برقيات السفارة الأمريكية فى صنعاء - ويكيليكس

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Reference
Created Released Classification Origin
ID
2010-01-09 2010-12-19 Embassy
10SANAA19 SECRET
05:05 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #0019/01 0090504

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 090504Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3491
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL
COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0409
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON
DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0025
S E C R E T SANAA 000019
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND ISN/NESS

MHUMPHREY
EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2020

TAGS ENRG, ECON, MNUC, PARM, PREL, PGOV, IN, YM
SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX SOUNDS ALARM OVER
UNPROTECTED RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
REF: A. 07 SANAA 1905 B. 07 SANAA 2029
4
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and
(d).
¶1. (S) The lone security guard standing watch at Yemen’s main
radioactive materials storage facility was removed from his post on
December 30, 2009, according toXXXXXXXXXXXX.
XXXXXXXXXXXX. The only closed-circuit television security
camera monitoring the facility broke six months ago and was never
fixed, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. The facility
XXXXXXXXXXXX holds various radioactive materials, small
amounts of which are used by local universities for agricultural
research, by a Sana’a hospital, and by international oilfield services
companies for well-logging equipment spread out across the country.
“Very little now stands between the bad guys and Yemen’s nuclear
material,” a worried XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff.
¶2. (S) Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi told the Ambassador on
January 7 that no radioactive material was currently stored in
Sana’a and that all “radioactive waste” was shipped to Syria.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶3. (S) The NAEC nuclear material storage facility normally contains
IAEA Category I and II amounts of iridium and cobalt-60, including
a lead-encased package of 13,500 curies (Ci) of cobalt-60 that was
allegedly shipped to Yemen from India six months ago.
XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff that XXXXXXXXXXXX the
cobalt-60 was moved late on January 7 from the largely unsecured
NAEC facility XXXXXXXXXXXX implored the U.S. to help
convince the ROYG to remove all materials from the country until
they can be better secured, or immediately improve security
measures at the NAEC facility. XXXXXXXXXXXX
COMMENT
-------
¶4. (S) Post will continue to push senior ROYG officials to increase
security at all National Atomic Energy Commission facilities and
provide us with a detailed accounting of all radioactive materials in
the country. XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXXXXXXXX’s concern over the safety
and security of Yemen’s modest nuclear material inventory, however,
appears genuine. XXXXXXXXXXXX. . Post POC is EconOff Roland
McKay, mckayrd@state.sgov.gov. SECHE
5
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2009-12- 2010-12- Embassy
09SANAA2208 SECRET//NOFORN
14 05:05 06 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #2208 3480539

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 140539Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3380
INFO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0001
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0274
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0007
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0131
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0015
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0150
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD

DEPT FOR PM/WRA LFREEMAN
EO 12958 DECL: 12/14/2019

TAGS ETTC, ECON, MARR, MASS, MCAP, PREL, PGOV, YI,
BU, CY,
UK, LI, UNSC, YM
SUBJECT: ALLEGED ILLICIT SERBIAN ARMS SALE TO
YEMENI
MILITARY, POSSIBLE UNSCR 1521 VIOLATION
6
(d)
¶1. (S/NF) A front company for Serbian illicit arms dealer Slobodan
Tesic (alt. Tezic), XXXXXXXXXXXX, signed a USD 78 million arms
contract with the Yemeni Ministry of Defense in early October 2009,
to be delivered by early January 2010, according to the Bulgarian
Embassy in Sana’a. The 34-page contract, an alleged copy of which
was provided to EconOff by XXXXXXXXXXXX on December 7 and
subsequently forwarded to State NEA/ARP and Washington
analysts, details a package of small arms ammunition, heavy artillery
ammunition, sniper rifles, demolition equipment, antiaircraft guns,
and howitzers. The Bulgarian Embassy claims that
XXXXXXXXXXXX, both named in the contract, are linked to
Slobodan Tesic, a Serbian national listed in the travel ban annex to
UNSC Resolution 1521. Tesic has made frequent trips to Yemen in
the past year in connection to this contract, according to the
Bulgarian Embassy. (Note: Sensitive USG reporting corroborates the
claim that XXXXXXXXXXXX is a Tesic front company. End Note.)
The XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff he was passing on information
of the upcoming arms transfer, obtained through a Yemeni source in
the ROYG Ministry of Defense, in the hopes of having the U.S.
Government stop the sale and thus provide opportunities for
Bulgarian arms manufacturers to supply similar equipment to the
ROYG. The Cyprus address of record for XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶2. (S/NF) Below is the text of a one-page document on Slobodan

