warrant and
found narcotics in the dresser. On appeal, the United States Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the cases for further proceedings
because the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the police
from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's
home in order to make a routine felony arrest. The Court held that to
be arrested in the home involved not only the invasion attendant to all
arrests, but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home, which was too
substantial, absent exigent circumstances, even when it was
accomplished under statutory authority and when probable cause was
present.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed and remanded the cases for further
proceedings because the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
prohibited the police from making warrantless and nonconsensual entry
into suspects' homes in order to make routine felony arrests.
PRIVACY INTEREST INTO PRIVATE PLACES…ANY PLACE WHERE YOU HAVE

EXPECTION OF PRIVACY [IS THE PLACE A PRIVATE PLACE TO THAT PERSON
THE OFFICER MUST HAVE A REASON TO BELIVE THE PERSON IS THERE TO

GO INTO A PRIVATE PLACE TO GET A SUSPECT OF WHICH THERE IS A VALID
ARREST WARRANT
STEAGALD v. UNITED STATES
No. 79-6777
4418

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION: 606 F.2d 540 and 615 F.2d 642, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner sought review of a judgment of

the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed
the denial of petitioner's suppression motion and held that petitioner's
U.S. Const. amend. IV rights were not violated when law enforcement
officers searched for the subject of an arrest warrant in petitioner's
home without first obtaining a search warrant.
OVERVIEW: Based on information received from a confidential

informant, Drug Enforcement Administration agents entered
petitioner's home with an arrest warrant in an attempt to locate a
federal fugitive. The agents did not have a search warrant. The fugitive
was not found in the house, but the agents did observe cocaine while
in the house. After obtaining a search warrant, the agents uncovered
additional incriminating evidence. Petitioner was arrested and indicted
on federal drug charges. The court reversed the judgment of the
appellate court, which affirmed the denial of petitioner's suppression
motion. The court concluded the arrest warrant was not adequate to
protect the U.S. Const. amend. IV interests of petitioner, who was not
named in the warrant and whose home was searched without his
consent, and in the absence of exigent circumstances. While the arrest
warrant protected the fugitive from an unreasonable seizure, it did
nothing to protect petitioner's privacy interest in being free from an
unreasonable invasion and search of his home.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment that affirmed the denial
of petitioner's suppression motion where petitioner's U.S. Const.
amend. IV rights were violated when drug enforcement officers, in the
absence of consent and exigent circumstances, entered petitioner's
home and searched for the subject of an arrest warrant without first
obtaining a search warrant.
STEADGALD:
AS TO LIONS THEY HAVE A VALID ARREST WARRANT…IF THEY WANT TO

USE EVIDENCE AGENST STEAGALD THEY NEED AN ARREST WARANT
ARREST WARANT GIVES SOME PRIVACY INTEREST TO THE ARRESTE, PO

MUST THINK THE ARRESTE IS HOME AT THE TIME OF EXERSIZING THE
WARRANT’
CANT USE THE ARREST WARANT FOR ONE PERSON TO GET EVIDENCE
AGAINST ANOTHER PERSON
=====
IF OFFICER THINKS YOUR HOME, HAS AN ARREST WARRANT, COMES INTO
HOME, CAN LOOK AROUND IN PLACES THAT ARE REASONABLE THAT SHE
MAY BE, ARREST HER, AND DO A SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
ARREST WARRANT ONLY PROTECTS THE INTERESTS OF THE ARRESTE
GO BACK OF SPEGALD
SANTANA CASE= THRESHOLD OF HOME IS PUBLIC PLACE, NO PRIVACY

INTEREST……..IF THE PO PO WOULD HAVE GOT A SEARCH WARANT FOR
SEGALD RESEDENCE THAN THEY COULD USE THE EVIDENCE AGAINST
STEGALD [IF THEY SEE SOMETHING IN PLAIN VIEW]
WARDEN, MARYLAND PENITENTIARY v. HAYDEN
No. 480

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH

CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner warden sought review of an order

from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granting
habeas corpus relief to respondent inmate after the inmate was
convicted of armed robbery.
OVERVIEW: The inmate was convicted of armed robbery. Items of his

clothing, including a cap, jacket, and trousers, were seized during a
search of his home and were admitted into evidence without objection.
After unsuccessful state court proceedings, the lower court granted
habeas corpus relief to the inmate, finding that the clothing was
improperly admitted into evidence because the items had evidential
value only and were not subject to seizure. On appeal by the warden,
the Supreme Court found that neither the entry of the inmate's home
nor the search for him without a warrant was invalid. Under the
circumstances of the case, the exigencies of the situation made that
course imperative. The Court further found that the seizure of clothing
occurred prior to or immediately contemporaneous with the inmate's
arrest, as part of an effort to find a suspected felon, armed, within the
house into which he had run only minutes before the police arrived.
Finally, the Court found that the seized clothing matched the
description of those worn by the robber and the police could have
reasonably believed that the items would aid in the identification of the
culprit.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the order granting habeas corpus relief
to the inmate.
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES= HOT PERSUIT

RATIONEL IS TO PROTECT POLICE AND PUBLICE…THIS MEANS THEY
CAN ONLY LOOK FOR WEAPONS AND THE PERSONYOU CAN’T LOOK
FOR EVIDENCE
POLICE NEED TO HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR EXIGENCY
VALE...IF IMERGANCY OK, BUT IF NO PC THAN CAN’T GO IN—NOT

AUTOMATICALY
THERE MUST BE EXIGENCY, AND NO TIME TO GET A WARRANT
RATIONALE: DANGER TO PO AND OTHERS

SHOWING: PC THAT THE PERSON COMMITTED A FELLONY, ANDACTIVE HOT
PERSUIT
SCOPE [THE PLACE AND TIME]: WHEREEVER THE PERSON CAN BE FOUND,
OR FOR WEAPONS
….IF SUSPECT HAS BEEN CAUGHT, AND NO OTHER PEOPLE IN HOUSE, THE
SEARCH FOR WEAPONS MUST STOP
---EXIGENCY ALSO INCLUDES: DANGER TO PO OR OTHERS—HOSTAGE

SITUATION, SUISIDE, OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE OR CONTRABAND=A
REASONABLE BELIEVE THAT THE STUFF WOULD BE GONE IF THE PO PO GOT
A WARANT [DOESN’T WORK WHEN THE POLICE CAUSE THE EXIGENCY…AND
USE IT AS AN EXCUSE AS A WARANTLESS SEARCH]
ROBINSON PERSON
CHEMMEL WINGSPAN
BELTON THE INTERIOR OF CAR
VALE v. LOUISIANA
No. 727
March 4-5, 1970, Argued

PRIOR HISTORY:
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA.
DISPOSITION: Appeal dismissed and certiorari granted; 252 La. 1056, 215 So. 2d
811, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant sought review from a judgment

of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which affirmed his conviction for
possession of heroin and rejected his claim that evidence introduced at
trial was the product of an unlawful search and seizure.
OVERVIEW: Police officers, who had warrants for defendant's arrest,

observed defendant engaged in what the officers believed was a
narcotics sale. The officers arrested defendant on the street outside of
his dwelling, searched defendant's dwelling, and recovered additional
narcotics. Defendant was convicted in state court of possessing heroin
and was sentenced as multiple offender to 15 years' imprisonment at
hard labor. The state supreme court affirmed his conviction and
rejected defendant's claim that evidence introduced at trial was the
product of an unlawful search and seizure. Defendant appealed. The
Court dismissed the appeal but treated defendant's papers as a petition
for certiorari. In granting the petition and reversing defendant's
conviction, the Court declined to hold that an arrest on the street
outside of defendant's dwelling justified a warrantless search of
defendant's dwelling as providing its own "exigent circumstance" so as
to justify a warrantless search of defendant's house. The Court
concluded that the Louisiana courts committed constitutional error in
admitting into evidence the fruits of the illegal search.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case
for further proceedings.
IF YOU DO HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE THAT EVIDENCE IS BEING DESTROYED THAN

CAN GO IN…THIS IS A CASE BY CASE CONTEXT ANALYSIS
MCCARTHER—ALOWED WARANTLESS SEIZURE, AND ALLOWED POLICE TO

REASONABLY DETAIN PEOPLE FROM GOING INTO AN AREA TO DESTROY
EVIDENCE…IN THIS CASE THE PO PO DETAINED A PERSON AND WENT TO GET A
WARRANT
UNITED STATES v. CHADWICK ET AL.
No. 75-1721
Argued April 26, 1977

