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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2005-10-11 2010-12-13 Embassy
05CAIRO7782 CONFIDENTIAL
10:10 21:09 Cairo
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 007782
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015

TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG
SUBJECT: PDAS LIZ CHENEY'S SEPTEMBER 28 MEETING
WITH GAMAL
MUBARAK
Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
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Summary
-------
¶1. (C) In a September 28 meeting with PDAS Elizabeth

Cheney, Gamal Mubarak, head of the NDP Policies Committee,
reviewed his father's presidential election campaign, which
he argued had been a major success. He also reviewed the
ruling party's preparations for the upcoming parliamentary
elections. PDAS Cheney reminded Gamal of the paramount
importance that the USG places on international monitoring
and urged him to use his influence to encourage the GOE/NDP
to undertake other concrete improvements in the electoral
process. Significant improvements in the parliamentary
elections, the PDAS noted, would be crucial to continuing
Egypt's democratic reform progress. End summary.
--------------------------------------------- ----
The NDP's Campaign Architect Reviews His Creation
--------------------------------------------- ----
¶2. (C) PDAS Cheney, joined by DAS Carpenter, Charge, and

poloff (notetaker) met with Gamal Mubarak on September 28 to
4
discuss Egypt's political reform progress. Gamal opened the
meeting with questions about Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
PDAS Cheney updated Gamal on cleanup and recovery efforts and
thanked him for GOE relief supplies. The Charge noted that
Washington had been gratified by the speed of the GOE airlift
to supply water, blankets, and other items.
¶3. (C) Turning to the September 7 presidential election,

Gamal noted that he and his NDP colleagues had been working
on the campaign since the end of June, when President Mubarak
had indicated that "he wanted a proper campaign team." Gamal
said the team, which included Ahmad Ezz and Mohammad Kamal,
used focus groups and polling to fine tune the President's
message. After the campaign team devised a "credible
program," which the NDP "simplified" to address focus group
concerns, the party used the campaign period (August
17-September 3) to reach out to voters.
¶4. (C) Gamal noted that his father had directed the party
to "run a positive campaign," and to respond only to attacks
that misrepresented policy. Gamal attributed the NDP's
success to a packed schedule of campaign events (nearly one
major event per day) along with DVC outreach to provincial
party leaders, and personal letters from the President to
each of the party's 7000 "basic unit leaders" (i.e., precinct
bosses). According to Gamal, the precinct bosses were
"absolutely crucial" and the "backbone" of an effort to "fire
up" youthful NDP voters. In response to a question by the
PDAS, Gamal said that his father had much enjoyed the
"intensity" of the campaign as well as his engagement with
party activists. Gamal said that the final event of the
campaign, the closing rally at Abdeen Palace in Cairo, had
been a "big success," since it linked the President to key
episodes in Egyptian historical memory.
¶5. (C) The PDAS noted the USG's continuing encouragement of

the GOE to invite international observers, and pressed Gamal
to identify areas that he though could be improved in future
elections. Gamal described Egypt's outdated and incoherent
voter lists as "not a huge issue," but noted that cleaning
them up would be a long-term project. He blamed the low
turnout of the presidential election (about 7 million voters
or 23 percent) on overzealous judges supervising the
5
September 7 ballot who had, allegedly, refused to allow more
than one voter at a time into polling stations, and thereby
diminished turnout. "We were aiming for at least nine
million voters, but many people went home without voting
because of the queues," Gamal said.
¶6. (C) Gamal termed the controversy over domestic observers

on election day as "a huge mess," and noted that the party
had tried to play a constructive role on this issue, behind
the scenes, despite the obstructionism of the Presidential
Election Commission and some of the judges. The PDAS
reiterated the USG's views on international monitors and
urged him to use his influence in support of both
international and domestic monitors.
-------------------------------------
Plans for the Parliamentary Elections
-------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Turning to the parliamentary elections, which will

be held in three stages beginning on November 8, Gamal said
that a central difference with the presidential campaign
would be that campaigning for the 444 parliamentary races
"would be the party's effort, not the President's." The
President plans to campaign on behalf of some candidates,
however and the Party plans to use the same Heliopolis
campaign headquarters and core team, although this team will
be "adjusted for the battle."
¶8. (C) The PDAS asked how the party plans to select its
candidates. Gamal noted that the party's selection process
hadn't worked in the past, since it permitted candidates with
deep pockets to win the party endorsement even if they were
not able to win at the polls. (Note: In the 2000 elections,
official NDP candidates won less than 40 percent of the
seats. Most winners were so-called "NDP independents" who
had not managed to secure the party's endorsement but
nevertheless prevailed at the poll and eventually rejoined
the party, thereby giving the NDP its lock on Parliament.
End note.)
¶9. (C) Gamal provided an overview of the new process. He

said that the party would hold "primaries" during the first
6
week of October, which would assemble precinct bosses and
other grass roots leaders to bet potential candidates. Gamal
said that in addition to this popularity contest, the party
would use polling, analysis of the voting in the presidential
election, and a "software" analysis to create a single
consolidated party slate of candidates.
-------------------------------------------
But How Will They Be Better than Last Time?
-------------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Gamal said that the parliamentary elections would

be "both messier and easier" than the presidential election.
The PDAS pressed Gamal to suggest steps that the GOE could
take in the next few weeks to demonstrate its commitment to
political reform. In response to the PDAS's inquiry about
the GOE utilizing transparent ballot boxes in place of the
existing wooden boxes, Gamal described them as "cosmetic."
For Egypt, he said, the key is judicial supervision. Gamal
also dismissed alleged problems with indelible ink, multiple
voting, and voting by unregistered citizens. All of these
allegations, he said, were "unfounded."
¶11. (C) More important, he argued had been the information

deficit. Voters had sometimes not known which polling
stations to report to, and the lists of registered voters had
not been widely available ahead of time. Improving the
available information about the polling station locations and
access was Gamal's highest priority. "If I was in charge,"
he said, "this is what I'd do."
¶12. (C) The PDAS ask Gamal about the period after the
parliamentary election. He replied that Egypt's unregistered
voters were now excited about politics and enthusiastic to
register to vote in future elections, when the registration
period opens in late 2005. The PDAS asked if any opposition
party would get the five percent of the parliamentary seats
need to field a future presidential candidate. Gamal
shrugged and replied that this would depend on the opposition
parties' organization and discipline. Might the GOE revise
Article 76 again, the PDAS asked, if an opposition party
failed to get the required five percent? Gamal replied that
talk of additional modification of Article 76 was premature:
7
"the ink is not yet dry," he said.
¶13. (C) He also argued that the special candidacy rules in

2005, to encourage multiple presidential candidates, could
not be extended in future elections. The somewhat less
restrictive rules for 2005 had been necessary, he said, as an
incentive to the parties to "get their acts together." In
the long term, however, encouragement of fringe candidates
who do not have significant parliamentary representation
would be a recipe for "chaos."
¶14. (C) The PDAS sought Gamal's views on rumors that the
President plans to appoint a vice president. Gamal professed
ignorance on the subject. Should the President appoint a VP,
the PDAS asked. Gamal paused for a moment then said some
people argue the President should name a Vice President,
while others say that the new amendment to the Constitution
makes a vice president unnecessary. Gamal said, "I listen to
both arguments."
--------------
A Man in Full?
--------------
¶15. (C) At Gamal's invitation, the PDAS and DAS later

attended the gala reception on September 29 hosted by the NDP
for the diplomatic corps on the occasion of the party's
annual conference. Members of the diplomatic corps,
including the Iranian Ambassador, gathered around Gamal vying
for his attention and the opportunity to shake his hand.
Party old-guard figures Kemal al-Shazli and Safwat Sherif
stood together off to the side while Gamal was clearly the
center of the show. Minister of Tourism, Ahmed Maghrabi,
told the PDAS that members of the new guard received loud and
prolonged applause whenever they took the podium at the party
congress. The reception for old guard figures, by contrast,
was muted and polite. Judging from this, Maghrabi said, "I
don,t think the old guard will be with us much longer."
¶16. (U) PDAS Cheney cleared this message.
RICCIARDONE
8
2006-04-03 2010-12-13 Embassy
10:10 21:09 Cairo
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016

TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT: ACTIONS LOUDER THAN WORDS -
GAMAL MUBARAK
AND THE PRESIDENCY
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Summary
-------
¶1. (C) The public profile of Gamal Mubarak, presidential son

and rising star in the ruling party, has increased in recent
months. His appearance in late March on an evening talk show
and a highly publicized visit to a Cairo slum have fueled
speculation that an effort to succeed his father is moving
full speed ahead. The possibility that Gamal might succeed
9
his father remains deeply unpopular on the street - a
sentiment often echoed by commentators in the independent and
opposition press. Gamal has denied that he harbors
presidential ambitions, but many believe his actions speak
louder than his words. The intra-family politics of a Gamal
succession bid are unclear. Conventional wisdom holds that
Suzanne Mubarak is her younger son's most ardent booster.
Gamal's chances are improved by the fact that there are no
other obvious contenders for the presidency waiting in the
wings. End summary.
-------------
Burning Issue
-------------
¶2. (C) The issue of presidential succession is the hottest

single issue on Egypt's domestic political scene. Unlike his
predecessors, President Mubarak has never named a Vice
President. Mubarak, who began his fifth six year term in
September 2005, will turn 78 in May. Though he is vigorous
and healthy, there is general recognition that the actuarial
tables will catch up with Mubarak sooner or later.
Speculation that Mubarak was grooming his son Gamal to
succeed him increased markedly in 2002, when the younger
Mubarak assumed a prominent leadership post in the ruling
National Democratic Party (NDP), just two years after Bashar
al-Asad succeeded his father in Syria.
-------------
Stage Setting
-------------
¶3. (C) Both Gamal and his father have repeatedly denied that
there is any plan for a "succession scenario." More
important than such words, many Egyptians tell us, are the
actions of Gamal, his father, and others, which appear to be
setting the stage for the young Mubarak's rise to power. In
the summer of 2004 and again at the end of 2005, the
President shuffled his cabinet, replacing "old guard" figures
with younger, ambitious technocrats, most with direct or
indirect links to Gamal. In early 2006, a shake-up in the
ruling NDP promoted Gamal to the post of Assistant
Secretary-General (co-equal with Zakaria Azmy, the
10
SIPDIS
President's de-facto Chief of Staff, and old-guard cabinet
veteran Mufeed Shehab). The party shuffle also brought a
number of other Gamal allies into key party leadership
positions, replacing a number of old-guard rival kingmakers,
including the notorious machine politician Kamal al-Shazly.
-------------
Settling Down
-------------
¶4. (C) Gamal's February engagement to the 24 year old

socialite Khadiga el-Gammal is widely viewed as another step
on the path to the presidency. In a society where men
typically marry before their 30th birthday, Gamal's
bachelorhood has extended into his 40's. Thus Gamal's
engagement, cynics tell us, was engineered to broaden his
appeal.
---------------------------
"Not for Any Other Purpose"
---------------------------
¶5. (C) On March 28, Gamal paid a visit, camera crews in tow,
to the slums of Agouza al-Qadima in Giza, just west of
Central Cairo. Gamal was there, with Housing Minister (and
ally) Ahmed al-Maghraby, to cut the ribbon on new low income
housing units prepared by his Future Generation Foundation, a
development group he founded in 1999, aimed at addressing the
needs of poor youth. Most political observers regard the
foundation as a vehicle primarly intended for Gamal's public
entree onto the political stage. "We came to help and serve
only - not for any other purpose," Gamal told accompanying
journalists in Agouza.
¶6. (C) Later that evening, Gamal made a rare appearance on a

talk show on State Channel 1, promoted all day in advance of
the broadcast and re-aired on March 29. Gamal focused his
remarks on his work to rejuvenate the NDP and promote reform
and "new thinking." He denied that he was out of touch with
the public, asserting that "one enjoys...going down into the
11
street and listening to the people." He also asserted that
he regularly visits the provinces, but usually keeps a low
profile lest people ascribe ulterior motives. We have
noticed an uptick of recent Gamal forays outside of Cairo.
He stood in for his father, grounded in Cairo by a dust
storm, at the ribbon cutting for an international air show in
Sharm el Sheikh. Given all the attention, he could have
easily been mistaken as the head of state himself.
--------------
Stone Throwers
--------------
¶7. (C) On his alleged presidential ambitions, Gamal told

Egyptian talk show viewers on March 28 that he had "made
clear as daylight" that he did not intend to seek the
presidency and was instead focused on his current efforts to
promote reform and serve society. These denials have been
generally disregarded. "He is repackaging himself - if he is
not interested, why is he going to all this trouble?"
prominent liberal dissident Saad Eddin Ibrahim recently mused
to a western journalist. Former Nasser advisor and
influential writer Mohamed Hassanein Heikal has made
opposition to Gamal's succession a staple of his regular
newspaper columns in the independent press. The notion that
Gamal might succeed his father, Heikal has written, is an
affront to Egypt's republican principles.
¶8. (C) Abdel Halim Qandil, editor of the Nasserist weekly

Al-Araby (and a co-founder of the Kifaya protest movement),
was a pioneer of the anti-Gamal movement, authoring in 2003 a
series of scathing editorials against the alleged plot to
install Gamal and underlining the public's "universal
rejection" of the notion. These editorials, many believe,
were linked to Qandil's brief 2004 abduction and beating by
still unidentified thugs, who left him bruised and naked on
the Suez desert highway.
¶9. (C) Very publicly resigning from the NDP in early March,
leading liberal thinker Osama el-Ghazaly Harb told us of his
disillusionment with the party's reform process, which he
came to believe was merely a vehicle for Gamal to promote his
political career. Imprisoned opposition politician Ayman
12
Nour and his supporters have repeatedly insisted to us that
it was his threat to Gamal that led to his political
destruction. Like Gamal, Nour is 42 years old.
¶10. (C) An article that appeared March 23 in the maverick

independent paper Al-Dustour attacked Gamal from a new angle.
With dubious sourcing, the paper alleged that the Egyptian
brokerage and financial analysis firm EFG-Hermes had
manipulated the early March drop of the Cairo-Alexandria
Stock Exchange to the advantage of its partners and clients
and at the expense of small investors, adding that Gamal
Mubarak is on the firm's board. The article clearly got
Gamal's attention: He acknowledged in his talk show
appearance that he sat on EFG's board, but insisted that his
work focused on subsidiary companies not traded on the stock
market.
-------------
An Open Field
-------------
¶11. (C) Despite the sniping of many Egyptian opinion-leaders,

and a more general public hostility (echoed by many of our
contacts) to Gamal's possible presidential succession, there
are few other obvious contenders for the post. The post of
Vice President has remained vacant, despite earlier
speculation that Mubarak might fill it after the 2005
elections were behind him. Of the 10 candidates who
contested Mubarak's presidency last fall, Ayman Nour, who
placed second, lost his parliamentary seat under very
controversial circumstances and was subsequently convicted of
forgery and sentenced to a seven year jail term. The
third-place finisher, Wafd Party candidate No'man Gomaa, was
arrested for attempted murder and other charges on April 1
(septel). The other eight candidates, marginal figures to
begin with, have faded back into nearly total obscurity.
¶12. (C) There are currently almost no other Egyptian

personalities with the national stature and political capital
needed to seriously contend for the presidency. One
exception could be Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman, who
wields enormous influence over national security policy and
is known to have the full confidence of Mubarak. Soliman is
13
often cited as a potential appointee to the long-vacant Vice
Presidential post and his profile has grown with his
well-publicized mediation visits to Israel and the
Palestinian territories.
¶13. (C) Another possible exception could be Arab League

Secretary-General Amr Moussa, who has a high public profile
SIPDIS
and generally receives favorable coverage across the spectrum
of Egyptian media outlets. Consequently, he enjoys
considerable street crediblity as a champion of Arab causes.
However, Moussa has never expressed or even hinted at any
presidential ambitions and has no Egyptian institutional
platform from which to spring. Moussa's assumption of
another five year term as Arab League SYG could be
alternately interpreted as keeping him "otherwise occupied"
or "still in the game," with respect to future political
positions, but he has never offered any hint that he intends
to wade into Egypt's domestic political scene.
-----------------
All in the Family
-----------------
¶14. (C) The intra-family politics of a Gamal succession bid

are unclear. Elder son Alaa', well-known to have extensive
business interests (many of which are privately criticized as
corrupt and exploitative) keeps a low public profile and has
never shown any inclination to wade into the political arena.
(A rare sighting of Alaa' on national TV took place during
the final game of the Africa Cup championship in late
February, when he was photographed in the stadium's VIP
section with Gamal, cheering on Egypt to its 2-1 victory over
Ivory Coast.)
¶15. (C) The President has been careful not to indicate any
overt support for Gamal, is rarely photographed with him, and
has on several occasions angrily denied to the media that
there is any plan for his younger son to succeed him. While
some have speculated that the President is ambivalent about
Gamal's political future, he has not stood in the way of the
rise of his son and his allies through the ranks of the
14
ruling NDP, or obstructed his increased public profile.
Moreover, the President has twice in the past two years
shuffled his cabinet and replaced "old guard" elements with
younger technocrats linked to Gamal. While there is little
public evidence, commonly accepted wisdom in Cairo is that
First Lady Suzanne Mubarak is Gamal's most ardent political
patron. Unlike the President, the First Lady is often
photographed at public events with Gamal, frequently in
connection with social issues. Her power and influence, many
argue, are keys to Gamal's viability. Sources tell us that
she has kept Mubarak pere from naming a Vice President.
---------------------
Legal Framework Wired
---------------------
¶16. (C) The legal/electoral stage, rearranged in 2005 with

the amendment of Article 76 of the constitution, currently
guarantees that the ruling NDP, increasingly dominated by
Gamal and his allies, will retain their lock on the
presidency. Of all 20 of Egypt's legally recognized parties,
only the NDP currently meets the conditions as defined in the
amendment to field a presidential candidate. (The rules set
forth in the amendment state that only parties holding five
percent or more of the seats in each of the People's Assembly
and the Shura Council. The bar is set higher for
independents, who must obtain endorsements from 65 PA
members, 25 Shura Council members, and 10 local council
members from each of at least 14 of the 26 provinces.) While
voters will have opportunities to change the current makeup
of the Shura Council in 2007 and 2009, and the People's
Assembly in 2010, should a presidential transition become
necessary sooner, there would be no legal or procedural
hurdles for any NDP candidate to the presidency.
---------------------------
A Military Stumbling Block?
---------------------------
¶17. (C) A key stumbling block for any effort to bring Gamal
Mubarak to the presidency could be the military. Each of
Egypt's three presidents since the republic was established
in 1952 were drawn from the military's officer corps, and the
15
military has historically been the ultimate guarantor of the
president's rule. Gamal Mubarak did not serve as a military
officer (and it is not clear whether he ever completed, even
"on paper," his national military service) and unlike his
father, can not take the military's support for granted.
This factor is often cited by our contacts, who believe that
Soliman, the intelligence chief with a military background,
would have to figure in any succession scenario for Gamal, if
only as a transitional figure. Another theory is that some
other military officer could emerge from obscurity as a
presidential contender. (Defense Minister Tantawi is
acknowledged to be frail and without any political ambition.)
-------
Comment
-------
¶18. (C) Gamal Mubarak's rise in the ruling NDP, his attempts
to position himself as a "friend of the people," and as the
national champion of reform and "new thinking," are all
compelling evidence that his political ambitions are real -
denials notwithstanding. Despite palpable public hostility
to his succession, and potential stumbling blocks, the way
forward for Gamal currently appears open. Gamal and his
ambitious allies, such as MP and NDP figure Ahmed Ezz and
economic reform ministers such as Rachid Rachid and Youssef
Boutrous Ghali, are apparently banking that structural
improvements to the economy will deliver tangible benefits to
the masses, and build a support base that extends beyond
affluent business circles.
RICCIARDONE
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2007-05-14 2010-12-13 Embassy
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TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT
REF: A. CAIRO 671

¶B. CAIRO 974
¶C. 2006 CAIRO 2010
CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE,

FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENTIAL

SUCCESSION IS THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM OF
EGYPTIAN POLITICS. DESPITE INCESSANT WHISPERED
DISCUSSIONS, NO ONE IN EGYPT HAS ANY CERTAINTY
ABOUT WHO WILL SUCCEED MUBARAK, OR HOW THE
SUCCESSION WILL HAPPEN. MUBARAK HIMSELF SEEMS
TO BE TRUSTING TO GOD AND THE INERTIA OF THE
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SECURITY SERVICES TO ENSURE
17
AN ORDERLY TRANSITION. IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL
FRAMEWORK, THE MOST LIKELY CONTENDERS ARE
PRESIDENTIAL SON GAMAL MUBARAK (WHOSE PROFILE
IS EVER-INCREASING AT THE RULING NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC PARTY), EGIS CHIEF OMAR SOLIMAN, DARK
HORSE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL AMRE
MOUSSA, OR AN AS-YET UNKNOWN MILITARY OFFICER.
WHOEVER ENDS UP AS EGYPT'S NEXT PRESIDENT LIKELY
WILL BE POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK. ONCE
MUBARAK'S SUCCESSOR HAS ASSUMED THE POST, HIS
FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT.
WE THUS EXPECT THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL
LIKELY ADOPT AN ANTI-AMERICAN TONE IN HIS INITIAL
PUBLIC RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS
NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO THE EGYPTIAN STREET,
AND MAY POSSIBLY EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH TO THE
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID PREVIOUS EGYPTIAN
PRESIDENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS. END
SUMMARY.
------------------------------
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESSION
------------------------------
¶2. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS FOND OF OBSERVING