Tesic and XXXXXXXXXXXX that the Bulgarian Embassy claims
was produced by the Bulgarian national intelligence service. (Note:
Post has no information on the alleged local agent mentioned in the
document, XXXXXXXXXXXX. End Note.)
Begin text:
XXXXXXXXXXXX ) Cyprus
Serbian Off Shore Co. ) Registered in Cyprus and owned by the
person SLOBODAN TESIC/TEZIC/ - Serbian national.
XXXXXXXXXXXX There is large list of crimes connecting with this
man, supplying weapons for Iraq, Liberia etc., terrorist regimes.
XXXXXXXXXXXX has a power of attorney for the A/M company.
He signed the contracts as XXXXXXXXXXXX
He has also British passport but he has no any official authorization
or license issues by UK for trade with military items.
Mr. SLOBODAN TESIC tried to enter Bulgaria during 2005 but he
was returned back to Serbia as he is in the ban list of UN.
Local agent in Yemen: XXXXXXXXXXXX
7
End text. SECHE
8
2009-09-02 2010-12-05 Embassy
09SANAA1632 CONFIDENTIAL
13:01 12:12 Sanaa
VZCZCXRO6952
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHYN #1632/01 2451339
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 021339Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001632
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR SMOFFATT

DEPT OF TREASURY FOR BRIAN MCCAULEY
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2019

TAGS: PTER PGOV KFIN YM
SUBJECT: AQAP LIFTS $500K IN ADEN HEIST?
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: An armed robbery rocked Aden on August 17,

in part due to the large amount stolen (100 million Yemeni
riyals) and in part due to the belief of government and
non-government sources that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) operatives are the culprits. The tactics utilized in
the armed robbery bear a striking resemblance to AQAP methods
used in previous attacks, and the sophistication of the
attack discredits claims that ordinary robbers or bank
officials acted alone. Given the ROYG's lack of
follow-through investigating a similar 1998 armed robbery
attributed to an Islamic extremist group and the potential
for these monies to be used to fund terrorist activities,
this bold, unusual operation, if truly attributable to AQAP,
would provide the organization with a substantial financial
9
infusion at a time when it is thought to be short of cash.
END SUMMARY.
HIGHLY COORDINATED ATTACK POINTS TO AQAP

----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Armed gunmen robbed an Arab Limited Bank truck

carrying 100 million riyals (equivalent to $500,000) in Aden
on August 17 in a highly coordinated attack that many suspect
was the work of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
operatives. The armed robbers were disguised as Yemeni
policemen and conducted the robbery in a busy, downtown
district in broad daylight, signaling a high level of
operational sophistication uncommon among average Yemeni
criminals. After hijacking the bank vehicle and transferring
the money to a get-away car, they erased the serial number of
a third car they used in the operation, which they abandoned
outside Aden in order to delay authorities in tracing its
ownership, according to press reports.
¶3. (C) According to independent and official sources, the