June 21, 1977; as amended
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRSTCIRCUIT
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States sought review of the

order from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
which affirmed the suppression of marijuana seized from defendants.
OVERVIEW: After arresting defendants, agents opened and searched

defendants' locked foot locker without a warrant and seized marijuana
from the locker. After several appeals, the appellate court affirmed the
suppression of the seized marijuana holding that probable cause was
not sufficient to sustain a warrantless search. On review, the Court
held that by placing personal effects inside a double-locked footlocker,
defendants manifested an expectation that the contents would have
remained free from public examination. The Court held that the
expectation of privacy was no less than one who locked the doors of his
home to intruders and that defendants were due the protection of U.S.
Const. amend. IV's Warrant Clause. The Court held that there being no
exigency it was unreasonable for the government to have conducted a
search without the safeguards a judicial warrant provided. The Court
held that the search was too remote to have been considered incident
to arrest. The Court affirmed the order from the appellate court.
OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the order from the appellate court that
affirmed the suppression of marijuana seized from defendants.
--DOG SNIFF NOT AN ILLEGAL SEARCH B/C ONLY REVEALS PRESENCE OF
CONTRABAND
--ARREST
--SEIZE CAR AND LOCKER
--SEARCH LOCKER AT THE STATION
WE ARE IN THE PERSONAL EFFECTS DOCTRINE B/C THE EFFECT IS OUTSIDE THE
CAR [THUS TAKING IT OUT OF THE VEHICLE EXCEPTION DOCTRINE]INTRODUCES
A SEPARATE RATIONEL FOR VEHICLE EXCEPTION=THAT THERE IS A REDUCED
PRIVACY EXPECTATION IN ADDITION TO LOSS OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE
STILL GOOD LAW, AND WOULD TURN OUT SAME TODAY, ON THESE FACTS THE
SICA RATIONEL DOEN’T COME IN
CALIFORNIA, PETITIONER v. CHARLES STEVEN ACEVEDO
No. 89-1690
U.S.L.W. 4559; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3898; 91 Daily Journal DAR 6569

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FOURTH APPELLATE

DISTRICT.
DISPOSITION: 216 Cal. App. 3d 586, 265 Cal. Rptr. 23, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant pled guilty to possessing

marijuana for sale, but appealed the denial of his motion to suppress
marijuana found in a paper bag in a car's trunk. The Court of Appeal of
California, Fourth Appellate District concluded that the marijuana
should have been suppressed. The State was granted certiorari.
OVERVIEW: Defendant placed a bag in the trunk of a car. Police

officers stopped him, opened the trunk, and found marijuana. The
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not require the police to
obtain a warrant to open the sack in a movable vehicle simply because
they lacked probable cause to search the entire car. The same probable
cause to believe that a container held drugs allowed the police to arrest
the person transporting the container and search it. The police had
probable cause to believe that the paper bag in the car's trunk
contained marijuana and probable cause allowed a warrantless search
of the paper bag. The Fourth Amendment did not compel separate
treatment for an automobile search that extended only to a container
within the vehicle. The police could search containers found in an
automobile without a warrant if their search was supported by probable
cause.
OUTCOME: The judgment concluding that marijuana found in a paper

bag in the trunk of a car should have been suppressed was reversed,
and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the
Court's opinion.
WE GET RULE, IF THERE IS PC, YOU CAN LOOK IN THE AREA IN WHICH YOU HAVE
PC TO LOOK
…CAN SEARCH IT INSIDE THE CAR, BUT AS SOON AS IT LEAVE THE CAR THE
CONTAINER THEN COMES UNDER THE CONTAINER RATIONEL…ALTHOUGH IT IS
STRANGE TO THINK A SUIT CASE HAS GREATER EXPECTATION OUTSIDE A CAR
RATHER THAN INSIDE A CAR
CARNEY CASE…A MOBLE HOME IS STILL A VEHICLE
HOLTON CASE: 205 THIS EXTENDS TO CONTAINERS OF PASSANGERS TO CARS…

COURT HAS NERVER SAID THAT PC TO SEARCH A CAR MEANS PC TO SEARCH A
PERSON W/IN THE CAR
===
IF COPS WERE LOOKING FOR A GUN, PART OF A ROBBERY, AND FIND AN
UNLOADED GUN IN THE CAR, THAN CAN CONTINUE LOOKING FOR THE BULLETS
AUTO EXCEPTION APPLIES IF IT IS PRIVATE PROPERTY, OF WHICH THE PUBLIC IS

INVITED TO
SOUTH DAKOTA v. OPPERMAN
No. 75-76
Argued March 29, 1976

July 6, 1976
PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH DAKOTA
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: State sought review of the judgment from

the Supreme Court of South Dakota, which held that local police
violated U.S. Const. amend. IV, as applicable to the states under U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, when they conducted a routine inventory search of
an automobile lawfully impounded by police for violations of municipal
parking ordinances. The issue on appeal was whether the search and
seizure was unreasonable pursuant to U.S. Const. amend. IV.
OVERVIEW: State appealed the judgment that held that local police
violated U.S. Const. amend. IV when they conducted a routine
inventory search of an automobile lawfully impounded by police,
contending that the search and seizure was not unreasonable. On
appeal, the judgment was reversed and remanded on the basis that
the police were indisputably engaged in a caretaking search and such
was not unreasonable. The court reasoned that the owner, having left
his car illegally parked for an extended period and thus subject to
impoundment, was not present to make other arrangements for the
safekeeping of his belongings. Further, the inventory itself was
prompted by the presence in plain view of a number of valuables inside
the car. The court held that there was no suggestion whatever that the
standard procedure was a pretext concealing an investigatory police
motive. The court concluded that in following standard police
procedures the conduct of the police was not unreasonable under U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
OUTCOME: The judgment that held that local police violated the
constitution when they conducted a routine inventory search of an
automobile lawfully impounded by police for violations of municipal
parking ordinances was reversed because the conduct of the police was
not unreasonable. The court reasoned that the police were indisputably
engaged in a caretaking search of a lawfully impounded automobile.
--CAR IS TAKEN TO IMPOUND LOTS [LAWFUL B/C THERE IS A STATUTE AND CAR
WAS IN VIOLATION]
--THERE WAS NO PC FOR THE SEARCH, AND NO WARRANT
JUSTIFICATION, PROTECTS:
--OWNER’S PROPERTY
--PO PO FROM FALSE CLAIMS
--“POTENTIAL” DANGER
REDUCED EXPECATION OF PRIVACY B/C MOVILE AND PULIC TRAVEL
--PC IS IRRELEVANT TO MEET GOVERNMENT NEEDS, IT JUST DOESN’T MAKE SENSE
~ THERE IS JUST NOTING TO DERTERMINE
--WHAT DOES THE GOVERNMENT HAVE TO SHOW INORDER TO USE THIS

EXCEPTION [THIS IS A THRESHOLD QUESTION]:
--SHOW REGULARY OPPERATING PROCEDUERS
--SHOW A LAWFUL SIEZUER [IF IT WAS NOT, IT WOULD BE FRUIT OF THE
POISONOUS TREE]
--SCOPE INCLUDES LOCKED GLOVEBOXES AND TRUNKS…AS LONG AS PROPERTY IS

NOT DAMAGED BY OPENING IT
--IT IS POSSIBLE TO FIND SOMETHING TO FIND PC TO JUSTFY A SEARCH BEYOND

THE STANDARD INVATORY SEARCH
ILLINOIS v. LAFAYETTE
No. 81-1859

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, THIRD DISTRICT.
DISPOSITION: 99 Ill. App. 3d 830, 425 N. E. 2d 1383, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: On certiorari, the State challenged a

judgment from the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District, which
affirmed a trial court's decision granting defendant's motion to
suppress narcotics that were found in his shoulder bag during a post-
arrest, warrantless search at a police station.
OVERVIEW: Defendant was arrested for disturbing the peace. When

he arrived at the police station, he removed cigarettes from the
shoulder bag he was carrying and then placed it on the counter in the
station. As part of a routine booking procedure, an officer emptied and
inventoried the contents of the bag. Narcotics were found in the bag
and defendant was subsequently charged with violating the state's
controlled substances statute. On defendant's motion, the state trial
court suppressed the drugs and that judgment was affirmed on appeal.
On certiorari, a majority of the Court held that the search was not
invalid under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the Court held that
because the search was conducted as a part of a routine administrative
procedure that was incident to defendant's arrest and incarceration,
the search was not unreasonable. In such circumstances, the police
could search any container in defendant's possession. The Court
reasoned that such a search was supported by the State's interest in
safeguarding defendant and his property as well avoiding possible
claims of theft by the police.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed and remanded the judgment below.

The warrantless search of defendant's shoulder bag, which was
conducted pursuant to standard booking procedures as an inventory of
defendant's belongings, was not unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The narcotics found in the bag were thus improperly
suppressed.
ARREST THAT IS LAWFUL

SEARCH OF LAFAYETTE AND HIS BAG
SEARCH INSIDE A CONTAINER [EFFECTS HAVE HIGH PROTECTION UNDER 4TH]
BRIGHT LINE RULE, SAME JUSTIFICATIONS FROM ABOVE FOR CAR INVATORY, AND
FOR IDENTIFYING THE ARRESTTE
GOVERNMENT HAS TO SHOW A LAWFUL AREST, REASONABLE BELIF THAT PERSON

