CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES/I965

CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES SERIES 1965

THE RISE
AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE
PHENOMENOLOGICAL
MOVEMENT
by J ohan Vander Hoeven

Three lectures given at the

1964 Study Conferences
of
The Association for Reformed Scientific Studies

Publiahod by
'1'11111AHH<HrIA'I'ION II'Olt Itlill"OltMI'lD SCIENTIFIC STUDIES
""11 Ilppl'I' Cnnudn
<:111(11AVI", IIl\lrIIlLC1I1. Ollt.III'IO,
 Foreword
The 1965 Christian Perspective Series Lectures were delivered
at the Unionville, Ontario Study Conference of The Association
for Reformed Scientific Studies in August, 1964. The lectures
on Phenomenology were given also in Vernon, British Columbia
and at a student conference in Unionville in September. Their
appearance in printed form will make them available to a much
wider circle than those who hear them delivered.

Dr. Johan Vander Hoeven's analysis of phenomenology and

Dr. Remkes Kooistra's critique of modern university education
complement each other nicely. The lectures of Kooistra cover a
broad field of modern university education and show the destruc-
tive influence of science that has divorced itself from the controlling
power of the Word of God. Those of Vander Hoeven deal in
some depth with a specific way in which modern philosophical
thought, called phenomenology, has traveled far toward the dead
end of a blind alley that started with assurance of reason's self-
directedness.

Taken together, the lectures of the 1965 Series show with

new force that learning that will not bow to the kingship of
Christ nor follow the law of His Word nor recognize as His the
order He has set permanently in created reality, provides no hope
of salvation to modern man in his quandry. Modern scholarship,
separated from the source of Light and in enmity with Him who
is the Wisdom and the Power of God (I Corinthians 1 :24), has
bound itself in service to an idol, and in spite of its great achieve-
ments, can offer man only confusion and bondage. Unless it is re-
deemed by Jesus Christ, its last state will be worse than the first,

The Association which has sponsored these lectures and now

f'Iers them in printed form would like to think that many of
t he readers will come to see that not the discovered truths of the
science of pretended autonomy can set man free but only the
nut horitative TRUTH of the Word of Christ.

To Il consideration of this claim we would challenge the

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TJIUn Iltnn , Onturlo, Cunadu Pnul G, Schrotenbccr
 JOHAN V AN DER HOEVEN

J ohan van tier H oeven was born in Rotterdam,

• The Netherlands in .1932. He studied theology

in the Theological College in Kampen and pur-

sued graduate study in philosophy at the Univer-
sity of Leuien. He receuoed his doctor's degree
there upon presenting a dissertation entitledJ:

Kritische ondervraging van de fenomenologische

rede. He is now associate professor in Philosophy
at the Free University in Amsterdam.
 CONTENTS

Lecture I
Page

Husserl and the crisis of European "Reason"

11

Lecture 11

Phenomenology and Existentialism

33

Lecture III

Beyond Existentialism
59
 Lecture I

Husserl and the crisis of European

"Reason"

1. Introduction and general remarks

I should like to begin with a word of appreciation. I have
only just started as a lecturer at the Free University of Amster-
dam. I therefore consider it an honour to be permitted to
deliver lectures on this continent and for this community. You
have many ties with the Netherlands and regularly supply the
Free University with enthusiastic and energetic students. II con-
sider it the greatest privilege that the bond which joins us to
our Master and the refreshing experience of contact with these
students can be strengthened in this way.

Rise of phenomenorogy in the beginning of the 20th century

I have been asked to speak to you on the phenomenological
movement. This philosophical movement arose in Europe in the
beginning of this century and quickly attained a strong influence
there. Both in philosophy and the special sciences, in particular
the so-called social sciences, phenomenology in Europe has slain
its thousands. This does not mean that it was a very 'popular'
philosophy. On the contrary, I should warn you at once that these
lectures will not be easy. Much has been thought during the
Pl\~t ages and phenomenology has assimilated it in its own
manner. Besides, because phenomenology itself is such a laborious
oxortion to find a new way in an entangled situation, it is neces-
('xI'I'lion to find a new way in an entangled situation, it is as neces-
ru-y f1~ difficult to follow the leading phenomenologists as to re cog-
1I1i';('the' salient point where a wrong track starts.
You may already have heard or read about the inner crisis
11111\ Iil(' extreme disruption, into which humanism, the leading
IHIW('" of W('Ht('1'1lsoC'iC'ty, has come since the last century.
l/ollI:hly NJ)('/lldI\I~, 111('IDlh c'('tlllll'Y succombcd to positi1)iwn. This
J)(I/llIlvilml WII.'1 llu: 11'1:IIhlllllt' lu-lr of l hr: 1I1~(I-()ld Nf"io'l7oo-id,<'nl, but
then in a situation which was determined by the critique of know-
ledge of the great humanistic philosopher Immanuel Kant. This
critique itself had opened the door to a historicism) which increas-
ingly gained ground. From this historicism an anarchistic rela-
tivism resulted.
Dilthey and the inner dialectic of the humanistic
One of the noblest minds of this period was the famous
philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey, He lived through this crisis intensely
and all his life tried to find an escape by means of a so-called
critique of historical reason. However, when he gave the final
account of this critique, he had to acknowledge: "In the mind of
the present period and its philosophy the last and most charac-
teristic feature arises out of the discord of the sovereignty of
scientific thought and the desperation of the mind concerning
itself . . . . Here the emptiness of consciousness asserts itself,
whereby all standards have been abolished; everything fixed has
become wavering, an unlimited liberty of admission, the play
with boundless possibilities let the mind enjoy its sovereignty and
at the same time give it the pain of its lack of content." 1
These are striking and penetrating words. When they were
spoken, phenomenology came into existence. In this movement
age-old humanism has, as it were, made its last, impressive
attempt at resurrection and renewed concentration. In this last
gathering of forces the whole development contracts itself once
again. But because in the above mentioned crisis we have to do
with an inner crisis of humanism as such, We must state that
in this undoubtedly great attempt the essential crisis becomes
vividly evident. A height has been reached, which at the
same time implies a Iow point. The words of Dilthey cited
above give expression to a profound dialectic. A dialectic is a
tension between two poles, here simultaneously excluding and pre-
supposing each other. We can designate these poles with the words
of Dilthey himself: on the one hand the sovereignty or autonomy
of the human ('rational') mind, on the other hand the total
1 "Aus dieser Dissonanz der Souveranitat des wissenschaftlichen
und der Ratlosigkeit des Geistes iiber sich selbst . . . entsteht
letzte und eigenste Zug im Geiste des gegenwar tigen Zeitalters und in scincr
,Philosophie .... In ihnen macht sich die Leere des Bewusstaotna
da alle Massstabe aufgehoben worden sind, alles F'estc ist, schwnnkond
geworden, eine schrankenlose F'reiheit dol' Annahmon,
grenzenlosen Mdglichkeitcn Iasscn -dcn GOiHt H0illCl RUUV(l1'1I
und geben ihm zurrleic'h d(\I1 Rc'hltH'l'l'. H(licH'r InhIlItJot\lg'lwlt.",
GeSMnmcl/,(I So/Wi/II"II, vol. V Ill, n. IIll!.
I"
rational domination of reality, the human mind itself included.
In short: a tension between rational autonomy and autonomous
rationality. The first pole is and remains the primary one: man
in his apostasy from the living God, his Origin, chooses himself,
decides to be autonomous at all cost. But he cannot really be
autonomous, he cannot really disengage himself from his Creator
standpoint and from the wholesome order of creation; in his insurrection
against God, man falls away to a spurious, would-be creative
origin. For humanism this means an apostasy to the human
function of rational distinction, a function that is dislocated from
its real meaning and now continually threatens the 'autonomous'
self-consciousness from which this absolutization of 'reason' origi-
nated. Now phenomenology tried anew and very laboriously to
overcome this fundamental tension with all its disastrous conse-
quences and to discover again the higher, 'transcendental' unity
of life. It results, however, in a manifestation of this tension:
the two poles are confronted with each other once again, but in
this way the original dualism comes to light even more clearly.
This is the historical meaning of phenomenology in its religious
perspective.
Why we are interested in phenomeoology
Precisely for this" reason this philosophical current is par-
ticularly instructive for us all. We have to deal with it. As
people of Western culture and primarily as 'natural' men we live
in a society wherein a dominant humanism constantly tries to
assert its power via philosophy and from there via the various
sciences.
There is a second reason why it is important for you and
me to concern ourselves with phenomenology. The phenomeno-
logical way of thinking arose as a European, originally German
and then also French, philosophy. But recently it has met with
more interest in America too. Lately English translations have
uppcared of the main works of the outstanding phenomenologists:
l Iusscrl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. James M. Edie,
nrorcssor at the Northwestern University, who studied in Europe
Denkens 1111' pig-ht years, published a book What is Phenomenology?, a trans-
nun del' lnllnn of articles by the well-known French-Swiss phenomenologist
gcltC'nd, 1'11'1'1'(' 'I'})('vcnnz, with Cl preface by John Wild.' In 1960 Herbert
(lIlK Rpipl mit
n it,llI, g'I'IIII'HH(11l ,111111"11 M, 1·:1111', 11h"l III JlIII'IIII/III'illllill/l/t lon:l.
W. III It.Ilt1y, III IIIIM I~H"( \.11"/'1' 1'11111,11 11 ~III'VI'.V IIr LI", I I'IIIIHIIII 101111 Ill" Iho mn in phl'l1(JIll(,.
111I1"pll'lIl WIII'II
Spiegelberg, who lives and works in the United States, published,
especially for American readers, an important book in two vol-
umes, entitled The Phenomenoloqical Movement. A historical In-
troduction?
However in my opinion this influence of phenomenology is
far from 'pure' that is, it is mainly the influence of phenomenology
in its last phase. This phase is marked by the clear manifestation
of the tensions which characterized this philosophy from the
outset and by the appearance of a certain disintegration. Many
adherents, to be sure, still try to hold on to what at first looked
like a hopeful revival of the once vital humanistic ideals. At the
same time there is an increasing search for the possibilities of
cross- fertilization with schools that formerly were considered as
antagonists. Precisely in order to draw your attention to this
situation, I spoke briefly at the beginning about the spiritual
'climate,' wherein phenomenology came into existence. Yet we
cannot deny, that the original, 'pure' phenomenology already gave
occasion to the alliance which 1 now point out. Here we meet
with a noteworthy course in the development of the phenome-
nological movement. The first impression of this course is con-
fusing. But this cannot be a reason to neglect or to simplify it
for convenience's sake. On the contrary, we must try to pene-
trate into the inner dialectics of the humanistic religious ground-
motive as a community-motive.
Thus we touch the third and main reason that induces us
to a serious confrontation with phenomenology. You know or
have heard about the work A New Critique of Theoretical 'I'houqhi:
by Herman Dooyeweerd. This title is a clear allusion to those
of the main works of Kant, the great philosopher of modern
times. Indeed, nowhere in the Western world can philosophy
after Kant be the same as before him. His appearance had the
significance of a real turning-point, because he, like nobody else,
summoned humanism to a critical self-reflection upon its own
foundations. One can theoretically throw one's 'light' upon all
sorts of things and try to combine this in a universal system of
thought, but when one system opposes the other, when 'universal'
systems of knowledge come and go and in the end all is in danger
of' ending in scepticism (think of Hume) , then it is high time
to-subject the 'dogmatical,' naive self-evidence of this universal
3 H. Spiegelberg, The Phenomcnolouioal Movcm(·nt. A hi8torioal int,·orluotion.
2 vols. Den HUIlA' 19GO.
theoretical knowledge to a searching critique by asking: what
is knowledge? how is it possible? what are its a priori 'transcen-
dental' conditions? This is what Kant did. But precisely in the
'critique of reason' the humanistic original dualism appeared. (1
shall return to this point presently.) Since Kant, much has hap-
pened, but I must by-pass it now. 1 mention only the end crisis
about which I spoke at the beginning. The meaning of phenome-
nology, briefly stated, consists then in the fact that in it we are
concerned with the last, renewed endeavor within humanism to
reach an integral and radical 'critique of reason.'
The cardinal point of impact between humanistic and Christian
philooO'phy
Here is the cardinal point of impact between humanistic and
Christian philosophy. Every Christian who works in science
should be particularly interested in this attempt of humanism.
For humanism is characterized by its belief in the autonomy of
'reason.' Against that the Christian thinker has to protest most
profoundly for the sake of his sole Master, Jesus Christ. Opposite
to the stagnation and the inevitable tensions, which this belief
entails, the Christian scientist has to show in a positive way,
what a great liberation. faith in Jesus Christ - a faith that
discloses its own meaning - brings about for reflecting upon
the many-sided reality, into which we all have been placed. It
is, as a matter of fact, self-evident that, in trying to do this
we can learn much from humanistic thinkers. We should not
be narrow-minded or even hypocritical in this respect. From the
beginning to the end we stand in the God-created reality, that
surrounds us on every side. There is no other reality. And we
all must work together to open up this creation, even in spite
of ourselves; we have been charged with this task. But the
direction is always decisive and that is chosen in faith. Only
in the true direction do the various moments of truth become
what they really are: moments of the Truth.
Now when a philosopher like Husserl makes a critique of
reason a main point of his program, the Christian thinker has
10 pay close attention. Obviously this points up that there is
HOnlt'l hlrur wrong with 'autonomous reason': something in the
dt'VI'lopmont hn» run stuck and the movement has to be started
up IIgllll1. 'I'hl» will bc' our <'c'/11nt) point of view in these lee-
1111'PH(Ill phl'/1oIJlI'llo1ogy.
)"
 The difficulty of a (definition)
A central point of view - which cannot be forced from the
outside - is certainly needed. Of course it would be easiest for
you and me, if I could begin with a short and clear answer to
the question: what is phenomenology? You may ask me, what
are you speaking about? But this very question encounters a
great difficulty, for a concise answer is impossible. The terms
'phenomenology' and 'phenomenological' are among the most un-
defined, chameleon-like terms of modern philosophy. Sometimes
this is considered as a sign of the particular fruitfulness of this
thought. At any rate, there is no use in denying that in various
respects we can learn from and be stimulated by the outstanding
phenomenologists. But as a matter of fact, under the banners
of phenomenology sails a rather heterogeneous company. Already
during the lifetime of Husserl, grave dissidence arose between
"-
him and Heidegger concerning the meaning of phenomenology.
For various reasons this difference has issued in a grave aliena-
2. Huseeri's program of philosophy as a rigorous science
Husserl/s experience of a crisis
In this first lecture we speak on Husserl, the initiator of the
movement. To arrive at the centre of 'Husserl's intentions, it is
useful to listen to a note in his diary of 1906. Here Husserl says:
"In the first place I mention the general task that I must fulfill
for myself, if I should be able to call myself a philosopher. I mean
a critique of reason. A critique of logical and practical reason,
of 'valuing' reason in general. Without coming to clarity in broad
outline about the meaning, the essence, the methods, the main view-
points of a critique of reason, without having contrived, drawn
up, established and founded a general draft for it, I most truly
cannot live. I've sufficiently passed through the vexations of a
lack of clarity, of wavering doubt. I must come to an inner
firmness. I know that great geniuses have failed at it and if
I would compare myself with them, I should have to despair
in advance." 6,

tion between these two great men. Nowadays we must ascertain Such a high and far reaching endeavor, pronounced in such
why such great figures as Heidegger and Sartre hardly mention charged words, presupposes the experience of a crisis. In another
'phenomenology' and 'phenomenological.' On the other hand, as way this crisis was already attested by two great older contempo-
far as these terms are still used with some regularity, they often raries of Husserl, viz., Dilthey and Nietzsche. Towards the end of
are hollowed out and only vaguely intend to indicate a certain his life Husserl himself published a great and important work
tradition which no longer has much positive uniting force. Many entitled The Crisis Of European Sciences and Transcendental
philosophers, strongly divergent among themselves, who, traveling Phenomenoloqu? You see then that in 1937 Husserl was still
along different ways, almost all came to an impasse and, more intensely occupied with what stirred him already in the beginning
than once inclined to defeatism, clung to 'the' phenomenology as of our century.
the new perspective. Since this perspective appears to fail as
the final insight, for the once enthroned philosophy only two What was it, more concretely, which engaged Husserl so
ways seem to be left. On the one hand: an escape into explicit seriously, and what gives him his special significance and infuence
mythology. On the other: the seal of stagnation and of power- in the philosophical life of this century? We discover a first
lessness in the pragmatistic proclamation of the 'plurality of the
truth.' In this case for practical philosophizing ..there. is hardly • "An erster Stelle nenne ich die allgemeine Aufgabe, die ich fiir rnich Iosen
another avenue left than that of a logicistic thought-and-language- muss, wenn ieh mieh soll einen Philosophen nennen k6nnen. Ieh meine eine
Kritik del' Vernunft. Eine Kritik del' logischen und del' praktischen Ver-
technique - without much to say. The vangueness of the term nun ft, del' wertenden iiberhaupt, Ohne in allgemeinen Ziigen mir iiber
'phenomenology' is rather symptom of the character of our time; Sinn, Wesen, Methoden, Hauptgesichtspunkte einer Kritik del' Vernunft
it is a melting-pot into which all sorts of things are thrown to- ins Klarc zu kommen, ohne einen allgemeinen Entwurf fUr sie ausge-
dacht, entworfen, festgestellt und begrundet zu haben, kann ieh wahr
gether. It is difficult to say what will come from this, apart from und wahrhaftig nicht leben. Die Qualen del' Unklarheit, des hin- und
some contours gradually appearing here and there. horachwankenden Zweifels habe ich ausreichend genossen. Ich muss zu
piner inneren Festig-ke,it hinkommen. Ieh weiss, dass grosse Genien daran
(IHchciiert Hind und wollt ich mich mit ihnen vergleichen, so miisst ich
, Nevertheless, there is a certain continuity between Husscrl VU/I vornhorcln vorzwoif'eln." Cited in the "Introduction of the editor"
(W. Hh'ltwl) or ItL IIl1HRM1, Di« Idoc de?" Pluienomenolooie (The Idea of
and the existentialist phenomenology, as well as bet woon the I'lwuonJIIllOluI{Y), I )C'II 111l/lg' 10rlO.
first and the last phase of th0 latter. But to <IiH(,OV(,1' this con- IJ;,' oIir;H;1I tll,/, "lIl'fJ/III";/I"""// 1I';mll'IIHc'III1!1 If/Id die L1'anllzcndcnta/c: Phao.
tinuity, wo cannot ~tuy I'll tho Hlll'lnc·<'. I/fJI/If'//"/U/J;,I, 1l1'" 11'111111 IIIM.