precision of the attack and the tactics utilized during the
armed robbery make it unlikely to be the work of ordinary
criminals. Official government newspaper 26 September noted
that a group of Islamic extremists are suspected to be behind
the plot, though no confirmation of their affiliation or
motives was published. XXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff on August 18, "Al-Qaeda is
responsible and I reiterate that the robbed money may be used for
terrorist
operations," underscoring the similarity to previous armed
robberies by terrorist groups in the region. The attackers'
use of police uniforms is reminiscent of al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) tactics utilized during the attack
on the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a on September 17, 2008.
¶4. (C) Rather than attack the bank itself, the robbers
conducted the heist in broad daylight in a busy sector of
Aden, suggesting a high degree of operational sophistication
and access to bank routes and times. XXXXXXXXXXXX said,
"There is
no doubt that there were people who provided them with
information about the amount of money and schedule of the
10
movement." Several bank officials have been arrested by ROYG
security forces for possible complicity in the robbery,
according to press reports. Lieutenant Colonel Haider Haider
of the Political Security Organization in Aden told EmbOff,
"Preliminary reports indicate that there was an insider
involved in this case." Though no official word has been
issued by the ROYG, Ministry of Defense-owned weekly 26
September noted on August 20 that security forces in Aden had
arrested a group of Islamic extremists they believe were
involved in the robbery. On August 22 the Yemen Observer, an
English-language weekly owned by the President's secretary,
quoted an anonymous security official claiming that the
Islamic extremists were affiliated with Tariq al-Fadhli,
former pro-Saleh jihadi turned Southern Movement leader.
Interestingly, Free Aden, an anti-ROYG, openly secessionist
web publication, also identified AQAP as the likely
perpetrator but claimed the ROYG was attempting to frame the
Southern Movement by highlighting the fact that the empty
bank vehicle was found in a district of Aden populated by
Southern Movement activists.
DJA VU?
--------
¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX highlighted the similarity between the

recent
attack and a 1998 armed robbery of a car carrying nine
million Yemeni riyals of government salaries. The 1998
robbery was conducted by eight men dressed in military
uniforms at a checkpoint where they ordered the vehicle to
pull over, requested paperwork, and then shot two of the
SANAA 00001632 002 OF 002
passengers before hijacking the car with the stolen salaries.

After the 1998 incident, the ROYG simply compensated the
government employees whose salaries were stolen without
investigating the robbery, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. Though
independent reporters tried to garner updated information
from the ROYG on the whereabouts of the stolen money and the
perpetrators, a follow-up was never published by independent
or government press. A few weeks after the 1998 robbery, 16
western tourists were kidnapped in Abyan by the Aden-Abyan
11
Islamic Army, an Islamic extremist group believed to have
cooperated with al-Qaeda in the 2000 USS Cole bombing in
Aden. (Note. The group was led by the late Abu al-Hassan
al-Mihdar, who later confessed to the kidnapping and was
summarily executed after a Yemeni court sentenced him and two
of his men to death. End Note.) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff that
at
the time, the robbery was widely believed by Adenis to have
been carried out to fund the kidnapping operation, and he
believes the same motives could be behind this recent
robbery.
COMMENT
-------
¶6. (C) It is unlikely that ordinary robbers were behind the

August 17 attack, considering the precision of the attack and
the sophisticated tactics used. The fact that the attackers
conducted a coordinated attack requiring information on the
specific routes and times of the bank vehicle suggests that
they enjoyed good connections and access to sensitive
information, both historical hallmarks of Islamic extremists
in Yemen. The ROYG's lack of transparency regarding the 1998
armed robbery and its apparent failure to thoroughly
investigate the whereabouts of the stolen monies does not
inspire confidence that the perpetrators of this attack will
be apprehended. If, in fact, they are affiliated with AQAP,
$500,000 represents a significant influx of cash which could
be used to fund future attacks. END COMMENT.
SECHE
12
2004-09-02 2010-12-03 Embassy
04SANAA2346 SECRET
11:11 21:09 Sanaa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 002346
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014

TAGS: MASS MOPS OVIP PARM PINR PREL PTER YM
COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SALEH TO A/S BLOOMFIELD "NO
NEW MANPADS"
Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski; reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
¶1. (C) Summary. Assistant Secretary of State for Political

Military Affairs Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr. discussed proposed
U.S. MANPADS buyback and destruction initiative with Yemeni
President Ali Abdullah Saleh on September 1. Saleh not only
agreed to move forward with the modalities of the buyback,
but pledged to A/S that the ROYG would not seek to buy any
new systems. Despite Saleh's attempt to extract more money
out of the buyback offer, Post expects/hopes to conclude an
agreement in the next two weeks. A/S Bloomfield's August 31
meeting with Minister of Interior al-Alimi, Chief of Military
Staff al Qassemi, and National Security Bureau Saleh covered
septel. End Summary.
---------------------------------------------
Saleh -- "We Have to Get Them Off the Market"
---------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) A/S Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr. and Ambassador met