WILL BE INCARSERATED, ESTABLISHED INVENTORY PROCEDURES
SCOPE: IS OK TO SEARCH A BAG, AND PERSON…STRIP SEARCH AS NEEDED

COLORADO v. BERTINE
No. 85-889
4105

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO.
DISPOSITION: 706 P. 2d 411, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant filed a motion to suppress the

evidence found during an inventory search of the closed backpack and
containers in his impounded vehicle after he was arrested, which he
alleged exceeded the permissible scope of such search under the
Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the motion based on the
Colorado Constitution. On the State's interlocutory appeal, the
Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed. The State petitioned for certiorari.
OVERVIEW: The state court held that searches of closed trunks and
suitcases violated the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme
Court reversed. There was no showing that the police, who were
following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole
purpose of investigation. The police were potentially responsible for the
property taken into their custody. By securing the property, the police
protected the property from unauthorized interference. Reasonable
police regulations relating to inventory procedures administered in
good faith satisfied the Fourth Amendment, even though courts might
as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules
requiring a different procedure. The trial court found that the police
department's procedures mandated the opening of closed containers
and the listing of their contents. The discretion afforded the police was
exercised in light of standardized criteria, related to the feasibility and
appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle rather than
impounding it. There was no showing that the police chose to impound
defendant's van in order to investigate suspected criminal activity.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the suppression of evidence.
INVENTORY SEARCH OUTSIDE THE IMPOUND LOT, AND EVEN WHEN THE
PERSON
JUSTIFIED BY BRIGHT LINE RULE, IT CAN’T BE INVESTIGATORY, MUST
FOLLOW STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDUERS IS PRESENT AND COULD
MAKE OTHER ARANGEMENTS
===========================
REVIEW
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS UNDER THE 4TH INCLUDE:
--SEARCH
--ARRESTS
--SEIZURES OF PROPERTY
SEARCHES MUST BE REASONABLE:

--WARRANT
--GENERALLY NEED A WARANT TO SEARCH
--NEED WARNT TO ARREST IN PUBLIC FOR A PAST MISTERMEANER, IN A
PRIVATE PLACE ALWAYS NEED A WARRANT…ALL CURRENT AND PAST FELLONIES
DON’T REQUIRE A WARRANT…AND IT IS PERSUMED YOU NEED A WARANT TO SIEZE
IDOMS
--PROBABLE CAUSE
--ALWAYS NEED PC, REASONS YOU SIEZE THESE THINGS IS FOR EVIDENCE
OR CONTRABAND
VEHICLE EXCEPTION ALOWS SEARCH W/O A WARRANT, STILL NEED PC.

CONTAINER EXCEPTION, ALLOWS PO PO TO SIEZE, STILL NEED PC. [CAN SIEZE B/C
IF THEY DON’T THE EVIDENCE WILL GET DISTROYED…BUT THEY CAN’T SIEZE
[WHAT THEY DISCOVER CAN CREATE ADDITIONAL PC, RATIONEL IS MOBILITY AND
REDUCED PRIVACY EXPECTATION]
SCHNECKLOTH, CONSERVATION CENTER SUPERINTENDENT v. BUSTAMONTE
No. 71-732

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner sought certiorari to review a

decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
which vacated an order that denied a writ of habeas corpus to
respondent and that remanded the case for further proceedings. The
court of appeals held that consent to a search could not be found solely
from the absence of coercion and a verbal expression of assent.
OVERVIEW: Respondent was brought to trial on a charge of

possessing a check with intent to defraud. Respondent moved to
suppress the introduction of certain material as evidence against him
on the ground that the material had been acquired through a
warrantless search and seizure that were unconstitutional. The court of
appeals vacated an order that denied the petition for habeas corpus
relief on grounds that there was insufficient proof that respondent
knew that he had a right to refuse to give his consent to the search.
The Court disagreed that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse
consent was a necessary prerequisite to demonstrating "voluntary"
consent. Rather, the Court held that individual consent could only be
ascertained by analyzing all of the circumstances. The traditional
definition of voluntariness, which the Court adhered to, did not require
proof of knowledge of a right to refuse as the sine qua non of an
effective consent to a search.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the decision of the court below,

reinstating the affirmation of respondent's conviction and the denial of
a writ of habeas corpus to respondent, on the grounds that the
determination of voluntariness did not require proof of knowledge of a
right to refuse as the sine qua non of an effective consent to a search.
NO PC TO SEARCH THE CAR

NOT ARESTED
NOT IMPOUNDED…THUS NO EXCEPTIONS
THUS ONLY THING THAT IS LEFT BUT CONSENT
IS THERE VALID CONSENT…
DEFENDANT DIDN’T KNOW HIS RIGHTS, HE SAID
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 4TH AND TRIAL RIGHTS…GOVT. HAS THE BURDEN OF VALID
CONSENTPART OF THE SHOWING IS THAT THE PERSON ORDINARILY IN TRIAL
HAS TO KNOW THEY HAVE THE RITGHT…BUT IN THIS CASE, THEY DON’T HAVE TO
MAKE THE SAME SHOWING IN REGARDS TO PRIVACY B/C
RULE: CONSENT HAS TO BE VOLUNTARY, NOT KNOWING, IT IS DETERMINED BY

THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
FACTS THAT HELP: TIME, AGE, REPEDITIVE, TONE, WEAPONS, RACE, LANGUAGE
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
REVIEW
GOVT. ACTION WARRANT REQUD? PC REQUD?
SEARCH
ARREST CS OF PERSON
SEIZURE OF PROPERTY
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES GO TOWARDS WHETHER THE CONSENT WAS

VOLUNTARY
FOR ANY WARRANT OR CONSENT EXCEPTION, THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE BURDEN
OF SHOWING…THEY DON’T HAVE TO SHOW THAT THE PERSON KNEW THEY HAD
THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
JIMENO: resasonableness goes towards scope and amount of time. All containters
have privacy interests, so presumably the cop can look in any unlocked container
when they get pers when they get permission to look for drugs in a car
UNITED STATES v. MATLOCK
No. 72-1355
December 10-11, 1973, Argued

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH

CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: In connection with defendant's trial for

bank robbery, the government challenged a judgment from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the
district court's judgment that the government had not satisfactorily
proved a third party's actual authority to consent to a search.
OVERVIEW: The question before the Court was whether the evidence
presented by the government with respect to the voluntary consent of
a third party to search defendant's living quarters was legally sufficient
to render the seized materials admissible in evidence at defendant's
criminal trial for bank robbery. The Court reversed the judgment,
finding that the government had proven the third party's actual
authority to consent to the search. The Court noted that defendant's
own out-of-court admissions would have surmounted all objections
based on the hearsay rule both at the suppression hearings and at the
trial itself, and would have been admissible for whatever inferences the
trial judge could have reasonably drawn regarding joint occupancy of
the east bedroom. The Court also noted that, under the circumstances,
there was no apparent reason for the trial judge to distrust the
evidence and to exclude the third party's declarations from his own
consideration. Finally, the Court noted that because the third party was
a witness for defendant at the suppression hearing, she was available
for cross-examination. Thus, the risk of prejudice, if any, from the use
of hearsay was reduced.
OUTCOME: The judgment of the lower court upholding a judgment in

favor of defendant was reversed and remanded for reconsideration.
ILLINOIS v. RODRIGUEZ
No. 88-2018
U.S.L.W. 4892

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS, FIRST DISTRICT.
DISPOSITION: Reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was charged with possession of

a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Defendant's motion to
suppress evidence seized at the time of his arrest was granted by the
state trial court. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court's
decision. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the State's petition for
leave to appeal. The State sought review, and the Court granted
certiorari.
OVERVIEW: The State argued that defendant's former roommate still

retained control over defendant's apartment and, therefore, had
common authority over the premises to consent to the police search.
The State also argued that even if the roommate lacked control or
authority, the search and seizure was still proper under the Fourth
Amendment because the police reasonably believed that she had
authority to consent. Defendant asserted that permitting a reasonable
belief of common authority would cause his Fourth Amendment rights
to be "vicariously waived." The Court held that "common authority"
rested on mutual use of the property and that there was sufficient
proof in the record that the State failed to satisfy its burden that
defendant's former roommate had joint access or control over the
apartment. The officers' reasonable belief that the roommate had
common authority over the apartment could have validated the search,
but the lower courts failed to render a decision on the issue.
OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for
further determination whether the police officers possessed a
reasonable belief that defendant's former roommate had common
authority over the apartment.
ACTUAL AUTHORITY=NO
APPARENT AUTHORITY=YES… AND RESUTS IN THE EVIDENCE COMING IN
A NUMBER OF STATES HAVE REJECTED THIS CASE…STATES CAN GIVE CITIZENS
MORE RIGHTS
TERRY BRICE HORTON, PETITIONER v. CALIFORNIA
No. 88-7164
U.S.L.W. 4694

PRIOR HISTORY:
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California Sixth Appellate District.
DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner sought certiorari review of a

judgment from the Court of Appeal of California Sixth Appellate
District, which affirmed his conviction for the armed robbery of the
treasurer of a coin club following denial of his motion to suppress
weapons seized by police from his residence.
OVERVIEW: Petitioner was convicted of the armed robbery of the

treasurer of a coin club following denial of his motion to suppress
weapons seized by police from his residence. After an appellate court
affirmed the conviction, petitioner sought certiorari. The Supreme
Court affirmed. The Court concluded that, though inadvertence was a
characteristic of most legitimate plain view seizures, it was not a
necessary condition, so that the items seized from petitioner's home
were discovered during a lawful search authorized by a valid warrant.
When the weapons were discovered, it was immediately apparent to
the police officer that they constituted incriminating evidence. The
officer had probable cause, not only to obtain a warrant to search for
the stolen property, but also to believe that the weapons and handguns
had been used in the crime he was investigating. The search was
authorized by the warrant, and the seizure was authorized by the plain
view doctrine. The scope of the search was not enlarged in the slightest
by the omission of any reference to the weapons in the warrant.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed petitioner's armed robbery conviction

because weapons seized from his residence were discovered during a
lawful search authorized by a valid warrant and the seizure was
authorized by the plain view doctrine.
SEARCH DOES NOT HAVE TO BE INADVERTANT

