برقيات السفارة الأمريكية فى الرباط - ويكيليكس

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2009-05- 2010-12-20 Embassy
09RABAT408 SECRET//NOFORN
15 12:12 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO5443
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0408/01 1351235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151235Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0113
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 3198
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0316
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0494
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0246
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1634
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0902
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 4595
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RABAT 000408
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR INR - MCCORMACK AND INL/AAE -

ALTON/STOLWORTHY
STATE ALSO FOR NEA/MAG AND CA/OCS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2029

TAGS: PINR PHUM SOCI EAID SNAR PTER KCRM MO
SUBJECT: OPENING UP AGAIN? MOROCCAN PRISON
ADMINISTRATION
AND REFORM (C-NE9-00043)
REF: A. STATE 006210 (C-NE9-00043) (NOTAL)
4
¶B. 08 RABAT 0569 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons

1
.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for

information and provides a broader general update on
Morocco's prison situation and the now year-old Prison
Administration. Overcrowded and underfunded, Morocco's
prisons are in a difficult, but changing situation. They
have won increasing international interest, due in part to a
large number of Islamist prisoners, and the risk of
radicalization. The Government of Morocco (GOM) reported
that among the roughly 60,000 prisoners, more than 100
inmates died in 2008, which NGOs blamed on poor conditions.
Morocco's chief warden is Prison Administration
Delegate-General Moulay Hafid Benhachem, a former top cop for
the late King Hassan II. Benhachem has been in office a year
following a shakeup after a major breakout by radical
Islamist prisoners. He told us security was his first
priority and rehabilitation next. With King Mohammed VI's
support and a larger budget, Benhachem has improved security,
increased rations, and is embarking on an ambitious building
program, but problems persist. He is beginning to open to
international cooperation. The Justice Ministry is
redrafting the penal code to allow for parole and probation,
the most effective way to ease overcrowding, and has asked us
for help. The USG so far has provided only modest support to
a prison rights NGO. We have sought new funding, including
under a Defense Appropriations Act Section 1207, to aid the
Ministry of Justice, Prison Administration and organizations
involved in post-release re-entry, to reduce the risk that
former prisoners could become suicide bombers. End Summary.
----------
Background
----------
¶2. (C) Overcrowded and underfunded, Morocco's prisons are in

a difficult but changing situation. They have been the locus
of increasing international interest, due in part to a large
number of Islamist prisoners, and the risk that the difficult
5
environment could foster violent tendencies post-release.
With a population of some 60,000, estimates in early 2008
suggested that prison budgets were barely one dollar per
prisoner per day. Prisoners must receive food from family
and friends if they are to eat at a reasonable standard.
Overcrowding can be severe, as shown in some photographs of
prisoners sleeping across the floor of a large cell, packed
like sardines, a condition uncommon, but which may still
exist in some facilities.
¶3. (C) During the &years of lead,8 the repressive era of

Hassan II, Moroccan prisons were often forbidding places,
isolated in the desert with unspeakable conditions and abuse
common. Later in Hassan II,s reign and under King Mohammed
VI, many of these symbols of repression have been closed;
some turned in to places of remembrance but cutting prison
capacity. Despite growth in the number of prisoners in
recent years, no new prisons have been built for years,
although that is now changing. Outside interest has
increased since a young Moroccan, released on pardon after
being imprisoned for several years for alleged association
with those involved in the 2003 Casablanca bombings, blew
himself up in a Casablanca cybercafe in 2007, part of a ring
of seven such suicide bombers. In the years leading up to
2008, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) then responsible for
prisons, instituted some human rights-linked changes funded
by outside donors, including permitting NGOs to work in the
prisons. In response to agitation by Islamist/Salafist
prisoner support groups and families, it also granted
increasing privileges to some Islamist prisoners. The death
penalty has not been carried out in about a decade, although
abolition of capital punishment will not likely soon occur.
RABAT 00000408 002 OF 007
This has contributed to growing numbers of capital prisoners.

The diminution of repression in Moroccan society has
probably also contributed to the rising number of inmates,
with severe physical abuse a lesser form of crime deterrence.
We understand that as many as half the inmate population may
be awaiting trial.
6
¶4. (C) In late April 2008, after the escape of nine
Salafists (Islamic radicals) from Kenitra prison, many
convicted of involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings,
King Mohammed VI moved responsibility for prison
administration from the MOJ and gave it to the newly created
Directorate under the Prime Minister's Office. The MOJ had
accommodated the growing organized presence of Salafists in
the prisons by granting increasing privileges, and there was
a sense that it had simply lost control. The escape turned
the prison situation into an embarrassment for the GOM and
the King.
------------------------------------------
Benhachem and the King: The New Old Guard
------------------------------------------
¶5. (C) The King named Moulay Hafid Benhachem, a former

Director General of National Security (DGSN or national
police) under Hassan II, to head the new Prison
Administration, with the quasi-ministerial-rank of Delegate
General, and reporting formally to the Prime Minister but
undoubtedly also directly to the Palace. Retired since 2003,
Benhachem had a reputation for toughness. He did not engage,
as far as we have been able to determine, in any official or
unofficial work or consulting for the GOM during his
retirement, nor did he work in the private sector. Benhachem
brought with him to the Prison Administration several
veterans of the former king's security apparatus, triggering
concerns within the diplomatic and domestic human rights
communities.
¶6. (C) On the day of Benhachem's appointment, King Mohammed

VI released a statement directing Benhachem and his new
Directorate to improve the reinsertion and reintegration of
former prisoners into society; guarantee security and
discipline within the prison system; ensure respect for law
within the system; bring conditions in prisons into
accordance with international norms; ensure respect for human
rights and dignity within facilities; and improve working
conditions for staff members and guards. The same statement
indicated that such improvements were crucial to combating
radical Islam. This was notable as the GOM had previously
been reluctant to publicly link militant Islam with prison
7
conditions. The same day, Minister of Justice Radi said that
Benhachem's appointment was part and parcel of a broader
justice sector reform process.
-------------------------
The Prison Administration
-------------------------
¶7. (C) The Directorate General for Prison Administration and

Reinsertion is an independent entity with its own budget and
central administrative apparatus. It absorbed all
responsibility for correctional administration from the MOJ
and is not affiliated with any other ministry or agency.
Since the removal of the Prison Administration from the
Ministry, there has been little discussion between the two
organizations except through formal channels. While the MOJ
still directs strategic penal policy, such as the possibility
of expanding alternative sentencing or judicial supervision,
it now has no input into security and daily operations of
prison facilities. Nor is there any indication of a
continuing link between Benhachem and the DGSN, or of any
influence from the DGSN/Interior Ministry (MOI). The MOI has
adamantly refused to even discuss with us prisons or related
assistance.
RABAT 00000408 003 OF 007
¶8. (C) Benhachem's approach to his new job seems well

thought-out and strategic. On assuming his position in April
2008, Benhachem halted discussions with foreign embassies
about cooperation programs, undertook an intensive internal
organizational audit, and formulated a plan and budget. He
fired officials he felt were incompetent or corrupt.
Benhachem proceeded to issue a series of directives ordering
prison guards to begin wearing their uniforms on duty once
again and instructing all staff to apply all rules and
regulations consistently at all facilities. He warned of
dire consequences if his instructions were not followed. He
ended the policy of appeasement of Salafist inmates, who had
gained unprecedented privileges and control under the MOJ
(Ref B). However, with palace support, he also got a larger
8
budget, and once he reestablished security, funds were then
appropriately next allocated for improved food. In addition,
he expedited existing construction and pushed forward plans
for additional new prisons. The recapture (or death) of all
the Salafist escapees, and others as well, allowed scope for
renewed reform and cooperation with the international
community.
--------------------------------------
Personality, Priorities and Assistance
--------------------------------------
¶9. (C) EmbOffs met with Benhachem on June 19, 2008 (Ref B),
and again on March 31, 2009, at the Directorate General for
Prison Administration and Reinsertion (DGAP) headquarters.
In both meetings, they found him direct, charming and
practical, but wary of USG intentions. Benhachem underscored
the ministerial status of the Prison Administration.
Benhachem told EmbOffs that he is in charge of prisoners
while incarcerated and responsible for their reintegration
into society when released, although he had earlier confirmed
that his responsibility ended at the prison gate. The DGAP's
2009 budget includes USD 128 million for general operations
and USD 86 million for capital expenses such as new
construction and renovation. Benhachem told EmbOffs that
this represented a 40 percent increase in funding. In
statements reported in the press, Benhachem said that the new
budget allowed him to increase spending per prisoner USD 50
cents to two dollars per day.
¶10. (C) In a separate meeting with Morocco USAID Mission

Director, he expressed a greater degree of comfort in working
with USAID than the Embassy, and recommended that all
requests for programming and cooperation with the DGAP be
sent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) via
diplomatic note. He also floated the idea of forming an
inter-ministerial coordination group, helmed by the MFA, to
work on security sector assistance issues with the USG.
(Comment: This suggests his mandate may include increased
controls on and transparency in relations with U.S. entities.
End Comment.)
¶11. (C) In the March 31 meeting, Benhachem told EmbOffs that
9
security and rehabilitation were his twin and intertwined
priorities. However, he emphasized that he would not
sacrifice security in the name of reform, saying, "I cannot
make progress if I do not control my buildings." On the
security side, Benhachem had very specific thoughts and
highlighted renovation, new construction, and improved
technological ability to scan inmates and packages for
contraband as immediate areas of focus. He said that
establishing closed-circuit-television networks and
electronic monitoring of facilities and inmates was an
important medium-term goal that would leverage his limited
staff and financial resources to greater effect. Benhachem
also expressed a need for better equipment for his staff and
improved training.
¶12. (C) On the subject of rehabilitation and post-release

reintegration of inmates, Benhachem appeared open-minded but
less in command of the subject. He expressed a need for
RABAT 00000408 004 OF 007
greater life skills programming but offered no specific

ideas. He reinforced a desire for medical assistance within
prisons and encouraged EmbOffs to coordinate with Deputy
Administrator for Social and Cultural Programs Hilmi.
Benhachem also said that there needed to be greater
coordination with the private sector and local governments to
provide jobs and soft landings for released prisoners.
Benhachem maintained there was no serious overcrowding in the
women's section and was less interested in specific women's
programming. (Note: Women are a small minority of prisoners
-- perhaps only three percent. End Note.)
¶13. (C) Despite public statements of support from Minister

of Justice Radi, who told then-Ambassador Riley in November
2007 that he sought the creation of an independent prison
authority, relations between Justice and the DGAP remain
tense. M'Hammed Abdenabaoui, the number three at the MOJ,
still holds the pre-sentencing and post-release portfolio for
his Ministry. He told PolOff in a February meeting that the
MOJ was interested in collaborating with the USG in designing
reentry programs. Abdenabaoui said that communication with
10
the DGAP was still tense but improving. He thought Benhachem
seemed to have little respect for the MOJ's former prison
managers.
----------------
The Two Deputies
----------------
¶14. (C) Two deputies assist Benhachem. Mustapha Hilmi, a

former prosecutor who also served at the upper echelons of
the MOJ's Central Prison Authority, was given the title of
Director of Social, Cultural and Reintegration Activities.
Soufiane Ouamrou, formerly of the police (DGSN) became the
Director of Inmate and Physical Security. Hilmi is known to
EmbOffs and is respected within the legal community. He
assisted the American Bar Association in Rabat in efforts to
reform the Moroccan Bar Association. Under the MOJ, he was
known as a moderate voice on prison issues. At the March 31
meeting, Benhachem appeared to have a collaborative,
respectful and easy relationship with Hilmi, who also
attended. Benhachem appeared to trust his insights and
delegated tasks to him easily. Mission staff have not met
with Ouamrou and little is known about him.
------------------
Current Conditions
------------------
¶15. (C) Overcrowding remains the largest single challenge to

the Moroccan prison system. Its 59 prisons, many of which
are outdated and poorly maintained, hold 60,000 inmates, 40
percent more than they were designed to house. Almost half
of those detained are in pre-trial or preventive detention.
Since Moroccan law allows for up to a year of pre-trial
detention, and Morocco has no jails in which individuals
awaiting trial can be held separately from convicts, this
class of inmate contributes significantly to the overcrowding
problem.
¶16. (C) According to the Moroccan Prison Observatory (OMP),

an independent, non-profit watchdog group, inmate complaints
of abuse or substandard conditions increased by 22.48 percent
in 2008 compared to 19 percent in 2007. OMP received 520
11
letters from prisoners or their relatives related to
mistreatment, poor conditions, malnutrition, lack of medical
treatment, sexual assault and violence. The OMP's report
linked 18 deaths directly to substandard conditions and
inmate violence as a result of overcrowding, and reported
greater than 100 inmate deaths overall. The OMP also
strongly criticized poor working conditions for the system's
5,228 guards, most of whom only make USD 240 per month. In
press statements, Abderrahim Jamai, a member of the OMP
board, said that the organization's attempts to raise issues
of concern with Benhachem were rebuffed and their letters to
RABAT 00000408 005 OF 007
the DGAP remain unanswered.
¶17. (C) The DGAP's Hilmi, in a public statement, countered

that cases of violence were down 12 percent in 2008 compared
to the period between 2003 and 2007. In a separate
statement, Benhachem said that 2008's inmate mortality rate,
while high, was less than the previous year's rate of 125
deaths, and well within norms for a system of this size. He
added that 32 percent of mortality cases were due to chronic
diseases, and that 66 percent of deaths among the prisoners
were registered in hospitals. Benhachem said that there was
one suicide every two months in 2008.
----------------------------
Status of Islamist Prisoners
----------------------------
¶18. (C) The majority of Salafist or terror-related inmates

are held in prisons in Tetouan, Sale and Ain Sebaa outside
Casablanca. Although they no longer enjoy the broad
privileges they once did they, like most inmates in the
system, they have easy access to mobile phones and contraband
smuggled in when family members bring food. On January 29,
Embassy received a letter from Reda Ben Othman, an "Islamic
detainee at the local prison of Ain Sebaa." He alleged that
he and his fellow religious prisoners still suffer "assault
and torture" at the hands of authorities for their beliefs.
There is a formally recognized NGO, "Anassir" (victory),
12
which advocates for the prisoners as individuals or as a
group. In 2007, a photograph of a police officer beating the
wife of a Salafist prisoner at an Anassir demonstration was
carried by al Qaeda websites, accompanied by threats against
perfidious Moroccan authorities. Benhachem has apparently
dispersed some Salafist prisioners, but most remain
concentrated in a few higher-security prisons.
--------------
Plan of Action
--------------
¶19. (C) In a speech at a national workshop on implementing

the International Convention against Torture (ICAT) in
Morocco, Benhachem said that harmonizing Moroccan legislation
with the ICAT was in the interests of society and that
protection of human rights was a central aspect of his
mandate. He said that he had issued directives on respect
for rights to all staff members and would not hesitate to
punish violators. He also encouraged all security sector
staff to meet both the spirit and the letter of laws and
agreements. Since his appointment, Benhachem has suspended
or fired five prison directors and more than 20 guards and
officials for dereliction of duty or malfeasance.
¶20. (C) At the ICAT workshop, Benhachem said that a special

240 million dirham (USD 30 million) allocation is being used
to complete six new prisons in the first half of 2009. He
added that renovations at the "priority prisons" of Oukacha
in Casablanca and Kenitra are well underway. The end result
of this investment, he explained, would be to increase inmate
living space from the current level of 1.6 meters per person
to three meters. (Note: International norms call for nine
meters. End Note.) The new facilities will include areas
for enhanced inmate training and counseling. Benhachem
indicated that the DGAP will begin to recruit an additional
6,000 guards in 2012.
¶21. (C) In terms of health services, Benhachem said that the

DGAP directly employs 107 general practitioners and has a
large number of medical specialists under contract to provide
inmates with additional care as needed. According to
Benhachem, the DGAP has also increased per person medical
13
expenditures from less than USD .01 to USD .50 per day.
--------------------------------------------- ------
Pretrial Diversion, Parole and the Justice Ministry
RABAT 00000408 006 OF 007
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶22. (C) As part of a longer-term strategy to decrease

overcrowding and provide incentive-based rehabilitation
programs, the GOM with the MOJ in the lead is revising the
penal code to allow for parole and probationary release of
convicts. There is no such provision under current law; so
inmates must either serve their entire sentence or hope to
benefit from a royal pardon. Some prisoners convicted of
terrorism won early release in pardons, in some cases due to
an admittedly wide dragnet after the 2003 Casablanca
bombings. Both Benhachem and the MOJ's Abdenabaoui
separately told EmbOffs that the creation of a parole and
probation system is a crucial aspect of correctional reform
in Morocco. Abdenabaoui, who would have MOJ authority over
any conditional release structure, informally requested USG
help in setting up such a system in 2007, 2008 and 2009.
Abdelaziz Nouyaidi, President of NGO Adala (Justice), told
EmbOffs in April that the GOM had not yet invited civil
society comment on the draft penal code and was playing its
cards close to the chest.
-------------------------
Partners and Other Actors
-------------------------
¶23. (C) The largest actor working on rehabilitation and

correctional issues outside of the DGAP is the Mohammed VI
Foundation for Reinsertion. Founded in 2002 with strong
royal patronage, the GOM-funded private foundation aims to
lead the effort to improve vocational and educational reform
in prisons. Overseen by a board made up of human rights
activists and private sector leaders, the Foundation has laid
out a plan to provide vocational training to 26,570 inmates
(11 percent female) between 2008 and 2012. The Foundation
14
has established Post-Release Coaching Centers designed to
ease the transition to freedom.
¶24. (C) Other potential partners include:
-- The Observatory of Moroccan Prisons (mentioned earlier).

OMP was the recipient of the first USG funded prison
assistance in Morocco, initially in 2006 through a grant from
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for technical
assistance to this human rights civil society organization
and, in 2008 in a modest USD 80,000 grant of Counterterrorism
(S/CT) funds administered by Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI);
-- Relais Prison, a social work organization run by Fatna

Elbouih, a prominent former political prisoner, who works
with inmates on vocational, health and counseling issues;
-- Association Annasir (or Al Nasir), an Islamist prisoner

support and advocacy organization;
-- Other small NGOs, including one in Western Sahara, support

prisoner welfare and education;
-- The Belgian Embassy, which works with released prisoners;
-- The British Embassy, which is funding a mediation training

program in prisons through U.S.-based NGO Search for Common
Ground and has funded curriculum development programs in the
past at the DGAP's training Academy in Ifrane;
-- The Danish Embassy, which is funding an agricultural

vocational skills program at a minimum-security prison in
central Morocco; and
-- The European Union, which has expressed an interest in

working on penal issues in Morocco.
-------
Comment
RABAT 00000408 007 OF 007
15
-------
¶25. (C) Comment: Although still steering a firm,

security-focused course, Benhachem appears to have somewhat
assuaged those who feared he would focus only on walls and
guards and not rehabilitation or reform. Once he established
control, he seems ready to begin engaging with donors. Given
his apparent lack of trust over USG motives in wanting to
fund prison programs, it would be advisable to proceed slowly
and closely engage only if identifiable funds are already
available for a program that could be implemented with input
from the DGAP. Conversely, assistance to the MOJ, with which
our relations are good and growing, in revising the penal
code and setting up conditional release programs might be
easier and less controversial first steps towards building
broader trust and programming. The Mission has also
requested Washington funding for a longer-term, more
comprehensive approach, including under Section 1207 and/or
MEPI, that would also focus on pre-intake, prison conditions
and vital support for the re-entry into society of those
whose term is finished. End Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Jackson
16
Reference IDCreated Released Classification Origin
2006-03-29 2010-12-14 Embassy
06RABAT557 CONFIDENTIAL
14:02 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRB #0557/01 0881446

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291446Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3222
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3852
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2856
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5422
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3072
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4097
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 8736
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 1472
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0160
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000557
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG, EUR; PARIS FOR DEA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2010

TAGS: MO PGOV PREL SNAR
SUBJECT: SPANISH AMBASSADOR ON WESTERN SAHARA,
MIGRATION,
ISLAMISTS
REF: A. RABAT 539
¶B. RABAT 308

¶C. RABAT 484
17
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Over lunch March 20, Spanish Ambassador

Planas Puchades told Ambassador Riley that Spain continued to
encourage Morocco to produce a credible autonomy plan for the
Western Sahara. He dismissed alleged splits within the
Polisario, suggesting the recently emerged faction "Line of
Martyrs" seemed to be made up of disgruntled or former
Polisario members living in the Canary Islands, and "it is
not significant." Planas pointedly did not reiterate Spanish
concern about Van Walsum's remarks on pulling the Security
Council back from the Sahara dispute or US interest in
downsizing MINURSO. On migration, Planas expressed
disappointment with Algeria's apparent decision not to
participate in the July regional conference in Rabat, which
Planas said enjoyed EU buy-in. Planas was interested in a
recent International Republican Institute (IRI) poll that
appeared in the March 18 issue of Moroccan weekly Le Journal,
which indicated strong support for Morocco's Islamist party.
The conversation touched briefly on the upcoming NATO
High-level event in Rabat, Spanish investment in Morocco, and
narcotics. End Summary.
Western Sahara
--------------
¶2. (C) Continuing a series of reciprocal lunches, Spanish

Ambassador Planas Puchades hosted Ambassador Riley and
Polcouns to lunch at the Spanish residence on March 20.
Planas was accompanied by his new DCM and previously Spanish
Ambassador in Nigeria, Alfonso Portabales, who had arrived in
Morocco the previous week.
¶3. (C) Planas said the GOS was following with great interest
the King's much-anticipated visit to Western Sahara (March
20-25; see ref A). Ambassador Riley noted we were also
following the visit with interest. Planas said Spain's
primary message to Morocco at this point was one he believed
we shared: Morocco should present a credible autonomy plan.
Planas said Spain would need to review the plan before taking
a position on it, but in the meantime the GOS was providing
18
"comfort and support" to the GOM to produce a serious plan.
Planas was somewhat dismissive of the consultation process
with Moroccan political parties, saying he understood the
parties' meetings with Palace advisor Mohamed Moatassim were
"not really an exchange." He said, nevertheless, that
conferences such as that held by the PJD and FC several weeks
ago (Ref B) "were okay." Planas said the Spanish have been
clear with Morocco that the autonomy plan must be concrete
and not conservative. Ambassador Riley said this was a key
US message as well.
¶4. (C) Planas said the reported split within the Polisario
(the so-called Ligne de Martyrs, or Line of Martyrs) was not
significant. These were mostly individuals based in the
Canary Islands. While the split itself was not significant,
Planas believed there was growing frustration in Tindouf, but
it might not be related solely to pressure for negotiation.
Planas noted that the Polisario cause continued to resonate
with Spaniards, who visited Tindouf in large numbers every
year as families back in Spain opened their doors to
5000-10,000 Sahrawis for home stays.
¶5. (C) Planas did not echo GOS concern about the possible
backing off of the Western Sahara conflict by the Security
Council as advocated by UN Envoy Van Walsum; nor he did
express concern about a possible MINURSO drawdown.
Migration
---------
¶6. (C) Planas said there continued to be good cooperation

between Morocco and Spain on migration issues, especially
after the unfortunate deaths on the frontiers of the Spanish
enclaves last fall. Planas said the GOS was pleased Morocco
had announced it was holding a regional conference on

migration in Rabat in July, but he regretted that Algeria had
apparently decided not to participate (he actually said
Algeria's non-participation was "dangerous.") on the ground
that the AU was already organizing migration conferences.
The Rabat conference, Planas said, enjoyed solid support from
France and the EU, as well as Spain. He was concerned about
the growth of trafficking networks in the region, noting that
19
some migrants bought "travel packs" (a package of movements
-- by road, car, ship, with a series of handlers at each
phase -- to get one to the desired destination), which from
his information cost thousands of dollars, with no certainty
that one would ever reach the destination.
Islamists
---------
¶7. (C) Planas had read with interest recent coverage in

Moroccan weekly Le Journal of an "American poll" on Moroccan
political attitudes (the poll was conducted by the
International Republican Institute but was not intended to be
shared with the press; according to IRI, one of political
parties that had helped with the poll likely leaked it. Full
details and embassy analysis of the results can be found in
Ref C). Planas said the results, purporting to forecast a
likely PJD victory in the 2007 parliamentary elections, were
very interesting. Planas said even if it won many seats the
PJD probably would not be able to govern without a
coalition. Other political parties are being slow to
democratize, Planas said; their leaders are old and there is
little dynamism in the ranks. The PJD seems to be following
the Erdogan path, he added (see Ref C).
NATO High-Level Event

---------------------
¶8. (C) Planas raised Morocco's hosting of the upcoming NATO

High-Level Event (April 6-7 in Rabat) and said it was an
important event for Morocco, especially as it followed the
meeting of NATO and Med Dialogue Defense Ministers in
Taormina in February. Planas added that the upcoming 50th
anniversary of the Moroccan Armed Forces was also a showcase
event for Morocco, and he hoped the US would participate
robustly. (Comment: we are firming up a robust US
participation in the 50th Anniversary of the FAR celebrations
and have tentatively secured a DV embarkation onboard a U.S.
aircraft carrier as part of the event. End Comment).
Ambassador Riley thanked Planas for Spanish support for the
recent planning conference for an upcoming exercise, Phoenix
Express, which brought together Moroccan, Algerian, and
Spanish naval officers for a week in Rabat.
20
Spanish Investment
------------------
¶9. (C) Ambassador Riley noted Spain's announcement in

February of a 200 million Euro plan to facilitate small and
medium-sized enterprises in Morocco. (Spain is Morocco,s
second largest investor). Planas said he hoped the plan
would assist Spanish enterprises but said Morocco remained a
challenging place to do business given lack of transparency.
In terms of providing aid to Morocco Ambassador Riley said
there ought to be better coordination among donors and
suggested small meetings for donors for specific regions in
Morocco, not for all programs in the whole country,
especially given the MCA activities. Planas agreed and
pointed out that two thirds of Spanish aid to Morocco went to
the northern part of the country.
Narcotics
---------
¶10. (SBU) Planas noted that Spain was developing plans to

promote tobacco production in Larache province (between Rabat
and Tangiers) as a way of promoting alternatives to narcotics
cultivation in northern Morocco.
******************************************
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************
Riley
21
2007-03-19 2010-12-14 Embassy
08:08 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0022
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRB #0494/01 0780849

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 190849Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 4356
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0645
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 3246
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 5668
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 3445
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4565
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0676
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016

TAGS: PBTS PHUM PGOV MO FR GE SP
SUBJECT: RABAT POL COUNSELORS INFORMAL DISCUSS
WESTERN
SAHARA
Classified By: Classified by Polcouns Craig Karp for reasons 1.4 (b)
an
d (d)
¶1. (C) Spain hosted Polcounselors from U.S., U.K., France and
EU-President Germany for an informal discussion of Western
Sahara developments March 14. In general, participants noted
22
the intensity of Moroccan diplomatic efforts, including
multiple consultations with U.S., France, and Spain. The
energy of the initiative, however, did not appear to be
matched by any apparent breakthrough on the substance of
autonomy that could convince the other side. The broad
outlines of the autonomy plan, which have been universally
briefed, suggested Rabat would retain full control, and did
not go far beyond what was in the 2003 plan. That had been
rejected out of hand by Baker and governments.
¶2. (C) The French continue to broadly support the Moroccan

position. They believe that the GOM effort should be
encouraged by the UNSC by some explicit mention and also
support encouraging the parties to negotiate. After some
informal discussions with Van Walsum, the French were
concerned that SYG Ban Ki Moon will be very conservative on
his report to the Council. It will be his first and he will
likely want to keep the text of the last report. The French
continue to insist on self-determination, but the act of
self-determination can be an institutional arrangement that
is endorsed by a vote that comes way down the line. They
were to have formal discussions with Van Walsum in Paris this
week
¶3. (C) The Germans will try to forge a common European

position but are not confident of doing so. For Europe as a
whole, the principal interest is that Morocco has been an
island of stability in a crucial but shaky near neighborhood.
This stability must be preserved, so a solution to the
Sahara problem that destabilizes Morocco proper is
undesirable.
¶4. (C) The Spanish host was not happy. For Spain, the Sahara
is now a hot domestic political issue. Last week, in the
joint declaration of the Zapatero visit, they had agreed to a
statement cautiously praising the Moroccan proposals as a
basis for progress. The Algerians then raised the price of
gas exports to Spain by a hefty amount described in the press
as 20 percent. (Comment: This move, possibly worth hundreds
of millions of dollars, may have been in the cards anyway.
End comment.) The Spanish Parliament unanimously (including
Zapatero's own Socialist party) appeared to repudiate this
endorsement by voting for a bill proposed by leftist splinter
23
parties to return to the historical Spanish approach focusing
on self-determination. King Juan Carlos, in Algiers this
week, tried to dodge the issue and was accommodated by
Bouteflika. FM Moratinos, with the King in Algiers,
published an op-ed walking the cat back on the Moroccan
proposals, stressing Spanish rejection of unilateral
solutions, and support for negotiations without
preconditions.
¶5. (C) Polcouns briefed on his recently completed trip to

Sahara. GOM consultation with the Sahrawi has been minimal,
but there appeared to be interest in the prospect of a plan.
Local observers believe that most of the original Sahrawis
were still opposed to Moroccan overlordship, but they now
admitted to being a minority of current population in the
territory. Both pro and anti-government Sahrawis mostly want
to manage own affairs, the difference is trust, which is
eroded by continuing, if modestly abating, human rights
violations. It appeared that the Moroccans have put in a lot
of work on their proposals, and it now looked like they will
at least have a plan to put on the table in April, but no one
has yet seen anything that will win many additional Sahrawi
hearts and minds.
¶6. (C) Algeria remained a thorny question for all. Algiers

is beginning to react to the GOM diplomatic offensive, but
has stuck tightly to its insistence on the Baker formula.
France said Algiers is like a boxer in a corner, and could
lash out. Levers to persuade them are few, as the Spanish
have discovered. Opening the border with Morocco will
benefit the Kingdom and Algeria both, but the latter doesn't
need it. The only fruitful area of collaboration, as noted
by the German, was counterterrorism, but this may not be
enough to foster a rapprochement. Russia may have some
influence with the Algerians, but the French said their

Embassy in Moscow commented that the Russian were unlikely to
play a constructive role (apparently without haing directly
posed the question to the GOR). They unhappily recalled
GAZPROM-SONATRACH discussions on forming a cartel. The
French believed that giving the Algerians some formal status
in the negotiations, not as a party, which they refuse, but
as a Godfather (parrain) could provide some incentive.
24
¶7. (C) On next steps, the French have advised the GOM to
present their plan first to the UNSYG to include in his
report, and to the April UNSC president, the UK. The U.K.
said they expected to see a Moroccan draft during their UNSC
presidency.
******************************************
******************************************
Riley
25
2007-11-02 2010-12-14 Embassy
17:05 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXRO6845
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHRB #1695/01 3061742
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021742Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3117
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1203
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3434
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 5830
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4822
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001695
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2017

TAGS: PREL MO SP
SUBJECT: MOROCCANS FURIOUS OVER SPANISH ROYAL
VISIT TO
ENCLAVES, BUT STRONG TIES WILL ENDURE
REF: RABAT 1687
Classified by Charge d'Affaires Robert P. Jackson for reasons

1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: The Moroccan government is reacting strongly

to the announced visit of Spanish King Juan Carlos to the
disputed enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Following blistering
criticism of the intended visit by PM El-Fassi and
Information Minister Naciri, the GOM announced in the
26
afternoon of November 2 that it was recalling its Ambassador
in Madrid for consultations. A senior MFA official we spoke
with expressed exasperation over the development but implied
that the relationship would weather the storm. A Spanish
diplomat told us they had received a similar message of anger
mixed with resignation from their MFA contacts. Despite the
public flash of anger, we doubt the incident will do
sustained damage to the relationship. End summary.
¶2. (SBU) The Moroccan government did not take lying down news
that Spanish King Juan Carlos and Queen Sofia were planning
their first visit to Ceuta and Melilla, the Spanish enclaves
on the Mediterranean coast claimed by Morocco. (We
understand both enclaves will be visited November 5, with no
overnight stop.) Prime Minister El-Fassi late on November 1
expressed "deep regret" at the decision and warned it would
impact the bilateral relationship. Information Minister (and
government spokesman) Khalid Naciri told local media on
November 1 that the GOM rejected the visit and was very
disappointed by the decision. Speaking on pan-Arab
Al-Jazeera TV, Naciri warned "the Spanish government must
understand there are red lines not to be crossed." Moroccan
independent media also had an angry, nationalistic reaction.
The wide circulation Al-Massae criticized the Spanish monarch
for violating tradition and "implementing the occupation" of
the enclaves.
¶3. (C) Youssef Amrani, Director-General for Bilateral Affairs

and the third ranking diplomat at the Moroccan Foreign
Ministry, told PolCouns during a November 2 meeting that the
Spanish decision was "not astute" and "disturbed the
atmosphere" between the two countries. He noted that Spain
and Morocco had been undergoing several years of improved
ties and confidence building, manifested most recently by
Crown Prince Felipe's late October visit, which generated
positive coverage in Moroccan media. Amrani implied that the
relationship was durable enough to weather the storm.
¶4. (C) Similarly, a Spanish diplomat told PolCouns on

November 2 that he had discussed the issue with a senior
contact at the MFA. Heated complaints from the Moroccan side
were followed by assurances that bilateral cooperation would
continue as usual. Asked why King Juan Carlos had chosen to
27
break with tradition and conduct the visit, the Spaniard
noted that the King has been under domestic political
pressure on a variety of issues from all sides, particularly
the right wing. This pressure may have prompted the King to
conduct a muscular gesture, he speculated.
¶5. (C) News that Morocco was "indefinitely" recalling its

Ambassador in Madrid for consultations broke on the afternoon
of November 2. A (separate) Spanish diplomat told D/PolCouns
his Embassy was taken by surprise by the decision. He noted
that Vice President Maria Teresa Fernandez De La Vega had
insisted after a Council of Ministers meeting on November 2
that the King Juan Carlos' visit should not have an impact on
Spain's relations with Morocco. News of the withdrawal of
Morocco's Ambassador appeared to belie this hope, our Spanish
contact opined.
¶6. (C) Comment: We assess that the GOM felt it had to react
loudly and publicly to Juan Carlos' visit. Whatever its
intended purpose, the visit was bound to irritate Morocco,
which continues to claim the enclaves. We also assess that
this angry public reaction will not impact the underlying
calculus behind Morocco's robust cooperation with Spain, and
this incident will not cause sustained damage to their
bilateral relationship. End comment.
*****************************************
RABAT 00001695 002 OF 002
*****************************************
Jackson
28
2007-11-07 2010-12-14 Embassy
15:03 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXRO0477
DE RUEHRB #1706/01 3111519
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071519Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5834
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7711
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017

TAGS: PREL MO SP
SUBJECT: MOROCCO: MONARCH CRITICIZES BUT
EXTENDS HAND TO
SPANISH COUNTERPART
REF: A. RABAT 01695

¶B. MADRID 02070
Classified By: Classified by Charge d'Affairs Robert P. Jackson for

rea
sons 1.4 (b) and (d)
-------
29
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) On November 6 Morocco's King Mohammed VI criticized

Spain over the visit of King Juan Carlos to the disputed
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, but called for "honest and
forward-looking dialogue", sending a clear message that the
relationship will be preserved. Moroccans across the
political spectrum have reacted stridently to the November 5
and 6 visits to the coastal cities. Prime Minister Abbas
El-Fassi made a strong speech to Parliament and there were
protests and sit-ins by senior government officials, NGOs,
and parliamentarians. Morocco postponed the annual bilateral
PM-chaired coordination meeting indefinitely. Foreign
Affairs Committee Chair Fouad Ali El Himma presented a
protest letter to the Spanish Ambassador on October 6. This
nationalist grandstanding increased the profile of both PM El
Fassi and El Himma in the royal domain of Foreign Affairs.
Exacerbated by inopportune timing on the eve of Morocco's
Green March celebration, the visit raised political tensions,
but has not so far appeared to have fired the public
imagination. It is likely the flurry of Moroccan anger will
not set back burgeoning relations across the straits of
Gibraltar. End Summary.
-----------------------------
Irked, but Calming the Waters
-----------------------------
¶2. (U) Press reports indicate that on November 6, royal

adviser Mohammed Moatassim read a statement from King
Mohammed VI to the Moroccan cabinet. In it, the monarch
condemned the recent visit by Spain's King Juan Carlos to the
disputed Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on Morocco's
northern coast as "useless" and a sign of "yearning for a
long-gone era of darkness." (Note: Morocco does not
recognize Spanish sovereignty over the two enclaves. End
Note.) He reiterated his resolve to reassert Moroccan
sovereignty over the territories, which have been under
Spanish rule for approximately 500 years. He closed,
however, by calling for an "honest and forward-looking"
dialogue in order to continue building constructive relations
30
between the two countries.
------------------------------------
Fired by Memories of the Green March
------------------------------------
¶3. (U) On November 5, the day of the visit, a group of

parliamentarians, NGO representatives, local government
officials and hundreds of protesters marched on the border
crossing between Morocco and the Spanish enclave of Melilla
An even larger crowd (some press estimates put the number of
people at 5,000) demonstrated uneventfully at the border with
Ceuta. The march was organized to protest both Juan Carlos's
visit and the continued "colonization" of Moroccan territory
by Spain. This event followed similar, but relatively small,
peaceful protests outside the Spanish Consulates in Tetouan,
Agadir and Casablanca.
¶4. (U) In Rabat, also on November 5, a 10-person delegation

headed by the Chairs of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs
Committees (FAC) from the chambers of Councilors (upper
house) and Deputies (lower house), under the leadership of
Deputies' FAC Chair Fouad Ali El Himma, "demarched" the
Spanish Ambassador in his own Embassy.
¶5. (C) A Spanish poloff told us that Al Himma personally

transmitted a parliamentary letter of protest to the
Ambassador during a surprisingly cordial meeting. He was
accompanied by the heads of the major parliamentary caucuses,
including the Party of Justice and Development (PJD). The
Spanish Embassy told us that the letter repeated political
leaders' call for Spain to re-evaluate the status of the
enclaves and criticized the King's visit as provocative and
RABAT 00001706 002 OF 002
inopportune.
----------------------------------
A Calculated Spanish Miscalculation?
----------------------------------
31
¶6. (C) Other Spanish emboffs told us that the Government of
Spain (GOS) knew that King Juan Carlos's visit would lead to
a strong Moroccan reaction, but that Spanish electoral
imperatives played a role in the decision to send him to the
enclaves. The King had been under pressure from separatists
on the one hand and grumbling from the military on the other.
At the same time, Prime Minister Zapatero, who faces
re-election in March 2009, calculated that the domestic
electoral boost he would receive from the king's journey
outweighed the damage it would do to bilateral relations.
Additionally, Madrid believed that Spanish/Moroccan relations
were the strongest they had ever been and that they would
weather the storm. They maintained the visit by Crown Prince
Felipe and Foreign Minister Moratinos on October 30 was
actually an opportunity for Moratinos to give the Fassi
government advance notice and sound out their reaction. At
the time, Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi-Fihri assured the
Spanish of overall "business as usual." Nevertheless the
strength of the response caught the Spanish diplomats here
off guard. In one initial first consequence, the Moroccan MFA
announced that the annual high-level coordination meeting,
chaired by the two countries' respective Prime Ministers, was
"unlikely to occur."
----------------------
Remember the Melilla
----------------------
¶7. (C) Our Spanish contacts felt that the widespread

"manufactured outrage" and "orchestrated" demonstrations
outside Spanish missions and the two enclaves were a sign of
the Fassi government's weakness. The limping parliament
seized on this issue to whip up the winds of Moroccan
nationalism and gain legitimacy in the eyes of a jaundiced
electorate. They said that complaints by the unpopular Prime
Minister El Fassi, that the visits "hurt Moroccans feelings,"
were an effort to distract from his own short-comings.
-------
Comment
-------
¶8. (C) The strident and visible public reaction was likely
32
exacerbated because the Juan Carlos visit came on the eve of
annual celebrations commemorating the Green March, the date
on which Hassan II sent 20,000 Moroccans into the desert to
"liberate" the Western Sahara from Spain. In Morocco at
least, we note that stirring up nationalistic feelings to
distract from domestic concerns has long been a tactic of the
kingdom's leaders. It was used by both Prime Minister El
Fassi and Fouad Ali El Himma to strengthen their nationalist
and foreign policy credentials. Neither the Prime Minister
nor parliament have had much prior role in foreign affairs, a
preserve of the throne.
¶9. (C) The theatrics of the Moroccan response could end up

benefiting Juan Carlos and Zapatero as they face the Spanish
right. We assess that Mohammed VI's comments are a signal to
the Moroccan side to reduce the rhetoric and histrionics and
begin moving past the issue. We concur with our Spanish
colleagues that there likely will be little long-term effect
on relations. End Comment.
*****************************************
*****************************************
Jackson
33
2008-07-22 2010-12-14 Embassy
17:05 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXRO3552
RR RUEHLA
DE RUEHRB #0681/01 2041720
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221720Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8875
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4840
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3778
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 9670
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 0005
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2018

TAGS: PREL KMIG SP MO
SUBJECT: ZAPATERO FINALLY MEETS WITH KING:GOOD
FRIENDS
REF: 07 RABAT 1706
Classified By: PolCouns Craig Karp for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez

Zapatero met with King Mohammad VI on July 11. The purpose of
the meeting was to reinforce the strong relations that
already exist between the two countries, primarily
highlighting cooperation in the areas of economics, security,
34
and immigration. Zapatero also met Moroccan Prime Minister
El Fassi followed by a meeting with the press. Publicly, the
two parties never mentioned the Ceuta and Melilla controversy
that sparked widespread demonstrations last year. However,
they reportedly addressed the issue privately, assuring each
other that it would not obstruct relations. The two
neighbors will re-invigorate their bilateral cooperation with
a round of ministerial visits leading up to a meeting of the
Bi-National Commission in Madrid chaired jointly in November
by Prime Ministers El Fassi and Zapatero. End Summary.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF OUJDA

¶2. (U) Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero
met with King Mohammad VI on July 11 in the city of Oujda.
Oujda is located in the northeastern corner of Morocco, not
far from the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla. The locale
underscored the absence of rhetoric over the issue. This was
Zapatero,s fourth official visit to Morocco and the first
since his re-election victory in March of this year. Some
Moroccan/Spanish experts claim that the King strategically
selected Oujda as the venue of his meeting with Zapatero
because the King wanted the Spanish president to speak out in
favor of re-opening the nearby border with Algeria, 9 miles
away. During the visit; however, Zapatero did not make any
official comments related to the Algerian/ Moroccan border
dispute.
GOOD RELATIONS
¶3. (U) Zapatero and Moroccan Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi
held a joint Press Conference following the meeting between
the King and Zapatero. The Spanish Prime Minister stated
that the relations between Morocco and Spain are good and
will always be good. Zapatero highlighted the importance of
strong regional security cooperation.
¶4. (U) Zapatero focused on three key areas of concern:

economics, security, and immigration. He spoke positively
about the 500,000 Moroccans currently living in Spain and
contributing to the economic and social development of both
countries. He stated that Morocco is a prime destination for
Spanish investors where 600 Spanish businesses currently
operate. Trade between the two kingdoms is estimated to be
close to $8 billion US dollars. Spain is Morocco's second
35
largest economic partner after France.
¶5. (U) On the subject of immigration, Zapatero acknowledged

the Moroccan and Spanish joint efforts to decrease the number
of illegal immigrants coming into Europe from Africa. Prime
Minister Zapatero noted the recent Government of Spain
initiative to regularize thousands of Moroccan immigrants
currently living in Spain. Zapatero complimented Government
of Morocco's (GOM) treatment of immigrants stating that
Morocco is not a country that exports immigrants but a
country that welcomes thousands of Sub-Saharan immigrants,
treating them with dignity and respect.
NO MENTION OF CEUTA OR MELILLA

¶6. (U) Neither El Fassi nor Zapatero publicly broached the
subject of Ceuta or Melilla, two enclaves under Spanish rule
for more than five hundred years. (Note: Morocco views these
two areas, in addition to the Western Sahara, as a part of
its territory. In November 2007, the GOM recalled its
Ambassador to Spain after the Spanish King, Juan Carlos, made
his first official visit to the disputed region (reftel).
There were no reports of protests or demonstrations during
Zapatero's visit. End Note.)
MAKING PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

¶7. (U) Prime Minister Zapatero announced that several
Spanish ministerial delegations would visit to prepare for
the next Moroccan-Spanish High Level Committee Meeting that
will convene in Madrid in November. The November meeting is
expected to focus on the key issues of immigration, the
RABAT 00000681 002 OF 002
economy, and culture. It will be chaired jointly by Prime

Ministers, El Fassi and Zapatero. The first of the promised
visits, by Spanish Interior Minister Rubalcaba, took place
July 16 and produced a number of technical understandings on
immigration and security.
¶8. (C) Youssef Amrani, Director General of Bilateral

Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Spanish Embassy
DCM both confirmed to PolCouns that the meeting between the
36
King and PM Zapatero was "extremely good". Spanish diplomats
also told us Zapatero proposed to Mohammad VI mediation to
help improve the Moroccan/Algerian relationship. However,
Mohammad VI responded that, "the time was not right".
COMMENT
9.(SBU) The Spanish/Moroccan relationship remains strong and
positive. The absence of public discussion by the King or
the hotly nationalist El Fassi of the Spanish enclaves is a
sign of the strength of the relationship. Morocco and Spain
have transcended the enclaves issue to concentrate on their
rapidly growing economic ties, managing immigration
(including keeping Sub Saharans out of Spain) and their vital
shared interest in counterterrorism cooperation.
*****************************************
*****************************************
Riley
37
2009-12-18 2010-12-14 Embassy
15:03 12:12 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRB #0990/01 3521540

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181540Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1173
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0983
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA, IO/UNP, NEA/MAG, PRM/AFR AND

DRL/NESCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019

TAGS: PHUM PREL PREF PGOV UN WI MO
SUBJECT: AMINATOU HAIDAR RETURNS SAFELY TO
WESTERN SAHARA
REF: A. RABAT 0979 (NOTAL)

¶B. RABAT 0977 (NOTAL)
¶C. RABAT 0915 (NOTAL)
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Prominent Sahrawi pro-independence activist

Aminatou Haidar returned safely to the Western Sahara on
December 18 aboard a Spanish military aircraft. She
recovered her passport at the airport, completed normal
Moroccan immigration formalities, and proceeded from the
airport to her home in the company of family members.
Sahrawi activists report that she has terminated her hunger
strike; that she is in very good spirits; but that she is
still in precarious physical condition and under close
38
medical supervision at her home. Western Sahara-based
government officials confirm that her arrival took place
without incident, and that a spontaneous gathering of
well-wishers had taken place with no serious security
incidents. After having handled the Haidar case in
disastrous fashion, the GOM finally brought the ordeal to an
end -- and not a moment too soon. However, the case has left
the GOM angry and badly shaken, which will create real
challenges as we look toward the next round of formal UN-led
Manhasset talks. End Summary.
-----------
Home Safely
-----------
¶2. (SBU) Aminatou Haidar, President of the Collective of

Sahrawi Human Rights Defenders (CODESA) and a prominent
Sahrawi pro-independence activist, returned safely to her
home in Laayoune, Western Sahara, in the early hours of
December 18. Haidar arrived shortly after 2:00 AM local time
(GMT) aboard a Spanish military plane specially equipped to
handle medical emergencies, and in the company of her sister
and a physician. By prior agreement among Haidar and the
Governments of Morocco and Spain, there were no journalists
or other passengers aboard, according to Laayoune-based
Moroccan Ministry of Interior (MOI) officials. As Haidar
arrived, immigration officers met her plane-side and handed
her the passport they had confiscated on November 13 (Ref C),
and she proceeded to complete normal customs and immigration
formalities. There was a beefed-up police presence at the
airport, but only Haidar's brother and an uncle came to meet
her; by all accounts, she exited the airport without
incident, and they drove her home.
¶3. (SBU) Haidar's return marked the end of a 35-day exile

and of a hunger strike that had reportedly taken a terrible
physical toll on her. On December 16, her health had
deteriorated to the point that she had to be hospitalized in
Lanzarote, and she remains in precarious but stable condition
now at her home in Laayoune. Djimi Elghalya, a CODESA member
and the Vice Chair of the Association of Victims of Grave
Human Rights Violations (ASVDH), confirmed by phone that
Haider has ended her hunger strike and is beginning to take
39
food under close medical supervision; she is extremely weak,
but "her spirit is extremely strong."
----------------------------------
Supporters Jubilant, Laayoune Calm
----------------------------------
¶4. (SBU) At Haidar's home, a large, jubilant and peaceful

crowd turned out in the middle of the night to greet her,
according to both press reports and participants. CODESA
members told the Embassy that several hundred Sahrawis --
ranging from independence activists to apolitical
well-wishers -- gathered to celebrate "a great victory for
international law and human rights." Celebrations near her
home continued into the late morning, and there were
reportedly other gatherings throughout Laayoune. Elghalya
said that supporters had intentionally stayed away from the
airport, recognizing that the police presence there would be
heavy and in a specific effort to avoid any kind of incident.
However, she added, no one could keep away the "hundreds"
who spontaneously gathered at Haidar's home. Elghalya noted
that there were also police around Haidar's home, but they
limited themselves to keeping order and did not try to
interfere with the celebrations. Separately, Mohammed
Jelmous, the Wali of Laayoune (i.e., the Governor and senior
MOI official), said that a small group of "youths" who oppose
Western Saharan independence did attempt to gain access to
the crowds in front of Haidar's home, but police quickly
ushered them away after one threw a rock that hit -- but did
not seriously injure -- a Spanish journalist. Otherwise, the
Wali reported, as of noon Laayoune time, the city was calm.
------------------------
Comment: An Ordeal Ended
------------------------
¶5. (C) Haidar's return comes not a moment too soon,

especially in light of the serious down-turn her health had
taken in recent days. It also brings to a close a disastrous
episode for the GOM, which drew dangerously close not only to
perpetrating a case of forced exile, but also to badly
jeopardizing its relationships with Spain and other allies
through its belligerent handling of the case and some
40
stunningly maladroit diplomacy. Local press and our
Laayoune-based Sahrawi contacts have given enormous credit to
the U.S., France and to a lesser extent Spain for pressing
the GOM to find a solution to the problem. GOM officials
have grudgingly acknowledged that the tough -- and consistent
-- messages that Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Taieb Fassi Fihri heard on his recent travels to Europe and
the U.S. (Ref A) were crucial to the GOM's rather sudden
change of heart. Even the provincial Wali in Laayoune told
PolCouns, "You see, we listen to our friends." This said, we
will need to be mindful that the whole Haidar case has left
the GOM badly shaken; indeed, Moroccan officials' (and, we
suspect, the other parties') anger and distrust, especially
toward Algeria, has reached its highest level in recent
years. As we look to a fifth round of formal UN-led
Manhasset talks, Ambassador Ross, and we, have our work cut
out for us. End Comment.
*****************************************
*****************************************
KAPLAN
41
Reference
Created Released Classification Origin
ID
2008-01-09 2010-12-11 Embassy
06:06 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRB #0021/01 0090619

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 090619Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0530
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2259
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0699
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/PPD AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2018

TAGS: PGOV KPAO SCUL OIIP KIRC PHUM KISL MO
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS DISCUSSES
PRESS CODE, VIDEO
PIRACY AND MODERATE MUSLIM MESSAGING WITH
AMBASSADOR
Classified by Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and

(d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Riley paid an introductory call on

January 4, 2008 with Khaled Naciri, the new Moroccan Minister of
42
Communications and Government Spokesman. Naciri stated that
passing
a revised, more liberal press code was one of his top policy
priorities. He defended, however, the need to maintain prison
sentences in rare cases as a "precaution," arguing in particular that
publication of anything that might be deemed a "provocation"
against
Islam could reinforce fundamentalism and destabilize Moroccan
democracy. He pledged that the Fassi government would not limit
freedom of expression, and described plans to further liberalize the
audiovisual sector. Naciri assured the Ambassador that Morocco was
committed to combating video piracy, recognizing the importance of
the film industry to the Moroccan economy. He also discussed
Government of Morocco (GOM) efforts to promote a moderate
vision of
Islam in Morocco and with Arab communities abroad via a public
television and radio network focused on religion. A former
international visitor program (IVP) participant, Naciri expressed
appreciation for USG efforts to promote professionalism and ethical
journalistic practices in Morocco through training and exchange
programs. End summary.
------------------------------
Promoting Freedom of the Press
------------------------------
¶2. (C) Said Sihida, head of the minister's cabinet, and an aide
joined from the Ministry of Communications (MOC); the PAO and
IO
accompanied the Ambassador. The Ambassador opened by asking
Naciri
for an update on the long-promised revised press code, noting that
its passage was a top USG policy priority. Naciri stated that this
was one of his two top priorities as well (the other being
liberalization of the audiovisual sector - see para 6 below). He
stated that the previous government had hoped to finalize and
introduce it to parliament last year, but the government had run out
of time because of parliamentary elections. Naciri repeated a
familiar refrain that the Ministry of Communications had been
caught
in the middle between the competing interests of the media
community
(which wanted to see the draft further liberalized), and the
43
Ministries of Interior and Justice (which had taken a more
conservative stance). Naciri stated that he had already held
consultations with all the key stakeholders, and was in the process
of collecting final comments.
¶3. (C) Naciri's goal was to reach consensus on a final draft text
that would be more liberal than the existing one, but which would
preserve key "precautions," including prison sentences for a very few
"extreme cases," notably concerning the three red-lines: Islam, the
monarchy and "territorial integrity" (read: Western Sahara).
Journalists had expressed concern that the provisions of the new law
were too vague, but Naciri argued it was not possible to have an
exact recipe for what constituted a transgression. Nevertheless,
"you will see that the new text will be a step forward . . . a very,
very liberal text," he stated, taking into account the views of all
the stakeholders, and in which prisons sentences would be very
limited.
¶4. (C) Naciri stated that application of the law was as important as
the law itself. The new press code should be considered in the
context of a Moroccan Government commitment to openness and
democracy. He noted that prison sentences existed in the French
press code; they were never applied, but were nevertheless
maintained
as a precaution. He stated that fundamentalism was one of the main
political forces confronting the Arab world today; Arab governments
could not allow this phenomenon to be reinforced, and provocations
against Islam, he stated, fed the demagoguery of the fundamentalists.
"We must not allow democracy to be used by those who want to
destabilize it," he stated, which was the underlying reason for the
existence of the red-lines in the press code. Every day, Naciri
stated, there were examples of transgressions of the red-lines in the
press, which the Moroccan Government chose not to prosecute. This
demonstrated that, regardless the text of the press code, the
government was committed politically and philosophically to
permitting the maximum possible freedom of the press; "This
government will not threaten freedom of expression," he averred.
¶5. (C) The Ambassador stated that Morocco was known

internationally
for its advances in the area of press freedom, but it was important
to remain vigilant. He commented that international organizations
44
and non-governmental watchdog groups evaluated press freedom as
much
by the written law as by its application; this was a reality that
underscored the need for a revised press code. Naciri responded that
the GOM was endeavoring to strike a balance. He reminded the
Ambassador that he was first and foremost a human rights activist,
and that he understood the point of view of such NGOs. "I am
imbued
in the human rights philosophy," he stated, which "does not change
just because I am a minister." (Note: Naciri previously participated
in an international visitor program focused on human rights issues.
End note.)
¶6. (C) Naciri stated that his second priority was the further
liberalization of the audiovisual sector. In this regard, he
expected that the Higher Audiovisual Communications Authority
(HACA)
would be issuing additional licenses for private television and radio
stations this year. He also discussed the planned launch of a
publicly-financed Amazigh (Berber) television channel in the coming
months. Naciri stated that the core team was already in place, with
plans to begin broadcasting six to seven hours per day, but that the
Minister of Finance had not yet approved the expensive budget for
the
project.
-----------------------------------
Video Piracy Bad for Moroccan Image
-----------------------------------
¶7. (C) Naciri, who heads a governmental committee on the

enforcement
of intellectual property rights (IPR), stated that the promotion of
the film industry in Morocco was an additional priority. He
acknowledged receipt of a letter from the Ambassador expressing
concern about the availability in Moroccan markets of a high-quality
pirated version of Ridley Scott's latest film "American Gangster."
Noting the key economic role played by the film industry in Morocco,
the Ambassador reiterated his concern that this pirated video went
on
sale while Scott was filming his latest film in Morocco. He also
45
related a conversation he had had with a well-known Moroccan
singer,
now living in Europe, who was one of the most popular singers in
Morocco but had sold only ten legitimate copies of his latest CD in
the whole country. He expressed concern that Moroccan artists could
not survive without moving to Europe.
¶8. (C) Naciri stated flatly that Moroccan did not want to be
associated with this sort of piracy. Naciri assured the Ambassador
that the Moroccan security forces were on board regarding the need
to
enforce IPR.
--------------------------------------
Using the Airwaves to Combat Extremism
--------------------------------------
¶9. (C) Expanding on his earlier discussion of the threat of Islamic

fundamentalism, Naciri raised GOM efforts to promote a moderate
vision of Islam on the government-owned Mohamed VI television and
radio network, which is focused on religious issues. Such
programming was intended to counterbalance fundamentalist
messages
about Islam that were circulating widely in Morocco via Arab
satellite networks such as al-Jazeera, as well as from Europe,
advanced by preachers of a "catastrophic vision of Islam." "We are
in a difficult battle," he stated. The strategic objective of the
GOM was to promote, via Mohamed VI television and radio, an
alternative mindset, in order to influence Moroccans in Morocco, and
Arabs living in Europe, to embrace moderation. (Note: Mohamed VI
television and radio, part of the government-owned television and
radio corporation SNRT, was founded two years ago as a venue for
the
GOM to broadcast moderate perspectives on Islam. It is available via
both local and satellite broadcast, and is piped in to mosques
throughout the country, allowing the government to provide AV
content, such as sermons and lessons on Islam, that conform with its
moderate vision. End note.)
--------------------------------------
Promoting Professionalism in the Media
--------------------------------------
46
¶10. (SBU) IO provided Naciri a briefing on USG efforts to promote
professionalism and the ethical practice of journalism in Morocco.
Over the past ten years, the USG had sponsored the participation of
roughly 100 journalists in a variety of exchange programs in the
U.S., the IO noted, as well as in reporting tours abroad in places
such as Pakistan and Mali. The USG had also provided in-country
training, conducted by American and local experts, on issues ranging
from investigative reporting, to journalistic ethics, to citizen and
electronic journalism. Naciri expressed enthusiasm for these
programs, and hoped to reinforce and expand them.
-------
Comment
-------
¶11. (C) Naciri's comments on the revised press code confirm

concerns
expressed to us recently by senior members of the Moroccan press
establishment that short-term progress is unlikely, and reinforce our
impression that nothing will happen absent a clear expression of
royal will. Notwithstanding Naciri's assurances that a new draft
would be very liberal, the prison sentences he pledged to maintain
are a non-starter for local publishers, editors and journalists.
Moreover, given that Moroccan law continues to be deployed on a
sporadic but regular basis to stifle press freedom, it is unlikely
that anyone in the local press community would be assuaged by
Naciri's statement that prison sentences will be used sparingly. We
will continue to press this issue at every opportunity with senior
GOM officials. Naciri's statements on promoting moderate Muslim
messaging demonstrate the GOM commitment to creatively
employing its
own substantial resources to combat extremism. End comment.
Riley
47
2008-02-19 2010-12-11 Embassy
17:05 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRB #0154/01 0501719

ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191719Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NESCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018

TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PINR MO
SUBJECT: MR. EL-HIMMA GOES TO PARLIAMENT:
AMBASSADOR'S
CALL ON CHAMBER FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEAD
FOUAD ALI
EL-HIMMA
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 13 meeting, prominent

parliamentarian and royal confidante Fouad Ali El-Himma
discussed with the Ambassador his efforts to better
coordinate local, regional and national governance in the
48
poor constituency he represents. El-Himma asserted that
Morocco's legislature has "all the legal authority it needs"
and complained bitterly about mismanagement of resources and
lack of vision among the parliamentary leadership.
Interestingly, El-Himma declined to engage on issues like
Western Sahara (in which he was intimately engaged as Deputy
Interior Minister) and did not even mention his "All
Democrats Movement," an initiative which has prompted
clamorous speculation in the domestic media about his
political ambitions. End summary.
¶2. (C) The Ambassador met on February 13 with Fouad Ali

El-Himma, Chairman of Parliament's Foreign Affairs, Islamic
Affairs, and Defense Committee. El Himma is also leader of
the parliamentary bloc with provides lynch-pin support to
Prime Minister El-Fassi's minority government. The former
Deputy Interior Minister and childhood friend and confidante
of King Mohammed VI, is still commonly viewed as perhaps the
most influential person in Morocco, after the monarch. In a
90-minute, one-on-one meeting, El-Himma talked at length
about his efforts to help Skhour Rhamna, the poor
constituency north of Marrakech he was elected to represent
in September 2007. El-Himma said he had been leading a
continuing dialogue between local officials, NGOs, and
private sector leaders to discuss ways to attract investment,
generate employment, and upgrade economic development
activities in the district.
¶3. (C) El-Himma claimed that Skhour Rhamna was the poorest
district in Morocco and lamented that it had not been
selected as a beneficiary for Millennium Challenge Account
projects, the first of which are being launched in early
¶2008. El-Himma urged that the USG look closely at Skhour
Rhamna as it planned future assistance activities, pledging
that he would make sure the USG received the full cooperation
of all levels of the GOM in such an endeavor. If you invest
in Skhour Rhamna, "we will give you your success story," he
asserted. One potential asset he mentioned was the air base
at Ben Guerir, the former NASA alternate landing site.
¶4. (C) Asked about his perspective as a new parliamentarian,

El-Himma complained bitterly about the mismanagement of staff
resources at the institution. Upon arrival, El-Himma
49
discovered, to his dismay, that he could not hire even one
staff member of his own choosing. Parliament's entire human
resources budget was already tapped out, with 600 persons on
the staff payroll, of whom "maybe 30 or 40 actually do
something," he complained. He directly criticized former
lower house speaker Abdelouahed Radi (now Minister of
Justice) for having allocated jobs as political party favors
and paybacks rather than on merit. El-Himma also clearly
implied that his relations with Radi's successor, speaker
Mustapha Mansouri, were chilly. (Comment: We had heard this
from independent sources.)
¶5. (C) El-Himma challenged the widely held view that

parliament was a weak institution because its powers were
circumscribed by the constitution. The existing legal
framework provides all the power it needs to effect change,
he argued. The problem has been the myopic vision of the
political parties in the parliament, he contended. If
parliament got together and presented effective legislation
based on strong consensus, the GOM could not and would not
say no, he argued.
¶6. (C) Returning to the theme of helping his district,

El-Himma told the Ambassador he had decided to step down from
his post as Minister-Delegate for the Interior (i.e. Deputy
Minister) to go back to a quieter life in his home town and
focus on his family and his community. Once there, he
decided he needed not to rest but to work hard to improve his
community, concluding that he could best do so by
representing his district in parliament.
¶7. (C) Comment: As Deputy Minister of the Interior from

2002 to the summer of 2007, he overshadowed the actual
Minister (Chakib Benmoussa) and was widely considered, mainly
because of his proximity to the King, to be the second most

influential man in Morocco. Many still believe this is the
case. It is hard not to think him disingenuous in claiming
that he stepped down from his ministerial post in the summer
of 2007, not to enter parliament but to return to his dusty
and rural hometown to spend time with his family.
50
¶8. (C) Comment continued: Perhaps most significant in the
conversation was what El-Himma did not say. He ignored the
Ambassador's question on Western Sahara, an issue on which he
worked in the Interior Ministry and as a leader of numerous
diplomatic missions to press Morocco's case in world capitals
and the first Manhasset meeting. El-Himma also declined to
say anything about his leadership of the "All Democrats
Movement" (reftel), an initiative which has provoked
clamorous speculation in the domestic media about his
possible plans to form a new political party that would seem
well placed to steamroll its rivals and transform the
political landscape. Instead, with the Ambassador, El-Himma
clung to his pose as a newly minted parliamentarian who has
come to the capital determined to do something good for his
district.
¶9. (C) Comment continued: This is doubtful, at least in

part. El-Himma's proximity to the King has apparently not
been diminished. In fact, we have heard that he was called
to join the King on his early February skiing vacation in
France. We think more plausible the commonly held view that
El-Himma has been tasked by the King with going into
parliament, seeing why it doesn't work well, and ultimately
fixing it. Perhaps by forming a dominant new party, or
perhaps through more indirect approaches. We are reminded of
the 1980 Robert Redford film "Brubaker," in which the newly
appointed warden enters a corrupt and brutal prison disguised
as an inmate, to see for himself what the problems are from
the ground level. El-Himma watching will continue to be a
major sport for observers of Morocco's domestic political
scene and will likely yield interesting results in the months
to come. End comment.
*****************************************
*****************************************
Riley
51
2008-12-18 2010-12-11 Embassy
17:05 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO9909
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #1169/01 3531726
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181726Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0688
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1619
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0895
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0387
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 0007
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0054
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
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SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PI, DRL/IRF AND DRL/NESCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2023

TAGS: PHUM PGOV PTER PINR KISL IT MO
SUBJECT: AL ADL WA IHSAN: MOROCCO'S ISLAMIST
DISSIDENTS
GOING LEGIT?
REF: A. RABAT 462

¶B. 07 RABAT 1838
52
RABAT 00001169 001.2 OF 004
(d).
¶1. (C) Summary: The banned Islamist religio-political

organization Al Adl wal-Ihsan (Adl) (more commonly known as
the Justice and Charity or Justice and Good Works
Organization) may be moving toward political participation,
perhaps as a legal political party. Adl spokesman Fatallah
Arsalane highlighted Adl's political project to PolCouns
December 11. Noting stability is Adl's key goal, he
denounced terrorism and violence, while protesting ongoing
repression. Democratic politics was meaningless, he said,
given the powerlessness of Parliament and royal absolutism,
but he did not challenge the legitimacy of the monarchy.
Arsalane echoed Adl's charismatic Sufi leader Abdelsallam
Yassine's public disavowal last summer of Adl's historic call
for a Caliphate, reinforced by the Sheikh's suspension of
outreach, reported December 15. In their often symbolic
dialogue, the authorities transmitted some positive signals
of their own, while still holding some Adl members in jail.
Were Adl to accept the monarchy and become legal, it could
enhance stability but it could also increase Islamic
influence on Moroccan politics. Arsalane closed by extending
a hand to the new U.S. administration, urging changes in
policies toward the region. End summary.
¶2. (C) Al Adl wal-Ihsan (Adl) spokesman and executive

committee (Majlis al Shura) member Fatallah Arsalane and
Hassab Bennajeh, the director of Adl's public relations
office, met with PolCouns and Casablanca PolOff (notetaker)
at Arsalane's home in Rabat on December 11. Arsalane was
welcoming and spoke openly and at length about Adl's
political aspirations and its difficult relationship with the
GOM.
-------------------------------
Adl: "Stability" and Good Works
-------------------------------
¶3. (C) Arsalane began discussing the organization by
53
stressing, "Our first goal, above all others, is the
stability of Morocco." Both left and right have failed,
leaving only Islam as a model. Within Islam there are
moderates and extremists and, "we have chosen moderation."
He said Adl wanted to work with other groups and political
parties to help pull Morocco out of the political, social and
economic crises it now faces.
¶4. (C) Adl is best known for its grassroots organizational

abilities and for its social welfare programs among the poor
urban Moroccans. Arsalane admitted that Adl's social
programs were a source of its popularity, which was based
more on Adl's message and ideas. The government ban on Adl's
offering these services has only increased Adl's popularity.
(Note: We have heard many of these efforts continue under the
guise of Adl-related independent NGOs. Adl also has focused
on youth; it gained control of the student unions of most
Moroccan universities and the national organization of
students. Its activists on campus continue to harass more
secular students.)
--------------------------------------------- -
Repression and Dialogue: An evolving Approach
--------------------------------------------- -
¶5. (C) Arsalane reported that GOM repression of Adl is

widespread and includes bans on all public activities as well
as all publications. In recent years police have raided
private meetings in homes, but many of activities are
tolerated. His own house was kept under surveillance and he
was confident that his phones were tapped, but was
unconcerned, noting, "We have nothing to hide." (Note: As we
departed, an apparent surveillance team of three made a
choreographed exit of their vehicle, parked just behind our
embassy car, making sure we noticed. End note.)
RABAT 00001169 002.2 OF 004
¶6. (C) Arsalane acknowledged that Adl had over the years
maintained informal communication with the Moroccan regime.
This was only rarely direct, and more often one-way and
54
symbolic. He contended that the "undemocratic regime" was
unwilling to engage in a more open and formal dialogue,
maintained political red lines and imposed conditions on
allowing Adl greater scope for activity. "In Morocco we have
the motto: 'God, Nation, King' but in fact the only thing
that matters here is the King."
¶7. (C) When asked about the historic support of Adl for a
Caliphate or Islamic state, Arsalane said this was not Adl's
position, claiming legitimacy and authority comes from the
people and the Ulema. He thus substantiated the major but
largely unremarked turnaround on this basic question by
Sheikh Yassine during an interview this summer with the
Arabic satellite TV channel Hiwar that opened the door to
Adl's potential acceptance of the monarchy -- albeit not in
its current state.
------------------------------
Condemning the Use of Violence
------------------------------
¶8. (C) Arsalane insisted that Adl was a political

organization, and opposition to violence was a key principle.
Adl also demanded that its members reject violence and
expelled those who did not. He acknowledged that one
participant in a failed bombing of a tour bus in Meknes in
2007 had once been a member, but claimed that the bomber had
been out of Adl for a long time before the incident.
Unprompted, Arsalane raised the detention and subsequent
release, at the end of November, of 11 Moroccan immigrants in
Italy, including members of Adl. Arsalane strongly rejected
that these members were involved in terrorism and charged the
Italian police were well aware of their activities. He
contended that the arrests took place at the instigation of
the Moroccan government, which unable to prove any
wrongdoing, falsely continued to try to paint Adl members as
terrorists. Arsalane contrasted Adl to Salafist groups truly
bent on terrorist violence. "We reject these extremists ...
they are against us and call us 'kufar' (non-believers)." He
insisted that Adl regularly condemned terrorist attacks.
¶9. (C) PolCouns urged that Adl be more vocal in its

condemnation of terrorist attacks, such as the 2007 suicide
55
attacks against the U.S. Consulate General and other sites in
Casablanca, and other terrorist attacks around the world.
Arsalane responded that Adl in fact had denounced the 2003
Casablanca attacks, all terrorist attacks in Morocco and many
elsewhere.
------------------------------------------
Intra-party dialogue on its Political Role
------------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Arsalane noted that there is a constant dialogue

within Adl about the extent to which the movement should
participate in elections or the political process. He
recounted that in 1981 Adl had asked to become a political
party, but the GOM refused. In the lead up to the 2007
parliamentary elections, Adl decided not to participate
because it believed that the Parliament does not have any
real power to effect change. "It does not matter which party
is in power, even the Party of Justice and Development
(PJD)." If the GOM were now to allow Adl to become a
political party, Arsalane averred they would accept.
----------------------
Relations with the PJD
----------------------
¶11. (C) Arsalane characterized Adl's relationship with PJD

as respectful but denied that there is any active political
cooperation except on Arab/international issues, such as
Palestine and Iraq, as in their recent joint demonstrations
in Tangier against a visit by senior Israeli officials.
(Comment: It is unclear just how much the undeclared Adl
RABAT 00001169 003.2 OF 004
boycott of the 2007 parliamentary elections contributed to

the abysmally low turnout. If Adl members had voted for the
PJD, the PJD might have fulfilled the many predictions that
it would emerge as the largest party, and would have been in
a position to form the government. So in the convoluted
logic of Moroccan politics, this boycott served the regime's
purpose. End comment.)
56
----------------------------
Succession of Sheikh Yassine
----------------------------
¶12. (C) We asked about what would happen after the death of
Adl's charismatic leader, "Sheikh" Ahmed Yassine, reportedly
80 and poor health. Arsalane said that Adl has internal
rules governing succession, which would be decided by an
election of its executive committee (Majlis Ash-Shura).
----------------------------------------
A Message to the New American Government
----------------------------------------
¶13. (C) Like virtually all our Moroccan interlocutors,

Arsalane expressed interest in the incoming U.S.
administration and asked that we convey a message to it.
First, he said, the USG should stop supporting dictatorial
regimes in the region and encourage them to be more
democratic. The USG, in his view, has spoken much about
principles of freedom and democracy but has observed them
only when there was no conflict with U.S. regional interests.
Second, he urged that the incoming administration devote its
energy from outset to helping solve the Palestinian issue
which would help solve many of the other problems in the
region. Finally, he noted that prior to 9/11 many in the
Islamic world aspired to visit the United States. Since
then, however, many across the region, particularly moderate
Islamists, are afraid to visit, because they believe that USG
will falsely accuse and imprison them at behest of their
repressive home governments. He also hoped some intervention
could be made on behalf of party members he claimed were
falsely convicted of homicide in Morocco and have gone a long
way towards serving their 20-year sentences.
--------------------------------------
The all-Embracing Makhzen opens a door
--------------------------------------
¶14. (C) For its part, the authorities have responded with
some positive signals to Adl,s overtures. While the
newspaper remains banned, there appears to be less tampering
57
with the well-constructed Adl website (www.aljamaa.net in
French and Arabic). Arrests continue but appear to be
diminishing in both frequency and scope. The prosecution of
Nadia Yassine, the Sheikh,s daughter, for verbal assault on
the monarchy continues to be delayed. (Note: Arsalane
described this as equivalent to judicial supervision.) In
another step, earlier in the week Minister of Endowments and
Islamic Affairs Ahmed Toufiq paid a condolence call on the
family of a recently deceased Adl Board member and close
companion of Yassine, whom Toufiq knew long ago in a common
Sufi brotherhood, a visit that likely required palace assent.
¶15. (U) On December 15, media reported that Sheikh Yassine

decreed that the organization would suspend all public
activity, assemblies, meetings, etc., apparently to avoid any
confrontation with the authorities. (Note: This is in
context of, and may be an attempt to insulate Adl from, a
current GOM crackdown against Islamic extremists.)
-------
Comment
-------
¶16. (C) Arsalane represents an apparently growing tendency

within Adl that is eager to engage more actively in the
political life of the country. In contrast to past
expressions of religio-political identity, he clearly
acknowledged its principally political nature and
RABAT 00001169 004.2 OF 004
aspirations, pointedly making little or no reference to it

being a religious body. It is unclear to what extent Sheikh
Yassine's own epiphany is behind this evolution of the
movement, or whether he is reflecting the wishes of the
politicized next generation, be it Arsalane and his
politicized cohort or the sheikh's daughter Nadia Yassine --
who appear to be rivals. There has been widespread
speculation that after the sheikh's death there will be a
split in the organization. It now seems clear that either
way the politicos will dominate, with the religious element
possibly becoming a parallel organization, as is the case
58
with the PJD and its religious counterpart the Movement for
Unity and Reform (MUR).
¶17. (C) Although Arsalane was adamant that the GOM/Palace

has not engaged in a formal dialogue with Adl, it is clear
that an understanding is developing between them. The GOM
has tolerated the activities of Adl so long as it did not
press the question of the king's legitimacy or take steps to
mobilize its followers against regime. Some analysts believe
that Adl has played a critical role as a release valve for
social and political tensions through a non-violent
organization. Certainly, Adl exploited these frustrations to
swell its ranks. The GOM periodically alleges Adl
involvement in violent or terrorist activities, as it
apparently did in Italy, but has presented no evidence for
this. All indications appear to substantiate Adl's
commitment to avoid violence.
¶18. (C) Adl's potential buy-in to the system could have an

important effect on enhancing stability in Morocco, just at a
time when it is under pressure due to the global economic
downturn. It would also, however, increase Islamic influence
on politics, adding to the leverage of the PJD, but even
together, Islamists would almost certainly remain a minority.
Like most politics here, this potential "conversion" to
legitimacy will remain for some time obscure, and play out
only over time. End comment.
¶19. (C) Note A: The last time mission has had contact with
Arsalane was before 9/11/2001, and the government protested.
We have heard no such protest so far. We have avoided
contact with Nadia Yassine since her indictment, and have
been in touch only at a lower level.
¶20. (SBU) Note B: Al Adl wal-Ihsan has frequently been

translated as the Justice and Charity Organization, with the
familiar acronym JCO. In fact, the organization itself
prefers the translation Justice and Spirituality. While
perhaps the best translation of the Islamic concept of Ihsan
would be "good works," the term encompasses that notion as
well as charity and the performance of spiritual acts.
Following local press usage, we plan to continue to use Adl
(Justice). End Notes.
59
¶21. (U) This cable was drafted by Casablanca PolOff and has
been cleared with the Consulate General.
¶22. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
*****************************************
*****************************************
Riley
60
2009-07-15 2010-12-11 Embassy
09RABAT607 SECRET
10:10 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRB #0607/01 1961038

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151038Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T RABAT 000607
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NESCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019

TAGS: PHUM PGOV PINS KDEM MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO'S MANAGED MAYORAL ELECTIONS
MAY STRENGTHEN
PJD
REF: RABAT 0517

1
.4 (b) and (d).
-------
Summary
-------
¶1. (C) Despite the relative transparency of the recent election of

town (or communal) council members across Morocco on June 12,
the subsequent election by council members of city and communal
council leaders (mayors), may represent a step backward for
Moroccan democracy. The high-stakes indirect balloting for mayors
has traditionally been a forum for vote buying and pressure. This
61
year, not content with its already impressive and fair electoral
performance, the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) of
Fouad Ali El Himma reportedly used extra-political pressure tactics,
including invoking the name of King Mohammed VI, to pressure
other parties into entering pro-PAM mayoral coalitions and
withdrawing from alliances with the Islamist-oriented Party of
Justice and Development (PJD). This resulted was non-PJD led
coalitions in Casablanca, Tangier (PAM-led), and Sale. Most
troubling, the Palace appears to have intervened in several places to
keep the PJD from controlling Morocco's major cities, while allowing
them to run second-tier cites, such as Kenitra and Tetouan. Palace
interference was most blatant in the city of Oujda. There, the
Ministry of Interior-appointed local governor blocked a vote that
would have produced a PJD-led coalition on June 25, allowing the
centrist parties time to pressure coalition allies. National police and
intelligence officials reportedly intimidated PJD coalition supporters
and beat a local PJD leader into a coma. A former Minister, a French
government contact and other sources confirmed Palace complicity
in the pro-PAM/anti-PJD effort. The PAM has sullied its reputation
as a reformist party and bolstered criticism that it is an instrument of
the Palace. The picture as usual is mixed, and palace intervention
appears more anti-PJD than pro-PAM. In Laayoune in the Western
Sahara, the PAM suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Istiqlal's
Ould er Rachid machine. In total, these machinations may further
erode public support for Morocco,s fledgling democratic processes
and increase sympathy for the PJD. End Summary.
---------------------
PAM: The Palace Party
---------------------
¶2. (SBU) For over two weeks, Morocco has witnessed widespread
media coverage of political party irregularities, corruption and
government interference in the recent city leadership election races.
In contrast with the public June 12 elections for communal councils,
which saw Moroccans electing town council members in a relatively
transparent manner (Ref A), the roughly week-long process for
selecting mayors (in large cities) and communal council presidents (in
small cities and rural areas) has been characterized by multiple
reports of irregularities. Because mayors are selected indirectly from
the pool of recently elected communal council members, which come
from a myriad of over 30 political parties (six of which dominate
62
Moroccan politics), the process comes down to intense negotiations
(with various
incentives and disincentives) to establish majority coalitions in each
city. The ranking member of the leading party in these coalitions
typically becomes the mayor or chief executive. See Paragraph 9 for
new mayoral selection results.
¶3. (C) Several days into this negotiation process, leaders of the self-
described Koran-referent PJD began to complain that the PAM had
been using extra normal pressure tactics, i.e., outside of the normal
petty bribery often associated with the process, to enlist other parties
and their members to support PAM-led coalitions and desert PJD-led
coalitions in key cities. D/PolCouns attended a political debate on
June 29 among party leaders at which PJD leader Benkirane roundly
criticized the PAM for using the extra-normal pressure tactic of
invoking King Mohammed VI's name to underscore His Majesty's
alleged preference for other parties to join PAM-led coalitions and to
thwart PJD-led coalitions in cities like Casablanca, Tangier, and
Oujda. Because PAM party founder, Fouad Ali El Himma is widely
known as "a friend of the King" and the PAM's success has largely
hinged on the perception that he "has the monarch,s ear,"
Benkirane's accusations received thunderous applause from the
crowd, even as the local PAM representative deflected the
accusations as "sour grapes."
¶4. XXXXXXXXXXXXX, confirmed Benkirane's accusations. In

addition, XXXXXXXXXXXXX said that the PAM also employed
malicious and untruthful smear campaigns against individual PJD
members, calling some drug dealers, terrorists, and criminals and
getting guidance from the security services. This focused on
Morocco's largest cities, as the PJD did win elsewhere. "If you look
at all of the cities where PJD was permitted to win mayoral slots, e.g.,
Tetouan, Chefchaouen, Kenitra and Larache, they all have several
points in common: they are relatively small, poor, and lacking
central government investment," XXXXXXXXXXXXX.
¶5. (C) A French Embassy source (strictly protect) confided to

D/PolCouns July 9 that his contacts in the Moroccan leadership
report that King Mohammed VI had indeed ordered that the PJD
not be allowed to assume mayoral positions in several Moroccan
cities like Tangier and Oujda. PAM's taking the top job in Tangier
seems particularly suspicious. With the PJD tying the Rally of
National Independents Party (RNI) for the plurality of votes there,
63
the two parties initially formed a coalition with RNI taking the
mayor,s slot in exchange for a PJD taking the Vice mayor,s position.
However, the coalition dissolved just before it was to be finalized with
RNI representatives claiming enigmatically to reporters that "they
came under extraordinary pressure" to withdraw from the coalition,
without further elaboration. This coalition was replaced with a PAM-
led coalition, despite the fact that PAM finished fourth in Tangier.
--------------------------------------------- -------
Oujda Mayor,s Race Marred by Government Intervention
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶6. (C) MOI complicity in supporting PAM, or at least blocking the

PJD from securing the mayor,s position in major Moroccan cities,
however, appeared most blatant in the city of Oujda where PJD won
a plurality of council seats. In the council chambers, MOI officials
prevented a PJD-led coalition with members of the Popular
Movement Party (MP) and other parties on June 25, declaring an
insufficient quorum. In the
ensuing days, 13 local council members allied with the PJD, including
all six communal council members from the MP, reported
harassment from the Renseignements Generaux (RG), i.e., an
internal intelligence branch of the National Police, to withdraw their
support from a PJD-led coalition. On July 27, one of the MP
communal councilors supporting the PJD-led coalition, Fadwa
Manouni, posted on YouTube a scathing commentary on the security
force,s intimidation tactics, which included lengthy questioning by
local police and attempted blackmail by the RG of the 13 communal
council members supporting the PJD-led coalition. MP councilors
said that party chief Mohand Laenser originally approved the
coalition; then only after the PJD mayoralty was blocked, changed
his position. Subsequently, Manouni and the five other MP
communal council members that had continued to support the PJD
were expelled from the MP on July 9. She then reportedly dropped
out of sight. On July 11, Manoumi recanted her YouTube speech in
another web posting, but has not appeared in public.
¶7. (SBU) PJD, MP, and other elected council members protested
the government's intervention on July 3. Police were called in to
break up the protests, according to the press. During an ensuing
melee, PJD leader Noureddine Benbakr, who would have been
Mayor if the PJD-led coalition had been permitted to stand, suffered
a cerebral hemorrhage and fell into a coma as a result of a blow to
64
his head by security personnel. Other elected council members
suffered less serious injuries, were detained, and later released. Later
that day, a PAM-supported Party Istiqlal (PI)-led coalition secured
the mayoral post for the brother of Transport Minister Hejira. PJD
parliamentary leader Mustapha Ramid, who had come to support
local PJD members in Oujda, was blocked from entering the Oujda
municipal center, according to the press reports.
¶8. (C) A Parliamentary staffer and former MP member confirmed

to D/PolCouns on July 13, that the six MP council members in Oujda
had come under "intense pressure" from local security authorities
and PAM members, through threats and intimidation, to withdraw
their support from coalition with the PJD. He said these threats bore
the moniker of the Palace, adding, "they (the MP members) were put
in a terrible position." He also confirmed that he had heard from his
political contacts that the Palace was taking all necessary measures to
prevent the PJD from securing the leadership of any of Morocco,s
major cities. He went on to say that he knew of communal council
members that came under the same combination of pressure tactics
from PAM and government security authorities in the cities of Sale
and even Rabat.
The media reported that a move to select PJD parliamentary leader
Lahcen Daoudi as Mayor of Rabat subsequently collapsed under
rumors of government pressure, but the PJD stayed in the coalition
to support socialist USFP member and former Finance Minister
Oulalalu.
¶9. (U) Mayors and Their Coalitions follow:

City Mayor Party Coalition
---- ----- ----- ---------
Meknes Ahmed Hilal PAM RNI, UC
Marrakesh TBD PAM PI, RNI, MP, UC
Tangier Samir Abdelmoula PAM RNI, MP
Fes Abdelhamid Chabat PI RNI, FFD
Oujda Omar Hejira PI PAM, MP
Laayoune Hamdi Ould er Rachid PI PI majority
Chefchaouen Mohamed Soufiani PJD USFP
Tetouan Mohamed Ida Ammar PJD USFP
Sale Noureddine Lazrak RNI PI, FFD
Agadir Tarik Kabbage USFP PJD, PT
Rabat Fathallah Oualalou USFP PJD, PI, RNI,
and PPS
65
Key:
Constitutional Union UC
Democratic Forces Front FFD
Istiqlal Party PI
Party of Authenticity and Modernity PAM
Party of Justice and Development PJD
Popular Movement Party MP
Progressive Socialist Party PPS
Rally of National Independents RNI
Union of Socialist Forces Party USFP
Workers Party PT
------------------------------------
Normal Irregularities Are Bad Enough
------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Even without the extraordinary events described

above, the process of selecting city leaders has always been
one of the most opaque and corrupt aspects of Morocco's
communal elections process. XXXXXXXXXXXXX, the mayoral
selection process is heavily
influenced through the giving and taking of bribes. She said
that while this election was no exception to the rule,
increased government scrutiny over government-provided
campaign funds had given increased incentive to parties to
recruit wealthy individuals into parties to contribute to
parties' "slush funds." Tronnes pointed to political
"kidnapping," of council members to resort hotels (with their
families) for the duration of the selection negotiations,
rewards the councilors and denies competitors the opportunity
to make counter offers so that, "once a candidate is bought,
they stay bought."
¶11. (C) Former Minister of Human Rights Mohamed Aujjar told

Charge that the GOM,s heavy-handed tactics may have
backfired and increased support for the PJD. The former
Minister also noted that the RNI split with the PAM has
certainly deepened. He felt the only positive development
from this exercise was the possible entry of the MP and the
UC into the Istiqlal-led coalition. Aujjar believed that a
looming cabinet reshuffle will be limited in scope, with the
PAM remaining in opposition but voting with the Government on
most issues.
66
¶12. (U) On July 13 and 14, the Ministry of Interior and the
PAM, respectively,separately refuted any inappropriate and
anti-democratic tactics.
-------
Comment
-------
¶13. (C) As usual in Moroccan politics, this is a mixed bag

with an unclear bottom line that points to both ongoing
evolution and continued monarchical autocracy. Despite the
relative transparency and success of the local communal
elections on June 12 (Ref A), the subsequent elections of
mayors appears to represent at least a partial step backward
for Moroccan democracy. For the PAM, despite having secured
a plurality of council seats nationwide, elected hundreds of
young reformers new to politics, and won leadership of some
major cities, it has tarnished its effort to paint itself as

a standard bearer of democratization. The combination of the
PAM,s extra-normal pressure tactics and its joint efforts
with security officials to block PJD city leadership has
largely confirmed previous criticism that it is an instrument
of the Palace. But it too suffered several setbacks, as in
Western Sahara. While probably still destined for victory in
2012, it will be subject to greater scrutiny.
¶14. (C) PAM success has been blunted a bit by a large number
of legal challenges, at least two of which it has already
lost, including its new star, the young women mayor it had
gotten elected in Marrakesh, who has been ordered to face a
rerun of the election in her district (septel). PAM
officials indicate they will be fighting these challenges in
court and appealing decisions that have gone against them.
¶15. (S) One uncertainty in this is the role of the King. He

was in the north through much of the unfortunate events in
Oujda. Unconfirmed accounts have indicated that it was at
his personal order that the PJD was kept out of the large
cities. One source claimed that the King was pouring a lot
of the government's money into the previously neglected north
and particularly into the Oujda region, on Algeria's border,
67
in order to prepare regional infrastructure for a potential
reopening. The source said the King did not want the PJD to
be able to claim credit for this largesse and the development
it would promote.
¶16. (C) For the PJD, it may have been kept out of running
major cities, both by normal hardball politics and, at least
in Oujda by apparently blatant intervention by security and
domestic intelligence services, denying it the chance
showcase any example of good governance in a high profile
city prior to the 2012 general election. Still, the modern
Islamists of the PJD now run more cites than ever before and
their number of local councilors remains 50 percent above
what it scored last time around. In sum, this is enough of a
blow to frustrate them, but probably not enough to drive them
from the game. The outcome may well erode further public
support for Morocco's democratic processes and future voter
participation. However, while the political season of
cascading regional and upper house elections will continue
run until October, and the legal fights will continue, on the
local level, the public will turn to see how the new mayors
and councils govern. End Comment.
*****************************************
*****************************************
Jackson
68
2009-04- 2010-12-10 Embassy
06 16:04 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO0775
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0289/01 0961646
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061646Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2029

TAGS: PREL PINR SCUL KISL IR SA EG MO
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: XXXXXXXXXXXX LINKS
MOROCCAN
BREAK WITH IRAN TO SAUDI ARABIA
REF: A. RABAT 0196

¶B. RABAT 0205
¶C. RABAT 0230
¶D. CASABLANCA 47
¶E. RABAT 0247
¶F. KARP/DESK EMAIL 30 MAR 2009
Classified By: PolCouns Craig Karp for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Morocco broke diplomatic relations with

Iran and began a campaign against its domestic Shi'a minority
at Saudi Arabian instigation, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX.
According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Tehran had been using Morocco
69
and its Embassy in Rabat for activities in Mali and Senegal.
Domestically, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized that the anti-Shi'a
campaign was aimed at neutralizing possible challenges to
monarchist parties by Islamic groups in upcoming municipal
elections. In addition, King Mohammed VI was seeking to reassert
his position as a religious leader. End Summary.
¶2. (S/NF) Morocco broke relations with Iran and began a

campaign against its domestic Shi'a minority at Saudi Arabian
instigation, XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff on March 30.
XXXXXXXXXXXX was aware his comments would be reported.
XXXXXXXXXXXX said there was almost daily contact between
Mohammed VI's palace and Riyadh in the run up to the surprise
March 6 severing of Moroccan relations with Iran (Ref A-D); and the
intense consultations have continued (Note: He did not provide a
source or basis for this comment other than to say "our information
shows."
End Note.). XXXXXXXXXXXX believes that Saudi Arabia has
enlisted King Mohammed VI personally (and not the Government
of Morocco, which was as surprised as the rest of the world
at the rupture, XXXXXXXXXXXX noted) in its geopolitical strategy
to counter Iranian influence. In return for active Moroccan
support, Saudi Arabia will ensure a continued flow of
subsidized oil to Morocco, and may plug holes in Morocco's
foreign direct investment balance sheet resulting from recent
Gulf withdrawals from major projects as a result of the
global financial crisis.
¶3. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX said goading Iran, a country

with which it had limited economic interests, and demonizing the
Shi'a, a powerless minority group, was a small price for Morocco to
pay for a strategy that could have major payoffs. He added
that the King was "killing several birds with one stone" with
his actions, and was also seeking to reassert his position as
Commander of the Faithful (Note: Supreme religious leader for
the Moroccan Malachite branch of Sunni Islam. End Note.).
¶4. (S/NF) According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, Iran has sought

to increase the influence of Shi'ism in West Africa, where Tehran had
been using Morocco (which is a regional air hub) and its
Embassy in Rabat as a jumping off point for activities in
Mali and Senegal. A former Iranian ambassador was also
apparently travelling to Tangier, Tetouan and other cities in
70
Morocco to lecture and identify promising young religious
students from the Shi'a community for familiarization visits
to, and further training in, Iran.
¶5. (S/NF) Mohammed VI apparently saw this as a personal

affront to him and a direct challenge to his religious and
economic authority. (Note: Contributions from the wealthy
Tijani sect in Senegal and Mali augment Palace coffers. Many
Muslims in West Africa look to the Moroccan Monarch as their
religious leader. End Note). Although XXXXXXXXXXXX did
not provide any basis for the supposition, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said XXXXXXXXXXXX believed that Mohammed VI had
probably been planning his move for at least
a year. XXXXXXXXXXXX also speculated that the Palace was also
worried about the prospect of Moroccan foreign fighters
returning from Iraq, possibly having been recruited and
trained by Iran, and slipping into Iranian networks in
Morocco.
¶6. (S/NF) Domestically, XXXXXXXXXXXX emphasized that the

anti-Shi'a campaign was also directed at dissident Islamic
group Adl Wa Ihsane (The Justice and Good Works Organization)
which has recently signaled its desire to become a legitimate
political party. The group, which has at times called for
the abolishment of the monarchy and the establishment of an
Islamic republic, is believed to have wide popularity among
poor and middle class populations unhappy with the political
system, which they view as corrupt. XXXXXXXXXXXX said
that the Palace is trying to be "more conservative than the
fundamentalists" in a bid to neutralize their drawing power.
¶7. (S/NF) On the Doha conference (Ref E and F),

XXXXXXXXXXXX said
RABAT 00000289 002 OF 002
the King's dithering about whether he would or would not

attend was a sign of the difficult balancing act he was
attempting to carry off by keeping Saudi Arabia happy, while
not alienating Qatar. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that by sending his
brother Moulay Rachid to the summit, despite his own last
minute withdrawal, Mohammed VI showed respect to the Qataris
71
while not enthusiastically endorsing their leadership bid.
Had he sent someone of lower stature, such as the Prime
Minister, it might have been read as a snub, XXXXXXXXXXXX
explained. (Comment: We agree.)
¶8. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX
*****************************************
*****************************************
Jackson
72
2009-12- 2010-12-09 Embassy
17 18:06 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO9482
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0988/01 3511840
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 171840Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0009
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0589
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0450
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0077
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0097
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0194
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1293
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0129
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL PRIORITY 0101
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0055
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY 0034
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME PRIORITY 0562
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY 0568
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1177
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPT FOR AF, AF/W, NEA/MAG, AND INR/AA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019

TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL XA MO
SUBJECT: GUINEA: UPDATE ON DADIS CAMARA'S HEALTH
REF: A. STATE 127514

¶B. OUAGADOUGOU 1158
73
RABAT 00000988 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM ROBERT P. JACKSON FOR REASONS 1.4(B)

AND (D).
¶1. (S) Summary: In separate meetings on December 16 with

the Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri and
XXXXXXXXXXXX
the Mission learned that the health of wounded Guinean junta
leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara has improved and that his
release from the hospital may be imminent. Fassi Fihri told the
Ambassador that the GOM would keep Dadis Camara in Morocco
until the end of the month, while XXXXXXXXXXXX outlined some
of the reasons Dadis should not resume a role in Guinean politics.
Both described ethnic politics in Guinea and the need for free and
fair elections. Fassi Fihri noted as well that elections would not solve
the problems
because the army is so factionalized and ethnic conflict in
Guinean society is so prevalent. End Summary.
¶2. (S) In a December 16 meeting with the Ambassador,

Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri related that he had
visited Dadis Camara on Wednesday, December 9, and that he
had been conscious but not coherent. Dadis arrived in a
coma, and doctors removed bullet fragments from his skull.
He continued to recover, according to Fassi Fihri, and was
now able to speak. He has reportedly asked the GOM to help
him tape a five-minute television appearance for Guinean
television. Fassi Fihri stated that Dadis's admission to
Morocco was a humanitarian gesture and that the GOM would
keep him in Morocco until the end of December. The Minister
noted as well that Libya would be willing to accept Dadis
Camara.
¶3. (S) Fassi Fihri also said that the Guinean Defense
Minister, General Sekouba Konate, had told the GOM that he
wished to visit Morocco to meet with Dadis, presumably to
evaluate his ability to govern. The GOM was likely to honor
Konate's request but only after the December 18 release of
the report on the September massacre. However, Fassi Fihri
also expressed pessimism about a Konate-led government,
calling the Konate a drunkard.
74
¶4. (S/NF) Also on December 16, XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff
that Moroccan doctors are expected imminently to release Dadis
Camara from the hospital, but that there could be long-term health
consequences from the failed December 3 shooting.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
reported that Moroccan officials have not allowed him, Guinean
dignitaries, or the Guinean Ambassador to visit Dadis Camara, but
that he received regular medical updates from an unnamed
Moroccan source who was providing care for the junta leader at the
Mohammed V Military Hospital in Rabat. XXXXXXXXXXXX
said Dadis was alert but was not expected to return fully to his
previous state of health.
¶5. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX described the "ethnicization" of

Guinea and the risk of conflict and violence like in Rwanda. He
stated that Dadis Camara has recruited mercenaries from South
Africa and Israel and assembled them, along with some of his own
men, in Forecariah, in the ethnically Sussu region in the west of the
country, while Dadis was from the Forest region to the east. His
militia numbered 2,000-3,000 and wss armed with weapons from
Ukraine. The risk of conflict and destabilization threatened the
entire region, he said.
¶6. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX handed a handwritten document of

unknown origin to PolOff describing Dadis as a philandering,
mentally unstable, heavy drinker and drug abuser given to
delusions. The document also outlined a plan for the future of
Guinea, proposing that Guinean Minister of National Defense
Sekouba Konate lead a ten-member civilian/military committee to
restore order in the country, after which trade
RABAT 00000988 002.2 OF 002
unionist Dr. Ibrahima Fofana would serve as transitional

president for six months until presidential elections were
held.
¶7. (S/NF) Comment: Fassi Fihri,s discussion of Guinea

contrasted sharply with his much more emotional, less
objective discussion of Western Sahara. In any case, with
Dadis Camara evidently recovering and the GOM agreeing to
75
keep him in Morocco only until the end of December, the
situation in Guinea could become more complicated unless the
international community can persuade Konate and the Economic
Community of West African States to act quickly. End comment.
*****************************************
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KAPLAN
76
2009-12- 2010-12- Embassy
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O 281805Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0011
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 5209
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0452
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 1175
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0053
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA/MAG, AND INR/AA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2019

TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL PINR GV MO
77
SUBJECT: GUINEA UPDATE: DADIS CAMARA TO LEAVE
MOROCCO?
REF: RABAT 0988
RABAT 00001009 001.2 OF 002

1
.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S) Summary: Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chief

of Staff and Director General of Multilateral Relations
Nasser Bourita told the Charge on December 28 that the health
of wounded Guinean junta leader Captain Moussa Dadis Camara
has improved and that he has sought to leave Morocco.
Bourita reiterated that Dadis Camara arrived without prior
consultation with the GOM, but he was allowed into Morocco
for treatment of his wounds. Charge noted that Guinea seems
to have become calmer in Camara's absence and stressed that
it would be helpful if he were to remain out of the country.
Bourita stated that the GOM shared U.S. concerns about the
stability of Guinea and the region and wished to help find a
solution, but he added that there are no grounds upon which
to keep Camara any longer. He urged the U.S. and France to
avoid making any public request that Morocco keep Dadis
Camara. End Summary.
¶2. (S/NF) In a meeting on December 28, Moroccan MFA Chief of

Staff Nasser Bourita told Charge and A/PolCouns that Dadis
Camara had wanted to leave Morocco last week but that the GOM
decided to keep him here until the end of the month for
continuing medical treatment. He added that Guinean Minister
of National Defense Sekouba Konate is due to arrive about
20:30 GMT on December 28 to visit Dadis, who is still the
leader of Guinea. Bourita suggested that Konate was not
preparing to take over that role. Konate has wanted to see
Dadis for some time, presumably to make his own assessment of
Dadis, health. XXXXXXXXXXXX corroborates that a plane
carrying Konate has left Conakry.
¶3. (C) In explaining the GOM's desire to help find a
78
peaceful solution to the problems in Guinea, Bourita said
Morocco's relations with Guinea and other countries must be
taken into consideration. It is not for Morocco, he said, to
turn Dadis Camara over to the ICC. He added that were a
Security Council resolution forthcoming, it would put the GOM
in a difficult position but would, of course, be binding.
Bourita asked rhetorically whether "out of Guinea" meant "in
Morocco" or that Morocco should help find a third-country
location for Dadis Camara. Bourita stressed that the U.S.
and France should avoid any public request for Morocco to
keep Dadis. Bourita further urged that the U.S. and France
should maintain contact with Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi
Fihri while the Minister is in Tripoli, Libya, for the Arab
Maghreb Union Ministerial, December 28 to 30.
¶4. (C) Echoing comments made to A/PolCouns several weeks ago

by the MFA Director of African Affairs, Bourita went on to
say that it would be better to find a way to deal with Dadis
Camara in Guinea. He noted that Dadis still enjoyed
considerable support in the country and stressed the need to
keep Dadis calm and confident about his future. To do
otherwise, he said, risked more violence and more bloodshed.
¶5. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX declared that Dadis' return to

Guinea would lead to significant problems. He said he learned from
doctors attending to Dadis that he was doing quite well, and he
confirmed that Konate was on his way to Rabat to meet with the
junta leader and perhaps return with him to Guinea.
XXXXXXXXXXXX said he had contacted General Mamadouba
Toto Camara in Conakry and was told Dadis' imminent return to
Guinea "was a lie."
RABAT 00001009 002.2 OF 002
¶6. (C) Comment: While we understand both from Bourita and

from French Ambassador Joubert that French President Sarkozy
planned to discuss Guinea with King Mohammed VI during their
&family dinner8 on December 27, there do not appear to have
been any breakthroughs.
¶7. (S/NF) We believe Bourita is sincere in expressing the
79
GOM's desire to help Guinea. However, with no legal or
medical basis to keep Dadis here and without any country
other than Libya prepared to accept him on a legal or medical
basis, Bourita's suggestion that Dadis be dealt with in
Guinea may be the only viable option. End Comment.
*****************************************
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JACKSON
80
2009-12- 2010-12- Embassy
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O 311455Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, NEA/MAG, AND INR/AA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2020

SUBJECT: GUINEA LATEST: DADIS AND BEYOND?
REF: A. RABAT 1009
81
¶B. RABAT 0988
RABAT 00001018 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs on

December 30 that despite Dadis Camara's apparent desire to
depart Morocco (Ref A), he is in no condition to travel and
will not be able to resume control of the country. Minister
of National Defense Sekouba Konate and an assistant, Mr. Bah,
along with Minister of Communications Idrissa Cherif have
been in Rabat to visit Dadis, but Konate planned to return to
Guinea by December 31, possibly to present to the Guinean
people a case for his assumption of power in place of Dadis.
The next ten days would be telling and potentially chaotic
for the country, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX, but with the
assistance of the international community, Konate should be
able to control the army and avert violence that could have
regional implications. End Summary.
¶2. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs on December

30 that Dadis Camara was in no condition to travel and would
not be able to control Guinea again. XXXXXXXXXXXX said
that Dadis Camara still had a bullet in his head, suffered from
impaired
vision and speech, and was not fully aware of his
surroundings. XXXXXXXXXXXX admitted that he had not
seen Dadis; according to him only Konate and Bah were allowed
into his room. Regarding earlier news reports that Dadis was
preparing to speak to the Guinean people, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said that if Dadis could speak to the media, he certainly would
have by now. Evidently Dadis also suffered from heart
problems unrelated to the gunshot wounds.
¶3. (S/NF) Konate evidently was not in the best of health,

either, and sought medical consultation while here in Rabat.
Reportedly a heavy drinker, Konate suffered from liver
problems consistent with his intake of large amounts of
alcohol. On December 30, senior Moroccan military officials
separately questioned Konate's fitness to lead, calling him
weak.
82
¶4. (S/NF) For XXXXXXXXXXXX, Konate's travel to Rabat
allowed him to return to Guinea and report on the basis of his first-
hand knowledge that Dadis was unable to continue in his role as
leader of Guinea, paving the way for Konate to assume power for a
transitional period. Were Konate to attempt to take control without
having undertaken the trip to Rabat to see Dadis, he would have
been perceived as a traitor to Dadis and have no legitimacy before
the Guinean people and army. Konate would then have Cherif and
Claude Pivi, another CNDD leader, arrested, XXXXXXXXXXXX
said.
¶5. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX went on to say that Cherif

was behind demonstrations being planned for Conakry,
while Pivi, who was from the same ethnic group as Dadis,
might organize supporters on an ethnic basis and incite
clashes with other groups. Given that ethnic and national
boundaries are not coterminous, this could affect neighboring
countries and plunge the entire region into chaos (Ref B),
asserted XXXXXXXXXXXX. With the help of the United States
and European countries, Konate would be able to take power
and control the army, which lacked discipline and had too many
crooks and militias, but XXXXXXXXXXXX did not specify what
sort of
assistance from the international community would be
necessary.
¶6. (S/NF) Comment: XXXXXXXXXXXX urged intervention, both

to
keep Dadis out of Guinea and to support an effort by Konate
to take power in the country, in order to forestall
devastating ethnic violence. His argument that Dadis would
RABAT 00001018 002.2 OF 002
have made a public statement by now if he could have is

compelling, while his comment that Konate would have other
CNDD leaders arrested suggests that the fate of Guinea does
not depend on Dadis alone. Dadis has amassed militias and
enjoys some popular support (Ref B), and for XXXXXXXXXXXX
his return would undoubtedly lead to violence and unrest.
His continued absence, however, might not preclude it.
83
End Comment.
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KAPLAN
84
Reference
ID
2010-01-04 2010-12-09 Embassy
16:04 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO0327
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0005/01 0041658
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041658Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0015
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR S/CT, PM, AF/W AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2030

TAGS: MARR PTER MOPS PREL SNAR GV MO
SUBJECT: GEN. WARD SIGNS CISMOA; DISCUSSES AQIM,
ACSA,
GUINEA, NARCOTICS AND FUTURE COOPERATION
REF: STATE 130969 (NOTAL)
RABAT 00000005 001.2 OF 003
¶1. (S) Summary: General Ward of Africa Command visited

Rabat on December 30 to sign the Communications
Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement
85
(CISMOA) and continued military cooperation. During meetings
with Inspector General Bennani and other Moroccan general
officers, General Ward and the Ambassador requested
overflight clearance for the P-3 (Reftel); asked for an
assessment of the threat posed by AQIM; urged Morocco to keep
Guinean junta leader Dadis Camara in Morocco a long time; and
said he looked forward to returning to sign the ACSA.
General Bennani and his senior staff reacted positively to
the overflight request and said they would examine it in more
detail. They thought Guinean Defense Minister Konate was
weak, and, unlike other senior Moroccan officials, they
downplayed the importance of narcotics transiting Morocco.
End Summary.
¶2. (C/NF) Commander, U.S. Africa Command, General William E.

Ward visited Rabat on December 30, 2009 to meet with
Inspector General of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (CHOD)
General de Corps d,Armee Abdelaziz Bennani for the purpose
of signing the Communications Interoperability and Security
Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) between the U.S. and
Moroccan militaries. Accompanied by Africa Command Foreign
Policy Advisor Dr. Raymond Brown, General Ward and his party
met with the Ambassador and other members of the country
team. General Ward reinforced the strong relationship
between the U.S. and Moroccan militaries and predicted the
agreement would lead to continued and expanded cooperation
between the two nations in the future.
--------------------------------------------- ---
Communications Interoperability and Security MOA
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶3. (SBU) General Ward expressed satisfaction with his visit

to Morocco, following recent visits to Algeria, Libya and
Mali and serving to show equality in dealing with the
militaries of a region that does not tend toward regional
cooperation. He further expressed admiration and
satisfaction with the mission,s work supporting U.S. Africa
Command,s goals and objectives, particularly in the areas of
security cooperation, international development and economic
stimulation. He again explained the purpose of his command
as orchestrating security activity on the continent in
support of national policy and objectives, and declared his
86
support for all other agencies, work in Africa.
¶4. (C/NF) At the signing ceremony, General Bennani warmly

welcomed General Ward,s visit both professionally and
personally, expressing his esteem for the vision and progress
with U.S. Africa Command. He emphasized that King Mohammed
VI had designated him to sign the CISMOA on behalf of
Morocco, with the understanding that the agreement was
integral to the full utilization of the F-16 by the Moroccan
Royal Air Force, but also with a vision to future cooperation
for integration of technologies and weapons systems for the
navy and army. He further reiterated previous statements
that the King wished the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces to be on
par with American forces in order to permit full integration
and interoperability should the commanders-in-chief of both
countries decide to employ their forces in a coalition or
combined operation.
¶5. (C/NF) General Ward returned the warm greetings and

stated that the agreement was both a symbol of the relationship
between the two countries and signal of their commitment to mutual
security. He affirmed that the agreement would have broad
application across the entirety of the Moroccan military, and would
open doors to future technologies and cooperation not yet envisioned
in mutually beneficial ways to guarantee stability and peace.
¶6. (C/NF) General Ward explained that teams would visit

Morocco in January and February to discuss implementation of
the CISMOA and implementation meetings would take place three
times per year thereafter. General Ward said that he looked
forward to returning to Morocco to sign the Acquisition and
Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) as soon as it has received
the necessary clearances from the Department of Defense, and
RABAT 00000005 002.2 OF 003
General Bennani responded that he looked forward to General

Ward,s next visit and to his participation in the next
signing ceremony.
----
AQIM
----
87
¶7. (S) Turning to regional issues, General Ward asked
General Bennani how he saw the regional threat from Al
Qu,aida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
narcotics traffickers. Bennani responded that narcotics were
not making their way into Morocco. However, AQIM posed a
serious threat to countries like Mauritania and Mali that
could not counter the terrorists. General Bennani explained
that he was intimately familiar with Mauritania,s geography
and topography and that the country was not capable of
controlling its territory. Brigadier General Abdellah
Hamdoun, the Director of Military Intelligence, offered that
Mali lacked the means to counter AQIM. General Ward then
briefed General Bennani, Air Force Commander Major General
Ahmed Boutaleb and other general officers on the U.S. plan to
gather intelligence about AQIM in Mali and Mauritania and
requested overflight clearance for a U.S. EP-3 aircraft.
General Bennani responded positively, saying it was important
to box in AQIM. General Boutaleb added that the Air Force
and the General Staff would study the overflight request and
respond quickly.
------
Guinea
------
¶8. (S) General Ward next noted that Morocco was hosting some
important guests. General Bennani asked if he was referring
to President Sarkozy or former President Chirac. General
Ward replied he was referring to Guinean junta leader Dadis
Camara and Guinean Minister of National Defense Sekouba
Konate, asking about their conditions. Surprisingly, Bennani
had no information about either and did not even know that
General Konate was in Morocco )- although he had attended
the Moroccan military academy and had strong ties to Moroccan
leaders. General Ward strongly urged that Morocco keep Dadis
Camara as long as possible. General Bennani noted that
Camara was in Morocco on humanitarian terms, and responded
only that many African leaders come to the Mohammed V
Military Hospital in Rabat for free medical care. General
Hamdoun suggested that Konate was weak and might not be fit
to serve as head of state for an extended period.
-------
88
Comment
-------
¶9. (C) General Bennani, who can be very prickly, appeared

upbeat throughout the ceremony and related discussions. The
CISMOA brings a level of U.S. scrutiny and procedure to the
control and dissemination of the cryptographic and keying
material associated with U.S. weapons systems that can appear
intrusive to a sovereign nation. However, the General seemed
thoughtful as he digested the discussion of the upcoming
implementation and programmatic activities that would take
place in the coming months and years. He and the rest of the
senior military leadership seemed totally uninformed about
patients at the military hospital. Moreover, General
Bennani,s comments about narcotics transiting Morocco were
at odds with comments from key civilian leaders who express
significant concern about this matter.
¶10. (C) In sum, General Ward,s visit accomplished the

necessary act of signing the document integral to full and
timely implementation of the F-16 program in Morocco, and
reinforced the already strong relationship between the U.S.
and Moroccan militaries. The upcoming year will see a full
slate of security cooperation activities between the two
militaries, building to the delivery of the first F-16 in
July 2011. End Comment.
¶11. (U) General Ward has cleared this message.
RABAT 00000005 003.2 OF 003
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KAPLAN
89
Reference
ID
2010-01-08 2010-12-09 Embassy
10RABAT8 SECRET
11:11 21:09 Rabat
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081117Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 0657
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, NEA/MAG AND INR/AA

KINSHASA PLS PASS BRAZZAVILLE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020

90
SUBJECT: GUINEA: THE WAY FORWARD
REF: A. 09 RABAT 1018

¶B. 09 RABAT 1009
RABAT 00000008 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Ambassador Samuel L. Kaplan for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).
¶1. (S) Summary: Following a series of discussions in Rabat

on January 5, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs Johnnie Carson signaled explicit USG support to
Guinean Defense Minister Sekouba Konate in his bid to lead
the country's transition to civilian rule. A/S Carson, along
with French Presidential Advisor for African Affairs Andre
Parant and Moroccan Foreign Minster Taieb Fassi Fihri, signed
a declaration indicating their commitment to the transition
process based on the plan proposed by ECOWAS facilitator
Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso. Under the
declaration, wounded junta leader Captain Moussa Dadis
Camara, who remains hospitalized in Rabat, would be
prohibited from returning to Conakry as the signatories
pursue his resettlement to a third country. Konate departed
Rabat after meeting with A/S Carson and was expected to make
a public pronouncement in the near future in Guinea
announcing his intention to lead the transition to civilian
rule (Ref A).
¶2. (S) On January 7, King Mohammed VI called Gabonese

President Ali Bongo to request that Gabon host Dadis Camara;
according to the Moroccan MFA, Bongo declined. French
Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner planned to ask Congolese
President Denis Sassou-Nguesso if the Republic of the Congo
would host Dadis, and the GOM requested that we reinforce
that message. Finally, the GOM indicated that it would be
willing to participate in an international contact group
meeting on Guinea in Addis Ababa on January 26 and would
mobilize Arab support -- if an organization other than the
African Union (AU) convened the meeting. End Summary.
-----------------------
91
Moroccans Set the Stage
-----------------------
¶3. (C) Prior to meeting with Konate, A/S Carson met on

January 5 with Moroccan Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri and
Moroccan Director General for Studies and Documentation
(external intelligence service chief) Mohamed Yassine
Mansouri, the de facto national security advisor. Also in
attendance were Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director
General for Multilateral Affairs and Chief of Staff
Ambassador Nasser Bourita, Ambassador, DCM, and D/PolCouns.
French Presidential Advisor for African Affairs Andre Parant
had met with the Moroccans and with Konate on January 4, and
A/S Carson subsequently briefed French Ambassador Bruno
Joubert.
¶4. (S) Emphasizing Morocco,s goal of finding a way to

stabilize the situation in Conakry, Fassi Fihri reported that
in the past few days Konate had asserted his readiness to
begin the political transition in Guinea. Konate had told
the Moroccans that he would not name a Prime Minister but
would ask Guinean civil society, including the political
parties and the labor unions, to identify a leader until
elections could be held. Fassi Fihri added that Konate
recognized the inseparability of military and political
affairs and the need to disarm the militias and restructure
Guinean armed forces. Konate needed, however, the commitment
of support from Washington, Paris, and Rabat, evidenced by
signature of the declaration, to move forward, Fassi Fihri
said.
¶5. (S) Fassi Fihri went on to explain that Konate saw the
restructuring of the military as a three-to-five year process
RABAT 00000008 002.2 OF 004
before the country could claim to have a professional army.

Konate wished that violence and bloodshed such as seen in
Guinea and elsewhere on the continent would "never happen
again," and he recognized the need for those responsible,
from Dadis to the lowest ranking accomplice, to be brought to
justice either through Guinean courts or, if not credible, through an
international tribunal, Fassi Fihri reported. As for the document
92
expressing French, U.S. and Moroccan support for Konate, French
Presidential Advisor for African Affairs Andre Parant had already
signed it. Fassi Fihri said Konate would "keep it in his pocket" but
needed the written assurance of support.
-------------
The U.S. Role
-------------
¶6. (S) A/S Carson and the Ambassador expressed appreciation

for the GOM's leadership on the issue and in the region,
noting the urgent need to set Guinea on the path to stability
and civilian rule. While recognizing the importance of
military restructuring, A/S Carson stressed the need to
address Guinea's economic situation as well by working to
develop a strategy for the country's economic revitalization.
Specifically, A/S Carson suggested that the United States
could seek the establishment of an international contact
group that would encourage economic assistance to Guinea,
engaging the World Bank and the IMF as well. He noted too
that U.S. Africa Command could visit Guinea to assess the
security sector and make recommendations on security sector
reform.
------------
Enter Konate
------------
¶7. (S) After more than one hour, Guinean Minister of

National Defense Sekouba Konate, who had been waiting nearby,
joined the meeting. A/S Carson thanked him for sharing
concerns about the future of Guinea and applauded his efforts
to resolve the situation in the country. He stated that
Guinea is at a crossroads and that Konate's leadership was of
crucial importance and could help ensure the country moved
along the road to stability and progress. A/S Carson
stressed that it was important for the transition to begin
and to lead in the shortest possible time to new elections,
adding that it was similarly important that Dadis not return
and participate in elections. Likewise, it would be
beneficial for Konate to facilitate the presence in Guinea of
a small ECOWAS monitoring group consisting of 30 to 40
diplomats and unarmed military personnel, which would lend
93
credibility to the transition process. A/S Carson noted
there was much international goodwill toward Guinea, and if
the country chose the path toward stability, economic
development, and civilian government, there would be help
along the way.
¶8. (S) Konate expressed his appreciation for A/S Carson's

message and repeated the importance of having the signed
document verifying support for his efforts. He repeatedly
expressed concern for his own security and for the security
of his country, but stated his readiness to return to Conakry
and put the Ouagadougou Accords in place. It was important
to begin, he said, adding that the violent events of
September 28 could be repeated if efforts were not made to
prevent violence. Konate stated explicitly that he would
engage the Forces Vives and others in support of the
transition and that he would not be a candidate in any future
elections.
RABAT 00000008 003.2 OF 004
¶9. (S) Konate also stated that he supported a civilian

government of national unity and suggested that opposition
leader Jean Marie Dore serve as Prime Minister until
elections were held but asserted in this regard that he would
accept the decision of the opposition. Konate said the
military would agree to his role in leading the transition,
and he agreed it would be important to show that the army was
not engaged in politics. Claude Pivi (Dadis's half-brother)
and others closely affiliated with Dadis Camara and the junta
would similarly be excluded from participating in the
transition. Pivi was involved in the September 28 massacre,
Konate said, and should go to court (Ref A).
--------------
Whither Dadis?
--------------
¶10. (S) Carson did not meet with Dadis Camara, but discussed
his health with the Moroccans outside of Konate,s presence.
Fassi Fihri told A/S Carson that he has visited Dadis four
94
times since he was allowed into the country for medical care
(Ref B). According to the FM, Dadis has regained "80
percent" of his faculties, but has difficulty putting more
than five words together without 30-second pauses before the
next phrase or sentence. Fassi Fihri,s conversations with
Dadis had focused mainly on health issues, the FM said, with
Fassi Fihri urging him to fully recover before thinking about
politics and his future. Dadis has, however, expressed the
desire to leave, Fassi Fihri said, and has begun to wonder
why he has not been discharged from the hospital.
¶11. (S) Fassi Fihri and Mansouri suggested that once Konate
made his public pronouncement, Dadis would know he was
finished politically and it would be difficult for him to
return to Guinea. Concerted engagement by Konate with
political forces inside Guinea, and by the U.S. and France
with external forces such as ECOWAS and President Blaise
Compaore, to enlist support for Konate and his leadership
though a transitional period and their positive reaction to a
pronouncement would convince Dadis to go to a third country,
Fassi Fihri said. Konate was explicit that Dadis not be
allowed to return to Guinea and participate in the transition.
¶12. (S) A/S Carson outlined U.S. efforts to identify a

country to house Dadis Camara for the long term, noting that
Gabon, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Libya have been considered.
Fassi Fihri suggested that The Gambia or the Republic of the
Congo (Brazzaville) might be other options.
--------------
The Road Ahead
--------------
¶13. (S) After A/S Carson relayed to ECOWAS facilitator

Blaise Compaore the contents of the meetings, Compaore
expressed his gratitude for the efforts and noted that this
could help break the impasse in Guinea. However, he noted
that Pivi seemed to be running the show in Guinea and asked
rhetorically if Konate would be able to bring the factions
together or whether a Konate pronouncement would bring
greater instability. The real issue for Compaore was whether
Konate would be able to command the support of the military.
Konate's stated intention was to move the country along the
95
path to economic progress and civilian rule. Konate departed
Rabat for Conakry on January 5.
¶14. (S) On January 7, King Mohammed VI called Gabonese

President Ali Bongo to request that Gabon host Dadis Camara;
according to Bourita, Bongo declined. French Foreign
Minister Bernard Kouchner planned to ask Congolese President
RABAT 00000008 004.2 OF 004
Denis Sassou-Nguesso if the Republic of the Congo would host

Dadis, and the GOM requested that we reinforce that message.
Bourita told DCM that Morocco it would be willing to
participate in an international contact group meeting on
Guinea in Addis Ababa on January 26 and would mobilize Arab
support -- if an organization other than the African Union
(AU) convened the meeting. Having the AU convene is
unacceptable to Morocco because Morocco is not a member.
-------
Comment
-------
¶15. (C) Ambassador Carson,s trip was very productive and

clearly led to forward movement. Konate, who spoke very
softly, repeated several times that he was concerned about
his personal security. For its part, the GOM is anxious to
1) get Dadis Camara out of Morocco and 2) continue to support
the transition and reconstruction processes in Guinea. End
Comment.
¶16. (U) A/S Carson cleared paragraphs 1 and 3 through 13.
¶17. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered.
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Reference
ID
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07:07 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO8688
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DE RUEHRB #0022/01 0150743
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150743Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0022
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY 0599
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0005
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0107
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0204
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 1295
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0143
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0111
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 0065
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0524
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0005
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0661
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0574
RUEHPA/AMEMBASSY PRAIA 0011
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0727
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0463
RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2020

TAGS: PREL PINS GV MO UV
97
SUBJECT: WHY DID MOROCCO SEND DADIS CAMARA TO
BURKINA FASO?
RABAT 00000022 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Following the Secretary,s conversation with

Minister of Foreign Affairs Taieb Fassi Fihri, the Embassy
was surprised to learn January 12 of the Government of
Morocco,s (GOM,s) abrupt decision to discharge Guinean
junta leader Dadis Camara from the Mohammed V Military
Hospital in Rabat and send him by medical plane to
Ouagadougou. A January 11 telephone conversation between
King Mohammed VI and Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore,
Security Council consideration of the report on the September
28 massacre in Conakry, and pressure from Dadis, supporters
to repatriate him appear to have motivated the GOM,s action.
Believing that President Campaore may have torpedoed French,
Moroccan and U.S. efforts to find an African country that
would accept Dadis for resettlement, King Mohammed VI
intended to place responsibility for continued mediation of
the Guinea conflict squarely in Campaore,s court. The GOM
supported U.S. requests to keep Dadis Camara from using
contracted civilian air arranged by his supporters for return
to Conakry, and transported him via Moroccan &medical8
airlift to Burkina Faso without telling him that he would not
be returning to Conakry. Finally, the GOM pledged continued
support for U.S. and French requests to establish a new
residence for Dadis Camara to keep him out of Guinea and for
Guinea,s transition. End Summary.
¶2. (C) Embassy Rabat learned the afternoon of January 12

that the GOM intended to facilitate the departure of Dadis
Camara for Burkina Faso by the end of the day. According to
Ambassador Nasser Bourita, Chief of Staff of the Moroccan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Dadis Camara was
aware of events in Guinea, had been well enough to travel for
at least three weeks, and his return had been formally
requested by the Guinean Ministry of Foreign Affairs through
the Moroccan Ambassador to Guinea. Bourita stated that King
Mohammed VI, who reportedly spoke with Burkina Faso President
98
Blaise Compaore on January 11, wanted Compaore to assume
responsibility as mediator of the Guinean conflict vice
remaining angry that he had not been party to the Rabat
Declaration of January 5. It was the king,s further desire
that Dadis Camara not be in Morocco when the UN Security
Council considered the contents of the United Nations report
on the September massacres in Guinea. Bourita asked for U.S.
support to keep the travel secret from the Government of
Burkina Faso, which he stated was not advised until shortly
before Dadis' arrival of the GOM,s intent to deliver Dadis
Camara to Ouagadougou that day.
¶3. (C) Embassy Rabat demarched the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs late January 12, requesting the GOM not permit Dadis
Camara to utilize a rented airplane arranged by his
supporters in Guinea for return to Guinea. The GOM honored
that request and Dadis Camara departed Rabat for Ouagadougou
between 1845 and 1900 GMT aboard a Moroccan &medical plane8
in the company of two Moroccan doctors (one an
anesthesiologist), a Moroccan nurse, a Lebanese doctor, and a
Guinean cardiologist. Dadis reportedly thought he was going
to Conakry and was &calm8 although the previous day, he had
reportedly told Fassi Fihri that he wanted to return to
Conakry to &cut off hands and heads.8 Camara landed in
Ouagadougou before 21:45 GMT on January 12.
¶4. (C) The GOM expressed its intent to reach out to the
Government of Saudi Arabia in support of the U.S. and French
demarches urging Saudi Arabia to accept Dadis Camara for
residency, just as King Mohammed VI had reached out to
Gabonese President Ali Bongo, who declined to host Dadis.
The GOM also reached out to General Sekouba Konate on both
January 12 and 13 to reassure him that Morocco remained
RABAT 00000022 002.2 OF 002
supportive of his efforts to lead a transition. The GOM reportedly

also urged President Campaore to host Dadis Camara for more than
five days -- as Campaore had reportedly stated the night Dadis
arrived.
¶5. (C) Comment: The timing of the king,s decision was surprising,
if not entirely unexpected. While not in accord with the spirit of the
99
January 5 declaration, the GOM had always said that it needed a
legal basis to keep Dadis and did not want him in Morocco when the
Security Council considered the report on the massacre. The GOM
remains hopeful that Dadis Camara will not return to Guinea.
Morocco,s willingness to work with the U.S. and France to prevent
Dadis from taking contracted air back to Guinea, bought some time.
Moreover, Morocco remains interested in participating in the
international contact group meeting in Addis Ababa in late January.
End Comment.
¶6. (U) Conakry and Tripoli minimize considered.
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Reference
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INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0024
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RUEHDS/USMISSION ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0994
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0007
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0109
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0206
RUEHJL/AMEMBASSY BANJUL 0113
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 0067
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN 0044
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0663
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME 0572
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1187
RUEHPA/AMEMBASSY PRAIA 0013
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SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, NEA/MAG AND INR/AA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2020

TAGS: PINS PGOV MARR PREL MO UV GV
SUBJECT: MOROCCO AND BURKINA FASO
CONSULTATIONS ON GUINEA
101
REF: A. RABAT 0022
¶B. RABAT 0008
RABAT 00000034 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Robert Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Moroccan Director General for Studies and

Documentation (DGED) Mansouri met with President Compaore,
Guinean General Konate and Guinean Captain Dadis Camara in
Ouagadougou on January 18. According to a senior Moroccan
MFA official, Mansouri assured Compoare that the GOM
appreciated his efforts to mediate the crisis in Guinea and
asked him to take a softer stance toward Konate as the leader
of the Guinea transition. To Konate, he offered Moroccan
political and material support for the transition. And to
Dadis, Mansouri promised continued Moroccan medical
assistance throughout his convalescence, but also strongly
dissuaded him from returning to Rabat. Looking to next
steps, the GOM urged the USG not to "rush" the International
Criminal Court's investigation, noting that while Morocco
does not condone "impunity" for the crimes that occurred in
Conakry, it also fears that an early ICC warrant for Dadis
Camara's arrest could destabilize the Guinea transition. End
Summary.
¶2. (C) On January 18, Ambassador Nasser Bourita, Director

General for Multilateral Relations and Chief of Staff to
Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi Fihri, offered DCM and PolCouns
a readout of Moroccan director of external intelligence and
national security advisor equivalent) Mohammed Yassine
Mansouri's trip to Ouagadougou. During his January 18 visit,
Mansouri met separately with Burkinabe President Blaise
Compaore, Guinean General Sekouba Konate, and Captian Moussa
Dadis Camara.
---------------------------------
Morocco's Messages in Ouagadougou
---------------------------------
¶3. (C) Mansouri delivered three separate messages to each of
102
his interlocutors, Bourita told us. First, he sought to reassure
Compaore that Rabat greatly appreciated his personal
efforts to mediate the Guinea crisis, his close coordination
with Morocco, and Burkina Faso's willingness to receive
Dadis. Alluding to the Moroccan MFA's bitterness over its
perception that Compaore may have torpedoed French, Moroccan
and U.S. efforts to find an African country to accept Dadis
for resettlement -- and apparent Burkinabe anger at Rabat's
abrupt decision to send him by medical plane to Ouagadougou
(Ref A) -- Bourita said that Mansouri also calmed the waters
with Compaore and secured agreement for continued future
cooperation. Finally, Mansouri urged Compaore to "reflect a
bit" on his initial distrust of Konate, and to realize that,
given the circumstances and poor alternatives, he was not
necessarily a bad choice to lead the Guinean transition.
¶4. (C) In discussions with Konate, Mansouri assured him that

the GOM fully supported his efforts to lead the transition
and brainstormed with him as to what Morocco's most effective
roles might be, Bourita reported. Mansouri noted that
Morocco would be willing to offer materiel, funding and
observers for elections; economic and development assistance
to build water, electricity and other infrastructure; and, in
coordination with the U.S. and France, assistance in
rehabilitating and modernizing the armed forces.
¶5. (C) As for Dadis, Mansouri promised that Moroccan physicians

would be with him throughout his convalescence in Ouagadougou,
and that during that time the GOM would continue allow his wife
and children, who remain in Rabat, to stay at Morocco,s expense.
Dadis suggested that he wished to return to Morocco, Bourita said;
however, Mansouri strongly dissuaded him. The GOM would send
as many medical personnel
RABAT 00000034 002.2 OF 002
as necessary to Burkina Faso, Bourita added, but it would not

accept Dadis' return. "Since Dadis cannot come to Rabat,
Rabat will go to Dadis," he said with a smile.
------------------
Don't Rush the ICC
------------------
103
¶6. (C) Looking forward, Bourita warmly welcomed the
opportunity for Morocco to continue working closely with the
U.S. and France on Guinea's transition. The GOM likewise
welcomed the ICC's eventual investigation and likely issuance
of an arrest order for Dadis. However, he cautioned, the GOM
did not wish to see the ICC process result in additional
instability in Guinea. "Camara is unstable, and therefore
dangerous," he said; for this reason, France and the U.S.
should take care not to "rush" the ICC process. Morocco does
not support or accept impunity for Dadis, Bourita emphasized,
but France, the U.S., Morocco and their African partners
"need to move at a rate that is in harmony with one another
and that does not disturb the process." He added that in
addition to Mansouri's message to this effect in Ouagadougou,
the MFA was reiterating it to France, Gabon and Nigeria,
among others. Finally, Bourita said that the GOM looked
forward to receiving an invitation from the African Union to
attend the international contact group on Guinea,s January
26 meeting in Addis Ababa.
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KAPLAN
104
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INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2027

TAGS: PTER PREL KISL MO IZ XF XA
SUBJECT: APHSCT TOWNSEND'S VISIT TO MOROCCO
Classified by Ambassador Thomas Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and

(d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: During her July 6-8 visit to Morocco,

Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, met with the chiefs
of Morocco's intelligence service, the internal security
service, the chief of the national police, the Minister of
Interior, and his deputy, a senior royal advisor. Townsend
thanked her hosts for Morocco's excellent cooperation in the
global war on terrorism, including significant efforts to
shut down the foreign fighter pipeline to Iraq. The
105
Moroccans affirmed that they highly value security
cooperation and support from the USG as they continue to
confront a substantial and growing terror threat that extends
across North Africa and the Sahel. Townsend also visited
the sites of twin suicide bombings near the U.S.
Consulate-General and the (private) American Language Center
and received a briefing on efforts to augment security for
U.S. buildings and personnel in the city. End summary.
¶2. (S/NF) Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President

for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, was hosted for a
July 7 working lunch in Rabat by Yassine Mansouri, Chief of
the External Studies Directorate General (DGED), Morocco's
premier intelligence agency. Joining the lunch were
Abdelatif Hammouchi, Director-General for Territorial
Surveillance (DGST), which has the lead on domestic
counterterrorism operations, and Charki Draiss, Chief of the
National Police force (DGSN). Townsend was accompanied by
Ambassador Riley, Adnan Kifayat and John Pearson of the NSC
staff, and Emboffs.
¶3. (S/NF) Welcoming Townsend to Morocco, DGED Chief Mansouri

affirmed that the country has enjoyed a long-standing and
very cooperative security relationship with the USG, to the
benefit of both sides. Townsend expressed U.S. satisfaction
with the security relationship and particular gratitude for
Morocco's robust efforts to shut down the foreign fighter
pipeline to Iraq. The Moroccans made clear that stopping
foreign fighters bound for Iraq or other destinations was a
major GOM priority.
¶4. (S/NF) DGST Chief Hammouchi noted that Morocco has

disrupted 83 different terrorist cells since the 2003
Casablanca bombings. A number of cells identified have had
connections to the Algerian GSPC, he noted. Mansouri added
that the terrorist adversary is "very strategically minded"
and is always seeking ways to maximize the impact of attacks
by exploiting outside events. Townsend strongly agreed: The
timing of the attempted car bombs in London and the Glasgow
airport attack to coincide with the transition from the Blair
to the Brown government, was a case in point, she opined.
¶5. (S/NF) Townsend asked her hosts about the GOM's approach
106
to monitoring and controlling materials that can be
precursors to explosives. TATP, which was used in the April
attacks in Morocco, is made from readily available
ingredients, she noted. Hammouchi stated that the broad
availability of explosive precursors was a source of
frustration for the GOM. He recalled a case in which a
violent Jihadist had sent his wife on 38 separate trips, in
multiple cities, to buy hydrogen peroxide from pharmacies.
"Our only weapon against this phenomenon is information,"
Hammouchi opined.
¶6. (S/NF) The security chiefs underlined their conviction

that the terrorist threat to Morocco was transnational in
nature. At least 12 cells wrapped up in recent years have
had direct connections to groups operating in Algeria,
Northern Mali, and Spain. Of particular concern is recent
information that a number of individuals in terror camps in
Northern Mali have moved from training units to operational
units. This information, and the approach of important
events on Morocco's political calendar, such as the "Fete du
Throne" (Throne Day) and the parliamentary elections in early
September, prompted Morocco to elevate its alert level on
July 5.
¶7. (S/NF) Townsend asked the security chiefs for their

assessment of CT cooperation between the countries of the
Maghreb region. Cooperation with the Algerians was erratic,
Hammouchi assessed. Sometimes they provide very good
information and sometimes it seems like a one-way street.
They make difficult partners, Mansouri added, speculating
that they still suffered psychic trauma from their bloody
RABAT 00001229 002 OF 003
struggle against terror in the 1990s, a battle they fought

largely on their own. Security cooperation with Libya has
been good, Mansouri noted, they are ready to work with us and
exchange information. There has been an improvement in
cooperation with the Tunisians as well, he continued, though
he opined that they are still prone to denial in assessing
the terror threat.
107
¶8. (S/NF) Turning to the ideological front in the war on
terror, the security chiefs affirmed that CT disruption and
preemption operations alone were not sufficient to defeat the
enemy. "We have had to become involved in the ideological
battle, even if this isn't our business," Hammouchi stated.
"Unfortunately, political and diplomatic restraints often
limit our ability to act," he added. Citing President Bush,
Townsend affirmed the U.S. belief that the war of words and
ideas is a core theater of battle, but often an area where
Muslim leaders can be more effective than Americans.
¶9. (S/NF) Townsend asked about lines of authority within the

Moroccan government in pursuing the ideological battle
against terrorists. Mansouri responded that there was a
diffusion of authority, with the security agencies, the
Ministry of Communications, and the Ministry of Religious
Affairs all countering extremism in different ways. Townsend
observed that this mirrored the diffusion of
counter-extremist efforts in the USG, but wondered if both
systems wouldn't benefit from centralization of efforts.
¶10. (S/NF) Subsequent to the lunch, Minister of Interior

Chakib Benmoussa welcomed Townsend, the Ambassador, NSC
staff, and emboffs to his office. The Minister was joined by
Minister-Delegate Fouad Ali Himma (who, as a long-standing
friend and close advisor of King Mohammed VI, is generally
considered more powerful than the Minister), and senior MOI
officials Khalid Zerouali, Mohieddine Amzazi, Noureddine
Benbrahim, and Abderahmane Achour.
¶11. (S/NF) Affirming her appreciation of strong bilateral

security cooperation, Townsend asked her hosts for more
background on Morocco's recent decision to elevate its state
of alert. The Minister said that information developed
following recent arrests of Moroccans in the U.K., Spain, and
Morocco, a continuing stream of general threat information,
and upcoming events including the Fete du Throne and the
legislative elections all prompted Moroccan security
officials to conclude that it would be prudent to elevate the
alert level.
¶12. (S/NF) Townsend expressed understanding, mentioning the

USG's experience that it was relatively easy to raise the
108
alert level, but more difficult to bring it back down.
Explaining such decisions to the public was always tricky,
she added. Himma agreed that the relationship between the
security services and the public was crucially important and
merited constant attention. Educating the public about the
nature of the threat and enlisting them as allies is
particularly important he added.
¶13. (S/NF) Defending the Malikite rite of Islam, native to

Morocco, against intolerant theological strains flowing out
of the Middle East was a major priority for King Mohammed VI
and his government, Himma emphasized. He asserted that in
Morocco "our people are religious and conservative, but not
fundamentalist. Our rite is completely opposed to radical
theology." Himma cited recent efforts to overhaul and
upgrade the religious education system in the country,
traditionally subsidized by the monarchy. The GOM is working
hard to strike a balance between Moroccan tradition and
modernity, seeking to take the best from both. Himma also
cited the King's human development initiative, launched in
2005, as an important piece of the counter-extremist puzzle.
¶14. (S/NF) Townsend complimented the Minister for Morocco's

apparent success in integrating various elements of the GOM
involved in countering terror and extremism into a cohesive
team. Himma affirmed that the GOM strives to work as one
integrated unit, and also lauded the strong security
cooperation Morocco enjoys with countries like the U.S. and
Spain. "But our ambition is even higher," Himma continued.
We would like to have the same level of coordination and
cooperation with our neighboring countries, particularly
Algeria.
¶15. (S/NF) Recalling a visit to Algiers as the King's

personal envoy, Himma asserted that repeated Moroccan efforts
RABAT 00001229 003 OF 003
to bridge the diplomatic chasm had been rebuffed. He claimed

that he had told the Algerians that Morocco was prepared to
reopen its border and take any of a number of other
confidence building measures, "but the Algerians would never
109
tell us what they want." He attributed what he described as
Algerian intransigence to a generational and mind-set gap
between the leaderships of the two countries. Noting that
Algiers was the next stop on her multi-country itinerary,
Townsend said she would encourage the GOA to expand security
cooperation with Morocco and to work hard to realize a
broader rapprochement with its neighbor.
¶16. (S/NF) Prior to her arrival in Rabat, Townsend visited

the U.S. Consulate General in Casablanca, which was targeted
during a twin suicide bomb attack on April 14. The CG, RSO,
and Emboffs briefed Townsend on the incident, showing her the
site of the bomb which detonated near the Consulate General,
and the site of the bombing which targeted the American
Language Center one block away, which was apparently mistaken
for a USG facility. Townsend reviewed CCTV footage of the
attack, and received a briefing on upgrades being implemented
to enhance the physical security of Consulate facilities and
personnel.
*****************************************
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RILEY
110
2008-02-28 2010-12-03 Embassy
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TAGS: PREL OVIP MO
SUBJECT: NEA A/S WELCH,S MEETINGS WITH KING
MOHAMMED VI AND
111
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TAIEB FASSI FIHRI
(d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: King Mohammed VI received NEA A/S Welch

for
an hour on February 25. The wide-ranging exchange of views
focused on bilateral cooperation, the Middle East Peace
Process (MEPP), Iran, Kosovo, Lebanon, Mauritania, Syria,
Algeria and Western Sahara. In most respects, the audience
mirrored the meeting that preceded it with Minister of
Foreign Affairs Fassi Fihri and MFA Director General for
Multilateral Affairs Mohamed Azeroual. However, we heard
that Amr Moussa,s latest visit to Beirut had been "a
catastrophe;" the Emir of Kuwait did not plan to attend the
Arab summit in Damascus; and Morocco was looking at other
Arab countries' reaction to Kosovo's declaration of
independence. The King asked us to assist Mauritania and
warned that the POLISARIO must not attempt to occupy the area
east of the berm in Western Sahara. In his meeting with the
Foreign Minister, Ambassador Welch pressed for an agreement
on the status of the American schools in Morocco and informed
the Minister of a planned accord with the U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum. END SUMMARY.
BILATERAL COOPERATION
---------------------
¶2. (C) Receiving NEA A/S Welch, the Ambassador, DCM and Erin
Yerger, the Executive Assistant to Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs Elliot Abrams, at the
royal palace in Marrakech on February 25, the King thanked
the United States for the excellent cooperation on
counterterrorism, the Millennium Challenge Account and the
Free Trade Agreement. Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri also
attended the audience.
KOSOVO
------
¶3. (C) The King noted that he had just met with the Greek
Foreign Minister, who urged him not to recognize Kosovo. The
King and the Foreign Minister indicated that they intended to
discuss recognition with other Arab leaders at the
112
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Dakar
in March. Fassi Fihri said the Serbian Foreign Minister has
also requested a meeting.
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

----
¶4. (C) Ambassador Welch began by underscoring that this is
an important year for the region and that the President is
determined to make progress on the MEPP. Welch briefed the
King and the Minister on the process and assured them that
the Israelis and the Palestinians are making progress, but
the public is unaware of it. On Gaza, Welch averred that
Israeli Prime Minister Olmert is focused on the least bad
option. For his part, the King expressed deep concern about
the humanitarian situation in Gaza.
LEBANON
-------
¶5. (C) Turning to the continuing leadership vacuum in
Lebanon, A/S Welch said that we see three options: 1) to
continue efforts to elect a President by consensus; 2) to
elect a President with 50 percent of the vote plus one; or 3)
to support the Siniora government. Welch indicated that we
increasingly believe the third option affords the best means
to support Lebanon,s institutions. Asked about Arab League
Secretary General Amr Moussa's visit to Beirut, Fassi Fihri
SIPDIS
characterized it as 'a catastrophe.'
SYRIA AND THE ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT

--------------------------------
¶6. (C) Noting that Kings Mohammed VI and Abdullah II of
Jordan had come to power at approximately the same time as
RABAT 00000185 002 OF 003
President Bashar al-Assad, Welch decried Syria,s lost

opportunities. Welch said that he understood that the Syrian
Foreign Minister would be in Marrakech on February 26 to
deliver an invitation to the Arab Summit in Damascus, and
Welch predicted that attendance would be poor. The King said
113
he understood that the Emir of Kuwait did not plan to attend,
implying that Morocco would be represented at the ministerial
level at best.
IRAN
----
¶7. (C) Ambassador Welch asked if he might say a few words
about Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The King
responded that he understood that Iran had suspended its
nuclear weapons program. Welch thanked the King for the
opportunity to clarify, declaring that the U.S. intelligence
estimate had been misunderstood and that the reporting on
this issue has been unclear. Welch said that we continued to
believe that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons; so President
Bush was seeking a middle ground "between the bomb and
bombing," without giving up any option. Diplomatic pressure
is best for now. When the King asked what that middle ground
might look like, Welch said that more Security
Council-approved sanctions loom and that Iran must accept a
diplomatic solution.
ALGERIA
-------
¶8. (C) The conversation then turned to Algeria, and Welch
asked if the GOM had any views on President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika,s plans. The King said he understood that
Bouteflika was amending the Constitution to permit a third
term, and Welch noted wryly that Bouteflika was doing so
without Syrian assistance. The King praised the "frustrated"
Algerian Ambassador in Rabat for his tireless efforts to
improve bilateral relations, stating, &We have no relations
with Algeria, except for limited cooperation on security
issues." In spite of obvious opportunities for cooperation
in agriculture, energy and a host of other areas, President
Bouteflika and his government clearly prefer the status quo.
The King noted that he had even traveled to Algiers to try to
break the impasse, but the GOA continues to insist on the
Western Sahara issue being resolved before proceeding with
other bilateral or regional initiatives.
WESTERN SAHARA
--------------
¶9. (C) The King and Fassi Fihri expressed grave concern
114
about the POLISARIO's stated plans to move people into the
area east of the berm. The King said bluntly that Morocco
could not allow that. Praising the King,s autonomy
initiative, Welch urged the GOM to press ahead with the
Manhasset talks. He said support for Morocco,s position is
growing ever so slowly. Separately, Welch cautioned the
King's intelligence chief against militarization of the
dispute.
MAURITANIA
----------
¶10. (C) Looking at Western Sahara's neighbor Mauritania, the
King stressed that Mauritania needs help and that he will see
the Mauritanian President in Dakar.
AMERICAN SCHOOLS
----------------
¶11. (U) Welch took advantage of a few private minutes with
Fassi Fihri to underscore the need for an agreement on the
status of the American schools in Morocco. Noting that he
had attended the Rabat American School (RAS)as a child, Welch
said if a solution is not found soon that RAS could not
produce more David Welches. Fassi Fihri replied that he had
RABAT 00000185 003 OF 003
been in contact with Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi and

Director General of Taxation Nouredine Bensouda about our
proposal.
U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM

------------------------------
¶12. (U) Welch also raised made the Minister aware of the
planned signing of an accord between the U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum and the Moroccan National Archives. Welch
also mentioned that the Museum still planned to host a
conference on the Holocaust in Arab lands.
COMMENT
-------
¶13. (C) Although his face looked puffy, the King appeared
relaxed and rested after four weeks in France. The meeting
115
itself underscored how much U.S. and Moroccan views coincide.
END COMMENT.
¶14. (U) NEA A/S Welch has cleared this message.
*****************************************
*****************************************
Riley
116
2008-03-03 2010-12-03 Embassy
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TAGS: PREL PINS OVIP MO
SUBJECT: NEA A/S WELCH AND DIRECTOR GENERAL
MANSOURI REVIEW
REGIONAL ISSUES
117
REF: A. RABAT 185 (NOTAL)
¶B. RABAT 0178 (NOTAL)
¶C. RABAT 0171 (NOTAL)
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reason 1.4 (b, c, and
d).
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: On February 25, Director General for

Studies and Documentation (DGED) Mohamed Yassine Mansouri
(the Moroccan equivalent of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency) and NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch
and his party had a cordial and frank two-hour exchange on
regional issues, working their way from east to west. Welch
explained U.S. plans to maintain and strengthen Lebanese
institutions. He described Syria's unhelpful role in both
Lebanon and in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), with
Mansouri noting that Syria has begun to realize that the
foreign fighters might threaten its own internal security.
Welch updated Mansouri on the MEPP, and Mansouri replied that
he and Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri had met Israeli Foreign
Minister Livni. Mansouri predicted a "monarchical
succession" in Egypt. He said Libya continued to blame Saudi
Wahabism for the region's terrorism problem. He expressed
concern about rapacity and brittleness in Tunisia. Mansouri
said that Algeria's terrorism problem was returning as
Al-Qaeda focused more on North Africa; yet Bouteflika flatly
refused to participate in an AMU security summit.
Ambassadors Welch and Riley urged Morocco to stick with the
diplomatic track to resolve the Western Sahara dispute and
said diplomatic support for Morocco's autonomy proposal was
growing. Mansouri ended the tour with a plea for greater
U.S. assistance to Mauritania. END SUMMARY.
SYRIA AND LEBANON

-----------------
¶2. (C) With the Syrian Foreign Minister coming to Morocco on

February 26, Ambassador Welch inquired about Syria's
cooperation with Morocco. Mansouri said that while it was
not all that Morocco desired, it has improved in the last few
months. Welch said the Syrians have recognized that the
foreign fighter pipeline may pose a risk to their own
country. However, Syria continued to exert a great deal of
118
pressure on Lebanon and appeared determined to maintain its
interests in Lebanon at any cost. Prior to the Annapolis
conference, Syria had been relatively quiet vis-a-vis the
Palestinians. However, three or four weeks ago, it hosted
the conference of rejectionists. Damascus has lost the
support of many Arab friends, and the Arab League Summit is
insufficient incentive to achieve better behavior.
¶3. (C) A/S Welch asked how Lebanon could be a threat to

Syria; yet Syria is bent on destroying Lebanese institutions,
i.e., the government, the army, and the central bank. As a
result, the United States was increasing its assistance to
Lebanon, working in tandem with Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, and other friends. Mansouri interjected that Saudi
Arabia, Jordan and Egypt's positions had evolved. Welch
noted that family, intelligence, and business are all one in
Syria. He ended that portion of the discussion by stressing
U.S. support for a political solution and a short-term focus
on maintaining and strengthening Lebanese institutions.
ISRAEL AND THE MEPP

-------------------
¶4. (S) Turning to Israel, Welch said that the good news was
real albeit unseen. He assured Mansouri that the
Israeli-Palestinian talks were addressing all issues and were
making progress. He told Mansouri that the Secretary and
then the President intend to return to the region. More Arab
financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority would be
helpful. Mansouri said that he and Foreign Minister Taieb
Fassi Fihri had met Israeli Foreign Minister Livni and found
RABAT 00000194 002 OF 003
her serious.
GAZA AND EGYPT

--------------
¶5. (C) The conversation then turned to Gaza and Egypt.

Ambassador Welch noted that the GOE had contained 300,000
Palestinians within the Sinai after they spilled across the
119
frontier. Meanwhile, Hamas was not using funds it received
from Iran to improve the humanitarian situation. Asked about
the expected transition in Egypt, Mansouri agreed that the
army would not control the next transition. He nonetheless
expected a "monarchical succession."
THE MAGHREB
-----------
¶6. (C) Moving west, Mansouri said Morocco and Libya enjoyed
very good relations and agreed on many regional issues.
Mansouri noted that Libya continues to believe that Saudi
Wahabism is the source of terrorism in the region. Welch
acknowledged that Libyan-U.S. relations are currently
strained due to historical disputes. Mansouri was surprised
when Welch expressed concern about Tunisia. Mansouri said
Morocco is quite concerned about the greed and brittleness of
the Ben Ali regime. Mansouri added that the December
2006/January 2007 events had scared the GOT.
¶7. (C) Continuing the westward progression, Mansouri

declared that Algeria's terror problem was returning, as
Al-Qaeda focused on North Africa to offset reverses in Iraq
and Afghanistan. He said that even though senior Algerians
refuse to come to Rabat, Moroccans go there. Mansouri said
that Morocco has tried everything to improve bilateral
relations. He noted that while counterterrorism cooperation
must work, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika had recently
completely rejected a Tunisian initiative to organize a
security summit of Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) members.
WESTERN SAHARA
--------------
¶8. (C) Mansouri told Welch and party that Algeria's internal
problems did not prevent a solution to the Western Sahara
dispute. He expressed some concern that generational change
in Algiers might complicate a solution, declaring that the
older generation had created the problem and was best placed
to solve it. Mansouri said the GOM is "very worried about
the POLISARIO moving into the area east of the berm."
Ambassador Welch then launched into a long discussion of U.S.
support for Morocco,s autonomy proposal and for a diplomatic
120
solution. Both he and Ambassador Riley cautioned against
military action. Welch said that while nine UNSC members
still do not back Morocco's position, international support
was growing. Mansouri then explained that UN Special Envoy
Peter Van Walsum had expressed some disappointment with U.S.
and international support. Welch said we would look at ways
to publicly support Van Walsum's efforts to achieve a
solution. He added that the POLISARIO would never have an
independent state.
MAURITANIA
----------
¶9. (C) Last but not least, Mansouri expressed deep concern
about the deteriorating security situation in Mauritania and
requested that the USG consider enhanced assistance to
support the new democratic government. Welch said that the
U.S. is providing more assistance both through the Middle
East Partnership Initiative and the Trans-Saharan
Counterterrorism Partnership.
COMMENT
RABAT 00000194 003 OF 003
-------
¶10. (C) Director General Mansouri, who is very close to King

Mohammed VI, clearly enjoyed his three hours with Ambassador
Welch and party. The exchange was frank and collegial as one
might expect with an ally who shares similar interests and
perspectives on many regional and international issues. END
COMMENT.
PARTICIPANTS
------------
¶11. (U) U.S. Moroccan

---- --------
NEA A/S C. David Welch DGED Director General

Amb. Thomas T. Riley Mohamed Yassine
121
DCM Robert P. Jackson Mansouri
RAO Counselor George Gaydos Gen. Abdeljabbar Azaoui
Executive Assistant to
DAPNSA Elliot Abrams
Erin Yerger
NEA Staff Assistant
Kimberly Harrington
¶12. (U) NEA A/S Welch did not have an opportunity to clear
this message.
*****************************************
*****************************************
Riley
122
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TAGS: PBTS PHUM ECON PREF WI AG MO
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA REALITIES
REF: RABAT 0693

1
.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: Although the Western Sahara negotiations

have now re-started (Reftel), the conflict is 34 years old.
The Government of Morocco (GOM) has invested tremendous
resources in the territory, and some observers estimate that
it spends USD 2.7 billion per year on the territory and its
385,000 residents. The level of development and of social
services clearly exceeds the level in Morocco proper.
123
Significant voter participation )- despite a Polisario call
for a boycott -- in the June 12 local elections may be a sign
that support for independence is waning although support for
self-government is real. Serious human rights abusers have
been transferred, and respect for human rights in the
territory has greatly improved, reaching the same plane as in
Morocco. However, advocating independence is still a red
line, and the GOM refuses to register pro-Polisario NGOs.
Giving the territory more autonomy, improving
Algerian-Moroccan relations, enhancing regional integration,
building real confidence, and addressing all parties,
propaganda seem essential to resolving the conflict. End
Summary.
¶2. (C) Since King Hassan II launched the Green March in

1975, the Western Sahara issue has been intimately linked to
the stability of the throne and Morocco itself. Hassan,
twice victim of coup attempts and for years at war with the
left, used Western Sahara to bolster nationalism and park his
army far away in the desert. More recently, however, that
link has blurred. King Mohammed VI is more secure,
maintained in power more by love than fear and facing no
apparent major domestic threat. He recently has somewhat
distanced himself from the issue, however, and has not
visited the territory in three years, a stark contrast to his
peripatetic ribbon cutting throughout the Kingdom.
¶3. (C) The GOM continues to subsidize the territory and

provide tax and duty exemptions that form the base of much of
the private fortunes there (mostly key clans loyal to the
throne and a few senior military). Despite some siphoning,
the investment has produced higher levels of urban
development than in comparably sized cities in Morocco proper
and made the capital, Laayoune, the first city without any
shantytowns. Social indicators such as access to and level
of education and availability of health care and social
facilities exceed Moroccan norms and far surpass those in
comparably sized Morocco,s cities. Growth in Morocco has
made these expenditures much more bearable to Rabat,s
exchequer than they once were.
¶4. (SBU) In April 2009, a local weekly newsmagazine TelQuel

published an article laying out and likely even exaggerating
124
what the Sahara was costing Morocco. TelQuel claimed that
the GOM has spent 1.2 trillion dirhams on the territory since
1975 and is spending 3 percent of GDP or USD 2.7 billion per
year, including the funds to maintain two-thirds of the Royal
Armed Forces in Western Sahara. (Note: TelQuel faced no
consequences for the article. Even with the relative
expansion of the freedom of the press in Morocco to cover
subjects formerly taboo, this was astonishing. End Note.)
¶5. (C) In the June 12 local elections, &First Friend8

Fouad Ali el Himma,s Party of Authenticity and Modernity
(PAM) challenged local Laayoune strongman and Royal
Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) head
Kalihenna Ould er Rachid. The PAM lost, despite having an el
Himma protege installed. The Ould er Rachid family and clan
control the Tammany Hall-like Istiqlal party machine that has
run the territory for many years, and played a major part in
winning the Prime Minister,s chair for party head Abbas El
Fassi. Voter participation in the Sahara, stoked by clan
rivalries, was far above the norm, despite a
Polisario-declared boycott. Some pro-independence Sahrawis
reportedly voted for the Ould er Rachid because they alone
were deemed strong enough to stand up to the government in
Rabat. This real political competition, while perhaps not
democracy, seems far more open than the Cuba-like Polisario
system. It underscores the fact that there is a significant
part of the population of the Sahrawi territory, in addition
to most immigrants, who support Moroccan sovereignty.
¶6. (C) After it took control of Western Sahara, Morocco

tried to affect any vote by promoting immigration by its
nationals, who now are well over half of the some 385,000
residents of the territory. Perhaps half of the immigrants,
however, were themselves Sahrawis, from areas just north of
the dividing line that were also home to some of the most
nationalistic Sahrawis. In a referendum that could include
independence, they are not seen by the GOM as reliable
voters, partly explaining GOM reluctance to go to a vote.
(Comment: Curiously, we know of no advocate of independence
that has ever claimed the &Sahrawi8 territories in Morocco,
Algeria or Mauritania as part of a national homeland,
although some members of the CORCAS unsuccessfully tried to
include the Moroccan parts in the autonomous region, when it
125
was first proposed. The absence of such larger nationalism,
along with the Polisario,s 1970,s war against Mauritania
--the world,s only Sahrawi state -- suggest the conflict is
less nationalist than geopolitical, linked to the much older
dispute between Algeria and Morocco, and hardly boosts the
case for an independent state. End Comment.)
¶7. (C) Given the small population at stake, Spain,s

granting of Spanish nationality, with the possibility of
migrating to Spain, its nearby Canary Islands or elsewhere in
Europe, is significant, and, indeed in better times,
resettlement could be a simple way of resolving the plight of
the refugees.
-----------
Who Counts?
-----------
¶8. (C) The UN process recognizes the parties in the

negotiations as Morocco and the Polisario. This asymmetry
makes any resolution difficult, as it does not recognize the
determinative role of Algiers, which the Moroccans see as
their real adversary in this dispute. It also neglects the
diverse views among the Sahrawis.
--------------------------------------------- -
Human Rights: Progress but Continuing Paranoia
--------------------------------------------- -
¶9. (U) The human rights situation in the territory has

dramatically improved since a brief &intifada8 in 2005.
Like Morocco itself, Western Sahara has come a very long way
from the mass disappearances of the &years of lead8 during
Hassan II,s reign. Pro-Polisario Sahrawis are able to
organize under the rubric of human rights activists, which
most of them legitimately pursue, such as last year,s RFK
award winner, Aminatou Haidar from the Sahrawi Collective of
Human Rights Defenders (CODESA). In just over a year,
restrictions on their international travel have disappeared.
¶10. (C) Since mid-2008, once common beatings and arbitrary

imprisonment have also essentially ceased. One key to the
reduction in abuses last year was the transfer of
126
long-serving security officials with consistent records as
abusers. Activists and officials confirmed in July 2009 that
more transfers (many by promotion) had recently taken place,
and most well known abusers are reportedly now gone. All
sources report the territory is quiet, with residents hopeful
for some political progress.
¶11. (C) What opponents of Morocco cannot do is explicitly

organize in favor of independence or a referendum thereon,
nor can they publish or even distribute tracts on the
subject. In addition, they are denied by the government the
right to operate as legal entities. Establishing these
rights would not only be just, but would help build
confidence in a consensual solution that would involve
re-integration. The Sahrawi Association of Human Rights
Victims (ASVDH) has even obtained court approval for its
registration as an NGO and won on appeal lodged by the
Interior Ministry (MOI), but has not been able to get local
officials to accept its registration. The USG has pushed for
this for some time. We recently heard that the local Wali
has proposed to MOI that it accept the registration but the
decision is pending. We should press the GOM on this both
here and in Washington.
¶12. (C) Despite this substantial progress, which leaves the

human rights situation in Western Sahara nearly equivalent to
Morocco, Morocco campaigned for most of the year and spent
scarce diplomatic capital in a successful effort to push back
proposals for the UN to have a monitoring role on this issue.
It is possible that they have understood the opportunity
costs of that strategy and appear more recently to have been
somewhat less vocal on the issue.
--------------------
What the People Want
--------------------
¶13. (C) Extensive interviews and independent sources in the

territory suggest that the principal goal of most Sahrawis is
more self-government than self-determination; a desire more
for protection and identity than independence, an army and
embassies. The small vocally pro-Polisario minority,
including many of the human rights activists, formerly
127
enjoyed the support of the &silent majority8 of these
Sahrawis, particularly during periods of repression.
Development and reduced oppression have reduced this support.
The Sahrawi &silent majority8 in the territory has been
intrigued by the prospect of autonomy and has generally
quietly awaited its development. Recently, a pro-Polisario
activist, when asked, confided to us that he believed that in
a free election held now a majority of voters in the
territory would choose autonomy.
-----------------------------
On the Other Side of the Berm
-----------------------------
¶14. (C) While not the competent Mission to comment on the

Polisario or the camps, Embassy Rabat understands the
situation for the refugees in Tindouf is difficult but
support for the Polisario appears strong. Nevertheless, we
hear from credible Sahrawis that there is growing interest
there in a negotiated solution, belying the stories of
unrealistic saber-rattling, frequently attributed to Sahrawi
youth. GOM calls for a census and audit of international
programs seem reasonable to us. Finally, if there is no
prospect of a solution, re-settlement should be considered an
option. The Spanish decision in 2008 to accord passports to
1975 residents of its former colony could be implemented in
Tindouf as it has been in Laayoune (but not in the current
economic climate).
-------------------
Frozen Negotiations
-------------------
¶15. (C) Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General,s Personal

Envoy for Western Sahara has struggled to get the UN
negotiations back on track. The negotiation process
re-started in 2007, after Morocco tabled a proposal for
autonomy that had been carefully negotiated with the Bush
Administration. The main impetus to getting the plan
produced was then-USUN Permrep John Bolton,s threat (October
2006) to end MINURSO,s mandate. When first released, the
USG called the autonomy proposal &serious and credible.8
In substance, the proposal was serious, including local
128
police and some independence for the judiciary, and was
accompanied by a declared willingness to negotiate. It was
also viewed as credible by the international community,
including explicitly Russia and implicitly China, which
nearly universally expressed a willingness to accept this as
a possible outcome, if agreed. Credibility was an issue,
however, among Sahrawis on both sides of the berm, as there
was little confidence, given past Moroccan evasions, that
even if agreed, the GOM would implement the plan. This
credibility gap has narrowed, but only slightly, due to the
improvements in the human rights situation. Credibility is,
therefore, key to winning hearts and minds.
¶16. (C) In April 2007, the United Nations Security Council

lengthened the mandate of MINURSO to 12 months (from six) and
the &Manhasset talks8 (named after the Long Island, New
York town where they were held) began. The Moroccans, while
negotiating with the Polisario, showed them no credence and
sent Moroccan Sahrawis to seek defectors. CORCAS head
Kalihenna questioned the Polisario,s right to be there. The
Polisario broke diplomatic and Middle Eastern protocol by
refusing to shake hands with the Sahrawis on the Moroccan
delegation and walked out or turned away when they spoke.
¶17. (C) Neither side offered any compromise or considered

the arguments of the other. This was hardened when, at the
end of 2007, King Mohammed VI publicly instructed his
delegation to discuss no solution but autonomy, creating
little room for discussion. This hard-line stance may have
been bolstered by what was perceived in the Palace as
uncritical support from Washington. In the end, there was no
result after four rounds of rotating restatement of static
positions. Former UN Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum cited
immovable Moroccan commitment to retain sovereignty, and
called the prospect of independence unrealistic. For this
unusual frankness, the UN let Van Walsum go, at Algerian and
Polisario insistence.
¶18. (C) The new Personal Envoy, Ambassador Christopher Ross,

long one of the stars of U.S. diplomacy in the region, seems
better positioned than anyone to budge President Bouteflika
and his government. In recognition, he was granted the
additional mandate to help improve Moroccan-Algerian
129
relations. King Mohammed VI took note of this and conveyed
through Ross an offer of unconditional, at-any-level and
on-any-subject, bilateral talks. Ross did get Algeria to
agree to go to the &informals8 but only as observers. He
got no response on the bilateral issue, although it is still
early in Bouteflika,s new term. The informal meeting this
month in Vienna has at least re-launched the negotiations.
--------------------------------------------- --------
Regional Link: Algeria-Morocco Key to Sahara Solution
--------------------------------------------- --------
¶19. (C) Algeria and Morocco are demographically similar but

with differences in historical experience that go back
hundreds of years. About a year after Algeria,s hard-won
independence, it and Morocco fought &The War of the Sands,8
over their then-disputed frontier, drawn by colonial France.
In 1975, when the Algerians sheltered the Polisario, it was
at least as much a reflection of their historical rivalry as
ideological support for a fellow liberation movement. King
Hassan II managed to work out a frontier agreement with the
Algerians which the GOM maintains has been ratified, and
needs only an exchange of instruments of ratification. The
subsequent closure of the Algeria-Moroccan border is now an
anomaly in a Mediterranean region of growing links. There
have been modestly growing functional links in recent years,
much of it under Arab Maghreb Union auspices and in 2008 some
technical agreements were signed. But direct high-level
communication remains cut and both quiet and public GOM
overtures to reopen it have been rebuffed. The Government of
Algeria (GOA) turned down then-Secretary Rice,s invitation
for a trilateral ministerial meeting on the margins of the
2008 UNGA.
-------
Comment
-------
¶20. (C) Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara dispute is a

chicken and egg situation. Algeria has indicated relations
cannot improve until there is self-determination in Western
Sahara. Morocco, following the close links between the
Polisario leadership and their Algerian hosts, remains
130
convinced that there will be no agreement if relations with
Algiers do not improve. In response, as of June 2009, the
Moroccans have maintained that their principal goal now is
rapprochement with Algeria, which could be discussed
separately.
¶21. (C) The international community is ready to support

Maghreb rapprochement and integration, which can only occur
in parallel with a settlement of the longstanding dispute
over the Western Sahara and resettlement of the
long-suffering refugees. Then-President Putin of Russia
urged Algerian-Moroccan compromise in vain, as have the
French, the Spanish, and the USG. We are not aware of any of
the P-5 opposing an autonomy-based solution, nor have we seen
real urgency or priority for the international community to
resolve a dispute over which there has been no real fighting
for 18 years. End Comment.
*****************************************
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Jackson
131
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MODERNIZING, BUT
FACING BIG CHALLENGES
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons

1.4
(a) and (b).
¶1. (C) Summary: The Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) are
modernizing but remain weighed down by long-standing
problems. King Mohammed VI, who in 1999 inherited a military
in need of professionalization, has implemented some needed
reforms, but much remains to be done. Civilian control, if
ascribed to the person of the King, is complete, but there is
no real Defense Ministry. Outside the FAR, there is only a
small administration. The military remains plagued by
corruption, an inefficient bureaucracy, low levels of
education in the ranks, periodic threats of radicalization of
132
some of its soldiers, political marginalization, and the
deployment of most of its forces in the Western Sahara.
There have been some indications of pending changes in the
leadership. In general, the U.S. and Morocco share a robust
military relationship with prospects for even closer ties in
the future. The health of the relationship is evident by
increased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and
Morocco's purchase of sophisticated weapons from the U.S. to
include 24 F-16s this year. We anticipate that the
U.S.-Moroccan military relationship will continue to flourish
but Morocco's ability to absorb its new high-end military
purchases and restrictions on high quality Moroccan
information sharing with our attaches represent two
challenges ahead. This mission-coordinated report draws
heavily on valuable reporting and analysis from the embassy's
military components, the Defense Attache Office and the
Office of Security Cooperation. End Summary.
------------------
All the King's Men
------------------
¶2. (C) As Commander-in-Chief of the Moroccan Royal Armed

Forces and Minister of Defense, King Mohammed VI maintains a
highly centralized role over the military. No troop
movements, exercises, or even travel of officers domestically
or abroad happens without the King,s approval. As a result
of the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts by the Moroccan Army and
Air Force respectively, the Palace increased control over the
military, marginalized it from policy making, and restricted
its interaction with foreign military interlocutors and the
press. The Alaouite dynasty depends upon, among other
things, a strong military, the leadership of which, however,
must remain sufficiently docile so as not to arouse
suspicions of disloyalty. The only civilian structure
responsible for the FAR is not a Defense Ministry but rather
an entity under the Prime Minister responsible for the
Administration of the National Defense. It is headed by
Minister-delegate Abderrahmane Sbai, whose role is
essentially restricted to that of comptroller. As far as we
can tell, political-military policy on issues such as
peacekeeping appears centered in the Foreign Ministry. All
other major defense matters are decided in the Palace.
133
¶3. (C) Over the past decade, Morocco has transitioned from a
conscript to an all-volunteer military force of approximately
218,000 soldiers. Of the three services, the Army is
dominant with approximately 175,000 personnel. There are
approximately 13,000 personnel in the Air Force and 7,800 in
the Navy. Though nominally subordinate within the military
structure but answering directly to the King, the
Gendarmerie, which consists of approximately 22,000
personnel, conducts paramilitary, royal guard, and internal
and border policing missions. Though a few legacy conscripts
remain in the military, professional reforms have made
voluntary military service an attractive career option for
Moroccans with opportunities for a steady income and some
upward mobility. The average military salary for enlisted
soldiers is approximately 2,000 dirhams (USD 270) per month.
An officer's starting salary is approximately 6,000 dirhams
(USD 850) per month. With benefits, such as free housing,
these are reasonably competitive in the Moroccan context.
¶4. (C) The top military commanders include Military

Inspector General and Army Commander, Lieutenant General (Lt
Gen) Abdelaziz Benanni; Operations Chief Lt Gen Boughaid
Arroub; and Gendarmerie Commander Lt Gen Housni Benslimane.
Benanni, who has become mired in suspicion of corruption,
will reportedly be retired soon. Arroub, who came out of
recent retirement, is tipped by some to succeed Benanni.
Arroub, historically pro-French, appears to have become
increasingly pro-U.S. in the last 5 years. Another rising
star in the FAR is General Mohamed Larbi Tamdi, who is
responsible for army logistics and force sustainment. There
is some military staff in the Palace, likely influent, about
which little is known.
¶5. (C) King Hassan II and his son, King Mohammed VI, have
maintained the Gendarmerie as a force relatively independent
from the FAR since 1972, in part as a check against a
military coup. While it most visibly serves as a State
Police/Highway Patrol, it has a wide range of units. Its
commander, Lt Gen Benslimane, likely reports in some way
directly to the King. He also leads the Moroccan National
Soccer League, making him a popular figure inside and out of
134
military circles. While there is no direct proof of
Benslimane being involved in corrupt activity, low ranking
Gendarmerie assigned to highway patrols are expected to pay
approximately 4,000 dirhams (USD 540) to their immediate
supervisors with extralegal earnings from motorists above
which they can keep for themselves, according to one credible
anecdote.
--------------------------------------------- --
Military Operations Dominated by Western Sahara
--------------------------------------------- --
¶6. (C) The FAR is composed of over 200,000 soldiers and

outclasses most militaries in Africa but has significant room
for improvement. Along with concerns regarding aging
equipment and an overtaxed force, the FAR is plagued by
institutional corruption, leadership that will not step
aside, and low morale among mid-level officers. The FAR is
preoccupied with operations in the Western Sahara region with
between 50 and 70 percent of its total strength deployed
there at any one time. The force in Western Sahara -- a
landmass roughly two thirds the size of California -- is
considered to be stretched thin with a reported estimated
operational readiness rate of just 40 percent. Morocco does
not consider the POLISARIO -- the ethnically Sahrawi
resistance based in Tindouf, Algeria, seeking to make the
Western Sahara an independent state -- to be a conventional
military threat. However, the FAR remains vigilant in
guarding against a renewed POLISARIO insurgency effort.
Morocco built a berm or sand wall along the eastern and
southern borders of the Sahara in the 1980s, which
effectively eliminated the POLISARIO's ability to launch hit
and run raids, leading to the 1981 cease-fire, which has been
fully respected. The POLISARIO continues to maintain a
small, lightly armed presence at a few desert crossroads in
the small remaining part of Western Sahara outside the berm.
Despite occasional expressions of concern, the GOM almost
certainly is fully conscious that the POLISARIO poses no
current threat that could not be effectively countered. The
POLISARIO has generally refrained from classic terrorist
bombings, etc. Although the specter is sometimes raised,
there is no indication of any Salafist/Al Qaeda activity
among the indigenous Sahrawi population.
135
¶7. (C) While the border between Morocco and Algeria is
closed, and relations remain cool, we do not believe that
Algeria poses an imminent conventional military threat to
Morocco. Nonetheless, the FAR has contingency plans and
"wargames" in training exercises for a possible Algerian
attack, but the FAR does not have troops deployed along the
border. Instead, the FAR remains stationed in garrisons,
hundreds of kilometers away from the border, from which they
could deploy in the unlikely event of an Algerian incursion
into Morocco. Any confrontation between the two countries
would likely take place through the proxy of the POLISARIO,
which Algeria has supported materially in the past and could
do so again if hostilities between Morocco and the POLISARIO
recommenced.
------------
Peacekeeping
------------
¶8. (C) Motivated to win over other countries to its claims

to Western Sahara, Morocco is active in United Nations (UN),
engages in peacekeeping activities, and occasionally sends
troops to assist friendly countries. Morocco is an
experienced contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts, deploying
to countries like Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti and
Somalia. It currently has over 1,500 peacekeepers deployed
to Cote d,Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC). Morocco also supports a military hospital in Kosovo
under NATO command. Morocco has sent medical personnel to
Niger to assist with famine relief and recently re-deployed
military forces to Senegal for an annual five-month &cloud
seeding8 operation for drought relief. Peacekeeping
contributions in recent years have been tarnished by
allegations of sexual wrongdoing in the DRC and Cote
d,Ivoire.
--------------------------------------------- ---
Corruption Remains the Single Greatest Challenge
--------------------------------------------- ---
¶9. (C) Corruption is prevalent at all levels of Moroccan

society and the military is also plagued by it, particularly
136
at the highest levels. This may partly reflect a grand
bargain struck by King Hassan II following at least two
nearly successful coups in the 1970's: remain loyal, and you
can profit. (Those whose loyalty was in question were
subject to sometimes decades of harsh imprisonment.)
Credible reports indicate that Lt Gen Benanni is using his
position as the Commander of the Southern Sector to skim
money from military contracts and influence business
decisions. A widely believed rumor has it that he owns large
parts of the fisheries in Western Sahara. Benanni, like many
senior military officers, has a lavish family home that was
likely built with money gleaned from bribes. Leadership
positions in regional sectors are a significant source of
extralegal income for military leaders. There are even
reports of students at Morocco's military academy paying
money to increase their class standings in order to obtain
positions in lucrative military postings. Command in the
southern sector, i.e., Western Sahara, given the predominance
of military activity there, is considered to be the most
lucrative of the sectors in this regard. Because command in
the southern sector is also considered critical to high level
advancement in the FAR, positions there are highly sought
after. Consequently, positions in this sector are often
jealously "guarded" by a number of influential families in
the military. The GOM seems to be looking for ways to stop
corruption, especially among the formative military ranks of
Colonel and below, but not much is being done to stop the
corruption in the general officer ranks.
-------------------------------------------
Retiring High Level Officers Also a Problem
-------------------------------------------
¶10. (C) Senior officers refusing to retire to allow younger

officers to move up the ranks has become a significant
problem for the FAR. Officers nearing the mandatory
retirement age do not want to retire since this would mean
relinquishing bribes, money-skimming, and some related
sources of income. Even for those officers not &on the
take,8 giving up government positions and paychecks is
economically difficult for a sustained retirement. This
"gerontocracy" problem, coupled with the King's notorious
micro-management of the military has had a negative impact on
137
the morale of mid-level military leaders.
--------------------------------------------- ------
Radicalization: Under Control But Lingering Menace
--------------------------------------------- ------
¶11. (C) Though now viewed as a minor problem, reporting

suggests that small numbers of FAR soldiers remains
susceptible to Islamic radicalization. The GOM first
encountered this problem following the 2003 Casablanca
bombings when investigators identified military members as
co-conspirators. Following the bombings, the FAR undertook
steps to identify extremists and implement preventative
measures, such as closing prayer halls on military bases, to
address the problem. Subsequently, Morocco,s internal
security services have identified and apprehended several
military and gendarmerie personnel in other terrorist cells,
some of whom had stolen weapons from their bases for
terrorism. Acknowledging this threat in a speech to the
armed forces in May 2008, the King stated his desire to
"immunize" the armed forces from the threat of radicalization
and to promote the values of tolerance and moderation in the
ranks. During this same time frame the military forced 30
officers to retire early, allegedly because they were deemed
potentially radical and hostile to the Government.
Subsequently, the FAR removed all mosques from army bases and
deployed military counterintelligence, i.e., 5th Bureau,
undercover officers to monitor local "off-post" mosques for
potentially radical activities. These officers refer cases
to the Gendarmerie if criminal charges can be pursued.
---------------
Winds of Change
---------------
¶12. (C) Since the 1970's the military itself has been
perceived as the greatest threat to the throne and internal
security in Morocco, not surprising given Morocco's own
history and the broader context of the coup-ridden Middle
East and Africa. Of late, however, there is a general
perception that the relationship between the Palace and the

FAR is beginning to change to one of greater trust. The
138
King's growing confidence is partly signaled by a recent
significant increase in military spending, particularly for
modern hardware, although this is primarily a function of the
GOM's perceived threat from Algeria and the fact that it is
cost prohibitive at a certain point to maintain older
military equipment. The GOM increased the military's
operating budget to more than USD 2 billion in 2007,
significantly more than in previous years. Likewise, the FAR
is undergoing a significant modernization process, paying
over USD 2 billion for 24 F-16 aircraft and over USD 300
million for T-6 training aircraft from the U.S. The GOM has
commercially financed these transactions, thus far, but the
upfront payments have come from the treasury, which has also
committed to cover monthly payments. The King recently
allowed armed military flights north of Ben Guerir (located
approximately 200 kilometers south of Rabat), an act not
permitted in the past due to the King,s desire to keep the
military far away from the Palace in Rabat. The GOM is also
looking to make significant purchases of M-1 Abrams battle
tanks in the future.
--------------------------------
U.S.-Moroccan Military Relations
Strong but Could Be Better
--------------------------------
¶13. (C) In general, the U.S. and Morocco share a robust

military relationship with prospects for even closer ties in
the future. The health of the relationship is evidenced by
increased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and the
aforementioned military sales. Morocco has also increased
its activities under a partnership arrangement with the Utah
National Guard, which regularly deploys to Morocco to conduct
joint training and humanitarian relief operations. We have
submitted draft proposed language for the Moroccans to
consider for an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement
(ACSA) and a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and have
received comments on the ACSA draft from the GOM. In the
future, the Embassy hopes to see improvements in the FAR's
information sharing and accessibility to military units and
facilities with our Defense Attache Office. Although the FAR
regularly dialogues with our attaches, quality information is
lacking. The FAR also does not recognize the Embassy Attache
139
circle, an organization of Military Attaches from various
countries residing in Morocco who elect a president to
discuss issues of collective concern with the FAR. It is
apparent that the Palace continues to tightly control the
FAR's interactions U.S. and other foreign governments.
---------------------------
AFRICOM Viewed with Caution
---------------------------
¶14. (C) Previous interactions with GOM officials indicate

that military leaders are opposed to AFRICOM basing a
headquarters element in Morocco. However, Morocco has
offered to send a military liaison officer to the AFRICOM
headquarters in Germany and has offered to assist U.S.-led
efforts engaging with African countries. Morocco has also
approached AFRICOM representatives to solicit AFRICOM support
in providing chemicals needed for their cloud-seeding
operations in Senegal and providing logistics to assist with
a proposed locust control program.
-------
COMMENT
-------
¶15. (C) The Mission is optimistic that the U.S.-Moroccan

military relationship will continue to improve, but there are
potential speed bumps in future. We anticipate that
cooperative joint training exercises will continue to occur
at a robust pace, although the vast majority of this activity
will likely take place in Morocco because of continued
restrictions on the travel of FAR personnel. While we
anticipate that the Palace will continue to modernize the
military, with the notable possible acquisition of M-1 Abrams
tanks, we are increasingly concerned that Morocco, not used
to the high operating costs of these high end items (and
other budgetary pressures) may make it increasingly difficult
for the Moroccans to make payments on purchases. If payments
become a problem for the GOM, this could sour relations
temporarily. While we believe that there are some signs of
the King's increased confidence in the FAR, we believe that
the monarchy still calculates that the military represents
the biggest potential threat to the crown. FAR officers
140
will, therefore, continue to be distanced from policy making
input and restricted from engaging in detailed discussions

about Moroccan military strength and intentions with foreign
military officers, including our attaches.
*****************************************
*****************************************
Riley
141
2007-10-29 2010-11-30 Embassy
16:04 21:09 Rabat
VZCZCXRO2178
DE RUEHRB #1657/01 3021644
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291644Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 10/29/2017

TAGS PREL, PGOV, MO, FR
SUBJECT: SARKOZY SWEEPS MOROCCO OFF ITS FEET
Classified by DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (C) Summary: French President Sarkozy’s October 22-24 visit to
Morocco was viewed as a success by both sides. During a star-like
visit and speech to the Moroccan parliament, Sarkozy offered the
most explicit French statement to date in support of Morocco’s
autonomy plan as the basis for a negotiated settlement to the Sahara
dispute. Sarkozy also essentially conceded the loss of the sale of
French Rafale fighters to a “better offer” to Morocco for U.S. F-16s.
Sarkozy and entourage completed nearly 3 billion Euros worth of
commercial deals and military sales during the visit, including a
naval frigate. The French Ambassador in Rabat downplayed the
commercial aspects of the trip, instead emphasizing Sarkozy’s
“Mediterranean Union” summit proposal and his support for
Moroccan democratic and economic reforms. The visit received
142
mainly favorable attention in the local media, featuring images of two
heads of state interacting as equal partners and friends. End
summary.
---------------------------------
Leaning Farther Forward on Sahara
---------------------------------
¶2. (C) In an interview with the pro-Palace daily Le Matin just
before his arrival, Sarkozy described Morocco’s autonomy proposal
for the Sahara as “serious and credible.” Addressing a joint session
of parliament in Rabat on October 23, Sarkozy appeared to take
explicit French support for Morocco’s plan a step further, describing
it as “a new element,” in a long deadlocked process, using the USG
formulation that it could “serve as a basis for negotiation in the
search for a reasonable settlement to the Western Sahara issue.”
Sarkozy’s remarks on Sahara appeared to move France closer
toward the Moroccan position, and were embraced as such by most
of the Moroccan press, which characterized the president’s remarks
as a breakthrough for French policy on the Sahara question. (We
understand the Polisario leadership has protested Sarkozy’s
remarks.)
------------------------------------
Mediterranean Union and Other Themes
------------------------------------
¶3. (SBU) During an October 26 briefing, French Ambassador Jean-
Francois Thibault emphasized to the DCM and other members of the
diplomatic corps the excellent atmospherics of the Sarkozy visit while
downplaying its commercial aspects. Thibault stated that Sarkozy
came to underscore French support for Morocco,s democratic
development, reforms not only in the economic realm but also in
human rights, and Morocco,s importance for Europe.
¶4. (SBU) In that context, Thibault spent several minutes describing
the proposed Mediterranean Union Summit in June 2008. While
noting that the union is not intended to replace the Barcelona
Process, he said that the themes would be political, security, energy,
educational and agricultural cooperation. In response to a question,
Thibault opined that the African Union and Arab League would be
invited to send observers as would some European nations that do
not border the Mediterranean.
¶5. (SBU) Queried about international issues, Thibault said there had
been little discussion beyond the public statements about Iran and
the Middle East Peace Process. Amb. Thibault also confirmed that
France and Morocco also signed agreements on extradition, prisoner
transfer, social security, and sanitation.
143
--------------------------------------
Economic Agreements and Military Sales
--------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) Though downplaying the economic issues that received the
greatest coverage in local media, Thibault confirmed that French
companies had completed a “draft” agreement to construct a high-
speed rail line (&train a grande vitesse or TGV8) from Tangier to
Marrakech and from Casablanca to Oujda in three phases. The first
phase would be to provide the engineering, equipment and rolling
stock for the Tangier to Rabat to Casablanca portion; phase two
would extend the line to Marrakech; finally, the TGV would link
Casablanca to Rabat, Meknes, Fes, and, ultimately, Oujda. The
agreement relates to the initial 200-km Tangier-Kenitra portion of
the route, at a cost of 2 billion euros, half of which will go to
RABAT 00001657 002 OF 002 French companies Alstom, SNCF, and

Reseau Ferre de France.
¶7. (SBU) The proposal, which has been under study since 2004, was
apparently seized on as a centerpiece for the visit once it became
apparent that Rabat was determined to proceed with purchase of
American F-16 fighters rather than the French Rafale, though the
project is not expected to be commissioned until 2013. Perhaps
chastened by the Rafale experience, the French president told French
attendees at a Moroccan-French economic forum in Marrakech on
the last day of his visit that they cannot rest on their laurels. Instead
they must aggressively outbid and outhustle the competition,
conceding (according to the Moroccan press) that if the French lost
the Rafale aircraft deal, “it is because the Americans made a better
offer.” Responding to a press question Sarkozy proudly defended his
good relations with the U.S.
¶8. (SBU) Other military contracts concluded during the visit

included the sale of a French frigate and the upgrade of 25 Puma
helicopters and 140 armored vehicles. In addition, an energy contract
was signed to build a 200 million Euro power plant near Oujda in
Morocco’s northeast and the French nuclear group Areva signed a
deal with the National Phosphate Company (OCP) to extract
uranium from Moroccan phosphoric acid. In a press release, the
company noted that Morocco’s reserves of the material total 6
million metric tons, twice the world reserves of actual uranium ore.
------------------------------------------
144
Press Coverage - Ecstatic, with Exceptions
------------------------------------------
¶9. (SBU) The visit generated numerous positive images and sound
bytes. During Sarkozy’s address to parliament he called for “a real
partnership without arrogance” - and promised “France will be at
your side” as Morocco moves forward with its economic and political
agenda. These and other sound bytes resonated in numerous
headlines above glowing articles in the Moroccan press, as did images
of Sarkozy affectionately greeting the King, the royal family,
Moroccan officials, and citizens in carefully managed photo-ops.
¶10. (SBU) Though press coverage of Sarkozy’s visit was

overwhelmingly positive, some commentators voiced resentment - the
independent (Arabic) daily Al Massae groused that French
diplomacy “remains governed by traditional and obtuse concepts”
and accused the President of patronizing Morocco by issuing a
“certificate of good conduct” to the regime. A leading Islamist daily
deemed insulting Sarkozy’s assertion during his address to
parliament that Islam stands for goodness, tolerance, and peace,
while political Islam stands for separateness and engenders hostility
toward “the other.” The Arabic daily affiliated with the Islamist
PJD denounced Sarkozy’s remark as a slap in the face to the Islamist
MPs present in the audience.
¶11. (C) While Sarkozy was generally well received, there was much
gossip in Moroccan salons about a “too relaxed” President slouching
comfortably in his chair as he and the King presided over an October
22 signing ceremony at the Royal Palace in Marrakech. In one image,
Sarkozy was seen crossing his legs and pointing the sole of his shoe at
the King - a taboo gesture in the Islamic world. Sarkozy was
accompanied throughout the visit, including at a banquet with the
royal family by his Justice Minister (of Moroccan heritage) Rachida
Dati.
***************************************** Visit Embassy

Rabat’s Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************
Riley
145
146

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STATE FOR INR - MCCORMACK AND INL/AAE -

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2029

REF: A. STATE 006210 (C-NE9-00043) (NOTAL)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for

¶2. (C) Overcrowded and underfunded, Morocco's prisons are in

¶3. (C) During the &years of lead,8 the repressive era of

RABAT 00000408 002 OF 007

This has contributed to growing numbers of capital prisoners.

¶5. (C) The King named Moulay Hafid Benhachem, a former

¶6. (C) On the day of Benhachem's appointment, King Mohammed

¶7. (C) The Directorate General for Prison Administration and

RABAT 00000408 003 OF 007

¶8. (C) Benhachem's approach to his new job seems well

¶10. (C) In a separate meeting with Morocco USAID Mission

¶11. (C) In the March 31 meeting, Benhachem told EmbOffs that

¶12. (C) On the subject of rehabilitation and post-release

RABAT 00000408 004 OF 007

greater life skills programming but offered no specific

¶13. (C) Despite public statements of support from Minister

¶14. (C) Two deputies assist Benhachem. Mustapha Hilmi, a

¶15. (C) Overcrowding remains the largest single challenge to

¶16. (C) According to the Moroccan Prison Observatory (OMP),

RABAT 00000408 005 OF 007

the DGAP remain unanswered.

¶17. (C) The DGAP's Hilmi, in a public statement, countered

¶18. (C) The majority of Salafist or terror-related inmates

¶19. (C) In a speech at a national workshop on implementing

¶20. (C) At the ICAT workshop, Benhachem said that a special

¶21. (C) In terms of health services, Benhachem said that the

RABAT 00000408 006 OF 007

¶22. (C) As part of a longer-term strategy to decrease

¶23. (C) The largest actor working on rehabilitation and

¶24. (C) Other potential partners include:

-- The Observatory of Moroccan Prisons (mentioned earlier).

-- Relais Prison, a social work organization run by Fatna

-- Association Annasir (or Al Nasir), an Islamist prisoner

-- Other small NGOs, including one in Western Sahara, support

-- The Belgian Embassy, which works with released prisoners;

-- The British Embassy, which is funding a mediation training

-- The Danish Embassy, which is funding an agricultural

-- The European Union, which has expressed an interest in

RABAT 00000408 007 OF 007

¶25. (C) Comment: Although still steering a firm,

DE RUEHRB #0557/01 0881446

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, EUR; PARIS FOR DEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2010

REF: A. RABAT 539

¶B. RABAT 308

¶1. (C) Summary: Over lunch March 20, Spanish Ambassador

¶2. (C) Continuing a series of reciprocal lunches, Spanish

¶6. (C) Planas said there continued to be good cooperation

had announced it was holding a regional conference on

¶7. (C) Planas had read with interest recent coverage in

NATO High-Level Event

¶8. (C) Planas raised Morocco's hosting of the upcoming NATO

¶9. (C) Ambassador Riley noted Spain's announcement in

¶10. (SBU) Planas noted that Spain was developing plans to

DE RUEHRB #0494/01 0780849

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016

¶2. (C) The French continue to broadly support the Moroccan

¶3. (C) The Germans will try to forge a common European