111
main line in his strenuous striving in his idea of 'philosophy as
a rigorous science.' With this idea Husserl placed himself over
against two sides: on the one hand the so-called 'naturalistic'
positivism and on the other hand the historicistic philosophy of
life-and-world-views (Weltanschauungsphilosophie). That is to
say, tendencies which meanwhile have passed through a certain
development, but in their proper purport are still relevant.
All his life Husserl was attached to this ideal of a philosophy
as a rigorous science. Until his death he remained laboriously
engaged in its realization. From the outset he knew that he
had to row against the stream. At the end of his career he
had to admit in disillusion: 'Philosophy as science, as serious,
rigorous, even apodictical science, - the dream has been dreamt.' 6
In the next lectures we shall expand on this point. In view of
this course it may seem obvious to consider Hlisserl's thought
only as a last stand, as a temporarily retarding barrier in a stream
that could not be stopped. Surely, there is truth in this view.
However, in the history of the Western world that has searched
for its great glory in its science, Husserl's impressive enterprise
of a 'philosophy as rigorous science' is too important for us to dis-
miss merely as a more or less interesting historical phenomenon,
as the cramped reaction of a clever scholar who was not able
to keep up with his time.
Natural scientific method and (understanding~
Against which stream did Husserl have to battle? In order
to understand his specific position as a 'critic,' we must realize
that he came from the so-called exact sciences. In the Western
world these sciences have been presented as the model of un-
assailable trustworthiness. Until now final certainties in all sorts
of areas, even in the so-called social sciences, have been expected
from mathematical, natural scientific methods. Actually, since
the end of the last century in Europe, especially under the in-
fluence of Dilthey, the monopoly of this method has been called
into question. We can observe a clear aversion to the manipu-
lations with hypotheses, which can be verified from the principle
of causality and thus lead to the establishement of 'laws' that are
conceived in a naturalistic way; from the determination of the
eourse of all events according to these laws; from the idea that
the knowledge of the latter would enable to the (in principle)
6 "Philosophie ala Wissenschaft, aJ'R crnatlichc, Htr(\nR'(',
Wissenschaft - dor TI'II'UIn illt l\uHj.\'('tl'llumt,", '1'''" IUI'i~i~
IH
total domination of all these events. There is an attempt, at
least as far as the area of the 'social sciences' is concerned, to
found the scientific certainty on a so-called 'understanding' (Ver-
stehen) of the varying subjective acting and its possible 'motives.'
It is an attempt) and those who make it generally are still so
attached to the 'only saving' natural scientific method that they
are at a loss what to do with a knowledge that surpasses it. To
put it differently: they have so surrendered their heart to this
way of thinking as the fundamental and all-dominating cer-
tainty, that they become uncertain, as to any question that con-
cerns a direction-giving view-point to the theoretical investi-
gation of that which does not belong to the 'natural' sides of
reality. I mean those sides of reality where we see man in his
responsible acting with 'nature' in his various societal relation-
ships.
For a fruitful investigation of these aspects, it is required
that we be willing to have our theoretical knowing itself opened
up by a central self-knowledge and knowledge of men, a know-
ledge which reaches far above any natural scientific method, and
above any psychological 'understanding' or 'feeling' (Einfiirhlung).
This central self-knowledge can only be granted us by the World-
revelation and thus, once accepted in faith, liberates our whole
theoretical outlook. But this opening-up is fundamentally excluded
as long as one a-priorily shuts himself up in an attitude of theo-
(Verstehen) retical thought, disengaged from its meaning, with the con-
comitant method, which - apart from this absolutization - can
indeed-be fruitful for the discovery and analysis of that which
really has been entrusted to the control of man.
Husserl's battle with psychologism
Positivism, dominant in the beginning of Husserl's career,
operated, as best it might, from this premise of a natural scien-
tific method. As best it might, for at any rate it had learned
from Kant, that nowhere can man (or, as humanistic philosophy
puts it, the (subject», with his act-life be left out of account. For
every 'fact' is at least always a perceived fact, and this perception
is directly accompanied by a certain interpretation. Yet it tried
to sight also these undeniable 'subjective' factors in the trusted
'objective,' i.e.) natural scientific way. The result was the psycholo-
gism of the 19th century, an absolutization of the psychical
jn npodiktlach«
Iunct ion that IH, human nets, which in reality carry only the
... , p, r,OH. pHyehknl fund Ion 111-1OIl(' (lmportnn t.) aspect among- others, were
I.!I
enclosed in this function. Thus there was a preference for speak-
ing about the 'stream' of sensations, ideas etc. This 'stream'
was most frequently conceived of as an 'objective,' natural-factual
process, in which, by virtue of the physical 'causality,' one thing
proceeded 'necessarily' from another. The 'subjective' (i.e., for
a humanist, meaning-giving) character of the acts was then in
danger of disappearing in the course of the 'stream,' closed in
itself. The typical totality-structures of human acts (unities, point-
ing above themselves, of all functions in a certain typical order)
were dissolved in so-called most simple 'elements' (of sensations
and the like), out of which then more or less intricate complexes
of 'representations' e.g., arise. That is to' say: by. means of
them these thinkers tried to reconstruct the whole. (Mill even
spoke about 'mental chemistry').
To understand Husserl, we must realize that in this way
the logical norms of human thought-activity were directly en-
dangered. For in this all-embracing 'process' these norms could
not fail to vaporize into one psychical factuality among others, a
factuality of reiatvoe stability and of more or less 'practical utility.'
Thus this 'scientific' way of thinking entered the threshold of a
disastrous scepticism. Just now we heard Husserl himself attest
this scepticism in a penetrating way.
Perhaps Husserl's program of a philosophy as a rigorous
science now has come somewhat nearer to you. For another
aspect of the scepticism implied the increasing distance between
philosophy and the special sciences. The latter unfolded ever
more quickly and widely, in consequence of an enlargement of
the technical possibilities as well as through the fact that the
ever more disclosing, integrating and differentiating society de-
manded specified and refined distinction. But at the same time
the first symptoms appeared of a malady that in our time has
really burst out: great activity of ever more specialists who
hardly know any longer 'With. what they are occupied.
'Deecruptive psychology) and the problem of foundation
Husserl and Kant
In this situation Husser! wanted to rehabilitate philosophy.
-Phtlosophy would again have to devote itself seriously to its
task and reflect upon the really ultimate questions of 'conscious'
humanity and upon the foundations of the various special sciences.
But at the same time it would' have to proceed in a rigorously
scientific manner. Over against speculative phantasy, brilliant
o "1
or no, Husserl placed the sober, laborious and patient analysis
of that which was really 'given,' of the so-called 'things them-
selves.' But he wanted just as much, with this parole ('to the
things themselves') to confront the so-called unprejudiced (in
reality constructivistic) methods of positivist psychologism which,
as we saw, developed into scepticism. According to Husserl, the
important thing before all construction is to attain insight into
that which is really given 'Within the human act-experience itself
and to describe this as accurately as possible. Descriptive psy-
chology against natural scientific psychology - this was Husserl's
start.
The general framework of his train of thought was that
of his time: psychology. The basic denominator that must bring
together the different sides of reality was the so-called stream
of experiences of consciousness. But within this general frame-
work Huser! had in mind something else, which could not fail
to break through it and indeed did so afterwards.
His main problem was the problem of foundation) namely
that of the universal validity of scientific, i.e.) logical statements.
That is why his first important philosophical publication bears
the title: Logical Investigations (Logische Unte'tsuchungen).7 This
validity, he stated, cannot be maintained; on the contrary, it is
undermined when human consciousness together with its acts, not-
withstanding the lip-service which positivistic psychologism renders
to it, is handled as a conglomerate of contingent natural processes,
characterized by certain regularities, but for the rest is conceived
of as a general, indeterminate stream without any real meaning.
For how can one uphold, from this point of view, the (implicitly
claimed) validity and meaning of the scientific statements con-
cerning these processes?
Undoubtedly Husserl's critique of psychologism was quite
to the point in several respects and did not fail to make an im-
pression. But as for himself the way of solving the problem
was far from easy. He could not return to Kant who had founded
universal validity upon so-called transcendental, a priori forms
of sensory perception and thought, taken together in the so-called
consciousness-in-general (Bewusstsein uberhaupt). For it is true
that this Kantian consciousness was meant to be subjective and
Cl!'; such the last, spontaneous origin of meaning. But, on closer
oxnmination, it was only a formal unity, which largely restricted
T i,lllliHO/r" (J/lI"I'H"r/r""V"/I. 11,1111111.11.1'4.,1022, 102R, 2 vols.
 the insight into the place and role of human acting as such, an
acting which never can be reduced to a form, let alone a theoretical
form of thought. The Kantlan solution shows too clearly the
tenacious influence of the old rationalism for which 'reason' is
the all-embracing, primarily given order of reality) the universal
framework wherein we exist, our most unproblematic, self-evident
asset. (Even when Kant established a second domain of 'prac-
tical' reason, where the most proper essence of man should be
found, viz.) his autonomous moral 'conscience,' -even then Kant
clung to a formal law: you ought (Du sollsi), and thus rather
obscured the subjective auto-nomy).
As a matter of fact, this was exactly one of the reasons
why the renewed attention to the human act-life - after the
brilliant but highly speculative metaphysics about it of German
idealism - fell back into psychologism and thus in reality re-
mained below the level of Kant. For Kant had at least tried
to lift humanistic reasoning up above its stagnation, its fixation
(idee fixe) with respect to the psychical aspect of life, to point
out the relation of this reasoning itself to a 'transcendental idea.'
In his Logical Investigations Husserl wants to overcome the im-
passe of this psychologism without returning to the formalism
of Kant and his consciousness-in-general, however transcendental
it may be called. The primary intention of Husserl is not to
explain the rules for the logical activity, but to show and
to establish that there are universal, 'constant essences (eide) ,
which, according to the great phenomenologist, are of a logical
nature and must be considered as undeniably real structures of
human acts themselves. But how can this be established?
Husserl's conception Of (intentionality'
The first thing is to take the act as act, i.e.) not as a blind,
mechanically passing process, but as a conscious experience.
Husserl explains this by a specific term, intentionality. Every
act, as an act of consciousness, is characterized by intending,
by meaning something. Let us take the example of a house.
You can perceive it, admire it for its beauty, pass judgment on
it, design it, occupy it, even set it on fire (if you are a pyromaniac)
, and so on. But in all these different acts the house has meaning.
That which is meant is not something like a thing-in-itself (Ding
an sich) , a so-called real object. Husserl, to be sure, does not
deny the real existence of the house; he is willing to concede
that there is a certain collection or stones, wood etc., with a
certain size and geometrical form, cal1ed 'house.' But he is not
interested' in this; this may be a matter with which physicists
and builders are concerned. We have to make a passing reference
to this point, for we must see that Husserl does not disengage
himself from the old and tenacious tradition which closes 'reality'
in its (abstracted) natural aspects, i.e., in those which, by natural
scientific means, can be calculated and measured and thus mas-
tered. What remains must then be placed in an (ideal' sphere,
where either 'pure' logic or 'metaphysics' or artistic experience
and expression or even mythology and 'religion' can try to exert
their strength.
Husserl does indeed distinguish between the natural, material
'reality' and the sphere of meaning, which is called 'ideal.' This
appears for instance from his argument that a house can be
burnt down, but not its meaning. We must allow this remark to
pass without comment. Suffice it to say that this separation is
based upon a more fundamental dualism which cannot be accepted
by a Christian philosophy. At any rate, within this general
traditional scheme H;usserl, who has experienced the consequences
of positivistic phychologism with its exclusive natural scientific
methods, fixes his eye towards that second domain, which for him
is the prevailing one. So he takes the positivist concept of
'reality' for granted, but, as he says, real existence (in this abstract,
restricted sense) is not relevant for the aim of his phenomeno-
logical investigations. According to Husserl, it is quite possible
to fix the meaning or the essence of a product of phantasy like
that of a centaur.
In any case, however, this opinion sharpens the question:
what is the meaning of this conception of 'meaning' and how
is it established? Certainly, it was important and high time, too,
that the question of meaning was raised again emphatically. In-
deed, here we touch the typical peculiarity of phenomenological
thought: its proper interest does not lie in what effectively goes
n in consciousness or - in a later phase and more generally -
in human activity, in order to describe this as completely as
posslblo, to make statistics of it and then to apply this knowledge,
j('C'hnically, in 'practice'; nor is it specially concerned with the
components of a correct logical statement. Its main question
IN: what do we mean by perceiving, feeling, dreaming, imagining,
.I1111J-tlnJ-tor - in El later phase - existing as such, and, with
pC c'llk
l 1"('/'('1'1'11<'(' t() tll(' HJ)(\('iul :..wiC'l1ceH? What do we mean
hy phYH1I'1I1, I lIolydl lcu I, loglcnl, hlatortcul, llngulstlc, ethical, 're-
.\
 Iigious"? (Incidentally, to prevent misunderstanding, it may be
profitable to' observe that Husserl does not aim at a sort of
linguistic analysis. His intentions penetrate much mare deeply
than the pursuits af the linguistic school which may be sound
in same respects against certain phantastic, speculative and care-
less tendencies in thought, but as a whale, in my conviction, is
a sign of the decadence of Western philosophy, because it practi-
cally displays an indifference to' the real meaning of language as
well as of analysis.)
A cardinal question
At this paint of our exposition of Husserl we must be at-
tentive. Far now that the question of the meaning of the different
acts has been put, another (prior) question cannot be avoided:
From which standpoint can the diversity of meaning be distin-
guished as such and can we expect to' find an answer to' the first
question? This standpoint cannot be included within the diversity,
far then our speaking about diversity of meaning itself would
'lose its meaning. On the contrary, it must be a central paint, to
which this diversity is related. Here we meet with a fundamen-
tal tension in Husserl's thought. On the one hand there is no
doubt that Husserl in his Logical Investigations considers this
Point as a psycho-lagical one. The psychological 'stream of sub-
jective experiences' is the basic denominator of his investigations.
This denominator, however, presupposes) as the composed ward
'psychological' already indicates, the meaning-coherence, which
precisely is reduced and put aside by this denominator, in order
to' reconstruct the meaning-coherence autonomously, as well as
passible. Up to' this point Husserl remains a child of his age.
The Kantian solution of the problem of universal validity of taking
the logical 'reason' as the sa-called transcendental, a priori form
of a sensory matter of experience could no longer satisfy Husserl
either. Logical acts or experiences themselves are reduced to' a
species of the general, all-embracing psychological stream of ex-
•• perience .
But at the same time the abstract character of this 'stream'
i.e., its insufficiency as a real basic denominator - becomes
clear. Far, an the other hand, Husserl's main concern was to'
avoid the pitfalls of psychologism. Far this purpose Husserl puts
forward theoretical-logical thought with its methodical abstraction
as such. This means that logieal thought, which on 1he one side
is classified under the 'universal' stream of (lx(lI'I'l(\IH'(1 (which,
nil
in fact, was already an abstract 'coherence'), an the other side
is set apart and put in the foreground as the central 'Archimedean
point' itself, the point from which the diversity of acts and their
'meaning-contents' can be viewed and established. At the same
moment the psychological basic denominator is reduced to the
'objective' field which must receive its meaning from logical-
methodical reflection.
This must take place _in a rigorous, methodical analysis.
Starting from a definite, 'concrete' act and its contents, this ana-
lysis has to' sift, by 'varying' the act in its different possibilities
and impossibilities (possibilities of thought!) , the 'individual', 'can-
tingent' features of it. At last it has to' accomplish itself in a
sa-called intuitive insight into the 'essence' (eidos), which insight
also must play the role of a final criterion. This is, in bra ad
outline, the meaning of what is called in phenomenology the
eidetic reduction.' In this eidetic reduction the theoretical outlook
is directed primarily to the 'objective' part of the 'intentional'
act, namely to' the intended 'meaning' as such. Husserl maintains
that it is an intended meaning, that the meaning-content is im-
manent to the intentional act itself and that the units of meaning
are nothing but the ideally grasped moments of these acts. But
since Husserl himself reasons within the general framework Of
psychologism) which had dissolved the central point of reference
in the psychological 'stream' with its conglomeration of various
'objective facts', no other expedient to save the universal validity
is left than the substantialization of the various logical 'meanings'
to' a domain of 'ideality.' The latter oscillates between a positl-
vistically conceived 'objectivity' and a sphere of 'laws,' but at
any rate exists at the cost of subjective activity. This is what
we can call the rationalistic trait in Husserl. It cannot be the
final word about him, however. Later an we meet with a 'phenome-
nological' or 'transcendental' reduction, in which the situation
has been modified. We shall return to this paint presently.
Reflection and faith
Husserl does not hesitate to declare that we must suspend
Ihe act-in-its-operation and leave aside its 'naively' intended 'ob-
Jects' (Gegenstande), in order to' reflect upon the act and its
mcuning-contont - without asking himself haw this operation
0(' SW11)('IlSion CHn be executed. This question should have been
put, liS I h(, 1\('ls 01' HUSp£'IlAion and reflection themselves simul-
IHlII'olIsly 111'(1 dIlHS('d IIIHi('r the psyC'hologknl denominator of the
..
~)
'stream of experiences.' What becomes evident here? Husserl's
faith in the revealing power of tl.eoreti al reflection itself - and
that in a rather naive way -, together with the untenableness
of this faith. For, after all, the relativity of this reflection urges
itself upon him, as appears in the first place from the dialectical
tension between the psycho-logical basic denominator and the
absolutized logical thought itself. KJant's so-called consciousness-
in-general as such is not mentioned, but even more so it is
self-evident as the Archimedean point and the origin of meaning-
giving. Even the Kantian reserve of the transcendental idea,
which pointed to a supra-theoretical, 'practical' unity of human
existence, is no longer present. As a matter of fact, this higher
unity of Kant did not surmount the level of abstraction either.
To Husserl speaking in this phase about an 'I-ness,' as a concen-
tration-point of acts, makes no real sense. Factually he stays at
the level of the 'psychology without a soul' iPsucholoqie ohne
Seele) of his time.
Of course the difficulty of this fundamental position has its
consequences. Husserl's hopeful program of accounting for what
is really given within human act-life, in fact amounts to a de-
preciation of the meaningful dynamic of this act-life itself. It
is reduced to the fixed anti-pole of the primarily fixed logical re-
flection. From the autonomous methodical reconstruction by the
latter it has to receive its meaning. The dynamic, many-sided
given-ness of pre-theoretical, practical experience, which unfolds
its meaning, among others, also in theoretical knowledge, cannot
be accounted for. 'Meaning' is frozen into the abstract counter-
part of the subjective phenomenological reflection. The latter
for the time being remains as such in the background, as Husserl's
most urgent task was to stem the tide of the scepticistic conse-
quences of contemporary psychologism, to save the universal
validity and meaning of scientific thought. Husserl neglects
the many-sidedness of theoretical-logical concepts: there are psy-
chological, juridical, ethical concepts etc. He also fails to see that
such concepts derive their meaning from the meaning of the
psychical, the juridical, the ethical sphere (which are only dis-
tinguished as such by means of 'reflection'); otherwise they would
fall into nothingness.
Husserl and Dilthey
At this point it may be worthwhile to make a short com-
parison between Husserl and Dilthey, ospcclnlly h('('/lu.'1P theso
')(j
two lines converge, in a typical way, in phenomenological exis-
tentialism. Dilthey too stuck to the humanistic tradition according
to which one cannot go back behind theoretical reason. Until the
end, when his 'critique of historical reason' had designated the
historical 'stream of life' as the true universal, he tried to cling
to the theoretical contemplation and interpretation of 'history.'
Nevertheless, Dilthey had much difficulty with this position, be-
cause he seriously wanted to avoid the so-called 'phenomenalism,'
i.e., the attitude of the 'pure' spectator, who is not really engaged
in actual life and its essential, autonomous progress. Husserl, on
the other hand, advocates the position of the 'uninterested spec-
tator,' in order to avoid the dispersion of the 'subject' into the
vicissitudes and multiplicity of the 'factual' course of things. The
ideal of the universal achievement of theoretical reflection revives
once more in Hussetl. But it is the last revival of an idea which
suffers from a vitium origin is.
Indeed, the inner emptiness of this ideal appears pre-emi-
nently in Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl tries to revive Des-
cartes, the father of modern Western philosophy, but he can not
simply return to him and his mathematical science-ideal, nor to
Hume and his psychologism, not even to Kant and his rigorous
separation of 'pure', i.e. natural scientific, and 'practical' reason.
In history there is no real return. Former simplifications and
levellings, which had been constructed to carry through the
postulate of the continuity of thought (a certain type of thought),
can never hold out against the transcendental dynamic of the
many-sided unfolding of meaning which characterizes this divine
creation. Husserl had to take into account more and also more
complicated problems than Descartes or Kant.
3. Some remarks about Husseri's further development
The question of the origin of meaning-giving
What are the main lines of the further development of
Husserl's phenomenology? The ideal of a truly universal science
is no longer as self-evident as it formerly was. The phenomenolo-
gist almost passionately searches for the assurance of this ideal.
This implies that his thought is increasingly focused on the
f'innl origin of meaning-giving. Husserl had thought to have
ostubllshed the existence of a sphere of logical idealities, but
(notwithstanding the frequent use of the term 'act') only at the
('OHt 01' It (kgl'll<i1lt Ion of subjective activity and then in such a
wily thnt tlllH Hpll\'I'\' I'IlC'tullllyWIlHonly an upper story above
the domain of the so-called 'empirical' (psychological) diversity
and multiplicity. A real coherence of meaning concentrated in
a real jocue failed. Thus phenomenology was in danger of be-
coming a 'picture-book-phenomenology.' This danger has re-
mained and even increased, now that Husserl's strenuous search-
ing for a real central grasp and a universal firm ground on the
whole has been abandoned.
Husserl's next step is to disengage himself further from
psychologism. Now all sciences, natural science as well as psy-
chology, must be 'suspended' as self-evident units-of-validity and
maintained only as 'phenomena,' in order to discover the origi?U3
of the scientific and everyday validities. This implies that now
the turn to the 'subject,' already present but at the same time
deviating in the logical investigations, becomes more pronounced.
This turn must be appreciated by a Christian thinker, for accord-
ing to God's Word revelation the human subjectivity in its act-