with Yemeni President Saleh on September 1 to discuss the
proposed U.S. MANPADS buyback initiative. Saleh welcomed A/S
Bloomfield's visit and the MANPADS initiative, describing it
as part of continuing U.S. - Yemeni joint security efforts in
13
the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East. A/S Bloomfield thanked
the President for his country's cooperation and partnership
in the GWOT, emphasizing that MANPADS in particular pose a
grave threat to U.S. and Yemeni global security interests
should they fall into terrorist hands. Saleh readily agreed,
adding "these weapons in the hands of al Qa'ida or Jihadists
threaten Yemen's security forces. We have to get them off
the market."
¶3. (C) A/S Bloomfield outlined the MANPADS buyback

initiative, explaining it was a very specific proposal to
purchase and destroy systems collected by the ROYG. In
addition to compensation for each system, U.S. technical
training and assistance would be provided to ensure the
safety of MANPADS collection and transportation, and to
conduct destruction. A/S Bloomfield stressed that there was
a 90-day window in which to buy and destroy current ROYG
illicit stocks, and that while the program did not have a
time limit -- the funding was, indeed, finite.
¶4. (S) Saleh told A/S Bloomfield that the ROYG was
currently in possession of 1435 MANPADS including 500 he had
recently collected from "private people" just prior to his
departure to London for an official visit on September 25.
The President made clear that these systems would be offered
up for sale and destruction according to the proposed
initiative, adding that he estimated there were another 150 -
200 still in private hands which the ROYG is targeted for
collection. (Note: On August 31 A/S Bloomfield viewed 79
recovered MANPADS stored in a MOD facility. The 1435 appear
to be some combination of these 79, plus the other 1029
emboffs observed in the same facility in 2003, and a number
of other illicit systems we were unaware had been collected.
We will seek clarification on these numbers from NSB Deputy
Director Ammar Saleh. End Note.)
¶5. (C) President Saleh assured A/S he was serious about

cutting off the possibility of MANPADS leakage from official
stocks. He said he had given the order to collect all
systems from the Yemeni Armed Forces in the field and return
them to storage immediately. A/S commended the President's
actions to get "these dangerous missiles out of dangerous
14
hands," emphasizing that Yemeni MANPADS must remain under
the
lock and key of the authorities. "Actually," Saleh
responded, "we don't need them."
--------------------------------
Saleh Promises No New MANPADS...
--------------------------------
¶6. (C) Saleh pledged to A/S Bloomfield that Yemen's

national defense did not require MANPADS; to the contrary,
the current crisis in Sa'da proves "it was a big mistake" to
allow such weapons to fall into the hands of our enemies
where they can be used against our own forces. "I assure
you," said the President, "there will be no new deals, we
will not trade in them." Bloomfield responded, "you have
made a very important statement, that MANPADS are more useful
to terrorists than to your military."
¶7. (S) A/S told Saleh he is engaged in ongoing discussions

with source country governments in Eastern Europe to stop
exporting MANPADS, but that we have indications arms dealers
claiming to represent Yemen continue to shop in these markets
for advanced MANPADS. Saleh advised, "You cannot prevent
(North) Korea, China, Ukraine, Russia, or Belarus from
producing or selling weapons. I do not believe you will be
successful." "Although," he continued, "maybe you can
convince them to sell through official government contracts
and not through brokers." A/S Bloomfield agreed that
controlling weapons production was not easy, but explained
that arms firms in nations working with the U.S. to limit
production of MANPADS report that Yemen remains a potential
client. "No," replied Saleh, we do not need them."
¶8. (S) A/S Bloomfield asked the President "if our friends
in Eastern Europe tell me they have a contract with Yemen,
may I tell them 'no, you do not'"?. Saleh replied. "yes,
tell them the contract is canceled -- stop it -- no one has a
deal to sell such weapons to Yemen unless they talk to me."
A/S replied that Saleh's pledge not to acquire new MANPADS
should not be underestimated, as it would enhance Yemen's
reputation in Washington and the international community.
15
--------------------------------------
...In Exchange for One Million Dollars
--------------------------------------
¶9. (C) "Rest assured," Saleh continued, "Yemen will not