ARIZONA v. HICKS
No. 85-1027
U.S.L.W. 4258

March 3, 1987, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF ARIZONA.
DISPOSITION: 146 Ariz. 533, 707 P. 2d 331, affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The State sought certiorari review of a

judgment from the Court of Appeals of Arizona, which affirmed the trial
court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized in plain
view during a warrantless search of a private area as violative of the
Fourth Amendment. The Arizona Supreme Court denied review.
OVERVIEW: When law enforcement officers entered defendant's

apartment under exigent circumstances after a bullet was fired into the
apartment below, two sets of expensive stereo equipment were noticed
by one of the officers. He thought these anomalous in the context of
the squalor of the apartment, and moved some of the components in
order to read and record their serial numbers. When, after phoning the
numbers into headquarters, it was confirmed that a turntable had been
taken in an armed robbery, the officer seized the equipment, and
defendant was subsequently indicted for robbery. The Court affirmed
the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's order granting
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence that had been seized,
holding that the officer's moving of the equipment constituted a
"search" separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims,
and weapons that was the lawful objective of his entry. Such a search
was not "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment because it was not
sustainable under the "plain view" doctrine absent probable cause,
which was not present by the State's admission.
OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the judgment granting defendant's

motion to suppress evidence due to a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
BEFORE HE PICKS UP THE TERN TABEL, IT IS NOT IMMEDIATELY APPARENTLY

SIEZABLE THAT THERE IS PC TO SEARCH THE TURN TABLE….SO IT ALL DEPENDS
ON WHETHER THERE IS PC
SAYS THAT DOESN’T WANT TO GET INTO CURSERY INSPECTION…THUS,
BRIGHTLINE RULE
==========================
TERRY v. OHIO
No. 67
392 U.S. 1; 88 S. Ct. 1868; 20 L. Ed. 2d 889; 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1345; 44 Ohio Op.
2d 383

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner sought review of a judgment

from the Supreme Court of Ohio that affirmed petitioner's conviction
for carrying a concealed weapon. Petitioner contended that the weapon
seized from his person and introduced into evidence was obtained
through an illegal search, under U.S. Const. amend. IV, and that the
trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress.
OVERVIEW: Petitioner sought review of his conviction for carrying a

concealed weapon, contending that the weapon seized from him was
obtained through an illegal search, under U.S. Const. amend. IV, and
that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. On
certiorari the court affirmed petitioner's conviction. The court ruled that
despite the fact that the arresting police officer lacked probable cause
to arrest petitioner at the time he made the "stop and frisk"
warrantless intrusion upon petitioner that produced the weapon at
issue, the search satisfied the conditions of U.S. Const. amend. IV: the
officer had a reasonable suspicion, based upon his experience, that
petitioner and his companions were about to commit a daytime
robbery, and his belief that petitioner was presently armed, dangerous,
and posed a threat to him and to others justified both the officer's
"stop" of petitioner and the "frisk," or pat-down, of petitioner's
overcoat. Furthermore, the court ruled that the search of the outer
clothing of petitioner and his companions was properly limited in time
and scope in order for him to determine the presence of weapons and
to neutralize the danger posed.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed a judgment that affirmed petitioner's

conviction for carrying a concealed weapon because the "stop and
frisk" tactics used by the police in the search of petitioner's person and
the seizure of the weapon produced from the search were reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment, as the arresting officer reasonably
concluded that petitioner was armed and was about to engage in
criminal activity.
DUNAWAY v. NEW YORK
No. 78-5066

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE DIVISION, SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK,

FOURTH JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.
DISPOSITION: 61 App. Div. 2d 299, 402 N. Y. S. 2d 490, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The court granted certiorari on a decision

from the Appellate Division, Supreme Court of New York, Fourth
Judicial Department for clarifying the Fourth Amendment's
requirements as to the permissible grounds for custodial interrogation.
Petitioner had been convicted of murder.
OVERVIEW: A murder occurred during an attempted robbery. An

informant supplied a possible lead that implicated petitioner. The police
questioned the informant but did not have enough information to get a
warrant for petitioner's arrest. The police located petitioner and took
him into custody. Although he was not told he was under arrest, he
would have been restrained if he had attempted to leave. He was taken
to the police headquarters, and questioned after being given Miranda
warnings. Petitioner waived his right to counsel and made incriminating
statements. On appeal, the Court held that the detention for custodial
interrogation intruded on the interests protected by the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment of the constitution and held that the police
violated the constitution when, without probable cause, they seized
petitioner for interrogation. The Court held that while proper Miranda
warnings were given and petitioner's statements were "voluntary" for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment, they were inadmissible since no
intervening events broke the connection between petitioner's illegal
detention and his confession.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the lower court's judgment that

convicted defendant of murder because the police violated the Fourth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment by illegally detaining
petitioner for interrogation without probable cause.
UNITED STATES v. MENDENHALL
No. 78-1821

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Petition for Rehearing Denied June 30, 1980.

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States appealed the judgment

from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which
reversed defendant's conviction for possessing heroin with intent to
distribute.
OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted of possessing heroin with intent

to distribute after the district court denied her motion to suppress the
introduction of the heroin at trial. The lower appellate court reversed,
holding that defendant's consent to the search of her person had not
been voluntarily given. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment of
the lower appellate court. The court held that defendant was not seized
when she was approached by the federal agents who asked to see her
ticket and identification, even though defendant was not expressly told
that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry. The court
held that a person had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that she was not
free to leave. The court held that the totality of the evidence was
adequate to support the district court's findings that defendant
voluntarily consented to accompany the officers and that defendant
consented to the search of her person freely and voluntarily.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment of the lower appellate

court that had reversed defendant's conviction for possession of heroin.
Incounter between popo and an individual, have to figure out what that incounter is, have
to calisify what that incounter is
Plurality says: no seizure~ # of police, weapons, what they say, [it is helpful to know if
they were informed that they were free to go], race, age, capacity [test= what would a
reasonable person in mendenha’s shoes feel free to leave]. Plurality sees it as not a
seizure so doen’t have to talk about 4th amendment.
The test= reasonable person think they are free to leave
7 say that this is a stop [thus a lesser kind of seizure compared to an arrest]
The 3 concurrers says it was a stop and that it was justified by reasonable suspision
She meets reasonable suspision, no luggage, coming from a drug area, last off the plain,
suspicious, meet a profile [meeting a profile is not enough, there has to be individual
reasons]
We are going to lower the standard in drug cases, b/c there is such a compelling
government interest
The plurality says that the other governemtn actions of accompany and search of purse
and person were purley consensual
No seizure Mere stop Equiv of arrest Formal arrest

Nothing Reasonable Probable cause Probable cause
suspiscion
FLORIDA v. BOSTICK
No. 89-1717

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
As Amended June 21, 1991.
PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA.
DISPOSITION: 554 So. 2d 1153, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner State obtained a writ of certiorari

for the review of a decision by the Supreme Court of Florida, which
reversed respondent's plea of guilty for drug trafficking and held that
the illegal drugs found in respondent's luggage should have been
suppressed because respondent's consent to the search of his luggage
was involuntary.
OVERVIEW: Respondent was travelling on an inter-city bus that was

at a stopover, when police boarded the bus. Without any reasonable
suspicion, they asked respondent's consent to search his luggage.
Respondent gave his consent, police found illegal drugs, and
respondent pled guilty to drug trafficking. On appeal, the state
supreme court reversed, holding that because respondent was on a
bus, he was not free to leave the bus without the risk of being
stranded, and his consent was involuntary. On certiorari, the court held
that if the police indicated that respondent was free to refuse consent
and terminate the encounter, and that the police would not detain him
if he refused, his consent was voluntary. Because there was no finding
by the lower court using that standard, the court reversed the decision
of the state supreme court and remanded the case to determine if,
under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would
have felt free to refuse to cooperate with the police, and thus
determine if respondent's consent was voluntary.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the decision and remanded the case to
determine whether respondent's consent to search was voluntary
under the totality of the circumstances.
Cops w/ badges and insignia, indentify defendant, and asked if could search luggage
Things to talk about [possible searches and seizures]:
--initial encounter
--search of a suitcase
Simply the fact that the encounter was on a bus does not make it a seizure
Remand b/c have to do a free to decline test, where they look at the totality
Rule: would a reasonable person would feel free to decline the requests of the oficers
CALIFORNIA v. HODARI D.
No. 89-1632

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE

DISTRICT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The State challenged a judgment of the

California Supreme Court, which denied its application for review of the
decision that found that defendant had been unreasonably seized under
the Fourth Amendment and that evidence of cocaine had to be
suppressed as the fruit of that illegal seizure.
OVERVIEW: The court granted certiorari on the issue of whether

defendant had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment at the time he dropped the cocaine when he saw an officer
running towards him. The state appellate court held that defendant had
been seized when he dropped the cocaine and that the evidence had to
be suppressed. The state supreme court denied the State's application
for review. The Court reversed and remanded the judgment. The Court
held that with respect to a show of authority regarding the application
of physical force, a seizure did not occur when the subject had not
yielded. Defendant's case did not involve the application of any
physical force, and he was untouched at the time he discarded the
cocaine. The Court found that the test for a show of authority was an
objective one and that defendant was not seized until he was tackled.
The cocaine abandoned while defendant was running was not the fruit
of a seizure and not excludable.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment that suppressed

evidence of cocaine as the fruit of an illegal seizure. The Court held
that defendant was not seized until he was tackled. The Court
remanded the case.
Possible government actions:

--The chase
~~~~evidence discarded
--then the tackle
Govt. concieded that there was no reasonable suspision to chase when kid’s started
to run
Would a reasonable person stop when popo yells stop when being chsed
--import the common law rule of arrest into a seizure
There has been no search or seizure at the time the evidence is thrown away
Summission to authority test is the hidori test

UNITED STATES v. MENDENHALL
No. 78-1821

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Petition for Rehearing Denied June 30, 1980.

THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States appealed the judgment

from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which
reversed defendant's conviction for possessing heroin with intent to
distribute.
OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted of possessing heroin with intent

to distribute after the district court denied her motion to suppress the
introduction of the heroin at trial. The lower appellate court reversed,
holding that defendant's consent to the search of her person had not
been voluntarily given. On appeal, the court reversed the judgment of
the lower appellate court. The court held that defendant was not seized
when she was approached by the federal agents who asked to see her
ticket and identification, even though defendant was not expressly told
that she was free to decline to cooperate with their inquiry. The court
held that a person had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that she was not
free to leave. The court held that the totality of the evidence was
adequate to support the district court's findings that defendant
voluntarily consented to accompany the officers and that defendant
consented to the search of her person freely and voluntarily.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the judgment of the lower appellate

court that had reversed defendant's conviction for possession of heroin.
FLORIDA v. BOSTICK
No. 89-1717

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
As Amended June 21, 1991.
PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner State obtained a writ of certiorari

for the review of a decision by the Supreme Court of Florida, which
reversed respondent's plea of guilty for drug trafficking and held that
the illegal drugs found in respondent's luggage should have been
suppressed because respondent's consent to the search of his luggage
was involuntary.
OVERVIEW: Respondent was travelling on an inter-city bus that was

at a stopover, when police boarded the bus. Without any reasonable
suspicion, they asked respondent's consent to search his luggage.
Respondent gave his consent, police found illegal drugs, and
respondent pled guilty to drug trafficking. On appeal, the state
supreme court reversed, holding that because respondent was on a
bus, he was not free to leave the bus without the risk of being
stranded, and his consent was involuntary. On certiorari, the court held
that if the police indicated that respondent was free to refuse consent
and terminate the encounter, and that the police would not detain him
if he refused, his consent was voluntary. Because there was no finding
by the lower court using that standard, the court reversed the decision
of the state supreme court and remanded the case to determine if,
under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would
have felt free to refuse to cooperate with the police, and thus
determine if respondent's consent was voluntary.
OUTCOME: The court reversed the decision and remanded the case to
determine whether respondent's consent to search was voluntary
under the totality of the circumstances.
CALIFORNIA v. HODARI D.
No. 89-1632

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE

DISTRICT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The State challenged a judgment of the

California Supreme Court, which denied its application for review of the
decision that found that defendant had been unreasonably seized under
the Fourth Amendment and that evidence of cocaine had to be
suppressed as the fruit of that illegal seizure.
OVERVIEW: The court granted certiorari on the issue of whether

defendant had been seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment at the time he dropped the cocaine when he saw an officer
running towards him. The state appellate court held that defendant had
been seized when he dropped the cocaine and that the evidence had to
be suppressed. The state supreme court denied the State's application
for review. The Court reversed and remanded the judgment. The Court
held that with respect to a show of authority regarding the application
of physical force, a seizure did not occur when the subject had not
yielded. Defendant's case did not involve the application of any
physical force, and he was untouched at the time he discarded the
cocaine. The Court found that the test for a show of authority was an
objective one and that defendant was not seized until he was tackled.
The cocaine abandoned while defendant was running was not the fruit
of a seizure and not excludable.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment that suppressed

evidence of cocaine as the fruit of an illegal seizure. The Court held
that defendant was not seized until he was tackled. The Court
remanded the case.
Before Teri: you had a seizure or an arrest [showing required for arrest was PC
and in some circumstance a warrant]
After Teri: nothing/ stop~reasonable showing/ arrest~probable cause
New case: shinging a light on a person is not a stop~not a sufficiently suffer

showing of govt. authority
Reid: general profile is not acceptable

Royer: says right to walk away………..one way ticket and different name on
luggage and paying cash, and going for only 48 hours these are all suspicious
Hensley: you can stop a person for past crimeadditional showing for it being a
right person and that the crime occurred
ILLINOIS v. WILLIAM AKA SAM WARDLOW
No. 98-1036
Cal. Daily Op. Service 299; 2000 Daily Journal DAR 389; 1999 Colo. J. C.A.R.
183; 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 20


ILLINOIS.
DISPOSITION: 183 Ill. 2d 306, 701 N. E. 2d 484, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The State appealed the judgment of the

Supreme Court of Illinois, which upheld the grant of defendant's motion to
suppress evidence, concluding that sudden flight in a high crime area did not
create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop.
OVERVIEW: Defendant fled upon seeing police officers patrolling an area

known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Two of the officers caught up with
him, and conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. Defendant
was arrested when officers discovered a .38-caliber handgun. The trial court
denied defendant's motion to suppress, but the appellate court reversed.
The state supreme court agreed, concluding that sudden flight in a high
crime area did not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. The Court
found that nervous, evasive behavior was a pertinent factor in determining
reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, and that headlong flight was the
consummate act of evasion. The Court found that the determination of
reasonable suspicion had to be based on commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior, and that officers were justified in
suspecting that defendant was involved in criminal activity based on his
presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking and his unprovoked flight
upon noticing the police.
OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed and remanded; defendant's

presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking and his unprovoked flight
upon noticing police created a reason
This is a close case

ALABAMA, PETITIONER v. VANESSA ROSE WHITE
No. 89-789
U.S.L.W. 4747

PRIOR HISTORY:
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF ALABAMA.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Certiorari was granted to review an order of the

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama, which held that officers did not have
the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop of
respondent's car and that the marijuana and cocaine that the officers seized
were fruits of respondent's unconstitutional detention.
OVERVIEW: The State sought review of a judgment holding that officers

did not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory
stop of respondent's car based on an anonymous tip and that marijuana and
cocaine seized were fruits of respondent's unconstitutional detention. On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, noting
that a "totality of circumstances" approach was used to determine whether
an informant's tip established probable cause or the reasonable suspicion
required by an officer to make a Terry stop. The level of suspicion required
for a Terry stop was less demanding than that required for probable cause,
and reasonable suspicion could arise from information less reliable than that
required to show probable cause. When the officers stopped respondent, the
anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable
suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal activity. The investigative
stop, therefore, did not violate U.S. Const. amend. IV. When significant
aspects of the informant's predictions were verified, there was reason to
believe that the informant was honest and well-informed.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and
remanded for further proceedings because when the officers stopped
respondent, the anonymous tip from the informant had been sufficiently
corroborated to furnish reasonable suspicion that respondent was engaged
in criminal activity. The investigative stop did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.
Apparently the consent was voluntary and the search was w/in the scope
Argument: that the stop was not based on reasonable suspicision
Before the stop the popo verified her car, apt. building, and the direction of the
car was traveling. Unverified before the stop= name, semi-verfication of
destination, and drugs
The tipsters basis of knowledge: 1st hand

Veracity: don’t know
Relaiblity: in this case good
If there were no coroberation in this case there would be no reasonable

suspision—but this is a CLOSE CASE
FLORIDA v. J. L.
No. 98-1993
U.S.L.W. 4236; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2409; 2000 Daily Journal DAR
3226; 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 1642; 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 216


FLORIDA.
DISPOSITION: 727 So. 2d 204, affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Court granted certiorari to review a

judgment of the Supreme Court of Florida to decide whether an anonymous
tip that respondent was carrying a gun was, without more, sufficient to
justify a police officer's stop and frisk of respondent.
OVERVIEW: The court affirmed a judgment holding that a Terry "stop and
frisk" search of respondent based only on an anonymous tip was invalid
under U.S. Const. amend. IV. Respondent was searched after an anonymous
caller reported to the police that a young black male standing at a particular
bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. The court held that
an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a gun was, without more,
insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. The tip
pointing to respondent lacked the moderate indicia of reliability necessary
because the call provided no predictive information to enable the police to
test the informant's knowledge or credibility. Further, the accurate
description of respondent's appearance was not enough since the reasonable
suspicion at issue required that the tip be reliable in its assertion of
illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. Finally,
the court declined to modify the Terry standard to license a "firearm
exception" since it roved too far from the court's established reliability
analysis.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed a judgment holding that a Terry "stop and