life is always at stake. In this subjectivity, which has been made
universally responsible, the whole creation is centred. Husserl,
however, following the line of the entire humanistic tradition, in
a very plain way puts the knowing, theoretically reflecting subject
in the foreground. The Cartesian, subjective cogito is the uni-
versal focus of reality and the rest can only be significant as
the cogitata (the things thought), the 'objective,' intended coun-
terparts of this cooito, immanent to this active cogito. Never-
theless this counterpart remains a counte1'-part and is called there-
fore a 'transcendence within the immanence.' Thus the funda-
mental dualism remains in force, although Husserl tries more
and more to surmount it by explaining the immanence of the
cogitata to the cogito as a constituting of the object by the coqito,
then called 'transcendental consciousness.' Here we explicitly meet
with the humanistically distorted creation-motive, which, to be
sure, was already at work. For however much is said about the
necessity of being attentive to what is really g;ven, Husserl beqin»
with an autonomous eliminatiOn of the coherence of meaning,
within which the logical function (in its theoretical unfolding)
itself is given, and then tries, on the basis of the absolutized
theoretical reflection, to reconstruct methodically this coherence
after the image of this phenomenological thought.
At any rate, it is typical of Husserlian phenomenology that,
on the basis of the fundamental dualism, and tied to the theo-
retically determined subject-abject-scheme, it attempts, almost
passionately and repeatedly, to surmount this dualism and 10
"H
discover the all-embracing unity, but it is its fate now to be
forced to objectify ever more and to retain only a vacuum for
the desired transcendental unity.
(Life-world' and (egology'
In his last phase Husserl makes a final attempt to avoid
this vacuum. His first 'conclusion' is a sort of confession. HusserI,
who cannot simply return after positivism to the former absolute
idealism of creative freedom, admits that in the reality of being,
we must stay with the 'riddle of the subject-object-correlation."
We human beings live tin a 'world' (the 'life-world', Lebenswelt)
and this (world,' is even the immediately given reality.
But the other, in fact most important, result of Husserl's
thought is his so-called egology. Here the person of the philoso-
pher himself is immediately at stake. Husserl, although he
gradually turned away from psychologism, can no longer be
satisfied with a formal consciousness-in-general, and chooses his
Archimedean point in the ego cogito of the phenomenologist him-
self. Faced with the extinction of the ideal of personality in
positivism, Husserl once more tries to save the primacy of the
individual person with his unremovable responsibility. In fact
this individual ego passes for the final certainty of the phenome-
nologist. This is an important point, not only in view of the
later development of phenomenology in existentialism, but also
for our own position. Indeed, personal responsibility can never
be avoided nor pushed off. I think, I live, I must decide, and I
cannot hide myself behind anything. But for a Christian the
ultimate certainty can never be his individuality, let alone his
individual thought.
Intensification of the problematics
As for Husserl, now that he has found his ultimate point
of support in this ego, a clear short-circuit arises. For at the same
time the claim of universal validity is upheld. That is to say,
IIusserl definitely wants to arrive at this 'ego,' and that by means
of the so-called phenomenological reduction. The latter amounts
1.0 a methodical reflection and as such remains umproblematic, i.e.)
it is trusted as the only way to the universal Truth. Husserl, to
ho sure, does not simply stick to his former standpoint, when he
HPol<.(' about the self-elimination of the phenomenologist. When
h(· 11-1 HI'HI'('hhl~~ r-xplk-It ly /'01' the universal origin of 'meanings' and
I'Clt' I h IH PIII'POHC' IIIIl'o«lIc'.'1-I hi" »honomonologtcal 01' 1ransccndental
reduction, this 'self-elimination' can no longer run so smoothly. For
in this reduction the whole world (with its concomitant 'empirical'
subjectivity) is, as Husserl puts it, 'bracketed' or even methodi-
cally 'annulled' and the 'pure' temporal stream of transcendental
consciousness is left, and in this the pure transcendental ego
appears as the constitutor of his meaning-world by means of his
intentional achievements. How then can this origin, this funda-
mental being, be the result, the 'resuiue' of the reduction? The
latter is, after all, a reflection and continually remains related to its
anti-pole, generally called the (world' (with its 'empirical,' 'naive,'
'natural' or 'human' subjectivity in it).
But the other pole of the humanistic ground-motive, i.e.
'autonomy,' as well as the intrinsic relativity of theoretical re-
flection - its tendency to the Origin of meaning - cannot fail
to stir. Husserl has to concede that the phenomenological 'residue,'
the 'transcendental subjectivity,' at the same time must be the
condition of possibility of the reduction itself and must be 'anti-
cipated.' But as long as this transcendental subjectivity in fact
only represents the absolutized phenomenological reflection itself,
which must borrow its content from the object of this reflection
and in which the individual philosopher is not recognizable, the
autonomy-pole remains suppressed, Therefore Husserl speaks
afterwards about the 'splitting of the ego,' which accomplishes
itself in the phenomenological attitude (Einstellung). And at
last the reduction is also presented as an inner change, a sort
of religious conversion, which must take place in one fell swoop
(in einem Schlage) and without which phenomenology cannot
really be understood.
At the same moment the problem of (intersubjecti'llity' be-
comes very urgent. Husserl has given some complicated reflec-
tions to this topic," which is very important in our 'social' age
and is much discussed. I cannot here retrace the line of his argu-
ment. It results in the conception that there is a plurality of
'monads': strictly individual units, which in the last resort are
only bound together by phenomenological rationality and of which
the phenomenologicizing Ego is the primordial one (Urmonade).
On the other part, only the horizon of the 'world' can be the all-
embracing coherence of the subjectivities.
8 Esp. in his Cartesiomische Meditattlonen (Cartesian Meditations), Den Haag
1950, and his Formale und Transzendentale LoOilc (Formal and Transcen-
dental Logic), Halle a.d.S. 1929.
:\0
As a matter of fact, even when the ego in its subjective
autonomy has urged itself upon the great phenomenologist, the
coqito (with its inevitable annex, the 'world') retains the predomi-
nant position. Husserl clearly expresses this, when in his last
work, The Crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenome-
nology, he says: (The method demands that the (transcendental)
Ego comes to know itself by systematic analysis, starting from
its concrete world-phenomenon." At bottom, however, it is not
the method that makes its demands. Fundamentally we are con-
cerned with the urge of the (ego' to autonomous, universal meaning-
giving. This urge wants to realize itself in methodical-theoretical
analysis. But analysis always remains analysis-of . , . , and a
method alway remains a way, which starts somewhere. Therefore
the urge to universal sovereignty, which wants to realize itself
in this methodical analysis, can only 'maintain' itself in a con-
tinuously and laboriously endeavored reductive (reflexive) liber-
ation from that to which reflection remains necessarily related.
This religious 'state of affairs' implies that the constituting Ego
(Ur-Ich), in spite of its key-position, must get to the background.
The so-called (natural attitude' is characterized by the naive direct-
edness of the subject to the 'world' (of things, events and values)
round about it, and this attitude must be radically altered into
the 'transcendental attitude,' in which the subject learns to dis-
cover itself as the 'intentional constitutor' of its world. Never-
theless, the natural attitude remains the necessary presupposition
or condition, without which the apparently autonomous reflection
(of the individual subject) cannot operate. In other words,
Husserl, who strenuously and passionately had tried to arrive at
a concrete-critical philosophy, participates in the crisis of human-
istic self-consciousness and indeed became an important exponent
of it.
Final remar7cs
The latter must be said, because the father of phenomenology
was right in underlining the special place and meaning of our
logical, analytic function in its 'acting.' Rightly he did not
ontent himself with speaking about subjective 'acts' and 'expe-
riences,' about 'significance,' 'facts,' 'values' etc., without explicitly
giving account of the fact that we always are concerned with a
11 "))i(1 M!'!,hodn (1f'fOl'dC'l'L nun, dllHA dnH (1g'0 von seinom konkroton Welt-
.I)hlll1ol111'1I IIUH HYML('lUlltiHC'l1 1I11)'il('lcfl'I1g'L und daboi sich HolbHL ... kcnncn
)(II'I1t.". 7'1/,1 i(Jrinin .•.• JI, 1(11,
'conscious' subject. Man knows what he does, and in the temporal
order of function-coherence, to which theoretical reflection is com-
mitted, human responsibility is 'founded' in his logical (which is
not the same as theoretical) distinction. In this respect Husserl,
against irrationalism, which also gained ground in Dilthey's 'Cri-
tique of historical reason,' defended a right case. But precisely
because Husserl focused on this zone, where the rampart of
humanism is situated, he could not fail to bring to light directly
the inner discord of the humanistic ground-position as such.
This discord can be avoided neither by a turn to irrationalism,
as Dilthey made and the existentialist phenomenologists, following
his track, carried through, nor by an attempt at medi:ation between
the two repelling poles of (ego) and 'coqito] as Husserl made in
his last period (in the form of the so-called life-world). It can
be avoided only by decidedly choosing position from the very
outset in the fulness of human experience, which in itself is
nothing and emptier than emptiness, but is fulfilled in man's
radical, faithful submission to the fulness of God's Revelation
of love in Jesus Christ. Only under the transcendental guidance
of this faithful surrender to this Word-revelation, which reveals
to us what nobody of himself can know, can our logical function
unfold its proper and important meaning, viz.) the ever more
refined and sharpened distinction of that which is really given)'
i.e., the many-sidedness of the richly varied meaning-dynamics)
in which God's creative power works in the direction of his
coming Kingdom. This Kingdom has come and is coming through
the Cross of his only Son. Therefore the primary mission of the
Christian scientist in 'this world,' where by virtue of his profes-
sion he has to practice especially his logical function, cannot be
any other than to distinguish sharply and continuously truth from
the error which lives in the heart of us all.
Lecture II
Phenomenology and Existentialism
1. Introduction)' general remarks
In this lecture we shall speak about existentialist phenome-
nology. Much might be said about this continuation of phenome-
nology. In the period between the two world wars, especially
since 1930 and for some years after the end of the second world
war, this phenomenological existentialism conquered the mind
of the European 'intellectuals' as no other current did. It sur-
passed the influence of Husserl, the father of phenomenology, in
the first place because of the turn which the famous modern
philosopher, Martin Heidegger, who was initially an assistant of
Husserl and then became his successor in Freiburg, gave to phe-
nomenology. His book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit), first
published in, 1927, struck like a bomb. We shall therefore spend
the greater part of this lecture on a discussion of Heidegger's
train of thought. His turn, however, was prepared to a certain
extent by an older phenomenologist, Max Scheler. To him we
can devote only a few words. In the final section of this lecture
we shall comment on the most outstanding French phenomenolo-
gist Jean-Paul Sartre.
The success of existentialist phenomenology is based to a large
extent on the fact that in it the lines of Husserl and of Dilthey,
i.e., of historicism, converge and continue in a curious, original
way and with a peculiar and suggestive expressiveness. The latter
point deserves mention. Particularly the later Heidegger, but
Merleau-Ponty too, deal elaborately with the importance of lan-
guage. Sartre, in addition to being an outstanding philosopher,
is a prominent literary figure; the first volume of his autobiogra-
phy appeared recently under the title The Words. (Les Mats).
2. Sch(3Z(3r)s
phenomenological (personalism)
FlrHt. of n11le'1 w, I race I he' trnnsl tlon from Husscrl's thought
10 phc'IlOnl(lllOlogl(,lI\ PX1Ht<'1I1 \1l\iHIl1. SC'!w\('r'H propurn! ion for 1hiR
:i
'conscious' subject. Man knows what he does, and in the temporal
order of function-coherence, to which theoretical reflection is com-
mitted, human responsibility is 'founded' in his logical (which is
not the same as theoretical) distinction. In this respect Husserl,
against irrationalism, which also gained ground in Dilthey's 'Cri-
tique of historical reason,' defended a right case. But precisely
because Husserl focused on this zone, where the rampart of
humanism is situated, he could not fail to bring to light directly
the inner discord of the humanistic ground-position as such.
This discord can be avoided neither by a turn to irrationalism,
as Dilthey made and the existentialist phenomenologists, following
his track, carried through, nor by an attempt at medi'ation between
the two repelling poles of {ego' and 'coqiio] as Husserl made in
his last period (in the form of the so-called life-world). It can
be avoided only by decidedly choosing position from the very
outset in the fulness of human experience, which in itself is
nothing and emptier than emptiness, but is fulfilled in man's
radical, faithful submission to the fulness of God's Revelation
of love in Jesus Christ. Only under the transcendental guidance
of this faithful surrender to this Word-revelation, which reveals
to us what nobody of himself can know, can our logical function
unfold its proper and important meaning, viz., the ever more
refined and sharpened distinction of that which is really given;
i.e., the many-sidedness of the richly varied meaning-dynamics,
in which God's creative power works in the direction of his
coming Kingdom. This Kingdom has come and is coming through
the Cross of his only Son. Therefore the primary mission of the
Christian scientist in 'this world,' where by virtue of his profes-
sion he has to practice especially his logical function, cannot be
any other than to distinguish sharply and continuously truth from
the error which lives in the heart of us all.
...
,~
Lecture II
Phenomenology and Existentialism
1. Introduction; general remarks
In this lecture we shall speak about existentialist phenome-
nology. Much might be said about this continuation of phenome-
nology. In the period between the two world wars, especially
since 1930 and for some years after the end of the second world
war, this phenomenological existentialism conquered the mind
of the European 'intellectuals' as no other current did. It sur-
passed the influence of Husserl, the father of phenomenology, in
the first place because of the turn which the famous modern
philosopher, Martin Heidegger, who was initially an assistant of
Husserl and then became his successor in Freiburg, gave to phe-
nomenology. His book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) , first
published in 1927, struck like a bomb. We shall therefore spend
the greater part of this lecture on a discussion of Heidegger's
train of thought. His turn, however, was prepared to a certain
extent by an older phenomenologist, Max Scheler. To him we
can devote only a few words. In the final section of this lecture
we shall comment on the most outstanding French phenomenolo-
gist Jean-Paul Sartre.
The success of existentialist phenomenology is based to a large
extent on the fact that in it the lines of Husserl and of Dilthey,
i.e., of historicism, converge and continue in a curious, original
way and with a peculiar and suggestive expressiveness. The latter
point deserves mention. Particularly the later Heidegger, but
Merleau-Ponty too, deal elaborately with the importance of lan-
guage. Sartre, in addition to being an outstanding philosopher,
is a prominent literary figure; the first volume of his autobiogra-
phy appeared recently under the title The Words. (Les Mots).
2. Scheier'« phenomenological (personalism'
I·'in;t. or. all 1('1 us 1race the' transition from Husserl's thought
1n pilt'II<l1Ilf'llOlog\('1l1 ('X lston 1lnllsm. St"tw\<'r'H preparation for this
transition can be called a phenomenological 'personalism.' This
philosopher must have been a brilliant, fascinating personality
and was very well read but had a restless mind. Till the end
of his life he searched again and again for certainties in the
dynamic developments of his time.
As for Husserl, his main problem was the question of the
universal trustworthiness of scientific thought as such. The as-
surance of this implies that the historical 'stream of life' as
well as religious persuasions, and even the person of the phe-
nomenologist himself have to be suspended in order to fall within
the phenomenological reduction. This reduction was not meant
as a real destruction) but it was at any rate an elimination of the
given meaning-coherence of reality, in order to reconstruct it
by a supposedly autonomous phenomenological thought. In the
first lecture I tried to point out some aspects of the entanglement
which then arises. The fundamental entanglement is this, that
only the phenomenological method can restore order, but only
at the cost of the transcendental (ego/ which nevertheless should
remain the ultimate guarantee and active source of phenomeno-
logical 'constitution.' In fact this ego remains a vacuum. To be
sure, Husserl makes a final attempt to fill the vacuum and for
this purpose appeals, like Dilthey, to 'historicity.' This appears
for instance from a statement of his last period: "The mind em-
braces all beings in an absolute historicity." Even then, however,
the 'teleology' of history, according to him, consists in its ratio-
nality, fulfilling itself in the methodical questioning of phenomeno-
logical thought as the truly conscious, responsible way of living.
Phenomenology as a (tool)
In Scheler, however, we can see how the tension between the
phenomenological systematics and that which the phenomenolo-
gist has ultimately in view, increases more and more. System-
atics as such falls to the background. But from there, with its
overstrained abstract structure, it keeps exerting its silent strength.
Herbert Spiegelberg is right when he writes that for Scheler the
main destination of phenomenology lies "in the development and
utilization of impulses which Nietzsche, Dilthey and Bergson had
given to modern thought long before Husserl," and that Scheler
"conceived of phenomenology as the great tool ... , as a stepping
stone on the way to his ulterior objectives." 1 But the interesting
t H. SJli('g-clbllr~r, 01'. oit ., p.p, 240, 200.
and important question is: is this tool, this stepping stone, only
an innocent and harmless thing, which as such is neutral with
respect to the 'ulterior objectives'? We have seen that in Husserl
the methodical problematics was a direct expression of a funda-
mental one: in the beginning two impulses collide with each other,
namely, the ideal of autonomous freedom and the avid desire
to universal rational domination, which only seeks 'accommodation'
in the structure of methodical, theoretical thought.
(Practical) reason; values and logic
With Scheler, 'practical reason' emphatically claims its rights
within the phenomenological movement. While Husserl remained
mixed up in the problems of the assurance of the classical science-
ideal and expected the decisive answer to all the questions of
conscious life from a 'radical theory of knowledge,' Scheler shows
a primary interest in "the place of man in the cosmos." 2 Just
like Kant he fixes his eye on the ethical function of man's acting.
For the rest, Scheler's trend of thought is considerably different
from the Kantian. We cannot elaborate on this comparison now.
Suffice it to say in this connection that Scheler in the final resort
falls back upon the individual person as the centre of an irrational-
istic act-life, wherein 'values flash up' (as he puts it).
According to Scheler, the values are a priori given) namely,
within 'consciousness.' Scheler wants to maintain the phenome-
nological principle of 'intentionality.' However, this consciousness
is not theoretical-logical, but the 'emotional feeling.' Within this
emotional-volitional consciousness the values are materially and
a priori present. Their content can be brought to light and
established by ethics, and this in entire independence of logic.
Here Scheler's turning away from Husserl is clear. Logic, he
says, should not be coordinated with ethics as another value-
science, because truth, with which logic is concerned, is not a
value at all. It is an 'idea,' different from all values and fulfilling
itself, when the meaning-content of a judgment is in accord with
a state of affairs and this accord itself is given evidently.
Scheler's detachment of ethics from logic is connected with his
irrationalism. The accomplishment of the subjective 'emotional'
acts is as such the final source of values. The values 'flash up'
" 'l'h ln iM t.hl' I it.l« of nn« or t h« illHL public a Lions of Scheler: Die Stellung
11"11 /11"//111111"11 i/II /\OHII/li/l (1IlilK). ~'kh(\l(,t"H main work is entitled: Der
II'/I"IIII/""IIIII~ ill ,/'" /I/lIIilr IIlId il i» uuurriu!» II"'/'Iothi/C (1913 ctc.) (Formal-
I/I'm. ;11 1'11""11 "1/'/ //11/1,'/'/'", 1)1I/1/,."I/I/(IH),
 in this activity of 'feeling,' preferring, loving, hating etc. Scheler
is still too much of a phenomenologist and too much of a disciple
of Husserl to forget that he himself is at work in a philosophical,
theoretical-logical way. He admits that his own statements con-
cerning 'values' etc. must also satisfy a criterion of truth.
What then is this criterion? No other than the universal
validity of the phenomenological 'intuition of essences' (Wesens-
schau); - in this case: essences of values, of evaluating acts
and of the person as the one, unique and individual accomplisher
of the different acts. Even the fact that the values flash up,
come to 'givenness' in the original, 'personal' accomplishment
of the act, belongs to the 'state of affairs,' and this state of
affairs is established and judged by the phenomenological essence-
intuition. Scheler, to be sure, describes this phenomenological
intuition as an immediate insight into the a priori contents of
the subjective acts and their connections, and within his system
logical thought, as we were able to observe, shifts to the second
rank: the reflection is called an accompaniment, be it an imme-
diate one, of the act itself. Husserl's sharp distinction of the
'natural' and the phenomenological attitude, which had to make
room for the constitutive activity of phenomenological reflection
as such, fades away. Nevertheless, Scheler himself declares too
that the so-called immediate phenomenological insight itself is
possible only when one abstracts from every way of setting the
subjects who think the act-essences, in their 'natural equipment,'
as well as from an 'object' (Gegenstand) to which the act-essences
might be applicable. Here the abstract character of Scheler's
final criterion becomes evident.
The fundamental antinomy
Scheler further exerts himself to save his irrationalistlc
position within the abstract area of the phenomenological es-
sences. Therefore he speaks emphatically about the individual
person as the immediately experienced, never objectifiable, unity
of the act-life, with its concrete, strictly individual (world) as its
'objective' correlatum. But this attempt only sharpens the anti-
nomy. For this individual, autonomous origin of values etc.,
which has its 'reflection' as one possibility among and even
under others, 1'emains contained within the supposed universal
phenomenological reflection. And the latter cannot lose its typi-
cal, so-called intentional subject-object-relation, which keeps ex-
pressing itself, for example, in the irrcmovabln rclutodnos» of the
l
'person' to his 'world.' Even ir-rationalism has fixed itself on
the absolutized theoretical subject-object-relation, which never-
theless continues to manifest its intrinsic relativity. The difficulty
of this position must reveal itself. Scheler says that the phenome-
nologically established act-essences, however clear, a priori and
material they may be, require a 'supplement' (Erganzung), in
so far as they also should be. The term 'supplement' is especially
significant here! On the other hand, Scheler defends his irra-
tionalistic view on the significance of the individual person in his
acts (as the source of the final evidence) by saying that this
'state of affairs' has its foundation in the essence of being) not of
'truth.' He himself, however, had maintained the universally valid
criterion of truth for his own statements.
At any rate we must see how in this way the question of
'being' gains in importance. H.eidegger, for whom 'values' and
abstract phenomenological 'essences' have lost their weight, will
make this question the predominating one.
As for Scheler, ultimately there is no other answer to his
question of the place of man in the cosmos than this: the being
of man is a fissure) namely, between the side of his natural,
vital, but 'blind' existence and the side of his 'spiritual,' steering,
but in themselves powerless acts. In this anwer the 'nothingness'
of human being, about which existentialism speaks, already an-
nounces itself.
3. Heidegger
The question of Being
Let us now consider how Heidegger enters the play. In the
rapidly increasing collapse of former certainties (which collapse
had been accelerated considerably by the first World War and
its consequences) Heidegger undertakes the impressive venture