have such weapons anymore, but everything has a price. You
will have to pay...one million dollars for each strela!"
(Note: After an awkward silence, Saleh laughed, indicated he
was exaggerating, and promised the price would come down. In
fear some uncertainty remained, the Palace translator turned
to A/S saying, "I feel it is my duty to make sure you
understand this is a joke." End Note.) "How much are you
willing to pay?" pressed the President. A/S responded that
that the price for each MANPAD was fixed and not negotiable.
"Fixed, but well above what we believe to be the market
price."
---------------------------
Al-Houthi - Lessons Learned
---------------------------
¶10. (S) Saleh told A/S that the recent events in Sa'da,
(where ROYG forces are embroiled in an increasingly bloody
fight against the well-equipped supporters of rebel Shi'ite
cleric al-Houthi) has proven that it was a "big mistake" to
allow these weapons to reach enemy hands. Saleh reported to
A/S that 250 soldiers had been killed and 1000-1500 injured
in addition to 300-350 rebels. (Note: Post believes the
number of ROYG casualties to be much higher. End Note.)
¶11. (S) A/S Bloomfield replied that the U.S. was aware of
the cost to Yemen of the recent fighting and that "this hurts
us too." A/S told Saleh that the Embassy is looking to see
how else we can help.
-----------------------
...And the Kitchen Sink
-----------------------
¶12. (S) As expected, Saleh raised extending the buyback to

include other types of weapons. He reported that the ROYG
has been buying back all types from the grey market since
16
9/11, including SA-2 and SA-3 surface-to-air missiles,
machine-guns, anti-tank missiles, mines, RPGs, and
explosives. "We have already paid 9 billion rials
(approximately 49 million USD) to keep these weapons out of
al Qa'ida hands," claimed the President we are ready to
destroy them. We hope you will not limit the program to
MANPADS." (Note: the ROYG claims it has collected 32 million
USD in assorted SW/LA and is seeking to recover this expense.
Although we doubt the claim of 32 million, we understand
from MOD and NSB contacts that the ROYG has yet to reimburse
the arms dealers it contracted to collect these weapons and
Minister of Defense Alaiwa is under considerable pressure to
make good on the deal. End Note.)
----------------------------
Inventory Control Assistance
----------------------------
¶14. (S) A/S emphasized that the program on the table is

urgent and specific; it targets several countries with large
numbers of these dangerous systems. He stressed that the
current proposal is for MANPADS only, and he is offering to
buy them for significantly more than market price. "We hope
that this important first step will be completed as soon as
possible," said A/S, adding, that he was prepared to explore
ways the U.S. can assist the ROYG in controlling its official
stocks such as providing inventory controls, computer
systems, stockpile security, and training. Saleh replied
that he looked forward to learning the details of this
assistance.
-----------------------
Give Us Our Spare Parts
-----------------------
¶15. (C) Saleh complained to A/S of ongoing licensing

difficulties which had grounded F-5's, and Augusta
helicopters, and rendered M-60 Tanks and M109 artillery
inoperable. "We have made request after request," he said,
"Why doesn't the U.S. respond?" The President repeated a
common theme, telling A/S Bloomfield that he pays a high
political price in the region and internally for his CT
cooperation with the U.S. "Our cooperation" he said will be
17
commensurate with yours, "As much as you move, we will move."
¶16. (S) A/S Bloomfield responded that the USG appreciates its
cooperative relationship with Yemen in the GWOT, and pointed
out that, "as a demonstration of our trust, yesterday I gave
Military Chief of Staff Qassemi a C-130 licensing agreement."
"No, interrupted Saleh, "that is a transport plane. We need
our F-5 in Sa'da." A/S assured the President that he would
personally look at each Yemeni licensing request when he
returned to Washington and would make sure that they received
full consideration. (Note: When A/S Bloomfield handed the
C-130 license to Chief of Staff Qassemi on August 31, the
General said sarcastically "these few parts to a transport
plane represent the biggest step forward in our military to
military cooperation in years." End Note.)
------------------------------
Comment: "What, Won't Haggle?"
------------------------------
¶17. (S) All joking aside, Saleh appears serious in trying

to push up the price per system. It is hard to imagine a
shrewd operator like the President paying more than market
price for Strela 2's, approximately 2000 USD. It would be
true to style for Saleh to try to extract as much possible
from the USG in exchange for his security cooperation. On
the margins of the meeting, NSB Deputy Director, and Saleh's
nephew, Ammar Saleh recommended A/S Bloomfield send the
President a follow-up letter to our meeting listing other
benefits to Yemen that may result from the agreement, and
urging him not to break the deal over prices that cannot/will
not change. End Comment.
KRAJESKI
18
2005-04-13 2010-12-03 Embassy
05SANAA923 SECRET
10:10 21:09 Sanaa
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/ARPI

