Azri Rehman

History of Modern Philosophy

Dr. James Taylor
03/22/10
Examination of Descartes’ Claims That God is Not a Deceiver

We shall analyze Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy and consider his

arguments for God being a non-deceiver. This particular argument is entirely critical for

his overall goal of the Meditations. The foundations for his latter arguments are

dependent on this one issue. If this detail were to be left out of his argument then it

would restrict his ability to delve into the realm of the material world. I will argue that

Descartes’ argument for God being a non-deceiver is simplistic at best. I will expose

some of the gray areas where his arguments that he does not address, and furthermore

undermine his justification of god not being a deceiver within the boundaries he creates. I

will structure my paper as follows. I will first draw upon why Descartes needs to

construct his argument. Next, I will then outline his claim and make it apparent why he is

certain that God is a non-deceiver. In the next section I will discuss my arguments for

why his claims are unjustifiable and reveal the holes in his argument by examining his

understanding of the word deception and its uses. Finally, I will recognize the counter

arguments one might pose with my claims and address them accordingly.

I will begin by demonstrating the necessity of Descartes’ argument and make it

clear why he believes that God is not a deceiver. By the conclusion of the second

meditation, Descartes has established that he is a “thinking thing.” To know more than

this, he needs to be able to rely on his senses to grasp an understanding of the material
world. He questions his senses based on three postulates. He says that there is a

possibility that he is insane, however judging cases of insanity against the sane can refute

this. He then states that he could be dreaming. This theory is also discredited because one

can deduce whether they are dreaming or not because dreams have a certain character

about them which makes them distinct from real world experiences. The final suggestion

was that he was in some way being deceived by some entity that would cause his senses

to be impaired and mislead him to believe things that he is predisposed to. Unlike the

previous two claims, this one is not as easily rejected. In order for Descartes’ discuss the

material world he needs to be able to trust his senses. For him to be able to trust his

senses, he needs the existence of a benevolent god who would not deceive him.

At this point in his Meditations, Descartes is at a standstill. He is unable to

proceed with his arguments unless he is able to develop a viable account that would lead

to a beneficent God who is not a deceiver. He begins his argument by stating that God is

a perfect being and due to his perfection he lacks any and all imperfections. He claims

that deceit and fraud are dependent on some defect; and God having no defects is

incapable of committing deceit. He then intensifies his argument by discussing the will to

deceive. Descartes’ states, “the will to deceive undoubtedly attest to maliciousness or

weakness. Accordingly, deception is incompatible with God." (Meditation IV) By stating

this, he is saying that if a person has the will to deceive then they are intrinsically

malicious or weak. His argument follows that if someone or something embodies the trait

of maliciousness then they have an imperfection, and God being a perfect being has no

imperfection. By this he reassures his claim and understanding that God is not a deceiver.
 I will begin my argument against his claim by first analyzing the nature of the

word “deceit.” In Descartes’ argument he takes a subjective stance by implying that that

the word deceiver has a negative connotation. The word deception is given to us with

Descartes’ “understanding” that we believe that the word is synonymous with evil and

malice. The language from which the word was derived from was a created by humans.

This language is something that was created by way of socialization. Like how we do not

know the difference between right and wrong as a baby, our knowledge of these words

are something that which are not inherent. Certain words may impart negative feelings on

some but their innate values are not dependent on Descartes to decide. Where Descartes

views deception as a defection, someone else’s perspective would yield a different result.

Surely Descartes’ does have the same interpretation of the universe as God does. Perhaps

in the God’s view deception would be a positive attribute. His argument is absolutely

reliant on his perception that deception is naturally a negative concept.

The strongest objection to my argument would be the claim that the idea of deceit

is given to Descartes by God. This understanding that was given to him clearly defines

the characteristic of the quality as having a negative meaning. This argument is then

reinforced by him stating that God is the one who put the idea of deception in his head.

This would be conclusive if its logic was not circular. Descartes’ idea of deception is

given to him from God, and he knows he can trust God because of he has a clear and

distinct idea of him. The reason he has this clear and distinct idea of God, is because God

gave it to him. This leads into a vicious circle, which does not produce veridicality. Much

like his “knowledge of infinity” one has to question the definitiveness of his claim and

whether the application of his argument will be able to be used by others. At best his
argument would work only at a first person perspective and will not merit any foreign

attempts.