frisk" search of respondent based only on an anonymous tip was
constitutionally invalid since an anonymous tip that a person was carrying a
gun was, without more, insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk
of that person.
Everyone on the court says that this is not reasonable suspission

Dictum in this case suggests that reasonable suspission can be brought down for
circumstances that are very dangerous [bomb threat or anthrax]
===============================================================
===============================================================
ARVIZU:
Sensors in the road, in a sparce area that is suspect for drug trafficking, kids neas are up
high, driver stiff and ridgid & didn’t look at the cops.
Court said reasonable suspissioneverything that looks purely inoscent can give rise to
reasonable suspission
REVIEW:
Taking fingerprint or hair is not a search b/c there is no reasonable expectation of

privacy
KAUPP V. TEXAS…reiterated Dunawaycops can’t take you down to the station

HAYES v. FLORIDA
No. 83-6766
U.S.L.W. 4382

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA, SECOND DISTRICT.
DISPOSITION: 439 So. 2d 896, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant sought certiorari review of a

judgment from the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District,
claiming the fingerprint evidence entered into the record at his trial for
burglary and sexual assault should have been excluded
Ditum is important:
UNITED STATES v. PLACE
No. 81-1617
4844

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND

CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION: 660 F.2d 44, affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States Supreme Court

granted certiorari to review a judgment from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed defendant's
conviction on a drug possession charge on the ground that a
prolonged seizure of defendant's baggage amounted to a seizure
without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
government appealed.
OVERVIEW: When defendant arrived at the airport on a Friday

afternoon, he was met by drug enforcement agents. When
defendant refused to consent to a search of his bags, an agent told
him that they were going to take the bags to a federal judge to
obtain a search warrant. The agents transported the bags to another
airport to subject them to a sniff test by a narcotics detection dog
that reacted positively to one of the bags. Ninety minutes had
elapsed since the seizure of the bags. The agents retained the bags
until Monday morning when they secured a search warrant for the
bag wherein they discovered cocaine. The Court affirmed the
reversal of defendant's conviction on the basis that the evidence
obtained from the search was inadmissible. The 90-minute detention
of respondent's luggage went beyond the narrow authority
possessed by police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected
to contain narcotics. The violation was exacerbated by the agents'
failure to accurately inform the defendant where they were
transporting his bags, how long he might be dispossessed, and what
arrangements would be made for return of the bags if the
investigation dispelled the suspicion.
OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of

defendant's conviction on a drug possession charge.
--Probably had reasonable suspicion when defendant encounter w/ police in New

York
--Seize luggage [
--Dog Sniff [gives probable cause]
--Additional seizure over weekend
--Search of Suitcase
Threshold: can you seize a belonging errespective to the seizure of the person. So
is the seizure of the luggage only a mini seizure [i.e. stop]only needs RS, or a full
seizure [arrest]needs PC
…………………answer to this question is yes
But in this case, the seizure was unreasonable, took to long and took the bag to
another airport. Here the popo could have had the dog at the seen
You can seize an item just like a person
An interesting point is that the movement of a persons stuff is not as stringent as

with a person…the prof thinks that the court would alow for the minimal movement
of the luggage.
====================================================
====================================================
Kabias Case: the presence of the dog did not change the traffic stop. The dog got
there right away and was walked around a car that was lawfully stopped. The
dissent says that bringing a dog to a traffic stop changed the nature of the dog. If
the person would have been held after the initial traffic stop so as to allow the dog to
come, than case would probably be very different
MICHIGAN v. LONG
No. 82-256
5231

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.
DISPOSITION: 413 Mich. 461, 320 N. W. 2d 866, reversed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner state sought review of a decision

of the Supreme Court of Michigan, which suppressed the evidence that
was obtained from a search of the passenger compartment of
respondent's vehicle on the ground that the sole justification of the
search, the protection of the police officers and others nearby, did not
warrant the search in this case.
OVERVIEW: The police officers found marijuana in the passenger

compartment and in the trunk of the vehicle that respondent was
driving. The officers searched respondent's vehicle because they had
reason to believe that the vehicle contained weapons potentially
dangerous to the officers. At issue was whether a protective search for
weapons could extend to an area beyond the person in the absence of
probable cause to arrest. Articles inside the relatively narrow compass
of the passenger compartment of an automobile were within the area
into which a suspect might reach in order to grab a weapon. Protection
of police officers justified protective searches when the officers had a
reasonable belief that the suspect posed a danger, especially during
roadside encounters. As such, the search of respondent's vehicle was
permissible since it was limited to those areas where a weapon could
have been placed or hidden.
OUTCOME: The court reversed, holding that the search of the

passenger compartment of respondent's automobile, limited to those
areas in which a weapon could have been placed or hidden, was
permissible since the police officers possessed a reasonable belief
based upon specific and articulable facts that reasonably warranted the
belief that respondent was dangerous and could gain immediate control
of weapons.
Government Action:
--Encounter w/ defendantok b/c car in ditch
--see weaponok b/c open to public view
--seach the passenger compartment, discovers pouch…find it in a pouch
--frisk
--arrest
--impounded the vehicle
--trunk
To facts which give PC to search the car…prior to lifting up the armrest= no PC to

search the car
JUST B/C THERE IS SOMETHING SUSPICIOUS, IT DOES NOT GIVE US PC
This is not a search incident to lawful arrest case, b/c searched the pouch first and
then arrested
New rule: can search the are inside the car for the sake of police protection have a
knife and drunk guy, so government interest goes up+ it is the middle of the night in
a rural area. This is not about evidence, it is about weapons and such things which
endanger the officer. Government showing is= reasonable suspicion that the suspect
is dangerous, and that may gain control to weapons.
Seeing the gun, or prior knowledge of armed criminal activity may work to give the
popo a reasonable suspicion that there is a weapon
====================================================
====================================================
Mimms police can order driver out during a traffic stop

Wilsonpolice can order passengers out of a car during a traffic stop
Hibble stop suspect, ask him name, and refused to give name…Navada statute
allowed to arrest if refuse to give name. Issue, is it reasonable to arrest him…it
matches the justification of Terri stop…and if they don’t arrest him now, they will
never get his identity
--during a risk popo can remove anything that is immediately apparent that is a
weapon or contraband
MINNESOTA, PETITIONER v. TIMOTHY DICKERSON
No. 91-2019
U.S.L.W. 4544; 93 Cal. Daily Op. Service 4134; 93 Daily Journal DAR 7077; 7 Fla. L.
Weekly Fed. S 373


MINNESOTA.
DISPOSITION: 481 N. W. 2d 840, affirmed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The United States Supreme Court granted a

writ of certiorari to hear petitioner government's case to determine
whether the Fourth Amendment permits the seizure of contraband
detected through a police officer's sense of touch during a protective
patdown search.
OVERVIEW: Respondent was arrested and charged with possession of

a controlled substance after a police officer, during a stop and frisk,
retrieved a lump of cocaine from respondent's pocket. The trial court
denied respondent's motion to suppress the cocaine. Respondent
proceeded to trial and was found guilty. The state supreme court
affirmed the state court of appeals' decision reversing the trial court.
The state supreme court found that based on the record before it, the
officer determined that the lump was contraband only after squeezing,
sliding, and otherwise manipulating the contents of respondent's
pocket which the officer already knew contained no weapon. The state
supreme court held that the stop and the frisk of respondent was valid
under Terry, but that the seizure of the cocaine was unconstitutional.
The court affirmed. The court stated that the state supreme court was
correct in holding that the police officer in this case overstepped the
bounds of the "strictly circumscribed" search for weapons allowed
under Terry.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the state supreme court's judgment

that the police officer overstepped the bounds of the "strictly
circumscribed" search for weapons allowed under Terry when the
officer retrieved a lump of cocaine from respondent's pocket.
Government Action:
--government conseeds it was a stopattorney should have contended the legality of the
stop
--the officers friskofficer squeezed the lump in his pocket, and it was immediately
apparent that it was not a weapon.
Can seize drugs und the “plain feel” doctrine, but it was not plain that the lump was
contraband
The frisk is ok b/c it is near a crack house, and it is assumed that guns may be present is
such an area
The additional viewing can’t give you probable cause…the popo blew it by giving the
pocket an extra squeeze.
MARYLAND, PETITIONER v. JEROME EDWARD BUIE
No. 88-1369
U.S.L.W. 4281

PRIOR HISTORY:
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
DISPOSITION: 314 Md. 151, 550 A.2d 79, vacated and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The State sought certiorari review of an

order of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, which, at defendant's armed
robbery trial, suppressed evidence seized in plain view during a
protective sweep because the officer who conducted the sweep did not
have probable cause to believe that a serious and demonstrable
potentiality for danger existed.
OVERVIEW: Following armed robbery by two men, police arrested

defendant in his home after defendant came up from his basement.
Police conducted a protective sweep of the basement and found, in
plain view, a sweat suit like the one worn in the robbery for which
defendant was arrested. The trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress and convicted defendant, but the court of appeals reversed.
The Court granted certiorari and vacated the court of appeal's decision,
finding that arresting officers were permitted to take reasonable steps
to ensure their safety after, and during, the arrest, and that interest
was sufficient to outweigh the possible intrusion. The Court found that
no search warrant was required and that officers could, as a
precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, look in spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from
which an attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, the Court
held that there had to be articulable facts which, taken together with