NSC FOR FTOWNSEND
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2010

TAGS: PINR PREL PTER YE COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: SALEH ON KANAAN: WE'VE GOT HIM!!
REF: IIR 6906012405
Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 (b)

AND (d)
------------------------
Gentlemen, We've Got Him!
-------------------------
¶1. (S) In a conference call with Ambassador and DCM,

President Ali Abdallah Saleh informed us last night, Tuesday,
April 12, that suspected terrorist Kanaan has been caught.
Saleh began with, "You know this man Kanaan who has been
threatening you and for whose sake you closed down your
embassy? Well, we've caught him. In fact, we also arrested,
two days ago, two of his top assistants." Saleh went on to
say that these arrests show the "seriousness and honesty" of
his services and the political will at the top for full
cooperation with "our friends the Americans." You, on the
other hand said Saleh, "don't move on our requests." Saleh
reassured us that his cooperation and the cooperation of his
"services" would continue no matter what.
19
-----------------------
Now, Where's Our Stuff?
-----------------------
¶2. (S) Saleh did not waste time for his usual quid-pro-quo
tactics. "So, where's my stuff? We have requested equipment
and weapons for our CSF counter terrorism unit," said Saleh.
"We have suffered important and costly losses in Saada and we
need your help. Please tell Washington that this is urgent."
"I respond to you immediately when you need something," added
Saleh, "and now, you must do the same for me."
---------------
Action Request:
---------------
¶3. (S) We have presented, through military channels, a list

of items requested by the Minister of Interior specifically
for his CSF/CTU unit (reftel). The Ambassador will be sending
a message separately to Centcom leadership to see about
speeding up some material already requested through FMF
funds. Post hereby requests Department and NSC assistance in
having a deliverable, or two, for NSC to offer as a pat on
the back during the planned telephone conversation later this
week. The deliverable could be any of the items in reftel,
but we recommend and advance on the armored vehicles which
MOI says are urgently needed for an operation against an AQ
target in the Ma'rib region.
Krajeski
20
2007-04-02 2010-12-03 Embassy
07SANAA473 SECRET
05:05 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXRO1280
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHYN #0473 0920535
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020535Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6625
COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHRMDAB/COMUSNAVCENT BAHRAIN
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
E C R E T SANAA 000473
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2017

TAGS: PREL MASS YM
SUBJECT: (S) UNMANNED USG AIRCRAFT WASHES ASHORE,
OFFICIAL
MEDIA REPORTS DOWNED IRANIAN "SPY PLANE"
REF: STATE 32641
Classified By: CDA NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)

AND (D).
¶1. (S) On March 27, Yemeni military officers discovered an

unmanned USG reconnaissance aircraft (Scan Eagle) that had
washed ashore on the Arabian Sea coast in the province of
21
Hadramaut. The President's Office immediately protested the
incident to CDA and requested an explanation. Initially
unaware of any USG operations in the area, Post learned after
further inquiry that the reconnaissance aircraft belonged to
the U.S.S. Ashland, which had been patrolling as part of
CTF-150, 60 nautical miles off the Yemeni coast. The
aircraft had crashed in international waters on March 17 and
had not been recovered.
¶2. (S) On March 28, CDA spoke with President Saleh (who was
attending the Arab League summit in Riyadh) via telephone and
confirmed that the aircraft belonged to the U.S. Navy. He
assured Saleh that the plane crashed performing routine
reconnaissance near the ship and had not been operating in
Yemeni territory. CDA also met separately with Interior
Minister Rashad Alimi and Ammar Saleh, Deputy Director of the
National Security Bureau, and presented both with general
information on the aircraft.
¶3. (S) President Saleh expressed doubt as to the plane's