THAT NO ONE SHOULD HAVE ANY QUALMS REGARDING
HIS SUCCESSION, SINCE EGYPT'S CONSTITUTION
PROVIDES A DETAILED GUIDE FOR HOW A SUCCESSION
SHOULD PROCEED. AMONG THE RECENT ONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS WAS A NOTABLE CHANGE TO THE ARTICLE
DETERMINING WHICH OFFICIAL ASSUMES POWER IN THE
EVENT OF THE TEMPORARY INCAPACITATION OF THE
PRESIDENT. ARTICLE 82, WHICH PREVIOUSLY
DELINEATED THAT THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHOULD
ASSUME PRESIDENTIAL POWERS "IF ON ACCOUNT OF ANY
TEMPORARY OBSTACLE THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO
CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES," HAS BEEN AMENDED SO THAT, IF
THERE IS NO VICE-PRESIDENT, THE PRIME MINISTER IS
ASSIGNED PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. ARTICLE 84 READS,
"IN CASE OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
OFFICE OR THE PERMANENT DISABILITY OF THE
PRESIDENT," THE PRESIDENT OF THE PEOPLE'S
ASSEMBLY (PA) OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME
18
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT SHOULD TEMPORARILY
ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY. NEITHER WOULD
SUBSEQUENTLY BE ALLOWED TO NOMINATE HIMSELF
FOR THE PRESIDENCY; THERE IS NO SUCH STIPULATION
AGAINST THE PM RUNNING FOR THE OFFICE. ARTICLE
84 GOES ON TO STIPULATE THAT, "THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC SHALL BE CHOSEN WITHIN A MAXIMUM
PERIOD OF 60 DAYS FROM THE DAY OF THE VACANCY OF
THE PRESIDENCY."
¶3. (C) CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 76, WHICH PREVIOUSLY

WIRED THE EGYPTIAN ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK TO
GUARANTEE THE PRESIDENCY TO THE RULING NATIONAL
DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP), WAS ALSO AMONG THE
ARTICLES AMENDED IN APRIL (REF A). THE CHANGE WILL
OSTENSIBLY FACILITATE MORE COMPETITIVE
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, WHILE STILL PROTECTING
AGAINST ANY SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE NDP
CANDIDATE. UNDER THE REVISIONS TO ARTICLE 76, FOR
AN INTERIM 10-YEAR PERIOD (I.E. UNTIL 2017),
LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH HOLD AN ELECTED
SEAT IN THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OR SHURA COUNCIL
CAN NOMINATE A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
(CURRENTLY, ONLY FOUR PARTIES MEET THIS
REQUIREMENT - THE NDP, AL GHAD, AL WAFD, AND
TAGGAMU). FOLLOWING THE INTERIM PERIOD, IN ORDER
TO RUN A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE:
-- A PARTY HAS TO HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR AT

LEAST 5 YEARS
PRIOR TO THE ELECTION;
-- ITS CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE

HIGHEST
LEADERSHIP BODY OF THE PARTY FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR;
AND,
-- THE PARTY WOULD HAVE TO HOLD AT LEAST 3% OF

THE SEATS IN BOTH PARLIAMENTARY HOUSES (I.E., 14
SEATS IN THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY, AND 6 SEATS IN THE
SHURA COUNCIL), OR 6% OF THE SEATS IN EITHER THE PA
OR SHURA COUNCIL).
19
¶4. (C) GENUINELY INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES FACE AN
ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE BAR TO ENTER THE RACE. TO
COMPETE IN THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION,
ARTICLE 76 STATES THAT AN "INDEPENDENT" MUST
OBTAIN ENDORSEMENTS FROM 250 ELECTED MEMBERS
OF EGYPT'S NATIONAL AND LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE
BODIES, OF WHICH THERE MUST BE A MINIMUM OF 65
ENDORSEMENTS FROM MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLES
ASSEMBLY, 25 FROM THE SHURA COUNCIL, AND 10 FROM
LOCAL COUNCILS IN AT LEAST 14 GOVERNORATES. THIS
WOULD BE A NEAR UNATTAINABLE FEAT FOR A NON-NDP
CANDIDATE TO ACHIEVE, GIVEN THE RULING PARTY'S
DOMINATION OF ALL EGYPTIAN ELECTED BODIES. IN
EFFECT, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 76 ACCOMPLISH
TWO OBJECTIVES REGARDING INDEPENDENTS: THE
RULING PARTY CAN BLOCK THE EMERGENCE OF ANY
GENUINELY "INDEPENDENT" CANDIDATE, WHILE IT
COULD THEORETICALLY REACH BEYOND THE
NDP'S TOP LEADERSHIP TO SELECT AN "INDEPENDENT"
WHOM THE RULING ELITE JUDGES WILL BEST PROTECT
THEIR INTERESTS, PROVIDED THE NDP RETAINS PARTY
DISCIPLINE.
--------------------
POTENTIAL CANDIDATES
--------------------
¶5. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WHO BEGAN HIS FIFTH 6-

YEAR TERM IN SEPTEMBER 2005, RECENTLY TURNED 79.
THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IS DUE TO BE HELD
IN 2011. BY THE TIME MUBARAK SERVES HIS FULL TERM,
THERE MAY BE OTHER CANDIDATES IN THE WINGS, OR
MUBARAK HIMSELF COULD CHOOSE TO RUN AGAIN FOR
THE PRESIDENCY. HE IS ON RECORD AS SAYING, IN A
NOVEMBER 2006 SPEECH, THAT HE PLANNED TO REMAIN
PRESIDENT "AS LONG AS I HAVE A HEART THAT BEATS,
AND BREATH IN MY BODY." BUT IF THE SUCCESSION
HAPPENED TOMORROW, EGYPTIAN PARLOR PECULATION
FOCUSES ON THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS.
GAMAL MUBARAK
-------------
20
¶6. (C) CAIRENE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT
GAMAL WANTS THE JOB, DESPITE HIS REPEATED DENIALS
TO THE CONTRARY (REF B). THE MOST RECENT SUCH
ABJURATION WAS ON MAY 2, DURING AN INTERVIEW
WITH THE ORBIT SATELLITE TV CHANNEL, WHEN GAMAL
STATED THAT, "I DO NOT HAVE THE INTENTION AND
AMBITION TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT ... WHATEVER THE
PARTY SAYS DOES NOT MATTER. I AM NOT LOOKING FOR
ANY EXECUTIVE POST." SUCH COY DEMURRALS
RING HOLLOW IN THE FACE OF HIS INCREASINGLY
ROBUST ROLE WITHIN THE NDP (FAR EXCEEDING THAT
OF HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE PARTY HIERARCHY), HIS
APPARENTLY CENTRAL ROLE IN CREATING NEW
LEGISLATION, AND HIS RECENT TOURS TO VARIOUS
GOVERNORATES FEATURING MINISTERIAL ENTOURAGES.
IT IS HARD TO ARGUE THAT GAMAL IS NOT BEING
GROOMED FOR THE PRESIDENCY.
¶7. (C) MANY IN THE EGYPTIAN ELITE SEE HIS SUCCESSION

AS POSITIVE, AS HIS LIKELY CONTINUATION OF THE
CURRENT STATUS QUO WOULD SERVE THEIR BUSINESS
AND POLITICAL INTERESTS. GIVEN THE LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDACY, AND WEAK OPPOSITION
LEADERSHIP, THERE ARE CURRENTLY FEW OTHER
EGYPTIAN PERSONALITIES WITH THE NATIONAL
STATURE AND POLITICAL CAPITAL TO SERIOUSLY
CONTEND FOR THE PRESIDENCY. LIKEWISE, DUE TO
THE PARANOIA OF THE EGYPTIAN DICTATORSHIP, NO
OTHER NAME CAN SAFELY OR RESPECTFULLY BE
BRUITED AS A CONTENDER. WHILE THE PRESIDENT'S SON
IS VULNERABLE TO OPEN CRITICISM FOR HIS
PRESUMED AMBITION, HE IS THE ONLY PERSON IN EGYPT
WHOSE TOTAL LOYALTY TO MUBARAK IS ALSO TAKEN
FOR GRANTED, SO HIS IS THE ONLY NAME THAT CAN
POSSIBLY BE BANDIED ABOUT.
¶8. (C) A KEY STUMBLING BLOCK FOR A GAMAL ANDIDACY

COULD BE THE MILITARY. EACH OF EGYPT'S FOUR
PRESIDENTS SINCE 1952 AROSE FROM THE OFFICER
CORPS, AND THE MILITARY HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN THE
ULTIMATE GUARANTOR OF THE PRESIDENT'S RULE.
GAMAL DID NOT SERVE AS A MILITARY OFFICER, AND WE
21
BELIEVE HE DID NOT COMPLETE HIS COMPULSORY
SERVICE. MANY OBSERVERS OPINE THAT TIMING IS THE
CRUCIAL FACTOR FOR A POTENTIAL GAMAL PRESIDENCY
- HIS POWER BASE IS HIS FATHER, AND SO WHILE HE
COULD CONCEIVABLY BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO
MUBARAK'S DEATH, THE TASK WOULD BECOME FAR
MORE DIFFICULT, ALTHOUGH NOT INSURMOUNTABLE,
ONCE THE PHARAOH HAS DEPARTED THE SCENE, AND
PERSONAL LOYALTIES TO HIM ARE IN THE PAST.
ALTHOUGH THERE IS WIDESPREAD POPULAR ANIMUS
AGAINST A GAMAL CANDIDACY, WITH MANY EGYPTIANS
OPINING PROUDLY THAT, "WE ARE NOT SYRIA OR
SAUDI!", THE NDP MACHINERY COULD LIKELY STAGE AN
ELECTORAL VICTORY, BASED ON POOR VOTER TURNOUT,
SLOPPY VOTER LISTS, AND STATE CONTROL OF THE
ELECTION APPARATUS.
OMAR SOLIMAN
-------------
¶9. (C) EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND MUBARAK

CONSIGLIERE, IN PAST YEARS SOLIMAN WAS OFTEN
CITED AS LIKELY TO BE NAMED TO THE LONG-VACANT
VICE-PRESIDENTIAL POST. IN THE PAST TWO
YEARS, SOLIMAN HAS STEPPED OUT OF THE SHADOWS,
AND ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED, AND HIS
MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN LEADERS REPORTED. MANY OF
OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT SOLIMAN, BECAUSE OF
HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND, WOULD AT THE LEAST
HAVE TO FIGURE IN ANY SUCCESSION SCENARIO FOR
GAMAL, POSSIBLY AS A TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. SOLIMAN
HIMSELF ADAMANTLY DENIES ANY PERSONAL
AMBITIONS, BUT HIS INTEREST AND DEDICATION TO
NATIONAL SERVICE IS OBVIOUS. HIS LOYALTY TO
MUBARAK SEEMS ROCK-SOLID. AT AGE 71, HE COULD BE
ATTRACTIVE TO THE RULING APPARATUS AND THE
PUBLIC AT LARGE AS A RELIABLE FIGURE UNLIKELY TO
HARBOR AMBITIONS FOR ANOTHER MULTI-DECADE
PRESIDENCY. A KEY UNANSWERED QUESTION IS HOW HE
WOULD RESPOND TO A GAMAL PRESIDENCY ONCE
MUBARAK IS DEAD. AN ALLEGED PERSONAL FRIEND OF
SOLIMAN TELLS US THAT SOLIMAN
22
"DETESTS" THE IDEA OF GAMAL AS PRESIDENT, AND
THAT HE ALSO WAS "DEEPLY PERSONALLY HURT" BY
MUBARAK, WHO PROMISED TO NAME HIM VICE-
PRESIDENT SEVERAL YEARS AGO, BUT THEN RENEGED.
AMRE MOUSSA
-----------
¶10. (C) THE CHARISMATIC ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY

GENERAL PRUDENTLY HAS NEVER INDICATED INTENTION
OR AMBITION TO ENTER INTO EGYPTS DOMESTIC
POLITICAL FRAY, AND HAS NO EGYPTIAN INSTITUTIONAL
POLITICAL PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO SPRING.
HOWEVER, AS THE HIGH-PROFILE ELDER STATESMAN OF
ARAB CAUSES, HE ENJOYS CONSIDERABLE STREET
CREDIBILITY, POPULARITY, AND PERCEIVED GRAVITAS.
IT IS FAR-FETCHED BUT CONCEIVABLE THAT,
IN A LEADERSHIP CRISIS FOLLOWING MUBARAK'S DEATH,
MOUSSA COULD EMERGE AS A PRESIDENTIAL
CONTENDER, PROVIDED THAT HE IS AN NDP MEMBER, OR
IF THE NDP WERE TO PROMOTE HIM UNDER THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ALLOWED FOR
INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES.
MILITARY OFFICER
----------------
¶11. (C) CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO OBVIOUS CONTENDER

FROM AMONG THE OFFICER CORPS, EGYPT'S
TRADITIONAL PRESIDENTIAL RECRUITMENT GROUNDS.
MINISTER OF DEFENSE TANTAWI, A CONTEMPORARY OF
MUBARAK'S, APPEARS TO HARBOR NO POLITICAL
AMBITIONS. LIKE SOLIMAN, HE COULD PLAY A ROLE IN
CLEARING THE WAY FOR GAMAL, IF HE CALCULATES
THAT IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY;
CONVERSELY, HE COULD ALSO BE A KEY PLAYER IN
PREVENTING GAMALS ASCENDANCE. WE HAVE HEARD
SOME LIMITED REPORTS OF TANTAWIS INCREASING
FRUSTRATION AND DISENCHANTMENT WITH GAMAL (REF
B). IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL LEADERSHIP CRISIS, IT
IS NEAR INCONCEIVABLE THAT GIVEN MUBARAK'S
PERSONAL MANIPULATION OF THE OFFICE CORPS, THAT
23
ANOTHER MILITARY OFFICER COULD EMERGE FROM
OBSCURITY TO ASSERT HIMSELF AS A CANDIDATE. BUT
TANTAWI AND HIS SENIOR COTERIE ARE NOT
NECESSARILY POPULAR AT MID AND LOWER RANKS,
SO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MID-20TH CENTURY STYLE
COUP OF COLONELS CANNOT BE ENTIRELY DISCOUNTED.
OPPOSITION MEMBER
-----------------
¶12. (C) OF THE 10 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS IN 2005,

SECOND-PLACE AL GHAD PARTY LEADER AYMAN NOUR IS
CURRENTLY SERVING A SEVEN-YEAR JAIL TERM, AND
ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN LAW, WILL BE BANNED FROM
PARTICIPATING IN EGYPTIAN POLITICAL LIFE FOR
SEVERAL YEARS FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE. THE THIRD-
PLACE FINISHER, AL WAFD PARTY CANDIDATE NO'MAN
GOMAA, LOST HIS PARTY POSITION FOLLOWING A
VIOLENT AND SCANDAL-RIDDEN LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE.
THE OTHER EIGHT CANDIDATES, MARGINAL FIGURES TO
BEGIN WITH, HAVE FADED BACK INTO TOTAL OBSCURITY.
CURRENT AL WAFD LEADER MAHMOUD ABAZA IS A
TALENTED POLITICIAN, BUT AT THIS POINT, DOES NOT
APPEAR TO HAVE NATIONAL APPEAL OR
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY TO MOUNT A SERIOUS
ATTEMPT AT THE PRESIDENCY.
DARK HORSE AND ALSO RANS

------------------------
¶13. (C) POPULAR REFORMIST MINISTER OF TRADE

RACHID IS A POTENTIAL CANDIDATE, THOUGH A
DISTINCT DARK HORSE. NONETHELESS, HE COMES FROM
AN OLD AND RESPECTED FAMILY AND IS SEEN BY MANY
AS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR EGYPT'S IMPRESSIVE
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE PAST THREE YEARS.
INTERESTINGLY, THE HEAD OF CAIRO'S LARGE AND
INFLUENTIAL AMCHAM, WHO KNOWS RACHID WELL,
TOLD US THAT, AFTER NEGOTIATING THE
CONTROVERSIAL QIZ PROGRAM, THE MINISTER "REALLY
NEEDS MOVEMENT ON THE FTA FOR POLITICAL COVER,"
RAISING THE
24
QUESTION: POLITICAL COVER FOR WHAT? WHILE IT IS
HIGHLY UNLIKELY RACHID WOULD TAKE ON GAMAL
HEAD-TO-HEAD, WE CANNOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY
THAT HE WILLPLAY A ROLE IN A CARETAKER
GOVERNMENT, AND MAY EENTUALLY EMERGE AS A
LEADER.
¶14. (C) SAFWAT ELSHERIF (NDP SECRETARY GENERAL

AND SHURA COUNCIL PEAKER), MUFEED SHEHAB (NDP
ASSISTANT SYG, AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR LEGAL AND
PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, AND ZAKARIA AZMY (NDP
ASSISTANT SYG AND MUBARA'S DE FACTO CHIEF
OF STAFF) ALL, AS SENIOR LEADES OF THE NDP, MEET
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA T RUN FOR OFFICE.
NONE OF THESE GRIZZLED NDP VETERANS HAVE
PUBLICLY EXPRESSED PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRATONS, NOR
DO THEY APPEAR TO POSSESS ANY CAPABILITIE TO
GOVERN, NOR PERSONAL CONSTITUENCIES. HOWEVE,
WHILE UNLIKELY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, ONCE MUBAAK
PERE IS OUT OF THE PICTURE, ONE OF THEM COULD
EMERGE IN AN ANTI-GAMAL PARTY PUTSCH.
FURTHERMORE. MOST ANALYSTS HERE BELIEVE THAT
ANY GOVERNOR PUSHING FOR THE PRESIDENCY IS A FAR-
FETCHED POSSIBILITY - THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY
OF GOVERNORS ARE FORMER SENIOR MILITARY AND
POLICE OFFICERS CHOSEN FOR THEIR LOYALTY, FAR
FROM THE CRITICAL POLITICAL FRAY IN CAIRO, AND
WITH NO POWER BASES.
MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
------------------
¶15. (C) WHILE THE SPECTER OF AN MB PRESIDENCY

HAUNTS SECULAR EGYPTIANS, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IN
THE IMMEDIATE POST-MUBARAK PERIOD. UNDER THE
CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE MB HAS NO ABILITY
TO PUT FORWARD A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN
THE EVENT OF AN ELECTION. THE ORGANIZATION DOES
NOT APPEAR TO HAVE THE ORGANIZED MILITARY WING
NECESSARY SHOULD IT WISH TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE
PRESIDENCY BY FORCE. CONSTANT OVERSIGHT OF THE
ARMED FORCES AIMED AT ROOTING OUT POTENTIAL
25
ISLAMIST SYMPATHIZERS MEANS THAT FEW LIKELY
REMAIN, ALTHOUGH THE POSSIBILITY DOES EXIST THAT
SOME CLOSE-MOUTHED MB-LEANING OFFICERS ARE
PRESENT. OVERALL, IN THE VIEW OF MOST EGYPTIAN
ANALYSTS, THE GROUP'S APPROACH SEEMS TO BE ONE OF
PATIENCE AND GRASS ROOTS BUILDING OF SUPPORT,
WAITING FOR THE DAY WHEN IT MIGHT COME TO POWER
THROUGH POPULAR ELECTION, OR BY POPULAR DEMAND
AFTER A GAMAL PRESIDENCY HAS FOUNDERED.
------------------------
POST-SUCCESSION DYNAMICS
------------------------
¶16. (C) WHOEVER EGYPT'S NEXT PRESIDENT IS, HE WILL

INEVITABLY BE POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK,
AND ONCE HE HAS ASSUMED THE POST, AMONG HIS FIRST
PRIORITIES WILL BE TO CEMENT HIS POSITION AND
BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT. WE CAN THUS ANTICIPATE
THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT MAY SOUND AN INITIAL ANTI-
AMERICAN TONE IN HIS PUBLIC RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT
TO PROVE HIS NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO THE
EGYPTIAN STREET, AND DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM
MUBARAK'S POLICIES. IF HISTORY IS ANY GUIDE, WE
CAN ALSO EXPECT THE NEW PRESIDENT TO EXTEND AN
OLIVE BRANCH TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID
GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, ANWAR EL SADAT, AND MUBARAK
EARLY IN ALL OF THEIR TERMS, IN AN EFFORT TO CO-OPT
POTENTIAL OPPOSITION, AND BOOST POPULARITY.
RICCIARDONE
26
2007-08-29 2010-12-13 Embassy
14:02 21:09 Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHEG #2669 2411434

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 291434Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6703
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1540
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0862
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2012

TAGS: PREL EAID EG
SUBJECT: GAMAL MUBARAK ADVISOR DISCUSSES EGYPT'S
ASSISTANCE
PACKAGE
Classified By: Minister Counselor for Economic and Political

Affairs William R. Stewart for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Mohamed Farnawany, senior advisor to Gamal Mubarak,

told poloff on August 27 that the GOE is not happy that the
USG never responded to the ESF proposal to create an
endowment. Poloff reminded Farnawany that the U.S. did
respond, explaining the difficulties with the concept.
27
Farnawany said that Egypt nonetheless feels that the U.S. is
making assistance decisions unilaterally, without substantive
engagement with GOE officials, and said Egypt would like to
discuss the direction of both ESF and FMF. When poloff noted
that the proposed ten-year FMF package was exactly what Egypt
requested, Farnawany said MoD concern stems from the decision
to increase Israel's FMF, thereby moving away from the 3:2
assistance ratio that previously existed. He noted that the
"MoD Generals" used to be the USG's "staunchest allies," but
now "things are different." He said he believes the MoD
officials want more engagement with U.S. DoD counterparts.
¶2. (C) Poloff told Farnawany that the current focus on

Egypt's counter-smuggling efforts will likely continue. The
advisor said that Egypt needs a new approach with the Hill --
a point he said he had raised recently with Ambassador Fahmy.
He thought that MoD's receptivity to U.S. proposals on
enhancing border security (particularly technical support and
training) may be linked to the degree to which MOD perceives
that the administration is vigorously defending FMF.
RICCIARDONE
28
2007-09-23 2010-12-13 Embassy
16:04 21:09 Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0000
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DE RUEHEG #2871/01 2661601

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231601Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/ELA; NSC FOR RWATERS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2017

TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT IN TRANSITION: SADAT AND MUBARAK
REF: A. CAIRO 2839

¶B. CAIRO 2825
Classified By: ECPO Minister Counselor William R. Stewart

for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Egypt faces uncertainty as it moves towards a

post-Mubarak future. It has been almost exactly twenty-six
years since Egypt last faced such a transition. Although one
could argue that some of the elements that led to the
dramatic events of September and October 1981 are back in
29
place -- shortages of basic foodstuffs, external political
pressures, and crackdowns on political adversaries --
tensions now are different, and not on the same scale. While
we should not place too much weight in analogy, it can
nevertheless be instructive to review the events of September
and October 1981 to see what useful comparisons can be made.
End summary.
---------------
Rumors Run Amok
---------------
¶2. (C) This September, as in past late summers, salon talk

and front page headlines have focused on that most sensitive
of topics: the health of the president and the eventual
transfer of power. Talk has been so pervasive, Prime
Minister Nazif felt obliged to announce that "there is a
system for the smooth transfer of power." Rumors of
President Mubarak's deteriorating health -- and even his
demise -- have been so insistent, even Suzanne Mubarak felt
the need to publicly assert that he is alive and well.
¶3. (C) At least half a dozen editorials have compared the

tensions and rumors of this September to September 1981.
Although the majority of Egyptians are too young to recall
personally those momentous times, the lore of it remains deep
in the national consciousness. Even young Egyptians recall
hearing of the great "round up" of September 3, 1981 when
Sadat seemed to "go crazy" as one commentator recalled,
arresting and imprisoning opponents and critics of every
stripe. Communists, Nasserists, Muslim Brothers, academics,
and liberal-minded journalists found themselves cell-mates
that late summer day. Even Coptic Pope Shenouda was placed
under house arrest. Although Mubarak has hardly gone so far,
some observers have argued that his feuds with Ayman Nour,
Anwar Esmat El-Sadat (the late president's nephew), Saad
Eddin Ibrahim, independent editors, and other perceived
opponents, combined with his sweeping roundup of the Muslim
Brotherhood -- arguably his only real political threat -- is
reminiscent of 1981, and they fear it could lead to similar
consequences.
-------------------
30
Mubarak Is No Sadat
-------------------
¶4. (C) According to some of Egypt's most astute political

observers, this is over-analyzing the situation and drawing
very wrong -- and dangerous - comparisons. Mohammed
El-Bassiouni, chairman of the Majlis al-Shura's National
Security Committee (which also has responsibility for Foreign
Affairs and Arab Affairs), believes that the two Septembers
have very little in common. El-Bassiouni recently told
MinCouns that in 1981, when he was Egypt's military attach
in Tel Aviv, President Sadat was under extreme pressure for
not providing the "peace dividend" he had promised would be
the result of his bold move towards Israel, and his deepening
friendship the United States. When prosperity for all did
not appear, Sadat felt under enormous pressure. Combined
with Egypt's isolation in the Arab world, it seemed that his
gamble had failed. In his pride, he lashed out at perceived
opponents.
--------------
No Comparison?
--------------
¶5. (C) Such a scenario simply does not exist today,

El-Bassiouni opined. Egypt's economy is growing, the fruit
of President Mubarak's reform program launched in 2004.
While relations with Israel are still "problematic," Mubarak
has taken Egypt back to its rightful position as leader of
the Arab world. The external pressures that helped stoke the
tension of September 1981 "simply do not exist today."
¶6. (C) Another alleged similarity between the present and

Sadat's September is the shortage of basic commodities.
Egyptians have been angered in recent weeks by reports of
villages without access to drinking water -- in some cases,
for years (ref A). Shortages of subsidized bread have also
been in the headlines, as the poorest Egyptians wait in
queues for shrinking loaves. At least one observer has made
the case that September 2007 is more reminiscent of January
1977 -- when riots erupted throughout Egypt due to price
increases for bread and other basic foodstuffs -- than
September 1981. But Dr. Galal Amin, economics professor at
31
AUC (as he was in 1981) thinks there is little in common,
economically, between the two eras. Egypt under Sadat, he
argued, was actually better off in many ways: unemployment,
which he sees as the single greatest problem facing Mubarak
today, was lower then, and the overall standard of living was
higher. The average Egyptian, he said felt that
opportunities were greater in 1981, leading to general
optimism. Sadat's "infitah" program, opening up Egypt's
economy to foreign investment appeared to be working and
creating jobs. Tourism was taking off, and the average
Egyptian "felt good" about his life and better about his
future than Egyptians today, according to Amin. Economic
statistics refute Amin's assertions, but there is a
perception within a certain statist/elite/academic
demographic, represented by Amin, that somehow Sadat's were
"the good old days."
-------------------------------------------
Economic Reform Still Masks Underlying Woes
-------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Sadat trumpeted economic reform, touting

privatization, pointing to a freer market that would benefit
all Egyptians. These thoughts have been echoed under
Mubarak, especially since the appointment of Prime Minister
Nazif and his cabinet of economic reformers in 2004.
However, as in 1981, recent economic advances are incomplete.
Gigantic government subsidies then, as now, have served to
brake greater economic reform. In 1981, 21.5% of the Gross
National Income (GNI) went to the wealthiest 5% of the
population, while the poorest 20% of the population received
a mere 5% of Egypt's income. In 2007, there remains the
general sense that Egypt's economic growth is benefiting only
a tiny portion of the population. 17% of today's population
lives under the poverty line, almost identical to the
percentage in 1981, and the poorest 20% of the population
received 4.8% of the GNI in 2004/05, while the richest 10% of
the population received 30% of GNI. Although statistically
the standard of living has not dramatically deteriorated,
neither has it improved, leaving Egyptians with the feeling
that others have passed them by to a brighter economic
future.
32
--------------
The Odd Couple
--------------
¶8. (C) What the two periods unquestionably do have in common

are a pair of increasingly isolated dictators, set in their
ways and fearful of any kind of dissent. But though alike in
certain personal characteristics (particularly paranoia),
there are at the same time some very fundamental differences,
including age (Sadat was a robust 63 years old when
assassinated; Mubarak is a slowing 79) and length in office
(barely 11 years for Sadat, closing on 26 years for Mubarak).
Importantly, Sadat had a clear successor -- his vice
president, Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak, in turn, has scrupulously
avoided naming a VP, and although most believe that son Gamal
will succeed him, no one can say for certain how that will
play out. Another dissimilarity: Minister of Information
Enas El-Fiqi, under intense scrutiny and pressure himself for
allowing the rumors about Mubarak's health to get out of
control, recently told the Ambassador that "there is no
comparison" between Sadat and Mubarak because, "Mubarak never
loses his temper." (El-Fiqi, though, admitted that the
stress of his job was literally driving him to drink.)
¶9. (C) Mubarak relishes his self-image as a benign, paternal

leader, tough but fair. Still, he has shown signs of moving
toward Sadat's modus operandi in dealing with political
opponents. In the past year, Mubarak has arrested upwards of
a thousand Muslim Brothers. While some have subsequently
been released and only 40 are facing trial before a military
tribunal so far, the message is unmistakable: after allowing
the MB to participate in the 2005 parliamentary elections as
"independents" (in which they won 88 seats, 20% of the
Assembly), Mubarak is cracking down. Another similarity is
the recent phobia Mubarak has developed towards the press.
The Egyptian media, arguably as free as it has ever been (and
certainly freer than it was under Sadat), is suddenly facing
a cost for that liberty. In early September, four editors of
independent newspapers were convicted of insulting the
president and other GoE officials, while another editor is
facing trial October 1 for allegedly spreading false rumors
about Mubarak's health which were damaging to Egypt's
reputation and to its economy. These arrests have been
33
widely seen here as blatant attacks on the freedom of the
press, much as Sadat's rounding up of journalists was in
¶1981.
-------------------------
Love and Hate For the USA
-------------------------
¶10. (C) One of the more striking similarities between the two
leaders is their uneven relationship with the United States.
Sadat's September madness came close on the heels of a
profoundly disappointing trip to the United States to meet
the new President, Ronald Reagan. By discarding the Soviet
Union and reaching out to the United States -- and Israel --
he had taken considerable political risk. He had calculated
that the payoff in tangible and intangible terms would more
than justify that risk. But as his international stature
increased spectacularly as the Arab world's "Man of Peace,"
his standing at home did not keep pace, as heightened
expectations for peace and prosperity were unrealized.
Still, in the U.S. he felt he had found a faithful ally, one
that would stand by him even when his own people did not.
Unfortunately, President Reagan's reception of Sadat in
August 1981 was lukewarm, and Sadat came under severe
criticism by the U.S. press for not delivering true peace to
the Middle East. According to Mohamed Heikal, Sadat's former
Minister of Information (who was himself arrested on
September 3, 1981), Sadat returned to Egypt a bitter man,
feeling betrayed by the Americans. Shortly afterwards came
the arrests.
--------------
Twin Twilights
--------------
¶11. (C) At the end of the day, and the end of their reigns,
Sadat faced and Mubarak faces similar situations. But
Mubarak seems to have managed the dilemma better in at least
one key area: he has systematically and "legally" eliminated
virtually all political opposition, leaving only the MB
standing, having foresworn violence and politically
emasculated. Mubarak's internal security apparatus, an
estimated 1.4 million strong, is at least twice the size it
34
was under Sadat. Its ubiquitous presence and monopoly of the
legitimate use of armed power makes any kind of violent
change of leader unlikely.
---------------------
The One Certain Thing
---------------------
¶12. (C) The two presidents share another undeniable point in

common: their mortality. Mubarak's street credibility, like
Sadat's, is very low. The was illustrated by the insistent
rumors of Mubarak's illness and death, despite numerous
official denials. This lack of faith by the people of Egypt
in their political leaders could well come back to haunt
Mubarak's successor, whomever he may be. Will it make the
transition more difficult? Yes. Will it matter in the end?
Probably not, as long as the successor enjoys the support of
the elite and the security apparatus, including the military.
And even if there is a valid analogy to draw between
September 1981 and September 2007, it is at best uneven. The
world -- and Egypt -- have fundamentally changed. While
President Mubarak clearly faces significant challenges, and
has reacted with at least some measure of Sadat's paranoia,
we do not foresee September 2007 leading to another October
¶1981.
JONES
35
Reference
Created Released Classification Origin
ID
2008-01-14 2010-12-13 Embassy
08CAIRO57 SECRET//NOFORN
11:11 21:09 Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHEG #0057 0141136

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 141136Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T CAIRO 000057
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, AND INR/B

NSC FOR PASCUAL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2018

TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL EG
SUBJECT: MUBARAK DISCUSSES BACK SURGERY, GAMAL
AS
PERFECTIONIST
Classified By: ECPO Minister-Counselor William R. Stewart

¶1. (S/NF) During his January 6 meeting with the Ambassador

and visiting Congressman Steven Israel (D-NY), President
Mubarak described his June 2004 back surgery in Germany to
repair a slipped disc (he stressed it was not a herniated
disc). Mubarak said that the opening made in his back was
"very small," that he was in surgery for one-and-a-half
hours, and that after the operation, he had felt no pain.
36
"The next day, I was able to walk." He explained that during
the time he was sedated, the Prime Minister (Atef Obeid) was
"in charge." He added that when in Cairo, he undertakes a
daily exercise regime in the afternoons, but when he goes to
Sharm, "I just relax -- no exercise."
¶2. (S/NF) Throughout the meeting, Mubarak was expansive and

in fine humor. He rose easily from his seat several times to
point out activity on the golf course and to be photographed
with his visitors. He engaged the visitors extensively on
the topic of food, stressing that his favorite fare is
Egyptian popular breakfast dishes, such as tamiya (felafel)
and foul (beans). He ordered up a huge tray of freshly made
tamiya sandwiches for lunch, and lustily consumed several.
¶3. (S/NF) Mubarak also offered insights into the character of

his younger son, Gamal, whom he described as a perfectionist
from childhood. "As a schoolboy, if I gave him a notebook
with one line that was not straight, he would throw a fit and
demand a new one," Mubarak laughed. Furthermore, Gamal is
"idealistic" and "punctual." Mubarak added, "If he (Gamal)
says, 'meet me for lunch at 2:00,' he means 2:00. Set your
watch by it."
¶4. (S/NF) During the two-and-a-half hour long meeting at his

golf course retreat in Sharm El-Sheikh, mostly outdoors on a
breezy veranda, Mubarak on several occasions seemed to have
more than his usual difficulty in hearing. Nonetheless, he
initiated several phone calls. He also displayed one
apparent lapse in memory in telling Congressman Israel that
Gamal is forty-one years old; he is in fact forty-four (born
December 27, 1963, according to leadership profile 20320807).
Ricciardone
37
2008-09-23 2010-12-13 Embassy
08CAIRO2091 SECRET
15:03 21:09 Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHEG #2091/01 2671517

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 231517Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA AND INR/NESA

OSD FOR AGUIRRE
JCS FOR YODER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2028

TAGS: PARM PGOV ECON EG
SUBJECT: ACADEMICS SEE THE MILITARY IN DECLINE,
BUT
RETAINING STRONG INFLUENCE
REF: A. CAIRO 1851

¶B. CAIRO 530
¶C. CAIRO 524
¶D. 07 CAIRO 1417
Classified By: DCM Matthew Tueller for reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Recently, academics and civilian analysts

painted a portrait of an Egyptian military in intellectual
and social decline, whose officers have largely fallen out of
society's elite ranks. They describe a disgruntled mid-level
38
officer corps harshly critical of a defense minister they
perceive as incompetent and valuing loyalty above skill in
his subordinates. However, analysts perceive the military as
retaining strong influence through its role in ensuring
regime stability and operating a large network of commercial
enterprises. Regarding succession, analysts highlight the
armed forces' uneasiness with Gamal Mubarak, but largely
agree that the military would support Gamal if President
Mubarak resigns and installs him in the presidency, a
scenario we view as unlikely. One professor opined that
since 2003, the regime has tried to strengthen the economic
elite close to Gamal at the expense of the military in an
effort to weaken potential military opposition to Gamal's
path to the presidency. Other analysts believe the regime is
trying to co-opt the military through patronage into
accepting Gamal and that despite tensions between the
military and business, their relationship remains
cooperative. End summary.
-------------------------
An Institution in Decline
-------------------------
¶2. (C) A series of recent conversations with academics and

other civilian analysts reveals their sense that while
Egypt's military is in decline, it nevertheless remains a
powerful institution. (Note: These academics' expertise in
Egyptian politics and willingness to comment on the sensitive
issue of the military's current role makes them valuable
interlocutors for us. End note.) An American University in
Cairo (AUC) political science professor with family ties to
the officer corps told us that the military reached its peak
of influence in the late 1980's before the ouster of the
recently deceased former Defense Minister Abu Ghazalah, who
was dismissed because of his growing political popularity.
He asserted that since 1989, the MOD's influence in Egyptian
society has been gradually waning, and the privileged social
position of its elite members has been in decline as
society's respect for the military fades. One
political-military analyst at the GOE-funded Al-Ahram Center
who is a retired general noted that military salaries have
fallen far below what is available in the private sector, and
that a military career is no longer an attractive option for
39
ambitious young people who aspire to join the new business
elite instead.
¶3. (S) A senior Cairo University political science professor

opined that before the 1967 war, military officers were
"spoiled," and constituted a social elite. Following the
military's poor performance in the 1967 war, he said,
officers began a descent out of the upper ranks of society
that accelerated after Abu Ghazalah's ouster in 1989. Since
Abu Ghazalah, a senior AUC political science professor noted,
the regime has not allowed any charismatic figures to reach
the senior ranks. "(Defense Minister) Tantawi looks like a
bureaucrat," he joked. The AUC professor described the
mid-level officer corps as generally disgruntled, and said
that one can hear mid-level officers at MOD clubs around
Cairo openly expressing disdain for Tantawi. These officers
refer to Tantawi as "Mubarak's poodle," he said, and complain
that "this incompetent Defense Minister" who reached his
position only because of unwavering loyalty to Mubarak is
"running the military into the ground." He opined that a
culture of blind obedience pervades the MOD where the sole
criteria for promotion is loyalty, and that the MOD
leadership does not hesitate to fire officers it perceives as
being "too competent" and who therefore potentially pose a
threat to the regime.
¶4. (C) A political-military analyst with an academic

background at the GOE-funded Al-Ahram Center believes that
the government's increasing opposition to dialogue with
academia is symptomatic of its social and intellectual
decline. He said that up until 6 years ago, the MOD had
assigned a military representative to the Al-Ahram Center to

participate in academic discussions; subsequently, the MOD
jailed the representative because his views were becoming too
independent, and has not sent a replacement to the center.
He claimed that Tantawi has become increasingly intolerant of
intellectual freedom and in 2006 refused to allow the
Al-Ahram Center to pursue a research project with the Royal
Dutch Military Society on military reform in Egypt and
Holland. In his view, Tantawi has made clear that the
military is "off-limits" as a subject for academic research,
and that the MOD will not tolerate independent thought within
40
its own ranks.
---------------------------------------------
...But Still Retaining Economic Clout For Now
---------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) Although analysts see a small number of regime and

business elites exercising increasing political and economic
control over the country, they acknowledge the military's
strong influence in Egypt's economy. A senior AUC
political-science professor opined that the regime gives the
six businessmen in the cabinet carte blanche to pursue
commercial activities, but that the defense minister can put
a hold on any contract for "security concerns." Contacts
told us that military-owned companies, often run by retired
generals, are particularly active in the water, olive oil,
cement, construction, hotel and gasoline industries. The
senior Cairo University professor pointed out that military
companies built the modern road to the Ain Souknah Red Sea
resorts 90 minutes from Cairo and Cairo University's new
annex. He noted the large amounts of land owned by the
military in the Nile Delta and on the Red Sea coast,
speculating that such property is a "fringe benefit" in
exchange for the military ensuring regime stability and
security. (Comment: We see the military's role in the
economy as a force that generally stifles free market reform
by increasing direct government involvement in the markets.
End comment.)
¶6. (C) Most analysts agreed that the military views the GOE's
privatization efforts as a threat to its economic position,
and therefore generally opposes economic reforms. The senior
Cairo University professor speculated that privatization has
forced military-owned companies to improve the quality of
their work, specifically in the hotel industry, to compete
with private firms and attract critical foreign investment.
One of the Al-Ahram Center political-military analysts
predicted that the growing power of the economic elite at the
military's expense is inevitable as economic necessity drives
the government to maintain its economic reform policies in
order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). He said
that FDI is essential to the government's plans to maintain
economic growth and political stability.
41
--------------------------------------------- -
Influence in the Bureaucracy and Civil Society
--------------------------------------------- -
¶7. (C) The senior Cairo University professor pointed to a

"concerted effort" from the "top of the regime" to penetrate
the civilian bureaucracy with retired senior military
officers. He highlighted retired officers filling top
civilian jobs, such as governors, and chief of staff
positions and other senior slots at the Information,
Transportation and Education ministries. Other contacts
noted their anecdotal experience with military officers
running civil society organizations and charities. The
senior AUC political science professor remarked that a
literacy campaign in his neighborhood recently hired a
retired military officer to run its operations. He told us
that the local charitable society where his wife volunteers
recently hired a retired general as its director, believing
that the general's competence, experience with bureaucracies,
and network of colleagues and contacts in the ministries
would serve the charity well.
---------------------------
The Military and Succession
---------------------------
¶8. (C) Contacts agree that presidential son Gamal Mubarak's

power base is centered in the business community, not with
the military. The senior Cairo University political science
professor said officers told him recently that the military
does not support Gamal and if Mubarak died in office, the

military would seize power rather than allow Gamal to succeed
his father. However, analysts agreed that the military would
allow Gamal to take power through an election if President
Mubarak blessed the process and effectively gave Gamal the
reigns of power. The AUC junior political science professor
opined that after Gamal became active in the NDP in 2002, the
regime empowered the reformers in the 2004 cabinet to begin
privatization efforts that buttressed the wealthy businessmen
close to Gamal. In his estimation, the regime's goal is to
create a business-centered power base for Gamal in the NDP to
42
compensate for his lack of military credentials. A necessary
corollary to this strategy, he claimed, was for the regime to
weaken the military's economic and political power so that it
cannot block Gamal's path to the presidency.
¶9. (S) Comment: The military still remains a potent

political and economic force. Its recent interventions,
using the MOD's considerable resources, to produce bread to
meet shortages in March and extinguish the Shoura Council
fire in August (refs A and B) demonstrate that it sometimes
can successfully step in where other government agencies
fail. The military helps to ensure regime stability and
operates a large network of businesses as it becomes a
"quasi-commercial" enterprise itself. While there are
economic and political tensions between the business elite
and the military, the overall relationship between the two
still appears to be cooperative, rather than adversarial.
The military's loss of some prestige is partly due to the
disappearance of an imminent, external military threat
following the 1979 Camp David Accords. The regime, aware of
the critical role the MOD can play in presidential
succession, may well be trying to co-opt the military through
patronage into accepting Gamal's path to the presidency. We
agree with the analysis that senior military officers would
support Gamal if Mubarak resigned and installed him in the
presidency, as it is difficult to imagine opposition from
these officers who depend on the president and defense
minister for their jobs and material perks. In a messier
succession scenario, however, it becomes more difficult to
predict the military's actions. While mid-level officers do
not necessarily share their superiors' fealty to the regime,
the military's built-in firewalls and communication breaks
make it unlikely that these officers could independently
install a new leader.
SCOBEY
43
2008-12- 2010-12- Embassy
21 15:03 13 21:09 Cairo
VZCZCXRO1774
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #2543/01 3561526
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211526Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1193
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002543
NOFORN
SIPDIS
CENTCOM FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS FROM AMBASSADOR

SCOBEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018

TAGS: PREL PARM MASS MOPS EG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS' VISIT
TO EGYPT
REF: A. CAIRO 2175

¶B. CAIRO 2141
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary and Introduction: General Petraeus,

welcome to Egypt. Your visit will be, I hope, the first in a
regular process of dialogue and consultation with Egyptian
leaders who view the U.S.-Egyptian security partnership as
the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. This visit
provides an opportunity for you to assess the state of our
military partnership and to identify new opportunities. To
44
date, the U.S. investment in the Egyptian Armed Forces (over
$36 billion since 1980) through the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) program has supported peace between Egypt and
Israel and assured Egyptian support for extending peace to
the rest of the Arab world. In addition, the Egyptian
military has the potential to become interoperable with U.S.
forces * capable of fighting side by side as they did in the
1991 First Gulf War - and continues to provide critical Suez
Canal and overflight access for U.S. military operations and
to provide peacekeepers to regional and international
conflict zones.
¶2. (S/NF) The United States has sought to interest the

Egyptian military into expanding their mission in ways that
reflect new regional and transnational security threats, such
as piracy, border security, and counterterrorism. Egypt,s
aging leadership, however, has resisted our efforts and
remains satisfied with continuing to do what they have done
for years: train for force-on-force warfare with a premium
on ground forces and armor.
¶3. (S/NF) We have requested meetings with President Mubarak,

Defense Minister Field Marshal Tantawi, EGIS Chief General
Soliman, and Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit. The overall
U.S.-Egyptian relationship has suffered in the past few
years. The Egyptians have lost confidence in U.S. regional
leadership. They believe that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was
an unmitigated disaster that has unleashed Iranian regional
ambitions and that the U.S. waited far too long to engage in
Arab-Israeli peacemaking efforts. In addition, U.S. and
Egyptian differences over the pace and direction of political
reform have drained the warmth from the relationship on both
sides. We believe President Mubarak would be interested in
an early visit to Washington to consult with President Obama,
in large part to try to begin repairing the relationship.
End Summary.
-------------------------------------------
Mil-Mil Cooperation: In Need of Renovation
-------------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Mubarak and military leaders view the FMF program
as the cornerstone of our security relationship and believe
45
the $1.3 billion annual grant should be viewed as
"untouchable compensation" for making peace with Israel. They
complain that the parity between U.S. assistance to Israel
and to Egypt has been destroyed as U.S. security assistance
to Israel has climbed and theirs has remained fixed. We have
come to take the U.S.-Egyptian security partnership for
granted, but we should not underestimate its value to us and
the region. Our partnership guarantees there can be no
resumption of overt Arab-Israeli war and also provides
valuable US military access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian
airspace. We would not like to contemplate complications for
U.S. regional interests should the U.S.-Egyptian bond be
seriously weakened. Nevertheless, we recognize the
backward-looking nature of Egypt,s military posture and
believe that finding new, mutually agreed objectives could
assure the continuation of our strategic ties with Egypt into
the future.
¶5. (S/NF) Seventy-seven year old Field Marshall Tantawi, in

office since 1991, has resisted any change to usage of FMF
funding and has been the chief impediment to transforming the
military,s mission to meet emerging security threats.
During his tenure, the tactical and operational readiness of
the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) has decayed. But he retains
Mubarak's support, and could easily remain in place for years
to come. Tantawi will likely express his opposition to
Congress conditioning military and economic assistance and
will seek support in convincing Congress of Egypt's strategic
importance. He will also make a case for the release of
certain military systems such as the TOW IIB and F-15
fighter aircraft.
CAIRO 00002543 002 OF 003
¶6. (S/NF) You should assure Mubarak and Tantawi that Egypt
remains a key U.S. ally, but that we would like to find new
areas of cooperation that build on existing relationships but
that look to meeting new threats. Such a development would
help us defend the Egyptian FMF program by demonstrating its
ongoing value.
46
¶7. (S/NF) Threats to this partnership exist. Although all
previous Administrations and Congresses since Camp David have
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to a strategic U.S.-Egyptian
relationship, the events of the last few years have made a
few cracks in the foundations. Congressional concern about
Egypt,s poor human rights and democracy record prompted the
imposition in 2008 of conditions upon Egypt,s assistance
program. Although the Secretary of State was given the right
to waive the conditionality, the Egyptians view
conditionality as "unacceptable." We are currently dealing
with the conditionality issue for FY2009.
¶8. (S/NF) The potential for Congressional action that could

affect Egyptian FMF/ESF funding, creates even greater reason
for Egypt to begin to orient more of its military
capabilities toward unconventional threats. The more
Egyptian military cooperation can be viewed as backstopping
U.S. military requirements in the region, the easier it is to
defend the Egyptian assistance program on the Hill. Over the
last year, we have engaged MOD leaders on developing shared
objectives to address current threats, including border
security, counter terrorism, civil defense, and
peace-keeping. Our efforts thus far have met with limited
success. After initially strong resistance, MOD supported
the first phase of a $23 million FMF-funded counter-smuggling
system soon to be installed on the Gaza-Egyptian border (ref
A). You should encourage Tantawi to immediately approve the
follow-on stages and stress the importance of using the
knowledge gained from the seismic-acoustic equipment to
destroy tunnels and break up arms smuggling rings.
¶9. (S/NF) One way to demonstrate Egypt's continued strategic

importance is through shifting more FMF funding to address
asymmetric threats like terrorism and improving border
security along its long and porous borders. You should also
stress with GOE interlocutors that our mil-mil relationship
is much greater than the yearly flow of military assistance.
Egypt could play a much more active
and influential role in regional security issues, including
supporting and training the Iraqi military, deploying more
peace keeping troops to Sudan, joining neighbors in combating
piracy, and stemming the flow of illegal migration. Another
such concrete display of a more forward looking security
47
strategy would be to support CENTCOM's efforts to re-invent
BRIGHT STAR. Tantawi will lament the loss of large-scale
BRIGHT STAR. You should stress that BRIGHT STAR continues to
be an important strategic
statement for the U.S. and its regional allies, and solicit
his input for ways to make BRIGHT STAR more relevant.
----------------
Regional Efforts
----------------
¶10. (S/NF) While the military remains inwardly focused,

Mubarak and key Egyptian officials remain engaged on a number
of regional issues. On Iraq, although President Mubarak
remains deeply suspicious that Nuri Al Maliki answers to
Tehran, other GOE officials have expressed increasing
confidence that Iraq has turned a corner and may avoid civil
war. Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit recently completed a
successful trip to Baghdad in October (ref B) and is moving
forward to reopen the Embassy in Baghdad. On the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, GOE efforts to facilitate
intra-Palestinian reconciliation under the auspices of EGIS
Chief General Soliman foundered in November due, in their
view, to Iranian-Syrian meddling. On Iran, Egypt is concerned
by rising Iranian influence in the region and has supported
UN sanctions, but does not have a comprehensive strategy to
counter Iran's regional momentum. The
Egyptians have worked with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states
to support Lebanese political and territorial sovereignty.
¶11. (S/NF) Egypt is a steadfast ally in the GWOT, and we

maintain close cooperation on a broad range of
counter-terrorism and law enforcement issues. We have a
long-standing and productive relationship with EGIS and SSIS,
the two Egyptian agencies that cover internal and regional
CAIRO 00002543 003 OF 003
terrorism issues. Through the Department of State's

Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, we are working with SSIS
to establish an anti-terror investigative unit, and also are
in the beginning stages of a USG-funded community policing
48
program that will include needed human rights training.
-------------------------------
Internal Politics and Economics
-------------------------------
¶12. (C) Our fundamental political reform goal in Egypt

remains democratic transformation, including the expansion of
political freedom and pluralism, respect for human rights,
and a stable and legitimate transition to the post-Mubarak
era. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however,
are being suffocated, and Mubarak remains skeptical of our
role in democracy promotion, lecturing us that any efforts to
open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood
(which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt's parliament).
Mubarak now makes scant public pretense of advancing a vision
for democratic change. An ongoing challenge remains balancing
our security interests with our democracy promotion efforts.
¶13. (S/NF) Mubarak, who is now 80, is in solid health,

notwithstanding a hearing deficit in his left ear. The next
presidential elections are scheduled for 2011, and if Mubarak
is still alive it is likely he will run again, and,
inevitably, win. Despite incessant whispered discussions, no
one in Egypt has any certainty about who will eventually
succeed Mubarak, nor how the succession will happen. Mubarak
himself seems to be trusting to God and the inertia of the
military and civilian security services to ensure an orderly
transition. The most likely contenders for next president
are presidential son Gamal Mubarak (whose profile is
ever-increasing at the ruling party), EGIS chief Omar
Soliman, dark horse Arab League Secretary-General Amre
Moussa, another old-guard regime insider, or an as-yet
unknown military officer.
¶14. (C) Economic reform has been a success story, although

Egypt still suffers from widespread and so far irremediable
poverty affecting upwards of 35-40% of the population.
Reforms in trade and tax policy, financial reform,
privatization and increased transparency have led to 7%
economic growth in the last fiscal year. Foreign investment
increased from around $3 billion in 2005 to $11
billion in the last year, mostly in the petroleum sector.
49
Despite this success, significant problems remain, including
20% inflation, high levels of poverty and unemployment, and
endemic corruption. The effects of the global financial
crisis on Egypt may not be as severe as elsewhere, as
Egyptian banks operate very conservatively and have been
spared involvement in risky financial products. The informal
economy also provides a certain degree of resiliency to the
economic picture. Nevertheless, as the economic crisis
worsens, Egypt remains vulnerable as exports, Suez canal
revenues, tourism, and remittances will reflect global
trends.
¶15. (S/NF) U.S. economic assistance will drop from $415

million in FY 2008 to $200 million annually for the next five
years starting in FY 2009. The Egyptians are not pleased
with the cut and have suggested several ways of using the
assistance that would be difficult to get through Congress,
such as debt relief. We would like to focus assistance on
health care and education reform along with poverty
alleviation. Negotiations are ongoing over use of future
assistance funds.
SCOBEY
50
2009-04- 2010-12-13 Embassy
28 15:03 21:09 Cairo
VZCZCXRO1066
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHEG #0722/01 1181534
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 281534Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
NOFORN
SIPDIS
FROM AMBASSADOR SCOBEY FOR AMBASSADOR ROSS

ABU DHABI PLEASE PASS TO ROSS DELEGATION
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2029

TAGS: PREL PARM KPAL IS LE SU IR EG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR ROSS' VISIT
TO EGYPT
REF: A. CAIRO 705

¶B. CAIRO 618
¶C. CAIRO 451
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reason 1.4 (b).
¶1. KEY POINTS:
-- (S) President Mubarak sees Iran's attempts to exert

influence throughout the region as Egypt's primary strategic
threat. However, Mubarak's focus on the Iranian threat
differs somewhat from ours. While he will readily admit that
the Iranian nuclear program is a strategic and existential
threat to Egypt and the region, he sees that threat as
relatively "long term." What has seized his immediate
attention are Iran's non-nuclear destabilizing actions such
51
as support for HAMAS, media attacks, weapons and illicit
funds smuggling, all of which add up in his mind to "Iranian
influence spreading like a cancer from the GCC to Morocco."
-- (S) In particular, Egypt views Iran as an adversary that

is trying to undermine GOE efforts on Palestinian
reconciliation and preventing weapons smuggling to Gaza,
while endangering key GOE interests such as stability in
Lebanon and Sudan.
-- (S/NF) The GOE remains concerned with Iranian efforts to

interfere in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq and Sudan, and Egypt views
the recently dismantled Sinai Hizballah cell as an
unacceptable Iranian escalation.
-- (S) The MFA believes that a harder U.S. line in UN fora on

Israel's nuclear program would strengthen the U.S. position
on demanding Iran cease working to develop nuclear weapons.
¶2. (S) Ambassador Ross, welcome to Egypt. Your visit comes

as Egypt continues its efforts to mediate a permanent
cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, to facilitate
intra-Palestinian negotiations and to stop the smuggling of
arms into Gaza. The GOE realizes that Iran is working to
undermine all of these Egyptian efforts. Many Egyptians see
the new U.S. Administration as a cause for optimism in both
the bilateral relationship and in U.S. engagement with the
region. President Mubarak appears ready to accept President
Obama's invitation to visit Washington within the next
several months, which will mark his first visit to Washington
since April 2004. Special Envoy for the Middle East Senator
George Mitchell has visited Egypt and the region three times.
While President Mubarak unfortunately will not be available,
we have requested meetings for you with Foreign Minister
Aboul Gheit, Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman, Arab League
Secretary-General Amre Moussa, National Democratic Party
Assistant Secretary-General Gamal Mubarak and Interior
Minister Habib Al-Adly.
-----------------
President Mubarak
-----------------
52
¶3. (S/NF) President Mubarak has made it clear that he sees
Iran as Egypt's -- and the region's -- primary strategic
threat. His already dangerous neighborhood, he has stressed,
has only become more so since the fall of Saddam, who, as
nasty as he was, nevertheless stood as a wall against Iran,
according to Mubarak. He now sees Tehran's hand moving with
ease throughout the region, "from the Gulf to Morocco," as he
told a recent congressional delegation. The immediate threat
to Egypt comes from Iranian conspiracies with Hamas (which he
sees as the "offspring" of his own most dangerous internal
political threat, the Muslim Brotherhood) to stir up unrest
in Gaza, but he is also concerned about Iranian machinations
in Sudan and their efforts to create havoc elsewhere in the
region, including in Lebanon via Hezbollah. While Tehran's
nuclear threat is also a cause for concern, Mubarak is more
urgently seized with what he sees as the rise of pan-Shi'ism
and Iranian attempts to dominate the Middle East.
¶4. (S) The Egyptians have been clear they do not intend to
resume normal diplomatic ties with the Iranians until
specific political and security issues are addressed,
including the renaming of "Islambouli Street" named after
Sadat's assassin. The GOE recognizes that Iran's long arm
has extended into Gaza via Hamas, but the same time, they are
worried that we are going to strike a "grand deal" with the
Iranians. Accordingly, the Egyptian MFA has reported to us
that they are in touch with the Iranians and "listen" to them
on regional issues. The prevailing GOE view remains a
principled rejection of any diplomatic rapprochement, but we
CAIRO 00000722 002 OF 003
believe the Egyptians are maintaining contact in the event

there is a need for a quick shift in their approach. The
Egyptians are also marginally increasing cultural and
economic ties with Iran. The Egyptians are also concerned
about Iranian Shi'a proselytizing in Egypt.
-----------------------
EGIS Chief Omar Soliman
-----------------------
53
¶5. (S/NF) Soliman, the key GOE advisor on national security
policy after President Mubarak, recently told us that Egypt
has started a confrontation with Hezbollah and Iran and will
not allow Iran to operate in Egypt. Soliman has noted that
after the GOE's recent arrest of a Hizballah cell in the
Sinai, Egypt had sent a clear message to Iran that if they
interfere in Egypt, Egypt will interfere in Iran, adding that
EGIS had already begun recruiting agents in Iraq and Syria.
Soliman has warned us against only focusing on one issue at
time, such as Iran's nuclear weapons program. He believes
Iran must pay the price for its actions and not be allowed to
interfere in regional affairs. Soliman has offered GOE
cooperation on Iran, and welcomes a U.S.-Egyptian partnership
on combating Iranian influence in the region.
¶6. (S/NF) Soliman recently noted that Iranian financial

support to Hamas amounted to $25 million a month, but that
Egypt was "succeeding" in preventing financial support from
entering Gaza through Egypt. According to Soliman, Iran has
tried several times to pay the salaries for the al-Qassam
Battalions, but Egypt had succeeded in preventing the money
from reaching Gaza. Soliman has expressed concern over
Hezbollah's first attempt to stand up a cell within Egypt,
and noted to us that Iran was also trying to recruit support
from the Sinai Bedouins, he claimed, in order to facilitate
arms smuggling to Gaza.
----------------------------
Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit
----------------------------
¶7. (C) Aboul Gheit has speculated that the new U.S.
Administration will engage with Iran, but will be
disappointed in late 2009 or early 2010 when it realizes that
Iran will not stop its enrichment activities. Aboul Gheit
believes Israel may then attack Iran. According to Aboul
Gheit, the "intransigence" of Israel and Iran will place the
U.S. in an awkward position with the Islamic world. Aboul
Gheit will reiterate President Mubarak's strong opinion that
the only real solution is a nuclear free zone in the Middle
East, which would require Israel to give up its nuclear
weapons. Aboul Gheit believes that while the U.S. may not
54
perceive a nuclear-armed Israel as a threat, it is so
perceived throughout the Middle East. In the Foreign
Minister's opinion, if the U.S. pushed Israel to renounce
nuclear weapons, the U.S. and Arab governments would be in a
much stronger position to demand that Iran end its nuclear
program.
¶8. (C) MFA officials have made it clear to us that they do

not expect Israel to give up its nuclear weapons in the
absence of comprehensive regional peace; however, the GOE is
frustrated with what it perceives as a lack of political
progress in international fora to advance the Middle East
Resolution that came out of the 1995 Nuclear Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, which called in part for a
Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (MENWFZ). The GOE's
campaign for progress on the eventual establishment of a
MENWFZ -- even if the ultimate goal remains far in the future
-- will likely guide their approach to the 2009 NPT
Preparatory Conference in May and the 2010 NPT Review
Conference.
------------------------------------
Arab League Secretary-General Moussa
------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Moussa has publicly and privately minimized Iran's

threat, claiming that the Arab world should strengthen its
economic and cultural ties with Iran. Moussa believes that
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict poses the greatest danger to
the region, and has consistently pressed the U.S. to do more
to stop Israeli settlement activity and advance the political
process between Israelis and Palestinians. The Arab League's
views on the importance of advancing a Middle East nuclear
weapons free zone are similar to those of the MFA. Moussa
also plays an important role in trying to manage intra-Arab
squabbles, including Qatar-Syria vs. Egypt-Saudi Arabia. The
Egyptians have made it clear that they consider the Qataris
CAIRO 00000722 003 OF 003
"nouveau riche upstarts" who are trying to buy their way to

influence via big spending and posing as the "true" champions
55
of the Palestinian cause by allying themselves with Syria and
Iran. The Qatari attempt to invite Iran to the Doha Arab
League summit incensed the Egyptians, many of whom blamed
Moussa for mismanaging the issue.
----------------------
Interior Minister Adly
----------------------
¶10. (S) Interior Minister General Habib Al-Adly focuses on

counterterrorism and suppressing domestic political
opposition. He will not offer strategic analysis of Iran
role in the region, but should be able to provide details on
the nascent Hizballah cell in the Sinai, which the GOE
recently dismantled and arrested. Adly may also be able to
share information on the steps the GOE is taking to disrupt
the flow of Iranian-supplied arms from Sudan through Egypt to
Gaza. In March, he told us that Egyptian police had killed
arms smugglers trying to transfer weapons from Sudan into
Egypt (ref C). He has described GOE efforts to combat
smuggling over the long Egyptian-Sudanese border region as
"difficult."
-------------
Gamal Mubarak
--------------
¶11. (C) Ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) Assistant

Secretary-General and Presidential son Gamal Mubarak does not
currently play a significant role in Egypt's formal foreign
policy process, focusing instead on NDP matters and economic
development. Gamal's recent trip to Washington raised his
political profile in Egypt, and he is of course a possible
successor to his father. As a UK-trained former
international banker, Gamal is perhaps most at home
discussing economics and the current financial crisis.
-------------------------------
-------------------------------
¶12. (SBU) We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt,

including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism,
56
and respect for human rights. Egyptian democracy and human
rights efforts, however, are being stymied, and the GoE
remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion,
complaining that any efforts to open up will result in
empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86
seats in Egypt's 454-seat parliament. Economic reform is
ongoing although Egypt still suffers from widespread poverty
affecting 35-40% of the population. Egyptian-U.S. trade has
more than doubled in the last four years, reaching almost $9
billion in 2008. The U.S. exports to Egypt about twice as
much as it imports. Egyptian banks operate very
conservatively and have been spared involvement in risky
financial products, but the effects of the global economic
crisis on Egypt are beginning to be felt. As the global
credit crunch worsens, Egypt remains vulnerable as exports,
Suez Canal revenues, tourism, and remittances -- its largest
sources of revenue -- are all down and likely to continue to
fall.
SCOBEY
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TAGS: PREL MASS PARM ETTC EG
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for Admiral Mullen
CLASSIFIED BY: Margaret Scobey, Ambassador, DOS, EXO;

REASON: 1.4(B),
(D)
¶1. (S/NF) Key Points:
-- Since your last visit, the U.S. and Egypt initiated a

senior-level Strategic Dialogue that built upon the improved
bilateral atmosphere following President Obama's June 2009 speech
in Cairo. We have seen improved cooperation in multilateral fora,
in addition to close cooperation on regional issues including
Arab-Israeli peace and Sudan.
58
-- While the U.S.-Egypt military relationship remains strong, the
Egyptian military has been resistant to our efforts to adjust its
focus to reflect new regional and transnational threats.
-- While Egyptian leadership continues to view Iran as the greatest

strategic threat to the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and Sudanese instability are immediate concerns for Egypt.
-- Egypt has increased counter smuggling efforts, including the

construction of a subterranean steel wall along the Egypt-Gaza
border that has provoked intense domestic and regional criticism of
perceived complicity in the Israeli blockade of Gaza.
----------------------------
Renewed Cooperation
----------------------------
¶2. (C) Admiral Mullen, welcome back to Egypt. Building upon the
optimism generated by a new U.S. administration and President
Obama's well-received June 4 speech in Cairo, we resumed in June
our Strategic Dialogue and set in place a new framework for regular
bilateral meetings with the Egyptians to explore areas for
cooperation and coordination, including examining our respective
assessments of strategic threats such as Iran. The most recent
meeting was hosted by Under Secretary Burns in December in
Washington. We are exploring other ways to translate this sense of
goodwill into concrete action, including a renewed focus in our
bilateral assistance programs on human capacity development and
strengthening Egypt's ability to compete in education, science, and
technology.
59
¶3. (S/NF) Our goal remains to widen our military cooperation
discussion beyond the annual flow of Foreign Military Financing
(FMF). At the end of 2009, we conducted our two premier bilateral
military events - the annual Military Cooperation Committee (MCC)
meeting and the Bright Star military exercise. During the MCC,
Egypt agreed to implement specific measures to improve their
ability to protect U.S. technology. During Bright Star, the
Egyptians canceled several joint-operations that would have
broadened the exercise's scope. We are working hard to ensure that
Bright Star 2011 will involve full-spectrum operations. Tantawi
and his senior leaders recognize and appreciate increased
engagement with the U.S. military, which provides us an opportunity
to highlight for them the need to sharpen and focus the Egyptian
military's mission to reflect new regional threats. Egypt's offer
to train Iraqi and Afghan military officials provides an
opportunity for the Egyptian military to play a greater role in
supporting regional security. Egypt also has plans to significantly
increase its peace-keeping presence in Africa, including a new
deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and we hope to
support their efforts through Egypt's inclusion in the Global Peace
Operations Initiative. We have requested meetings for you with
President Mubarak, MinDef Field Marshall Tantawi, CoS LTG
Anan, and
EGIS Chief MGen (ret) Soliman.
---------------------
Regional Security
---------------------
¶4. (S/NF) President Mubarak sees Iran as Egypt's -- and the

region's -- primary strategic threat. Egypt's already dangerous
neighborhood, he believes, has only become more so since the fall
of Saddam, who, as nasty as he was, nevertheless stood as a wall
60
against Iran. He now sees Tehran's hand moving with ease
throughout
the region, "from the Gulf to Morocco." The immediate threat to
Egypt comes from Iranian conspiracies with Hamas (which he sees as
the "brother" of his own most dangerous internal political threat,
the Muslim Brotherhood) to stir up unrest in Gaza, but he is also
concerned about Iranian machinations in Sudan and their efforts to
create havoc elsewhere in the region, including in Yemen, Lebanon,
and even the Sinai, via Hezbollah. While Tehran's nuclear threat is
also a cause for concern, Mubarak is more urgently seized with what
he sees as the rise of Iranian surrogates (Hamas and Hezbollah) and
Iranian attempts to dominate the Middle East.
¶5. (S/NF) The Egyptians have stepped up their cooperation with the
Iraqis considerably, primarily through establishment of a "joint
committee" which covers the full range of economic, social,
military and political bilateral development. In November 2009, the
Egyptians returned an ambassador to Baghdad. MOD is also
requesting USG approval to sell Iraq 140 M1A1 tanks manufactured
in
Egypt under a co-production agreement. On Afghanistan, the GOE
has
agreed to explore expanding its scope and breadth of programs
there, including in the areas of education, women's empowerment
and communications. Egypt has operated a military field hospital
at Bagram since 2003 with approximately 60 personnel.
¶6. (S/NF) Egypt's top priority in Africa is the future of Sudan.

The GOE would like to maintain Sudanese unity because it believes a
break-up will increase refugee flows into Egypt and threaten
Egypt's access to Nile waters. However, the GOE is hedging its
bets by providing South Sudan with development assistance
including
building and staffing medical clinics, helping to clear aquatic
plants from the White Nile and building power stations and a
university. Egypt is the fifth-largest peace keeping contributor in
the world, with the majority of its troops deployed to southern
Sudan and Darfur. They have also agreed to deploy a large
contingent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
61
¶7. (S/NF) Egypt continues to support our efforts to resume
negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians and maintains a
regular dialogue with all sides. Egyptian sponsored negotiations on
Palestinian reconciliation are ongoing. Egypt's objectives are to
avoid another Gaza crisis while eroding Hamas' power and
ultimately
returning the Palestinian Authority to Gaza.
--------------------------------------------- -----
Mil-Mil Cooperation: Counter Smuggling
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶8. (S/NF) President Mubarak and military leaders view our

military assistance program as a cornerstone of our mil-mil
relationship and consider the USD 1.3 billion in annual FMF as
untouchable compensation for making peace with Israel.
Decision-making within MOD rests almost solely with Defense
Minister Tantawi. In office since 1991, he consistently resists
change to the level and direction of FMF funding and is therefore
one of our chief impediments to transforming our security
relationship. Nevertheless, he retains President Mubarak's
support. You should encourage Tantawi to place greater emphasis on
countering asymmetric threats rather than focusing almost
exclusively on conventional force.
¶9. (S/NF) Egypt continues to use a wide range of military,

security, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts to combat the flow
of arms to Gaza. The effectiveness of these efforts is difficult to
assess, and our visibility into these programs is limited. However,
Egypt has reported success in identifying and intercepting arms
smuggling networks from Sudan to Cairo, as well as interdicting
illicit funds destined for Gaza. Israeli officials have also
reported some satisfaction with increased Egyptian efforts. MOD is
also participating in a USG-financed project - led by EGIS - to
62
install 15 x-ray scanners along the vehicular entrances to the
Sinai to search for arms and explosives.
¶10. (S/NF) Tantawi continues to resist U.S. offers of additional

counter smuggling assistance. Sovereignty concerns are likely
driving his hesitation, along with concerns that FMF funds may be
directed away from more high-profile programs like M1A1 tanks
and
aircraft. You should encourage Tantawi to focus more U.S.
assistance on border security, especially along the remote
Egypt-Sudan border. You should also remind Tantawi that no single
technology can stop smuggling. Success will depend on how well
Egypt uses all available tools and resources to identity and
disrupt smuggling networks. He will likely reply that BTADS -
currently on-hold because of security concerns - and the
subterranean steel wall MOD has begun to install along the
Egypt-Gaza border, will provide a sufficient counter-smuggling
capability.
¶11. (S/NF) Tantawi will likely express concerns over releasability

issues and frustration with Egypt's inability to procure restricted
weapons systems. However, concerns over Egypt's end-use
performance, especially in Congress, continue. You should stress
that decisions to release advanced weapons systems are made on a
country-by-country basis, but continued cooperation to improve
Egypt's protection of American technology and signing a CISMOA
would be welcome steps in our dialogue on releasability.
--------------------------------------
--------------------------------------
¶12. (C) We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt,
63
including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, and
respect for human rights. While Egypt has made some limited gains
over the last several years, such as on freedom of the press,
progress overall has been slow. We continue to press the GOE to
replace the State of Emergency, in place almost continuously since
1967, with counterterrorism legislation that protects civil
liberties. Designed to target violent Islamist extremist groups,
the GOE has also used the Emergency Law to target political
activity by the Muslim Brotherhood, bloggers and labor
demonstrators. The Interior Ministry suppresses political
opposition through arrests, harassment and intimidation.
¶13. (C) The GoE remains skeptical of our role in democracy

promotion, arguing that any efforts to open up will result in
empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86 seats
-- as independents -- in Egypt's 454-seat parliament. Elections
for the upper house of the parliament, or the Shura Council, are to
be held in June 2010 and elections for the lower house of
parliament or the People's Assembly are now scheduled for October
¶2010. Presidential elections will be held in 2011. It is still
unclear whether President Mubarak, in power for over 25 years, will
decide to run again. Some believe that he is grooming his son,
Gamal Mubarak, to succeed him as President.
¶14. (SBU) Economic reform is ongoing although Egypt still suffers

from widespread poverty affecting 35-40% of the population.
Egyptian-U.S. trade more than doubled between 2005 and 2008,
before slumping in 2009 amidst the global economic crisis. Bilateral
trade volume was roughly $7.5 billion in 2009, and the U.S. exports to
Egypt more than twice as much as it imports. Egyptian banks

operate very conservatively and have been spared involvement in
risky financial products, but the effects of the global economic
crisis on Egypt are beginning to be felt. As the global credit
crunch worsens, Egypt remains vulnerable as exports, Suez Canal
revenues, tourism, and remittances - its largest sources of revenue
-- are all down and will likely to continue to fall.
SCOBEY
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TAGS: PREL MASS MARR IS IR IZ EG LY SU
SUBJECT: DASD Kahl Meeting with Egyptian Military Officials
CLASSIFIED BY: Donald A. Blome, Minister Counselor, DOS,

ECPO;
REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) Key Points:
-- On January 31, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the

Middle East Dr. Colin Kahl met with Major General Mohammad
al-Assar, Assistant to the Minister of Defense, Major General Ahmad
Moataz, Chief of the American Relations Branch, and Major General
Fouad Arafa, Consultant to the Military Intelligence Department.
65
-- During the meeting, Kahl discussed the need to incorporate a
military strategy that included symmetrical and asymmetrical
capabilities, pursuing a capabilities-based approach to security
assistance, FMF issues, balance of power in the region, nuclear
weapons in the Middle East, current U.S. policy towards Iran,
Egyptian efforts to counter-smuggling and interdict illicit weapons
destined for Gaza, and the release of advanced weapons systems.
-- The Egyptian defense officials continued to stress that the

threats facing the United States were different from Egypt's, and
Egypt needs to maintain a strong conventional military to counter
other armies in the region.
--------------------------------------------- ----------------------
--------------
Egypt's Current Security Concerns and National Defense Policy
--------------------------------------------- ----------------------
---------------
¶2. (C) During the 31 January 2010 meeting, al-Assar

constantly referred to the numerous unstable security situations in
the Middle East that influenced Egyptian military doctrine to
include: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon/Hezbollah,
Palestine/HAMAS, Yemen, Sudan/Darfur, Somalia, Eritrea, Piracy
issues, Algeria, and al-Qaida. Al-Assar emphasized that ethnic
conflict throughout the region and border issues could have a
negative impact on Egyptian sovereignty at any time. al-Assar
commented that he did not expect any of these security situations
to resolve in the near future; instead, he believed the list would
grow even larger.
¶3. (C) al-Assar outlined Egypt's National Defense Policy
66
which he stated was based on a defensive, capabilities-based
strategy instead of threat-based. The number one priority is the
defense of Egyptian land and the Suez Canal. Other goals include:
preparedness for unexpected threats such as terrorism; the
achievement of regional stability; interoperability with Egypt's
military partners; and a leading role for Egypt in the region.
Al-Assar provided the Egyptian military's list of regional
threats/concerns such as Nile Basin water rights and the conflicts
in Darfur and southern Sudan. He commented that one never knows
what Libya might do and that it was essential that Egypt maintain
the balance of power on its eastern border. He reiterated the fact
that Israel possesses unconventional weapons and sophisticated
conventional weapons, which creates a regional imbalance and
contributes to instability. He noted that stability in the region
cannot be attained without balance of power. He stated that the
Egyptian military doctrine did not intend to gain an edge on any
other country in the region or cause offense to anyone.
¶4. (C) Al-Assar complained that the Egyptian military

sometimes felt pressured by the United States to reform its
doctrine and capabilities to counter asymmetric threats. He
emphasized that the threats faced by the United States were
different from Egypt's. He commented that tanks and aircraft were
necessary to fight asymmetrical threats as well. He referred to
General Patreaus' Sadr City battle plan against extremists and
noted that this plan depended on the use of tanks and aircraft in
Iraq. He called on Dr. Kahl to educate Congress about Egypt's
military needs and not put limits on the numbers of aircraft and
tanks. He noted that the Egyptian military preferred to purchase
its weapons and armaments from the United States, but that Egypt's
national security was a red line and they could go elsewhere if
they had to.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Security Assistance and Modernization
--------------------------------------------- ----
67
¶5. (C) Dr. Kahl commented that the U.S. military had learned
some hard lessons about the promises and limits of technology
during the first years of the war in Iraq. Kahl stated that there
are no longer any purely conventional military conflicts in the
world and the last large conventional war was the First Gulf War.
The current challenge for modern armies is to find the right
balance between conventional and irregular forces and doctrines to
fight what Secretary Gates refers to as "hybrid wars." Kahl
commented that the U.S. lost more tanks in Iraq to roadside bombs
than in battles with Iraqi tanks. He also noted that information
technology in the modern war was just as valuable as military
equipment in order to have the ability to rapidly communicate and
assess the environment.
¶6. (C) Dr. Kahl reiterated that a modern military should rely
on quality equipment rather than a large quantity of outdated
armaments, and should place a greater emphasis on the scope of its
aggregate capabilities vice number of high-end weapons platforms.
¶7. (C) Major General Fouad Arafa interjected during the

discussion to note that the spirit of the Camp David accord was
that there would be a 2:3 balance between Egypt and Israel's
security assistance. Egypt's role was to keep a certain balance of
power in the region that would not allow other parties to go to
war. Egypt had fulfilled this role faithfully for the last 30
years. al-Assar added that the current ratio of 2:5 was a
violation of the Camp David ratio.
--------------------------------------------- --------
Yemen, Iran, and the Weapons Free Zone
--------------------------------------------- ---------
68
¶8. (C) al-Assar noted that Iran effectively interfered in
the internal affairs of Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. He commented
that Iran's nuclear ambitions would significantly change the
balance of power in the region and was contributing to further
regional instability and intensifying the conflicts. Al-Assar
stated that Egypt views Iran as a threat to the region and its
conventional and unconventional weapons would only increase the
instability in the region. Al-Assar commented that if Iran was
successful in obtaining nuclear weapons, it would only encourage
other countries in the Middle East to pursue the same path.
¶9. (C) Al-Assar brought up President Obama's pledge to

pursue a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East.
He
called on the United States to not ignore the Israeli nuclear
program. He stated that Israel's nuclear program only gave Iran
justification for creating its own nuclear weapons. If Iran
obtained nuclear weapons, it would only embolden Iran to use
Hezbollah and HAMAS with impunity.
¶10. (C) Dr. Kahl stated that ultimate goal for the United States
was the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East. However, it was not
possible to draw strict parallels between Iran's acquisition of
nuclear weapons and other Middle Eastern countries. Iran is the
only country in the world that was currently threatening to wipe an

entire country off the map, and Tehran reinforced this message
through destabilizing activities pursued by its proxies in the
region. The goal of a NWFZ in the Middle East could take 10-20
years to achieve; however, the international community could not
wait 20 years to address Iran's nuclear program and needed to
figure out ways to slow down the clock on the Iran's nuclear
ambitions.
69
¶11. (C) Major General Fouad Arafa joined the conversation stating
that Iran was using the various Middle East conflicts for its own
ambitions and was gaining power because of its interference in the
internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries. It was essential
to cut Iran's connections and influence in the regional conflicts
in Lebanon, Israel, and Palestine in order to decrease the level of
influence Iran enjoyed in the region. Iran was effectively using
Arab public opinion to advance its goals. Dr. Kahl agreed and
reinforced the need for continued Arab engagement on this issue to
ensure a "unified front" on the part of the international
community.
¶12. (C) Kahl stated that the United States had reached out to
Iran in 2009 through unconditional talks and that this was meant as
a test of Iran's willingness to prove that its nuclear program was
for peaceful civilian use. Iran, however, had not seized this
opportunity to resolve international concerns. Kahl speculated
that European countries and even Russia, which would not have
supported the sanctions in the past, were now ready to increase
pressure on Iran.
-------------------------
Counter-smuggling
-------------------------
¶13. (C) Dr. Kahl extended his appreciation for Egypt's enhanced
counter-smuggling efforts in the past year, but expressed concern
over recent increases in smuggling activity into the Gaza strip and
HAMAS' efforts to rearm. Dr. Kahl emphasized that the United
States understands that this is an especially sensitive political
issue internally in Egypt, as well as in the region. Dr. Kahl
noted that the United States was looking forward to the positive
completion of the BTADs project and thanked the Egyptian Military
for its agreement-in-principle to sign a follow -on statement for
70
future BTADs support as this provided an opportunity for further
cooperation on counter-smuggling and border security. He also
underscored the importance of targeting smuggling networks and
their financiers in Sudan and the Sinai-not just their activities.
¶14. (C) Dr. Kahl renewed Secretary of Defense Gate's offer to

assist the Egyptian military in expanding its counter-smuggling
efforts on the Sudanese border and the Red Sea region.
¶15. (C) Al-Assar stated that the smuggling tunnels threatened the
national security of Egypt (highlighting HAMAS specifically) and
that "terror" could come to Egypt via these tunnels. Egypt has
spent approximately $40 million to purchase the steel for the
underground wall on the Gaza border, and Egypt was paying the
cost
of this wall in terms of public opinion both within Egypt and the
region. He noted that once the wall was in place, the time would
come to pressure Israel to take responsibility for the humanitarian
situation in Gaza. Dr. Kahl reaffirmed that in all of engagements
with Israel, the U.S. officials strongly encourage Israel to open
crossings into Gaza to allow humanitarian goods to cross, and that
Egypt's focus must be affixed on thwarting the movement of illicit
weapons into the strip.
-------------
Homework
-------------
¶16. (C) Dr. Kahl encouraged Egypt to sign a Communications

Electronics Security Agreement (CESA aka CISMOA) with the
Unites States, which would pave the way for the transfer of advanced
technology to Egypt and greatly increase interoperability.
Al-Assar stated that Egypt had "its reasons to delay a decision on
71
a CISMOA." He noted that thousands of Egyptian military officers
have participated in training and education programs in the United
States and learned about U.S. technology and strategy. He
commented that the younger officers are frustrated with the delay
in obtaining political release for more advanced U.S. technology.
Specifically, al-Assar referred to TOW2B and JAVELIN, which he
commented had already been released to other countries. Al-Assar
noted that a CISMOA was not a condition for obtaining these
systems, but instead they were held up due to a "third party".
¶17. (C) Al-Assar commented that Egypt was in negotiations with

Iraq to supply the Iraqi military with approximately 140 tanks,
which are manufactured at the FMF tank facility. He noted that the
Egyptian Ministry of Defense was awaiting the United States
positive response to its request for approval of the transfer. Dr.
Kahl noted that the U.S. was considering this request and would
provide a response soon.
¶18. (C) Al-Assar encouraged Dr. Kahl to convince the U.S.

Congress that Egypt was worth more than $1.3 billion a year. Dr.
Kahl mentioned that Egypt receives the second largest amount of
assistance in the world, and that during these difficult financial
times in the United States, it was unlikely that annual flow of FMF
would increase. He did however reassure the Egyptian officials
that the USG would continue to advocate for current levels of FMF
and push back on any attempts to condition those funds.
SCOBEY
72
2009-05-19 2010-12-09 Embassy
09CAIRO874 SECRET
12:12 00:12 Cairo
O 191258Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2465
Tuesday, 19 May 2009, 12:58
NEA FOR FO; NSC FOR KUMAR AND SHAPIRO
EO 12958 DECL: 05/17/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KDEM, ECON, EG, IS, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: PRESIDENT MUBARAK’S VISIT
TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d).
¶1. (S/NF) Introduction: President Mubarak last visited Washington
in April 2004, breaking a twenty year tradition of annual visits to the
White House. Egyptians view President Mubarak’s upcoming
meeting with the President as a new beginning to the U.S.-Egyptian
relationship that will restore a sense of mutual respect that they
believe diminished in recent years. President Mubarak has been
encouraged by his initial interactions with the President, the
Secretary, and Special Envoy Mitchell, and understands that the
Administration wants to restore the sense of warmth that has
traditionally characterized the U.S.-Egyptian partnership. The
Egyptians want the visit to demonstrate that Egypt remains
America’s “indispensible Arab ally,” and that bilateral tensions have
abated. President Mubarak is the proud leader of a proud nation. He
draws heavily from his own long experience in regional politics and
governance as he assesses new proposals and recommendations for
change.
MUBARAK’S PROFILE
-----------------
¶2. (S/NF) Mubarak is 81 years old and in reasonably good health;
his most notable problem is a hearing deficit in his left ear. He
responds well to respect for Egypt and for his position, but is not
swayed by personal flattery. Mubarak peppers his observations with
anecdotes that demonstrate both his long experience and his sense of
humor. The recent death of his grandson Mohammad has affected
73
him deeply and undoubtedly will dampen his spirits for the visit
which he very much wants to make. During his 28 year tenure, he
survived at least three assassination attempts, maintained peace with
Israel, weathered two wars in Iraq and post-2003 regional instability,
intermittent economic downturns, and a manageable but chronic
internal terrorist threat. He is a tried and true realist, innately
cautious and conservative, and has little time for idealistic goals.
Mubarak viewed President Bush (43) as naive, controlled by
subordinates, and totally unprepared for dealing with post-Saddam
Iraq, especially the rise of Iran,s regional influence.
¶3. (S/NF) On several occasions Mubarak has lamented the U.S.

invasion of Iraq and the downfall of Saddam. He routinely notes that
Egypt did not like Saddam and does not mourn him, but at least he
held the country together and countered Iran. Mubarak continues to
state that in his view Iraq needs a “tough, strong military officer who
is fair” as leader. This telling observation, we believe, describes
Mubarak’s own view of himself as someone who is tough but fair,
who ensures the basic needs of his people.
¶4. (S/NF) No issue demonstrates Mubarak,s worldview more than

his reaction to demands that he open Egypt to genuine political
competition and loosen the pervasive control of the security services.
Certainly the public “name and shame” approach in recent years
strengthened his determination not to accommodate our views.
However, even though he will be more willing to consider ideas and
steps he might take pursuant to a less public dialogue, his basic
understanding of his country and the region predisposes him toward
extreme caution. We have heard him lament the results of earlier
U.S. efforts to encourage reform in the Islamic world. He can harken
back to the Shah of Iran: the U.S. encouraged him to accept reforms,
only to watch the country fall into the hands of revolutionary
religious extremists. Wherever he has seen these U.S. efforts, he can
point to the chaos and loss of stability that ensued. In addition to
Iraq, he also reminds us that he warned against Palestinian elections
in 2006 that brought Hamas (Iran) to his doorstep. Now, we
understand he fears that Pakistan is on the brink of falling into the
hands of the Taliban, and he puts some of the blame on U.S.
insistence on steps that ultimately weakened Musharraf. While he
knows that Bashir in Sudan has made multiple major mistakes, he
cannot work to support his removal from power.
74
¶5. (S/NF) Mubarak has no single confidante or advisor who can
truly speak for him, and he has prevented any of his main advisors
from operating outside their strictly circumscribed spheres of power.
Defense Minister Tantawi keeps the Armed Forces appearing
reasonably sharp and the officers satisfied with their perks and
privileges, and Mubarak does not appear concerned that these forces
are not well prepared to face 21st century external threats. EGIS
Chief Omar Soliman and Interior Minister al-Adly keep the domestic
beasts at bay, and Mubarak is not one to lose sleep over their tactics.
Gamal Mubarak and a handful of economic ministers have input on
economic and trade matters, but Mubarak will likely resist further
economic reform if he views it as potentially harmful to public order
and stability. Dr. Zakaria Azmi and a few other senior NDP leaders
manage the parliament and public politics.
¶6. (S/NF) Mubarak is a classic Egyptian secularist who hates

religious extremism and interference in politics. The Muslim
Brothers represent the worst, as they challenge not only Mubarak,s
power, but his view of Egyptian interests. As with regional issues,
Mubarak, seeks to avoid conflict and spare his people from the
violence he predicts would emerge from unleashed personal and civil
liberties. In Mubarak,s mind, it is far better to let a few individuals
suffer than risk chaos for society as a whole. He has been supportive
of improvements in human rights in areas that do not affect public
security or stability. Mrs. Mubarak has been given a great deal of
room to maneuver to advance women’s and children’s rights and to
confront some traditional practices that have been championed by
the Islamists, such as FGM, child labor, and restrictive personal
status laws.
SUCCESSION
----------
¶7. (S/NF) The next presidential elections are scheduled for 2011, and
if Mubarak is still alive it is likely he will run again, and, inevitably,
win. When asked about succession, he states that the process will
follow the Egyptian constitution. Despite incessant whispered
discussions, no one in Egypt has any certainty about who will
eventually succeed Mubarak nor under what circumstances. The
most likely contender is presidential son Gamal Mubarak (whose
profile is ever-increasing at the ruling party); some suggest that
intelligence chief Omar Soliman might seek the office, or dark horse
Arab League Secretary-General Amre Moussa might run.
75
Mubarak’s ideal of a strong but fair leader would seem to discount
Gamal Mubarak to some degree, given Gamal’s lack of military
experience, and may explain Mubarak’s hands off approach to the
succession question. Indeed, he seems to be trusting to God and the
ubiquitous military and civilian security services to ensure an orderly
transition.
MUBARAK’S EGYPT: 1982 -- 2009

-----------------------------
¶8. (C) Egypt continues to be a major regional economic, political,

and cultural power. However, economic problems have frustrated
many Egyptians. Egypt’s per capita GDP was on par with South
Korea’s 30 years ago; today it is comparable to Indonesia’s. There
were bread riots in 2008 for the first time since 1977. Political
reforms have stalled and the GOE has resorted to heavy-handed
tactics against individuals and groups, especially the Muslim
Brotherhood, whose influence continues to grow.
¶9. (SBU) Economic reform momentum has slowed and high GDP
growth rates of recent years have failed to lift Egypt’s lower classes
out of poverty. High inflation, coupled with the impact of the global
recession, has resulted in an increase in extreme poverty, job losses, a
growing budget deficit and projected 2009 GDP growth of 3.5% -
half last year’s rate.
¶10. (S/NF) Mubarak himself refuses to discuss economic assistance

to Egypt, but other interlocutors may raise it. On May 7, Egypt
formally and publicly accepted FY 2009 and FY 2010 assistance
levels, ending a stalemate over the FY 2009 program, linked to levels,
a perceived lack of consultation, and political conditionality. Based
on our assessment of Egypt’s most pressing assistance needs, and
broad public consensus in Egypt that the educational system is
seriously deficient, we would like to focus on education. We believe
the Egyptians would welcome a new presidential level initiative in
this area, which would also be in U.S. national interests given the
critical role education will play in Egypt’s political and economic
development.
MUBARAK’S REGIONAL OUTLOOK

--------------------------
76
¶11. (S/NF) Israeli-Arab conflict: Mubarak has successfully
shepherded Sadat,s peace with Israel into the 21st century, and
benefitted greatly from the stability Camp David has given the
Levant: there has not been a major land war in more than 35 years.
Peace with Israel has cemented Egypt,s moderate role in Middle East
peace efforts and provided a political basis for continued U.S.
military and economic assistance ($1.3 billion and $250 million,
respectively). However, broader elements of peace with Israel, e.g.
economic and cultural exchange, remain essentially undeveloped.
¶12. (S/NF) Camp David also presented Mubarak with the perpetual
challenge of balancing Egypt,s international image as a moderate
with its domestic image as pan-Arab leader. Mubarak has managed
this strategic dichotomy most effectively in times of regional stability.
However, the Gulf wars, and especially post-Saddam regional crises,
have taxed this equation. For example, during the 2006 Lebanon war,
the Bush Administration asked Egypt to side against Hizballah; at
the same time Egyptian protestors demanded the peace treaty with
Israel be vacated. The Egyptians were frozen, and relegated to
waiting for the situation to stabilize. More recently, with Iran
bringing the battlefield closer with Hamas’ actions in Gaza and
discovery of the Hizballah cell in Egypt, the Egyptians appear more
willing to confront the Iranian surrogates and to work closely with
Israel.
¶13. (S/NF) Mubarak has been effective as an intermediary during

various phases of the Israeli-Arab conflict. In the Arafat era, Egypt
worked between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. At the outset of
the Abbas era, Egypt,s role was unclear as the Israelis and
Palestinians communicated directly, and Mubarak for a time was left
with no deliverable either to the West or his public. He firmly
believes, incorrectly, that the Bush Administration “forced” the
Palestinian legislative elections of 2006 (which Hamas won). Hamas’
June 2007 takeover of Gaza allowed the Egyptians back into the
game as a go-between, and Mubarak,s team has made clear they will
not cede the “Palestinian file” to another Arab state. In general, the
Egyptian-Israeli strategic relationship is on solid ground, as they face
a shared threat from Hamas.
¶14. (S/NF) The ongoing intra-Arab dispute, which pits Egypt and
Saudi Arabia against Syria and Qatar and is primarily driven by
Iran’s regional influence, is the current test for Mubarak. For the
moment the Egyptian-Saudi moderate camp is holding. Mubarak has
77
maneuvered with reasonable effectiveness, brandishing Egyptian
clout through a hastily prepared but effective summit in Sharm el
Sheikh in February, but Iran,s Arab surrogates (especially Qatar)
continue to unsettle the Egyptians. Mubarak will rail against
President Bush,s decision to invade Iraq, contending that it opened
the door to Iranian influence in the region. That said, the Egyptians
recently told Special Envoy Ross they expect our outreach to Iran to
fail, and that “we should prepare for confrontation through
isolation.” Mubarak and his advisors are now convinced that Tehran
is working to weaken Egypt through creation of Hizballah cells,
support of the Muslim Brotherhood, and destabilization of Gaza.
Egypt has warned that it will retaliate if these actions continue.
¶15. (S/NF) Egypt views the stability and unity of Sudan as essential
to its national security because of concern over its access to Nile
waters and the potential for increased Sudanese refugee flows. The
GOE is using development assistance in South Sudan to encourage
unity. Here too, the Egyptians are jealous and sensitive to the Qatari
foray into resolving Darfur, a crisis squarely in Egypt’s backyard.
Mubarak may ask about the potential for cooperation with the U.S.
on Sudan and will probably want to hear how the Administration
will approach the issue. If he agrees, Mubarak can use his stature
and credibility with Bashir to make progress on Darfur and human
rights issues.
¶16. (S/NF) MUBARAK REGIONAL TALKING POINTS

-----------------------------------------
Israeli-Arab peace: He will ask for continued U.S. leadership and
highlight Egypt’s role as moderate interlocutor. He will stress the
primacy of the Palestinian track over efforts with Syria. He will press
for concrete action on settlements and resist Arab gestures to Israel
until the Arabs can see whether or not Netanyahu is credible.
Iran: He will rail against Iranian regional influence and express
pessimism about U.S. outreach to Tehran. He will make clear that
there should be no linkage between Israeli-Arab peace and Iran but
will agree with the President’s assessment that such linkage as does
exist argues for progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track to
undermine Hamas and Hizballah.
Sudan: He will highlight Egypt’s role as provider of humanitarian

and military assistance, and stress the need to maintain stability.
Intra-Arab strife: He may criticize Qatar, and perhaps Syria, as
Iranian surrogates. He may ask about our plan to engage Damascus
and suggest we coordinate our efforts.
78
Iraq: He may be circumspect, but harbors continuing doubts about
Maliki and his Iranian ties. He will say Egypt is open to bilateral
improvement but is awaiting Iraqi actions.
SCOBEY
79
2009-04- 2010-12-06 Embassy
30 15:03 21:09 Cairo
VZCZCXRO3480
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0746/01 1201500
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301500Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2019

TAGS: PREL MASS MOPS PARM KPAL IS IR SO EG SU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL MULLEN'S MEETING WITH EGIS
CHIEF SOLIMAN
¶1. Key Points:
- (S/NF) During an April 21 meeting with Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, Egyptian
General Intelligence Service Chief Omar Soliman explained
that his overarching regional goal was combating radicalism,
especially in Gaza, Iran, and Sudan.
- (S/NF) On Gaza, Soliman said Egypt must "confront" Iranian

attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and "stop" arms smuggling
through Egyptian territory.
- (S/NF) Soliman shared his vision on Palestinian
80
reconciliation and bringing the Palestinian Authority back to
Gaza, saying "a Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be
calm."
- (S/NF) On Iran, Soliman said Egypt was "succeeding" in

preventing Iran from funneling financial support to Hamas
through Egypt. Soliman hoped that the U.S. could encourage
Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions and stop interfering in
regional affairs, but cautioned that Iran "must pay a price"
for its actions.
- (S/NF) Egypt is "very concerned" with stability in Sudan,

Soliman said, and was focusing efforts on convincing the
Chadean and Sudanese presidents to stop supporting each
others' insurgencies, supporting negotiations between
factions in Darfur, and implementing the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA). "Egypt does not want a divided Sudan,"
Soliman stressed.
----
Gaza
----
¶2. (S/NF) Soliman said radicalism was the "backbone" of

regional security threats, adding that radicalism in Gaza
posed a particularly serious threat to Egyptian national
security. Soliman said Egypt must "confront" Iranian
attempts to smuggle arms to Gaza and stop arms smuggling
through Egyptian territory. "Egypt is circled by
radicalism," he continued, expressing concern over
instability in Sudan and Somalia as well. Egypt's own
successful campaign against radicalism in the 1990s provided
a useful lesson in how to counteract extremist groups by
reducing their ability to operate and raise funds, in
additional to educating people on the dangers of extremism.
Soliman noted that only the Muslim Brotherhood remained and
the Egyptian government continued to "make it difficult" for
them to operate.
¶3. (S/NF) "We do not want incidents like Gaza to inflame

public anger," Soliman said, adding that the Gaza conflict
put "moderate (Arab) regimes" in a corner. To prevent
another outbreak of violence, Egypt is focusing on
81
Palestinian reconciliation and a durable cease-fire between
Hamas and Israel. On reconciliation, Soliman explained, the
ultimate goal was to return the Palestinian Authority to
Gaza, as "Gaza in the hands of radicals will never be calm."
The problem, however, is that the PA cannot return to Gaza
without Hamas' acquiescence. Soliman said the PA must return
before the January 2010 Palestinian elections, or else Gazans
would be afraid to vote for moderates.
¶4. (S/NF) Stability in Gaza also depends on giving people a

more "normal" life, Soliman continued, saying Israel must be
convinced to regularly open the border crossings for
legitimate commercial activity. The current system - where
Egypt informs Israel of a humanitarian shipment and Israel
waits two days before accepting or rejecting the shipment for
transfer to Gaza - does not adequately meet people's needs.
¶5. (S/NF) On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman said he

expected the factions to return to Egypt on April 26 to
discuss his proposal on establishing a high committee
comprised of the various factions. The committee would be
responsible for preparing for the January 2010 elections,
monitoring reconstruction, and reforming the security
services in Gaza. On reconstruction, the committee would
issue licenses for companies eligible to participate on
projects, but the PA would decide who receives the money for
private and government contracts. Arab governments would
assist with reforming the security services and could base
security assistance out of Egypt. Soliman doubted that Hamas
would agree to the high committee, but said it was important
CAIRO 00000746 002 OF 002
to keep Hamas and Fatah talking, so they would not resort to

violence.
-----------------------
Iran, Counter Smuggling
-----------------------
¶6. (S/NF) Iran is "very active in Egypt," Soliman said.

Iranian financial support to Hamas amounted to $25 million a
82
month, but he said Egypt was "succeeding" in preventing
financial support from entering Gaza through Egypt. Iran has
tried several times to pay the salaries for the al-Qassam
Battalions, but Egypt had succeeded in preventing the money
from reaching Gaza. Soliman said the Egyptian government had
arrested a "big Hezbollah cell," which was Hezbollah's first
attempt to stand up a cell within Egypt. Iran was also
trying to recruit support from the Sinai Bedouins, he
claimed, in order to facilitate arms smuggling to Gaza. So
far, he continued, Egypt had successfully stopped Hamas from
rearming. Soliman noted that in six months, MOD will have
completed the construction of a subterranean steel wall along
the Egypt-Gaza border to prevent smuggling. He warned,
however, that people will find an alternative to the tunnels
to smuggle arms, goods, people, and money. Admiral Mullen
expressed appreciation for Egypt's efforts to combat
smuggling, adding that he hoped Egypt felt comfortable enough
to ask for additional border security assistance at any time.
¶7. (S/NF) Egypt has "started a confrontation with Hezbollah

and Iran," Soliman stressed, and "we will not allow Iran to
operate in Egypt." Soliman said Egypt had sent a clear
message to Iran that if they interfere in Egypt, Egypt will
interfere in Iran, adding that EGIS had already begun
recruiting agents in Iraq and Syria. Soliman hoped the U.S.
would "not walk the same track as the Europeans" in regards
to negotiating with Iran and warned against only focusing on
one issue at time, like Iran's nuclear weapons program. Iran
must "pay the price" for its actions and not be allowed to
interfere in regional affairs. "If you want Egypt to
cooperate with you on Iran, we will," Soliman added, "it
would take a big burden off our shoulders."
-----
Sudan
-----
¶8. (S/NF) Egypt is very concerned with stability in Sudan,

Soliman said, but asked for the U.S. to be "patient" with the
Sudanese government and give Egypt time to help the Sudanese
government deal with its problems. He applauded the
appointment of Special Envoy Gration and recent U.S.
statements on Sudan. Soliman said Egypt was focused on three
83
areas for promoting stability in Sudan: 1) repairing the
relationship between Chadean President Deby and Sudanese
President Bashir and stopping their support for each others'
insurgencies 2) supporting negotiations between the various
factions in Darfur, and 3) implementing the CPA. Soliman
encouraged a larger role for French President Sarkozy in
mediating between Chad and Sudan. He said that Southern
Sudan "feels no benefits from unity," and Egypt is trying to
bridge the "physiological gap" between north and south itself
by providing humanitarian assistance. "Egypt does not want a
divided Sudan," he stressed. Admiral Mullen replied that
Egypt's leadership on Sudan was critical and looked forward
to increased cooperation between Egypt and Special Envoy
Gration.
------------------
Piracy and Somalia
------------------
¶9. (S/NF) Admiral Mullen stressed that piracy was an

international crime that needed an international solution,
especially on support for trying captured pirates. The U.S.
did not want Somalia to become the next safe haven for
al-Qaeda after Pakistan, he stressed. Soliman replied that
there were not enough ships in the region to provide adequate
security against pirate attacks and recommended that the
international community, through the UN Security Council,
focus counter piracy efforts on the Somali shore.
¶10. (U) Admiral Mullen did not have the opportunity to clear
before his departure.
SCOBEY
84
2005-08-01 2010-11-30 Embassy
05CAIRO5924 SECRET
16:04 16:04 Cairo
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
SIPDIS
NEA FOR FO, ELA

S/WCI FOR AMB PROSPER AND RMILLER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2015

TAGS: PTER EG GTMO
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN GTMO DETAINEES - STATUS OF
DISCUSSIONS
REF: CAIRO 5589 AND PREVIOUS
Classified By: CHARGE STUART E.JONES, REASONS 1.5 B AND

D
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: In the context of the close and sustained

cooperation between the USG and GOE on counterterrorism, Post
believes that the written GOE assurances regarding the return
of three Egyptians detained at Guantanamo (reftel) represent
the firm commitment of the GOE to adhere to the requested
principles. These assurances were passed directly from
Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) Chief Soliman
through liaison channels -- the most effective communication
path on this issue. General Soliman's word is the GOE's
guarantee, and the GOE's track record of cooperation on CT
issues lends further support to this assessment. End summary.
EGYPTIAN ASSURANCES
-------------------
¶2. (S) As stated in reftel, Post has received written

assurances from the Egyptian General Intelligence Service
85
(EGIS) regarding the acceptance and humane treatment of three
Egyptians currently detained in Guantanamo:
-- Abdul Rahman Mohammed AL-MARZOUQ, ISN US9EG-

00369DP;
-- Allah Muhammad SALEEM, ISN US9EG-00071DP;
-- Sami Abdul Aziz Salim ALLAITHY, ISN US9EG-000287DP.
Post believes that these assurances represent a firm

commitment by the GOE to handle the matter in accordance with
our stated principles. We recommend that the interagency
consider approving transfer now on the basis of these
assurances.
DIRECT CHANNEL
--------------
¶3. (S) Post has established that the most effective conduit
for addressing this issue is through Cairo Station - EGIS
Liaison. The written assurances (reftel) were passed directly
from EGIS Chief General Soliman through this channel.
General Soliman's stature and power in the Egyptian
establishment, and his history of close cooperation with the
USG on counterterrorism, corroborate the Egyptian intent take
responsibility for the detainees in such a way that protects
both U.S. and Egyptian security interests. In addition to
the written assurances regarding the detainees treatment,
EGIS has conveyed orally to Cairo station that all three will
be taken into custody upon arrival in Egypt and will be
investigated and prosecuted in accordance with Egyptian law.
¶4. (S) We understand the need for specific language on this

matter. However, the danger of seeking specificity beyond
what we have already received in EGIS' written assurances is
that EGIS may decide to turn the case over to the MFA. MFA
involvement will complicate the process and delay disposal of
the cases.
Visit Embassy Cairo's Classified Website:
86
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/cairo
You can also access this site through the

State Department's Classified SIPRNET website.
JONES
87
Reference
Created Released Classification Origin
ID
2008-01-02 2010-11-28 Embassy
08CAIRO9 SECRET
18:06 18:06 Cairo
VZCZCXYZ0001
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DE RUEHEG #0009/01 0021807

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021807Z JAN 08
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INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1637
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0246
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0972
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 1126
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1849
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0945
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2018

TAGS: PREL PGOV IS IZ SY EG
SUBJECT: CODEL VOINOVICH MEETING WITH EGIS CHIEF
SOLIMAN
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Stuart Jones

Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D)
¶1. (S) Summary. EGIS Chief Omar Soliman told Ambassador and
a visiting Codel led by Senator George Voinovich December 31
that he is optimistic progress will be made on
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. However, Soliman was
concerned with continuing Israeli criticism of Egyptian
anti-smuggling efforts. He was worried that the Egyptians
88
would not be able to work out an arrangement with the
Israelis for Hajj pilgrims to return to Gaza. On Iran,
Soliman said that the USG's release of the National
Intelligence Estimate had altered the calculus through which
Arab states are interacting with Iran. On Iraq argued that
the Iraqi government needed to amend its constitution and
that Prime Minister Malaki should not deal with the Iraqi
people in a "sectarian way." End summary.
¶2. (S) Soliman led off the New Year's Eve meeting by telling
the Codel that the region is at a special, critical juncture.
Egypt is America's partner. Sometimes we have our
differences. But Egypt will continue to provide the USG with
its knowledge and expertise on the critical regional issues,
such as Lebanon and Iraq. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict
remains the core issue; Soliman contended a peaceful
resolution would be a "big blow" to terrorist organizations
that use the conflict as a pretext. For this reason,
President Mubarak is committed to ending the Israeli-Arab
"stalemate."
¶3. (S) Soliman applauded the Administration's efforts,

commenting that Annapolis had given hope and begun a process.
The timing is right for progress based on four factors.
First, the PA leadership is moderate and willing to
negotiate. Second, Hamas is isolated and politically cut off
in Gaza. Third, the Israelis are ready for peace; Soliman
assessed that the GOI coalition is broad and strong, and
larger than Rabin's coalition of the mid-nineties. Fourth,
Arab states are ready to see an end to "the struggle."
¶4. (S) Soliman stressed that Egypt stands ready to help the
U.S. effort. The GOE knows both the Palestinians and the
Israelis, and knows the obstacles to peace. Soliman
recommended two steps be taken. First, both the Israelis and
Palestinians must be pressed hard to sign an agreement, which
the U.S. and international community could endorse, to be
implemented at the proper time. Second, the U.S. should
insist that "phase one" of the Roadmap should be completed
before the end of 2008.
¶5. (S) Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Soliman opined that the

Palestinian Authority was ready to sign an agreement, but
89
that establishment of a state may take between 1-3 years.
While Hamas is isolated politically and unable to stop an
Israeli-PA agreement, it remains entrenched in Gaza, and it
was unclear to Soliman how long that would last. At one
point in the discussion, Soliman seemed to imply Hamas may
remain in control of Gaza for more than a year; at another
juncture, he told Senator Voinovich that if negotiations
proceeded briskly, Hamas may be forced to cede power in Gaza
in 3-4 months. The bottom line for Hamas, according to
Soliman, is that they must be forced to choose between
remaining a resistance movement or joining the political
process. They cannot have it both ways, he said.
¶6. (S) Palestinian training: Soliman reiterated GOE

willingness to train and support Palestinian security forces.
He claimed that the GOE had training facilities ready, but
that he was waiting for an answer from U.S. Security
Coordinator General Keith Dayton. (Note: We have advised
Soliman that initial training of Palestinian security forces
will take place in Jordan, and that we will revisit the
option of training in Egypt this spring. End note). He
continued that the GOE would keep pressure on Hamas but will
maintain "low-level" contacts with Hamas. Egypt, he said,
wants Hamas isolated. The Qassam rocket attacks must stop.
When they do stop, the GOE will ask Israel to "meet quiet
with quiet."
¶7. (S) Border issues: Senator Voinovich asked Soliman why

the Israelis continue to report problems with Egypt's
anti-smuggling efforts. Soliman said that the Israelis do
not complain to him directly, and that GOI-GOE cooperation
and exchange of information continues. He was at a loss as
to why Israeli politicians continue to criticize Egypt
publicly. The GOE would like the USG to be included in the
GOI-GOE LAWIO discussions, but the Israelis continue to
object. "They don't want a witness in the room," Soliman
said. Nevertheless, Soliman was willing to turn the page.
"We have a short time to reach peace. We need it. We need
to wake up in the morning with no news of terrorism, no
explosions, and no news of more deaths. We want everyone
happy. That is the Egyptian dream."
¶8. (S) Syria: Congressman Turner asked if Iran and/or Syria
90
might be play a spoiler role. Soliman answered that Syria
wants desperately to halt the United Nations special tribunal
on the Hariri assassination. At the same time, the SARG is
ready to negotiate with the Israelis, and Soliman believed
that the GOI also is ready. Syria, Soliman said, can be
induced to play a constructive role but added that there are
no guarantees, however, on Syrian performance.
¶9. (S) NIE: Regarding the USG's National Intelligence

Estimate of Iran's nuclear program, Soliman was concerned
that many in the Arab world were recalculating their position
vis a vis Iran based on an assumption that the NIE
represented a USG policy shift. Soliman said the Egyptians
are working to correct this misimpression among Arab states.
"We tell the Arab world: Don't be happy with the NIE and
don't warm up to Iran. We know that the United States will
never allow Iran to have a nuclear bomb."
¶10. (S) Iran: Soliman said that Iran remains a significant

threat to Egypt. It continues to influence Shiaa in Iraq and
the Gulf. Iran is supporting Jihad and spoiling peace, and
has supported extremists in Egypt previously. If they were
to support the Muslim Brotherhood this would make them "our
enemy," he said. The GOE continues to press the Iranian
regime to turn over extremists given "safe harbor" in Iran.
This issue, he said, will remain an obstacle to improving
Egyptian-Iranian relations. (Soliman met with Iranian former
nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani earlier in the week.
Larijani was in Egypt on a week-long "private visit."
¶11. (S) Iraq: Soliman said he remains concerned that the

Maliki government in Iraq is not representing all Iraqis
(i.e. the Sunni population). The GOE has urged Maliki not to
deal with the Iraqi people in a sectarian way, and to amend
to constitution to allow greater Sunni representation. In
addition, the Iraqi government must remove militias from the
ranks of the army and police. In the long run, Soliman did
not think that the decrease in violence would be sustainable
absent these two steps. In addition, Iranian influence is
problematic. Soliman said that the GOE had worked to
reconcile 21 clans and tribes in Iraq, with good results, and
that this kind of efforts had to continue. He assessed that
both Sistani and Sadr were practical men, and able to be
91
dealt with.
¶12. (U) Delegation composition:
Senator George Voinovich (R-OH)

Congressman Mike Turner (R-OH)
Congressman Steve Pearce (R-NM)
Congressman Rob Bishop (R-UT)
Congressman Phil Gingrey (R-GA)
¶13. (U) The delegation did not clear this message.

Ricciardone

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TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EG
SUBJECT: CODEL BAIRD MEETS WITH EGYPTIAN LEADERS
ON MARGINS
OF WEF
92
¶1. (C) Summary: Codel Baird discussed Egyptian and regional
issues with Egypt's political and business leaders on the
margins of the May 18 - 20 World Economic Forum (WEF) in
Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt. President Mubarak, Intelligence
Chief Omar Soliman, and presidential son Gamal Mubarak
focused on the need for deep engagement to resolve the
Israeli/Palestinian crisis and to hinder Iran's growing
influence in the region. On Iraq, Mubarak said "you cannot
leave" but advised strengthening the military and allowing a
"fair" dictator to come to power via a coup. "Forget
democracy," he opined, "the Iraqis are too tough by nature."
On the economic side, Egypt's business leaders regretted the
lack of a U.S.-Egypt free trade agreement and asked the U.S.
to push Egypt harder on good governance and democratic
reform. Codel Baird consisted of Representatives Brian Baird
(D-WA), Christopher Shays (R-CT), Peter DeFazio (D-OR), Jeff
Fortenberry (R-NE), and Jim Cooper (D-TN); Representative
Jane Harman (D-CA) joined the codel briefly on May 18. End
summary.
President Mubarak
-----------------
¶2. (C) The codel began by thanking Mubarak for his positive
leadership on regional issues. Mubarak said that he had
advised Vice President Cheney and other U.S. officials not to
invade Iraq and that "no one listened," but that now "it
would be a mistake" to withdraw forces immediately because it
would further open the door for Iran. Asked about U.S.-Egypt
relations, Mubarak confirmed that "we have very good
relations with the U.S.," but "your administration is not
well-informed." However, "I am patient by nature," he said,
in apparent reference to U.S. criticisms over human rights
and democratization. Congressman Shays encouraged Mubarak
to engage with Iraq as much as possible and asked if Egypt
would send an ambassador, to which Mubarak replied "no, I
cannot do it. When there is stability I am willing, but I
cannot force civilians to go."
¶3. (C) Asked about Egypt's reaction if Iran developed nuclear

weapons capability, Mubarak said that none will accept a
nuclear Iran, "we are all terrified." Mubarak said that when
93
he spoke with former Iranian President Khatami he told him to
tell current President Ahmedinejad "not to provoke the
Americans" on the nuclear issue so that the U.S. is not
forced to strike. Mubarak said that Egypt might be forced to
begin its own nuclear weapons program if Iran succeeds in
those efforts.
¶4. (C) Asked about whether the U.S. should set a timeline for
withdrawal from Iraq, Mubarak said "you cannot leave" because
"you would leave Iran in control." Mubarak explained his
recipe for a way forward: "strengthen the armed forces, relax
your hold, and then you will have a coup. Then we will have
a dictator, but a fair one. Forget democracy, the Iraqis are
by their nature too tough."
Omar Soliman
------------
¶5. (C) Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) chief

Omar Soliman gave the codel an expansive evaluation of the
key issues in the region. He focused on Iran's growing
influence in Iraq, with Hamas, with Hizballah in Lebanon, and
with Shia communities in the Gulf. To solve regional
problems Egypt is working on three tracks - Palestine,
Lebanon, and Iraq.
¶6. (C) Egypt hopes to achieve something soon on the

Palestinian track, he said, but neither side is ready to stop
the vicious circle of violence, although most on both sides
want "quiet." Soliman's job now, he said, is to bridge the
gaps on specific issues like border crossings, prisoner
exchange, and bringing Hamas and the PA back together. He
hoped to see an agreement on borders for a Palestinian state
by the end of 2008, and noted that as a practical matter very
few Palestinian refugees would seek right of return.
¶7. (C) On Lebanon, speaking a week before the Doha agreement

was penned, Soliman said the three problems are Syria's large
influence, lack of power of the majority over militia forces,
and weak Arab support for the government. Syria is seeking a
deal with Israel and the U.S. over returning the Golan and
canceling the Hariri tribunal to lessen its meddling and
Lebanon needs a strong, nationalist army. Soliman bemoaned
94
that the Arab states have too poor relations with Syria to
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push them effectively.
¶8. (C) On Iraq, Egypt meets regularly with Jordan, Saudi

Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and Turkey to discuss reducing Iranian
influence. The GOI must understand it has support from the
Arabs and the U.S., not just Iran, he said. Soliman
advocated making Iran suffer economically to be "too busy
with its people" to make problems in Iraq. Reducing Iranian
influence will help the Iraqi government become one, and not
a competition between Sunni and Shi'a. he said.
¶9. (C) Asked about the consequences of any U.S. strike on

Iranian nuclear capabilities, Soliman said such an attack
would not destroy Iran's nuclear capabilities and would only
unite Iranians with their leadership and against the U.S. He
repeated the need to make Iran "busy with its people" by
effective sanctions, citing the successful example of Libya.
Asked about Sudan, he said that Egypt is still working to
make north-south unity attractive, and to encourage talks
between the GOS and rebels and between Bashir and Deby.
¶10. (C) Asked what it means when Arabs say that the U.S.
"should listen to us," Soliman gave the example that
President Mubarak warned Vice President Cheney about the
consequences of the U.S. invading Iraq. Additionally, "your
unilateral positions on economic aid are difficult."
However, Soliman emphasized that Egypt is keen to continue to
have a "very close" relationship with the U.S.
Gamal Mubarak
-------------
¶11. (C) Gamal opined that the "battle lines are clearer for
Egypt than ever before" on regional issues. The region "will
not realize its full potential as long as geopolitical
problems continue," he said. With the Israeli/Palestinian
problem in particular, "we are racing against time." Gamal
advocated close engagement by the U.S., Egypt, and other
95
countries (NFI) in order to make practical improvements in
the every day lives of Palestinians and develop a framework
for a final deal, with borders as the key issue. Other
regional issues such as Iran and Lebanon are "much more
complicated," he said; "the picture is not that rosy."
¶12. (C) Representative Baird raised the issue of USAID

efforts to assist conservation of Red Sea reefs, which Gamal
agreed was an important issue. Representative Shays asked
Gamal's opinion of Syria President Bashar Al Assad, to which
Gamal replied that "he understands the world better than his
father," but that he is worried that opening up politically
or economically could result in a loss of control.
¶13. (C) Representative Harman asked for Egypt to do more to

fight smuggling to Gaza through tunnels, perhaps by setting
up roadblocks a few miles before the border to intercept
contraband. Gamal said that the border is a "shared concern"
and Egypt is doing what it can to address smuggling.
¶14. (C) Representative Fortenberry asked about how to counter

a developing Iranian nuclear program. Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, as well as Jordan, are the "heavyweights" that can
counter Iran, Gamal said, but he advocated movement on the
Israeli/Palestinian track to remove a prime issue that Iran
can use as a pretext.
American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt

-------------------------------------
¶15. (SBU) The AmCham group led by President Omar Mohanna

(Suez Cement) lamented that the lack of a U.S.-Egypt FTA
continues to push Egypt's trade towards Europe and away from
the U.S. They praised the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ)
program and advocated expanding it to upper Egypt, though
they acknowledged that increasing Egyptian textile exports to
the U.S. would be a sensitive issue in the U.S. textile
lobby. Karim Ramadan (Microsoft) praised the historic role
of USAID in Egypt and asked that it continue with a focus on
education and health, areas in particular need of development
in Egypt.
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TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL PHUM AU EG IR IS SU
SUBJECT: CODEL KERRY MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
MUBARAK
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey, for reasons

1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: On July 2, Senator Kerry and the Ambassador

discussed regional developments with President Hosni Mubarak,
including Zimbabwe, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, and Israel-Palestine.
Mubarak said that Egypt was working to find a solution in
Sudan, but preferred to do so "quietly." Mubarak warned
against a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. While he
called Iranians "liars" and said they sponsor terrorism, he
opined that no Arab state would join the U.S. in a formal
defense alliance against Iran for fear of retaliation.
Mubarak expressed frustration with the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process, and was particularly disparaging about the
lack of Palestinian unity. End summary.
-------------------
AU "Soft" on Mugabe
97
-------------------
¶2. (C) In a 60-minute meeting with President Mubarak in Sharm

El-Sheikh, Senator Kerry began by asking for Mubarak's views
on the discussions at the African Union Summit, which had
concluded in Sharm El-Sheikh the previous day. Mubarak said
he had been at the Summit until late in the evening and was
tired. He reported that some member states had condemned
Zimbabwean president Robert Mugabe, while others told him to
form a national unity government and find a role for the
opposition parties. Mubarak said he couldn't prevent Mugabe
from attending the conference in Egypt because Zimbabwe is a
member of the African Union. He said the British were behind
this "big fuss" and that the pressure from other African
leaders was "sufficiently soft that Mugabe can do what he
wants."
-------------------------------
Sudan: Quiet Diplomacy Is Best
-------------------------------
¶3. (C) In response to Senator Kerry's query about the

situation in Sudan, Mubarak said the issue was not discussed
publicly at the AU summit. He also said "this issue could
have been worked out" if it were not debated so publicly
because "two tribes always work things out." Mubarak noted
Egypt's attempts to "try and help the (Sudanese) people"
through the Egyptian hospital in Sudan and the efforts of
EGIS Director Omar Suleiman to advise on North-South
negotiations.
------------------------------
Iraq: Don't Pull Out Too Soon
------------------------------
¶4. (C) Turning to Iraq, Senator Kerry asked Mubarak if he had

changed his opinion of Prime Minister Al Maliki after Iraq's
successful stabilization efforts in Basra and Sadr City.
Mubarak said he "I am not critical. He came to Cairo. I gave
him my phone number but he hasn't called us." He noted that
Egypt offered to host and train Iraqi forces, but that the
offer had not been acted upon by the Iraqis. He said the
U.S. "cannot withdraw until you strengthen the armed forces
98
and police. Until then you have to stay."
-------------------
Beware The Iranians
-------------------
¶5. (C) Mubarak's top concern for the stability of Iraq and
the region is Iran. He believes that "as a result of the
invasion of Iraq, Iran is spreading everywhere." He urged the
U.S. to be wary of what Iran says. "They are big, fat liars
and justify their lies because they believe it is for a
higher purpose." He said he believes this opinion is shared
by other leaders in the region. Nonetheless, he opined that
no Arab state will join the U.S. in a defense relationship
vis-a-vis Iran out of fear of "sabotage and Iranian
terrorism." He said Iran's sponsorship of terrorism is
"well-known but I cannot say it publicly. It would create a
dangerous situation." Mubarak said that sanctions are the
best hope for containing Iran, but Arab states won't dare to
endorse them.
-----------------------------------
Not Optimistic on The Peace Process
-----------------------------------
¶6. (C) On the Middle East Peace Process, Mubarak said he sees
no progress between Syria and Israel and doesn't expect any
progress between Israel and the PA leadership. He said that
"Palestinians are quarrelling" and Hamas and other factions
will reject any agreement made by Abu Mazen. Senator Kerry
CAIRO 00001637 002 OF 002
suggested the parties appeared to be close in some areas. In

response, Mubarak reiterated he doesn't believe the many
Palestinian factions will reach agreement and, thus, they
only serve to undermine Abu Mazen's efforts.
¶7. (C) This cable was not cleared by CODEL Kerry.

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2019

TAGS: PREL KPAL EG IS QA IR SY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR REQUESTED EGYPTIAN FM
ABOUL GHEIT
MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey

-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (S/NF) Madame Secretary, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit has

been looking forward to meeting you since your nomination was
first announced. The Egyptian leadership, including
President Mubarak, are encouraged by the Administration's
immediate attention to the Middle East and your and the
President's early outreach to them. Overall, the Egyptians
believe they did not receive fair treatment from the previous
Administration and hope to see improvements. Aboul Gheit
likely will explain Egypt's "soft power"--its ability to
100
influence regional events without benefit of deep pockets.
He likely will focus more on the strategic challenges of the
region--the peace process and Iran--but may also address some
pending bilateral matters. He may ask for your support for
Egypt to be part of an expanded G8 or G20 and press the
candidacy of Egyptian Culture Minister Farouq Hosny for
Director General of UNESCO. He may not raise human rights
(specifically Ayman Nour), political reform, or
democratization; but you should. Aboul Gheit will want to
discuss Gaza, including smuggling and counter-tunneling;
Iran; and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. On Iraq and
counter-terrorism, we and the Egyptians see largely
eye-to-eye; intelligence cooperation is close and effective;
and our military-to-military relationship is durable but
stuck in a force-on-force mindset.
¶2. (S/NF) Summary continued: Aboul Gheit is smart, urbane,

with a tendency to lecture and to avoid discussing Egyptian
failings with all-purpose recourse to Egyptian sovereign
pride. However, because this is his first meeting with you
and it is in Washington, he may be more inclined to listen.
You should thank him for Egypt's continuing regional
leadership, in particular regarding their efforts to bring
about a ceasefire in Gaza, and press him for Egypt to
continue to use their influence and good offices to achieve a
permanent solution to intra-Palestinian infighting and
conflict. You should also stress the need for Egypt to more
effectively insure that Hamas cannot rearm via smuggling
across -- or tunneling under -- the border with Gaza. Aboul
Gheit will press for your attendance at the March 2 Gaza
Donors Conference in Cairo, and may complain about unhelpful
Qatari and Syrian behavior. He will also want to explore US
intentions towards Iran; President Mubarak told Senator
Mitchell during his recent visit here that he did not oppose
our talking with the Iranians, as long as "you don't believe
a word they say." End summary.
------------------------
Respect and Appreciation
------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) In terms of regional affairs, Special Middle East

Envoy Senator George Mitchell struck the right chord during
101
his recent visit to Cairo when he told President Mubarak that
he was here to "listen and hear your advice." The Egyptians
have long felt that, at best, we take them for granted; and
at worst, we deliberately ignore their advice while trying to
force our point of view on them. You may wish to thank Aboul
Gheit for the vital role Egypt played in bringing about a
ceasefire in Gaza, and its efforts at making it last. You
should ask him what the current state of play is between
Hamas and Fatah and have him describe Egypt's vision of the
future for the Palestinians, both among their factions, and
vis a vis Israel. Note: Although the Egyptians will react
well to overtures of respect and appreciation, Egypt is very
often a stubborn and recalcitrant ally. In addition, Egypt's
self-perception as the "indispensable Arab state" is
contingent on Egyptian effectiveness on regional issues,
including Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
-----------------------------------------
Egypt and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict
-----------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Although Aboul Gheit was never enthusiastic about

the Annapolis Peace process, resolution of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains the primary strategic
political goal for the Egyptians. They are proud of their
role as intermediary, well aware that they are perhaps the
only player that can talk with us, the Israelis, and all
Palestinian factions. Mubarak hates Hamas, and considers
them the same as Egypt's own Muslim Brotherhood, which he
sees as his own most dangerous political threat. Since the
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June 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza, the Egyptians, under the

leadership of intelligence chief Omar Soliman (the de facto
national security advisor with direct responsibility for the
Israeli-Palestinian account) have shifted their focus to
intra-Palestinian reconciliation and establishment of the
Hamas-Israel ceasefire. Soliman brokered a half-year-long
truce last year, which Hamas broke in December, leading to
the Israeli invasion of Gaza. He has recently re-started
those efforts, with the goal of getting Hamas to agree to a
102
year-long ceasefire, which should give the Egyptians space to
bring about their political goal of Palestinian
reconciliation under a technocratic, non-partisan government
headed by President Mahmoud Abbas.
----------------
Gaza and Tunnels
----------------
¶5. (S/NF) Smuggling through the Sinai Peninsula and into Gaza
is an old and complicated problem for Egypt. Egypt views a
well-armed and powerful Hamas as a national security threat,
a point driven home in dramatic fashion by the January 2008
border breach when Hamas bulldozed the old border fence and
more than half a million Palestinians poured into Egypt,
unchecked and hungry. Since the closure of the Egypt-Gaza
border following the June 2007 Gaza takeover by Hamas, most
smuggling of consumer goods and weapons has gone underground.
The narrow corridor between Egypt and Gaza is as
honey-combed with subterranean passageways as a gigantic ant
colony.
¶6. (S/NF) Although it is not directly in Aboul Gheit's

bailiwick, belonging more to the security and intelligence
forces, nonetheless the issue of tunnels and rearming Hamas
is the subject of intense scrutiny (by Israel and the
Congress), and sensitivity (by the Egyptians). Long
criticized by Israel for "not doing enough" to halt arms
smuggling via tunnels, the Egyptians have stopped complaining
and started acting. Egypt has increased efforts to counter
arms smuggling by accelerating its $23 million FMF-funded
tunnel detection program along the Egypt-Gaza border and
requesting U.S. support to purchase four backscatter X-Ray
machines to scan vehicles entering the Sinai for weapons and
explosives (note Aboul Ghait may not be of this
EGIS-originated request). Egypt also continues to cooperate
with Israel, especially via intelligence sharing, to prevent
militants from Hamas and other extremist organizations from
crossing the Gaza border, and on thwarting militant activity
in Egypt. Egyptian efforts are all justified under President
Mubarak's pledge that Egypt with "protect its borders."
¶7. (S/NF) Egypt will not take any action that could be
103
perceived as collaboration in Israel's siege of Gaza, and
they have been hyper-sensitive to any suggestion that
foreigners are assisting them or overseeing their efforts to
counter smuggling. Aboul Gheit publicly distanced Egypt from
our January MOU with Israel to combat arms smuggling into
Gaza, although he knew about it in advance and consulted with
Secretary Rice and me about its contents. The Egyptians do
not want to be stuck holding the Gaza bag, and must be able
to point the finger of blame at Israel for the plight of the
Palestinians. At the same time, Egypt has withstood scathing
and widespread criticism in the Arab world for refusing to
open the Rafah border crossing to supply Gaza. Even during
the height of the December fighting, the Egyptians only sent
medicine and medical supplies through the Rafah border; all
other humanitarian goods went through the Israeli crossing at
Kerem Shalom. They likewise insist that Rafah will only
reopen to handle Gazan travellers when the Gazan side is
under PA control with EU observers according to the 2005 AMA.
¶8. (S/NF) Ultimately, Egypt believes that the only realistic

and viable solution to erode Hamas' power and stop arms
smuggling is the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza
and the opening of Gaza's border to legitimate trade. While
in the short term we can best assist the Egyptians with
technical know-how and training, long term counter smuggling
success will depend on reducing the financial incentives to
smuggling by providing the Sinai Bedouin with legitimate
economic opportunities and by regularly opening the Gaza
borders to trade, thereby reducing economic incentives to
smuggle.
----------------------------------
The March 2 Gaza Donors Conference
----------------------------------
¶9. (S/NF) President Mubarak told Senator Mitchell that he
CAIRO 00000231 003 OF 004
wanted to personally invite you to the March 2 Gaza Donors

Conference in Cairo. Aboul Gheit will press hard for you to
104
accept this invitation. He is keen to keep up the momentum
on Gaza reconstruction and for Egypt to be seen as taking the
lead in helping the Palestinians. It is very important to
him that this conference be at the ministerial level, and he
will be disappointed if you are unable to accept.
-------------
Iraq and Iran
-------------
¶10. (S/NF) President Mubarak enjoys recounting for visiting

members of Congress how he warned former President Bush
against invading Iraq, ending with, "I told you so!" and a
wag of his finger. In addition, there are Egyptian
misgivings about Nuri Al-Maliki and Shia majority rule in
Iraq. Egypt therefore will need additional prodding to
continue to take steps to help rehabilitate Iraq into the
greater Arab world. You should ask Aboul Gheit when he plans
to fully open the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad and exchange
accredited ambassadors with Iraq (the first Egyptian
ambassador to post-Saddam Iraq was assassinated). As for
Iran, Mubarak has a visceral hatred for the Islamic Republic,
referring repeatedly to Iranians as "liars," and denouncing
them for seeking to destabilize Egypt and the region. He
sees the Syrians and Qataris as sycophants to Tehran and
liars themselves. There is no doubt that Egypt sees Iran and
its greatest long-term threat, both as it develops a nuclear
capability and as it seeks to export its "Shia revolution."
Nonetheless, Mubarak told Mitchell pointedly that he did not
oppose the U.S. speaking to the Iranians, as long as we did
not "believe a single word they say." Aboul Gheit will be
keen to hear your description of U.S. intentions towards
Iran. In his conversation with Senator Mitchell, Aboul Gheit
carefully noting he was speaking personally, expressed more
interest into bringing the Syrians into negotiations again;
President Mubarak was not enthusiastic about dealing with the
Syrians at this time.
------------------------
U.S. Assistance to Egypt
------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) The greatest Egyptian outrage a year ago --
105
Congressional conditioning of $100 million of U.S. assistance
to Egypt -- may now be moot, according to our latest
understanding of the state of play with the FY2009
appropriations language. Beyond the issue of conditioning,
the Egyptians resent the U.S. unilateral decision to cut ESF
in half, from $415 million in FY-08 to $200 million in FY-09,
a level which the Egyptians find embarrassing, not because
they need the money (they say), but because it shows our
diminished view of the value of our relationship. In my
view, it is important to the U.S. to continue an ESF program
aimed at health, education, and poverty eradication to
demonstrate concern for the Egyptian people as opposed to a
strictly military assistance program. Egypt has also been
unhappy with the use of these funds to support democracy in
Egypt. It would be useful if you could urge that Egypt
accept the FY 2009 levels so that we can proceed to program
funds to benefit Egypt, while promising to engage in a
serious review of the conflicts that exist and a desire to
resolve them as soon as possible.
¶12. (S/NF) Concerning military assistance, the Egyptian

political and military leadership feel that they have been
"short changed" by our holding to an FMF level of $1.3
billion, (the same level for 30 years despite inflation), and
which they contrast with increases to our military assistance
to Israel. Finally, Egypt seeks a higher profile in
international financial circles (Finance Minister Youssef
Boutros Ghali was recently named Chairman of the IMF's
policy-setting committee, the IMFC, the first from a
developing country), and Aboul Gheit is likely to ask for
your support to include Egypt in expanded G8 and G20 fora.
---------------------------------
Ayman Nour and Saad Eddin Ibrahim
---------------------------------
¶13. (S/NF) Egypt's political leadership considers our public

chastisement of their treatment of jailed former opposition
Al Ghad party leader Ayman Nour as interfering with internal
affairs and infringement on national sovereignty. Mubarak
takes this issue personally, and it makes him seethe when we
raise it, particularly in public. Aboul Gheit's view is that
106
we have made Ayman Nour a freedom martyr, and a damaging (and
CAIRO 00000231 004 OF 004
distorting) prism through which we view our relationship with

Egypt. Much the same can be said about Saad Eddin Ibrahim,
the outspoken political science professor and democracy
activist who is in self-imposed exile in the U.S. because of
spurious law suits brought against him for allegedly defaming
Egypt. In a negative development in late January, Egypt,s
Attorney General-equivalent took action to advance the only
criminal case pending against Ibrahim. You should press
Aboul Gheit hard on Nour and Ibrahim, and also urge the GOE
to stop arresting other less prominent political activists.
Nour's health is bad and he has served more than half his
sentence; he deserves a humanitarian pardon. You may wish to
lay down a marker for a future discussion on democratization
and human rights concerns. You might note that although you
and the President want to improve the relationship, Egypt
could take some steps to remove these very volatile issues
from the agenda.
------------
Farouq Hosny
------------
¶13. (S/NF) Egypt has mounted a full-scale international

campaign to support the candidacy of Culture Minister Farouq
Hosny for Director General of UNESCO. The Arab League and
the African Union have already publicly stated their
commitment to Hosny, and the Egyptians believe they also have
the support of several Europeans, notably the French. Aboul
Gheit will also seek US support -- or, at least, not to
actively oppose -- the candidacy of Farouq Hosny as the next
Director General of UNESCO. The U.S. informed him last year
that we could not support the candidacy and urged Egypt to
put forward another name. Abould Gheit will argue Hosny's
merits for facing down the Islamic extremists who want to
narrow the space in Egypt for artistic expression. U.S.
objections have been to statements Hosny has made that
"Israel had no culture. . .it stole cultural ideas from
others and claimed them as its own" and other objectionable
107
remarks. If we plan to derail the Hosny candidacy, we must
provide a credible alternate, preferably an Arab and/or
Muslim.
SCOBEY
108
2009-07- 2010-11- Embassy
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SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2019

TAGS: PREL PARM MASS IR IZ KPAL IS EG
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH EGIS
CHIEF SOLIMAN
REF: A. CAIRO 1227

¶B. CAIRO 746
¶1. Key Points:
-- (S/NF) During a June 29 meeting with CENTCOM Commander

General Petraeus, Egyptian General Intelligence Service
(EGIS) Chief Omar Soliman shared his views on Iraq, Iran, and
ongoing efforts on Palestinian reconciliation.
-- (S/NF) On Iraq, Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were

taking a "new position" on supporting Iraqi Prime Minister
Maliki following the Iranian elections and described Egypt's
plans to increase cooperation with the Iraqi government.
109
-- (S/NF) Soliman believed that the Iranian elections and
Hezbollah's electoral defeat in Lebanon presented a "good
opportunity" to reduce Iranian regional interference,
including by improving Syria's relations with the Arab world.
-- (S/NF) On Palestinian reconciliation, Soliman was

pessimistic that an agreement would be reached, but promised
that Egypt would "not give up" and would continue efforts to
undermine Hamas, including by preventing money and guns from
entering Gaza.
----------------------------
Iraq: Extending an Arab Hand
----------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Soliman said Arab countries were looking for ways
to support Prime Minister Maliki during this "crucial time"
for Iraq. General Petraeus thanked Egypt for supporting the
Iraqi government, including by nominating a new Ambassador to
Iraq (ref A) and encouraging other Arab countries to "hold
out a hand in friendship." On President Mubarak's
instructions, Soliman explained, Egypt plans to increase
cooperation with Iraq on a wide variety of political,
security, and economic issues.
¶3. (S/NF) Soliman assessed that Arab leaders were taking a

"new position" on Iraq following the Iranian presidential
elections. He believed that Iranian leaders would "change
their attitude" towards neighboring countries and "supporting
terrorism" abroad, and would focus instead on domestic
issues. Iran cannot afford to "challenge the international
community now," Soliman opined. The challenge, Soliman
explained, was to "bring Iraq back to the Arab world" and
foster support for Maliki. According to Soliman, President
Mubarak told King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia "not to search for
another man," but should instead accept Maliki as Iraq's
leader and support him.
---------------------------------------------
Iran: Elections Present Opportunity for Arabs
---------------------------------------------
110
¶4. (S/NF) Soliman stressed that Egypt suffers from Iranian
interference, through its Hezbollah and Hamas proxies, and
its support for Egyptian groups like Jamaatt al-Islamiyya and
the Muslim Brotherhood. Egypt will confront the Iranian
threat, he continued, by closely monitoring Iranian agents in
Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and any Egyptian cells.
Improving relations between Syria and the Arab world would
also undermine Iran's regional influence. Soliman noted "a
little change" in Syria's attitude on engaging with the Arab
world, adding that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia shared this
view and planned to visit Damascus soon "to help change
Syria's attitude."
¶5. (S/NF) Soliman anticipated that Hezbollah's recent defeat

in the Lebanese parliamentary elections would force the group
to "remain quiet for sometime" as they rebuild domestic
support and counter the perception that Hezbollah is a "tool
of outsiders." With Iran itself focusing on domestic issues,
he continued, it was a "good time to make changes" in Lebanon
and reduce Iran's influence. Egypt will support a Saad
Hariri government and the Lebanese army, Soliman emphasized.
¶6. (S/NF) Soliman said that Iran heeded Egypt's warning

against meddling in domestic affairs (ref B) and supporting
groups like the Muslim Brotherhood. He received a "very
positive message" from Iran's intelligence chief indicating
that Iran would not interfere in Egypt. Egypt planned to
"remain quiet inside Iran" for the time being, but would
continue to recruit agents who "will do what we ask," if Iran
insists on interfering in Egypt. "We hope Iran will stop
CAIRO 00001349 002 OF 003
supporting Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and other cells"

within Egypt Soliman said, "but if not - we are ready."
Soliman said Iranian President Ahmadinejad wanted to attend
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) conference in Egypt July
11-16. If he did attend, President Mubarak would meet with
him and clearly explain that Iranian interference in "Arab
issues" was unacceptable. "We are ready for good relations
with Iran," Soliman noted, but only if Iran ceased
interfering and supporting terrorists in the region.
111
¶7. (S/NF) Because of domestic problems, Soliman believed that
Iran would seek better relations with the Arab world and
suspend its nuclear program for a period of time to avoid a
"war." He also anticipated Iran would try to strike more of
a "balance" between supporting its Hezbollah and Hamas
"tools" and trying to build better relations with the Arabs.
Soliman expressed concern that Iranian influence in Iraq
would spread after the re-deployment of U.S. troops out of
Iraqi cities and the eventual drawdown. General Petraeus
noted that 130,000 U.S. troops remain and that the drawdown
would be gradual. He expressed confidence that Iranian
influence could be contained if Arab countries moved
aggressively to support Iraq.
----------------------------------
Palestinian Reconciliation, Israel
----------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) Soliman explained that Egypt's three primary

objectives with the Palestinians were to maintain calm in
Gaza, undermine Hamas, and build popular support for
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. On Gaza, Soliman said
Egypt worked closely with Israel to coordinate humanitarian
assistance shipments and was encouraging the Israelis to
allow more assistance into Gaza. Soliman said he was still
seeking a "tahdiya" (calm) agreement between Hamas and
Israel, but noted that Israel's lack of a Gaza strategy and
desire to keep Hamas under pressure made any agreement
difficult. On undermining Hamas, Soliman said Egypt has
"stopped" money and arms from entering Gaza. "Hamas feels
they are losing their capabilities," Soliman said, as they
are unable to re-arm using the tunneling network under the
Egypt-Gaza border. The pressure, especially from Egypt's
success at dismantling Hamas' funding mechanism, may render
Hamas "more flexible" than before.
¶9. (S/NF) Palestinians must believe that Abbas is capable of

securing a Palestinian state, Soliman stressed. He noted
recent positive developments in the West Bank, including
improvements in the Palestinian security forces and the
lifting of some Israeli roadblocks to facilitate commerce and
movement. He expressed concern, however, that continued
112
settlement activity, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's
recent "radical" speech, and insufficient economic
development in Palestinian areas were undermining the chances
for resuming peace negotiations. Soliman added that
President Mubarak may invite Nentanyahu and Abbas to Cairo if
efforts to re-start negotiations became "blocked."
¶10. (S/NF) Soliman briefed General Petraeus on his efforts to

facilitate Palestinian reconciliation. Reconciliation
remains elusive, he noted, as neither Hamas nor Fatah really
want an agreement. The Palestinian factions were currently
in Cairo, he said, for discussions on releasing detainees.
Talks were at an impasse, however, as Hamas had suspended
reconciliation talks until Abbas released all Hamas detainees
in the West Bank, which Soliman said Abbas would never
accept. Soliman also doubted that a reconciliation agreement
would be reached by July 7 as Egypt previously announced, and
anticipated that talks would be suspended for one-two months.
Despite the challenge and frustrations, Soliman promised
that Egypt would "not give up" on Palestinian reconciliation.
"It is hard," he continued, "but I am always optimistic. I
consider myself a patient man, but I am loosing patience."
-------------------
Syria, Yemen, Afpak
-------------------
¶11. (S/NF) Soliman hoped Syria would improve its

relationship with the Arab world and the U.S. and stop
serving as "Iran's lifeline" in the region. He also stressed
that Syria must cooperate with Iraq to improve border
security and stem the flow of foreign fighters. Soliman also
called on Syria to drop its insistence that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be solved before Syria will
reach an agreement with Israel on the Golan Heights.
¶12. (S/NF) Soliman expressed concern over instability in
CAIRO 00001349 003 OF 003
Yemen and said Egypt was trying to help President Saleh,

including by providing information on Iranian and Qatari
113
support to the al-Houthi insurgents. General Petraeus noted
U.S. efforts to improve Yemen's capacity to combat
extremists. On Pakistan, General Petraeus said he was
encouraged by the Pakistani military's operations in the Swat
Valley and Northwest Frontier Province, including their focus
on holding and rebuilding effected areas. Soliman credited
the Pakistani government for doing a better job of convincing
people that extremists pose a real threat to Pakistani
national security. On Afghanistan, General Petraeus stressed
the importance of arresting the downward spiral of violence
and improving governance after the September 20 national
elections.
¶13. (U) General Petraeus cleared this cable.

SCOBEY
114
2010-02- 2010-11- UNCLASSIFIED//FOR Embassy
10CAIRO219
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COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS CAIRO 000219
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: ECON EFIN PGOV SOCI EG
SUBJECT: Egypt: Tax Reform Continues As Revenues Meet
Lowered
Expectations
REF: 10 CAIRO 26
¶1. (SBU) KEY POINTS
-- Egypt's Tax Commissioner expects the implementation of the new

real estate law to proceed without significant alternations.
-- He claims that much of the public resistance to filing property

declarations is rooted in people's desire to maintain the secrecy
115
of their wealth, which has traditionally been held in real estate.
-- Egypt's tax revenue is down substantially from last year, but

appears to be on track to meet budgetary expectations.
-- No new tax laws are expected to be presented to the Parliament

prior to the upcoming parliamentary and presidential election
cycles, but the Tax Authority will continue working to automate its
systems and improve data collection in support of expanding and
deepening the tax base.
--------------------------------------------- -------------------
Real Estate Tax Law Unchanged
--------------------------------------------- -------------------
¶2. (SBU) In a February 7 meeting, Ashraf Al Arabi, Egypt's Deputy

Minister of Finance for Tax Policy and Commissioner of the
Egyptian
Tax Authority, told us that he was confident that implementation of
the real estate tax would go ahead as scheduled (ref A). He
acknowledged the negative publicity surrounding the registration of
properties, which had "created anxiety" among taxpayers. Despite
this, he was confident that the plan would move forward with "no
official changes." Referencing President Mubarak's comments last
month, in which Mubarak suggested he might advocate for a
progressive tax structure or possible homestead exemption, Al Arabi
told us that the real estate tax situation had subsequently "been
clarified to the President" and that Mubarak supported leaving the
law intact.
116
¶3. (SBU) Al Arabi explained that there were a number of reasons
for
the public outcry against the real estate tax: Since most income
tax is paid through direct payroll deductions, the vast majority of
taxpayers in Egypt have no experience dealing directly with the Tax
Authority (Note: for taxpayers who have income tax deducted by
their employer, there is no annual tax filing requirement. End
note). His office, Al Arabi said, deals directly with only about
3.1 million corporate and self-employed tax filers. The new real
estate tax registration requirement will now bring 40 million
Egyptians in contact with the Tax Authority. He added that part of
the outcry relates to people's resistance to disclosing their real
estate holdings. According to Al Arabi, Egyptians have
traditionally used real estate as their primary store of wealth,
and people do not want information on their assets disclosed to the
government or made public. This echoes his public comments
suggesting that once holdings are declared, some people,
particularly government employees, might find it difficult to
explain where they got the resources to buy the properties they
own.
--------------------------------------------- -------------------
Revenues on Track, But Reforms Have Slowed
--------------------------------------------- -------------------
¶4. (SBU) In Egypt's fiscal 2009/10 budget, tax revenues are

projected at LE 145.5 billion (US$26.5 billion) down 10.8% from
last year. Actual tax revenues during the first six month of the
fiscal year (July-December) are down 8.5%. Tax revenues from the
Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), the state-owned
oil
company, which were budgeted to drop 45% due to lower world oil
prices are actually running about 6% lower than the already reduced
budget forecast. With the exception of the EGPC revenue, Al Arabi
asserted that revenues will meet projections and that the shortfall
117
from EGPC taxes could be made up by better than expected revenues
from taxes on treasury bills and bonds, which are taxable for the
first time this year.
¶5. (SBU) Al Arabi said that the onset of the financial crisis in
2008 stalled well-advanced plans to replace the sales and
consumption taxes with a unified Value Added Tax (VAT), and that
he
did not envision much progress in that area until after the 2010
Parliamentary elections and the 2011 Presidential election. He
explained that some articles of the new law might still be passed
even if the complete reform could not yet be addressed.
¶6. (SBU) Al Arabi told us that tax collection procedures had

improved substantially, particularly for corporate taxpayers, and
that the GOE had made progress in closing loopholes and incentives
for tax evasion. Tax preparers are now jointly liable with their
clients for information provided in tax returns. This has removed
much of the incentive for accountants to evade rather than comply
with the law. He said that the Tax Authority still has major
compliance issues with small and mid-sized businesses, many of
whom
deal strictly in cash and lack many of the formal legal and
accounting structures that would aid in tax collection. He
estimated that the government's tax revenues currently amount to
13-14% of GDP, but that by taxing the large informal economy, this
could rise to 20%.
--------------------------------------------- -------------------
Improvements in Data Collection Are the Key
--------------------------------------------- -------------------
¶7. (SBU) El Arabi, who has been in his current position for a
118
little less than three years, comes from a private sector
accounting and auditing background. He stated that the
reorganization he has done in the Tax Authority has proven
difficult. He pointed to the example of consolidating the 64 "tax
regions" that had previously existed into the 15 regions that exist
today. This consolidation removed a great deal of redundant
bureaucracy, but also limited promotion possibilities for Tax
Authority employees. He said successes in automation and
segmentation meant that the Tax Authority was "no longer a soft
administration" within the government.
¶8. (SBU) Al Arabi credited US assistance through USAID with

much of the progress in both automation and training within the Tax
Authority. He added that further progress in tax collection will be
reliant on the quality of information gathered and the proper
analysis of that data. He said he plans to create an "internal
inspection unit" and will build an "intelligence center" for data
collection and verification.
-------------
Comment
-------------
¶9. (SBU) Lower revenues and higher budget deficits remain a worry
both for Egyptian policy makers and the rest of the financial
community. Egypt does, however, appear to be on track to meet its
tax revenue projections for the year. As reported septel, the
spending side of the equation is less promising, as greater than
expected expenditures on subsidy programs and fiscal stimulus
packages continue to put a strain on the overall budget. Public
discontent with many of the measures proposed by Finance Minister
Youssef Boutros Ghali, including the real estate tax, continues to
be reflected in the press and among some members of the Parliament.
119
However, all indications are that Boutros Ghali continues to have
the support of the President, and the much needed fiscal reforms he
has been promoting will continue, though perhaps at a slower pace.
SCOBEY
120
121

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015

¶1. (C) In a September 28 meeting with PDAS Elizabeth

¶2. (C) PDAS Cheney, joined by DAS Carpenter, Charge, and

¶3. (C) Turning to the September 7 presidential election,

¶5. (C) The PDAS noted the USG's continuing encouragement of

¶6. (C) Gamal termed the controversy over domestic observers

¶7. (C) Turning to the parliamentary elections, which will

¶9. (C) Gamal provided an overview of the new process. He

¶10. (C) Gamal said that the parliamentary elections would

¶11. (C) More important, he argued had been the information

¶13. (C) He also argued that the special candidacy rules in

¶15. (C) At Gamal's invitation, the PDAS and DAS later

¶16. (U) PDAS Cheney cleared this message.

DE RUEHEG #2010/01 0931059

NSC STAFF FOR SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016

¶1. (C) The public profile of Gamal Mubarak, presidential son

¶2. (C) The issue of presidential succession is the hottest

¶4. (C) Gamal's February engagement to the 24 year old

¶6. (C) Later that evening, Gamal made a rare appearance on a

¶7. (C) On his alleged presidential ambitions, Gamal told

¶8. (C) Abdel Halim Qandil, editor of the Nasserist weekly

¶10. (C) An article that appeared March 23 in the maverick

¶11. (C) Despite the sniping of many Egyptian opinion-leaders,

¶12. (C) There are currently almost no other Egyptian

¶13. (C) Another possible exception could be Arab League

¶14. (C) The intra-family politics of a Gamal succession bid

¶16. (C) The legal/electoral stage, rearranged in 2005 with

DE RUEHEGA #1417 1341423

NSC FOR WATERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2017

REF: A. CAIRO 671

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE,

¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENTIAL

¶2. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS FOND OF OBSERVING

¶3. (C) CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 76, WHICH PREVIOUSLY

-- A PARTY HAS TO HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR AT

-- ITS CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE

-- THE PARTY WOULD HAVE TO HOLD AT LEAST 3% OF

¶5. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WHO BEGAN HIS FIFTH 6-

¶7. (C) MANY IN THE EGYPTIAN ELITE SEE HIS SUCCESSION

¶8. (C) A KEY STUMBLING BLOCK FOR A GAMAL ANDIDACY

¶9. (C) EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND MUBARAK

¶10. (C) THE CHARISMATIC ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY

¶11. (C) CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO OBVIOUS CONTENDER

¶12. (C) OF THE 10 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS IN 2005,

DARK HORSE AND ALSO RANS

¶13. (C) POPULAR REFORMIST MINISTER OF TRADE

¶14. (C) SAFWAT ELSHERIF (NDP SECRETARY GENERAL

¶15. (C) WHILE THE SPECTER OF AN MB PRESIDENCY

¶16. (C) WHOEVER EGYPT'S NEXT PRESIDENT IS, HE WILL

DE RUEHEG #2669 2411434

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2012

Classified By: Minister Counselor for Economic and Political

¶1. (C) Mohamed Farnawany, senior advisor to Gamal Mubarak,

¶2. (C) Poloff told Farnawany that the current focus on

DE RUEHEG #2871/01 2661601

STATE FOR NEA/ELA; NSC FOR RWATERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2017

REF: A. CAIRO 2839

Classified By: ECPO Minister Counselor William R. Stewart

¶1. (C) Egypt faces uncertainty as it moves towards a