the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably
prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbored an
individual posing a danger.
OUTCOME: The Court vacated the judgment below suppressing

evidence and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals.
Valid warrant and PC that he is present for the arrest warrant
…Issue, does popo have a lawful vantage point to seize the evidence.
--need reasonable suspicion, and where they reasonably think someone is hiding.
Reasonable suspicion that someone is hiding down there= 2 people, armed. have
to be lawfully there, and have reasonable suspicion
--holding also expands the wingspan in a SILA to adjoining areahas to be lawful

arrest and have to be validly present
====================================================
General Notes: Start w/ the government action, don’t start w/ a conclusion that
Popo had reasonable suspicion.
====================================================
YBARRA:
NO PC, NO INDIVIDUALIZED REASONABLE SUSSPISION THAT

PERSON IS ABOUT TO INGAGE IN ILLEGAL ACTIVITY AND THAT SHE
IS DANGEROUS
=========================================================
=========================================================
SUMMERS:
NEW JERSEY v. T. L. O.
No. 83-712
U.S.L.W. 4083

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
Reargued October 2, 1984.
PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY.
DISPOSITION: 94 N. J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934, reversed.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner State of New Jersey appealed the

judgment from the Supreme Court of New Jersey that reversed the lower
court's judgment and suppressed evidence found during a search by school
officials in an action where respondent student alleged that the school
officials violated respondent's rights under the U.S. Const. amend IV.
OVERVIEW: The student's purse was searched after she was suspected of
having cigarettes. The principal discovered that the student had the
cigarettes in her possession, and discovered evidence of marijuana and a list
of alleged users from the school. The State of New Jersey brought
delinquency charges against the student. The student alleged that the
search of her purse violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The Court held
that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that a
search by a school official was permissible in its scope when the measures
adopted were reasonably related to the objectives of the search and were
not intrusive in light of the age and the sex of the student. Therefore, the
Court reversed the judgment of the state supreme court and held that the
evidence of marijuana was admissible.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the state supreme court's holding against
the State of Jersey in which the evidence of drug dealing was suppressed
and the Court held that the search, which resulted in the discovery of the
evidence of marihuana dealing by the student, was reasonable.
NORMALLY YOU WOULD NEED PC AND A WARRANT OR WARRANT

EXCEDPTION TO DO A SEARCHGRANTED IT IS NOT CONSENT OR AN
INVENTORY.
But the court finds that this is not appropriate…uses Teri balancing. There is
a need for order, students have lesser expectation of privacyschool officials
are like parents, and it is a highly regulated environment.
B/c reasonable suspicion to search, court doesn’t say whether it is ok to

search without reasonable suspicion
If you got reasonable suspicion of a violation of a school rule…can do a full

search and seizure w/o PC
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. RICK
SITZ, ET AL.
No. 88-1897
496 U.S. 444; 110 S. Ct. 2481; 110 L. Ed. 2d 412; 1990 U.S. LEXIS 3144;
58 U.S.L.W. 4781

PRIOR HISTORY:
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Michigan.
DISPOSITION: 170 Mich. App. 433, 429 N.W.2d 180, reversed and
remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners, the Michigan Department of State

Police and its director, sought review of a judgment from the Court of
Appeals of Michigan, which affirmed the circuit court's determination that
the State's sobriety checkpoint program violated U.S. Const. amend. IV.
OVERVIEW: Petitioners set up programs for sobriety checkpoints, and

respondents, all licensed drivers, challenged the constitutionality.
Respondents argued that the analysis had to proceed from a basis of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and there must be some
governmental need beyond the normal need before a balancing analysis was
appropriate. On review the court found that a three prong test was
appropriate, balancing the state's grave and legitimate interest in curbing
drunk driving; the checkpoints were generally effective, and the subjective
intrusion on individual liberties was not substantial. The court found that a
seizure occurred when a vehicle was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint.
However, the court held that such stops were reasonable considering the
increasing number of alcohol-related deaths and mutilation on the nation's
roads. The State program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment and
the balance of the State's interest in preventing drunken driving and the
degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who were briefly stopped
weighed in favor of the State program.
OUTCOME: The judgment finding that the State's sobriety checkpoints were
unconstitutional was reversed and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the court's opinion because the proper analysis was a three
prong test balancing the state's grave interest in curbing drunk driving, the
effectiveness of the stops, and the insubstantial subjective intrusion on
individual liberties.
Everyone agrees that the sobriety checkpoint is a seizure…usually for a seizure
you need PC or individualized reasonable suspicion.
Use of the 3 part Brown v. Texas Test
MARTINEZ-FUERTE
Fixed border Checkpoints
--The court has forbidden Roving Sobriety Stops
Dicent: This is huge…seizure w/o individualized reasonable suspissionthey

say that this is almost no more effective than pulling over people who are
swerving around and give rise to individualized suspission
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, ET AL. v. JAMES EDMOND ET AL.
No. 99-1030
U.S.L.W. 4009; 2000 Cal. Daily Op. Service 9549; 2000 Colo. J. C.A.R. 6401;
14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 9

November 28, 2000, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which reversed
the denial of respondents' motion for a preliminary injunction and
determined that petitioner city's checkpoint program with the primary
purpose of interdicting illegal narcotics violated the Fourth Amendment, U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
OVERVIEW: Petitioner city operated vehicle checkpoints to interdict

unlawful drugs. At each checkpoint location, the police stopped a
predetermined number of vehicles. Pursuant to written directives, an officer
advised the driver that he or she was being stopped at a drug checkpoint
and asked the driver to produce a license and registration. The officer
looked for signs of impairment and conducted an open-view examination of
the vehicle from the outside. A narcotics-detection dog walked around the
outside of each stopped vehicle. Respondents were stopped at a narcotics
checkpoint and filed a class action lawsuit against petitioners, claiming that
the roadblocks violated U.S. Const. amend. IV. Respondents' preliminary
injunction motion was denied, but this decision was reversed on appeal. On
certiorari, the court affirmed the determination that the checkpoints violated
U.S. Const. amend. IV because the primary purpose of the narcotics
checkpoint program was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing. Because the authorities pursued primarily general crime control
purposes at the checkpoints, the stops could only be justified by some
quantum of individualized suspicion.
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the judgment determining that the

checkpoint program violated constitutional law because the primary purpose
of the checkpoint program was ultimately indistinguishable from the general
interest in crime control.
Can order you out of the car under mimswhen they stop you w/ reasonable
suspission, cops can also ask questions, can ask for ID,
They are just doing investigation of these drivers in this case…it’s not like the
highway safety concern of drunk driving.
LIDSTER
Court distinguishes Edmond b/c it is not about ferreting out crime, but to ask
citizens to help solve a crime. It doesn’t make sense to use individualized
suspicion, Govt. interest is strong, the individual intrusion is low
===============================================
===
Court says can’t do random pull overs…rather they should just look for
evidence of DUI
Can’t do for general investigatory purposes…investigating the individuals that

are stoped
Can stop you at a border…this is a point of wherever they decide to put the
check point
===============================================
====
Flores-Montano no property or privacy interest…and at borders there is a
high level of govt. interest they can detain and do legthy detentions
SkinnerDrug
Gernoniaresent rise in drug use, discaplin problems, athletes were drug

leaders, athletes could get hurt, most parents said ok
--Drug and urin tests are searches LOOK ON 423

WALKER L. CHANDLER, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. ZELL D. MILLER, GOVERNOR
OF GEORGIA, ET AL.
No. 96-126
520 U.S. 305; 117 S. Ct. 1295; 137 L. Ed. 2d 513; 1997 U.S. LEXIS 2505;
65 U.S.L.W. 4243; 145 A.L.R. Fed. 657; 12 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1233; 97 Cal.
Daily Op. Service 2723; 97 Daily Journal DAR 4831; 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S
393

PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, Reported at: 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 806.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner candidates sought review of a

judgment entered in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, which held that Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-140 was constitutional. The
statute in question required candidates for designated state office to certify
that they had taken a drug test and obtained negative results.
OVERVIEW: The Court held that Georgia's requirement that candidates for
state office pass a drug test was outside the category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches. The Court emphasized that the proffered
special need for drug testing must be substantial--important enough to
override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to
suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal requirement of individualized
suspicion. The Court found that Georgia failed to show, in justification of Ga.
Code Ann. § 21-2-140, a special need of that kind. Notably lacking in
respondent officials' presentation was any indication of a concrete danger
that demanded departure from the Fourth Amendment's main rule. The
statute was not needed and could not work to ferret out lawbreakers, and
officials barely attempted to support the statute on that ground. However
well meant, the candidate drug test Georgia devised diminished personal
privacy for a symbol's sake; state action that is prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment. Where, as in this case, public safety was not genuinely
jeopardized, the Fourth Amendment precluded a suspicionless search, no
matter how conveniently arranged.
OUTCOME: The Court reversed the appeals court's judgment.

REVIEW:
Ebara Case: Search Warrant for the Bar, stopped and searched a patron, were they
justified in frisking everyone in the bar. Court said no, to PC that everyone had
narcotics, and Teri Balancing requires individualized suspicionand there was no
individualized suspicion
Summers: Search Warrant for contraband, detain the resident of the home, there is
some suspicion attached to the home does the suspicion transfer to him. Just