actual mission, but promised CDA that the ROYG would not
"turn this into an international incident" and would instruct
government officials not to comment. On March 29, official
and pro-government media sources reported that the Yemeni
military had shot down an Iranian "spy plane" off the coast
of Hadramaut, after communicating with "multinational forces"
in the region. Independent daily Al-Ayam (largest
circulating independent newspaper), quoted an unnamed Yemeni
military official as confirming that the plane belonged to
the American government, but would not comment on whether the
plane was shot down or discovered after crashing.
¶4. (S) Comment: President Saleh clearly believes the

unmanned aircraft had been performing reconnaissance in
Yemeni territory when it crashed. He could have taken the
opportunity to score political points by appearing tough in
public against the United States, but chose instead to blame
Iran. No doubt focused on the unrest in Saada and our
support for the transfer of excess armored personnel carriers
from neighboring countries (reftel), Saleh decided he would
benefit more from painting Iran as the bad guy in this case.
End Comment.
KHOURY
22
2007-10- 2010-12- Embassy
30 06:06 03 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #1989/01 3030637

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300637Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0057
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 0506
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR ADNAN KIFAYAT; WHITE HOUSE FOR JOHN

PEARSON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017

TAGS: PGOV PTER YM
SUBJECT: TOWNSEND-SALEH MEETING PROVIDES
OPENING FOR
ADDITIONAL CT COOPERATION
REF: A. SANAA 1859

¶B. SANAA 1935
¶C. SANAA 1633
¶D. SANAA 1901
23
Classified By: DCM Angie Bryan for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1.(U) Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, has cleared this
cable.
Summary
-----
2.(S) Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, met with President
Saleh in Aden on October 22 to discuss mutual cooperation in
the War on Terror. During the meeting, Saleh accepted
Townsend's request for USG interrogation of Jamal al-Badawi,
convicted architect of the bombing of the USS Cole. Saleh
blamed "aging agents" in the Political Security Organization
(PSO) for inadequate cooperation, asked the USG to pressure
regional Gulf countries to stop their support of southern
"secessionist" movements, accepted Townsend's offer of USG
assistance in preparation of counterterrorism and cash
courier laws, and agreed to the need for joint operations to
combat terrorism outside Yemen. Saleh also warned against
the threat of Iran, specifically with regard to its role
inside Iraq, and promised to do more to curb the flow of
young Yemeni men going to fight in Iraq. The meeting was
generally a constructive one, with the Yemeni President
making some positive commitments. Post will continue to work
with the ROYG to ensure these commitments are not forgotten.
End Summary
Jamal "He is Under my Microscope" al-Badawi and Friends

-----------------------------
3.(S) Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for

Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, met with President
Ali Abdullah Saleh in Aden on October 22 to discuss mutual
cooperation in the War on Terror. During the lunch portion
of the meeting, also attended by the Foreign Minister, the
Governor of Aden, and a member of Parliament, she asked for
an update on the status of Jamal al-Badawi, convicted
architect of the bombing of the USS Cole (ref B). The
President confirmed al-Badawi's release, clarifying that he
is under house arrest, living and working on his farm near
24
Aden, while the ROYG closely monitors him. Saleh added that
while Yemeni authorities pursued al-Badawi, the ROYG was
transmitting messages to him "promising" that if he turned
himself in, his "situation would get better." Saleh said he
personally met with al-Badawi "two weeks ago" and had a frank
discussion with him. "Al-Badawi promised to give up
terrorism and I told him that his actions damaged Yemen and
its image; he began to understand," Saleh said.
4.(S) Townsend expressed dismay over al-Badawi's release and

asked for USG access to interrogate him. Saleh told Townsend
not to worry, "he is under my microscope," but had no
objections to her request, reiterating numerous times that
interested USG entities could interrogate al-Badawi by
coordinating with the Political Security Organization (PSO).
5.(S) Saleh specifically mentioned two other escapees that

remain at large: Abdullah al-Wadi'i and Nasr al-Wahishi. He
said al-Wahishi had taken the place of Abu Ali as head of
al-Qaeda in Yemen. Townsend reiterated USG concern over the
ROYG's house arrest system, with a reference to the cases of
Ibrahim Makri and Mansur al-Bahani, both of whom were linked
to terrorist activity while under house arrest.
Weapons Trafficking: You Can't Make This Stuff Up

