Phil. Press Institute, Inc. v.

Comelec

Facts: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. PPI,
a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring
publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready,
constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.

On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec
alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free
print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance
with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines
to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation
of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec
space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution
and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an
exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No.
2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication
and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair,
impartial and credible election.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.

Held: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its
present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and
the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the
extent it relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter
directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2
suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of
Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable
case or controversy.

Association of Small Landowners vs Sec of Agrarian Reform

The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas
Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin
Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under
P.D. No. 27.

The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.

They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said
measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention
limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of
a valid appropriation.

Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for
public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where
the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale
may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or
other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the
paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the
irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power,
that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

COMMISSIONER OF IR VS CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORP

FACTS:This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of Rules of Court seeking the nullification

of CA decision granting respondent’s claim for tax equal to the amount of the 20% that it
extended to senior citizens on the latter’s purchases pursuant to Senior Citizens Act.
Respondent deducted the total amount of Php219,778 from its gross income for the
taxable year 1995 whereby respondent did not pay tax for that year reporting a net loss of
Php20,963 in its corporate income tax. In 1996, claiming that the Php219,778 should be
applied as a tax credit, respondent claimed for refund in the amount of Php150, 193.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 20% discount granted by the respondent to qualified senior
citizens may be claimed as tax credit or as deduction from gross sales?
RULING:

“Tax credit” is explicitly provided for in Sec4 of RA 7432. The discount given to
Senior citizens is a tax credit, not a deduction from the gross sales of the establishment
concerned. The tax credit that is contemplated under this Act is a form of just
compensation, not a remedy for taxes that were erroneously or illegally assessed and
collected. In the same vein, prior payment of any tax liability is a pre-condition before a
taxable entity can benefit from tax credit. The credit may be availed of upon payment, if any. Where there is no
tax liability or where a private establishment reports a net loss for
the period, the tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the next taxable year.

Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. City of Pasig

Facts:

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig
Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials,
were located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks
could pass through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and
electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter
property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by a transfer
certificate of title which is abutting E. R. Santos Street.

On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to
initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance
stated that the property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to purchase the property for public use
as an access road but they rejected the offer.

On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching Cuancos for
the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to
construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same portion. The plaintiff
appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.
The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas
Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways
through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except
through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine
necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable
and practical necessity will suffice.

Issue:

Whether or not there was no due process?

Held:

Petition is granted. However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an
ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the
subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of
its right to due process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby
received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial.[73] Consequently, where, as in this
case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court
based on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the
ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.

Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220

F: The Philippine Tourism Authority sought the expropriation of 282 Ha of land in Barangay Malubog and Babag
in Cebu City. upon deposit of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of the property, the CFI authorized the
PTA to take immediate possession of the property. The charter of the PTA authorizes it to acquire through
condemnation proceedings lands for tourist zone development of a sports complex. The petitioners who are
occupants of the lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the taking was not for
public use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform program; and (3) expropriation would impair the
obligation of contracts.

HELD: The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of roads, bridges, and
the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The
petititioners have not shown that the area being developed is land reform area and that the affected persons
have been given emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has never been
regarded as a barrier to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain.

Didipio Earth Savers Multipurpose Association et al vs DENR Sec Elisea Gozun et al

Police Power – Eminent Domain

In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it comes to
either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an Australian company.
The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy
Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs. Didipio petitioned to have the law
and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to
nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust
“taking” of private property for private purpose in contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that private property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just
compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without
payment of just compensation.
Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid
exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This government regulation
involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use
or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded that “to require compensation in all
such circumstances would compel the government to regulate by purchase.”

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are;

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;

(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is not w/o
just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR.
To wit,

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or concessionaire as
a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing
rules and regulations.

Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of the
surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a result of
the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly
compensated.

Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry, acquisition
and use of private lands.

Gerochi v. DOE
FACTS
RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which sought to impose
a universal charge on all end-users of electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCOR’s projects, was enacted
and took effect in 2001.
Petitioners
contest

the constitutionality of the EPIRA, stating that the imposition of the universal charge on all end-users is
oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without representation for not giving the consumers a
chance to be heard and be represented.
ISSUE
W/N the universal charge is a
tax.
HELD
NO. The assailed universal charge is not a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State’s police power. That
public welfare is promoted may be gleaned from Sec. 2 of the EPIRA, which enumerates the policies of the State
regarding electrification. Moreover, the Special Trust Fund feature of the universal charge reasonably serves and
assures the attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure
the viability of the country’s electric power industry), further boosting the position that the same is an exaction
primarily in pursuit of the State’s police objectives
DOCTRINE
If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if
regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax.
The taxing power may be used as
an implement of police power.

The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity;
without

taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people.

Manila International Airport Authority vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years
1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million.

The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport
Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands
and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.

MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing
real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption
privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local Government
Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the express mention of one
person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in
Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport
Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax.

MIAA’s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax itself.
The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, since
in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

Issue:

WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws? Yes. Ergo, the
real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Parañaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to such
assessments, are void.

Held:

1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government
and thus exempt from local taxation.

MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or
voting shares.

MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock corporation must have
members.

MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with
corporate powers.

When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a
corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises
the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same
time, MIAA exercises “all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.”

2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic

a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines.

No one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like “roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports”
includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port” constructed by the
State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international
and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the
public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.

The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public
dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one “intended for public
use.” The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines,
constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not
change the character of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user’s tax. This means
taxing those among the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those
who never use the particular public facility.

b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the
subject of an auction sale.

Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through
public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is
void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion are
subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose
and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic

MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter 12,
Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties owned by the
Republic. n MIAA’s case, its status as a mere trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is clearer because even
its executive head cannot sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the President of the
Republic can sign such deed of conveyance.

d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization

The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to
transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely toreorganize a
division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the
beneficial owner of the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims
any ownership rights over MIAA’s assets adverse to the Republic.

e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable

Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person following are exempted from payment of the real property tax.

However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from
real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is
subject to real estate tax.