of putting the question of the meaning of Being as such. Accord-
ing to the philosopher, it is the question of all questions, the
most fundamental one because ultimately it inquires after the
ground and totality of the meaning of all beings. At the same
time it is the most concrete question, for Being is ever the
being of a being. Heidegger says that he does not want to lose
himself in vague metaphysical speculations. But however con-
crete and varied Being may be, everywhere it is Being that is
at stake. EV('t'ything 'i.'i, a stone, a flower, a cat, a chair, a con-
ept, n l-ltllt<', 1\ III 1111. It may be small or large, beautiful or ugly,
oorl 01' bud, It IIl1ly h•• thlH or thnt, thll-l wny or that way, but
:1
it always is. Dilthey may have drawn the attention to historical
'life' as an irreducible datum, which cannot be substantialized,
Husserl and Scheler may have warned continuously against dealing
with consciousness and personal acting as things) - even then
the question of the meaning of the being of 'life,' 'consciousness'
and 'acts' as well as of thingness remains.
This seems to be a hopeful start, the most critical one till
now: finally even the age-old mystifications called 'consciousness'
and 'thought' seem to be made problematic; the question of
their being, of their meaning, seems to be put. But how does
Heidegger continue?
The question of the 'Archsmedeosi point) of the philosopher
In order to avoid meaningless speculations and to discover
a first hold and clue in the obvious obscurity of the fundamental
question, we have to address ourselves to a be'ing. But which?
We must realize that this is an important question. It is the
question of the Archimedean point of the philosopher. The choice
cannot be arbitrary; otherwise the answer to the fundamental
question can be missed. The only being that is able to assume
the role of the Archimedean point is the being which inquires
after the meaning of Being-as-such, i.e. of us ourselves, more
precisely, of the philosopher himself. Every question concerning
a matter needs a preceding guidance on behalf of that which is
sought. According to Heidegger this means that there is already
a certain understanding-of-Being (Seinsverstandnis) and that this
understanding has to be the central starting-point and clue for
our inquiry after the meaning of Being.
You may remark that Heidegger follows Husserl's line in
his turn to the 'subject' - though he likes to avoid this charged
term - and tries to present a real self-reflection. But we have
to observe likewise that Heidegger as well as Husserl considers
this human understanding of 'Being' as the primary, autonomous
point from which we are able to start, be it in a 'provisional'
way. Provisional, for the idea of Being as such is already pre-
supposed in the fixation of this special being. Therefore, properly
speaking, the investigation ought to be 'repeated' in the reversed
direction, after the meaning of Being-as-such has become clear.
This point is important in order to understand the significance
of Heidegger's later so-called 'reversal' (Kehre). For the moment
suffice it to say that the so-called provisional chn 1"11('1 ('I' of lIei-
degger's starting-point is, indeed, connected with till' dllll'llC'1er
:IH
of Heidegger's basic denominator, viz.) with his pronounced his-
toricism, but that does not alter the fact that it is Heidegger's
firm and permanent Archimedean point. As long as the meaning
of Being-as-such remains 'questionable' and obscure for the philo-
sophical insight, this point continues to be the first and final
point, where the clue of philosophical questioning has been af-
fixed."
Since, secondly, the most fundamental question and the clue
to its answer are concerned, this understanding of Being is not
an accidental quality of this inquiring being, but is its most
essential characteristic. To be sure, it remains one being among
others and as such does not coincide with Being-itself. But it
nevertheless is (literally) out-standing, by virtue of its under-
standing of Being. To put it in Heidegger's own words: the antic
characteristic of this being consists in its being ontological.
Here too Heidegger remains true to the phenomenological
tackling of Husserl, who continually had harped on the string
of the 'intentional consciousness,' which never should be passed.
Indeed, as we observed above, in the temporal order the human
function of logical distinction is presupposed by all of the follow-
ing functions. But this is not to say that this function can play
the role of the central core and focus in which all other functions
are concentrated. No single function can take this role, but
all are neither more nor less than so many rays from the one and
only focus and root of our temporal existence.
The idea of (existence)
Meanwhile Heidegger has coined a special term for his Archi-
medean point. It is the practically untranslatable German word
Dasein, literally rendered: to-be-there. By this designation Hei-
degger does not mean that this being can be localized in a fixable
here or there. We must remember that this being is out-standing.
This word can be taken as the literal translation of Heidegger's
other description of this being, viz., existence (ex-sistence). And
this is to say, that Dasein. is the opposite of all locally determinable
phenomena. Its being-there is the openness, the unlocked-ness
(Erschlossenheit) as such, and only through this openness can all
beings appear in their being; it is the primary and necessary
.ondition of possibility for them to come to light.
n C], IIt.ltI(lllllt'r, Sttill IlIId Zl'it, p, llR.
:m
 Heidegger explains his intentions by pointing to the being-
temporality of the Dasein, i.e.) its being-historicity. Dasein is
thorouglhy temporal, never fixable here or there, but always
'further,' 'beyond'; is nothing substantial, but 'existential,'
standing-out. Here at the same time the true meaning of its
ireedom. reveals itself, which is obscured in different manners by
philosophy. We can cling to a kind of soul-substance in the manner
of Greek thought, or to a thinking substance like that of Des-
cartes, or to the consciousness-in-general as a formal unity of
'transcendental' thought (in the way of Kant), or even to the
transcendental ego coaito of Husserl and the 'person' of Scheler.
True freedom, however, consists in transcending all sorts of
'givenness,' in being ever beyond all these points of support.
These points fix the 'time' in a present of one kind or another.
Heidegger, on the contrary, admits the primacy of the future
(coming) which is experienced only in the ever new 'instant'
(Augenblick). For this view Heidegger in his early lectures
made reference also to the New Testament and its stress on the
Christian expectation of the future. Incidentally, I make bold
to remark that this may be a humiliating example for us. Too
often we don't live and think from the truth that we have to
expect the fulfilment of the times in the coming of our Lord and
that the past receives its meaning from there, unfolds it fully in
this future. I don't mean to say, however, that ifIeidegger is more
or less a Christian without being aware of it. On the contrary,
Heidegger closes off time in its (undoubtedly important) historical
aspect, and this implies at the same time a distortion of the
meaning of this aspect, for the latter reveals itself only in its indis-
soluble coherence with all the other aspects. In this case we meet
with a striking elimination of the normativity of this aspect and
with the identification of it with its subjective side.
(Past> and (future>; facticity and proiect
The clearest tension which must be established is the tension
between the 'past' and the 'future.' Between this past and this
future stands, of course, the present. But this present cannot dis-
solve the tension, because in reality it is torn asunder by it. In
the 'past' the contingency-side of human existence professes itself:
always we are already there, in a certain world, which happens to
be thus. This is a last fact which we never can get rid of, namely,
our facticity) and we always carry with us and in us this 'burden'
of our Dasein: This implies that Heidegger rejects the view of
110
the past as a perished 'thing,' with which we are no longer con-
cerned. In this view our being-temporal is not taken into account,
and we are (in the time,' whereby time is conceived as a sort
of space with separate, successive extents. According to Hei-
degger, however, temporality as the meaning of existentiality
unfolds itself in three existential perspectives (ex-stases), which
are equally original - although, as we saw, the 'future' receives
the primacy.
The facticity is also called our throum-ness into the world.
This term is significant for the spirit out of which Heidegger
wrote: the disillusionment, the serious decay of the humanistic
ideal of personality. Now that the once vital idealism of free-
dom with its unproblematic start from creative Ego or Mind has
resulted in the historicism of Dilthey, which in its turn had no
effective defence against positivism, no other support appears
to be left for the reflecting man than the 'factual' world. How-
ever, the inner dissatisfaction, the silent revolt against this 'con-
tingent' condition betrays itself in the terms used. Husserl still
retained the persuasion that man's 'worldliness' or 'facti city' was
a more or less accidental feature and even reserved to the subject
(viz.) in phenomenological thought) to rise above this world, to
'transcend' it. Heidegger can no longer agree with this 'solution,'
which indeed was none.
For the moment we should stay with the implications of the
'past' in Heidegger's existentialism. Husserl had to face the vacuum
of the pretended autonomous subjectivity, but he continued to
keep the 'world' at a certain distance; consequently, for the filling
of the vacuum there is no other 'expedient' than to let the subject
cease to be subject, to let it tumble back into the factual world.
Now Heidegger makes the attempt to include, from the outset,
the world in the being of the subjective Dasein itself, to make it
a so-called 'existential' (Existenzial). But this implies that now
the tension returns, even more intensely, within this 'existential'
subject itself.
The historical (objectivity) (extant-ness and serviceableness)
Indeed, apart from that, Heidegger continues to speak about
the thrown-noss into the world, and this apparently implies a cer-
tain pre-existence of the latter. Heidegger in fact admits this
by mont lonlng the cxtant-ncss (Vor'handonhei't) as an irreducible
'('11I('goI'Y,' 1)('lolIl~iIll{ t Cl t hiH world. Furt her, IIcidegger introduces
l H(I('()Iul, III f'lId Jll'lilllll'Y, ('lIt('I~()I'Y, namely that of being-ready-
at-hand, serviceableness (Zuhandenheit), i.e.) the world of instru-
ments, of 'tools' (Zeug), more or less representing the objective-
historical counterpart of the historical (existential) subject. These
'tools' are characterized by a so-called unto-structure, a structure
of reference-to ... , of in-order-to .... As such they refer more
directly to the existence of Dasein as to-be (Zu-sein), as being
projects itself.
The tension within the Dasein as such: disposition) anxiety;
inauthenticity and authenticity
This is all quite interesting, but the most important matter
is the manifestation of the tension within the Dasein itself. The
existential significance of the 'past' appears in the 'mood,' the
disposition (Stimmung). By this Heidegger does not mean a psy-
chical phenomenon. According to him the disposi.tion is a much
more profound, ontological datum: we always are already dis-
posed in one way or another; disposition is not something that
we can or cannot have, that we can or cannot make, it is-there,
it 'comes over' us; it is a fundamental tonality of our being-in the-
world, in which we 'find' ourselves (Befindlichkeit).
The fundamental, comprehensive disposition, by which Da-
sein as such is disclosed to itself in its thrown-ness, is anxiety.
Anxiety is not the same as fear. When we fear, we are afraid of a
definite something, of a being within the horizon of the world.
But anxiety is anxiety about nothing. When we experience anxiety,
precisely all beings with which we are occupied in the so-called
dissipation of our 'everyday fallen-ness' slip away into insignificance.
What is left is the being-in-the-world as such, our unfoundable
thrown-ness, our being homeless, with which we are confronted
directly. So at least from one side, from the dimension of the
'past,' the Dasein is permeated by 'nothingness,' by non-being. This
past, as we saw, is never 'gone': anxiety can always arise. This
fundamental 'facticity' is apparently cured, but in fact only dis-
guised by our every-day life of being occupied with the beings
of the world. This contingent 'non-being' remains the permanent
threat - even more than this - of the Dasein. in its 'back.'
But there is more. The attitude of escape, much as it attests
the intrinsic fallen-ness and 'inauthenticity' of the Dasein, would
be impossible if the other dimension of the 'futuro \\'1'1'(1 1I0t
'simultaneously' there. The latter is prepondorunt. IIC'ldl'gg('I', it
is true, cannot do without the 'past,' but ill t hI' t I'll<I)' (II' hl~ 1I1'j.!u-
11'
ment it functions mainly as the spring-board, without which the
leap or 'anticipation' of our ex-sistence would not be possible. In
the development of modern Western philosophy we must consider
Heidegger's thought about the 'past' etc. as an eloquent and pene-
trating, be it somewhat ghostly, expression of the final consequence
of the classical humanistic domination motive. This motive, reli-
giously considered, meant a refusal to start from what is given,
from the granted-ness and therefore significance of our full ex-
istence. Now it has turned into its reverse and man is terrified
by what once was considered as the terrain to which the imma-
nent forces of human domination could be exerted. Now he can-
not but concede the given-ness of our existence, the revelation
which manifests itself in it. He can, however, do anything but
accede to this character of our existence. He continues to main-
tain himself by speaking now about 'thrownness' and facti city
and his final self-revelation in his anxiety. There is no point in
contesting the reality of this anxiety. It does exist and the kernel
of our apostate being is involved in it. I believe that the depth
of the human heart opens better when man has suffered defeat
than when he begins his conquest with great self-confidence,
Thus the domination motive within the 'system' remains, be
it in an inverted, threatening way. The other pole of the human-
istic ground motive, however, the pole of autonomy, expresses
itself in existentialism too, especially in Heidegger, even first of
all in him. For the dimension of the 'past' may be urgently
'present,' ex-sistence also and primarily implies, that Dasein is
'in advance' (sich-vorweg) that it is a to-be and lives in possibility,
as possibility. It is its own project; it has to decide responsibly
in the ever new 'instant,' to choose itself again and again. Its
contingent 'condition' may become a 'situation' by this resolute
decision, which, if maintained as ever new resoluteness tBntschlos-
senheii), attests our possible authentiCity.
Being-unto-death
But what is the meaning or the content of this decision? To
what is Daeein resolved? To itself. But what can this 'self' be? It is
no longer a 'substance' nor a 'transcendental subject' nor a 'person.'
It is thoroughly temporal, t.e., historical, and the two co-ordinates
( this historicity, the 'past' and the 'future,' are all-embracing:
the 'present' romalns framed within these two and oscillates to
and I't'O by t I\p Il t t I'llet ion of' both. Especially in the future di-
1I\('IIHlolI 01' ('XiHklll'C' (j()('H 111(' ('iIlHHic'lIi humnnlst k ideal of autono-
4:\
mous personality show its last traces, its last convulsions, which
themselves however demonstrate the obstinate will to autonomy,
even in its downfall; for the future as anticipation of being also
results in nothingness. From this side death is the permanent
threat. Here too we must be on our guard against considering
temporal existence as a succession of points, of 'now' points, the
last of which will then be death. Our being is not a being that
has an end, it is a being-unto-end (Sein-zum-Ende). Death is the
utmost possibility for existence, because at the same time it is
its mere impossibility. The really authentic way of existing consists
in facing, in holding out, without any illusion, this utmost possi-
bility. Then we re-call ourselves, consciously and in conscience,
from the fallen-ness of our always being-present-to-the-world to
... ? Indeed, to 'nothing,' to our utmost possibility which coin-
cides with our impossibility.
There is no real centre left, towards which the 'historical'
movement of the Dasein can gravitate. Authenticity in reality
amounts to an ever failing and ever renewed attempt at liberation
from inauthenticity, without any positive aim. Even Being-as-
such, the question which directed Heidegger's first start, is not
able to come to the rescue. Indeed, at the end of the book it
turns up again, but only as a question. For this Being-as-such
remains at most an idea. An idea which must derive its meaning
from the Archimedean point and root, where the philosopher
has chosen position, namely the abstracted 'historical' existence
in its radically subjectivistic and irrationalistic shape. But is this
point able to serve as a real Archimedean point? No, for it manifests
its abstract character in the permanent polarity of Dasein and its
'world,' and it consumes itself in its inner discord. Thus its inner
in-self-sufficiency manifests itself after all. Therefore the question-
of-Being, as the question of the totality of meaning, must persist,
but also continue to be a question, because a preliminary answer,
and a false one, has been given.
The peculiar char,acter Of the fundamental tension in H eidegger
Here we touch the fundamental problematics of Heidegger's
phenomenological ontology as well as the roots of the general
and sharp distinction of authenticity and inauthentlcity. A similar
distinction turns up, somehow and somewhere, in every humanistic
philosophy. In Husserl we came across it in his speaking about
the 'natural attitude' and the 'trancendcntal,' pbonomonologlcal
ono, which at a glv('n moment resulted ill !\ ':4pliWt)r~ of 1hC'
Ego.> Gradually the problematics of the 'outer' world and its
existence loses its preponderance in the development of Western
philosophy and the main interest concerns the 'subject' and its
act-life. But as this happens, even more strongly a dualism ap-
pears within this 'subject,' which always remains primarily a
knowing, either a principially 'theoretical' or a historically 'under-
standing,' subject. We should make a serious mistake if we
should think that in the distinction of authenticity and inauthen-
ticity a point of contact might be discovered with the Christian
confession of the inner discord of our life, about which Paul
speaks so penetratingly in the 7th chapter of his epistle to the
Romans. We must be clearly aware of the fact that the 'natural'
or 'inauthentic' way of living is essentially indispensable and in-
superable within the system of the phenomenologist. This system,
as a manifestation of the supposed 'original,' i.e., revealing and
re-creating phenomenological thought, cannot do without a certain
opposed domain, which as such is marked by meaninglessness and
obscurity, and therefore is capable of re-creation and revelation.
In this oppositional relation the typical structure of theoretical
thought, however absolutized and distorted, continues to shine
through. (In theoretical thought we always meet with an element
of resistance.)" That is why the frequently mentioned (worrld'
retains, on the background, an irreducible position, which makes
possible the so-called natural attitude or inauthenticity of the
'subject.' This 'world,' to be sure, is no longer the fixed and closed
natural area of the former natural scientific ideal of science,
but in the first place is the 'lived' world of the 'historical' subject
in its handling and shaping things, its 'field' of historical experience
and 'practical' understanding. Certainly, this historical 'dress' as
such undoubtedly gives evidence of 'a better awareness of the dy-
namic character of the whole creation. But in this dress the
classical scheme itself, with its subject-object-polarity, is main-
tained." Consequently, because, on the one hand, the 'world'
always remains related to the human subject and its responsible
activity, the inauthenticity must be a subjective matter, but be-
cause, on the other hand, the world happens to be here in its
mere and permanent presence, even the 'authentic' existence must
retain its polar relation to this world, be it in a 'reserved' way.
, For an elaboration of this point I may refer to the publications of Prof.
Dooyeweerd, esp. his A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, and also
his In the TwUiUht o] Western Thouuht.
D Ro(\ 1I1HO Prof', Mt'lt1c(IH, Sl'h01J1·1i?1{IH01JOnbwri'llU 11'11. WijsllC'!lOlwto (1961), p, 91-
OR.
 But on account of this splitting-up of the subject, a very
urgent question arises: where does the philosophizing subject itself
stand, the thinker who reveals all these 'relations' in his phenome-
nology? Let us give the answer at once: nowhere, i.e., he 71.a8
crept auay behind his phenomenoioqical (system' in order to let
his thought retain the character of revelation of the T1"Uth at
any price. This price is high for a fundamental antinomy becomes
evident now. As phenomenological existentialism, strongly in-
fluenced by the increasing historistic trend of Western thought,
- which in Husserl still had remained mainly an undercurrent -,
puts all its eggs in the basket of individualistic, moving and
split-up 'existence,' the more the necessity of aiming at the pos-
ition of the philosopher himself must suggest, together with the
impossibility of this position. The more the philosopher is forced
to conceal himself, in order to be 'able' to maintain the silently
claimed (unity' and universality of his position as a philosopher.
The more the trust, the faith in his phenomenological thought
comes to light, a thought which in this case tries to join, in an
a priori synthesis, the (abstracted) historical function as its basic
denominator. Indeed, it is the significance of phenomenological
existentialism to have made this fundamental problematics (with
which we all are concerned) clear as to its fundamental character.
As for Heidegger, in order to loosen the question of Being,
he had chosen his starting-point in our 'understanding' of Being.
This is explained as 'existential,' historical, 'risky,' because in this
'understanding' Dasein's own being is 'at stake,' because ready-made
answers and certainties can never be given and this being is
rather a question in itself. It is also explained as ever individual
(jemeinig). Of course Heidegger does not deny the reality of
society, but this is in the first place a datum belonging to the
inauthenticity. Here precisely 'nobody' or, as Heidegger prefers
to put it, 'people' (das Man) is leading. The philosopher, it is true,
theoretically reserves a place for authentic being-with-others
(Mitsein), but as a matter of fact this is a very small place and,
in the last resort, this authentic being-with-others can derive its
meaning only from the authentic being-in-advance of the strictly
individual existence. As Heidegger himself states, "the Dasein
is authentically itself in the original isolation of the silent, anxiety-
facing resoluteness." 6
All these features may be elaborated in an impressive and
suggestive manner, but very soon it appears that this 'existence'
n SlIin. wnd Zllit, p. 822.
Hi
cannot be the true Archimedean point. It is not really a prime
datum} which is unfolded within philosophical reflection, but it is
a first point of contact to philosophical thought and finally appears
to be a point fixed by and receiving its meaning from this supposed
autonomous thought. Heidegger declares that this 'primary' un-
derstanding of Being is vague and average and therefore cannot
serve as the suitable clue to the ontological reflection; on the
contrary it must be investigated by this reflection itself. Heidegger
to be sure finds himself obliged to say, that this ontological
reflection also ultimately must be rooted in the existential, ontic
being-and-understanding of the philosopher himself. He has to
say this because he pretends to give a true self-reflection, even
the most fundamental one until now. But this remark in fact
remains only incidental and the philosopher himself for the rest
remains hidden behind his philosophy, even to the extent that
further on in the argument this existential philosophy is brought
on the scene as the "interpretative liberation of the Daseisi to. its
utmost existential possibility." Here the proper character of this
humanistic philosophy, its pseudo-revelation/ its pretention to
be the final, universally valid Wor'd, is very clear. It is all the
more clear because the content of this philosophy is marked by
'historicity,' 'individuality,' 'question,' threat, anxiety, death etc.
Heuieqoer's idea of phenomenology as 'hermeneutics'
Concerning the phenomenological character of this ontology,
Heidegger like Scheler accentuates the methodical, the way-char-
acter of phenomenology. Now that reality and even the vehemence
of 'history' and its speed has urged itself upon theoretical reflec-
tion too, the so-called transcendental, disengaged attitude of the
'coqito' with its 'constitution' of an ideal universe - which Husserl
himself already tried to 'supply' later on - is quickly going
to lose its appeal. But this does not imply that a really new
position is discovered.
Heidegger, who wants to focus the true depth of life, its
dynamic 'being,' presents the phenomenology as a 'hermeneuiice,'
This term is adopted by Heidegger from Dilthey, who had borrowed
it from the theologian Schleiermacher.
'l'hiA 1.(\I'm hnfl h(lOI1 borr-owed from Prof. Mckkcs. For a more elaborate
tliH('UHHioll of' 1.1\" qll!'Hli(loIlH wh irh in ~I!(\H(, lectures can only be glanced
ut, tWlI lily li?"lI;"I'/u.' tllld"/'''/'(/(/;//I/ //(11/ cl" fl'lI(/ml'l/ol()fI;~o/w ?·lldo. vol. J,
A'rlullI loua (('",.".,,(// ;1I/II/,/·tll/lIl;tllI u] /th,'/ItI///I'lItlltll/;I'II! 1'IIII~O/l J).