keeping him in his home [not a public place], Govt. interest=making sure he doesn’t
flea, making sure doesn’t come back and ambush police [court has never said can
detain resident during a warantless search, or if you could detain non-residentsa
non resident is less likely to be seen as attached to the contraband, and visitors
could not help police in the search]
McCarther: Popo detain guy when they go to get a warrant. Concern for destruction
of evidence/flight…yes detain him but it is just outside his home…this was ok
TLO: full search of student’s pursebefore this never allowed full search on less
than PC. Case allows school official to do a full search just based on reasonable
suspicion
===========
Suspissionless Searchesprior to this there was some govt. showing
Stizallows popo to stop and search with no cause [helps to think of these as special
needs cases
3 categories of special needs cases:
--Road Blocks [In Stiz, court said ok to do DWI, fixed for the duration of the check,
momentary stop, everyone is stopped, there is notice [so no surprise], and govt.
interest in apprehending DUI’s is high. Brown is the test for special needs cases.
Brown= Govt. interest, Effectiveness for meeting interest, Individual interest.
Other OK stops is at boarders, not only can they stop you and do full search, and
disassemble you car, with no showing of suspicion or PC
Lidster: It is ok to do a stop to investigate a crime. Brief stop, minimal individual

interest, high govt. interest in catching criminal. Effectiveness= narrowly tailored.
The only roadblock that is not ok is a General Crime Road Block: When the purpose
of the RB is to investigate if the drivers themselves are engaging in illegal activity
[section 2 on p. 404 gives good review of special needs cases] once department
starts getting into a department wide [implicit intent to get people] than starts
getting away from Wren
--Drug Test [ok for athletes and other students involved in extra curricular activity…
special interest for these people b/c they stay after school and travel, student has
lowed expectation of privacy. Govt. interest in fighting drugs, and student health.]
Skenner case: people involving in operating trains where there is accidents. High
govt. concern for safety where people operating trains and on drugs.
Channler: not ok for drug testing. Brown test no interest b/c appears no problem
and would not be effective
Ferguson: govt. argued special need to protect women and unborn childrenbut if
this was there real concern they would hand stuff over to health officials, but really
your handing it off to the police
--Administrative/ Regulatory [deal w/ housing and fire codes]
SEARCH/SEIZURE
None Minimal Full search or More than a full
arrest [or search or arrest
equivalent]
TENNESSEE v. GARNER ET AL.
No. 83-1035
4410

March 27, 1985, Decided *
* Together with No. 83-1070, Memphis Police Department et al. v. Garner et al., on
certiorari to the same court.
PRIOR HISTORY:
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION: 710 F.2d 240, affirmed and remanded.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: On writ of certiorari from the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, appellant sought review
of the finding that police officers could not use deadly force in the
apprehension of all criminals.
OVERVIEW: Appellee brought suit for violations of his son's

constitutional rights against appellant city and appellant police
department, and appellant state intervened after the court of
appeals reversed the decision made by the district court on remand,
finding the use of deadly force was unwarranted. Affirming the
judgment, the Court found that the apprehension of a suspect is a
seizure for the purposes of the Constitution and the use of deadly
force to achieve a seizure was only permitted under certain
circumstances. The Court held that deadly force was only allowed to
apprehend felons who the police had probable cause to believe were
dangerous to them or to the public. The Court further found that the
shooting of appellee's son, who was a suspect in a burglary, was not
an acceptable use of deadly force.
OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the judgment.
Govt. Argument: He will escape, it’s a deterrence [it will encourage peaceful
submission], common law rule.
Argument: the need to capture the suspect is not better than death, peaceful
submission argument is not warranted by any evidence, common law argument=
felonies were defined differently and were all punishable by death.
We are maxing out on individual interest in this case
Rule [438]-- [this is a reasonable test—i.e. not what the actual officer was thinkig
but what a reasonable officer would do in the situation] if the suspect threatens the
officer w/ a weapon, or, PC suspect committed a dangerous crime [of serious bodily
injury to officer or others]…AND popo must give a warning…AND, DF is necessary to
prevent excape
SCHMERBER v. CALIFORNIA
No. 658

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE DEPARTMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Certiorari was granted to review a

decision of the Appellate Department of the California Superior
Court, County of Los Angeles, which affirmed petitioner's conviction
of driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.
OVERVIEW: Petitioner contended that the drawing of his blood for

an alcohol analysis test without his consent denied him due process
of law under the Fourteenth Amendment and violated his privilege
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, his right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and his right not to be
subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The state court affirmed the
conviction and petitioner sought review. The Court upheld
petitioner's conviction. It held that the privilege against self-
incrimination protected an accused only from being compelled to
testify against himself, or to otherwise provide the State with
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the
withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis did not involve
compulsion to these ends. The Court also held that the record
showed no violation of petitioner's right to be free of unreasonable
searches and seizures, because the arresting officer could have
reasonably concluded that the delay in obtaining a warrant could
result in the destruction or disappearance of evidence and because
the test was conducted in a reasonable manner.
OUTCOME: The Court affirmed the state court's judgment of

conviction.
Beyond a full search…Individual interestfairly minimal, in hosbital, done by doctor.
Govt. interestest PC yes, Warrant doesn’t make sinse, govt. needs evidence to
prosecute him.
WINSTON, SHERIFF, ET AL. v. LEE
No. 83-1334
4367

PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH

CIRCUIT.
CASE SUMMARY
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioners challenged an order from the

United States Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit, which under the
U.S. Const. amend. IV, affirmed the order from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia where petitioners
sought to compel surgery to remove a bullet from respondent.
OVERVIEW: Petitioners alleged that a bullet in respondent's chest

was evidence that would link respondent to a crime. Petitioners
sought a motion to compel surgery to remove the bullet. Such
surgery required the use of a general anesthetic. Respondent
alleged that removal of the bullet from his chest was a substantial
violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, U.S. Const.
amend. IV. The court held that the proper safeguards were present
and exhausted. The court held that the reasonableness of surgical
intrusions beneath the skin depended on a case-by-case approach,
in which the individual's interests in privacy and security were
weighed against society's interests in conducting the procedure. The
court held the operation would substantially intrude on respondent's
protected interests. The court affirmed the injunction against
petitioners' request.
OUTCOME: Affirmed the order of the appellate court and granted an

injunction against petitioners' attempt to force respondent to
undergo surgery in order to remove potential evidence from
respondent's chest because such act was a substantial intrusion and
violated respondent's constitutional rights.
Govt. has PC…govt. want’s to remove bullet to match to gun. Individual interest: The
surgery was rather dangerious. Govt. had other evidenceso really didn’t need the
bullet

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WEEKS v.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Argued December 2, 3, 1913

OVERVIEW: In review of defendant's contention that the warrantless

ISSUE: Should the illegally gained evidence be admissible

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

March 29, 1961, Argued

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.

DISPOSITION: 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N. E. 2d 387, reversed.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant appealed from a judgment of the

OVERVIEW: It was apparent that the materials introduced into evidence in

POSSEORY INTREST AND PRIVACY INTRENCE ARE VIOLATED BY THE COPS

THE PURPOSE OF THE RULE: DETURANCE; NOT CORRECTION [VIOLATION

ARGUMENT IS A LITTLE TRICKY…

THE ASSUMPTION UNDER QUESTION IS THAT THE EXCUSIONARY RULE

4TH AMENDMENT VIOLATION CAN NOT BE FIXED, IT HAPPENED, IT IS

DECENT: IT IS MERLY A SUPERVISORY RULE, AND THUS CAN NOT BE

COURT CAN NOW WIDDLE AWAY AT THE EXCSIONARY RULE…THE SC HAS

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October 17, 1967, Argued

DISPOSITION: 369 F.2d 130, reversed.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant sought review of a judgment of the

OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering information

OUTCOME: The Court reversed defendant's conviction.

WHETHER THERE WAS A SEARCH WHEN A DEVICE WAS PUT OUTSIDE A

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

November 10, 1969, Argued

Reargued October 20, 1970.

PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

DISPOSITION: 405 F.2d 838, reversed.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The government sought review of a decision of

OVERVIEW: Defendant was convicted under two consolidated indictments

OUTCOME: The lower appellate court's judgment reversing defendant's

GOVERNMENT ACTION IS HEARING THE CONVERSTATIONS…IS THIS A

NO, THIS IS NOT A SEARCH. [POLICY CONSIDERATION: PEOPLE NEED TO

ARE PRIVACY INTRESTS MORE IMPLICATED WHEN THE POLICE OUT IN A

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

March 28, 1979, Argued

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.

DISPOSITION: 283 Md. 156, 389 A. 2d 858, affirmed.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner challenged an order of the Court of

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

November 9, 1983, Argued

* Together with No. 82-1273, Maine v. Thornton, on certiorari to the Supreme

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Writ of certiorari was granted from judgments of

OVERVIEW: Petitioner was arrested and indicted after police officers,

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

December 10, 1985, Argued

CERTIORARI TO COURT OF APPEALS OF CALIFORNIA, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff, the State of California, petitioned for

OVERVIEW: The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

February 29, 2000, Argued

PRIOR HISTORY: ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

DISPOSITION: 167 F.3d 225, reversed.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner challenged the judgment of the United

OVERVIEW: Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to possess, and

OUTCOME: The judgment was reversed because petitioner's motion to

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October 3, 1978, Argued

Petition For Rehearing Denied January 15, 1979.

PRIOR HISTORY: CERTIORARI TO THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS,