برقيات السفارة الأمريكية فى الرياض - ويكيليكس

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2010-02-12 2010-12-10 Embassy
10RIYADH184 SECRET
14:02 21:09 Riyadh
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRH #0184/01 0431416

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121416Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2481
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T RIYADH 000184
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, EEB/ESC/IEC (MONOSSON),

S/CIEA
(GOLDWYN, SULLIVAN), S/SECC (STERN, PERSHING,
ROCHBERG)
DEPT PASS TO DOE FOR JONATHAN ELKIND, JAMES HART
E.O. 12958 DECL: 02/09/2020

TAGS KGHG, SENV, EPET, ENRG, PREL, SA
SUBJECT: TWO FACES OF SAUDI ARABIA’S CLIMATE
NEGOTIATING
POSITION
REF: A. 09DHAHRAN 201 B. 09RIYADH 1302 C. 09RIYADH
1397 D. 09RIYADH 1492 E. 09RIYADH 1557 F. 09RIYADH 1642
G. RIYADH 103 H. SECSTATE 3080 I. SECSTATE 11182
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
Summary
-------
4
¶1. (S) Saudi Arabia is officially still studying the issue of whether to
associate with the Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change. Behind
the scenes, we understand serious discussions are taking place about
which road will best serve the Kingdom’s long term interests. On one
hand, Saudi Arabia’s lead climate change negotiator has criticized
the Copenhagen process in private and in public, arguing that the
UNFCCC process is the only acceptable legal framework. On the
other hand, Saudi officials are very eager to obtain investment
credits for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) and other technology
transfer projects that will only become available once an agreement
has been reached. Saudi officials express concern about the impact a
transition to a low-carbon energy mix will have on the country’s
revenue stream at a time when it faces enormous financing needs to
transform its economy to create jobs for its young, growing
population. It also fears imposed economic costs associated with
“demonizing” oil. Part of the explanation for this schizophrenic
position is that the Saudi Government has not yet thought through all
the implications of a climate change agreement, in part because it
may not fully understand the various demand scenarios. There
appears to be a growing sense within the SAG that it may be in
danger of becoming isolated on climate change, which may prompt a
re-examination of its position. Saudi officials have suggested that
they need to find a way to climb down gracefully from the country’s
tough negotiating position. More sustained engagement in
coordination with other governments, particularly if pitched as an
effort to develop partnership, may help them do so. End Summary.
Saudi Arabia not yet Decided on Copenhagen Accord

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶2. (C) Saudi Arabia’s lead climate change negotiator Dr.

Mohammad Al-Sabban told Econoffs February 3 the United States
should adopt a more inclusive, transparent approach to United
Nations Forum for Climate Change Cooperation (UNFCCC)
negotiations. Although he was encouraged by President Obama’s
attitude towards developing country partners in the negotiations, Al-
Sabban said the parties needed to “learn from the mistakes” of
Copenhagen in thinking about preparing for the next Conference of
Parties (CoP) in Mexico. Al-Sabban said developing countries felt
their Danish hosts forced them to decide on the Copenhagen Accord
with practically no notice. Heads of state were also called into the
negotiations too early and they applied too much pressure “when the
deal was not there,” he said. In specific response to the U.S. request
5
for support for the Copenhagen Accord (ref H), Al-Sabban said
Saudi Arabia was still studying the accord to determine its position.
The SAG cares about the environment, but it also must care for its
citizens, he said.
Addressing Saudi Economic Concerns Key to Progress

--------------------------------------------- -----
¶3. (C) Asked how to move forward on a global climate change

commitment, Al-Sabban agreed negotiations need a “speedy
outcome,” and said countries need to rebuild trust and confidence
through more transparent negotiations. He reminisced fondly about
the inclusive nature of the initial Kyoto Protocol negotiations, which
he said should be replicated in Cancun. Al-Sabban said climate
change negotiations should remain under the UNFCCC and not be
pursued under alternative frameworks.
¶4. (C) Asked about tangible actions to reach national climate change
goals, Al-Sabban said Saudi Arabia’s nationally appropriate actions
would include carbon capture and storage (CCS) credits. He
emphasized Saudi Arabia’s need for technology transfer and foreign
direct investment to mitigate
the adverse impact that emissions-reducing policies may have on the
Kingdom. Al-Sabban said the SAG had closely studied climate
change policies’ potential negative impacts. The Kingdom will need
time to diversify its economy away from petroleum, he said, noting
that a U.S. commitment to help Saudi Arabia with its economic
diversification efforts would “take the pressure off climate change
negotiations.”
¶5. (C) Al-Sabban said the development of renewable energy and

energy efficiency technologies was key to addressing Saudi Arabia’s
domestic energy demand, and he acknowledged the need for
increased energy efficiency awareness. The deployment of CCS
technology, he said, was “crucial” for Saudi Arabia. He said the U.S.
Administration’s rhetoric to end dependence on foreign oil,
reiterated by President Obama in Copenhagen, is antagonistic and
causes genuine fear in Saudi Arabia. The SAG is concerned about the
outlook for oil demand and global production, and fears it will not be
able to diversify in time to reach its development goals.
Shadow Negotiator Suggests Partnership

--------------------------------------
6
¶6. (C) Senior Advisor to the President of Meteorology and
Environment (PME) Fawaz Al-Alamy told Econoffs January 27 the
U.S. and Saudi Arabia share the same values on climate change, but
have different negotiation tactics. Al-Alamy, who joined PME in late
2009 and led Saudi Arabia’s World Trade Organization (WTO)
negotiations, said Saudi Petroleum Minister Ali Al-Naimi wants to
move forward in UNFCCC negotiations. (Note: PME sends three
representatives with Al-Sabban to climate change negotiations. End
note.) Al-Sabban’s negative approach to negotiations “disheartens”
him, as does the ongoing “blame game” on climate change. Saudi
Arabia, like China and India, needs to behave like an emerging
economy rather than a developing country, he said. Al-Alamy noted
he had met the previous day with both the Chinese and the Indian
Ambassadors to the Kingdom to discuss climate change.
¶7. (C) Al-Alamy recommended several steps for U.S. engagement

with Saudi Arabia on climate change, including active outreach to all
the key players including Al-Sabban, Petroleum Minister Al-Naimi,
and PME President Prince Turki bin Nasser. Al-Alamy
recommended the U.S. reach out to the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) Secretary General, who has the power to tone down the alarm
in the rest of the Arab world, such as in Egypt. Al-Alamy
recommended the U.S. continue to coordinate its approach with
other Embassies, which he said has been very effective. Asked how to
get beyond the Kyoto Protocol lens through which Al-Sabban views
climate negotiations, Al-Alamy quickly replied “he only has two
more years to talk about Kyoto” before it expires.
¶8. (C) Al-Alamy said that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi strongly

supports solar energy as he believes it will displace oil currently used
in the power sector and ultimately increase oil exports. Saudi Arabia
currently uses 1.5 million barrels per day to produce electricity and
water, he said. The Kingdom is considering beginning a civilian
nuclear program, and top leadership including Minister of Foreign
Affairs Saud Al-Faisal supports the increased use of renewable
energy sources. Some, however, view Copenhagen as a serious threat
to Saudi Arabia’s economic stability. “Ask any Saudi,” Al-Alamy
said, “they all think Saudi Arabia will be asked to foot the bill for
climate change.” Al-Alamy outlined Saudi Arabia’s top concerns,
including its strong aversion to mixing trade and environmental
priorities. If duties are placed on oil and gas, Saudi Arabia will not be
able to move ahead with its economic diversification plans, and this
7
creates a “phobia” of climate change talks, he said. The Saudis also
resent the U.S. when it makes decisions “without consulting its
friends.” Al-Alamy said Saudi Arabia, and Al-Sabban in particular,
needs to feel like a partner of U.S. decision making.
Is Al-Naimi the Problem?

------------------------
¶9. (S) Minister Al-Naimi has consistently been rational and practical
in talking with western delegations about climate change, noting that
Saudi Arabia had to address its development concerns, but conceding
that the world needs to work together to address climate change.
These reassuring statements stand in sharp contrast to Al-Sabban’s
public comments, such as questioning the science behind climate
change just before Copenhagen, and his often obstructionist
behavior, as reported by a number of Embassies in Riyadh, during
working-level negotiations. Senior Ministry of Petroleum officials
have reassured us after each of Al-Sabban’s public outbursts over
the last six months that he has been “tamed” and brought back onto
the reservation. The frequency and number of times that Al-Sabban
steps out of line, and the apparent lack of any sanction, raises
questions about the real Saudi position on climate change.
¶10. (S) A recent conversation with UK Embassy officers suggests

that indeed Al-Naimi may have some questions about climate change.
They report that Al-Naimi was sharply critical of the Copenhagen
meetings and the climate change effort in general, in marked contrast
to earlier meetings. He complained that heads of state were brought
in to negotiate the final stages, which prevented Saudi Arabia from
voicing its true opposition to several elements. He also questioned the
legality of the Copenhagen process and its future direction.
¶11. (S) A senior Ministry of Petroleum official explained that,

leaving Copenhagen, the Saudi delegation was convinced that the
Copenhagen accord would not attract significant support, apparently
largely based on Al-Sabban’s analysis. The Minister’s office was
unpleasantly surprised by mid-January, when it was clear that a
number of countries had already associated themselves with the
accord. Assistant Petroleum Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman
told EconCouns that he had spent two days walking Minister Al-
Naimi through each of the 90 plus submissions on the UNFCCC web
site. Prince Abdulaziz told the Minister that Saudi Arabia had missed
a real opportunity to submit “something clever,” like India or China,
8
that was not legally binding but indicated some goodwill towards the
process without compromising key economic interests. The Prince
intimated to EconCouns that Al-Sabban would not long retain his
position, and said the challenge for Saudi Arabia was to find a way to
“climb down” from its negotiating position.
Comment
-------
¶12. (C) All indications are that Saudi officials are intensely
discussing what position the country should take. We believe that the
message is getting through, that there is a broad consensus among
countries that tangible action needs to be taken now to address
climate change. We also think that Saudi leaders are beginning to
understand that they are in increasing danger of being left behind.
They do have significant, legitimate concerns about how this process
will affect their long-term livelihood. Our conversations, however,
with officials in Finance, Petroleum and the other economic
ministries suggests that they have not done sufficient economic
analysis of the various scenarios to understand what the real impact
of a climate change agreement might be. Such a discussion might
help provide the kind of dispassionate basis to address legitimate
Saudi concerns, while also making a better case for the need to take
action to mitigate increasing emissions. We take as an encouraging
sign the fact that several Saudi officials have noted to us that the
Kyoto agreement only runs for two more years, suggesting that some
at least understand the need to chart a more assured future course.
We take the suggestion seriously that we help the Saudis find a way
to climb down from their current position, ideally by offering the
hand of partnership, which may help persuade the rest of OPEC to
follow suit. For now, we believe that success will require a sustained,
broad engagement with Saudi leadership, as we think the problem is
more than just a rogue negotiator, but some broadly shared fears
about the future, and uncertainty about the way forward.
SMITH
9
2008-05-14 2010-12-07 Embassy
08RIYADH768 SECRET
09:09 21:09 Riyadh
VZCZCXRO3870
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
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DE RUEHRH #0768/01 1350924
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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8373
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 9548
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000768
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 05/12/2018

TAGS IR, IS, IZ, LE, MASS, MCAP, MNUC, MOPS, PGOV, PINR,
PREL, SA
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAG FM SAYS UN PEACE KEEPING
FORCE NEEDED
NOW
10
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Michael Gfoeller for reasons
1.4
(b) and (d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. S/I Ambassador David Satterfield and an MNF-

I/Embassy Baghdad team met with SAG Foreign Minister Prince
Saud Al-Faisal on May 10. While Iraq was the main topic discussed,
Saud brought up events taking place in Beirut and emphasized the
need for a “security response” to Hizballah,s “military challenge to
the Government of Lebanon.” Specifically, Saud argued for an
“Arab force” to create and maintain order in and around Beirut,
which would be assisted in its efforts and come under the “cover” of
a deployment of UNIFIL troops from south Lebanon. The US and
NATO would need to provide movement and logistic support, as well
as “naval and air cover.” Saud said that a Hizballah victory in Beirut
would mean the end of the Siniora government and the “Iranian
takeover” of Lebanon. END SUMMARY.
Lebanon: A “Military” Problem with a Military Solution
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶2. (S) Opening a discussion with S/I Satterfield focused largely on

Iraq, Saud first turned to Lebanon and stated that the effort by
“Hizballah and Iran” to take over Beirut was the first step in a
process that would lead to the overthrow of the Siniora government
and an “Iranian takeover of all Lebanon.” Such a victory, combined
with Iranian actions in Iraq and on the Palestinian front, would be a
disaster for the US and the entire region. Saud argued that the
present situation in Beirut was “entirely military” and that the
solution must be military as well. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
were too fragile to bear more pressure; they needed urgent backing
to secure Beirut from Hizballah’s assault. What was needed was an
“Arab force” drawn from Arab “periphery” states to deploy to
Beirut under the “cover of the UN” and with a significant presence
drawn from UNIFIL in south Lebanon “which is sitting doing
nothing.” The US and NATO would be asked to provide equipment
for such a force as well as logistics, movement support, and “naval
and air cover.”
¶3. (S) Satterfield asked what support this concept had from Siniora
and from other Arab states. Saud responded that “Siniora strongly
supports,” but that only Jordan and Egypt “as well as Arab League
11
SYG Moussa” were aware of the proposal, lest premature surfacing
result in its demise. No contacts had been made with Syria on any
Beirut developments, Saud said, adding, “what would be the use?”
An “Easier Battle to Win”
-------------------------
¶4. (S) Saud said that of all the regional fronts on which Iran was
now advancing, the battle in Lebanon to secure peace would be an
“easier battle to win” (than Iraq or on the Palestinian front).
Satterfield said that the “political and military” feasibility of the
undertaking Saud had outlined would appear very much open to
question. In particular, attempting to establish a new mandate for
UNIFIL would be very problematic. Satterfield said the US would
carefully
RIYADH 00000768 002 OF 002

study any Arab decision on a way forward. Saud concluded by
underscoring that a UN/Arab peace-keeping force coupled with US
air and naval support would “keep out Hezbollah forever” in
Lebanon.
¶5. (U) Ambassador Satterfield has cleared this cable.
FRAKER
12
2009-05- 2010-12- Embassy
09RIYADH651 SECRET//NOFORN
11 10:10 07 21:09 Riyadh
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SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP (JHARRIS), R (MARK

DAVIDSON), NEA/PPD (WALTER
DOUGLAS)
EO 12958 DECL: 10/20/2050

TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PTER, ECON KISL, SA
SUBJECT: IDEOLOGICAL AND OWNERSHIP TRENDS IN THE
SAUDI MEDIA
Classified By: CDA David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary: The Saudi regulatory system offers the al-Saud
regime a means to manipulate the nation’s print media to promote its
own agenda without exercising day-to-day oversight over journalists,
and Saudi journalists are free to write what they wish provided they
13
do not criticize the ruling family or expose government corruption.
In addition, most media in Saudi Arabia--print and electronic--are
owned by royal family members, and accordingly self-censorship is
the order of the day. In comparison to a few years ago, however, the
media business in Saudi Arabia is dynamic, fueled by increased
demand by Saudi and pan-Arab audiences, new licensing agreements
with US and other international media, and an unprecedented level
of openness to outside ideas.
2.In interviews with Embassy and Consulate Jeddah officers before

the early December Eid holiday, XXXXXXXXXXXX editors and
XXXXXXXXXXXX TV managers outlined key elements of these
trends and adumbrated how the long hand of the al-Saud--motivated
by profit and politics--retains a strong hold over media in this
sophisticated new environment, through means ranging from refined
Interior Ministry procedures for recalcitrant journalists, to directives
by King Abdallah himself to adopt progressive perspectives as an
antidote to extremist thinking. End summary.
//Family Business?//
¶3. (S) Embassy press officers met recently XXXXXXXXXXXX.
According to Shuaa Capital, a Gulf-based financial services firm,
SRMG is the largest publisher in the country, with a global
readership well in excess of 180 million and an aggregate market
share of 46.1%.
¶4. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Prince Waleed bin Talal,

he told us, now owns 35% of SMRG, with “private investors”
controlling the rest. Financial reports we acquired list Saudi
businessman Mohammed Hussein Ali al-Amoudi as owning 57.70%
of SRMG at the beginning of 2008, which on paper would give him
(and others he may represent) control of this powerful media
concern.
¶5. (S/NF) It is worth noting, however, that other Saudi editors we’ve
spoken to always refer to the Saudi Research and Marketing Group
as being “owned” by Prince Salman, despite the fact that
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that he is not a shareholder and the
official holdings of XXXXXXXXXXXX amount to only ten percent of
the company. When this was noted by emboff to one of our press
contacts, he told us that it was well-known that Prince Salman owns
SRMG and controls its direction through his son Faisal.
14
//New Direction//
¶6. (S)XXXXXXXXXXXX is representative of a trend we have noted
in all media here: the increase of well-educated, relatively pro-US
Saudis in editorial positions. Technocratically-minded with a
journalism degree from a US university, XXXXXXXXXXXX told us
that the entire SRMG organization has been directed to adopt a
“professional, western-style approach” to the media that would both
increase revenue and reinforce “modern ideas” that the SAG
leadership wishes to purvey as an antidote to extremist ideology.
¶7. (SBU) Although originally founded as an economic daily, “Al

Eqtisadiah” has long been equally known for its political content,
often printing editorials and opinion harshly critical of the US on a
number of fronts. XXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX told us
that XXXXXXXXXXXX recently had a three-hour discussion with
one of Rupert Murdoch’s sons on a deal to publish an Arabic-
language version of the Wall Street Journal, and that SRMG is
trying to win a contract to publish the International Herald Tribune
(uncensored, he emphasized) in Saudi Arabia. XXXXXXXXXXXX
RIYADH 00000651 002 OF 004
//The MBC Group//

¶8. (S) A similar ideological and ownership pattern characterizes the
hugely-successful Middle East Broadcasting (MBC) group, according
to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶9. (S/NF) During a visit to the US Embassy in November for a visa

in preparation for the King’s UNGA and White House summit
meetings, XXXXXXXXXXXX told press officer that while MBC is
owned by King Fahd’s brother-in-law (the non-royal Waleed bin
Ibrahim al-Ibrahim), fifty percent of the profits of the MBC empire
go to King Fahd’s youngest son (and al-Ibrahim’s maternal nephew)
Abdulaziz bin Fahd. XXXXXXXXXXXX on issues relating to al-
Arabiya and other MBC channels. When asked if the thirty-
something prince was interested only in the profits of the station, or if
he also took an active role in the ideological direction of al-Arabiya,
XXXXXXXXXXXX whispered with a grimace, “Both.”
¶10. (S/NF) In a meeting at his XXXXXXXXXXXX office

XXXXXXXXXXXX with Consulate and Embassy press officers,
XXXXXXXXXXXX because of the SAG’s concern that young
Saudis were particularly vulnerable to the calls of extremists, and
that the station now targets its moderate news broadcasts to the 14-
15
18 year old demographic in short presentations of three minutes or
less. He also said that the stations website, Arabiya Net, appeals to a
pan-Arab audience and gets about 100,000 visitors per day. Al
Arabiya and other MBC channels, he said, present programming
that they hope counters the influence of al-Jazeera and fosters
“moderate” perspectives among the country’s youth.
//David Letterman, Agent of Influence//

¶11. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX said the American programming on
channels 4 and 5 were proving the most popular among Saudis. A
look at the December 17 programming menu for MBC channel 4
reveals a 24-hour solid block of such programs as CBS and ABC
Evening News, David Letterman, Desperate Housewives, Friends and
similar fare, all uncensored and with Arabic subtitles. Channel 5
features US films of all categories, also with Arabic subtitles.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that this programming is also very
popular in remote, conservative corners of the country, where he said
“you no longer see Bedouins, but kids in western dress” who are now
interested in the outside world.
¶12. (S) Over coffee in a Jeddah Starbucks, XXXXXXXXXXXX, and

XXXXXXXXXXXX elaborated on the changes in the Saudi media
environment. “The government is pushing this new openness as a
means of countering the extremists,” XXXXXXXXXXXX told
Riyadh press officer. “It’s still all about the War of Ideas here, and
the American programming on MBC and Rotana is winning over
ordinary Saudis in a way that ‘Al Hurra’ and other US propaganda
never could. Saudis are now very interested in the outside world, and
everybody wants to study in the US if they can. They are fascinated
by US culture in a way they never were before.”
¶13. (S) So effective has US programming been, said

XXXXXXXXXXXX, that it is widely assumed that the USG must be
behind it. Some believe, he said, that Prince Talal’s relationship with
Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp and its sister company Twentieth
Century Fox has a clear ideological motive behind it, noting that the
Fox Movie Channel on “Rotana” is available for free to anyone with
a satellite dish. Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX,
liberal-minded supporters of US democracy and society with little
use for conspiracy theory, clearly believed this was the case.
¶14. (S) While revenue from commercials on Rotana’s Fox Movie

Channel probably matter more to Prince Waleed than the
16
dissemination of western ideas (MBC and Rotana are in a bitter
battle for market share) it is easy to understand why
XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX
believe that this programming is having a profound effect on the
values and worldviews of Saudi audiences. During the recent Eid
holiday, Rotana’s “Fox Movies” channel repeatedly aired two
mawkish US dramas (again with Arabic subtitles) featuring
respectful, supportive American husbands dealing with spouses
suffering from addiction problems--in one case gambling (lost the
kids’ college funds and then told her college professor husband it was
because he was boring) and the other alcohol (smashing cars and
china when she RIYADH 00000651 003 OF 004
wasn’t assaulting the husband and child.) These films and others
broadcast over the Eid offer models of supportive behavior in
relationships, as well as exemplary illustrations of heroic honesty in
the face of corruption (“Michael Clayton”) and respect for the law
over self-interest (“Insomnia.”)
¶15. (C) Saudi-produced religious programming on ART and Rotana

also departs from past models. Rotana’s popular religious channel
“Al Risala” features a hip, clean-shaven Saudi in western clothes
offering practical religious advice in a calm and friendly manner.
Jeddah-based Arab Radio and Television company (ART) (owned by
Saleh al-Kamel and according to our contacts being edged aside by
MBC and Rotana) recently featured an MTV-style music video clip
on its “Iqraa” religious channel depicting a group of dissolute young
Saudi men who give up their carousing and return to observance.
They are then shown succeeding in sales presentations and other
interactions at work, gaining the admiration of their colleagues and
supervisors. The young men continue to dress in standard attire,
remain clean-shaven and are fully integrated into normal, workaday
Saudi society. The message of moderation in the religious realm
could not be clearer.
//The Idol//
¶16. (S) The Kingdom’s chattering classes aren’t the only ones
noticing the movement towards moderation and rapprochement with
the outside world that is reflected in print and television media.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told us that religious conservatives call the
Saudi newspaper “Al-Watan” (owned by Prince Khaled al-Faisal)
“Al-Wathan”--the idol. XXXXXXXXXXXX said his network is
referred to as XXXXXXXXXXXX, and that pan-Arab daily “Al
Sharq al Awsat,” with its distinctive green-colored pages, is known as
17
“Khadraa al Domon”--”green plant from the dung heap,” a
metaphor from one of Prophet’s hadiths warning young men of
feminine corruption wrapped in meretricious allure.
¶17. (S) Extremist elements, said all of these contacts, have been
largely deprived of their public voice in the media and on television,
but remain a diminished but still potent force in Saudi Arabia. When
reporting officer noted the enormous security progress that allowed
him to sit outside a crowded Starbucks less than two blocks away
from the Jeddah Consulate--something that would have been
unthinkable two years earlier--XXXXXXXXXXXX shook his head.
“You (Americans) still have to be careful. They’re still out there,” he
said, referring to violent extremists.
//Okaz//
¶18. (S) In a meeting with Jeddah CG and XXXXXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXXXXX was blunt when asked about SAG efforts in
countering extremist thinking. “King Abdallah was here,” he said,
pointing around his well-appointed office XXXXXXXXXXXX in
Jeddah. “He told us that conservative elements in Saudi society do
not understand true Islam, and that people needed to be educated”
on the subject. King Abdallah, he said, used a metaphor of a donkey
to explain how the religious police use the wrong approach. “They
take a stick and hit you with it, saying ‘Come donkey, it’s time to
pray.’ How does that help people behave like good Muslims?”
XXXXXXXXXXXX quoted the king as saying.
¶19. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX also told us that he had taken over the
XXXXXXXXXXXX establishment only two months ago at the
direction of the Minister of Information, and that one of his first
orders of business was to enact dramatic cuts in the sprawling
editorial division. It was clear by the direction of the conversation
that XXXXXXXXXXXX, intends to make sure that the paper falls in
line with the SAG’s message.
//The Stick//
¶20. (S/NF) Although all chief editor positions in Saudi Arabia must
RIYADH 00000651 004 OF 004
be approved by the Minister of Information, it is the job of the
Ministry of Interior (MOI) to take action against editors and writers
who refuse to follow government directives and policies. In the past,
the MOI played a largely reactive role in this regard through its
Supreme Information Council, which would discuss questionable
18
material and order editors to be scolded or fired, or at times ban
publication of the paper for a certain period of time.
¶21. (S/NF) According to our contacts, however, a more effective

system is in place. Instead of being fired or seeing their publications
shut down, editors now are fined SR 40,000 ($10,600) out of their
own salaries for each objectionable piece that appears in their
newspaper. Journalists, too, are held to account. Instead of the
Supreme Information Council in Riyadh taking the lead in tracking
what journalists write, there are now MOI committees in each Saudi
city that know their community well and have a keen ear for who is
talking about what. If these MOI operatives detect a problematic
pattern in a journalist’s writing (or even hear through channels that
he or she is heading down a certain line of inquiry), they will invite
the journalist for a chat, during which they will discuss the origin of
these perspectives, suggest alternative approaches, ask after the
family, etc.,.. These mechanisms, our contacts say, have been very
effective in reining in media opinion that the SAG doesn’t like.
//Al-Hayat and Khaled bin Sultan//

¶22. (S/NF) One of the exceptions to the talking-point consistency of
most Saudi media is pan-Arab daily “Al-Hayat,” which is owned by
Deputy Defense Minister Khaled bin Sultan. XXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶23. (S/NF) When this rather more dynamic editorial environment at

“Al-Hayat” was noted to XXXXXXXXXXXX he told us that Khaled
bin-Sultan actually does not involve himself in the workings of the
paper, provided it never criticizes the royal family or SAG policy. Al-
Hayat, he explained, has more credibility in the Arab world than
rival Al-Sharq al-Awsat, and had to be more daring than other Saudi
print media. “Besides,” said XXXXXXXXXXXX, “information is
power for the al-Saud, and owning Al-Hayat gives Khaled bin Sultan
more influence in the family.”
¶24. (S) Comment: In keeping with other initiatives such as the

Interfaith Dialogue and plans for educational reform, the SAG has
clearly made a strategic decision to open the country to outside
opinion, perspectives and culture to root out the vestiges of the
extremist ideology and vision that threatened their rule. At the same
time, they have refined their methods of control over editors and
journalists in an effort to control the spread of these and other
dissident ideas. End comment.
19
Rundell
20
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TAGS: MASS MOPS PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: SITREP ON SAUDI MILITARY OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE
HOUTHIS, DECEMBER 23, 2009
REF: A. SANAA 2117

¶B. RIYADH 1558
¶C. RIYADH 1570
¶D. RIYADH 1547
¶E. RIYADH 1621
¶F. RIYADH 1633
21
RIYADH 00001667 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: A/DCM Lisa Carle,

1.4 (A), (B) AND (D)
SUMMARY
--------
¶1. (C) Assistant Minister of Defense Prince Khalid bin Sultan

announced in a new conference yesterday (Dec. 22) that Saudi
Arabia's main military operations in the Yemeni border area
had ceased, that the Saudi military had full control of the
border area, and that military activity was now focused on
expelling remaining intruders. His statement is the first
official indication that the fighting might be winding down;
senior Embassy contacts in the Saudi Ministry of Defense as
recently as yesterday were stressing the ongoing urgency of
resupplying aircraft munitions. Prince Khalid also gave the
first official accounting of Saudi casualties since early
November: 73 dead, 470 wounded, and 26 missing. End Summary.
Saudi Arabia Declares Victory

--------------------------
¶2. (C) During a tour of the Saudi-Yemeni border area

yesterday Prince Khaled Bin Sultan, Assistant Minister of
Defense and Aviation, announced to local reporters that the
Saudi military was now in full control of the border area and
that its main operations had ended. "What we are doing now is
bringing things to normal," he said, and that Saudi forces
would remain in the area with a mission of removing any
remaining "infiltrators." Prince Khalid also provided the
first official accounting of Saudi casualties since early
November: 73 dead, 470 wounded, and 26 missing. The Embassy
has been hearing rumors circulating over the past two weeks
that King Abdullah was increasingly upset that the military
campaign had not been wrapped up. Thus political pressure
may have been a factor in the timing of Prince Khalid's
announcement, but given the gravity and urgency with which
the Saudis viewed the challenge from the Houthis, Prince
Khalid's announcement suggests that the Saudi leadership is
22
now convinced that sufficient punishment had been inflicted
upon the Houthis to have taught them a lesson and to put an
end to their border harrassments.
Is it Really Over?
--------------
¶3. (S/NF) The Embassy DAO was told by senior Saudi Air Force
officers on December 22 that Saudi fighter aircraft had
continued to launch attack against Houthi targets in recent
days, sustaining the high tempo that started in the second
week of November. Saudi television was airing footage as
recently as December 21 showing Saudi tanks and artillery
firing in the border area, and Saudi soldiers launching
mortars and firing machine guns. A digest of other key press
reports from recent days is below:
-- (U) Military Successes: Saudi media continue to report

victories, describing in general terms how Saudi forces were
&repelling attacks8 or &pursuing infiltrators and
inflicting heavy losses.8 The Dec. 21 Saudi Gazette
headline boasted of 30 infiltrators killed. Al-Sharq
al-Awsat quoted a military source on Dec. 21 saying that
Saudi forces successfully destroyed a series of caves that
the infiltrators were using to store weapons and ammunition,
but could comment no further than to say that combing
operations continue on the ground while F-15 and Apache
aircraft continue air raids.
-- (U) Religious Support for Saudi Forces: Saudi Press

Agency ) 12/18/09: The Grand Mufti, Sheikh Abulaziz
Al-Sheikh, addressed Saudi forces saying, &Mujahedeen
Brothers, I salute your courage ( and congratulate you on
your Jihad for the sake of Allah. You are facing a corrupt
RIYADH 00001667 002.2 OF 003
and astray enemy of deviant thoughts.8 The Mufti went on to

say that the actions of the armed forces are the highest
deeds of Islam. (Comment: This statement of support by the
KSA,s highest religious authority seeks to reinforce the
message that the truest form of jihad is fighting to defend
23
the nation, and to remind that those who seek to bring the
nation down are deviant in their thoughts. End Comment.)
-- (U) Border Security: Arab News Online ) 12/16/09:

Normalcy Restored at Border, The Saudi military announced
that 127,875 infiltrators and 2,206 smugglers have been
arrested over the past six months on the Saudi-Yemeni border.
&Saudi forces also seized a number of weapons and 14,000
rounds of ammunition. Forces foiled attempts to smuggle 30kg
of gunpowder and explosives, eight sticks of dynamite and
large quantities of narcotic substances in 2,140 cars.8
(COMMENT: The six month time period and large number of
&infiltrators8 arrested make these statistics appear more
closely related to routine border patrol operations than
directly with the fight against the Houthis. This
announcement seems intended to show strong Saudi control over
the border, rather than make a statement about fighting
infiltrators., End comment.)
-- (S/NF) Report from the Houthi Side: Al-Minbar

(pro-Houthi website) and other Houthi sources over the past
week continued to claim that U.S. and Saudi aircraft were
conducting airstrikes on innocent villages. Houthi sources
report 54 Yemeni deaths from a Dec. 20 Saudi air attack and
70 deaths from an attack on Dec. 13. These reports could not
be verified; Yemeni officials continue to deny that any Saudi
planes have strayed into Yemeni airspace. (Comment: a senior
Saudi Air Force officer confirmed to the Embassy DAO that
Saudi aircraft have been operating in northern Yemen with the
Yemeni government's approval and facilitation.)
(U) On Dec. 18, Al-Minbar claimed another successful Houthi

attack on a Saudi military post in Quwwa village &expelling
the Saudi Army and seizing its military equipment ,
communication and surveillance devices and military vehicles
that soldiers left behind.8 The statement on Al-Minbar went
on to justify the Houthi attack against the Saudi forces,
explaining &We do not aim to take control over any part of
the Saudi territories. However, we are forced to chase the
aggressor wherever it carries out attacks against us. This
comes in retaliation for its continuous aggression against
civilians in the northern governorates.8
24
Iran: Still the Bogeyman?
--------------------
¶4. (C) The tacit cease-fire in the Saudi-Iranian war of words

over the Yemen border war seems to be holding. The Embassy
saw unofficial reports on the internet earlier this week that
Iranian Parliament Speaker Larijani might visit Riyadh today
(The Embassy has not been able to confirm these reports.)
Nonetheless, senior Saudi military and civilian officials
seem to uniformly share the conviction that Iran's
machinations are the only plausible explanation for why the
Houthis would have engaged in a fight with the Saudis that
they were bound to lose. Saudi military officials also point
to the improved training and battle tactics of the Houthi,
their deep reserves of weaponry, and several large stores of
money discovered in Houthi areas as further compelling
evidence of Iran's active support.
What's Next
----------
¶5. (C) The days ahead should tell whether there is a

significant stand down in Saudi military operations. Our
assessment is that the Saudi Land Forces have largely
established secure positions along the troubled area of the
Saudi-Yemeni border and that their shooting engagements have
for the most part trailed off into patrolling and monitoring
operations. Saudi air operations to patrol the border and
strike Houthi targets near the border and into Yemen will
likely continue for days or perhaps weeks, until the Saudis
are comfortable that Yemeni government forces have the
capability to suppress any Houthi activity near the border.
RIYADH 00001667 003.2 OF 003
Lessons from the Battlefield

-----------------------
¶6. (C) The last 50 days of Saudi-Houthi fighting have

arguably been the most significant Saudi military engagements
since the tribal battles that Abdulaziz that fought to
25
establish the Saudi kingdom. The Houthi battles will be
intensively studied in the months ahead, including how they
revealed Saudi military shortcomings. The Saudi military,
particularly the Air Force, resorted to the use of enormous
firepower (despite low munitions inventories) that proved to
be inadequately precise and minimally effective against
fighters maneuvering and dug into rugged mountain terrain.
Among questions that merit attention will be to what extent
should the Saudi military restructure itself to respond to
such asymmetrical threats, why the Saudis responded to the
Houthi challenge as such an urgent existential threat, and
whether the perceived inability or unwillingness of the U.S.
to more rapidly provide emergency munitions resupply to the
Saudis in their perceived hour of need will ramifications for
our military to military partnership. These and related
issues will be the focus of forthcoming Embassy analyses.
SMITH
26
2009-12- 2010-12- Embassy
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2019

TAGS: MASS MOPS PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: SITREP ON SAUDI MILITARY OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE
HOUTHIS, DECEMBER 30, 2009
REF: A. SANAA 2117

¶B. SANAA 2279
¶C. RIYADH 1558
¶D. RIYADH 1570
¶E. RIYADH 1547
¶F. RIYADH 1621
27
¶G. RIYADH 1633
RIYADH 00001687 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Amb. James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (A), (B) AND (D)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (C) While there is no open diplomacy being conducted, it

appears the Saudis and the Houthis may be seeking to
disengage from their fighting. Prince Khalid's announcement
on December 23 that major military operations had ended was
followed by a Houthi statement that offered withdrawal from
all positions on the border in return for a cessation of
Saudi attacks. Saudi Land Forces have reportedly ceased
offensive activities, although significant Saudi air strikes
and artillery shelling have continued. It may be that the
Saudis are now starting to turn the fight over to Yemeni
government forces; Yemeni military sources reported today
that they launched several attacks on Houthi positions on
December 28 (Reuters, 12/29). End summary.
SHRINKING MEDIA COVERAGE

------------------------
¶2. (C) Reporting in national Saudi media about the Houthi

fighting has decreased substantially in recent days, with
news about Yemen focusing mostly on the attacks against
Al-Qaida targets. Saudi media reports from the battlefront
say that the Saudi military continues "clearing operations"
and air strikes while insisting that these operations have
not and will not cross into Yemeni territory. Houthi-sourced
reports claim daily air attacks by Saudi and U.S. aircraft.
¶3. (C) After Prince Khalid's 12/23 announcement of Saudi

casualties and his 48-hour ultimatum for the Houthis to
withdraw from Al-Jabri, the Houthis released an official
statement to Al-Quds Al-Arabi. Muhammad Abd-al-Salam,
official spokesman for the Houthis, said: "There is no
objection to our withdrawal from the positions in Saudi
Arabia on the condition that the Saudis stop the aggression
28
and not allow the use of their territories against us. ...
The crux of the problem with the Saudi regime is not the
territory or the border but because we faced Yemeni
aggression from its territories."
¶4. (C) This possible olive branch offered by the Houthis was
apparently not accepted by the Saudis, as the next day the
Saudi newspaper Al-Yawm reported that Saudi tanks, heavy
artillery and planes "pounded the stronghold of the
infiltrators fortified in Al-Jabri inflicting heavy losses
including the deaths of 340 infiltrators and the destruction
of the deserted houses where the enemies were taking refuge."
The actual number of Houthi deaths has not been confirmed,
but both Al-Riyadh and Al-Watan reported on 12/28 that the
village of Al-Jabri was recaptured by Saudi forces. For
their part, the Houthis say there were 31 air strikes on
Al-Jabri.
PRINCE KHALID'S REPUTATION:

ANOTHER CASUALTY OF THE WAR?
----------------------------
¶5. (C) Embassy contacts in the Saudi Ministry of Defense

suggest that the Saudi Land Forces have largely ended
offensive actions since Dec, 23 when Prince Khalid declared
victory and an end to the main Saudi military campaign.
Prince Khalid's decision to stop ground operations probably
means that the Saudi military has been able to clear the
border area of Houthi insurgents.
¶6. (S/NF) We have also heard that Prince Khalid was pressed
to stand down the ground forces because of King Abdullah's
growing ire over three particular issues: 1) why it has taken
so long to expel the ragtag Houthi fighters, 2) how there
RIYADH 00001687 002.2 OF 002
could be so many Saudi casualties, and 3) why the Saudi

military has not proven more capable, given the billions
invested in modernization over recent decades. Some military
officers have speculated that Prince Khalid may have been
removed from his position by the King if not for the return
29
and protection of his father Prince Sultan. At minimum,
within the Saudi leadership Prince Khalid's reputation as a
military leader appears to have been damaged, perhaps ruling
him out as an eventual successor to his father as Defense
Minister.
COMMENT - FINGER-POINTING TIME APPROACHES

-----------------------------------------
¶7. (C) For the last two months, the Saudi military has
employed massively disproportionate force in its effort to
repel and clear the lightly armed Houthi guerillas from the
border area. Day and night aerial bombardment and artillery
shelling have been the main instruments of what is
increasingly regarded within the Saudi military as an
embarrassingly long campaign that was poorly planned and
executed that brought unexpectedly high Saudi casualties
(exact number not known - officially 73 deaths), many
apparently from friendly fire. Nonetheless, the conflict has
been carefully spun as a heroic and successful struggle to
protect Saudi sovereignty.
¶8. (C) During the campaign, the Saudi military turned to the
U.S. for emergency provision of munitions, imagery and
intelligence to assist them to operate with greater
precision. The U.S. military responded with alacrity to the
extent possible, primarily by flying in stocks of ammunition
for small weapons and artillery. However, the great majority
of Saudi requests remain bogged down in the FMS contacting
process or in interagency reviews. Prince Khalid and several
senior Saudi Air Force officers have complained that the U.S.
has not rallied to support Saudi Arabia during its hour of
greatest need. As the Saudi military services seek to divert
blame for the poor management of the Houthi operations in the
weeks ahead, it can be expected that such criticism of U.S.
support will continue, if not sharpen.
SMITH
30
Reference IDCreated Released Classification Origin
2010-02- 2010-12- Embassy
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP: JHARRIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2025

TAGS: PREL PINR SA YM
SUBJECT: (S) SAUDI ARABIA: RENEWED ASSURANCES ON
SATELLITE
IMAGERY
REF: SECSTATE 8892
Classified By: Amb. James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b, c and d)
SUMMARY
--------
¶1. (S/NF) Ambassador met with Assistant Minister of Defense

and Aviation Prince Khaled bin Sultan to relay U.S. concerns
about sharing USG imagery with Saudi Arabia in light of
evidence that Saudi aircraft may have struck civilian targets
during its fighting with the Houthis in northern Yemen.
Prince Khaled described the targeting decision-making process
and while not denying that civilian targets might have been
hit, gave unequivocal assurances that Saudi Arabia considered
31
it a priority to avoid strikes against civilian targets.
Based on the assurances received from Prince Khaled, the
Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the
provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the
Saudi Government. End summary.
USG CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE STRIKES ON CIVILIAN

TARGETS
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶2. (S/NF) Ambassador Smith delivered points in reftel to

Prince Khaled on February 6, 2010. The Ambassador
highlighted USG concerns about providing Saudi Arabia with
satellite imagery of the Yemen border area absent greater
certainty that Saudi Arabia was and would remain fully in
compliance with the laws of armed conflict during the conduct
of military operations, particularly regarding attacks on
civilian targets. The Ambassador noted the USG's specific
concern about an apparent Saudi air strike on a building that
the U.S. believed to be a Yemeni medical clinic. The
Ambassador showed Prince Khaled a satellite image of the
bomb-damaged building in question.
IF WE HAD THE PREDATOR, THIS MIGHT NOT HAVE

HAPPENED
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶3. (S/NF) Upon seeing the photograph, Prince Khalid remarked,

"This looks familiar," and added, "if we had the Predator,
maybe we would not have this problem." He noted that Saudi
Air Force operations were necessarily being conducted without
the desired degree of precision, and recalled that a clinic
had been struck, based on information received from Yemen
that it was being used as an operational base by the Houthis.
Prince Khalid explained the Saudi approach to its fight with
the Houthis, emphasizing that the Saudis had to hit the
Houthis very hard in order to "bring them to their knees" and
compel them to come to terms with the Yemeni government.
"However," he said, "we tried very hard not to hit civilian
targets." The Saudis had 130 deaths and the Yemenis lost as
many as one thousand. "Obviously," Prince Khaled observed,
"some civilians died, though we wish that this did not
happen."
32
HOW THE TARGETS WERE SELECTED
-----------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Prince Khaled gave the Ambassador further

background, explaining that the targets given to the Saudi
Air Force were studied and recommended by a Saudi-Yemeni
joint committee headed by Saudi and Yemeni general officers.
That joint committee reported to him, and no targets were
struck unless they had clearance from this joint committee.
"Did they make mistakes? Possibly." Prince Khaled also
reported that the Saudis had problems with some of the
targeting recommendations received from the Yemeni side. For
instance, there was one occasion when Saudi pilots aborted a
strike, when they sensed something was wrong about the
information they received from the Yemenis. It turned out
that the site recommended to be hit was the headquarters of
General Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, the Yemeni northern area
military commander, who is regarded as a political opponent
to President Saleh. This incident prompted the Saudis to be
more cautious about targeting recommendations from the Yemeni
government.
CEASEFIRE COMING SOON

---------------------
¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Prince Khaled that the USG is
looking to Saudi Arabia to help bring an end to the Houthi
fighting soon. Prince Khaled responded that Saudi Arabia is
"looking for ways to end this conflict in a way that fosters
good relations." He said that he met with President Saleh
last Wednesday to discuss Houthi ceasefire terms, and they
agreed that, so long as the Houthis deliver on the terms they
offered, there should be news about a ceasefire "within a
week." As part of the ceasefire arrangements the Yemeni

military will be deployed on the Yemeni side of the border to
prevent future Houthi incursions into Saudi Arabia. "Then,"
Prince Khaled noted, "we can concentrate on Al-Qaida."
COMMENT
------
33
¶6. (S/NF) Prince Khaled, in addressing the Ambassador's
concerns about possible targeting of civilian sites appeared
neither defensive nor evasive. He was unequivocal in his
assurance that Saudi military operations had been and would
continue to be conducted with priority to avoiding civilian
casualties. The Ambassador found this assurance credible,
all the more so in light of Prince Khaled's acknowledgment
that mistakes likely happened during the strikes against
Houthi targets, of the inability of the Saudi Air Force to
operate with adequate precision, and the unreliability of
Yemeni targeting recommendations. Based on these assurances,
the Ambassador has approved, as authorized in reftel, the
provision of USG imagery of the Yemeni border area to the
Saudi Government. While the fighting with the Houthis
appears to be drawing to a close, the imagery will be of
continuing value to the Saudi military to monitor and prevent
Houthi incursions across the border as well as enhancing
Saudi capabilities against Al-Qaeda activities in this area.
SMITH
34
2006-12- 2010-12- Embassy
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Appears in these articles:
http://www.spiegel.de
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TAGS: PREL EFIN PTER IZ IR SA
SUBJECT: xxxxxxxxxxxx ON IRANIAN THREATS
Classified By: Ambassador James C. Oberwetter for reasons 1.5 (b)

and (
d).
(S/NF) Summary: xxxxxxxxxxxx told Assistant to the President for

Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend that he
was speaking for the King when he urged action to counter
Iranian threats. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he worries more about an
Iranian missile launch against Saudi oil facilities than a
terrorist attack against them, because he can take
preventative measures against terrorism but not against
Iranian missiles. On the Iranian banking initiative, xxxxxxxxxxxx
urged getting action from the UAEG to freeze what he claimed
35
was up to $12 billion in Iranian assets in Dubai-based banks.
xxxxxxxxxxxx also discussed the failure to establish a charities
commission, and the need to replace the head of Saudi's
financial intelligence unit, as well as the King's personal
security measures. End Summary.
Iranian Bank Assets and Transactions

-------------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) In an early hour meeting at his palace in Riyadh

November 15, xxxxxxxxxxxx began by asking APHSCT Townsend if
there were any follow-up items from her meetings the prior
day with Prince xxxxxxxxxxxx or Prince xxxxxxxxxxxx.
Townsend noted that xxxxxxxxxxxx had a list of banking institutions
doing business with Iran. We need to use leverage with them,
she added, to get them to do what UBS and Credit Suisse have
done. xxxxxxxxxxxx agreed. He suggested we need to have an
approach, either openly declare the policy as governments or
perhaps get some of the banks to announce a new policy
towards Iran by themselves.
¶3. (S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx saw Dubai as the problem for this new
initiative. He said Dubai has 8-12 banks with extensive
links with Iran, holding up to $12 billion in Iranian assets.
xxxxxxxxxxxx indicated he had met with MBR and MBZ and that
MBZ
was supportive of our efforts. We need to send someone
quickly to the UAE to freeze these assets before the Iranians
begin to unload them. In addition, he continued, the Saudi
Monetary Authority should issue a caution to Saudi banks to
refrain from Iranian transactions or else jeopardize their
international dealings.
Terrorist and Iranian Missile Threats to Saudi Energy

Facilities
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶4. (S/NF) Townsend next raised recent threat information

about Saudi energy facilities. xxxxxxxxxxxx noted that the
Security Facilities Service aims to reach 35,000 personnel,
with all military services contributing to it. xxxxxxxxxxxx said
he was relatively confident in the SAG's ability to handle
terrorist threats to the energy facilities by deploying more
36
forces and building perimeters. The more dangerous threat,
in his view, is a SCUD missile launch from Iran, which could
happen with short or no notice. The Iranians would target
Saudi facilities at Ras Tanura and Jubail, also perhaps the
US bases in Qatar and Bahrain, which would cause the Saudis
to be involved as well, he said. His concern was that
tightening sanctions on Iran will cause Iran to up the ante,
triggering an escalation leading to a missile launch. Given
the possibility of this scenario, he speculated on the option
of a pre-emptive strike. "I would rather be on the offensive
since we are the target," he said, later adding that he meant
a state of military readiness, not offensive action. xxxxxxxxxxxx
stressed that this sense of urgency came from King Abdallah,
he was not freelancing. He added that he, Prince xxxxxxxxxxxx and
Prince xxxxxxxxxxxx were getting together an "Iran
to-do list."
¶5. (S/NF) On the Europeans' positions, xxxxxxxxxxxx asserted that

French President Chirac wants to be satisfied we've done
everything possible politically. However he is not prepared
to accept Iran as a nuclear nation. Russia got an earful
from King Abdalllah, he claimed, on relations with Iran and
Syria.
Counterterrorism Cooperation
----------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxxx sees an "alliance of convenience" between

Iran and al-Qaida. He and Prince xxxxxxxxxxxx agree that Iran
would try two terrorist tracks against Saudi Arabia: al-Qaida
elements and the "mini-Hizballah" in the Eastern Province.
Asked by Townsend on how other GCC countries are cooperating
on CT, xxxxxxxxxxxx said he is very satisfied with UAE, not
unsatisfied with Bahrain, but not comfortable with Kuwait's
Riyadh 00009095 002 of 002
position. Townsend, who had met with the Amir of Kuwait on

November 14, agreed the Amir is focused only on what happens
in Kuwait, xxxxxxxxxxxx said there was a disagreement in Kuwait on
CT measures. xxxxxxxxxxxx said his main channel there is the
foreign minister who has a steady hand and who is not
37
comfortable with what he sees. Oman, xxxxxxxxxxxx continued,
thinks it's safe because it is too far away. xxxxxxxxxxxx said he
hoped the December 9/10 GCC Summit would include a clear
statement on counterterrorism cooperation.
¶7. (S/NF) Townsend raised the status of the commission to

monitor and regulate Saudi charities, saying that since this
commission was announced publicly long ago and not yet
established, it is now a credibility issue. xxxxxxxxxxxx agreed,
noting that the Government was going slowly because of fears
of being attacked by the religious people, But he said it was
time to bring it to the King and get a decision. "Since we
often get accused of being autocratic, we might as well be
autocratic once in a while." He added that if pious Saudis
wanted to help the poor, there were plenty of poor Saudis
they could help and thus no need to fund outside charities.
When Townsend raised the importance of the Joint Terrorist
Finance Task Force, xxxxxxxxxxxx replied that he wants to resolve
this so they could get items like this off the agenda and
focus on the real strategic threat -- Iran. Townsend said
she would be thrilled if she didn't have to raise it again on
her next visit.
¶8. (S/NF) On counterterror financing issues, xxxxxxxxxxxx said

Muhammad bin Nayef was unhappy with the head of the Saudi
Financial Intelligence Unit xxxxxxxxxxxx, and
would replace him. Bandar claimed that Muhammad bin Nayef
reports having frozen 189 bank accounts, with nearly $20
million in frozen assets. xxxxxxxxxxxx asserted that the SAG
shared our interest fully in going after terrorist financing,
but that we need to do it intelligently so as not to create
economic martyrs for the religious extremists.
The King's Personal Security

----------------------------
¶9. (S/NF) Townsend raised recent measures to provide new

equipment, which xxxxxxxxxxxx thanked her for. He added that he
was trying to convince the King to buy 3 or 4 helicopters,
including a medical helicopter, Lockheed Martin models,
similar to those used by POTUS. But the King says he cares
first about the security of the country, and less about his
personal security. If the King doesn't use them, xxxxxxxxxxxx said
38
they would find another use for them.
¶10. (U) APSCT Townsend has cleared this cable.
Gfoeller
39
2009-05- 2010-12-05 Embassy
09RIYADH716 CONFIDENTIAL
29 11:11 21:09 Riyadh
O 291146Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0864
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L RIYADH 000716
EO 12958 DECL: 05/22/2019

TAGS PREL, PTER, EFIN, AF, PK, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTRY BRIEFS SPECIAL
ADVISOR
HOLBROOKE AND TREASURY DAS GLASER ON TERRORISM
FINANCE
REF: RIYADH 702
Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4 (b),(d)
¶1. Key points:
-- (SBU) Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and

Treasury DAS Glaser were briefed on Saudi terror finance
efforts at a May 16 meeting with Interior Ministry (MOI)
officials at the Security Forces Officers Club in Riyadh.
Holbrooke also received a briefing on Saudi counterterrorism
strategies (reftel).
-- (SBU) Saudi Arabia will join the Egmont Group by the end
of May 2009.
-- (C) Holbrooke pushed for stronger cooperation in pursuing
sources of funding for the Taliban, particularly in the Gulf
States.
-- (C) The Hajj is still a major security loophole for the
Saudis, since pilgrims often travel with large amounts of
cash and the Saudis cannot refuse them entry into Saudi
Arabia. A new Saudi law requires arriving travelers to
40
declare cash over certain amounts.
-- (C) The MOI is concerned about funds flowing to Hizballah
from the Saudi Shi'a community.
-- (C) The political situation in Pakistan affects MOI's
intelligence cooperation with Pakistan's ISI.
New saudi fiu promises better cooperation
¶2. (C) The briefing was delivered by officials from the

MOI's new Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). They said the
Saudi FIU's mission is to cooperate with all other
authorities to combat money laundering and terrorism finance,
and outlined the divisions of FIU and their responsibilities
to receive, analyze, investigate, and act upon reports of
terrorist finance activities in concert with other Saudi
financial and law enforcement agencies. The FIU had a budget
of $31 million in 2008.
¶3. (C) Holbrooke asked how the U.S. was working with the new
FIU. DAS Glaser said FIU cooperation will enable Saudi
Arabia to plug into the global terror finance context. The
U.S. has tested the Saudi system with three requests and has
received a good response. Glaser added that Saudi success in
rolling up domestic terror cells has had a positive impact
but the need now was to target financial donors and networks
that channel the funds to AQ and the Taliban. The daily work
of exchanging information with Saudi Arabia was going well.
¶4. (C) Holbrooke asked whether the relationship could be

further improved. The Saudis replied that Saudi Arabia would
join the Egmont Group by the end of May 2009. Holbrooke said
terrorists exploit the seams between countries such as
borders, free trade zones, and international networks such as
Hawala systems, and that in this respect drug proceeds were
not the primary source of funds for the Taliban; rather
private donations from the Gulf were the chief source of
Taliban financing. This indicated the need for a new level
of cooperation, he said, to address funds flowing from the
Gulf to the Taliban, AQ, and South Asian terrorist groups.
In particular, the UAE, Pakistan, and the UK must be on board.
¶5. (C) MOI counterterrorism advisor xxxxxxxxxxxx
41
said Saudi Arabia was working to create a
"coherent plan" on terrorist finance that included
establishing a legal basis for taking action against
financiers. The MOI had no problem targeting organizations,
he said, but preferred to go after financiers on an
individual basis: "the bad apples, not the whole barrel," he
said. With the FIU in place, he said, the MOI would be
better able to "turn leads into tangible evidence" and follow
up with counterpart authorities in other countries. "We used
to call Dubai the 'Black Hole'," of terrorist finance, he
said. Glaser agreed with the need for a comprehensive
strategy. He said he understood the Saudi approach to focus
on individuals rather than organizations, but there was
another more common model that focused on organizations as
part of a broader terrorist network.
Hajj, hizballah, and pakistan
¶6. (C) MOI Senior Advisor xxxxxxxxxxxx

said the Saudi approach was based on the fact that Saudi
Arabia had been in a war and had to act. Saudi authorities
had detained over 4,000 individuals, some of whom were
suspected of terrorist financing offenses and would act if
supplied with information. Hajj was still a big problem for
the Saudis, since they could not refuse to let pilgrims enter
the country. Some of the non-Saudi terrorism detainees in
Saudi Arabia had entered as pilgrims. The Saudi government
recently passed a law requiring arriving travelers to declare
cash above a certain amount, but Hajj was still "a vacuum in
our security," he admitted. Another problem was money going
to Hizballah from Saudi Shiites. The Saudis' focus had been
on funds from Sunni sources, but they needed to focus on the
Shi'a too,xxxxxxxxxxxx said.
¶7. (C) Holbrooke noted that Pakistan was also a center for
terrorist financing through Islamic charities and asked
whether the Saudis were monitoring the large Pakistani
community in Saudi Arabia, and whether the Saudis were
consulting with the governments of Pakistan, India, and
Bangladesh about the issue. xxxxxxxxxxxx said the Saudis had
detained numerous individuals from these countries and were
seeking cooperation to investigate their activities. He
42
added that "we talk to ISI (Pakistan's intelligence agency)
and get a good response, but we think ten times before
approaching them; things are changing there and we are
advised to be careful." Political unrest and new ISI
leadership were the principal changes, he said. As a result,
he concluded, "We only trust face-to-face transmission of
information." The MOI had shared information with ISI on
Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia suspected of terror finance, but
ISI had not responded.
Don't forget iran
¶8. (C) Holbrooke asked whether the Taliban still found

support in Saudi Arabia. xxxxxxxxxxxx answered that support
from Saudi Arabia was less than it had been in earlier years,
such as the 1980s, but was still present. Holbrooke asked
about Iran, and xxxxxxxxxxxx replied that in the Saudi view,
Iran was a "serious contributor" to terrorism activities in
many places, including Yemen, North Africa, and Latin
America.
¶9. (C) Holbrooke concluded by assuring his hosts of the U.S.

commitment to cooperation on fighting terrorism and for
better relations with the Muslim world.
¶10. (U) Meeting participants
U.s.
Special Advisor Ambassador Richard Holbrooke

Barnett Rubin, Senior Advisor
Dan Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
David Rundell, Charge d'Affaires
Andrew Roth, Embassy Riyadh
Edwin Brown, Embassy Riyadh (notetaker)
Jeff Smith, Embassy Riyadh
Saudi Arabia
xxxxxxxxxxxx, Ministry of
the Interior
43
Major General xxxxxxxxxxxx,
xxxxxxxxxxxx
Ministry of the Interior
xxxxxxxxxxxx, Ministry of
the
Interior
xxxxxxxxxxxx
FIU briefers
¶11. (U) Amb. Holbrooke cleared this telegram.
Rundell
44
2010-02- 2010-12- Embassy
12 12:12 05 21:09 Riyadh
VZCZCXRO2513
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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 4835
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0325
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY 0481
SECRET SECTION 01 of 03 RIYADH 000182
NOFORN
SIPDIS
S/SRAP FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE

DOHA FOR AMBASSADOR HOLBROOKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KTFN SA AF PK
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
AMBASSADOR
HOLBROOKE'S FEBRUARY 15-16 VISIT TO RIYADH
Ref: KABUL 500
RIYADH 00000182 001.2 of 003
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D)
45
¶1. (C) Ambassador Holbrooke, Embassy Riyadh warmly welcomes
you to Saudi Arabia, which, by virtue of its historical and
cultural ties to Central Asia; personal relationships between
Saudi, Afghani and Pakistani leaders; financial power; and
leadership of the Muslim world, can play a central role in
implementing the President's strategy for Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Your visit comes at a time of great potential but
great uncertainty: the Saudi-Afghan relationship appears to
be warming up, while the traditionally close Saudi-Pakistani
relationship has grown increasingly strained. The Saudis are
broadly supportive of our approach to Afghanistan and
Pakistan, but occasionally express skepticism about our
timing or our approach. Your visit provides an opportunity
to mine the Saudis' wealth of experience in dealing with
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and extremism, and further explore
ways to translate our shared goals into action in the unique
Saudi context. We have requested meetings with xxxxxxxxxxxx.
¶2. (C) SAUDI-AFGHAN RELATIONS WARMING: President

Karzai's
February 2-3 visit to the Kingdom, although richer in
symbolism than substance, was a sign that lukewarm
Saudi-Afghan relations may finally be warming up. In his
official statement at the London Conference, FM Saud
announced a $150 million pledge of additional financial
support for Afghan reconstruction. He expressed broad Saudi
support for reconciliation, adding that they would be willing
to assist at the request of President Karzai-- on the
condition that the Taliban sever its relationship with
Al-Qaeda and cease providing refuge to its leaders. While
not as forward leaning as we may have liked, FM Saud's
statement put the Saudis on the record and created an
opportunity to put reconciliation talks back in
motion--eventually. Saudi participation at the Turkish-led
regional conference on Afghanistan on January 26 was further
evidence of the Saudi commitment to engagement. Karzai's
visit showed that the King was ready to deal with Karzai as a
legitimate, Muslim head of state. However, the Saudis
continue to have concerns about Afghan corruption and believe
greater political incorporation of the Pashtun community is
essential. Their apparent wish to downplay Karzai's
visit--as compared to the Afghans (reftel)--may also indicate
46
the King's desire to keep some distance and maintain his
credibility as a potential reconciliation mediator.
¶3. (s/nf) but mediation not ready for prime time:

Privately, the Saudis tell us it's still "too soon" to be
publicly discussing technical and financial aspects of
reintegration efforts. xxxxxxxxxxxx has made
clear that his marching orders are to work through
intelligence channels only until progress becomes
sustainable, at which point foreign ministries will be
brought in. In a recent meeting with the Ambassador, xxxxxxxxxxxx
hinted at but did not provide details about what
appears to be significant movement on the Saudi mediation
effort, with visits by high-level Taliban and Afghan
officials, since the Hajj. We surmise that xxxxxxxxxxxx is
reluctant to share information because the talks remain
delicate and he fears U.S. involvement could derail progress.
He has also voiced concern about how to address UNSCR 1267
prohibitions on dealing with various Taliban members.
¶4. (C) ZARDARI STILL THE PROBLEM IN PAKISTAN: The

Saudis
generally agree that there is a need to deny terrorists
safehavens in Pakistan, but question whether the methods we
have outlined will be effective. Despite tense relations
with the Zardari government, close military and intelligence
cooperation continues between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The
Saudis believe opposition leader Nawaz Sharif can play a
"great role" in working with tribal chiefs and that "money is
better than bullets" in the fight against the Taliban. They
have started to fulfill their pledge from the Tokyo donor,s
conference (over half of the $700 million pledged has been
disbursed) and have expressed a willingness to continue with
financial support for a stable Pakistan. Saudi interlocutors
stress the importance of remembering that Pakistan remains
Riyadh 00000182 002.2 of 003
pre-occupied with issues on its Indian border, coloring its

ability to deal with the Taliban.
¶5. (C) IN THE ARMY WE TRUST: The tumultuous democratic
47
process in Pakistan makes the Saudis nervous, and they appear
to be looking for "another Musharraf": a strong, forceful
leader they know they can trust. In his January meeting with
General Jones, the King cited President Zardari as an
impediment to denying terrorist safehavens, calling him an
"obstacle" and "a rotten head" that was infecting the whole
body. He maintained that the Pakistani Army was capable of
being a strong partner for the U.S., and opined that U.S.
development assistance would rebuild trust. He asserted that
that the Army was staying out of Pakistani politics in
deference to U.S. wishes, rather than doing what it "should."
FM Saud told General Jones that we must reach out to tribal
leaders and separate "those we could work with" from "those
we must fight." He believed that using the military to fight
extremists posed certain dangers, and that the credibility of
the army must be maintained. The Saudis were pushing
Pakistan's civilian leaders to work together, but "compromise
seemed alien to Pakistani politicians."
¶6. (C) TURKI'S TAKE: During a recent meeting with

Ambassador, former GIP Director Prince Turki Al-Faisal called
Afghanistan a "puzzle," where establishing trust with Afghan
leaders, and recognizing the links between Pakistan and the
Taliban, were keys to success. All financial aid to the
Afghan government should be conditional: benchmarks must be
set for the leadership, and aid must be withheld until these
are met. Recent Saudi efforts to assist in Taliban mediation
had failed, he said, when "both sides fell short." He
described the Taliban leadership as "fractured," and
suggested the U.S. and NATO needed to target criminal
elements more vociferously and re-focus our attention on
capturing Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri. He
suggested Saudi Arabia, the U.S., China, Russia, Afghanistan
and Pakistan could join forces and share assets in order to
capture or kill bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri. This would break
the terrorists' "aura of invincibility" and allow the U.S. to
"declare victory" and move on.
¶7. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE: Terrorist funding emanating

from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern. Over the last
year, however, Saudi Arabia has made important progress in
combating al-Qaida financing emanating from the country.
Sensitive reporting indicates that al-Qaida's ability to
48
raise funds has deteriorated substantially, and that it is
now in its weakest state since 9/11. The Kingdom is also
cooperating more actively than at any previous point to
respond to terrorist financing concerns raised by the United
States, and to investigate and detain financial facilitators
of concern. Nonetheless, sustained engagement is required to
maintain the current momentum, particularly in providing the
Saudis with specific details and actionable information.
Your visit provides another opportunity to welcome the
progress Saudi Arabia has made, and reiterate the importance
that President Obama and the USG place on curtailing
fundraising activity by global terrorist groups in Saudi
Arabia, particularly those that undermine the stability of
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
¶8. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE, CONTINUED: While in the

past
the KSA stood reluctant to pursue Saudi donors who backed
groups that did not directly threaten the Kingdom, the Saudi
Ministry of Interior (MOI) has now demonstrated willingness
to take action, and has begun to detain individuals involved
in funding networks for groups such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba
(LeT), the Taliban, and in some cases even Hamas. Our TF
cooperation with the MOI is of utmost strategic importance to
U.S. national security as donors in Saudi Arabia continue to
constitute a source of funding to Sunni extremist groups
worldwide. Available intelligence reflects that the Kingdom
remains an important fundraising locale-especially during the
Hajj and Ramadan-for the Taliban, LeT, and other terrorist
groups based in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The MOI remains
almost completely dependent on the CIA to provide analytic
support and direction for its counterterrorism operations. As
such, our success against terrorist financing in the Kingdom
remains directly tied to our ability to provide actionable
intelligence to our Saudi counterparts. In order to enhance
the USG's ability to influence and direct Saudi efforts to
Riyadh 00000182 003.2 of 003
disrupt terrorist financing, in 2008 we stood up a Treasury

attach office in Embassy Riyadh. This office actively
contributes to the daily intelligence sharing process that
49
is led by CIA.
¶9. (S/NF) TERRORISM FINANCE, CONTINUED: Saudi Arabia

has
taken increasingly aggressive efforts to disrupt al-Qaida's
access to funding from Saudi sources. An example of recent
progress by the KSA is the conviction of over 300 people for
involvement in terrorism, including some for providing
financial support. News reports suggest that appeals may be
opened to the media in order to enhance the deterrent effects
of such prosecutions. In addition, Assistant Interior
xxxxxxxxxxxx stated that
the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) deliberately timed its
August 19, 2009 press release regarding the arrest of 44
terrorist supporters to deter potential donors from giving
money to suspected terrorist groups during Ramadan. Although
a great deal of work remains to be done,xxxxxxxxxxxx
has given his commitment to work with the United States on
Taliban finance, and has said that the MOI will arrest
individuals involved in Saudi-based Taliban fundraising
activities - even if involved in the reconciliation process -
when provided with actionable intelligence.
¶10. (S/NF) IDENTIFYING OPPORTUNITIES: The Saudis have

expressed broad support for the President's strategy on
Afghanistan and Pakistan, but often balk when asked to
designate an SRAP to coordinate policy with the USG and
others. In part, this reflects the centralized Saudi
decision-making process and the reality that issues related
to Afghanistan and Pakistan policy are not delegated, but
rather dealt with directly by the King and members of the
intelligence community. While the Saudis are hesitant to
delegate authority and tend to make only broad-based
commitments to high-profile, multilateral initiatives, they
appear ready, willing and eager to share their experiences
with us and identify greater opportunities for cooperation on
a bilateral basis. Your visit provides an opportunity to
further explore how we can best translate our shared goals
into action in the unique Saudi context.
50
Smith
51
2007-02-24 2010-12-05 Embassy
07RIYADH367 SECRET
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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2017

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PINR EFIN KTFN MEPP KPAL SA
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND FEBRUARY 6 MEETING
WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER PRINCE SAUD AL-FAISAL
REF: 06 RIYADH 9083
Classified By: Ambassador James C. Oberwetter

for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Assistant to the President for Homeland

Security and Counterterrorism Francis Fragos Townsend covered
both counterterrorism cooperation and regional political
issues in her meeting with Foreign Minister Prince Saud
52
Al-Faisal at his home in Jeddah on February 6. Saud
described the February 2 arrests of ten suspected terrorism
financiers in Jeddah and Medina as a positive step that could
well result in other leads and arrests. On the proposed
Charities Commission, Saud said that the SAG is leaning
toward establishing a government entity that directly
disburses charitable funds. He characterized engagement with
Iran as a two-pronged approach involving frank dialogue and
security pressure. "We will supply the logic and you supply
the pressure," he said, adding that the US Navy's recent
strengthening of presence in the Gulf was a good example of
the force element. In response to APHSCT Townsend's request
to use SAG influence with Arabsat to block Al-Manar
broadcasting, Prince Saud replied that Iranian-financed
cultural centers in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan are a
greater source of Iranian influence in the region than
Al-Manar television. On Arab-Israeli issues, Prince Saud
hoped Secretary Rice would return to the region soon to
address the "key substantive issues" of Jerusalem and
Palestinian refugees. In a subsequent private meeting,
APHSCT Townsend renewed US concerns about the Saudi
Ambassador in the Philippines; Saud said that the ambassador
would be ending his tour shortly. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S) APHSCT Townsend commended Prince Saud on efforts to

counter terrorist financing but urged more progress. She
noted that the President was quite concerned about bilateral
cooperation in this area and that she had a letter for King
Abdullah from the President on this subject. Prince Saud
replied that the arrests of ten terror financing suspects on
February 2 was "good progress" but that "more needs to be
done." Questioning these suspects could lead to more leads
and arrests, he noted. APHSCT Townsend said she had just met
with Finance Minister al-Assaf to ask about the royal decree
on declaring cash upon exit and entry. The King had issued
the decree over one year ago but it has yet to be
implemented. Prince Saud noted that the Customs people are
not the most capable, and that he was surprised at the lack
of implementation.
¶3. (S) Asked by Prince Saud what the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs could do to help on counterterrorism cooperation,
APHSCT Townsend raised establishment of the Charities
53
Commission, which was announced two years ago but not yet
implemented. She noted that it could be set up in either of
two ways: as a government body which is responsible for
disbursing charitable donations; or as a regulatory body to
oversee acts of the private charities, which is the way the
US does it. She stressed that a decision, either way, is
needed. Saud said the SAG was leaning towards an
organization that has direct responsibility for disbursing
charitable funds. He noted there are Islamic law
implications, implying that these implications are slowing
down the decision process but are important to consider
carefully. APHSCT Townsend raised the issue of continuing
activity by remnants of the UN-sanctioned al-Haramain
organization. Saud responded that any proposed illegal
transfers are being monitored and stopped. By following the
trail of illegal transfers, the SAG has found and stopped the
source of funding in many investigations-- sending a strong
preventative message to others engaging in similar, illegal
activities. APHSCT Townsend thanked Prince Saud for the
SAG's efforts in this area
¶4. (C) Asked by APHSCT Townsend about his views of

developments in Iran, Prince Saud described the recent
Iranian message, brought by Larijani, offering to help
prevent a Sunni/Shi'ite sectarian divide. Saud said his
government is focused on Iranian actions, not words. The
Saudis had earlier warned the Iranians against pursuing a
"dangerous" policy of sectarian division, especially in Iraq.
He said Iran was embarking on a dangerous path of "fitna"
(dissention) within the Muslim community. Although there is
a Shi'ite majority in Iraq, elsewhere in the region the Shi'a
are a minority. A sectarian-based policy in Iraq could
jeopardize the situation of these Shi'ite minorities outside
RIYADH 00000367 002 OF 003
Iraq, he noted.
¶5. (C) Saud compared the Iranian influence in Iraq with

Iranian influence in Lebanon, commenting that he saw
positive signs in Lebanon, where Iran urged Hizbollah to stop
street protests and go back to their homes. Saud said that
it is SAG policy to pursue very frank discussions with the
54
Iranians; we need a joint policy of frankness and security
pressure, he stressed. Strengthening the US Navy presence in
the Gulf sent a good message. "You provide the pressure and
we'll provide the logic," he said.
¶6. (C) APHSCT Townsend said that Hizbollah does not appear
to the US to have toned down its rhetoric, and she raised the
request for Saudi help with Arabsat to block the broadcast of
al-Manar television. Blocking al-Manar would help reduce
Hizbollah's sphere of influence, she said. The French have
agreed not to permit the broadcast of al-Manar, she noted.
Prince Saud replied that the "more important problem" is the
Hizbollah cultural center, which exercises greater influence
than al-Manar television and could be closed down by the
multi-national forces, he asserted. The Iranians also fund
such centers in Afghanistan and Iraq, he said.
¶7. C) Ambassador Oberwetter asked Prince Saud about media

reports ahead of Russian President Putin's visit to Saudi
Arabia on February 11-12 regarding a Russian interest in
discussing a "Middle East Security Regime." Prince Saud said
that he was unaware of such a plan, and that the scheduled
visit will focus on bilateral relations, including military
cooperation and economic agreements. He noted that the
Saudis will raise the possible purchase of military equipment
from the Russians because "your people told us it would be
better purchased from Russia, because they are cheaper and
just as good." He said he did not know why the US had told
the Kingdom to go to the Russians, but that they would
nonetheless. He added that the Saudis will raise UN Security
Council issues, especially the tribunal to look into the
Hariri assassination, and the Quartet issues.
¶8. (S) On Arab-Israeli issues, Prince Saud said that he

talked with Secretary Rice via telephone on February 4 about
the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation meeting in Mecca. He said if
they reach an agreement, the Saudis would hope for a positive
US reaction. He hoped that there would not be too many
conditions placed upon Hamas in order for it to enter into a
national unity government. APHSCT Townsend said they US
expected Hamas to stop fighting and to make progress on peace
with Israel. More important than what they say is what they
do, she stressed. Saud stressed the importance of having
55
clear guidelines and goals, which are applied to both sides
of the conflict. He said he expects Secretary Rice to return
to the region, to meet with Prime Minister Olmert and
President Abu Mazen. He said he hopes she will address the
substantive issues - Jerusalem and Palestinian refugees --
and noted that it has been seven years since anyone has
discussed the status of Jerusalem. The side issues, for
instance opening a passage between Gaza and the West Bank,
should be handled at a different level, by Assistant
Secretary Welch, he suggested.
SIPDIS
¶9. (S) In a following private meeting with Saud, attended

only by the Ambassador, APHSCT Townsend raised US concerns
with the potential involvement of the Saudi ambassador to the
Philippines Muhammad Amin Waly in terrorism facilitation,
particularly his intervention to get two members of IIRO out
of prison. Prince Saud said some of his actions may have
involved bad judgment rather than intentional support for
terrorism. Waly had been investigated, he said, and no
evidence was found regarding his involvement. Since this
Ambassador's assignment in Manila would be ending in several
months, Saud asked for USG evidence of his involvement.
APHSCT Townsend said the USG would cooperate with the
Mubahith in providing evidence.
¶10. (S) Prince Saud then raised in the private meeting the
Saudi Embassy in Washington's problems with the US bank that
handles the Embassy account. He asserted that the US bank is
performing audits on the Saudi Embassy bank accounts beyond
what is required by US law, and asking inappropriate and
aggressive questions. He noted that the Saudi Embassy enjoys
diplomatic immunity. If this is the bank's initiative, he
asked for USG intercession. APHSCT Townsend said we would
look into it.
RIYADH 00000367 003 OF 003
¶11. (U) This cable has been cleared by APHSCT Townsend.
OBERWETTER
56
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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
IMMEDIATE
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SIPDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, CENTCOM FOR POLAD, NAVCENT

AND J5, DOE
57
FOR KKOLEVAR AND WBRYAN, DEPARTMENT FOR P
SMULL, NEA
GCRETZ, S/CT AND NEA/ARP
EO 12958 DECL: 10/28/2018

TAGS ECON, ENRG, EPET, MARR, MCAP, MOPS, OVP, PGOV,
PREL,
PTER, SA
SUBJECT: SAG AGREES TO USG STEPS TO PROTECT OIL
FACILITIES
REF: A. RIYADH 1579 B. RIYADH 1408 C. RIYADH 1298
RIYADH 00001619 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge’ d’Affaires David Rundell for Reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D)
¶1. (U) This is an Action Request, see paragraph 11.
¶2. (S) SUMMARY. The Joint Commssion on Critical Infrastructure

Protection and Border Security (JCCIP) initiative in Saudi Arabia
made significant progress this week. On October 27, a Department of
Energy delegation led by DOE DAS Wm. Bryan, with AmEmbassy
Riyadh Charge’ d’Affaires in attendance, presented a three-hour
Vulnerability Assessment (VA) of the Abqaiq oil facility (Reftel A) to
Saudi Ministry of Interior senior-level and working staff, which
included a 40-minute briefing/discussion with Assistant Minister for
National Security Affairs Prince Mohammed bin Naif (MBN). DOE’s
recommendations were enthusiastically accepted by MBN, with
further JCCIP work agreed to. Concurrent with the VA
presentation, the deployed CENTCOM representative in Riyadh
presented the draft Letter of Request (LOR) to MBN to establish the
Office of the Program Manager - Facilities Security Force (OPM-
FSF), which will be responsible to train and equip the Saudi security
forces being formed to protect Saudi energy production facilities,
desalination plants and future civil nuclear reactors. The Saudis
remain highly concerned about the vulnerability of their energy
production facilities and reaffirmed their strong desire for a long-
term USG commitment to implement the JCCIP agreement. END
SUMMARY.
-------------------------------
FULL SPEED AHEAD ON ASSESSMENTS
-------------------------------
¶3. (S) DOE presented a two-day, thorough, highly-technical
evaluation of Abqaiq’s security capability to MOI, FSF and
58
ARAMCO officials on Oct. 27 and 28, with the introductory briefing
consisting of a three-hour presentation. The conclusion is that the
Abqaiq facility’s safety standards are world-class and its current
security measures would counter a repeat of the Feb. 2006 failed Al
Qaeda VBIED attack, but Abqaiq remains highly vulnerable to other
types of sophisticated terrorist attacks. DOE provided concrete steps
for the Saudis to enhance and harden Abqaiq’s security architecture.
¶4. (S) MBN was impressed with DOE’s Abqaiq VA and expressed
his appreciation for DOE’s work. He ordered his staff to immediately
implement DOE’s recommendations to improve Abqaiq’s security
and requested DOE to perform further VAs. The Ras Tannurah oil
facility was named as the next site to be assessed, with its VA to be
conducted as soon as possible. It was agreed DOE would establish
three VA teams dedicated solely to evaluating Saudi Arabia’s critical
infrastructure sites, which number approximately 100. These DOE
teams would be joined by MOI members who would learn the
necessary skill sets from DOE to then perform their own individual
VAs of sites. The goal would be MOI to eventually take the lead in
VAs of all remaining sites, with DOE supporting the MOI VA teams.
This would maximize the number of sites able to be assessed in the
shortest time period. DOE also invited MOI, ARAMCO and
CENTCOM to join them at Sandia Labs to wrap up the Abqaiq
assessment and demonstrate the models used in formulating their
recommendations. This visit is expected to
RIYADH 00001619 002.2 OF 003
be conducted by the end of 2008.
¶5. (S) It was noted during the presentation that the ARAMCO
officials were uneasy with MOI encroaching onto their territory.
ARAMCO expressed concern that “Too much security will make it
too hard for us (ARAMCO) to do our jobs in producing oil.” While it
was telling to see firsthand some the interagency disputes within the
SAG, an MOI official in a sidebar confided in us that ARAMCO’s
concerns would be addressed, but that MBN, who reportedly has the
final say in the protection of Saudi critical infrastructure, would not
allow Saudi oil facilities to be left vulnerable, regardless of
ARAMCO’s complaints.
¶6. (S) This same MOI official mentioned that the protection of Saudi
critical infrastructure is expected to eventually be 25% of MOI’s
budget. MOI’s current annual budget is approx. USD 1 billion. The
protection of Saudi critical infrastructure will likely lead to a
significant increase in MOI’s budget as the FSF alone will be 35,000
59
strong, minimum, with an additional 20 per cent more forces for port
and border security. DOE’s security projects and future to-be-
determined JCCIP programs with other USG agencies will add even
more to MOI’s budget requirements.
--------------
OPM-FSF STARTS
--------------
¶7. (S) The draft LOR for OPM-FSF prepared by CENTCOM was
presented to MBN. This draft explicitly lays out on one page the
exact wording for the SAG’s formal request to the USG to establish
OPM-FSF. MBN directed his staff to prepare such a letter for his
signature. Once we receive this letter, CENTCOM will then respond
with a Letter of Acceptance (LOA) which will allow CENTCOM to
begin building up OPM-FSF’s personnel and equipment structure.
MOI indicated they plan to present the formal Saudi LOR to GEN
Petraeus when he visits the Kingdom, currently scheduled for Nov. 8.
--------------------
JOINT WORKING GROUPS
--------------------
¶8. (S) A related discussion item was the role of the Joint Working
Groups (JWG). It was previously established there would be three
JWG: FSF, Industrial Security and Internal Security (Reftel B).
During our recent meetings, it was clarified and agreed to that
“Joint” will refer to USG-SAG only, not inter-agency. When these
working groups meet, it will be a single USG voice in dialogue with a
single SAG voice. Inter-agency USG discussions will take place at the
JCCIP Cell in Riyadh or in Washington.
¶9. (S) DAS Bryan, in discussions with MOI officials, requested

clarification on MOI’s view and scope of the Industrial Security Joint
Working Group. The “Industry” of focus is the oil industry and all
other industries that support the oil sector. This also includes
interdependencies on other utilities, in particular electricity and
water. This will enable DOE to better perform the system level
analysis as opposed to individual site assessments. Additionally, this
insight enables DOE to staff the Industrial Security JWG with
appropriate USG representation.
-----------------------------
RIYADH 00001619 003.2 OF 003
“WE MUST PROTECT IT TOGETHER”
-----------------------------
¶10. (S) In a private meeting between MBN and the Charge’, MBN
conveyed the SAG’s, and his personal, sense of urgency to move
60
forward as quickly as possible to enhance the protection of Saudi
Arabia’s critical infrastructure with the priority being its energy
production sites. MBN related how his grandfather, King Abdulaziz,
had the vision of forming a lasting strategic partnership with the
United States. MBN stressed he shared this vision, and wants the
USG’s help to protect Saudi critical infrastructure. He commented
that neither the Kingdom nor the U.S. would be comfortable with the
“French or Russians” involved in protecting Saudi oil facilities. “We
built ARAMCO together, we must protect it together.” MBN also
confirmed his travel dates to Washington will be Nov. 5 to 7.
¶11. (S) MOI officials queried us on the exact date U/S Wm. Burns,
P, would travel to the Kingdom for the meeting of the Joint
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Border
Security. The SAG expects it to be in mid-December after the Eid al-
Adha (set to end Dec. 12), and request confirmation as soon as
possible of P’s exact travel date so they can prepare the appropriate
agenda. Post requests the Department’s confirmation of P’s exact
travel dates to Saudi Arabia for the next JCCIP.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶12. (S) The Saudis now feel energized by DOE’s VA, DOE’s
subsequent proposals and CENTCOM’s assistance in establishing
OPM-FSF. Likewise, they recognize many of their energy facilities
remain at risk from Al Qaeda and other terrorists who seek to
disrupt the global economy, and vigorously urge we continue
assisting them to counter this threat. RUNDELL
61
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TREASURY FOR U/S STUART LEVEY AND AA/S HOWARD

MENDELSOHN STATE FOR S/SRAP RICHARD HOLBROOKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020 TAGS: ECON PREL EFIN KTFN

SA
Classified By: Acting DCM Lisa Carle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. On December 13, 2009, Treasury

Department Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis Howard Mendelsohn, along with GRPO officers and
Treasury analysts, met with senior Saudi Mabahith officials to
discuss suspected Taliban-related financial activity in Saudi Arabia.
62
Prior to this meeting, Treasury and GRPO officials shared with
Mabahith detailed information on the financing of the Taliban and
other terrorist and extremist groups based in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Mabahith pointed to the General Intelligence Presidency
(GIP), Saudi Arabia’s overseas intelligence agency, as having the lead
on Taliban matters for the Saudi Arabian Government (SAG).
Mabahith pledged to disrupt any Taliban-related financial activity in
the Kingdom, including fundraising carried out by Taliban leaders
participating in reconciliation efforts. Mabahith asked GRPO and
Treasury to provide additional detailed and actionable information
to assist in its investigations.
¶2. (S/NF) During the course of the multi-hour intelligence exchange

session, GRPO and Treasury analysts walked through the previously
shared intelligence, which suggested that Taliban-related finance
officials have visited Saudi Arabia in order to raise funds. Mabahith
pledged to follow up on the information provided, to work through
intelligence channels to share information and results, and submit
additional requests for information. END SUMMARY.
(U) Taliban/Haqqani Network
¶3. (S/NF) Mendelsohn acknowledged the important steps the Saudi

government has taken to combat al-Qaida financing, and highlighted
the importance the USG places on combating Taliban financing. He
stated that the Taliban receives significant money from narcotics
trafficking and extortion, but noted that the U.S. believes that the
group also receives significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from
donors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
¶4. (S/NF) Mabahith agreed that the Taliban is a serious threat and
stated that Saudi authorities can more easily target al-Qaida
financing since the group’s members are frequently Saudi nationals,
often with Saudi addresses and phone numbers. Taliban/Haqqani
network fundraisers, however, usually enter the Kingdom from
Afghanistan or Pakistan, and may use fabricated travel documents,
according to Mabahith. Mabahith also acknowledged that the Hajj
represents an opportunity for terrorist fundraisers. The same
officials further acknowledged the historical ties that existed between
Saudi Arabia and the Taliban, suggesting that lingering sympathies
may create a potential donor base in the Kingdom.
¶5. (S/NF) Mendelsohn stated that senior Taliban officials travel to

Saudi Arabia to discuss reconciliation issues, but said they also
63
conduct fundraising activities while in the Kingdom. Mabahith
initially responded that Taliban reconciliation issues were handled by
the GIP and stated that the Mabahith has very little insight or
coordination with the GIP in this area. After further discussion, Issa
said that even if Taliban fundraisers travel to Saudi Arabia under the
auspices of reconciliation, Mabahith officials would arrest anyone
who breaks Saudi law while in the Kingdom.
¶6. (S/NF) Treasury analysts provided information on

XXXXXXXXXXXX three senior Taliban officials who have made
multiple fundraising visits to Saudi Arabia, according to U.S.
intelligence. (NOTE: Information available to the USG and shared
for this exchange included telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and
passport information for crosschecking against Saudi customs
databases. END NOTE.) Mabahith was not familiar with the
individuals and pledged to follow up on the identifying information
provided by GRPO and Treasury. GRPO and Treasury analysts also
shared names and phone numbers of multiple Taliban and Haqqani
associates known either to reside in or travel to the Saudi Arabia.
¶7. (S/NF) Reviewing a list of several full or partial names of

suspected Taliban donors in the Kingdom, Mabahith recognized
XXXXXXXXXXXX, a prominent Saudi who reportedly gave
XXXXXXXXXXXX $30,000 in September 2008. Mabahith had no
information regarding XXXXXXXXXXXX’s financial contributions
to the Taliban, but speculated that the money could have come from
a trust or a charity that was associated with XXXXXXXXXXXX,
rather than from XXXXXXXXXXXX himself. Mabahith pledged to
investigate XXXXXXXXXXXX and stated that it would not hesitate
to “press him” regardless of his social status. Mendelsohn
emphasized the importance of taking actions to delegitimize Taliban
fundraising, just as the Saudi government has worked hard to
delegitimize al-Qaida and deter donors from giving money to the
group.
¶8. (S/NF) Mabahith also detailed the SAG’s new fingerprinting

system. Mabahith suggested that the system will likely be more
effective against Taliban fundraisers, who travel through official
points of entry, than it will be against al-Qaida-affiliated foreign
fighters, who enter the country illegally. Mabahith also stated that
this system should reduce the effectiveness of forged travel
documents used at official points of entry. They pointed out the
64
country’s large borders, highlighting the continuing challenges they
expect to encounter.
(S/NF) Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna
¶9. (S/NF) Mendelsohn also raised USG concerns about Pakistan-

based extremist group Jamaat al-Dawa al-Quran wa al-Sunna (JDQ)
and its involvement in attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan.
GRPO and Treasury passed names and other identifying information
of suspected Saudi Arabia-based JDQ donors and affiliates.
Mabahith pledged to investigate the names and follow up through
intelligence channels.
(U) Al-Haramain Foundation
¶10. (S/NF) Mendelsohn commended Mabahith for its successful

operations exposing and disrupting the terrorist support activities of
the Saudi-based NGO al-Haramain Foundation (AHF), and pledged
USG support for their investigation. Mabahith confirmed that more
than 40 AHF-affiliated individuals had been arrested as a result and
that Mabahith had a strong case against former AHF Director Aqil
al-Aqil. Mabahith candidly noted that Saudi authorities were
embarrassed about the way they had handled Aqil al-Aqil, since they
had previously arrested and released him based on an earlier lack of
evidence. SMITH
65
2010-01- 2010-12-03 Embassy
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NSC FOR AJOST
EO 12958 DECL: 01/12/2020

TAGS IR, MARR, MASS, MOPS, SA, YM
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: GENERAL JONES’ JANUARY 12,
2010
MEETING WITH PRINCE MOHAMMED BIN NAIF, ASSISTANT
MINISTER OF INTERIOR
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b, d)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) Summary: During a 30-minute meeting with Prince

Mohammed, General Jones reviewed U.S. and Saudi efforts to
combat Al-Qaida extremists in the region and discussed
66
Afghanistan/Pakistan, Yemen, and Iran. Prince Mohammed
highlighted Saudi Arabia’s continued and growing concerns about
Al-Qaida operations originating from Yemen and praised the
Yemeni government’s successful December attacks against Al-Qaida
operatives. The meeting was followed by a lunch and a briefing on
the situation on the Saudi-Yemeni border.
WE MUST KEEP AL-QAIDA ON THE RUN

--------------------------------
¶2. (S) General Jones noted that the attempted bombing of a U.S.
aircraft on December 25 is another reminder that we are passing
through difficult times. He assured Prince Mohammed that while the
U.S. recognizes that screening procedures can be improved, the U.S.
has confidence that the systems in place are basically sound. The
General also noted that terrorism concerns seem to be spreading
beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and now are
being heard from governments in north Africa, particularly Niger,
Mali, Morocco and Algeria.
¶3. (S) Prince Mohammed responded that we are likely to see many
more attempts like the December 25 incident. He also noted that the
Saudi experience against Al-Qaida demonstrates that the best
response is to “keep them on the run.” Right after the 9/11 attacks,
he noted, nearly eighty percent of the mosques in Saudi Arabia
voiced support for Bin Laden. That is when the Saudi leadership
realized how dire the problem they faced was. Over the last 6 years of
combating Al-Qaida inside Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom has foiled
many Al-Qaida plots and in the process learned that we must not
only to fight Al-Qaida “in the field,” but also to counter their
ideology in order to curtail recruitment.
¶4. (S/NF) In this light, the recent attack against Al-Qaida in Yemen
“was very positive.” Prince Mohammed noted that the Saudis have
been monitoring conversations of Al-Qaida operatives in Yemen very
closely, and whereas before the attack they were hearing relaxed 20-
minute phone conversations over cell phones, after the attack the
phones went virtually silent. This suggests that at least for now these
operatives are more focused on their own security rather than on
planning operations.
SAUDI CONCERNS ON YEMEN

-----------------------
67
¶5. (S) Prince Mohammed said that the Saudi government has been
watching with great concern Al-Qaida’s growth in Yemen over the
last five years. Yemen’s geography makes it a much more convenient
place for Al-Qaida operations. Not only does the mountainous terrain
help them hide, but the shoreline also gives them an ability to move
over the water - extending their potential reach much further
abroad.
¶6. (C) One of Al-Qaida’s objectives in its confrontation with Saudi

Arabia, Prince Mohammed explained is “to control Mecca and
Medina.” He said that they want to be able to control who makes the
Hajj, and if they were able to do so, they would limit the visits of
those coming to the Hajj to one week, something that could cause
chaos. (Embassy note: Among Al-Qaida’s basic objectives is its call to
“liberate” the Islamic holy sites from the corrupt hands of the Al
Saud, but this is the first time we have heard a Saudi official point
out the more specific goal of limiting how long Muslims can visit the
holy places as part of their Hajj. End note.)
¶7. (C) Prince Mohammed also noted that Saudi Arabia has been
making an effort to seal the Saudi-Yemen border, noting that “we
have been arresting between one to two thousand people each day.”
He also admitted that the Saudis have maintained a common practice
of feeding those caught crossing before transporting them back
across the border. “We need to change
that,” he went on, since many may be crossing the border only to get
a meal. Prince Mohammed pointed out that a key feature of the
Saudi approach to undermine Al-Qaida’s growth in Yemen is to
bolster the central government, in particular with substantial
financial assistance. A Saudi-Yemeni Council meets twice a year to
review development projects in Yemen funded by Saudi Arabia.
However, up to now, he reported, the Saudis have not been satisfied
with the distribution of these development and infrastructure
projects because the Yemeni government has been concentrating
them in Sanaa and other urban areas. The Saudis now insist on
having a say in distributing these infrastructure investments with
remote areas receiving priority “to give the tribes in those areas
something to lose if they cooperate with terrorists.”
Afghanistan/Pakistan
--------------------
68
¶8. (C) General Jones noted that the Obama administration’s
approach in Pakistan and Afghanistan reflects many of the same
lessons that the Saudis have learned. That is why the U.S. is working
with a new emphasis on national reunification in Afghanistan. The
approach includes reducing the emphasis on military operations
while exerting new efforts to encourage reconciliation. In order for
this strategy to succeed, Gen. Jones cautioned, it will be essential that
Pakistani territory no longer be available as a safehaven to terrorists.
¶9. (C) Prince Mohammed commented that “Pakistan must let

people know that it is fighting a war to keep Pakistan united and its
people safe.” But if we want one hundred percent from them, he
cautioned, we should make them feel more secure on their border
with India. He also noted that King Abdullah “has concerns about
the Pakistani government; the biggest problem is the army.” General
Kayani (Army Chief of Staff) is a good man; I asked him, Prince
Mohammed recounted, whether or not his soldiers, when they visit
their villages, wear their uniforms, or if they changed into civilian
clothes. He told me that they change to civilian clothes.
¶10. (C) General Jones assured Prince Mohammed that the U.S. is
working to reduce Pakistani-Indian tensions, and emphasized that
what is most needed at this moment is for Pakistan to choose which
path it wants to take. The first step is to dislodge the terrorists; if
Pakistan resolves to do this, they will find that the U.S. will help them
for some time to come. The Pakistani ISI also needs to act with
greater consistency. Noting Saudi Arabia’s influence with Pakistan,
General Jones emphasized that the U.S. is looking for Saudi Arabia’s
support.
Next Phase with Iran

--------------------
¶10. (C) General Jones described the administration’s current

thinking on Iran, noting that Iran has failed to enter into a serious
dialogue with the international community about its nuclear
program. With the deadline of the end of the year now passed, it is
time to start looking at sanctions. Prince Mohammed said Saudi
Arabia remains greatly concerned about Iran’s nuclear program and
noted that there is now a big crack in the Iranian government,
particularly following the recent attack on Karroubi. (Embassy note:
Opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi’s car was fired upon on January
69
9, an attack that oppositionist attribute to Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard. End note.)
High Marks for U.S.-Saudi Counterterrorism Cooperation

----------------------------
¶11. (C) General Jones asked Prince Mohammed if there was

anything needed from the U.S. to improve our counterterrorism
coordination. Prince Mohammed responded that King Abdullah has
made very clear that U.S.-Saudi security cooperation must remain
independent of political buffeting. He said that our cooperation is
very good, and has developed to the point that the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia are in “simultaneous mode” regarding the sharing of raw
data and threat information. Gen. Jones remarked that Prince
Mohammed has played an
important role in bringing about this strong security relationship,
and conveyed President Obama’s appreciation for this strong
partnership.
Comment
-------
¶12. (S) We note that Prince Mohammed did not raise the matter of
recently introduced heightened screening procedures on Saudi
citizens. While we have heard that these new measures provoked
strong reactions from some in the Saudi leadership, the absence of
any expressions of concern or upset on Prince Mohammed part is
fully in keeping with his reputation as one who fully understands the
difficulty of maneuvering against extremist elements to prevent
attacks. The Embassy views this meeting as accomplishing the
important objective of reinforcing our strong counterterrorism
cooperation. As is evident from his brief responses to Gen. Jones’
briefs on Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan, these issues are ones on
which Prince Mohammed carefully defers to the King. SMITH
70
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DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, SCA, AND P STAFF

EO 12958 DECL: 11/18/2017
TAGS PGOV, PHUM, PK, PREL, PTER, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE US ON
PAKISTANI
PRESIDENT MUSHARRAF’S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA
Classified By: CHARGE D’AFFAIRES MICHAEL GFOELLER

FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) A ND (D)
¶1. (S) On November 20, Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the US Adel

al-Jubeir invited the Charge d’Affaires and Executive Office Staff
Assistant (note taker) to his residence for lunch. During the meal,
Ambassador al-Jubeir said that Pakistani President Pervez
71
Musharraf arrived in Saudi Arabia, today, November 20, and will
meet with King Abdullah, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal,
and head of the General Intelligence Presidency Prince Muqrin bin
Abdulaziz after he completes Umra in Mecca. He noted that
Musharraf will meet with the Foreign Minister and Prince Muqrin
first and thereafter see King Abdullah sometime in the evening. “The
purpose of these meetings,” said al-Jubeir, “is to get a readout of the
situation and present our point of view to him.”
¶2. (S) Al-Jubeir denied that Musharraf had come to the Kingdom to
meet with exiled former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif,
although he carefully avoided ruling out such a meeting. Instead, he
boldly asserted that, “We in Saudi Arabia are not observers in
Pakistan, we are participants.” He asserted that the Saudi
government (SAG) had offered Sharif a pledge of protection and
asylum in the Kingdom after his ouster by Musharraf in return for a
promise that he would refrain from political activity for ten years. He
added that Sharif had begun to attempt to test the limits of this
promise five or six years in his exile. “Sharif broke his promise by
conducting political activity while in the Kingdom,” al-Jubeir
charged. He added that when the SAG had permitted Sharif to travel
to London, he first promised the Saudis not to engage in political
activity or return to Pakistan, but he then flew to Pakistan from
London in a direct violation of his commitment.
¶3. (S) Al-Jubeir expressed considerable “disappointment” in

Sharif’s broken pledges to the SAG. He stated very clearly that the
SAG has worked directly with Musharraf to have Sharif arrested on
his return to Pakistan and immediately deported to the Kingdom.
“We told Musharraf that we would receive him back and then keep
him here as an ‘honored guest’,” al-Jubeir said. He added that Prince
Muqrin had been the SAG’s point man in restraining Sharif. Prince
Muqrin was allowed to reveal the terms of Sharif’s asylum
agreement, he noted. Al-Jubeir made it very clear that the SAG
would seek to control Sharif’s movements in he future, even
suggesting that he would be kept in a state only a little less severe
than house arrest.
¶4. (S) Al-Jubeir added that he sees neither Sharif nor former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto as a viable replacement for Musharraf.
“With all his flaws,” he said of Musharraf, “he is the only person that
you or we have to work with now.” He claimed that Sharif would be
unable to control the Pushtun-dominated Islamic insurgency in the
72
tribal region near Afghanistan, while Bhutto would prove to be too
divisive a figure to rule the country, which he characterized as “very
tribal, much like our own country.”
¶5. (S) Al-Jubeir added that for the SAG, stability in Pakistan is an
essential strategic matter. Since Pakistan possesses both nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles, from the Saudi point of view, the
policy choice to be made there boils down to a drastic choice: “We
can either support Musharraf and stability, or we can allow bin
Laden to get the bomb, “he told the Charge’.
¶6. (S) Comment: As a senior royal advisor who has worked for King
Abdullah for eight years now, al-Jubeir’s views generally track very
closely with those of the King. It seems likely that King Abdullah,
Prince Muqrin, and Prince Saud al-Faisal will offer Musharraf
pledges of strong support in their meetings today. We note that the
Saudis have an economic hold on Nawaz Sharif, sine he was
reportedly the first non-Saudi to receive a special economic
development loan from the SAG, with which to develop a business
while here in exile. We will report further information on these
meetings as it develops. End Comment. GFOELLER
73
Reference
Created Released Classification Origin
ID
2008-01-02 2010-12-01 Embassy
08RIYADH7 SECRET
15:03 23:11 Riyadh
VZCZCXRO3301
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH
RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHRH #0007 0021550
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021550Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/01/2018

TAGS CIA, KGCC, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PK, PREL, PTER, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE SITUATION
IN PAKISTAN
REF: SECSTATE 170928
Classified By: Ambassador Ford Fraker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. The Ambassador delivered reftel demarche on

the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
to Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal at a meeting at the
Foreign Ministry January 2. Commenting on the current situation in
Pakistan, Prince Saud voiced strong support for holding
parliamentary elections. He added that a limited postponement of the
elections until February is acceptable, taking into account the current
situation. He advised that the Pakistanis should be allowed to resolve
their internal political differences without overt, external
74
interference. The Foreign Minister described former Pakistani Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif as “a force for stability” and “a man who can
speak across party lines even to religious extremists.” END
SUMMARY.
¶2. (S) The Ambassador delivered the demarche contained in reftel

regarding Benazir Bhutto’s assassination to Saudi Foreign Minister
Prince Saud al-Faisal on January 2. Responding to the demarche,
Prince Saud characterized Pakistan’s current internal situation as
“serious and tense,” and described the current political environment
there as “poisonous.” He emphasized the need to maintain stability,
noting that the key challenge for President Musharraf is to maintain
the unity of the Pakistani armed forces. He voiced strong support for
holding planned parliamentary elections, but also said that a limited
postponement would be acceptable, given the current situation in the
country. Postponing the elections could be “an opportunity for the
Pakistanis to talk things out,” he said. Prince Saud cautioned that
Pakistan must be allowed to resolve its current political crisis
internally, without overt, external pressure.
¶3. (S) Commenting on the Bhutto assasination, Prince Saud

observed that he had been afraid of just such an outcome ever since
the former Prime Minister had decided to return to Pakistan. He
then cautioned that the USG must not be seen publicly to be
influencing Pakistan’s internal affairs, lest it inadvertently inflame
matters by provoking Islamist extremists to further violence. “People
talk about the extremists we have here, but I think they are much
worse in Pakistan,” he commented.
¶4. (S) The Foreign Minister stated that former Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif is a force for stability, in his opinion. He called Sharif a
leader who can speak across party lines, even to religious extremists
who are not usually open to dialogue. In Prince Saud’s view, Sharif
can play an important role in stabiizing Pakistan.
¶5. (S) These views stand in marked contrast to those of Saudi

Ambassador to the US Adel al-Jubeir. In a December 31
conversation with the DCM, al-Jubeir was highly critical of Sharif,
stating in particular that Sharif had violated a promise made to King
Abdullah by publicly calling for President Musharraf to step down.
Accrding to al-Jubeir, prior to his return to Pakistan, Sharif had
promised the King to avoid questioning Musharraf’s recent political
decisions in public. Jubeir also compared Pakistan’s current
75
situation to Saudi Arabia in 2003, when the Kingdom witnessed a
violent campaign by terrorists linked to a-Qaeda. He explained that
the SAG was able to push back and eventually quell this extremism,
in large part by convincing the Kingdom’s religious scholars to
condemn terrorism strongly. Jubeir expresed the hope that a similar
outcome is possible in Pakistan.
¶6. (S) COMMENT. The contrast between the views of the Foreign
Minister and Ambassador al-Jubeir are worth noting, since they
probably indicate that the senior levels of the Saudi government are
still debating what the Kingdom’s Pakistan policy should be in the
aftermath of the Bhutto asassination. It is likely that al-Jubeir’s
views more closely reflect those of King Abdullah, his patron. END
COMMENT. FRAKER
76
2008-07-30 2010-12-01 Embassy
08RIYADH1175 SECRET
14:02 23:11 Riyadh
VZCZCXRO9493
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHRH #1175/01 2121424
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301424Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON
DC PRIORITY 0233
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
SIPDIS
STATE FOR D JNEGROPONTE
DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO MWILLIAMSON, GPERSON, AND
JHART
TREASURY PASS TO A/S CLOWERY
EO 12958 DECL: 07/30/2018

TAGS EPET, PREL, PK, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI OIL ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN
PROCEEDING SLOWLY
Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller for reasons 1.4 (b) (c) and (d).
-------
77
Summary
-------
¶1. (S) Recent conversations with the Assistant Minister of

Petroleum, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance, and the
Pakistani Embassy point to one conclusion: the Saudi offer to assist
Pakistan by deferring crude oil payments is proceeding slowly. With
King Abdullah, Petroleum Minister Naimi, Foreign Minister Saud al
Faisal, and Assistant Minister of Petroleum Prince Abdulaziz all out
of the country on vacation, absent USG intervention, the proposal is
unlikely to advance substantially until September.
-------------------------------
MinPet Unaware of Any Progress
-------------------------------
¶2. (S) In a July 30 phone call from London, Assistant Minister of

Petroleum Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud was
surprised to hear we were interested in discussing the Saudi proposal
to defer payments for crude sales for Pakistan. He stated he had
heard nothing about the proposal since the June 22 oil summit in
Jeddah. Abdulaziz, who led the Jeddah summit and holds the
international portfolio for the Ministry of Petroleum (MinPet),
promised nonetheless to look into progress on the negotiations, and
call us again tomorrow.
--------------------------------------
Deal At Least a Month Away? Saudis Reluctant with Crude Prices so
High
--------------------------------------
¶3. (S) In a July 30 meeting with Pakistan Embassy Commercial

Counselor Zia Shams, Shams told us, “The deal is not finalized, it is
in negotiations.” He clarified that Pakistan did not expect to alter its
regular schedule of crude oil deliveries from Saudi Arabia, but had
requested a deferred payment scheme. He explained Pakistan could
have turned to the IMF for assistance, but had hoped terms would be
easier working with Saudi Arabia. Shams told us Pakistan had
requested the assistance when oil was about $147/barrel, but
negotiations still had not concluded. Shams fretted that, “Muslim
brotherhood is not what it used to be, these deals have become very
commercialized.” The Saudi government had explained they could
not do a deal with oil prices so high, Shams noted. Saudi Arabia is
78
concerned that if Pakistan were awarded payment concessions, other
major developing nations such as India would make similar
demands. Shams believes a deal might be concluded if crude prices
continue to slide. At the conclusion of the meeting, Shams whispered
that he thought a “deal was likely a month away.”
¶4. (S) Shams indicated any encouragement the USG might offer for
the proposal would go a long way to see that it was implemented in
time to avoid further chaos in Pakistan. Shams told us that the new
Pakistani government had been forced to raise gasoline prices by 60
percent and diesel prices (key to the transport sector) by 100 percent
since March. The price increases were pushing the population to the
limit and fueling extremism, he said.
-----------------------------
MFA Has No Knowledge of Deal
-----------------------------
¶5. (S) On July 30, the Charge D’Affaires met with Ambassador
Khalid Al Jindan, the third ranking diplomat at the MFA, and the
Director of Western Affairs. Ambassador Al Jindan had no
knowledge of the deal. Nonetheless, he said there was wide agreement
within the Saudi government on the need to do everything possible to
support Pakistan’s internal stability.
RIYADH 00001175 002 OF 002
--------------------------------------------
Ministry of Finance: Deal Still with MinPet
---------------------------------------------
¶6. (S) Hamad Najashi from the International Relations Office at the
Ministry of Finance shed some light on the process for negotiating
such oil relief packages. He verified MinPet was the lead negotiator
for such programs. Once a relief package was agreed upon, it would
be forwarded to the Ministry of Finance (MOF) for financial
processing. After researching the issue with counterparts in the
international assistance area, he told us the MOF has not seen the
Pakistan proposal, because the agreement was not yet concluded.
--------
Comment
--------
79
¶7. (S) Prince Abdulaziz’s apparent ignorance of any recent
developments on the Saudi offer to assist Pakistan suggests there has
been no movement since the June 22 Jeddah summit. Prince
Abdulaziz would be aware of, if not leading, any negotiations with
Pakistan. Taken together with the comments from the MFA’s
Ambassador Al Jindan, the Pakistani Counselor, and the MOF, it
appears the Saudi offer has been shelved until a decline in oil prices
make it more palatable for MinPet to implement. The Saudi royal
family and senior officials are on vacation now, to be followed by the
September Ramadan season. If we see rapid implementation of the
offer as critically important to the Pakistan government’s stability, it
will likely take USG intervention at the highest levels with senior
Saudi officials now in Morocco to secure its rapid implementation.
GFOELLER
80
2008-10- 2010-12-01 Embassy
16 10:10 23:11 Riyadh
VZCZCXRO6948
OO RUEHLH
DE RUEHRH #1541 2901016
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161016Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 4717
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2903
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 0054
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 0047
RUSBPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 0183
IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/15/2018

TAGS PREL, PTER, SA, PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI RELATIONS WITH SAUDIS

“STRAINED”
REF: A. (A) ISLAMABAD 3249 B. (B) RIYADH 1510 C. (C)
RIYADH 1175 D. (D) ISLAMABAD 2405
Classified By: CDA David Rundell, reasons 1.4 b & d.
¶1. (C) SAUDIS UNHAPPY WITH ZARDARI: Echoing Pakistani

interlocutors in Washington and Islamabad, in an introductory call
with PolCouns, Pakistani DCM Sarfraz Khanzada (protect)
characterized Saudi-Pakistani relations as “under strain.” This was
due, he said, to a lack of Saudi confidence in the Zardari government.
81
He cited a sharp reduction in Saudi financial assistance to Pakistan,
and said that the Saudis had not provided “a single drop” of oil at the
concessionary terms promised last year (refs c & d). Instead, during
2008, the Saudis had provided assistance in the form of a single $300
million check, considerably less than in previous years, but “beggars
can’t be choosers,” he lamented. Khanzada opined that the Saudi
government appeared to be “waiting for the Zardari government to
fall.”
¶2. (C) NAWAS FAVORED: Khanzada said the Pakistanis are

convinced that Saudi King Abdallah would prefer to see Pakistan
run by former PM Nawas Sharif, and were cutting back assistance to
Pakistan to hasten this eventuality. Nawas “practically lives” in
Saudi Arabia, Khanzada declared, claiming that Nawas had even
been favored with reserved prayer space in the Prophet’s Mosque in
Medina. Because Nawas’ daughter is married to a grandson of King
Fahd, he has “become a member of the Saudi royal family.”
(Comment: Embassy is not able to confirm whether this is true. End
comment.)
¶3. (C) AFGHAN MEDIATION: Khanzada claimed that the

Pakistani government was not directly informed about the Saudi
Afghan mediation effort, though they suspected that Nawas had been
present, since he was in Mecca at the same time. While the Pakistani
government did not oppose such talks in principle, they believe they
have little chance of succeeding without U.S. and Pakistani
participation.
¶4. (C) COMMENT: Khanzada’s remarks track with reporting from

Islamabad and Washington regarding Pakistani concerns about
deteriorating relations with the Saudis. While our Saudi interlocutors
tend to be less forthcoming, they’ve made no secret of their
reservations regarding Asif Zardari. Nevertheless, officials continue
to insist that Saudi Arabia supports efforts to stabilize Pakistan, and
we expect that Saudi officials will participate in the next round of
meetings of the Friends of Pakistan. End comment. RUNDELL
82
2009-05- 2010-12-01 Embassy
17 16:04 23:11 Riyadh
VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRH #0670/01 1371606

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171606Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 2489
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 0465
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 1648
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2019

TAGS: PREL PTER AF PK SA YM
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISOR HOLBROOKE'S MEETING
WITH SAUDI
ASSISTANT INTERIOR MINISTER PRINCE MOHAMMED BIN
NAYEF
Classified By: CDA DAVID RUNDELL, 1.4(b),(d)
¶1. KEY POINTS:
-- (C) Ambassador Richard Holbrooke met in Riyadh May 16 with

HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN), Saudi Assistant Minister
of the Interior.
-- (C) Holbrooke emphasized that Afghanistan and Pakistan

should be treated as a closely inter-related problem. He
stressed U.S. desire for stronger cooperation and a common
U.S./Saudi approach to Pakistan based on economic assistance,
encouraging cooperation between Pakistani political factions,
83
and transforming the Pakistani army to fight a
counterinsurgency war.
-- (C) MbN noted the Saudis viewed the Pakistan army as the
strongest element for stability in the country. In reply
Holbrooke emphasized U.S. support for Pakistan's democracy
and said the U.S. opposed a military coup. MbN said he
agreed.
-- (C) MbN described Yemen as a dangerous failed state and a

growing threat to Saudi Arabia because it attracts Al-Qaeda
(AQ), said Yemeni President Saleh is losing control, and
outlined a Saudi strategy of co-opting Yemeni tribes with
assistance projects.
-- (C) MbN strongly supported President Obama's decision to

oppose release of photographs of U.S. detainee
interrogations, saying release would provide a boon to AQ,
and would be "the favor of their life."
PAKISTAN MUST NOT FAIL
¶2. (C) Holbrooke thanked the Prince for Saudi Arabia's $700
million pledge at the April 17 Pakistan donors'
conference in Japan. He said he had not come to make demands
or requests but simply to begin a consultative process. The
fact that three U.S. special envoys (Senator Mitchell, Dennis
Ross, and now Holbrooke) have visited Saudi Arabia
demonstrates the importance President Obama places on
U.S./Saudi relations and the Saudi role in the region.
Afghanistan and Pakistan were a major problem the new U.S.
administration had inherited.
¶3. (C) Success in Afghanistan was essential for U.S.

security as well as security in Europe and the Middle East,
Holbrooke continued. The U.S. might be able to live with
some degree of instability in Afghanistan, but not with an
unstable Pakistan, because of Pakistan's nuclear arms,
fragile politics, and relationship with India. He asked if
Saudi Arabia shared this conclusion. MbN said "Absolutely,"
a comment echoed precisely in Holbrooke's subsequent meetings
with King Abdullah and Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal
(septels). It's clear that Saudi Arabia has a "unique"
84
relationship with Pakistan, Holbrooke said. He noted that
over 800,000 Pakistanis live and work in Saudi Arabia. Saudi
Arabia was especially important to Nawaz Sharif, the most
popular politician in Pakistan. These were reasons why what
happened in Pakistan was of direct concern to both the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia.
¶4. (C) Holbrooke said the U.S. and Saudi Arabia shared a
common purpose on Pakistan but not yet a "common
collaboration." The purpose of his visit was thus to begin a
dialogue on Pakistan and seek a common policy. Neither the
U.S. nor Saudi Arabia could afford to let Pakistan fall
apart. There were three important issues to address:
-- Pakistan desperately needs economic assistance;

-- Even though the Saudis preferred Nawaz Sharif, Sharif and
Zardari need to be persuaded to work together;
-- The Pakistan army needs to restructure itself to fight
today's war against the Taliban rather than yesterday's war
against India.
If Pakistan fell apart, Holbrooke said, the consequences for

Saudi Arabia would be "unimaginable,"
especially if Pakistan's nuclear weapons fell into unfriendly
hands. ("God forbid!" interjected the Prince.)
"Under your leadership," Holbrooke told the Prince "Saudi
Arabia has defeated terror, but if Pakistan falls apart, the
result would be catastrophe."
¶5. (C) Holbrooke said the U.S. wanted to expand the

U.S./Saudi relationship concerning Pakistan. Saudi Arabia
could do a lot for Pakistan, he added, noting that economic
and social conditions in Pakistan created fertile ground for

extremism. Zardari had many faults but he was democratically
elected, so the U.S. tries to get him and Sharif to work
together. Meanwhile, Holbrooke said, money for the Taliban
flows in from the region.
¶6. (C) MbN said a vacuum in Islamabad would be dangerous.

He described Pakistan army Chief of Staff General Kayani as a
"decent man" who wanted to restore dignity to the army, and
sought consensus support of all the civilian factions. The
85
army was the Saudis' "winning horse," MbN said, but it needed
to prepare to fight the current war against terror.
Pakistani soldiers needed to be proud of their service, and
not hide their identity as soldiers when they were off duty,
MbN said. He had told Kayani that Pakistani troops needed to
feel they were fighting for Pakistan and not the U.S. The
Pakistani army had a "golden opportunity" because now
Pakistan faced an external enemy. MbN emphasized that the
army was Pakistan's "best bet" for stability. There were
800,000 Pakistanis and over one million Indians living in
Saudi Arabia, MbN said, and millions more visited the
Kingdom to make the Hajj pilgrimage, so anything that
happened in Pakistan, or between Pakistan and India, was a
threat to stability in Saudi Arabia.
¶7. (C) Holbrooke said he knew Kayani, with the Director of

Pakistan's intelligence service (ISI), and
General Pasha, and also Musharraf. He recalled the U.S. and
Saudi Arabia had decided to support Musharraf in
the aftermath of 9/11. This had been the right decision at
the time but Musharraf had been a disappointment. The U.S.
supported democracy in Pakistan, not any individual leader.
Holbrooke repeated that the U.S. supported Zardari because he
was elected, and emphasized that the U.S. was "100 percent
opposed" to a military coup in Pakistan. MbN assured that
Saudi Arabia would not support a coup either.
¶8. (C) He noted the U.S. agreed that corruption in Pakistan

was an issue, but the U.S. had decided it was more
important to help Pakistan. Attaching onerous conditions to
assistance was a mistake, Holbrooke said. Since the U.S. and
Saudi Arabia agreed on Pakistan's importance, the question
was how to start working together. MbN answered that
U.S./Saudi security cooperation should stay as it is, since
it had "never been better" despite past tensions. Each side
knew its own business best, and the focus should be on
obtaining results. MbN characterized Saudi cooperation with
U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies as "one team."
¶9. (C) Holbrooke reiterated that terrorists in Pakistan were

not under enough pressure and pressed the point that
U.S./Saudi cooperation on Pakistan needed to rise to a higher
level. MbN replied that he had asked King Abdullah
86
for permission to maintain a "security channel" with the U.S.
to remain open at all times to facilitate information
exchange regardless of other issues in bilateral relations.
The Prince added that the King despised the corruption he saw
in Pakistan and this colored his views toward that country.
"WE HAVE A PROBLEM CALLED YEMEN"
¶10. (C) Moving to a new subject, the Prince said "We have a
problem called Yemen." AQ has found fertile ground
there, he said. The geography was similar to Afghanistan,
and many Yemenis were more sympathetic to AQ's goals than
were the Afghans. Yemen is also closer to AQ targets and
recruiting grounds in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had detected
a pattern of individuals coming to the Kingdom for Hajj or
Umrah and then traveling south to Yemen ("it's only 400
miles," he noted) for training before returning to their home
countries. Saudi forces have arrested Egyptians and
Algerians, among others, who were attempting to do this.
¶11. (C) MbN described Yemen as a failed state that is "very,

very, extremely dangerous," and required focus. The Huthi
tribes were Takfiri and Shi'a "like Hizballah South," he
said. This was a threat forming around Saudi Arabia that
required action now. The Saudis would like Saleh to be a
strong leader, MbN said, but "his vision of Yemen has shrunk
to Sana'a," and he was losing control over the rest of the
country. Saleh's old advisors were gone and now he relied on
his son and other younger men who did not have good
connections with the Yemeni tribes. In contrast, Saudi
Arabia had good connections with the tribes, MbN said.
¶12. (C) MbN said the Saudis had established a bilateral

council with Yemen that met twice a year to consider
assistance projects. The Saudi representatives were the
Crown prince and the oil minister (Note: Crown Prince

Sultan has been incapacitated by illness for at least he past
year; it is not clear whether the bilateral council
has continued to meet in his absence.) Saudi assistance to
Yemen was not in the form of cash payments, MbN said, since
cash tended to end up in Swiss banks. Instead the Saudis
87
backed projects in the tribal areas of Yemen where AQ was
hiding. The idea was that when Yemenis saw the concrete
benefits of these projects they would push their leaders to
eject the extremists. Saudi Arabia was counting on this
strategy, MbN said, to persuade Yemenis to see extremists as
criminals rather than heroes. Holbrooke replied that the
U.S. understood Saudi concerns about Yemen, and would work
with the Saudis to address the problem there.
TERRORISTS STOLE OUR FAITH
¶13. (C) Turning to another issue, MbN recalled that the day
following President Obama's inauguration, White House
counterterrorism advisor Brennan had telephoned to assure him
the new president was committed to continuing the war on
terror. "Terrorists stole the most valuable things we have,"
said the Prince. "They took our faith and our children and
used them to attack us." It had not been easy to see Saudi
involvement in 9/11 and other terrorist incidents, he said.
AQ was smart in wanting to hit both the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia. AQ's strategic goal was to hurt the U.S. and to take
control of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina.
¶14. (C) MbN claimed that in 2003 radicals were present in

"90 percent" of Saudi mosques. The current Saudi leadership
had decided it needed to be on the front lines of the
struggle against terrorism, that the task could not be left
to the next generation, since AQ gained momentum every time
it succeeded. The Saudis realized they could not fight back
without public support, he said, and developed a strategy of
working with families of suicide bombers and other extremists
who had been killed. This approach involved providing
support to the families and telling them their sons had been
"victims" and not "criminals." This gave the families "a way
out" and
provided a public relations advantage to the government. "If
you stop five but create fifty" new radicals, "that's dumb."
MbN said. The Saudis measure their success against extremism
by looking at levels of terrorist recruitment the number of
successful operations, and they see a growing rejection of
extremist violence. The Prince related an anecdote about an
anti-terrorist operation in which the officer commanding
Interior Ministry forces had discovered his cousin was the
88
leader of the terrorists inside a surrounded building. MbN
said he had offered to relieve the officer, but the latter
had refused, and had insisted on leading the attack. The
officer succeeded in defeating the terrorists while capturing
his cousin alive.
¶15. (C) Saudi Arabia was not yet free of terrorism, MbN
said. Thus it remained important to defeat the terrorists on
the ground, in the media, and ideologically. The Saudis
wanted to do this in cooperation with the U.S., the Prince
said. Time was the key, and it was "not in our favor," he
added, so "we need to work fast."
¶16. (C) On terrorist financing, MbN said "We are trying to

do our best." Saudi Arabia has millions of visitors,
especially during Hajj. The Saudis are making arrests, but
are not making this public. Instead, the Saudi goal is to
make the public aware that donations could go to the wrong
places. MbN said that "if money wants to go" to terrorist
causes, "it will go," and that terrorist attacks were
inexpensive, "but let's make it harder." Holbrooke asked
what the Saudis would do with Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia who
financed terrorism. The Prince replied the suspects would be
tried in Shari'a courts with Wahhabi judges so that the
results of the judicial process could be used to condemn
extremist ideology.
A BIG FAVOR TO AL-QAEDA
¶17. (C) Holbrooke explained that President Obama had decided

to oppose release of 2000 photographs of U.S.
interrogations of terrorist suspects on grounds of national
security, and asked what the Saudi public reaction would be
to publication of these photos. MbN responded "You bet!" it
would be bad for security, and noted that following
publication of the first Abu Ghraib photos, Saudi authorities
had arrested 250 individuals trying to leave Saudi Arabia to
join extremist groups in Afghanistan. Release of more
pictures would give AQ "the favor of their life," said the
Prince. Saudi Arabia had fought very hard to defeat AQ on

the Internet, but he couldn,t see how to fight 2000 new
photos.
89
¶18. (U) Meeting participants
U.S.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
Saudi Arabia
XXXXXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXXXXX,
XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶19. (U) Amb. Holbrooke cleared this telegram.

RUNDELL
90
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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0301
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0508
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 2541
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY 0287
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 0050
RUSBPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 0186
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 001415
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/21/2019

TAGS SA, PK, AF, PREL, PGOV
SUBJECT: PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR ON MILITARY

OPERATIONS IN
FATA; SAUDI RELATIONS
RIYADH 00001415 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (B) and
(D)
SUMMARY:
---------
¶1. (C) During an Oct. 20 courtesy call with the Ambassador,

Pakistani Ambassador Umar Khan Alisherzai highlighted the success
91
of recent military operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas; lamented
strains on the Saudi-Pakistani bilateral relationship; discussed other
regional issues affecting Pakistan; and offered his advice on
countering extremism in rural tribal regions. End Summary.
WAZIRISTAN: “REASONABLE RESISTANCE, BUT NOT AS

MUCH AS WE EXPECTED”
-----------------------------------
¶2. (C) Alisherzai described the Pakistani military operations in

Waziristan as “progressing well,” adding that they had encountered
“reasonable resistance, but not as much as we expected.” The army
faced difficult terrain in the region, he continued, but had already
killed over 100 militants. Alisherzai described the extremists as a
group of “Chechens, Saudis, Uzbeks and others” who had come
across the border from Afghanistan and sought refuge with the local
population. Although tribal tradition required the Pakistanis to offer
them shelter, he explained, “these people turned out to be monsters,”
and the local population turned against them.
SWAT VALLEY: A SUCCESS STORY?

-----------------------------
¶3. (C) Alisherzai pointed to the military’s advances against the

Taliban in the Swat Valley as one example of success in the region.
The cooperation of the local people was a decisive factor, as they
provided the most effective intelligence to the military after realizing
that “the militants were not interested in Islam at all.” In addition,
the military and police in Swat provided weapons to local tribes.
When pressed about conditions in Swat, Alisherzai admitted that the
Pakistani military still faced challenges due to their limited resources.
He said that 10,000 soldiers had been relocated from the Indian
border to Swat and that 100,000 new soldiers were placed there as
well. However, Alisherzai was quick to point out that the 100,000 new
soldiers were inexperienced.
¶4. (C) While upbeat that Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders
were “truly working in tandem for the first time,” Alisherzai was
disappointed that action was not taken sooner. “All of this would
have been easier if done under (former Pakistani President)
Musharraf,” he concluded.
“WE NEED MORE ARMS, AMMO AND PLANES”
92
------------------------------------
¶5. (C) In response to the Ambassador’s question about support from

CentCom, Alisherzai replied that the U.S. “does a lot for Pakistan.”
However, it was not enough to fight this problem. All of NATO was
fighting the battle in Afghanistan, he complained, while Pakistan
alone was standing up to the extremists within its borders. For this
reason he insisted that Pakistan needed more material support from
the U.S. in the form of “arms, ammo and planes.”
REBUILDING OLD RELATIONSHIPS

----------------------------
¶6. (C) When asked about the Saudi-Pakistani relationship,

Alisherzai admitted that it had been strained since Pakistani
President Asif Ali Zardari’s election. Alisherzai blamed the problems
on the Saudi perception that Zardari was pro-Iranian and pro-Shia,
which made them apprehensive about working with him. “We have
been punished by Saudi Arabia because our president talks to the
Iranians,” Alisherzai lamented. He claimed that his access to Saudi
leadership was good, but that he would have to continue to work
hard to rebuild Pakistan,s relationship with the SAG. Alisherzai
opined
RIYADH 00001415 002.2 OF 002
that the Saudis were more concerned with their own internal
problems than with the problems of Pakistan.
IRAN
----
¶7. (C) Alisherzai accused Russia of “fully supporting the Iranians’

nuclear program,” adding that all Shia communities in the region
supported this program. He described Iranian nuclear ambitions as a
move to consolidate domestic political power and stated multiple
times, “they will not leave this subject.”
INDIA: “WE ARE NOT EXPECTING ANYTHING GOOD”

-------------------------------------------
¶8. (C) Alisherzai blamed India for helping to train and fund
extremist groups fighting against the Government of Pakistan. He
said that India also helped support the Taliban in Pakistan,
explaining “They (India) will never let a chance to harm Pakistan
93
go.” Alisherzai summed up his feelings about India by saying, “We
are not expecting anything good from them.”
THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM

-----------------------
¶9. (C) Asked how to stop terrorism and extremism in Pakistan,

Alisherzai said that the people living in the tribal areas “don’t know
the value of life.” He blamed this on their lack of education and
knowledge of the outside world, and said that they only know
fighting and dying. In his view, investment in education and
development was the only way to help the tribal areas, and said that
years of “bad luck” had redirected development funds from the
tribal areas to the urban population centers. He reiterated his
support for military operations, but insisted that a program to
educate young boys in the region must also be implemented. He
noted that this program should be funded by NATO and added, “I
am only here today because of my education. Perhaps I would have
been Al-Qaeda too, if not for my education.”
COMMENT:
--------
¶10. (C) Alisherzai is from the Kurram Agency, one of the seven
tribal agencies that make up the Federally Administered Tribal Area
(FATA) along the Afghanistan border. As such, he is able to offer an
insider’s view of life along the Pakistani-Afghan border. His
observation that intelligence and support provided by the local
population has been essential to the success of Pakistani military
operations is worth noting, as are his suggestions as to how we might
counter the growth of extremism in the region. However, his insights
about larger regional issues (ie: Iran, India, Saudi Arabia) appear to
be much more limited. End comment.
BIOGRAPHIC NOTE
---------------
¶11. (C) Alisherzai grew up in the FATA bordering the Afghanistan

provinces of Khowst and Paktya. His father served in the British
military and insisted that his son attend school. Alisherzai says that
at the age of five he walked 8km to school everyday. He has six
children, all living in the U.S. and all graduates of George Mason
University. SMITH
94
2008-01-26 2010-11-30 Embassy
08RIYADH102 SECRET
11:11 21:09 Riyadh
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OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
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FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 01/26/2018

TAGS FR, PGOV, PINR, PREL, SA
SUBJECT: SARKOZY IN SAUDI ARABIA
REF: RIYADH 0037
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires David Rundell for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s visited

Saudi Arabia on January 13-14 to make clear that Saudi Arabia is
now “at the top” of the French Middle East policy list. Pres. Sarkozy
met with Saudi King Abdullah, addressed the Shura council and
spoke briefly with Saudi business leaders. Topics discussed were
Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Mid East Peace Process, Syrian meddling
in Lebanon, security in Iraq, and French-Saudi cooperation,
95
including the offer of nuclear energy technology. The visit can be
viewed as a moderate success for French-Saudi bilateral relations,
although no major announcements were made. Press reports of the
visit along with a private readout by the French DCM were positive,
but our Saudi contacts passed on certain displeasure with the
French’s conduct. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S/NF) French President Nicholas Sarkozy arrived in Riyadh on

January 13 for a one night/two day visit. This visit was a follow up to
Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s visit to Paris in June
2007. Pres Sarkozy was accompanied by French Foreign Minister
Bernard Kouchner, Minister of Defense Hevre Morin, Minister of
Justice Rachida Dati, Minister of Culture Christine Albanel and
Minister of Education Valerie Pecresse. French DCM in Riyadh
Emmanuel Bonne provided a private readout to Acting Pol
Counselor of this visit. Topics raised included Iran’s nuclear
ambitions, Mid East Peace Process, Syrian meddling in Lebanon,
security in Iraq, and French-Saudi cooperation, including the offer of
nuclear energy technology. Additionally, the main theme was to
foster a stronger personal relationship between Pres Sarkozy and
King Abdullah. Overall, King Abdullah emphasized multilateral
solutions, vice bilateral approaches, regarding the multitude of issues
discussed. Readouts from the French and the press were positive, but
our Saudi contacts privately shared displeasure with certain French
conduct.
IRAN
----
¶3. (S/NF) Pres Sarkozy reiterated his strong concern with Iran’s
nuclear ambitions to King Abdullah, asserting sanctions were the
best way to put pressure on Iran. Abdullah reportedly does not want
to inflame the situation and recommended continued international
engagement (P-5 plus Germany) with Iran. He emphasized that Iran
must abide by its international obligations, specifically the Non-
Proliferation treaty. Abdullah reportedly concurred, noting Iran’s
destabilizing activities in Iraq and Lebanon, along with Saudi belief
that Iran’s ultimate goal is to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the
Saudis are not yet ready to take any action beyond diplomacy at this
point and assured their commitment to French efforts for a
diplomatic solution with Iran. King Abdullah stated that Iran knows
its obligations and the next step is for the Iranians to comply. The
French had hoped to make a joint communiqu on Iran, but the
96
Saudis declined because they do not want to aggravate the Iranian
situation. COMMENT: It was not made clear just how the proposed
communiqu would have aggravated Saudi-Iranian relations. END
COMMENT.
MEPP
----
¶4. (S/NF) Both Pres Sarkozy and King Abdullah agreed to support
the Annapolis initiative to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Abdullah told Sarkozy that the issue of Palestinian refugees must
first be resolved and that the Israelis must cease all West Bank
settlement construction. Abdullah maintained that East Jerusalem
must be the capital of a Palestinian state and that this section of
Jerusalem must be solely under Arab control. The French had hoped
to issue a joint communiqu on the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,
but no consensus could be reached.
SYRIA/LEBANON
-------------
¶5. (S/NF) The issue of Lebanon was raised by Pres Sarkozy.
Abdullah cautioned that everyone should be very cautious in
speaking with the Syrians, implying their duplicity. He added the
French “should be firm” with Syria in regards to
RIYADH 00000102 002 OF 003
Lebanon. In a separate meeting between French FM Bernard
Kouchner and Saudi FM Saud al Faisal, the French supported the
Arab initiative on Lebanon. Saud added he was skeptical of the
current Lebanese political parties and doubted the Syrians would
comply with any accord.
IRAQ
----
¶6. (S/NF) Regarding Iraq, both Pres Sarkozy and King Abdullah
concurred that Iraq’s security had dramatically improved since 2006.
Abdullah reportedly opined that Iraq must remained a unified state,
and that external players, such as Iran, must be dissuaded from
interfering.
FRENCH-SAUDI COOPERATION
------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) General energy policy was discussed, including gas, oil
and nuclear power. Pres Sarkozy made an offer to provide civilian
nuclear energy technology (Reftel) to the kingdom. King Abdullah
was receptive to the offer, but no firm agreement was made.
¶8. (S/NF) In his speech to the Shura Council (Septel) on January 14,
Pres Sarkozy espoused tolerance of different religious faiths,
women’s rights, and freedom of expression. His speech barely
97
mentioned political issues and instead focused on a “civilization
policy” - respect and dignity for all cultures. While some of these
themes are at odds with traditional Saudi society, Emb Off present at
this event reported that Sarkozy was well-received.
¶9. (S/NF) The French delegation included various Ministers to
strengthen educational, commercial and energy ties with the
kingdom. Four cooperative agreements were made: 1) political
consultations to coordinate regional activities; 2) energy policy
regarding gas and oil; 3) vocational language training increase from
100 to 500 students to help overcome the French-Arabic language
barrier; and 4) higher education with the goal to increase the number
of Saudi students in France (currently 4000). Pres Sarkozy had a
brief (10-minute) presentation to Saudi business leaders.
¶10. (S/NF) The overarching theme of the visit, according to French
Embassy Riyadh, was to strengthen the personal relationship
between Pres Sarkozy and King Abdullah. Former Pres Jacques
Chirac and King Abdullah had a strong friendship with agreement
on a host of issues. Reportedly, the Saudis were concerned by
Sarkozy’s election last year because of his expressed support of Israel
and Jewish background. This visit was to dispel Saudi concerns and
to assure the Saudis that Pres Sarkozy could be counted on as
strongly as Pres Chirac. Likewise, the French told us they are
modifying their Mid East policy. The Levant states have been
France’s top Mid East focus, while the Arabian Gulf had been at the
“bottom of the list.” Recognition of Saudi Arabia’s emerging
influence and status has resulted in the French putting Saudi Arabia
“at the top” of the French foreign policy Middle East list.
GOOD VISIT, BUT NOT GREAT
-------------------------
¶11. (S/NF) COMMENT. Per the French DCM, they were quite
pleased with Pres Sarkozy’s visit. They were disappointed they could
not issue any joint communiqus on any major issues, such as Iran or
the MEPP. Still, they viewed the reciprocal state visits were steps
forward in French-Saudi relations. Press coverage of Pres Sarkozy
was positive with front page newspaper pictures of both leaders
smiling together.
¶12. (S/NF) However, our Saudi contacts provided some negative
comments. Minor in substance, but significant to Saudi sensibilities.
Initially, Sarkozy’s fiance Carla Bruni was expected to accompany
him (but finally did not travel), which the Saudis found offensive
given their strict, conservative culture against the company of an
unmarried woman. Various protocol faux pas were committed by the
French delegation during the visit. The French advance made, in
98
Saudi opinion, unreasonable logistical demands. Finally, Pres
Sarkozy was viewed as less than gracious, in Saudi eyes, during
certain events, such as avoiding tasting traditional Arab foods and a
bored look during the televised arrival sword ceremony. While these
are minor points, the fact our Saudi contacts mentioned them shows
their discontent. These incidents
RIYADH 00000102 003 OF 003
characterized one overarching private comment from the Saudis,
that Pres Sarkozy has not replaced Pres Chirac in Saudi eyes. Other
usually well-informed Saudi contacts have lamented the overtly
commercial nature of the visit. Sarkozy reportedly presented a list of
fourteen (14) sales that French firms would like to make to the Saudi
government, complete with the original price and discounts that
Sarkozy was prepared to negotiate. END COMMENT. FRAKER
99
2009-03- 2010-11- Embassy
31 14:02 29 21:09 Riyadh
nytimes.com
P 311432Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0487
INFO CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NOFORN
DEPT FOR H(SHANE) AND H/RGF(LANG)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ECON SA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SENATOR BOND'S APRIL 6-8
VISIT TO
SAUDI ARABIA
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David Rundell for reasons 1.4
(b)
and (d)
¶1. (U) The Embassy welcomes your visit to the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia. This message provides a brief overview of key
current issues in U.S. - Saudi relations, tailored to the
particular issues that your Saudi interlocutors will likely
raise with you.
¶2. (C) You will be arriving six days after an Arab League
Summit in Doha. Despite the Saudis pulling out all the
diplomatic stops to ensure the summit conveyed publicly a
sufficient degree of Arab unity, Libyan leader Muammar
Qadhafi's eccentric outburst showed that deep fissures still
exist. This was the second such embarrassment in the past
three months showing the Arabs to be badly divided on
regional security issues after public disagreements at the
100
Arab Economic Summit in Kuwait in January.
U.S. Saudi Relations on the Mend

---------------------------------
¶3. (C) As you will hear, Saudi foreign policy calculations

are driven by a deep fear and suspicion of expanding Iranian
influence. While U.S.-Saudi relations have improved
dramatically since their post-9/11 nadir, differences remain
over U.S. Middle East policies. The Saudis have three
principal issues areas of concern about U.S. policies:
--(C) As the author of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, King

Abdallah risked his personal prestige to advocate a
comprehensive Middle East peace as the "strategic option" for
the Arabs, only to be frustrated by what he saw as U.S.
reluctance to engage over the next seven years.
--(C) Similarly, in the Saudi view, we ignored advice from

the King and Foreign Minister against invading Iraq. In the
words of Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal,
"military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan has tilted the
(regional) balance of power towards Iran."
--(C) Finally, the U.S. debate over whether and how to engage
Iran has fueled Saudi fears that a new U.S. administration
might strike a "grand bargain" without first consultating
Arab countries bordering the Persian Gulf.
Appointment of Prince Nayif

---------------------------
¶4. (C) Saudi King Abdallah issued a royal decree appointing

his half-brother, Interior Minister Prince Nayif bin
Abdalaziz, as second deputy prime minister March 27. The
position had been vacant since Abdallah became King in 2005.
Though the previous two crown princes held Nayif's new
position prior to being formally tapped as heirs to the
throne, this appointment does not necessarily mean Nayif is
"Crown Prince in Waiting," because King Abdallah created a
committee -- the Allegiance Council -- to select the King's
successor.
101
¶5. (S) The King was likely driven by expediency. Crown
Prince Sultan is for all intents and purposes incapacitated,
and the King needed to travel abroad. Someone had to be left
in charge and Nayif, by virtue of his seniority among the
sons of Abdalaziz and his position as Minister of Interior,
was by tradition the leading candidate for the job.
Assistant Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayif (MBN) told the
Ambassador that his father's appointment should not be seen
in the light of succession, but as "an administrative
necessity."
Internal security
------------------
¶6. (C/NF) With our assistance, Saudi Arabia has largely

defeated terrorism at home. The Saudis are now arguably our
most important counterterrorist intelligence partner. They
established tighter controls on charities and the
transporting of cash to disrupt terrorist finance. We have
signed an Information Sharing Agreement with the Kingdom and
started to exchange Airline Passenger Information and
Passenger Name Record (API/PNR) data to help track terrorist
suspects and facilitate legitimate travel. We can say
clearly that Saudi Arabia is now part of the solution, not
the problem.
¶7. (S/NF) The Saudi leadership remains greatly concerned

about the vulnerability of its energy production facilities,
and has put MBN of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in charge
of efforts to acquire the capability to defend this key
infrastructure. He is looking primarily to the U.S. to build
this capability through an initiative formalized in May 2008
when Secretary Rice and Prince Nayif signed a TCA creating
the Joint Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.
We have established an inter-agency, DOS/DOD/DOE, security
advisory organization, the Office of Program
Management-Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI), to implement this
bilateral security agreement. King Abdullah has made the
protection of Saudi Arabia's critical infrastructure a top
security priority, with MBN fully empowered to achieve this
objective.
Rehabilitation Program
102
----------------------
¶8. (S/NF) We estimate that at least 1,500 former extremists

have passed through the Interior Ministry's rehabilitation
program for extremists (1,200 through the prison rehab
program and 300 through the care center), including 119
Guantanamo returnees, with an overall recidivism rate of 8-10
percent. Despite the front page treatment of former
Guantanamo detainee Sa'eed al-Shihri's appearance in Yemen,
the real story of the Saudi rehabilitation program is one of
success: at least 90 percent of its graduates appear to have
given up jihad and reintegrated into Saudi society. The
recidivists are the exception, not the rule. The Ministry
takes a dynamic approach to the rehab program and will look
for ways to strengthen it by learning from these incidents of
recidivism.
¶9. (S/NF) We know less about recidivism among non-Guantanamo

detainees since they were arrested here for activities inside
Saudi Arabia and as such their cases are an internal Saudi
matter. However we believe a small minority of these have
re-engaged in violent extremist activity, and MOI tells us
former Guantanamo detainees were harder to rehabilitate than
this other category.
The Peace Process after Gaza

----------------------------
¶10. (C) King Abdullah stated the Saudi position bluntly in

the opening session of the January Summit in Kuwait: Israel
should realize that the choice between peace and war will not
be available indefinitely, and the Saudi-authored Arab Peace
Initiative, currently on the table, will not remain there
forever. However, the Saudis have made no move to withdraw
the plan yet. Saudi and Arab public opinion have reacted
strongly to the Israeli offensive on Gaza, creating intense
pressure on Arab governments to act. The Saudis fear
instability and increasing Iranian influence could result,
and believe that there is a limited window of opportunity for
action.
Iran
-----
103
¶11. (S) Iran remains the strategic threat at the forefront of
Saudi security concerns. Senior U.S. officials visiting the
Kingdom recently have heard the King expound at length about
the great danger that Iran poses to the region. In general,
the Saudi leadership has begun to look at all regional
security issues through the prism of their fears about
growing Iranian influence. They see Iran's activities as
dangerously provocative, not only in Iraq, but also in
Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, parts of Africa, and southeast Asia.
King Abdullah met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki
earlier this month, and subsequently informed the NSC's John
Brennan that he had had a "heated exchange" with Mottaki,
upbraiding him that "Persians" have no business meddling in
"Arab" affairs and threatening that he would give Iran no
more than a year to repair its relations in the region.
Saudi intelligence chief Prince Muqrin told Brennan the
"Shi'a crescent has become a full moon," implying that the
Saudis are surrounded by Iranian intrigues.
¶12. (S) On Iranian nuclear activities, the Saudi view is that

nations have the right to a peaceful nuclear program, but
that Iran does not have the right to do what it is doing.
The Saudis want to see a peaceful solution to the Iran
nuclear problem but they also want reassurance that Saudi
interests will be factored into any deal struck with Iran.
Afghanistan
------------
¶13. (S/NF) We have been encouraging the Saudi government to

be more active in support of the Karzai government, in
particular by helping to train, or to fund the training of,
Afghan security forces. Saudi Arabia has been helpful in
providing assistance, but we would like them to do more. One
area in which Saudi diplomacy has been forward leaning is in
offering to help mediate between the Afghan government and
the Taliban.
Pakistan
---------
¶14. (C) The Saudis are extremely concerned about Pakistan's
104
political fragility, and have worked hard, through their
embassy in Islamabad, to bring the Pakistani factions
together. Saudi relations with Pakistan have been strained
because the Saudis don't trust Zardari and see him and other
leading Pakistani politicians as corrupt. Zardari visited
Saudi Arabia last November for talks with King Abdullah on
Saudi support for the "Friends of Pakistan" initiative and
oil subsidies. The visit was an opportunity for Zardari to
persuade skeptical Saudis that he can be a trustworthy
partner in managing one of Saudi Arabia's most important
regional relationships, but his trip appears not to have
resulted in new Saudi assistance or other commitments. The
Saudis say they have been holding back economic and political
support pending evidence that the political situation in
Pakistan is stabilizing.
FRAKER
105
2009-08- 2010-11-28 Embassy
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P 310443Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDIS CONDEMN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT,
RALLY BEHIND
PRINCE
REF: A. RIYADH 1110

¶B. RIYADH 939
¶C. RIYADH 921
¶D. RIYADH 928
Classified By: CDA Ambassador Richard Erdman for reasons 1.4(b)

and (d)
SUMMARY AND COMMENT

--------------------
¶1. (C) In the aftermath of the failed assassination attempt

targeting Assistant Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin
Naif (MbN) (ref A), King Abdullah and other officials
responded swiftly and decisively to reassure the public that
the Prince was well, and reaffirm the Kingdom's commitment to
combating terrorism. The press and the public universally
condemned the attack, characterizing it as a direct assault
against the Saudi state and Islam. A more measured reaction
106
in the blogosphere hints at how this most recent incident
might affect domestic debate on the proper approach to
dealing with domestic terrorism, with some calling for
continued leniency and emphasis on reform and others arguing
the Saudi government is being too lax. The attack seems to
have strengthened the already positive public reputation of
Prince Mohammed bin Naif, and many religious-minded Saudis
will see his miraculous survival, almost unscathed, as a sign
of Divine protection and blessing for his efforts against
Al-Qaeda and other extremists. For his part, Prince Mohammed
has told us the attack has only strengthened his resolve, and
convinced him that the Kingdom's counter-terrorism strategy,
combining firmness with understanding, is effective and
should continue. End Summary and Comment.
OFFICIAL REACTION SWIFT AND DECISIVE

------------------------------------
¶2. (U) Official condemnation came from all quarters

immediately following the attack. The Saudi Press Agency
published photographs of King Abdullah and MbN, wearing a
bandage on his left middle finger, meeting at the hospital in
Jeddah. News channel Al-Arabiya played a tape of the visit
throughout the day in which the visibly concerned King
praised Allah for the Prince's safety and described the
attack as an attack against both Islam and the country:
"Thanks be to God that you are safe and nothing has happened
to you. Everything you might have suffered in the service of
your religion and homeland will not be for nothing, God
willing." MbN responded that this attack "would only
strengthen our resolve to root out the terrorists," and
admitted that he was at fault for failing to require a full
search of the bomber. Official reports note that the
would-be assassin was on a list of 85 wanted terrorists, that
MbN was aware of his planned attendance, and that he had been
expected to turn himself in at the event.
¶3. (U) Other prominent religious and political figures were

widely quoted in the press the day after the incident. The
Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia told Okaz newspaper the attack
was "not unexpected," and called the assailant "deviant" and
"corrupt to the core." Justice Minister Mohammed Al-Issa
107
"thanked Allah" for keeping the Prince safe. Interior
Ministry Spokesman Major General Mansour Al-Turki reaffirmed
the Ministry's commitment to fighting terrorism,
characterizing the attack as "an isolated incident" and
adding "those who think the war on terror is over in the
Kingdom are mistaken."
PRINCE FETED IN PAPERS, PUBLIC SHOCKED BY ATTACK

--------------------------------------------- ---
¶4. (U) All major Arabic and English dailies led with the
story, focusing prominently on MbN himself and his role in
the Kingdom's war on terror. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat dedicated the
first three pages of the August 29 edition solely to the
attack on the Prince and related subjects. Other papers
included lengthy biographical profiles of the Prince,
editorial cartoons dealing with the event, and even poems in
his honor.
¶5. (U) The articles and editorials show broad support for
MbN and, more generally, the fight against terrorism. Many
depicted the event as an assault on the Saudi state that
called for a patriotic response. Saudi journalist Dawood
Al-Shiryan wrote in Al-Hayat that the attack was "terrorism
as a political rebellion attempting to undermine the
authority of the state." Okaz called the attack "an attack
on the security of the nation...that should make everyone
alert and ready to fight." The August 29 editorial cartoon
in Al-Watan depicted a prone terrorist, wearing an explosive
belt and holding a detonator in each hand, dead and bleeding
RIYADH 00001121 002 OF 003
from a wound caused by the Saudi flag planted in his back.

In the same paper, a caricature accompanying a poem
celebrating the Prince as "Engineer of Love and War" shows
him carrying a shield resembling the Saudi flag.
¶6. (U) The public's reaction as portrayed in an Arab News

article was of "shock, disgust, and dismay," noting that the
timing of the attack during the holy month of Ramadan was a
108
particular source of ire. One student in Jeddah said "Yes,
there is frustration among a section of people regarding our
foreign policy, but what happened...is deplorable and utterly
un-Islamic." A Riyadh-based professional questioned whether
the Kingdom should continue with its rehabilitation programs,
saying these efforts had been "nullified" by the attack and
that the perpetrator had "betrayed our leaders." Others
called the attack "evidence that the government's anti-terror
tactics have been largely successful," and observed "panic in
the terror camp" and "frustration with the government's
continued success of hitting (terrorists) hard."
DIVERSE REACTION IN THE BLOGOSPHERE

-----------------------------------
¶7. (U) On his Saudi Jeans blog, Ahmed Al-Omran expressed

relief that the Prince was not seriously injured and hope
that the incident would not "add fuel to the fire" of the
debate between liberals and conservatives. He added, "this
is a time for solidarity and national unity, let us not ruin
it." A contributor to blog Al-Saha encouraged MbN to
continue to demonstrate openness and patience with
terrorists, not revert to iron-fisted policies. An informal
poll on the same website indicated strong support for the
Prince, with 58% of voters suggesting MbN should replace his
father as Interior Minister. Liberal blog Al-Tomaar said the
attack was the result of "spoiling terrorists and treating
them leniently," referring to the SAG's widely-touted
terrorist rehabilitation scheme (ref B).
CONTACTS RESERVE COMMENT

------------------------
¶8. (C) Post contacts were reluctant to comment substantively

on the attack over the phone, telling us that it was common
for royals to welcome well-wishers during Ramadan, that they
were relieved MbN was not injured, and that they wondered why
the man was not checked. When the subject was broached at a
meeting between PAS officers and Deputy Minister of Higher
Education Mohammed Alohali on August 29, however, he went
somewhat beyond the fulsome praise of MbN as "Qahir al
109
Erhaby" (conqueror of terrorism) that is the stuff of most
media commentary. "We know what we,re up against," said
Alohali, adding that dangerous extremists were still a threat
to the country. This, he said, was the reason the SAG was
pushing educational reform so hard.
TERROR, YEMEN ALREADY HOT TOPICS

--------------------------------
¶9. (U) Saudi soul-searching about the root causes and extent
of domestic terrorism has been evident since 2003, and the
August 20 announcement that 44 suspected Al-Qaeda militants
had been arrested in the Kingdom injected it with new vigor.
On August 22, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat columnist Husayn Al-Shubakshi
praised the Saudi security forces for their "pre-emptive,
focused, professional, and secret blows," and credited MbN
directly for the Ministry's success.
¶10. (U) In an August 27 piece in the same paper, columnist

Mshari Al-Zaydi also considered the arrests a success, while
citing the need to confront terrorism as an ideological
issue. That this new batch of terrorists was predominantly
Saudi, middle-aged, and well-educated challenged previous
assumptions that economic deprivation and youthful religious
zealotry were responsible for domestic terrorism, and
indicated that the government needed to rethink its approach.
"Saudi Arabia is now confronting a new virus that is
constantly evolving," he writes, adding "the ideological
doctor who is holding on to the surgeon's scalpel...is yet to
enter the operating theater."
¶11. (C) Although unvoiced in the gushing media paeans to

MbN, ordinary Saudis are wondering how this assassination
attempt came so close to fruition. According to today,s
edition of "Okaz," the suspect managed to make his way from
Yemen into Saudi Arabia some weeks ago, and finally rented a
furnished apartment in Jeddah. We anticipate that such
reports will inevitably spur some introspection into how well
the security services are patrolling the Asir region.
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ERDMAN
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S/I
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2018

TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN IZ PGOV PREL MOPS SA IR
SUBJECT: SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES
ON SAUDI
POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
Classified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (S) Summary: US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and

General David Petraeus met with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd
al-Aziz, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, General
112
Presidency of Intelligence Chief Prince Muqrin bin Abd
al-Aziz, and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz during
their April 14-15 visit to Riyadh. The Saudi King and senior
Princes reviewed Saudi policy toward Iraq in detail, all
making essentially the same points. They said that the
Kingdom will not send an ambassador to Baghdad or open an
embassy until the King and senior Saudi officials are
satisfied that the security situation has improved and the
Iraqi government has implemented policies that benefit all
Iraqis, reinforce Iraq's Arab identity, and resist Iranian
influence. The Saudis evinced somewhat greater flexibility
regarding the issues of economic and humanitarian assistance
for Iraq and debt forgiveness. In a conversation with the
Charge' on April 17, Saudi Ambassador to the US Adel
al-Jubeir indicated that the King had been very impressed by
the visit of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and
al-Jubeir hinted that the Saudi government might announce
changes to its Iraq policy before the President's visit to
Riyadh in mid-May. End Summary.
Positive Signs in Iraq
¶2. (S) In all their meetings with the Saudi royals, both
Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus conveyed the progress
in Iraq and confirmed the negative role Iran is playing in
Iraq. They characterized the recent ISF-led operations in
Basra and Baghdad as having a striking effect against the
Shia militias, most importantly turning Iraqi public opinion
away from the militias. While Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki's decision to take action against the militias was
described as hasty and not well-planned, Ambassador Crocker
and General Petraeus emphasized that any tactical shortfalls
were overshadowed by the greater positive effect of unifying
Iraq and demonstrating the GOI's, and most specifically
al-Maliki's, determined resolve to take on the Shia militias,
especially Jaysh al-Madhi. Concurrently, these operations
unequivocally demonstrated Iran's subversive activities in
Iraq and its broader regional ambitions. Throughout all
their discussions, Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus
stressed the importance and urgent need for the Saudis to
join us in supporting Iraq.
The Saudi Embassy Issue
113
¶3. (S) King Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, and Prince
Muqrin all stated that the Saudi government would not send an
ambassador to Baghdad or open an embassy there in the near
future, citing both security and political grounds in support
of this position. The Foreign Minister stated that he had
considered dispatching an ambassador and had sent Saudi
diplomats to Baghdad to identify a site for the Saudi
embassy. However, he said. "the King simply forbade us to go
any farther." King Abdullah confirmed this account in a
separate meeting with Ambassador Crocker and General
Petraeus. The King asserted that the security situation in
Baghdad was too dangerous for him to risk sending a Saudi
ambassador there. "He would immediately become a target for
the terrorists and the militias," he said.
¶4. (S) The King also rejected the suggestion that by sending
a Saudi ambassador to Baghdad he could give essential
political support to the Iraqi government as it struggles to
resist Iranian influence and subversion. He expressed
lingering doubt on the Iraqi government's willingness to
resist Iran. He also repeated his frequently voiced doubts
about Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki himself by alluding to
his "Iranian connections." The Saudi monarch stated that he
does not trust al-Maliki because the Iraqi Prime Minister had
"lied" to him in the past by promising to take certain
actions and then failing to do so. The King did not say
precisely what these allegedly broken promises might have
been. He repeated his oft heard view that al-Maliki rules
Iraq on behalf of his Shiite sect instead of all Iraqis.
¶5. (S) However, in a potentially significant move, the King

did not reject the idea of dispatching a Saudi ambassador to
Baghdad completely. Instead, he said that he would consider
RIYADH 00000649 002 OF 003
doing so after the Iraqi provincial elections are held in the

autumn. The conduct of these elections would indicate
whether or not the Iraqi government is truly interested in
ruling on behalf of all Iraqis or merely in support of the
Shia, King Abdullah asserted.
114
Grudging Acknowledgment of Change in Iraq
¶6. (S) The Foreign Minister signaled another potential

softening in Saudi policy by saying that the Kingdom's
problem was not with al-Maliki as a person but rather with
the conduct of the Iraqi government. The King himself
admitted that the Iraqi government's performance has improved
in recent months and grudgingly accepted the point that
al-Maliki and his security forces have indeed been fighting
extremists, specifically Shia extremists in both Basra and
Baghdad and Sunni extremists and Al Qaeda in Mosul. However,
the King and the senior Princes argued that more time would
be required to judge whether the recent change in Iraqi
behavior was lasting and sincere. The King suggested that
much of the Iraqi government's improved performance is
attributable to US prodding rather than change in Iraqi
attitudes.
¶7. (S) The Foreign Minister also suggested that the USG
should prod Ayatollah Sistani to speak out in favor of a
unified Iraq and national reconciliation among different
Iraqi sects and groups. "You have paid a heavy price in
blood and treasure, and Sistani and his people have benefited
directly. You have every right to ask this of him," Prince
Saud al-Faisal said.
Possible Saudi Economic Assistance
¶8. (S) The King, Prince Muqrin, and the Foreign Minister all
suggested that the Saudi government might be willing to
consider the provision of economic and humanitarian
assistance to Iraq. Prince Muqrin asked Ambassador Crocker
and General Petraeus to send him a list of the kinds of
assistance that the US government would like to see the
Kingdom provide Iraq. Al-Jubeir later told the Charge' that
this assistance would be separate from the USD 1 billion in
aid that the Saudi government had promised at the Madrid
Conference but still not delivered due to security worries.
He said that the Madrid commitment consisted of $500 million
in trade credits and $500 million in project assistance with
strict conditionally, along the lines of what the World Bank
would require. Al-Jubeir added that the assistance the Saudi
115
government might provide via Prince Muqrin would initially be
in the range of $75-$300 million.
Possible Debt Relief
¶9. (S) The King noted that Saudi debt relief for Iraq "will
come at some point," although he did not say when. Al-Jubeir
told the Charge' that debt relief is a real possibility. He
also noted that the Saudi government might make changes to
its Iraq policy, perhaps including both assistance and debt
relief, prior to the President's visit to Riyadh.
The Need to Resist Iran
¶10. (S) The King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and

Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needs to cooperate
with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence
and subversion in Iraq. The King was particularly adamant on
this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well.
Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US
to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons
program. "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," he
recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to
roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority
for the King and his government.
¶11. (S) The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, called

instead for much more severe US and international sanctions
on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on
bank lending. Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing
that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval.
The Foreign Minister also stated that the use of military
pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.
RIYADH 00000649 003 OF 003
¶12. (S) Comment: Saudi attitudes toward Iraq, from the King
on down, remain marked by skepticism and suspicion. That
said, the Saudis have noticed recent events in Iraq and are
eager to work with the US to resist and reverse Iranian
encroachment in Iraq. The King was impressed by Ambassador
116
Crocker's and General Petraeus' visit, as were the Foreign
Minister, GPI Chief, and Interior Minister. Cautious as ever,
the Saudis may nevertheless be willing to consider new
measures in the areas of assistance and debt relief, although
further discussions will be required to make these ideas a
reality. End Comment.
¶13. (U) This cable was reviewed and cleared by Ambassador
Crocker and General Petraeus.
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TAGS: MNUC PGOV PREL SA TRGY KNNP IR
SUBJECT: SAUDIS ON IRAN REF UPCOMING NAM FM
MEETING
REF: A. SECSTATE 74879

¶B. RIYADH 43
Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires Michael Gfoeller for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) On July 21, Pol Counselor delivered demarche on the

upcoming Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers meeting
scheduled for Tehran from July 27-30 (Reftel A) to Saudi MFA
Deputy Director for Western Affairs Department Mojahid Ali
Alwahbi.
¶2. (S) Alwahbi informed us that Saudi Minister of State for

Foreign Affairs (MFA Deputy Secretary equivalent) Dr. Nizar
bin Obaid Madani would lead the Saudi delegation. He assured
us Saudi Arabia did not want the NAM meeting to become an
Iranian propaganda event, adding he had seen the proposed
agenda and did not expect it to develop in such a manner.
Alwahbi agreed Iran's continued nuclear enrichment was a
grave SAG concern with regional security implications (Reftel
B).
¶3. (S) Alwahbi strongly advised against taking military

action to neutralize Iran's program. Rather, establishing a
US-Iranian dialogue was the best course of action, asserting
that the USG opening an Interest Section or re-opening our
Embassy in Tehran would be positive step. Alwahbi was
heartened by the USG's initiative for Under Secretary Burns
to meet with the Iranians last week in Geneva. He added
that, in his view, Iran's position was "shifting" and wanted
to avoid escalation of tensions. He noted his belief that
the Russians had recently been effectively pressuring Iran to
be less provocative. Alwahbi concluded that he expected Iran
to keep tensions relatively low at least until after the US
presidential election.
¶4. (S) COMMENT. These comments are typical of Saudi MFA

bureaucrats who take a pacific stance towards Iran, but
diverge significantly from the more bellicose advice we have
gotten from senior Saudi royals. END COMMENT.
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GFOELLER
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TAGS: PARM PREL MARR MNUC IR SA RU
SUBJECT: SAUDI EXCHANGE WITH RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR
ON IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PLANS
Classified By: P/M COUNSELOR SCOTT MCGEHEE

REASONS 1.4 (b) (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY & COMMENT: Netherlands Ambassador Ron

Strikker, Russian Ambassador Victor Gibinvish, and Embassy
Riyadh Pol/Mil Counselor Scott McGehee met on January 25 with
Dr. Prince Turki Al-Kabeer, Undersecretary for Multilateral
Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to deliver a
joint demarche on the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
121
Terrorism (GICNT). The meeting evolved into a pointed
exchange between the Russian Ambassador and Dr. Prince Turki
on Iran's nuclear ambitions. Prince Turki warned that if
Iran tried to produce nuclear weapons, other countries in the
Gulf region would be compelled to do the same, or to permit
the stationing of nuclear weapons in the Gulf to serve as a
deterrent to the Iranians. Turki then pointedly demanded
that the US keep Saudi officials informed about US plans for
Iran.
¶2. (C) Dr. Prince Turki is not a decision-maker, but he is a

reliable transmitter of official Saudi thinking. Most of
what he said is not new, although this is the most explicit
mention we have heard of Saudi willingness to see nuclear
weapons deployed in the GCC as a deterrent to Iran. His
concern that the United States will negotiate a "grand
bargain" with Iran without consulting Saudi Arabia is a
concern we have heard often in recent weeks. End summary &
comment.
¶3. (C) After hearing a brief verbal demarche from Ambassador

Strikker on the upcoming June Plenary of the GICNT, Dr. Turki
turned to Ambassador Gibinvish, saying, "On this issue, what
concerns us most is how to get our neighbor to change its
policy on enrichment." Iran needs to be convinced to enter a
dialogue on this matter, he continued, noting that Saudi
Arabia is also concerned about the Russian-built reactor at
Bushehr. A leakage from a plant at that location could bring
an environmental catastrophe to Saudi Arabia, pointing out
that it is located less than 300 kilometers away from Saudi
shores, across open water.
¶4. (C) Ambassador Gibinvish was able to say only "Sure, I

agree!" before Prince continued, "The location is so
dangerous! Not just to us, but to the world economy!" He
urged that Russia use its influence to have the reactor moved
north, suggesting that a location on the shore of the Caspian
Sea would be much better, where there is water available for
reactor cooling, and where mountains rise behind to contain
any possible leakage from moving south. Perhaps more
troubling, he said, is Iran's pursuit of nuclear enrichment.
He explained that if Iran tries to produce nuclear weapons,
other countries in the Gulf region would be compelled to do
122
the same, or to permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in
the Gulf to serve as a deterrent to the Iranians.
¶5. (C) Amb. Gibinvish responded that Iran's desire to enrich

uranium reflected its fears that it will someday be attacked
by Israel or the United States and also a sign of Iran's
desire to establish its "supremacy" in the region. Prince
Turki interjected: "And we cannot accept Iranian supremacy
in the region. We are okay with nuclear electrical power and
desalination, but not with enrichment." He said that the
prospect of Iranian enrichment raises troubling questions
about their motivations for doing so: "they do not need it!"
¶6. (S) Amb. Gibinvish noted that "some experts in Russia

believe that Iran will have a bomb in 10 to 15 years."
Russia, he said, is concerned about this matter as well, and
has "put forward initiatives" with Iran. Russia hopes to
discuss this further with Saudi Arabia in the near future,
and he said that an "important delegation" would be coming to
Riyadh in about two months to discuss this with the Saudi
leadership. Prince Turki said that the Russian delegation
would be welcomed, stressing that "we must work together to
get them to abandon their effort to acquire nuclear weapons.
Israel too, he said, must be convinced to surrender its
nuclear arsenal. But you deal with them, you have influence,
that is why I raise this with you." Amb. Gibinvish pledged
that "we will do what we can. But the Iranians are difficult
partners." At this point, Prince Turki turned to Pol/Mil
Counselor who had momentarily stopped taking notes. Prince
Turki said "Please write this down. Whatever is discussed
with the Iranians, we must be kept informed! Any
RIYADH 00000181 002 OF 002
negotiations with the Iranians must take into account the

interests of Saudi Arabia, otherwise, we will not accept it!
We should be told -- in advance! -- of what you plan to say."
RUNDELL
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TAGS PREL, PTER, KWBG, SA, AF, IN, PK, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: COUNTERTERRORISM ADVISER BRENNAN’S
MEETING WITH
SAUDI KING ABDULLAH
REF: RIYADH 427
Classified By: Pol Counselor Lisa Carle, 1.4(b),(d)
¶1. KEY POINTS

-- (S) Saudi King Abdullah welcomed White House counterterrorism
adviser John Brennan, S/WCI Ambassador Williamson, and
Ambassador Fraker to his private palace March 15 for a 90-minute
discussion focused on U.S. Saudi-relations, counterterrorism
cooperation, the Yemeni Guantanamo Bay detainees, Iran, and Iraq.
-- (S) Brennan presented the King with a letter from President
Obama expressing a personal message of friendship, appreciation for
our close and collaborative relationship and concern over the
disposition of Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo.
-- (S) The King said he had told Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki
only minutes before that Iran should stop interfering in Arab affairs,
124
and had given Iran a one-year deadline to improve its relations with
Saudi Arabia.
-- (S) The King expressed a complete lack of trust in Iraqi PM al-
Maliki and held out little hope for improved Saudi/Iraqi relations as
long as al-Maliki remains in office.
-- (S) When asked what advice he had for President Obama, the King
said he had “one request”: that it was “critically important to restore
America’s credibility” in the world.
U.S. SAUDI RELATIONS
¶2. (S) PLEDGES OF FRIENDSHIP: Brennan asserted that the

U.S./Saudi alliance must remain strong, and assured the King of
President Obama’s wishes for a long and healthy U.S./Saudi
relationship, and the President’s personal commitment that Saudi
Arabia had a friend in the White House. The King replied that he
appreciated the sentiments and that he had great respect for
President Obama. “We (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) spilled blood
together” in Kuwait and Iraq, the King continued, and Saudi Arabia
valued this tremendously. Friendship can be a difficult issue that
requires work, Abdullah said, but the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have
done it for 70 years over three generations. “Our disagreements don,t
cut to the bone,” he stated.
¶3. (S) U.S. CREDIBILITY IS CRITICAL: The Bush

Administration is now in the past, the King said. Both President
Bushes were his friends, but the recent President Bush didn,t take his
advice on dealing with issues in the region, and they found their
problems “compounded.” The King said, “we are ready to consult,
provide guidance and to do whatever is necessary. We are people of
the region and we know it well.” Brennan responded that President
Obama wants to listen, and asked what advice the King would offer
to President Obama. Abdullah said his one piece of advice was that
restoring U.S. credibility in the world was critically important.
Brennan responded that this was an important issue for President
Obama as well. Brennan said that under President Obama we will
restore our credibility. He said the U.S. is a great country and we
know what we have to do.
¶4. (S) THE WORLD NEEDS OBAMA: Brennan said President

Obama looked forward to seeing the King at the G-20 summit in
London. “Thank God for bringing Obama to the presidency,” the
King answered, which has created “great hope” in the Muslim world.
“May God grant him strength and patience, Abdullah continued,
125
“May God protect him. I’m concerned about his personal safety.
America and the world need such a president.”
¶5. (C) THAT WITHOUT WHICH NO SAUDI MEETING IS

COMPLETE: Abdullah said “as a friend” that “it was a mistake” to
limit access of Saudi citizens to the U.S., since “this damages bilateral
relations and the image of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia.” The King noted
there were 60,000 Saudi students abroad, about one third of whom
were in the U.S., and “others would have gone” but for the
difficulties in gaining access to the U.S. The King noted that for many
years very senior Saudi officials, including Prince Saud al-Faisal, had
studied in the U.S. He then noted that Saudi Ambassador to the U.S.,
Adel al Jubeir (who was interpreting for the King) had studied in the
U.S. and was “half American” as a result. He also said he was aware
of, and appreciated, Ambassador Fraker’s efforts to improve the visa
situation “even though there were people in Washington who fought
him.” Finally, he observed that anyone from Saudi Arabia who
studies in the U.S. inevitably becomes a friend and advocate of the
United States and that we only hurt ourselves by cutting off this flow
of students.
DETAINEES
¶6. (S) GUANTANAMO WILL BE CLOSED: Brennan explained

that President Obama had made a commitment to close Guantanamo
to eliminate the potential propaganda benefits its existence provided
to Al-Qaeda, but also because it was the right thing to do. Brennan
reassured the King, however, that President Obama would remain
strong on counterterrorism. Brennan presented the King with a letter
from President Obama addressing the issue of Yemeni detainees at
Guantanamo. Brennan noted that he had met with Prince
Mohammed bin Nayef (MbN) the day before to discuss at length The
issue of the Yemeni detainees. Brennan further stated that he would
be traveling to Sanaa the next day to meet with President Saleh, as
the issue of the remaining 99 Yemeni detainees still needed to be
resolved. Brennan praised MbN as an outstanding counterterrorism
partner, and that the MOI was doing a wonderful, courageous job in
countering the terrorist threat to the Kingdom. Returning to the
subject later in the conversation, Brennan warned that the U.S.
feared Yemen could become another Waziristan, and urged that the
U.S. and Saudi Arabia needed to work together to keep Al-Qaeda in
Yemen from growing even more dangerous. The King replied that
having Somalia next door to Yemen only adds to the danger.
Brennan said that the capabilities of the Ministry of the Interior
126
security forces had grown impressively over the past 10 years.
Brennan added that counterterrorism and intelligence sharing
cooperation between our countries had never been better and that
MbN deserved the credit. In an unusual concession, made at the
conclusion of their conversation, the King said, “be assured I am
fully briefed on the work you are doing with Prince Mohammed bin
Nayef.”
¶7. (S) HOW TO TRACK DETAINEES: “I’ve just thought of

something,” the King added, and proposed implanting detainees with
an electronic chip containing information about them and allowing
their movements to be tracked with Bluetooth. This was done with
horses and falcons, the King said. Brennan replied, “horses don,t
have good lawyers,” and that such a proposal would face legal
hurdles in the U.S., but agreed that keeping track of detainees was an
extremely important issue that he would review with appropriate
officials when he returned to the United States.
IRAN
¶8. (S) A “HEATED EXCHANGE”: The King noted that Iranian

FM Mottaki had been “sitting in that same seat (as Brennan) a few
moments ago.” The King described his conversation with FM
Mottaki as “a heated exchange, frankly discussing Iran’s interference
in Arab affairs.” When challenged by the King on Iranian meddling
in Hamas affairs, Mottaki apparently protested that “these are
Muslims.” “No, Arabs” countered the King, “You as Persians have
no business meddling in Arab matters.” The King said the Iranians
wanted to improve relations and that he responded by giving Mottaki
an ultimatum. “I will give you one year” (to improve ties), “after
that, it will be the end.”
¶9. (S) “SPARE US YOUR EVIL”: The King expressed hope the U.S.
would review its Iran policy and “come to the right conclusion.”
Brennan responded that President Obama was personally reviewing
U.S. Iran policy and wanted to hear the King’s thoughts. Abdullah
asserted that Iran is trying to set up Hizballah-like organizations in
African countries, observing that the Iranians don’t think they are
doing anything wrong and don’t recognize their mistakes. “I said (to
Mottaki) that’s your problem,” recounted the King. Abdullah said he
would favor Rafsanjani in an Iranian election, were he to run. He
described Iran not as “a neighbor one wants to see,” but as “a
neighbor one wants to avoid.” He said the Iranians “launch missiles
with the hope of putting fear in people and the world.” A solution to
127
the Arab/Israeli conflict would be a great achievement, the King said,
but Iran would find other ways to cause trouble. “Iran’s goal is to
cause problems,” he continued, “There is no doubt something
unstable about them.” He described Iran as “adventurous in the
negative sense,” and declared “May God prevent us from falling
victim to their evil.” Mottaki had tendered an invitation to visit Iran,
but Abdullah said he replied “All I want is for you to spare us your
evil.” Summarizing his history with Iran, Abdullah concluded: “We
have had correct relations over the years, but the bottom line is that
they cannot be trusted.”
¶10. (S) AN EMPTY CHANNEL: The King said “three years ago”
Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei had sent his adviser Ali Akbar
Velayati with a letter asking for Abdullah’s agreement to establish a
formal back channel for communication between the two leaders.
Abdullah said he had agreed, and the channel was established with
Velayati and Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal as the points of contact. In the
years since, the King noted, the channel had never been used.
¶11. (S) A DANGEROUS NEIGHBORHOOD: Brennan responded

that the Saudis lived in a dangerous neighborhood with Iran across
the Gulf, with Saudi Arabia sharing a long border with Yemen, and
with a number of other troublesome countries nearby. Brennan
noted that we have a lot of work to do in the Middle East together.
The King responded that the world,s attention was focused on the
region. He further stated that he believed that the U.S. could help in
this sensitive region, but that we should not take matters lightly.
Brennan noted that President Obama is fully aware of the dangers in
the region, that the U.S. knew that it had to remain involved in
constructing a solution, and that we would seek the King,s counsel in
dealing with the many issues in the Middle East. The King asked if
that included Iran. Brennan responded that it did. Brennan said that
we had our eyes wide open to Iranian ambitions, that we were not
nave to the dangers Iran posed to Saudi Arabia, and that Iran could
not be allowed to succeed in its destabilizing activites. Brennan
observed that the President had ordered a complete review of U.S.
Iran policy and made reference to a passage in the President,s letter
that we needed to test Iran,s intentions to cease its destabilizing
behavior and live up to its international obligations. Brennan further
observed that the U.S.-Saudi partnership had to remain strong and
that together, and with others, we needed to thwart Iran,s nuclear
ambitions. “That is important,” responded the King. Finally,
Brennan said the President wanted the King to know he had a good
128
friend in the White House who would be willing to assist in any way
that he could. The King thanked Mr. Brennan, said he appreciated
the sentiments, said that he had great respect for President Obama,
and reflected that we had been great friends for many years and
would remain friends as our disagreements were minor.
¶12. (U) SEE REFTEL: Ref A provided a separate readout on the

Iran discussion and the King’s meeting with Mottaki.
IRAQ
¶13. (S) IN THE HANDS OF GOD AND IRAN: Brennan expressed

the importance the U.S. attaches to achieving peace and stability in
Iraq. The King replied that this was “in the hands of God,” though
he agreed that Iraq was vitally important to both the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia. The King also pointed out that “some say the U.S. invasion
handed Iraq to Iran on a silver platter; this after we fought Saddam
Hussein.”
¶14. (S) NO HOPE FOR MALIKI: The King said he had “no
confidence whatsoever in (Iraqi PM) Maliki, and the Ambassador
(Fraker) is well aware of my views.” The King affirmed that he had
refused former President Bush’s entreaties that he meet with Maliki.
The King said he had met Maliki early in Maliki’s term of office, and
the Iraqi had given him a written list of commitments for
reconciliation in Iraq, but had failed to follow through on any of
them. For this reason, the King said, Maliki had no credibility. “I
don,t trust this man,” the King stated, “He’s an Iranian agent.” The
King said he had told both Bush and former Vice president Cheney
“how can I meet with someone I don,t trust?” Maliki has “opened the
door for Iranian influence in Iraq” since taking power, the King said,
and he was “not hopeful at all” for Maliki, “or I would have met with
him.”
AN ALERT AND ENGAGING HOST
¶15. (S) I MISS MY HORSES: The King appeared alert and at times
animated, entertaining his guests with anecdotes about his
encounters with Iranian leaders (septel), and throwing up his hands
in complaint when asked if he spent time with his horses: “I see them
on television when they race,” he said. “I love horses,” he exclaimed,
“every couple of weeks I get to see them, and then I have a very calm
and restful sleep.”
129
¶16. (S) DIALOGUE AND REFORM AS DUTY: In response to
Brennan,s praise for the King,s interfaith dialogue initiative, his
commitment to advancing rights as reflected by his recent
appointment of the first female (deputy education) minister, the King
said “Thanks for the sentiment but I did nothing special, only what I
thought was my duty. I believe we do our duty as determined by
God.”
¶17. (S) PARTICIPANTS:

Saudi Arabia -- Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah
bin Abdulaziz al-Saud -- HRH Prince Mohammed bin Nayef bin
Abdulaziz al-Saud, Assistant Minister of the Interior -- Ambassador
to the U.S. Adel al-Jubeir (interpreter)
U.S. -- John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism -- Ambassador Ford Fraker --
Ambassador-at-large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson --
John Duncan, NSC Director for Counterterrorism -- Shaun
Coughlin, Special Assistant, S/WCI -- Embassy control
officer/notetaker
¶18. (U) Assistant to the President Brennan cleared this cable.

FRAKER
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NEA FOR ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2020

TAGS: PREL MNUC PTER PGOV KGHG SENV ETRD SA IR
SUBJECT: SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTRY PRESSING CHINA TO
STOP
IRANIAN PROLIFERATION, CONCERNED ABOUT TSA
REGULATIONS
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith, reasons 1.4 (b and d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Saudi Foreign Ministry officials told

visiting NEA A/S Feltman that they are convinced Iran intends
to develop a nuclear weapon, and that the Saudi Foreign
Minister pressed his counterpart hard for greater Chinese
engagement on this threat during the Chinese FM's visit
earlier in January. While no explicit deal was discussed,
131
Saudi Arabia made it clear it was willing to address Chinese
concerns on energy security and trade in exchange for
effective Chinese support to prevent Iranian proliferation.
Saudi Arabia is also concerned about Iran's unhelpful role in
Yemen. While generally very pleased with the state of
bilateral relations, Saudi officials strenuously - and under
instruction - complained about the continued negative effect
of the recent Transportation Safety Administration (TSA)
regulations that call for extra security screening for Saudi
Arabia. The Saudi Foreign Minister will raise these concerns
with the Secretary in London on January 27. They noted that
the Saudi public is increasingly upset by this, and does not
understand why they were put in the same group with Cuba,
which has prompted some Saudis to question how special their
relationship with the United States really is. A/S Feltman
urged Saudi Arabia to associate itself with the Copenhagen
Accord by January 31. The MFA reported that Saudi Arabia
donated $50 million for Haitian relief efforts on January 25.
End Summary.
Iranian Nuclear Ambitions:

-------------
¶2. (C) Visiting NEA A/S Feltman discussed a wide range of

issues with Deputy Saudi Foreign Minister Dr. Prince Torki
Al-Saud Al-Kabir on January 26. Prince Torki said Saudi
Arabia is convinced that Iran intends to develop nuclear
weapons, and reported that Saudi Foreign Minister Saud
Al-Faisal pressed the Chinese Foreign Minister on this issue
on his January 17 visit. Saud Al-Faisal told the Chinese
that, for Saudi Arabia, this is a critical security issue.
Iran,s getting nuclear weapons will open the door to the
rest of the Middle East pursuing nuclear weapons. Saudi
Arabia would prefer that the Middle East remain a nuclear
free zone. When the Chinese Foreign Minister replied that
China will not accept Iran's development of nuclear weapons,
Saud Al-Faisal told him that China will have to work more
closely with the rest of the world and the UN Security
Council to prevent this from happening.
¶3. (C) Prince Torki agreed that it was not helpful that the
Chinese sent a low-level delegation to the most recent 5 1
talks. He also agreed it was unfortunate the delegation did
132
not agree it was time now to increase pressure on Iran.
Al-Kabir also noted that time was not in the UN Security
Council's favor, but in Iran's. Prince Torki said that Saudi
Arabia was convinced the time was ripe to push China on this
issue. It would be important to demonstrate that the
assurances FM Al-Faisal got were not just from the Foreign
Minister, but represented the thinking of the whole
government. He said that Saudi Arabia repeated these points
to the Chinese Middle East special envoy, who visited a week
later. Saudi Arabia has also raised these concerns with
Russia, "which is closer to the U.S. and Saudi positions,"
and with the Deputy French Foreign Minister three weeks ago.
Prince Torki also agreed to work with Lebanon's UN Mission,
now on the Security Council, where it is sure to confront the
issue of Iranian proliferation.
¶4. (C) Prince Torki said that China never directly raised the
issue of its concerns about securing sufficient oil supplies,
particularly in the event of a cutoff of Iranian supplies.
However, Saudi Arabia fully understands China's concerns, and
in that context, is pleased that the Chinese Foreign Minister
had &successful8 talks with Saudi Aramco and trade
officials about specific commercial and energy issues.
Prince Torki noted that Saudi Arabia has become one of
China's largest energy suppliers, and has invested billions
of dollars in refineries in China. Trade has grown from $140
million a decade ago to $75 billion now, with prospects for
further increases. Prince Torki concluded by noting that
Saudi Arabia knows what concerns China, and is willing to
take actions to address those concerns, but must have Chinese
cooperation in stopping Iran,s development of nuclear
weapons as a quid pro quo. Saudi Arabia is encouraging other
Gulf countries to meet with China to explore similar

cooperation, although it expects these countries will seek
the same exchange.
Yemen:
----
¶5. (C) Prince Torki explained that Saudi Arabia also believes
that Iran is playing an unhelpful role in Yemen. Dismissing
the need for specific evidence, he said it was hard to
133
explain how the Houthis, as a poor tribal group, managed to
get so much money so quickly to obtain the heavy armaments
that they have been using absent the help of some outside
group. It is also hard, he argued, to explain the striking
similarities with techniques that have been used by
pro-Iranian groups in Iraq. Saudi Arabia is convinced that
Iran is providing money for poor tribesmen to fight, as well
as payments to their families, and is facilitating contact
with Somalia and Al Qaeda. Prince Torki said the Saudi
Defense Forces have been impressed how well the Houthis have
fought, displaying advanced training. (Note: in a separate
meeting, Ministry of Interior officials echoed many of these
assessments in greater detail, septel. End Note).
¶6. (C) Prince Torki was unequivocal in stating that Saudi

Arabia has no intention of becoming part of the current
conflict between the central government and the Houthis.
Saudi Arabia felt it had to respond, however, after Houthi
forces crossed its border. He said that it made little sense
for the Houthis to have attacked Saudi Arabia, especially
since the SAG had warned them previously not to. He
concluded that Iran was trying to test Saudi reactions.
Yemen does not need U.S. troops, but does need equipment,
training and information, as well as assistance to meet its
long-term development challenges. He also said that Saudi
Arabia is very concerned about Al Qaeda's continued presence
in Yemen, as it will exploit any opportunity to attack Saudi
Arabia and the United States.
Bilateral Relations:
-----------
¶7. (C). Prince Torki agreed that our bilateral relations are
quite strong in general. He singled out counter-terrorism as
an example of the strength of cooperation, noting that Saudi
Arabia enjoys a unique level of cooperation on security with
the United States. Prince Torki confirmed that Saudi Arabia
had contributed $50 million to the Haiti relief effort on
January 25, which is the largest contribution to date of any
Middle Eastern country. He also welcomed greater U.S.
engagement in multilateral and international organizations.
Climate Change:
134
--------
8.(SBU) A/S Feltman noted the importance that the President

places on Climate Change, and the Copenhagen Accord. Given
that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi was involved in crafting
the final agreement, A/S Feltman noted the United States is
counting on Saudi Arabia to associate itself with the accord
by January 31. Prince Torki said that Saudi Arabia was very
pleased the United States was more actively engaged in this
issue, and said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports
trying to address this issue. He noted that the MFA will
have to consult with other involved ministries, such as the
Ministry of Petroleum, and promised to respond before January
¶31.
Concern over TSA Regulations:

----------------
¶9. (SBU) Prince Torki noted he had been instructed to raise

Saudi Arabia's significant concern about the TSA regulations
which had included Saudi Arabia in a limited group of
countries for additional airport screening. Prince Torki
said that this issue had caused a lot of difficulties and
embarrassment for Saudi Arabia, to the degree that Foreign
Minister Saud Al-Faisal will raise this with the Secretary in
London on January 27. Prince Torki said that Saudi Arabia
was not upset about the regulation itself, as it recognized
the U.S. right and obligation to protect its citizens. The
issue, rather, was inclusion on the list with the likes of
Cuba, which causes Saudi Arabia's friends and enemies to
question how strong its bilateral relationship with the

United States really is. Prince Torki said it is very hard
to explain to the Saudi public why they are included on this
list, despite not being the origin of the December 25 flight,
while other countries that have had recent terrorist
incidents on planes, like the UK, Egypt and Turkey, are not.
Prince Torki said that Saudi Arabia had been shocked to be
included on the list. He noted that Saudi Arabia had been
told these provisions would only be temporary, and said Saudi
Arabia would like to know how and when they will be amended,
implying that the longer they remained in effect without any
public explanation from the USG, the more it was likely to
135
prompt the Saudi Government to re-evaluate areas of
cooperation, including counter-terrorism cooperation. A/S
Feltman promised to convey the spirit and strength of the
message, and invited any specific Saudi suggestions to
address the security gap regarding nonmetallic explosives
exploited in the December 25 incident.
Middle East Peace:

---------
¶10. (C) In response to a question, A/S Feltman explained that

the United States believes that we need to get the Israelis
and the Palestinians back to the negotiating table, which
will be the best way to compel Israel to follow through on
its public statements and to overcome Palestinian skepticism.
A/S Feltman noted that the United States had referred to the
1967 lines with swaps as a way of helping encourage the
Palestinians to return to the table. Prince Torki welcomed
this overview.
(U) This cable has been cleared by A/S Feltman.
SMITH
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2015

TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ETRD CH KWBG IR SA
SUBJECT: CHINESE FM YANG VISITS RIYADH
REF: A. BEIJING 69
¶B. 09 RIYADH 895
¶C. RIYADH 118
RIYADH 00000123 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for

reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
SUMMARY:
----------
¶1. (C) Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi met with King
Abdullah and FM Prince Saud Al-Faisal on January 13, during
the last stop of a five nation Africa and Middle East tour.
During the visit, FM Yang discussed deepening Saudi-Chinese
137
ties in a variety of fields, emphasizing trade, in
particular, with his Saudi counterparts. Responding to
statements made by FM Saud, Yang also briefly discussed
Chinese support for Iraq, concern about Iranian nuclear
ambitions, and hopes for the Middle East Peace Process. FM
Yang's foray into regional political commentary appears to
have been a result of FM Saud's prodding, both publicly and
behind closed doors, and is a reflection of the developing
Saudi-Chinese relationship.
END SUMMARY.
TRADE TAKES PRECEDENCE

----------------------
¶2. (U) FM Yang arrived in Riyadh on January 13, the first

high-level visit since Chinese President Hu Jintao's February
2009 "Trip of Friendship and Cooperation." FM Yang's visit
coincided with the 20th anniversary of Saudi-Chinese
diplomatic relations, and followed three days after Chinese
Trade Minister Chen Deming co-chaired the 4th session of the
Saudi-Chinese Joint Commission in Riyadh.
¶3. (U) The Chinese Foreign Minister has traditionally made

his first overseas trip of the new year to Africa, visiting
with African leaders and expressing Chinese goodwill and
improvements in trade relations. This year, FM Yang extended
his visit to include not only major trading partners like
Nigeria, Kenya and Morocco, but also Saudi Arabia. In a
January 13 statement to the press, FM Yang stressed the
importance of strengthening cooperation in "energy,
infrastructure, finance and science and
technology." He said that both sides should carry out
cultural and education exchanges to deepen the bilateral
relationship and pressed the need for closer relations
between China and the GCC.
¶4. (U) These statements echoed similar announcements from

Chinese Trade Minister Chen who, in a January 10 press
conference, called for finalizing the Chinese-GCC free trade
agreement and increasing bilateral trade by 50%, from a total
annual value of $40 billion to $60 billion, over the next
five years (ref A). During the Joint Commission meeting,
138
Saudi Minister of Finance Ibrahim Al-Assaf reportedly urged
the Chinese to participate in more joint ventures, noting
that while bilateral trade increased 25 times over the past
ten years, the two countries only have 19 joint projects.
Al-Assaf also welcomed China's 44 billion riyal ($11.7
billion) worth of infrastructure projects in the Kingdom.
DUMPING CAUSES A BUMP

---------------------
¶5. (C) This call to increase Sino-Saudi trade comes on the

heels of a December 24 announcement that China would impose
anti-dumping tariffs of up to 13.6 percent on Saudi and
Taiwan-produced butanediol. Beijing began a dumping probe on
methanol and butanediol (BDO) from Saudi Arabia in July,
which caused an unusually public trade spat between the two
countries (ref B). Methanol and butanediol make up 10 to 15
percent of Saudi Arabia's $2 billion in annual non-oil
exports to China. A Ministry of Commerce and Industry
official told Econoffs on January 13 that Saudi Arabia was
able to convince the Chinese not to impose tariffs on
methanol, but said the BDO case was still pending. The
Ministry recently appointed a new Deputy Minister for
Technical Affairs, Dr. Hamad Al-Awfy, who will handle all
anti-dumping issues, he said. Al-Awfy previously complained
to EconCouns that the SAG was increasingly frustrated by the
growing number of Saudi companies complaining about Chinese
dumping in Saudi Arabia. Other senior SAG officials have
caustically complained about the low quality of Chinese
construction and the "short-term, extractive" approach of
Chinese companies to investments in Saudi Arabia.
RIYADH 00000123 002.2 OF 003
A MATURING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP?

---------------------------------
¶6. (C) China recently surpassed the U.S. as the largest

importer of Saudi oil. Saudi Arabia's investments in China
139
have increased significantly over the last few years,
including a $3.5 billion refinery in Fujian and a $2.86
billion joint-venture petrochemical complex in Tianjin.
Additionaly, President Hu Jintao commemorated the opening of
a cement plant when he visited Saudi Arabia in February 2009.
Saudi Arabia,s more forward-leaning approach, including
large-scale investments in China, indicates a maturing of the
bilateral relations and assumes a more pro-active, rather
than reactive, role towards economic engagement. (Note:
China is now the SAG's number two trade partner after the
U.S. Saudi-Chinese bilateral trade was estimated at $40
billion in 2008, while Saudi-U.S. trade was estimated at $67
billion during the same time period. End note.)
FM SAUD PRODS, FM YANG RESPONDS

-------------------------------
¶7. (U) While trade issues dominated FM Yang's agenda, both he

and FM Prince Saud-Al Faisal commented on the regional
political landscape in a press conference that followed their
bilateral meeting. FM Saud spoke out against Israeli
defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and called on
China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to
"deal with world disputes in accordance to international
legitimacy...as stipulated in the Arab Peace Initiative."
The meetings with FM Yang were "part of a framework of
coordination and consultation," FM Saud continued, that
included not only the Palestinian cause but also Iran's
nuclear file, Iraq and Yemen. In particular, he emphasized
China's role as a member of the P5 plus 1 group and their
responsibility "to solve the (Iranian nuclear) crisis through
dialogue and peaceful means. "Our two nations are keen that
the Middle East and the Gulf should be free of all weapons of
mass destruction, including nuclear weapons," he stressed.
¶8. (U) In response to FM Saud's comments, FM Yang said China

called for serious negotiations between Israel and Palestine
that would carry out the peace process and establish the
State of Palestine. "China is ready for cooperation with the
world community to work for stability in the Middle East," he
added. In regard to Iraq, he said that China extended
assistance by reducing Iraqi debt obligations to China and
140
forging trade agreements between Iraqi and Chinese companies.
With respect to Iran, FM Yang said the Iranian file should
be solved through "political diplomatic channels which help
stabilize the situation in the region."
FM SAUD: CHINA NEEDS TO MORE ACTIVELY COUNTER

IRANIAN NUKES
---------------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Prince Torki told visiting
NEA A/S Feltman on January 26 (ref C) that FM Saud had
pressed the Chinese Foreign Minister hard on the need to be
more active in working with the rest of the international
community and the UN Security Council to counter the threat
of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. FM Saud told FM Yang
that Saudi Arabia was convinced Iran intended to develop a
nuclear weapon, despite its assurances, and that only
concerted international action could stop that. While no
explicit bargain was discussed, Dep FM Torki explained that
Saudi Arabia understood China was concerned about having
access to energy supplies, which could be cut off by Iran,
and wanted to attract more trade and investment. Saudi
Arabia was willing to provide assurances on those scores to
China, but only in exchange for tangible Chinese actions to
restrain Iran,s drive for nuclear weapons.
COMMENT:
--------
¶9. (C) Since King Abdullah's historic visit to Beijing in

January 2006, the Saudi-Chinese relationship has focused
predominantly on energy and trade. However, the relationship
may be showing signs of political evolution. While the
Chinese would likely prefer to stay away from political
controversy, their economic power and permanent seat on the
UN Security Council has made it more and more difficult for
them to avoid politics altogether.
¶10. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: The incentives for the Saudis

to
141
RIYADH 00000123 003.2 OF 003
try and leverage their economic relationship with China for

political gain with respect to sensitive regional issues,
such as Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are
significant and growing. After patiently focusing on
building the economic relationsip since 2006, FM Saud,s
public and private prodding of FM Yang indicates the Saudis
are ready to try and cash in some political chips. End
comment.
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TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV PTER SA YM IR ECON
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S FEB
15-16
VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES SMITH

REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)
INTRODUCTION
------------
¶1. (C) Madam Secretary, Mission Saudi Arabia warmly welcomes
143
your visit to the Kingdom, a country which, by virtue of its
energy resources, financial power, counterterrorism efforts,
and leadership of the Muslim world, plays a critical role in
many global and regional issues of importance to us. Your
visit comes at a time of emerging opportunities for
engagement to advance the goals that you and the President
have laid out in your speeches in the region.
¶2. (C) Our alliance with Saudi Arabia, while complicated and
subject to occasional disjunctions, has proven durable.
Taking stock of where we stand, we see a mixed picture. The
good news is that the Saudi leadership still sees the United
States as its most important strategic partner and guarantor
of its stability. We also share many global and regional
objectives, including the need for global financial and
energy stability, a common view of threats posed by terrorism
and extremism, the dangers posed by Iran and destabilization
in Pakistan, and the linkage that progress toward Middle East
peace has to virtually all other regional issues. Finally,
Saudi Arabia has become one of our most important allies in
the fight against Al-Qaida and terror financing.
¶3. (C) The bad news is that we differ on tactics in some key
objectives, and we are often frustrated by Saudi
unresponsiveness and a dearth of interlocutors among an aging
collective leadership. The status of women, religious
freedom, and human rights are ongoing concerns. On the Saudi
side, King Abdullah believes we are not always reliable,
consistent, or willing to heed his advice on important issues
such as Iraq. Saud Al-Faisal and others have openly been
critical of U.S. policies they describe as having shifted the
regional balance of power in favor of arch-rival Iran.
Differences of opinion on some of these issues can be
exacerbated by our differing cultures and value systems,
which can introduce a degree of skepticism and hesitancy in
the relationship.
¶4. (C) Despite the problems, a negative assessment of the

bilateral relationship would miss a critical point relevant
to U.S. goals in the region: Saudi Arabia is a country in
transition, and the changes underway present opportunities
for engagement that can advance U.S. interests and national
security. Saudi Arabia faces transitions on multiple levels,
144
from the geopolitical, where its trade and energy relations
are shifting from west to east, to economic, where greater
integration in the world economy is steadily exposing Saudis
to international best practices. Domestically, greater
access to internet and cell phones is unleashing new forms of
social activism, something demonstrated by an outpouring of
Saudi spontaneous voluntary assistance in the aftermath of
the Jeddah floods.
EDUCATION & DIVERSIFICATION TO COMBAT EXTREMISM

--------------------------------------------- --
¶5. (C) Having faced down what amounted to an insurgency by

Al-Qaida from 2003 to 2006, Saudi Arabia's leadership
acknowledged the pressing need for systemic reforms to combat
extremist ideology and provide for a rapidly expanding
population (the annual growth rate is about 2 percent). King
Abdullah's strategy is two-pronged: he has attacked the
roots of the extremism that fed Al-Qaida through education
and judicial reforms to weaken the influence of the most
reactionary elements of Saudi Arabia's religious
establishment. He is also promoting economic
diversification. The King is keenly aware of the urgent need
to make Saudi education more relevant to today's workplace
and increase the role of women in the economy, goals which
remain controversial in this deeply conservative,
inward-looking desert Kingdom. Guided by a vision that
dovetails with some key elements of the President's Cairo
speech, King Abdullah has begun to implement an ambitious
plan to transform Saudi Arabia's economy away from excessive
RIYADH 00000178 002 OF 005
reliance on hydrocarbons and towards a knowledge-based

economy that can provide sustainable development for the
long-term. Achieving these goals will require nothing short
of a revolution in the education system and significant
changes in most aspects of Saudi society, especially the
status of women.
¶6. (U) Seen from the outside, the pace of political reform
seems glacial (a notable exception is that changes introduced
145
after the WTO negotiations have been very fast for any
country; regulatory agencies are also standing up quickly).
Yet for certain elements of Saudi society, the changes are
coming too fast. Whatever the pace, however, the reality is
that serious reforms are gradually but irrevocably changing
Saudi society. Recently implemented reform measures include
re-shuffling the Ministry of Education's leadership last
February (bringing in the King's pro-reform son-in-law as the
new minister); a top-to-bottom restructuring of the country's
courts to introduce, among other things, review of judicial
decisions and more professional training for Shari'a judges;
the creation of a new investment promotion agency to overhaul
the once-convoluted process of starting a business here; the
creation of a regulatory body for capital markets; the
construction of the King Abdullah University for Science and
Technology (the country's new flagship and
controversially-coed institution for advanced scientific
research); and a substantial budgetary investment in
educating the workforce for future jobs. The Saudi government
is also encouraging the development of non-hydrocarbon
sectors in which the Kingdom has a comparative advantage,
including mining, solar energy, and religious tourism. The
Kingdom's 2010 budget reflects these priorities -- about 25
percent is devoted to education alone -- and amounts to a
significant economic stimulus package.
U.S. PARTNERSHIPS TO SUPPORT

REFORM & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
-----------------------------
¶7. (SBU) Saudi officials have been candid in stressing the

importance they place on strong ties with the United States
to help them meet reform challenges, both through increased
engagement at the government level, including educational
exchanges and more FDI, particularly in energy, high tech,
and manufacturing. The past year has seen several large
investments by prominent U.S. firms in advanced technology
areas, and we are working to raise the profile of our trade
and investment relations, including through a major Saudi
exposition in Chicago at the end of April. The Mission has
also steadily expanded USG engagement in education, public
health, science & technology, entrepreneurship, and civil
society. There are now more than 22,000 Saudi students
146
studying in the US, exceeding pre-9/11 levels. Public health
engagement has included breast cancer awareness and CDC
cooperation to set up an advanced epidemic screening network
that protected this year,s 3 million Hajj pilgrims. Our
Science & Technology umbrella agreement is already expanding
cooperation, including new projects with NASA. Our MEPI
programs include a first-time ever exchange visit by a group
of Saudi judges, leadership development for women, prevention
of violence against women and children, and youth exchange
and study. One female participant in our Social
Entrepreneurship Forum was a finalist in the 2009 Global
Student Entrepreneur Awards. She and seven other Saudi
entrepreneurs will attend the President's April summit.
Mission elements have also provided training to help the SAG
implement a new law to combat trafficking in persons.
Intensive engagement with the SAG on IPR is another success
story. You will want to congratulate Saudi officials for the
significant progress Saudi Arabia has made over the last
several years in improving IPR protection, which resulted in
the Special 301 Committee deciding to remove Saudi Arabia
from the Watch List.
SAUDI STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS

----------------------------
¶8. (C) TURNING EAST: Saudi Arabia is trying to come to terms

with the shift in global energy and trade ties towards Asia,
RIYADH 00000178 003 OF 005
which has both political and economic consequences.

Bilateral trade with China has more than tripled, and China
will soon be Saudi Arabia,s largest importer. Saudi Arabia
has also committed significant investments in China,
including the $8 billion Fujian refinery. Increased trade
has also brought increased friction, including anti-dumping
complaints from both sides. Saudi Arabia is thinking through
how best to take a leaf from the Chinese playbook and use
these expanded trade ties to achieve important political
goals. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has told the Chinese
that it is willing to effectively trade a guaranteed oil
147
supply in return for Chinese pressure on Iran not to develop
nuclear weapons.
¶9. (S/NF) COUNTERING IRAN: We expect that Saudi Arabia will

continue to develop its ties with China, in part to
counterbalance relations with the West. While the King's
preference is to cooperate with the U.S., he has concluded
that he needs to proceed with his own strategy to counter
Iranian influence in the region, which includes rebuilding
Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus coordination, supporting Palestinian
reconciliation, supporting the Yemeni government, and
expanding relations with non-traditional partners such as
Russia, China, and India to create diplomatic and economic
pressure on Iran that do not directly depend on U.S. help.
The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in
developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do
the same, including Saudi Arabia.
¶10. (S/NF) The King is convinced that current U.S. engagement

efforts with Tehran will not succeed; he is likely to feel
grimly vindicated in his view by Ahmadinejad's February 11
boast that having successfully enriched uranium to a level of
20 percent, Iran "is now a nuclear nation." The King told
General Jones that Iranian internal turmoil presented an
opportunity to weaken the regime -- which he encouraged --
but he also urged that this be done covertly and stressed
that public statements in support of the reformers were
counterproductive. The King assesses that sanctions could
help weaken the government, but only if they are strong and
sustained. The King will want you to elaborate on the
President's statement that the time for sanctions has come.
He will also want to hear our plans for bolstering Gulf
defenses vis a vis Iran. (The King has invited General
Petraeus to his desert camp for discussion on this topic on
Tuesday.)
¶11. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE: Your visit offers an important

opportunity to head off a serious clash over climate change.
Saudi officials are very concerned that a climate change
treaty would significantly reduce their income just as they
face significant costs to diversify their economy. We want
to get beyond the obstructionism that Saudi negotiators have
often shown during the negotiations and persuade senior
148
leaders to work with us in a partnership to meet their
strategic concerns, including by cooperating on developing
solar and biomass energy. The King is particularly sensitive
to avoid Saudi Arabia being singled out as the bad actor,
particularly on environmental issues. Your conveying the
importance the President places on working as partners with
Saudi Arabia on the Copenhagen process will be very important
in making this dialogue more constructive. Secretary Chu
intends to explore specific areas of collaboration during his
February 21-23 visit.
SAUDI REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

--------------------------------
¶12. (S) PREVENTING A COLLAPSE OF YEMEN: Saudi

participation
in international diplomatic efforts to stabilize Yemen
reflect Saudi fears that instability on its southern border
is a clear and present danger. The King will tell you that
Yemen's strategic location makes an Al-Qaida presence there
more threatening than in Afghanistan; he will stress the need
to support Yemeni unity, despite his mistrust of Ali Abdullah
Saleh. With respect to Saudi involvement in the war against
the Houthis, the King will stress that the SAG's motivation
was self-defense. As Al-Qaida infiltrators from Yemen
multiplied, the SAG concluded that the Houthi rebellion had
distracted Saleh's government to the detriment of Saudi
RIYADH 00000178 004 OF 005
security. The military intervention was triggered by a

Houthi incursion into Saudi territory, but it presented a
long-sought excuse to fortify the porous Saudi-Yemeni border.
On February 7, Prince Khalid also informed Ambassador Smith
the fighting is wrapping up, and that a ceasefire arrangement
could be in place by mid-February.
¶13. (C) GESTURES AFTER ALL?: The King appreciates the

President's commitment to Middle East peace but is skeptical
the U.S. can bring sufficient and sustained pressure to bear
on Israel, especially regarding settlements. The King told
General Jones that progress on Middle East peace was only
149
possible if President Obama was willing to pressure Israel,
and Saudi officials have rebuffed U.S. requests for
confidence-building gestures to help restart negotiations.
Despite their adamant rhetoric, however, several members of a
private Jeddah-based think tank run by a retired Saudi
general have very quietly been participating in Track Two
discussions, apparently with SAG knowledge, and even put
forward a proposal on Gaza. In a more dramatic public
encounter that has provoked commotion in the region, former
Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Turki Al-Faisal shook
hands with Israeli Deputy FM Ayalon to settle a dispute over
joint seating at a Munich conference. Both sides have since
insisted the gesture did not signal changes in policy, with a
"senior Saudi diplomat" issuing a statement emphatically
denying that the incident constituted any form of recognition
for Israel.
¶14. (S/NF) AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN: King Abdullah firmly

believes that Asif Zardari is the primary obstacle to the
government's ability to move unequivocally to end terrorist
safe havens there ("when the head is rotten, it affects the
whole body"). The King told General Jones that U.S.
development assistance would rebuild trust with the Army,
which he asserted was staying out of politics in deference to
U.S. wishes, rather than doing what it "should." On
Afghanistan, the King has expressed support for the new U.S.
strategy, saying that spending on roads, schools, hospitals
and mosques would dissipate popular mistrust and help rebuild
the country. The King has not yet acknowledged the Saudi
role in Taliban mediation in conversations with USG
officials; GIP Director Prince Muqrin has explained to
several recent USG visitors that the SAG prefers to keep such
discussions in intelligence channels until any agreement is
reached. Perhaps reflecting this, the Saudi media downplayed
President Karzai's recent visit and the Afghan Ambassador
reported that the meeting with the King lasted only ten
minutes.
A NOTE ABOUT THE KING

---------------------
¶15. (C) The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques will offer you
a traditional Saudi welcome at the desert "encampment"
150
outside Riyadh, where he likes to spend his winter vacations.
You will find in 86-year old King Abdullah a wry and
forthright interlocutor. Having struggled with a speech
impediment throughout his life, he tends to express himself
tersely. Reflecting his Bedouin roots, he judges his
counterparts on the basis of character, honesty, and trust.
He expects commitments to be respected and sees actions, not
words, as the true test of commitment; and he expects
good-faith consultations, not surprises. Once the King has
lost trust in a counterpart, as has been the case with Nouri
Al-Maliki or Asif Zardari, his personal antipathy can become
a serious obstacle to bilateral relations. On the other
hand, as with President Obama, the King's esteem will help
navigate differences and at times change policies. The King
is undoubtedly looking forward to his discussions with you,
and Mission Saudi Arabia enthusiastically looks forward to
supporting your visit.
MISSION STAFFING
----------------
¶16. (U) The U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia includes Embassy

Riyadh, and Consulate Generals Dhahran and Jeddah. The
entire Mission, representing ten agencies, consists of 605
staff (212 U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) and 393 Locally Engaged
RIYADH 00000178 005 OF 005
(LE) staff).
SMITH
151
152

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‫

DE RUEHRH #0184/01 0431416

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP, EEB/ESC/IEC (MONOSSON),

E.O. 12958 DECL: 02/09/2020

Saudi Arabia not yet Decided on Copenhagen Accord

¶2. (C) Saudi Arabia’s lead climate change negotiator Dr.

Addressing Saudi Economic Concerns Key to Progress

¶3. (C) Asked how to move forward on a global climate change

¶5. (C) Al-Sabban said the development of renewable energy and

Shadow Negotiator Suggests Partnership

¶7. (C) Al-Alamy recommended several steps for U.S. engagement

¶8. (C) Al-Alamy said that Minister of Petroleum Al-Naimi strongly

Is Al-Naimi the Problem?

¶10. (S) A recent conversation with UK Embassy officers suggests

¶11. (S) A senior Ministry of Petroleum official explained that,

EO 12958 DECL: 05/12/2018

¶1. (S) SUMMARY. S/I Ambassador David Satterfield and an MNF-

Lebanon: A “Military” Problem with a Military Solution

¶2. (S) Opening a discussion with S/I Satterfield focused largely on

RIYADH 00000768 002 OF 002

¶5. (U) Ambassador Satterfield has cleared this cable.

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP (JHARRIS), R (MARK

EO 12958 DECL: 10/20/2050

2.In interviews with Embassy and Consulate Jeddah officers before

¶4. (S) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Prince Waleed bin Talal,

¶7. (SBU) Although originally founded as an economic daily, “Al

//The MBC Group//

¶9. (S/NF) During a visit to the US Embassy in November for a visa

¶10. (S/NF) In a meeting at his XXXXXXXXXXXX office

//David Letterman, Agent of Influence//

¶12. (S) Over coffee in a Jeddah Starbucks, XXXXXXXXXXXX, and

¶13. (S) So effective has US programming been, said

¶14. (S) While revenue from commercials on Rotana’s Fox Movie

¶15. (C) Saudi-produced religious programming on ART and Rotana

¶21. (S/NF) According to our contacts, however, a more effective

//Al-Hayat and Khaled bin Sultan//

¶23. (S/NF) When this rather more dynamic editorial environment at

¶24. (S) Comment: In keeping with other initiatives such as the

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019

REF: A. SANAA 2117

Classified By: A/DCM Lisa Carle,

¶1. (C) Assistant Minister of Defense Prince Khalid bin Sultan

Saudi Arabia Declares Victory

¶2. (C) During a tour of the Saudi-Yemeni border area

-- (U) Military Successes: Saudi media continue to report

-- (U) Religious Support for Saudi Forces: Saudi Press

RIYADH 00001667 002.2 OF 003

and astray enemy of deviant thoughts.8 The Mufti went on to

-- (U) Border Security: Arab News Online ) 12/16/09:

-- (S/NF) Report from the Houthi Side: Al-Minbar

(U) On Dec. 18, Al-Minbar claimed another successful Houthi

¶4. (C) The tacit cease-fire in the Saudi-Iranian war of words

¶5. (C) The days ahead should tell whether there is a

RIYADH 00001667 003.2 OF 003

Lessons from the Battlefield

¶6. (C) The last 50 days of Saudi-Houthi fighting have

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2019

REF: A. SANAA 2117

RIYADH 00001687 001.2 OF 002

¶1. (C) While there is no open diplomacy being conducted, it

SHRINKING MEDIA COVERAGE

¶2. (C) Reporting in national Saudi media about the Houthi

¶3. (C) After Prince Khalid's 12/23 announcement of Saudi