Theology has a lot on its conscience already, but especially
in its idea of 'hermeneutics' it has increased its guilt, precisely
because this subject looks rather innocent and apparently in-
volves no speculative dogmatical constructions. Nowadays this
subject enjoys an unprecedented interest (cf. Bultmann). But
we have to be very careful here! Too often the essential idea of
this 'hermeneutics' implies that God's Word-revelation needs theo-
logical interpretation) in order to be understood really by the
faithful to whom it speaks. The reliable methods of this theo-
logical interpretation must then be learned in 'hermeneutics.'
It goes without saying that those theologians, who still maintain
that God reveals Himself in his Word, never want to attach more
importance to hermeneutics and interpretation than an inter-
mediary one. This in itself is enough to shrink from, but, as a
matter of fact, it is not all. For since in God's Word-revelation
we are concerned most eminently with our only Creator and
Redeemer himself, who can be heard only with our heart (which
does not mean that our logical function is excludoo), the mere
thought of being an (intermediary) is foolish pride and in fact
implies a substitution of God's living universal and re-creating
Word-revelation by theological 'reason.'
A similar state of affairs must be established with regard
to Heidegger's idea of phenomenology as an 'hermeneutics of the
Dasein:' Here this Dasein in a humanistic manner is put in the
foreground as the primary and final origin of meaning-giving
and therefore as self-revealing. But because this Dasein at the
same time is 'vague' and 'inauthentic' self-understanding and
lives in 'dissimulation' and 'forgottenness,' i.e.) because the self-
sufficiency of philosophical reflection must be maintained, there-
for the Dasein needs phenomenology to discover, to reveal to
it its true 'being.' To reveal to it, I say, for the existential Dasein
must remain the point from which (as Heidegger puts it) philo-
sophical questioning arises and to which it hits back. Therefore
phenomenology as 'hermeneutics' plays 'only' an 'intermediary'
role. But we have seen already, that this 'modest' role can no
more be upheld than theological 'hermeneutics' can be (the wrong
hermeneutics, I mean). Phenomenology, even if adjusted to
Heidegger's specific aims, remains the decisive and universally
valid "way of access to and determination of that which becomes
the theme of ontology." 8
n 8(1ihl U7l(Z Zl'it, p. 36.
f.I
3. Sartre
Introductory remarks
I should like to conclude this lecture with a few remarks
about the most outstanding representative of French phenome-
nological existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre. If you now feel in-
clined to heave a deep sigh, I can assure you that I can 'under-
stand' that in a more than phenomenological way. But recall the
warning I gave you in the beginning of my first lecture: the
subject-matter cannot be presented more easily. It is Cl. laborious
and difficult endeavor to penetrate into the phenomenological
philosophy and to arrive at the points which really are at stake,
without breaking off the 'dialogue' prematurely,
Sartre openly admits that he has been influenced profoundly
by Heidegger. He also wants to present a phenomenological
'ontology,' which is both existentialistic and historicistic: the
(distorted) historical temporality in its subjective, even still more
pronouncedly individualized, side functions as the basic denomi-
nator of human existence, i.e., of 'human reality,' as Sartre often
puts it. Nevertheless Sartre's existentialism is specific. To char-
acterize it very briefly, we may call it an existentialism of can-
sciousness. Sartre wants to cling to the cogito of his famous
French predecessor, Descartes. However, within his system this
subjective cogito ultimately falls into the abyss of nothingness) of
non-being. The title of Sartre's main work is Being and Nothing-
ness (L'etre et le neant),
Dialectics of 'consciousnees'
Let us try to understand what this curious accentuation of
consciousness means. According to Sartre, Heidegger has not yet
entirely settled accounts with idealism. This is a rather serious
reproach, because Sartre thinks that we are in need of a 'concrete'
philosophy, which throws idealism overboard for good. The latter
must be considered as an alienation of man from himself, from
his being-free and being-responsible. It fixes man, above his
'world,' in a so-called transcendental consciousness, conceived
of as a system of ideas. Indeed, man's freedom and responsibility
arc anchored in his being-conscious. But then we must take con-
sciousness in its phenomenological meaning, viz., as intentionality)
and this implies for Sartre that consciousness always is conscious-
Consciousness has no interiority, it is only
ncsH-of-sV?nOLh'i.'I'lfl-ol.'W.
its own outside'; it. is un nhsolutc 'flight,' a refusal to be 'sub-
xtunthtl.' ThlH IH'lllg.lu-f11ght dllll'ne'tc'!' 01' ccnscfousncss involves
n
that it is a movement. Here Sartre's irrationalistic historicism
appears: this movement is primordial, fundamental and un-
regulated, norm-less, is wholly an affair of subjective, individual
consciousness itself.
The presence-to . . . .
Sartre, however, differs from Heidegger in his accentuation
of the present. He wants to maintain that the movement is con-
scious, and consciousness in the first place is presence-to; that is,
when I am conscious of a thing, I am present to this thing. NQIW
I must take my decisions, which according to Sartre constitutes
my most proper being: I am choice, which is the same as to
say: I am freedom. I am consciousness, and this is an instant-
aneous manner. Consciousness as presence-to and as choice is
thoroughly spontaneity. It retains, it is true, its temporality-struc-
ture, i.e., the dimensions of the 'past' and the 'future' can never
be neglected. Every decision has a certain motive) because it is
accomplished in a factual 'situation.' But this implies by no
means that this decision is explicable or would be predictable from
this 'motivation' and 'situation.' On the contrary, in the same con-
dition a certain person, as a free existence, might have made quite
another decision, might have projected himself as quite another
possibility. In fact the meaning of the 'situation' is determined
by the choice as its situation. Without this spontaneous meaning-
giving there would only exist a brute, meaningless massive 'con-
dition,' a pure being-in-itself (en-soi).
Of course in this 'project' the dimension of the 'future' im-
mediately announces itself. Sartre does not deny that there is
something like Heidegger's 'understanding' as the anticipating
project of the subjective possibilities. He does not think, how-
ever, that this 'understanding' is the most original one. Man can
withdraw too easily from his 'conscious' present and his present
responsibility. Too quickly the 'primacy' of the future may be-
come a last idealistic port of refuge, in which man, especially
philosophizing man, tries to evade his real 'situation,' namely,
that he has to decide now. According to Sartre, Heidegger's idea
of existence in general labours under the mistake that it wants
to retain a last reserve, that is, in the so-called being-in-advance-
of-itself the projected 'self' is in danger of becoming a new main-
stay, be it a weak one. Then the 'world' can only appear as the
pure distance from 'self' to 'self,' in spite of Heidegger's descrip-
tion of the Dasein as being-in-the-world. Sartre perceives ft slmi-
so
lar tendency in Heidegger's idea of Being-as-such, in which the
Dasein ultimately seems to be lifted up above its tensions and
'saved' in a new substitute of the religious 'transcendent.'
Sartre himself resolutely endeavors to explode for good the
self-complacent attitude of the (bourgeois satisfaW (self-satisfied
bourgeois), be this either a more idealistic or a more positivistic
one, and to arrive at a radical, open confrontation of man with
himself, however horrible this may be. As to the question of
idealism or positivism, Sartre believes there is no fundamental
difference. In the first case the self-sufficiency - which in
reality is only an alienation - is expressed, in the projection of
a 'transcendental subjectivity'; therefore Sartre plainly rejects
Husserl's transcendental Ego as the 'inhabitant' of consciousness:
he calls it the death of consciousness, because consciousness only
'lives' in its being-unfixed and without any content. In the second
case the self-sufficient subject remains 'safe' on the background
as the self-assured master of his 'world.'
Appraisal
Sartre is relatively correct in his criticism of Heidegger.
Though time is indeed directed to the future, we can never
make an attempt at playing it off against the present, let alone
use it as an escape from the present into a 'future' as a sort of
mystification. Heidegger speaks about the 'silence' of authentic
existence, and his extreme historicism does not bring out clearly
the proper place and meaning of man's logical function, which
in the real temporal order precedes his historical function and in
which his universal responsibility begins to manifest itself. In-
deed, my 'intuition,' as the universality-in-its-own-sphere of my
analytical (not primarily theoretical) function, accompanies all
my acts, including those that are historically qualified. Equipped
with this function I have to decide now with respect to the
'future.' This is what Sartre has in mind but cannot really under-
stand because he, if possible still more strongly than Heidegger,
has bound his thought to the fixed abstract theoretical subject-
object-relation in a logicistic and irrationalistic manner. This we
should consider briefly.
The dJissolution of the (self'
Snrt I'()uppenrs to be f'ascinatcd by the word 'oneself,' which
l~rl\nlllll\l k-nlly IH ('1111('(1 It 1'1'I'1('xlv(' pronoun. TIc refuses to make
1111.'1 'rt-f'h-xlv« rr-ullty 1\ ('('1'111111 jIl'o.l(·('llolI In tho future: it Is
.,1
immediately present as one's own 'reflection.' This 'reflection'
is not a real object, as the 'oneself' directly refers to the subject.
Nevertheless, some dietomce is left; otherwise, it would not be a
'reflection.' Therefore Sartre speaks about the 'tpreretlecciue coaito;
which is the heart of 'human reality' as a self -conscious one.
Consciousness-of is possible only as consciousness-of-oneself. By
preference Sartre writes this as consciousness (of) oneself, in
order to emphasize that nothing separates the two. This structure
is not accidental, as if there would exist a human subject which
has also a self-consciousness. It is the most proper being of this
subject: being self-conscious does not mean that there is a 'self'
somewhere, which has consciousness, for the mentioned 'self' is
itself a conscious one. In this way Sartre arrives at his thesis
that self-consciousness as such is the pure 'reflection,' i.e., nothing,
non-being, because there is nothing 'substantial' in it, which would
not be 'reflection' itself. Self-consciousness is the split-ness as
such, the pure distance, and the origin of all 'negativity' in the
world, but at the same time the essence of human freedom, which
does not tolerate any fixation. This is all elaborated in ample,
difficult, dialectical reasonings, which continually force the reader
to leap from one side to the other and vice versa. When we read
Sartre, it is as though we enter a hall of mirrors which all
reflect our image in such a confusing way that at last we no
longer know where we are.
{Bad faith'
Sartre tries to approach and illustrate the essential negativity
of consciousness by the discussion of some specimens of human
conduct. Sartre dwells especially on the phenomenon of 'bad
faith' (mauvaise [oi), the analysis of which is a striking example
of his undaunted, piercing intellect and of his dialectical ability.
Let this suffice to make clear Sartre's argument." Suppose
somebody reproaches me for drinking too much. Then I might
answer: you are right, this has happened in the 'past,' but just
now I have made up my mind to prevent it from happening
again. At that moment the reproach becomes empty. It hits a
past person but not me as I am now. I appeal to my freedom
and my future and remove myself entirely from the past; my
bad faith consists in my doing as though nothing has ever hap-
pened. But a different answer is possible too. I might reply:
9 See also J. Th. C. Arntz OiP., De liefde in de ontologie vc~n Jcam-Paul
Sortre (Love in the ontology of Jean-plJIUl Sartro), 1960, p. 205.
r
I happen to be that way, I cannot help it. In that case the re-
proach is also empty for at bottom it does not hit me. As
a matter of fact, my dipsomania in me drinks, not 1. Sartre
concludes that in bad faith the point is to constitute human reality
as a being that is what it is not and is not what it is. And
this bad faith is made possible by the fact that human reality in
its centre does indeed not coincide with itself, that it is a being-
in-non-identity. Therefore bad faith remains the permanent
threat of every existential self-project. The bad nature of this
faith however consists in its use of this being-in-non-identity, in
order to shelter oneself (as one 'self') behind this being-in-non-
identity ... as a new 'identity,' as a new being-in-itself. According
!
to Sartre we have to take this split-ness quite radically: our
non-being cannot be made a new 'being,' but it must be understood
as non-being, as a 'hole within being.' On close examination we
1 cannot say that we are free, but only that we have to be free.
I Freedom means to make oneself free, again and again, from the
being-in-itself, which is always present to and even in the heart
of consciousness itself, and thus to experience in a radical manner
the split-ne ss of self-consciousness. There is no other 'synthesis'
than the nothingness of the split itself, and in Sartre Being-in-
general is entirely absorbed in the dialectical movement between
these two fixed poles (of being-for-itself and being-in-itself).
The question of the origin
But when only these two poles are ultimately left, where can
the movement as such, the dynamics of consciousness, arise?
This is an important question, and Sartre cannot neglect it.
He thinks that human reality does indeed pursue a certain ideal,
by which it is attracted, namely the synthesis of the for-itself
and the in-itself. This ideal, however, is impossible, according
to Sartre, because every synthesis between 'the two antagonistic
'beings' is excluded. It is the idea of God as causa sui (cause of
himself), and this idea must therefore be rejected. But because
this striving, this 'desire to be,' apparently is essential to human
reality, this reality as such must be called antinomical. As nothing-
ness can only appear as non-being, against the background of
bring, in metaphysics an attempt might be ventured to say more.
The most acceptable hypothesis would be, then, that once, at some
mOI1H\nt,Bdng-l1fHmch has made an attempt at self-foundation,
1111<1 tl11H IItl('mpt. has resulted in its divlsion. Here the power-
(,WIWI'HN 01' Sn 1'1 I''''H Id('1I or t1w humnn exlstonco becomes evident:
Iho 'world.' however 'Iuctunl' IIlId IIH I1ll<'h 1lH'lIlllnl.!ll'HH at bottom
,,:\
it may be, is overpowering, and so the ideal of autonomy has
bled to death into a 'total void' (one of Sartre's expressions for
consciousness) .
Nevertheless this autonomy is maintained at all cost. We
cannot but start from the consciousness (of) self as the 'foun-
dation' of its own 'non-being' and 'temporal' moving. The 'world,'
however, in the broad sense of 'natural' and 'cultural' 'milieu,'
simultaneously is 'there' with its massivity; it immediately urges
itself upon consciousness, and in the 'natural attitude' the latter
even loses itself in it. But consciousness cannot fail to present
itself. Then, however, a new danger appears, namely that of the
so-called accomplice-reflection. This means that it has a com-
plicity in the 'natural attitude' and is characterized by 'bad faith,'
because in this case consciousness and freedom are made inde-
pendent and indifferent 'beings.' True authenticity can only consist
in a way of living, which in a radical way takes on and expe-
riences the being-at-distance-from-oneself as a never accomplished
task. This 'structure' of human 'being' can be discovered, on the
one hand, by anxiety (which appears only occasionally), but
generally and with universal validity by the so-called (pure,'
phenomenological reflection.
With Sartre this reflection is on the way to become explicitly
dialectical. The transcendental trait of reflection, its directedness
to a unity which reaches above 'time,' disappears more and more,
in favour of the dialectical-logical domination as such. Sartre,
to be sure, remains true to the proper tendency of phenomenology,
i.e., its turn to the 'subject' with its actual and irreplaceable re-
sponsibility. In a way he radicalizes this turn, because he cannot
rightly be content with Husserl's Ego and the 'silent' retiredness
of Heidegger's 'authentic' existence. But the remedy to 'liberate'
human reality from these positions turns out to be worse than
the disease. The craving for logical domination manifests itself
clearly in the splitting-up of our self-consiousness without any
reserve. The only possibility to 'save' human reality then is to
let the 'world' become immediately present, be it as an anti-pole,
and to have the relations settled in the last analysis by the
dialectics as such.
The meaning of Sartre
Considered from this point, the so-called 'risky' position of
our existence, about which the philosopher manages 10 Ray much,
does not exist for Mmself: he 100 has ('rl'pf nwny hohlnd hls phi-
.1
losophy and in this sheltered position, which according to him
can be none, he holds his universal pretensions. It is very im-
portant to have a clear insight into this state of affairs, for other-
wise we might think there is much in this philosophy that can
or must be accepted and possibly may be 'completed' or 'interpreted'
in a 'Christian' manner. I don't deny that there are appealing
parts in this thought, namely, as possible antidotes) for instance
against a certain 'Christian' hypocrisy and theological self-com-
placency, which no longer lives by faith. But this is at stake:
that we seriously try to confront the philosopher at the right
point, that is the point where he himself wants to stand and where
he too often tries to withdraw himself, precisely in order to save
his real 'faith,' namely the faith in the universal validity of his
phenomenological thought, which operates within the absolutized
subject-object-scheme. From this point all his statements receive
their proper meaning.
Concerning our self -consciousness, this secret is never explicable
on the basis of this scheme. It is indeed a presupposition of our
reflection and is experienced and understood only in faith. In faith
we 'understand' it as the outstanding revelation of our Creator
within our 'being-there.' In the complete surrender and subjection
of this faith we actually profess our being-nothing in ourselves,
but right then we experience the true fulness of meaning of our
existence as 'subjective,' or responsible and as a transcendental
related-ness to the living God, who out of His love has been
pleased to reveal Himself in and through us. But this surrender
is indeed a decisive, fundamental choice, which cannot be cleared
up by any philosophy, not even a Christian philosophy, but rules
every philosophical formation of concepts and ideas.
Two more points: 1. The problem. of (intersubjectivity'
It might be interesting and useful to mention more of Sartre's
thought but time fails me and so, in conclusion, we glance at two
points only.
The real insufficiency of the logical subject-object-scheme
and the disastrous consequences of its absolutization come to
light especially in the discussion of the problem of 'inter-subjec-
tivity.' This discussion covers the largest part of Sartre's main
work. Here we can perceive the more 'social' strain of Sartre
with respect 10 ITURRCrland Hcidcggcr, but at the same time we
HC'(, tho utter ilnpoHHibility of any real 'communication' within
fhl' ,'.'/IIU(lWOI')( or filtH thoiurht,
 Sartre wants to explain the meaning of my real meeting
with the other subject. He does not want to prove the factual
existence of other subjects; they are 'there' contingently. But
what does their mutual meeting imply? To make a long story
short, this meeting is an encounter; contact is conflict and conflict
is contact. It cannot be otherwise, because the (look) of another
subject, his actual presence-to ... , makes me an object} while
I remain subject, and have the possibility to make the other subject
an object (a real 'clash') or to recognize his subjectivity and
to take my objectivity upon myself. But when I act in this way,
I do so in order to 'save' my subjectivity furtively. This is an
attitude of 'escape' and of 'bad faith.' Sartre analyses, often in
a penetrating manner, different kinds of possible attitudes: hatred,
love, masochism, sadism and the like. At any rate, the encounter
(in the sense of conflict) is inevitable; it is, as Sartre says, the
essence of my relations with the other. We have to live with
it, i.e., we have to take on this reality 'consciously,' in every
situation we have to strive after the best possible 'contact.' Prac-
tically this means for Sartre, that he seeks the side of the
'most oppressed' 'class' of society, the labour-class. This class,
be it rather outwardly, is in a way brought 'together' as a con-
sequence of its together-being-oppressed by the individualistic
'exploiting class' and therefore is necessitated to make itself free.
2. The (existential psycho-analyisis)
The second point is Sartre's idea of 'existential psycho-ana-
lysis.' This method of 'insight into fellow-men' has been used
by Sartre in some expositions of the life and work of literary
figures, and also of himself." As the name indicates, it intends
to be a substitution for the psycho-analysis in the style of Freud.
Sartre, who considers consciousness as the heart of human being,
cannot agree with Freud in his reduction of the phenomena of
consciousness to unconscious 'processes' of various psychical drives,
which are understood in a biological sense. Sartre himself does
not say that every act is founded on consideration and reflection,
for consciousness is primarily pre-reflexive consciousness (of)
oneself. In this sense even psychical emotions as well as our
will must be called 'conscious.' In all his acts man is in a certain
relation to the purposes he makes for himself on the basis of a
10 In his already mentioned book "The Words" (Lee mot.R), 10(13 tC]. my
article in Mededeli'l1gen va.n de VerO'l1igi'l1ll voor Call1illiMliM(·lttl Wijllbfl-
geerte, July 19601).
fundamental self-project. The 'emotional' man for example, has
decided to live in a 'magic' world in which he looks for 'symbolical'
solutions to the question of his being. The fundamental self-
project itself, however, which gives meaning and coherence to
my life, remains inexplicable, and without foundation. There is
no reason why it might not have turned out differently. Every
'motive' is only a motive in function of this fundamental choice,
which coincides with consciousness. When we make an attempt
at understanding another person, we should recognize this fun-
damental project as well as possible.
In my opinion Sartre's criticism of Freudianism is sometimes
to the point. As a matter of fact, psychology in traditional
Western thought, generally has a tendency to present itself as a
sort of general science of man. The traditional natural scientific
strain of this psychology, either in a Freudian or in a more 'be-
havioristic' or in a mainly 'statistical' sense, is on the whole
still carried on. Thus, in this varied psychologism, both sides
of the old humanistic tradition seem to have entered into a happy
alliance. In so far as Sartre tries to disengage hilmself from this
idea of psychology and to accentuate the entire responsibility
of man, this endeavor deserves our sincere interest. Indeed, the
task of psychology is nothing more or less than the investigation
of the psychical aspect of humam. acts (I leave the psychology of
animals out of consideration now). But because of the univer-
sality of the spheres, all the other aspects are mirrored here in
a special arrangement." Every psychology which does not take
into account that man can and does digest his 'impressions' and
control his emotions - which deals with the psychical life as a
closed sphere, entirely ruled by so-called natural scientific 'laws,'
representing the (absolutized) analogies or retrocipations to pre-
ceding natural aspects (especially biotical and mechanical ones),
and which therefore cannot really account· for such phenomena
as the sense of justice, linguistic feeling, sense of beauty, moral
feeling and the like, in which the anticipatory structure of 'feeling'
reveals itself, - every similar psychology cannot fail to come to
a deadlock and do violence to the central meaning-dynamics of
human life in its transcendental directedness.
Sartre's extremely irrationalistic subjectivism does not per-
mit the admission of any real structures at all. That is why
snrtro at a given moment describes the emotion as a 'degradation
11 cr. I)". 111111111'" III Ch";HII'III/ I'/I/'H/lt'n/iv/IH, 10UI, p. (ill fr.
 of consciousness,' i.e.) a being involved in the 'desire to being,' Lecture III
which is unfaithful to the 'authentical' attitude. This all on the
basis of the fundamental split-ness of self-consciousness, which,
once seen and experienced as such, at the same time 'degrades'
emotional life more or less to insignificance - at least in the
theoretical conception. When we don't take this position, we can
acknowledge, without any repugnance, that the psychical function
is present everywhere in our ad-life, at every turn determined in
Beyond existentialism?
its meaning by that specific act, but also, in the temporal order,
presupposed by every 'consciously' accomplished act. Then, in
my opinion, there can be room for the insight into a reality The last phase of phenomenology: Merleau-Ponty) Heuieqqer,
such as the 'emotional value' of a certain word (as a symbolical
Sartre
designation), but also for a frank admission of 'unconscious'
processes in the psychical sphere and of a certain 'mechanical'
Introductorry remarks
aspect of the course of these 'natural' processes - prrovided that
it is not considered as a closed 'sphere,' let alone as a basic de- In this last lecture I propose to comment on the last phase
nominator of human existence, but from the very outset is con- of phenomenology. This last phase might be called the 'fall'
sidered as an (important) function of human responsible act- of the movement because especially in the case of Merleau-Ponty
life, i.e.) in its vertical direction. we notice a second flourishing of phenomenology. On the whole
however the decrease of inner vitality is perceivable through
the late glow of Merleau-Ponty's, Heidegger's and Sartre's thought.
As a matter of fact, we have to be very careful in using biological
categories in historical connections. Often they are too 'innocent,'
too uncomplicated, especially when a difficult, revolutionary and
'grim' philosophy like existentialism is involved. 'History' is
made by man in free responsibility and only secondarily can we
say that it is 'passed on' by him. But at any rate there is an
analogy with biotical development as such. -