In this section I will address the argument about the will to deceive and its

implications of malice upon the self. Descartes’ argument is furthered by his addition that

with his statement that the will of any entity to deceive comes implicitly the trait of

malice and weakness. The problem with his argument is that he does not recognize

ulterior motives for deception that do not carry any intention of malice. There is a

plethora of other ways to view deceit. Rather than seeing it as a wrong thing to do, its use

could be an alternative to telling the truth when it not favorably applicable to do so.

Telling the truth in some cases may have detrimental values that may make it an unwise

choice. If the use of a clever deception would prevent a potentially unfavorable outcome

then its use would then have a more desired effect. In addition to this, another reason for

deception is that it could be a more efficient solution to the truth. Descartes addresses that

a deception, or lie rather, is an omission of the truth; therefore it is a lack. True as this

may be, it can also be considered as the contrary. God could tell us that if we do not

adhere to a set of moral rules then we will be punished for the sins we commit in the

afterlife. To follow through with his claim would be taking an extra step. Perhaps God

would see this extra step as unnecessary and value the effective methods of the deception

rather than going through the process of creating the punishment. Another use for

deception would be its use as a tool for beneficence. This practice is widespread in daily

interactions. Assume that we are the parents of a child who is three years old and that the

dog of the child was injured by a moving vehicle and had to be put down. By telling the

truth to the child we would impart sadness upon him or her and may provoke mental
issues that could be damaging to the sensitive mind of a child. In another case, consider

the instance where we take on the role of a doctor who is treating a patient whose life is

dependent on you deceiving someone. This could mean deceiving someone who might be

a potential transplant donor, or the patient himself. The purpose of the deception in each

case is for a benevolent cause with wisdom guiding each action. This could be an

analogous depiction of God; an omniscient being who deceives us with good intentions

utilizing their insight for our benefit.

Descartes might respond this argument in three ways. The first would be him

reaffirming his idea of God. He would say there is no necessity of God to create a

deception. He would question why God would need to deceive if he has the ability to do

whatever he wills. If God is omnipotent then creating the extra truths to support his

claims would not be a problem. An all-powerful God would find such tasks to be

inconsequential and fully within his capabilities. However, this response fails because

once again it is not up to Descartes to decide the parameters of God. According to

Descartes, his God has the characteristic of omnipotence. If we say that because he is all

powerful then creating whatever he wants is negligible in difficulty, then we are

assuming that God favors the truth more than efficiency. Perhaps deceit is a quality that is

associated with being clever and intuitive. Both of these are positive characteristics which

Descartes could not call imperfections. Another way for Descartes to respond to my

argument is by altering his stance on the will to deceive. Instead of holding steadfast that

maliciousness being directly correlated with deceiving, he would state that the will to

deceive is necessarily malicious. Although this does strengthen his argument, one can

clearly see the holes in his position by changing his definitiveness to a more flexible
stance. By taking this standpoint he would have to submit that God would have the ability

to deceive without malice. Finally, in response to my claim of the use of deception as a

clever tool to avoid a potentially disastrous event, Descartes would claim that even

though this method is a more effective solution it is still the result of a lack. In the

example of the doctor and the patient, he would note that the root of the deception is a

lack of the doctor’s ability to convince either the patient or an outside party to accept his

position. This lack is something that a perfect god would not have. Once again, the

perspective of God questions this argument. Descartes’ ability to adopt the viewpoint of

God is purely speculation. The ideals of God is not for Descartes to decide, rather it is

something that is determinate from God alone.

I have demonstrated in my argument how Descartes’ idea of a non-deceiver God

is invalid for a third person perspective and then exposed a weakness in his argument

concerning intent. With even the slightest hint of God being a deceiver he would not be

able to fully trust his senses without making the assumption that God is not deceiving

him. Without the knowledge that he does not have an entity that is continuously

deceiving him, Descartes is only able to state he is not dreaming or insane and that the

former clause is entirely plausible. The implications which that this argument employs on

his meditations are all encompassing. The idea that God is a non-deceiver is an essential

part of his foundation to then analyze the extension of himself along with the material

world.
Works Cited
Bailey, Alan. "Descartes' - Lecture 8." Web Spawner. Web. 25 Feb. 2010.
<http://www.webspawner.com/users/alanbailey/desc8.html>.