I. Merleau-Ponty

As for Merleau-Ponty (hereafter: M-P), who died a few

years ago, his philosophy might have been discussed in our second
lecture, because he was nearly the same age as Sartre and re-
mained a phenomenological existentialist whose influence, at least
in scientific life, gradually surpassed that of Sartre. Most likely
this must be explained by the fact that he tried to answer the
internal problematics of the special sciences (especially psy-
ihology) more fully, and seemed a more 'real' and less 'scandalous'
author. On the other hand, this fact itself is connected with a
certain transitional character of his thought. Therefore he may
1>(' plll('('d 111I hls IItHI 1(1('1111"1'. lkHi<1(,H, the second lecture was,
I thlnk, 1(}1l1~ ('IIIHlldl!

lH •III
 of consciousness.' i.e., a being involved in the 'desire to being,' Lecture III
which is unfaithful to the 'authentical' attitude. This all on the
basis of the fundamental split-ness of self-consciousness, which,
once seen and experienced as such, at the same time 'degrades'
emotional life more or less to insignificance - at least in the
theoretical conception. When we don't take this position, we can
acknowledge, without any repugnance, that the psychical function
is present everywhere in our act-life, at every turn determined in
Beyond existentialism?
its meaning by that specific act, but also, in the temporal order,
presupposed by every 'consciously' accomplished act. Then, in
my opinion, there can be room for the insight into a reality The last phase of phenomenology: MerZeau-Ponty, Heuieqqer,
such as the 'emotional value' of' a certain word (as a symbolical
Sartre
designation), but also for a frank admission of 'unconscious'
processes in the psychical sphere and of a certain 'mechanical'
Introductory remarks
aspect of the course of these 'natural' processes - provided that
it is not considered as a closed 'sphere,' let alone as a basic de- In this last lecture I propose to comment on the last phase
nominator of human existence, but from the very outset is con- of phenomenology. This last phase might be called the 'fall'
sidered as an (important) function of human responsible act- of the movement because especially in the case of Merleau-Ponty
life, i.e., in its vertical direction. we notice a second flourishing of phenomenology. On the whole
however the decrease of inner vitality is perceivable through
the late glow of Merleau-Ponty's, Heidegger's and Sartre's thought.
As a matter of fact, we have to be very careful in using biological
categories in historical connections. Often they are too 'innocent,'
too uncomplicated, especially when a difficult, revolutionary and
'grim' philosophy like existentialism is involved. 'History' is
made by man in free responsibility and only secondarily can we
say that it is 'passed on' by him. But at any rate there is an
analogy with biotical development as such. -

I. M erleau-Ponty

As for Merleau-Ponty (hereafter: M-P) , who died a few

years ago, his philosophy might have been discussed in our second
lecture, because he was nearly the same age as Sartre and re-
mained a phenomenological existentialist whose influence, at least
in scientific life, gradually surpassed that of Sartre. Most likely
this must be explained by the fact that he tried to answer the
Internal problematics of the special sciences (especially psy-
hology) more fully, and seemed a more 'real' and less 'scandalous'
author. On the other hand, this fact itself is connected with a
cortaln t,/'(t'Yu{Uioool character of his thought. Therefore he may
1>('plll('('(( ill tills IlIst lccturo. B('sidc's, the' second lecture was,
I thluk, IOllg ('IHl\II~h!

58 ,,! I

The two major works of M-P are: The structure ot conduct
(La structure du comportement, 1942) and Phenomenology oi
perception (1945). M-P wants to call his own theory a 'phenomeno-
logical positi'1{ism/ a remarkable characterization indeed, of which,
however, the adjective 'phenomenological' must not slip our at-
tention.
'Consciousnees' and (nature>
In the opening sentence of his first book, M-P clearly explains
his principal aim. There he says that he desires to understand
the relations of consciousness and nature, the latter conceived of
as 'organic, psychological and social.' Nature, then, is under-
stood as a multiplicity of events which are exterior one to an-
other and are connected by relations of causality.' As a matter
of fact, this beginning expresses the constant main theme of his
works. But at the same time we have to notice that M-P appears
to start [rom. a duality. Like all other humanistic philosophers,
he wants to surmount this duality - and this the more emphati-
cally, as especially in Sartre's thought the dualism had become
crudely pronounced -, but as it is the starting point and the
expression of the dualistic humanistic ground-motive, it can at
most be repaired somewhat. When, for instance, M-P describes
the essential relation of the two as a 'circular causality,' then,
on close examination, the term 'circular' appears to lack real
foundation, because there is no real centre) round about which a
circle can be drawn.
'Consciousness,' which in itself was already a precarious
'synthesis' of the subjective logical function and another subjective
function (psychical, historical etc.), was, as we have seen, the
traditional point of attachment for the impulse of autonomy, while
'nature' has represented of old the terrain on which the domina-
tion-motive, by means of theoretical thought, had to try its
strength. Another way to describe his intention is the following
sentence of M-P: " ... the point is to join the perspective of
'idealism,' according to which everything is only an object for
consciousness, and the perspective of 'realism,' according to which
1 "Notre but est de comprendre les rapports de la conscience et de la nature,
organique, psycholcgique, ou meme sociale. On entend ici par nature une
multiplicitc d'evcnements oxtericurx les uns nux autrcs ot lies par des
rapporta do cuusnl iL('." L« 81'/'//('/1/1'(1 dn~ (lO'll/1101'! ('1//('11 t, p. 1.
00
the 'consciousness-ss' are woven into the tissue of the objective
world and of the events-in-themselves." 2
'Phenomenoloqical positivi8'YI'l,J
M-P thinks it is the proper achievement of phenomenology
to have joined the utmost subjectivism and the utmost objectivism,
to wit, in its notion of the (world.' This is, indeed, a quite remark-
able pronouncement, especially considering the 'radical subjec-
tivism,' which was proclaimed by Husserl as the only outlet in
the 'crisis of European reason,' and, in a way, was radicalized
even more in the 'existential' phenomenology of Heidegger and
Sartre. For these philosophers, too, the notion of the 'world'
was, it is true, already important, especially as the inner emptiness
of the 'subject' had clearly manifested itself. At any rate, they
had, apart from their mutual differences, explicitly chosen their
fundamental position in subjective autonomy as the origin of
true meaing-giving, be it an ever 'failing' meaning-giving. For
M-P, however, the 'world' has gained in importance. Somewhere
he calls it 'the true transcendental' or 'the cradle of meaning.'
Here indeed, we can perceive a peculiar trait of M-P's 'phenome-
nological positivism,' which, however, remains phenomenological
and even existentialistic and not a traditional, 'natural scientific'
positivism. The latter point will demand our attention presently.
At any rate, there is a connection with this curious 'positivism,'
when M-P, after he, too, has established (time> as the final horizon
of our existence-in-the-world, also disputes Heidegger's 'primacy
of the future' and, like Sartre, accentuates the 'present' - but
then as a present that is rooted in the (past,' which constitutes
the indispensable 'field' of my present and anticipating 'decisions.'
Ultimately M-P's 'phenomenological positivism' even shows a
development to a 'mythology' of 'Nature' (written with a capital).
'Nature,' then, is conceived of as a universal stream of 'savage'
life, which, it is true, can toss us to and fro, but at the same
Li:me'bears' and holds us and is experienced immediately in our
'corporeal' existence and its bodily 'perception.' Even then, how-
ever, the primordial duality still operates. For the notion of
Being-us-such is not wholly absorbed in this 'Nature.' The dimen-
xion of' the 'Logos' ultimately cannot be reduced to it. According
.. ". , , il H'HI(IHllllil. dll 1'('11('1' lu P("I'H\lpcLivo ldcaliate, salon laquelle rien n'est
1\11(\ ('011111111 ohJl'I, pnu r \11 ('(11111('1(11\('(\, «L 1/\ lWI'Hp("('~iv(\ realisto, solon la-
1I111111c. \"M ('IIIIH('I"III'''" Mllllt. 11111"'1,,"(111dlllll1 In tlHRII ell! mond« objcctlf ot dos
,'VdU'IlIC'II!." ('11 ~111." l'h,"1I011I,<lIUIIlJ.(11I cI," III P"I'('(lpt lun, p, IIHIl.

to M-P this dimension shows itself pre-eminently in human
'language,' in its unique, creative revelations (cf. lecture IT).
This, in a nutshell, is the main line of development of M-P's
endeavor to achieve a doctrine of (engaged consciousness.' At
last it results, in order to avoid the triviality of a positivism
and pragmatism without any trace of self-reflection, into a rap-
prochement to Freudian psycho-analysis with its descent to the
hidden 'depths' of (un-consciousness.' In this 'descent' the really
transcendental trait of phenomenology, which we have pointed out
more than once already, has turned into its reverse in a remarkable
way.
The inner tension in M erieau-Pontu's idea of pheoomenology
Nevertheless, we must continue to notice that for M-P
too, from the outset, it is consciousness which has to 'engage'
itself, and that it is consciousness which has to 'engage' itself·
What does this mean? When we see the development of phe-
nomenology in the central light of its dialectical religious ground-
motive and the inner tensions of the latter, we must establish
that M-P is the phenomenologist who tries to rescue the 'auto-
nomous' subject from the 'lost' position of emptiness and 'nothing-
ness,' in which it had made its final attempt at self-maintenance
in Heidegger and Sartre, by means of a reinforcement and con-
solidation of its relations to the 'world.' The question remains
whether this 'remedy' is able to improve the situation, considering
the fact that phenomenology does not leave a real escape from
the problematics of the 'subject'-and-its-'world.'
At any rate, in the famous preface of his Phenome?Wlogy
of PerceptionM-P clearly shows his existentialist intentions.
After he has pointed out the various difficulties and interpre-
tations of phenomenology, which again and again revive the
question: what is phenomenology? he declares that only in our-
selves can we find the unity of phenomenology and its true mean-
ing. This pronouncement is strongly stressed when he writes:
"I am the absolute source, my existence does not come from my
antecedents, from my physical and social surroundings, it goes to
them and supports them, for it is I who make be for me (i.e' 'be'
in the only meaning which the word can have for me) that
tradition which I decide to resume or this horizon whose distance
to IInC would disappear . . . , if I wcre not there to traverse it
Kt
with my look." 3 Strictly speaking, this would imply that we have
to consider this pronouncement as well as the rest of this philosophy
as the highly personal expression of the highly personal individual,
viz' M-P. But, of course, this is not what the philosopher means.
J
He wants to discover universally valid truth; he wants to address
you and me.
But how must this take place? Here already M-P declares
at the same time that phenomenology - about which he said
that it has its unity and true meaning in ourselves - is only
accessible to a phenomenological method. So phenomenology, con-
ceived in this way, seems to be self-sufficient. This is indeed
what M-P means, for according to him phenomenology, as reve-
lation of the 'world,' i.e., as truly universal, rests in itself. And
thus we see M-P fill, in a way that looks somewhat 'innocent'
in comparison with the 'grim' self-reflection of his predecessors,
the greatest part of his main work with a so-called 'direct,'
phenomenological 'description' of the so-called 'liie-uiorld/ in which
we live (Lebenswelt). Yet M-P is too great a phenomenological
philosopher to let it go at that. After the accomplishment of this
'direct description' - into which we shall go further presently -
a 'phenomenology of phenomenology' is necessary, he says. In
this one the preceding 'description' has to receive its final check
and certainty.
The shift in the phenomenology of M erleau-Pontu
What is the final inspection-point? It is the 'subject' again,
and this subject again first conceived of as cogito. However, even
here at this 'final' inspection-point, we are concerned with a
"phenomenoloqu of phenomenology'! Therefore the question can
no longer be suppressed now, if in this way we don't land in
a so-called regressus ad infinitwm: phenomenology of phenome-
nology of phenomenology of phenomenology etc. without any per-
spective. Precisely to avoid a similar reqressus, Sartre had put
in the foreground the so-called pre-reflexive cogito, in which no
distance at all is left, but which also appeared to be as such pure
'nothing-ness.' Merleau-Ponty, who wants to steer clear of this
rock, has, in fact, no other expedient than to fall back upon
n " .. jo suis la source absoluo, mon existence ne vient pas de mes ante-
J r6ci(\I1IH, do mon cntournze physique et social, elle va vers eux et les
HOlIllC'lIt, ('/11' ("('Hl moi qu] fah; Gll'o PO'tl1' moi (et done Iltre au soul sens
1111(\10 mol. 111111-11\(1 uvnlr 110\11' mol) cctto tradition quo [e choisis do re-
IIt'HlIIII'II 0111.('1'1. lun-Izon dOIl't In diHlulH'o n mol 1\'(,fConcll'c'l"nit ... , si jo
n',"11I11I III IIUIII' III 1)111'('11111'11'
du 1·I'~rnl'd,". /'/1111/11/11.rill /(1. 1)('?'o(Jl>timl, p. TIT.
n:\
 phenomenology as such i.e., with respect to the content of his
philosophy, a heavier weight of the (world/ This is, in my opinion,
the proper meaning of the shift in M-P's phenomenology with
regard to Heidegger's and Sartre's thought. This is also why in
M-P's work the fundamental 'dispositions' of 'anxiety' and 'loath-
ing',' as expressive utterances of subjects which are entirely
thrown back upon themselves, hardly return. This shift, especially
for us who are able to look back and to see some of its historical
consequences, is significant, but is no more than a shift. As we
saw, M-P returns at last to the subjective coqito, which, in the
preface of his book, he had already indicated as the ultimate
source of meaning-giving. Again, to be sure M-P is out to show
the cogito as an intentional one, i.e., as an (act) directly moving
to the (things.,' to the (world.' To think always means in the first
place to think something. This sounds rather general and vague,
indeed, but it is this general (opinion,' this 'rough adhesion to the
world' (as M-P calls it), which is and remains our fundamental
'hold,' because it is this which makes 'something in general' arise
for us. M-P too, however, holds fast a sort of 'prereflexive
coqito:' The intentional moving toward the world remains in
itself conscious; it must start frOm a primordial opening-to this
'field' of the world. Therefore M-P introduces a 'tacit-coqito'
(cogito tacite), which he describes as an 'undeclinable subjectivity,'
a 'presence of oneself to oneself,' which precedes all philosophy.
But now at the same moment we are faced with the limit) where
the fundamental difficulty appears again. For this 'tacit cogito,'
this 'undeclinable subjectivity,' upon which consequently also this
philosophy must be based and be dependent, simultaneously functions
within this philosophy, behind which the philosophizing subject
himself - whose position, indeed, is untenable - hidJe.shimself,
in order to (save,' anyhow, the universal validity of this philosophy,
i.e., of his own 'Coqito' as (pseudo-j Word-revelation.'
Because M-P desires to avoid the snares of Sartre's 'nothing-
ness' and its concomitant dialectics, inexorably elaborated with
logicistic means and henceforth 'unreal,' he soon lets the problem-
atics, so to speak, 'slip,' and returns to his 'world.' The 'tacit
cogito' has, according to him, only a 'gliding,' slipping hold on
itself and on the world. It 'guesses,' presumes, the latter round
about itself as its 'field,' which happens to be there and in the
'ambiguous' conversation with which a 'meaning' appears. This
'slipping' presence is explained also by M-P as the direct expression
• Cf. lecture H.
64
of the thoroughly 'temporal,' i.e.) historical, character of our ex-
istence. With him, too, this 'historical' temporality ultimately
serves as the final denominator of this existence. And the mention-
ed absolutization of phenomenology as such, its self-sufficiency,
must be 'compensated' by the statement, that phenomenology,
however much it is maintained as the final 'revelation' of mean-
ing, is an 'infinite meditation,' which never knows where it
goes, but which is 'odoeniurous:' This statement, indeed, has
come true, for, as we saw, with M-P phenomenology, once born
as a 'rigorous scientific' investigation of the 'intentional con-
sciousness,' finally passes into a certain 'mythology' of 'Nature.'
The fundamental difficulty
Once more, however, the fundamental tension becomes evident
within the 'historical' denominator itself. At the end of his
expositions the philosopher, after his 'conclusion' that he is 'a
psychological and historical structure,' states that "even the
thought of a philosopher is only one way to explicate his hold
on the world, that which he is.)) 5 Again, then, he neglects that
it is precisely this philosophy itself to which the final word con-
tinues to be reserved and which alone reveals the so-called psycho-
logical and historical structure. The antinomy is very sharp here,
precisely because at last the philosopher himself, in a critical
self-reflection, seems to turn up, as he is. But in fact he conceals
himself the more firmly. He spooks) from the outside, within his
Phenomenology and without any possibility to account:
Here lies the essential weakness of this philosophy as well
as its fundamental point of encounter with a Christian way of
thinking. Therefore we first purposely discussed somewhat ela-
borately this idea of a 'phenomenology of phenomenology.'
In the idea of 'temporality' (historicity) itself, which should
bring the final elucidation, the tension still works. Now the three
dimensions of this temporality become its components, while M-P
shows the tendency to accentuate the present-in-its-broad-sense
(as he puts it). This is to say, the 'field' of the present, the am-
biguous alliance of (moving) consciousness-and-life-world. This
" "Jo IItliH uno structure psychologique ct historique. J'ai recu avec I'existence
uno ttl'llllc'II'(\ d'('xiHLul', IIn HLyk, T'outos mos actions et mes pensces sont en
ruppnr], IIVCW (,t'LLcI HLl'lu't,III'O, (',L m~n'll' In pcns60 d'un philosophe n'est
1111'111111Itlll,dc'm ,1'c'xplfcoILt'I' ~I\ pl'ilH' aur Itl ItIO11 de, cola qu'll cat", l'hrlnmn,
/111 lu 1//1/'(1., 11, Jj Ill,
field always is already 'present,' and thus it is rooted in the 'past.'
In reality M-P has to fall back, in this concluding part of his
'phenomenology of phenomenology,' upon the result of his so-called
'direct description,' namely the (,natural' and 'social') 'world' as
the 'true transcendental.'
The (direct description) and the (life-world)
This is not to say that the typically phenomenological ideas
are not already present in this 'direct description' as such, which,
indeed, serves as a demonstration of 'phenomenological positivism'
and tries to keep a close contact with the so-called 'positive'
sciences. They are. In the first place there is the idea of
'description' as such. We spoke about it in the first lecture
already and we saw that it had a polemical side, namely, against
the natural scientific method of causal explanation and construction
on the basis of an 'objective' basic denominator, as it was prac-
tised in current positivism. M-P agrees with this idea of descrip-
tion. By the 'world' he means the so-called 'life-world,' the world
lived in by the subject in its moving existence and, therefore,
a moving, 'open' one itself. This life-world does not consist of
a series of separate physical-chemical 'elements,' but is the uni-
versal, shifting horizon of our 'lived experience,' a whole with
different levels, each of which are characterized as 'wholes,' as
'structures,' showing a primary and clear coherence. The or-
ganic, the psychical and the historical level are the main ones
which M-P distinguishes here (especially in his Structure of
conduct). As such this life-world 'is more original than the fixed,
determinate universe of 'science' or the closed world of the
'natural attitude.' M-P develops this view in the way of a criti-
cal discussion of the postulates and results especially of modern
psychology. More than once, indeed, he shows in a striking
manner that the discoveries made particularly by the so-called
Gestalt-psychology clearly evince the untenability of the usually
behavioristic-positivistic postulates of modern psychology, Gestalt-
psychology itself included. These discoveries can only be really
utilized and interpreted in their true meaning-COherence by a
philosophical, i.e., phenomenological, 'description,' which has
broken resolutely with these postulates and is able to discover
this really primordial 'world' under that of science and of the
'natural attitude.' As a matter of fact, over against the positivistic,
behavioristic constructions, he often gives evidence of a consider-
ably greater sense of reality, and the perusal of this can be
very instructive:
6
The 'reduction' and the (natural attitude)
This is not to say, however, that M-P has managed to
liberate himself entirely from ordinary positivism. Now a second
typical trait of his phenomenology must be mentioned, namely
the reduction. The life-world with its mobility may represent the
most original and most embracing horizon of our directly lived
experience, i.e., of our 'perception,' it can be discovered only
by means of this reduction, which is a reflection. This implies
that, in order to become aware of our being-intentional-movement-
to-the world, We must suspend this movement. The natural atti-
tude and its certainties are, it is true, not annulled by this re-
flexive reduction. It is characteristic of M-P, who wants to sur-
mount the vacuum of Husserl's transcendental cogito as well as
the existential non-being of Heidegger and Sartre, which is ab-
solutely present to itself in anxiety, that he, on the one hand,
shows his trust in the immanent possibilities of the reflection
also within his expositions, but, on the other hand, remains enough
of an existentialist to reject a simple return to Husserl's 'trans-
cendental coqito' and its constituting of a previously 'annulled'
world. This is the fundamental 'ambiguity' of his position; the
ambiguity, about which he speaks much within his argument,
is only a consequence of the first. 'He thinks that the 'natural
attitude' must be considered as presupposed by every philosophy.
Nevertheless, it is not able to know itself really as movement-to-
the-world; its certainties 'pass' as 'self-evident.' So the phenome-
nological reduction is indispensable in order to cause the appear-
ance of the being-in-the-world, inaugurated by Heidegger.
I believe that rafter all our previous discussions it needs no
demonstration that the order is in fact an inverse one. First of
all the phenomenological reflection is dis.engaged from the co-
herence of meaning of our full experience, set and held aside
as the decisive self-revelation. Thereiore - as this reflection
remains a reflection-upon-something, and, as self-revelation, pri-
marily upon a subjective 'something' - the so-called 'natural
attitude' is needed as the so-called 'presupposition' of this re-
flection. At the same time, however, it must be 'reduced' and
remain secondary with regard to this reflection. 'Secondary,'
then, implies always a degradation of this 'natural' experience.
~ven M-P, who pursues a certain 'rehabilitation' of this natural
attitude, cannot avoid this degradation. More than once this
It Lt it ude il-1 dcscribod as 'dogmatical,' as orientated to the world
liS 11 {Iiv('n, fi::n()(t 1111ivcrso, in which everything has been settled,
In shurt, IlH 11 'l)()HlllvIHtk' world. But bocausc this natural attitude
within the phenomenological view indeed remains indispensable,
we must say that positivism, be it in a mere or less negative
sense, continues to be presupposed by this phenomenological phi-
losophy, As fer the phenomenological reflexion and reduction as
such, which is set and held apart, where does it stand? Nowhere,
i.e., everywhere. Even the se-called pre-reflexive of pre-conscious
experience of the life-world, which according to what the phi-
losopher says, is the initial, constant and final 'situation' of the
'conscious' activity of reflexion, can only really go en as a 'subjec-
tive' giving of meaning, when the abstract, absolutized structure
of reflexion, se to speak, has been projected 'back' into it before-
hand. Even the 'life-world,' then, remains on the 'objective' side
of the line, whereas the 'lived experience' of this 'world' keeps to
the 'subjective' side.
Inbentiorvality as {perception.' Functionalism
On the whole, however, M-P tries to surmount the age-old
dualistic subject-object-scheme by means of this denominator of
'lived experience,' which he usually calls {perception.' It is in this
'sensory' perception and its typical mobile 'structure' that the
true unity must be found, But the difficulty of this task does
not fail to appear. On the one hand, perception is defined as an
(intentional' act; but as such it should anticipate the 'conscious,'
i.e., fer M-P, the logical and historical functions of our existence
and thus a 'subject' with an 'objective' field over against it.
Therefore, en the ether hand, M-P sets perception apart as a
se-called {operating,' even sometimes 'unconscious,' intentionality,
which, in a way, remains 'active,' but in the first place refers to
a certain receptivity as the expressions ef our always being-in-
the world. This concept of 'operating intentionality' is quite ob-
scure and confusing, though M-P's abundant imagery gives it a
suggestive force. At any rate, he insists en it and in this line
later on even inclines to the already mentioned mythology of
'Nature.'
In order to judge the expositions of M-P. correctly, we have
to realize that there is indeed ne logical distinction er historical
formation without preceding sensory affect-ivity, in the sense of
psychical sensitivity, in which indeed, a specific 'mobility' as
well as a certain receptivity are evident. These features, however,
can never be closed up and understood in themselves by means
of an absolutized abstraction. This is what we call 'functionalism.'
They only reveal their true meaning in the dynamic coherence
of meaning which unfolds in the vertically directed typical struc-
tures of the human act, in which the different functions only
function. A sensory 'impression,' er a perceptive 'linage,' can
never be made a closed, possibly even 'movable,' 'whole,' but we
have to admit that such an 'impression,' in the temporal order,
in itself demands, is designated to, 'conscious' (logical, but not
primarily theoretical) distinction, to historical 'control,' to sym-
bolical expression etc., and this all in one dynamic direction, which
points above time. Functienalism, en the contrary, remains con-
fined within the temporal horizon with its 'horizontal' order of
functions, and it revenges itself in the lability and inner tensions
of the function chosen as the basic denominator.
Se much fer M-P's 'perception,' which, as we established
already, appeared to require 'completion' in another basic denomi-
nator, namely the 'historical' function.
Corporality
One point must still be briefly dealt with, namely M-P's
view of corporality. In this corporality M-P. thinks he can point
out the real intermediary between 'subject' and 'world.' In our
perception, my enaaaement-m-the-uorui attests itself, but it con-
tinues to be my perception. This perceiving subject, this 'natural
Ego,' is called 'body' er bodu-subieci, On this point, again, M-P
is correct and also instructive in his protest against every attempt
at closing up and confining our bodily existence in its physico-
chemical or even biotical functions. The body, he says, has its
own motorial experience, which implies a direct, practical 'know-
ledge' of the 'world' without the necessity of any 'representations.'
It is an original, general, be it a rough, 'adhesion to the world.'
As such, however, it has an impersonal character. The truly per-
sonal, i.e., 'conscious' and 'active,' existence continues to be char-
acteristic of the {historical' existence. Therefore the body-subject
is, en the ether hand, called only a provisional draft of this his-
torical existence. The relation between body and 'existence' is
dialectical; he says that the body is the fixed or generalized
existence and that existence is a continual incarnation. Ultimately
the true initiative is reserved to the 'historical' subject, on the
constant basis of the subject-object scheme. Fer he declares that
this bodily perceiving subject is never an absolute subjectivity,
that it remains a {blind' adhesion to the world and is destined
to 1>C"C'OI11(' o1>,1('('t to an ultimate Ego, This means that this
would-he 'Ill I«rmorlln ry' of OH' 'body,' ttsolr, in sptto of some useful
nn
descriptions of it, is a clear demonslration of the general tension
in which his thought moves.
II The last phase of Heidegger and Sartre
Heidegger's (reversal'
This must suffice to give you a general impression of this
thought. To conclude these Iectures about phenomenology I
should like to make some remarks about the last development
of Heidegger's and Sartre's thought. Don't be afraid that it will
be too difficult and tiring - I, too, 'bodily' know that it is the last
day of the conference -, for we are not concerned with an entirely
new philosophy, but with a certain development of the previously
elaborated lines, which development in a sense implies a (reversal.'
This development, however, is worth considering for a moment
as a sign of the times.
When we say 'reversal' tEehre), we touch the central term
of the second phase of Heidegger's thought. What does it mean?
According to the philosopher himself we have to understand it
primarily as a turn in the history of Being-as-such, i.e., in
Being-as-such as history. A turn, in which this thoroughly his-
torical Being has imparted, has com-mitted (sich eu-schiclcen)
itself as such. This reversal implies, in the second place, that now
the way of the book Being and Time, which we discussed last time,
must be reversed. Now the question is not to find and to investi-
gate a being, viz., 'existence,' as the central point from which
Being-as-such, or rather, the 'idea' of Being, may be discovered,
but now Being itself, its truth, its self-revelation and its related-
ness to beings, the Dasein included, are at stake. Here we are
concerned with the most primordial question and questionable-ness
(Frag'UYilrdigkeit). The question of 'existence' is dependent upon
this most primordial question, although the questionable-ness of
this Being-as-such can only appear in the true light via the start
of Being and Time, i.e., via the profound, penetrating investigation
of the Dasein, which, as you will recall, resulted into 'nothing.'
Only in this way can the age-old 'error' (1rre) of history
be discovered as such, namely, the 'error,' which derived from
the '[orqotten-ness' of Being-as-such, i.e., of its dif-ference tUnter-
schied) from the beings. This age-old error, which according to
Heidegger already starts clearly with Plato, is called by him the
era of metaphysics. Metaphysics, to be sure, cannot really dis-
engage itself from the dif-ference (of Being-as-such and 'being(s) '),
it has, like all human thought and activity, to receive its primary
stimulus from this all-porvading dlf-J'crcnco. nut. 01(' inner ton-
()
dency of metaphysics is to efface this dif-ference. It starts from
the 'beings' or from Being-in-general and strives to 'explain' it
from -, to re-present it to a highest being as the uniting 'founda-
tion' of being-in-general. In modern times this founding 'ground,'
to which beings are re-presented, is called 'subjectivity,' to which
the rest appears as its 'ob-ject' tGeqen-etosui), The pre-eminent
demonstration and also ultimate completion of this development
is the modern technical system (Gestell), in which everything
is re-presented,calculated and arranged, and in which the meaning-
lessness of being-in-general together with the immediate threat
to our free, 'ex-sistential' Dasein becomes terribly clear. In this
all-embracing re-presentation the most proper character of Being,
its 'verbal' character, its to-be - what we 'may translate as
(presence' - remains forgotten, becomes 'dissimulated,' even beyond
all recognition. Especially Nietzsche was already aware of this"
when he proclaimed the era of (nihilism.'
But Heidegger goes a step further. He thinks that precisely
in this 'ultimate' situation of 'planetary' re-presentation, which
is rapidly perfecting itself now, Being-as-such, i.e., the truth of
'presence,' of to-be, has its proper chance. Precisely in this utmost
hidden-ne ss it might reveal itself as different, namely to him who
has undergone the radical experience of 'Being-forgottenness' and
who is willing to take the radical existential (leap' (Sprung).
This view, however, implies that the era of 'metaphysics,'
the age-old 'error' of history was (properly we should say: is)
a necessity. Indeed, the inner tension in the Dasein as 'existence'
between 'freedom' and 'necessity,' which we established in the
previous lecture, now returns in Being-as-such, and this the more
so, because 'historicity' is now presented as the truly universal
'origin,' which leaves no room for any 'foundation' whatsoever,
not even to a 're-solved' existence and its 'decisions' (which, as
a matter of fact, appeared to be without any perspective). Now
that Heidegger in order to veil this lack of any perspective, has
shifted the essential 'decision' and the responsibility for it to
'Being-as-such,' he has to admit that this 'inauthentic' era of
'metaphysics,' of re-presentation, belongs to this 'Being-as-such.'
Being as presence, as dif-ference, can only 'be,' if, in itself, in
its being-difference, it sets free the manifestation of being-in-
general and, thus, occasions the re-presenting, 'technical' turn
to the latter, in order to continue to be free. This latter trait,
which rcmnlns the prvailing one for IIeidegger, he describes as
Ilt'i 11 INJVn1 t (lO'r-f"i{/'I'I';,'1), the kC'l'I1C'l of historicity. In the e-vent,
,1
 the proper 'gathering' of beings takes place, precisely because the
e-vent as such is a 'withdrawal' (Entzug), and only in this with-
drawal can it really continue to be 'authentic.' The 'issue' (Aus-
trag) in the being-in-general and this withdrawal balance each
other in a dialectical and at the same time labile way, whereby
the latter remains accentuated, but the first cannot disappear.
We might, if need be, denote this as the inner 'risky' character
of Being.
(Mythological' thought
All this may look like quite obscure language to you, al-
though I tried to present it in such a way that you might observe
the continuity of Heidegger's thought. It is obscure, indeed, and
all the numerous 'interpretations' are not able to make this
thought-and-language-of-Being (Seinsdenken) 'clear'. In fact, this
thought-of-Being results in a sort of mytho-logy, wherein Being-
as-such and its 'revelation' - the transcendental question of which,
as we saw, had to arise - evaporate into an idle myth. At the
same time the philosopher appears as the 'prophet,' as a sort
of 'oracle,' but without any real message. This thought-of-Being,
however, remains thought: the dialectical balance, in which the
polarity of concealment and un-covering, of withdrawal and
leaving 'behind,' stand in the foreground, in the last resort hinges
on mouatu; namely a thoroughly historicis,tic thought. Presum-
ably we can say that in Heidegger historicism arrives at its final
consequences, and thus, at its end. The philosopher himself,
who had started with a so-called 'fundamental ontology' with
an apparently radical and critical questioning of our truly prim-
ordial position, now seems to have abandoned every attempt at
a really philosophical account of essential 'states of affairs'; he
speaks, but without message. For in this mature historicism,
this historicism in its 'eventide,' both 'history' and 'thought' lose
their intrinsic, specific 'speech.' In reality both structurally are
designated one for another within a super-arbitrary meaning-
coherence which points forward, and, thus, function within God's
universal revelation in creation. Here they mutually become
each other's 'echo' 6 Heidegger's later philosophy can, in a way,
as has been done, be designated as 'metacritical.'
The 'grim' accents of this first thought, it is true, are replaced
by milder ones. But Heidegger's final word is the description
6 Cf. J. P. A. Mokkos, Sohl'7/pi?10soponlulrino 1111 wijH1wl/llllrll',
of Being as a (play,' which is, in fact, only a more 'innocent' and
friendly word for the dialectics we mentioned above. When at
bottom nothing happens (in the e-vent), everything can 'happen.'
In this 'play' the search for 'foundation' can be abandoned. But
rules too, fail, and even something that is at stake. In my opinion
this 'play' betrays the 'resignation' of the humanistic European
thinker to the (force maieure' of a 'technically' dominated time
together with a final attempt at preserving an inner 'distance.'
It goes without saying that this attitude, at least with less pro-
found and erudite disciples, easily may join a pragmatistic op-
portunism, which, under the guidance of a powerful elite, seems
to promise more for the 'present.'
Sarire'e turn to Marxism
For Sartre too, systematic philosophy, as it recently has
appeared in phenomenological analysis, is no longer that self-
evident authority and cultural power, which it has been in Western
SOcietyfor centuries. His last work, Critique of dialectical reason/
it is true, to judge by its title and appearance, looks traditional.
But Sartre in fact professes here his new 'universal,' namely
Marxism. That is to say, he wants to present an (engaged) critique,
which no longer takes a retired, idealistic position (actually a
refuge-position), which at the same time rejects the positivistic
trend of dispersion into a multiplicity of 'facts' and 'events'
without real self-reflection, i.e., a critique which joins the central
movement of reality, i.e., of (history! This movement according
to Sartre is that of the 'rising class,' the labour-class, which
gradually has become (conscious' of its prominent position and
has re-flected itself in the dialectical doctrine of Karl Marx. The
.latter had already said that the point was, to change the world,
instead of endlessly 'interpreting' it, and to 'engage' philosophy in
this 'historical' endeavor. Because, as we have seen, 'freedotm'
ultimately means: making oneself free, Sartre thinks that this
'human reality,' this motor of all historical movement, is repre-
sented pre-eminently by the 'oppressed' labour-class, which has
to struggle for 'freedom.' It never can be satisfied with the
existing conditions and consolidate itself in a 'natural attitude,'
but it experiences, practically, its (dialectical' relation to its
present 'natural' existence, which relation urges itself imme-
diately upon the labourer in his (needs' (besoin), at the same
1 Cr;,1il/lHl tl« la rainOrl (Unirotiq'lto, vel. I, Thtlorio ,les ensembles pratiques,
p, 4/). IUIlO.
:\
time requires his (project' and thus constitutes the real historical
movement. In this movement class-consciousness increases grad-
ually, i.e., mostly in a revoZutionaTY way.
You see, Sartre's existentialistic categories are used now to
justify the dynamic progress of communism. At the same time
the factual powerlessness of phenomenological-existentialistic
'reason,' gravitating to the idea of 'freedom,' becomes evident.
Still Sartre wants to save this idea within the Marxist framework.
The 'historical' dialectics as such can be neglected in favour of a
new tyrannical dogmatism, which theoretically works with the
primacy of 'matter' and admits 'consciousness' only as a 'super-
structure,' based on the primary substructure of 'matter.' The
Stalinistic period was a very striking example of this. Therefore,
a critique of dialectical reason' is needed. This critique, however
can only be accomplished by dialectical reason itself. This dia-
lectical reason first of all has to take seriously the historical,
'temporal' character of dialectical existence. This is to say,
within the primarily 'economical' engagement of the subject in
its 'material' world, this subject, on account of its self-conscious-
ness is at the same time already beyond its present condition.
Within this engagement, which also Implies an increasing engage-
ment in 'groups' and other 'communities,' although starting from
the individuals as such, subjective consciousness holds itself free
for itself in its being-beyond-itself. As such this 'historical' con-
sciousness, however, to use Sartre's own words, is nothing more
than an 'ephemeral' subjectivity. In this manner the existentialist
subjectivity, which in its radical 'autonomy' had fallen into
'nothingness,' is now wholly absorbed into a dialectical historical
'process' in Marxist fashion, with the only reserve that it retains
its inner, in reality ineffective, consciousness- (of) -freedom.
On the other side, however, 'consciousness,' i.e. dialectical
(reason' as such continues to be itself, i.e., in spite of all 'histori-
city,' it remains umioersal. For this conscious reason remains,
in the final analysis, that which 'jYUts ioruxmi this 'critique of
dialectical reason,' that behind which the philosopher himself,
who within his philosophy presents himself as one of the 'ephemeral
subjectivities,' remains concealed in a definitely uncritical
that which he SImply lets speak. Here the insuperable religiOUS
dialectics of the humanistic qrousui-motive appears once more.
The historical development of this ground-met ivc, however, now,
after the last, violent, but at tho same 1lmo powl'l'lc'HH1'('vo11of the
autonomy-polo, hnA nrrlvrxl n1 11 phllHl', WhC'I'I'III, wlt h J h'jcl('g1!f'I'
as well as with Sartre, though in divergent directions, the factual
inner capitulation of humanistic philosophical self-reflection,
polarized of old to the idea of 'autonomy,' has become clear.
Perspectives
What can still be expected of this developement? It is not
easy to speak positively about this point. At any rate, as may
appear already from our brief discussion, we are faced with a
drastic transition in the history of philosophy, which of course
is connected with the present intensity of history in general. We
may presume in the European area a rapidly increasing decay
of real philosophy, i.e., of serious critical self-reflection, a growing
rapprochement to a practical pragmatism with philosophy in the
secondary position of a 'supporter' and, at times, of a weak 'brake.'
We may presume, on the other hand, an attempt at a final
refuge of Western, autonomously 'reflecting' man into a certain
mytho-logy, more or less new, at any rate 'esoteric' and lacking
any power of historical formation. This is the only 'beyond' I am
able to point out, when I take up again the questioning title of
this lecture and try to answer it.
We may presume. We shall have to wait. But this waiting
cannot be passive. If anything has became clear in the present
confused situation, it is this that the question of the true, tenable,
universal and responsible, engagement is now most urgent for
us all. The primordial decision concerning this vital question
is also decisive as far as the fulfilment of our philosophical and
scientific vocation is concerned, as an integrant part of our total
life-vocation. First of all we have to learn again and again that
philosophy is a modest occupation, that our whole life has to be
evangelization, always and everywhere. Philosophy has to be sub-
servient to this 'authentic' life, which, however, can use all avail-
able really philosophical and scientific means. In this full en-
gament, which coincides with our real liberaiurn, also philosophy
can unfold its true meaning, namely in a direction which always
points (beyond,' towards the only full unity of life, Jesus Christ,
who is coming - now.
way,