-------------------------
6.(C) As Townsend began to ask Saleh about his efforts to

combat weapons trafficking, Saleh interrupted her to invite
one of Yemen's top three weapons traffickers, Faris Mana'a,
into the lunch meeting. When Mana'a, who met with the
President earlier in the day, entered the room, Saleh
jokingly addressed the Embassy Assistant Legal Attach
(Legatt), saying, "hey FBI, if he does not behave properly,
you can take him... back to Washington in Townsend's plane or

to Guantanamo." The Legatt replied, "we could put both
Mana'a and al-Badawi on the plane;" however, the translator
did not report this to Saleh, making it unlikely that the
President heard the Legatt's reply. Meanwhile, Presidential
staff provided Mana'a with a chair at the table. Saleh
explained that the ROYG had recently confiscated a shipment
of "pistols" from Mana'a and given them to the military.
25
Townsend lightheartedly commented, "he has donated weapons to
the nation's military -- he can be considered a patriot now."
Saleh responded with laughter, saying, "no, he is a double
agent -- he also gave weapons to the al-Houthi rebels." The
President said the Ministry of Defense was the only entity in
Yemen authorized to purchase weapons. (Comment: If the
President,s statement were an accurate portrayal of the
situation, arms dealers would effectively be out of business.
Saleh's comment has been made to Post numerous times before.
This, and Mana'a's presence at the Palace, raises serious
questions about the President's commitment to stopping
weapons trafficking. Mana'a also runs a construction company
and a petroleum services business, with contracts in Iraq.
His ties to Saleh may extend beyond money made from the
weapons trade. End Comment)
7.(C) Saleh said the new weapons ban (ref C) in Yemen's major
cities had been a success, receiving a surprisingly positive
public response. He specified that in the past month 45,000
pieces of weaponry had been collected. The Governor of Aden
added that his city was "100% clean of weapons." Saleh
expressed a desire to "follow the United States example" of
licensing guns. When asked by the Legatt if he was going to
expand the weapons ban outside major cities, Saleh responded
that it is a "step-by-step" process.
PSO: The Old Guard is the Problem

-----------------
8.(S) Townsend complimented Yemen's National Security Bureau,

saying, "it has done good work, despite its youth," yet
complained of a lack of cooperation from the PSO with the
USG. Saleh replied that his proposed constitutional
amendments (ref A) were the first step in addressing this
problem. At Foreign Minister al-Qirbi's insistence, Saleh
elaborated upon his answer, adding that, "although the PSO
has firm orders to cooperate and respond quickly, its agents
are aging," alluding to PSO Head, Ghalib Mutahi Qamish.
(Note: Qamish has been a topic of (sometimes tense)
discussion between Townsend and Saleh in the past. End Note)
The Gulf Factor: Fueling Southern Unrest

---------------------
26
9.(S) While Saleh claimed the situation in the rebellious
northern Saada governorate was "very calm," he expressed
apprehension over the unrest in the South. The President
asked the USG to pressure countries funding southern
opposition, saying, "it is important that Yemen not reach a
state of instability. We need your support." Townsend
replied, "you do not even have to think about it. Of course
we support Yemen."
10.(S) Saleh asserted that neighboring Arab countries were

intent on destabilizing his country by supporting the
southern "secessionist" movement, "not because they have
anything against Yemen, but because we are following the
United States' democracy model, and they do not want a
democracy in the region." He specifically referred to Crown
Prince Sultan of Saudi Arabia, but inculpated other Gulf
countries as well. According to Saleh, Gulf Islamic
organizations are funding the opposition in the South and
supporting secessionist movement leaders living in Oman,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. He said some of those regional
Islamic organizations had links to the radical factions
within the Islamist opposition party Islah - calling them
"jihadists, salafis, and al-Qaeda." (Note: Islah is the
largest opposition party in Yemen and is largely recognized
as moderate. It includes radical factions that are
considered to be a minority. End Note)
USG Support: CT, Cash Courier Law and Joint Operations

-------------------------------
-----
11.(C) Townsend asked about the progress of Yemen's draft

counterterrorism (CT) law. Saleh answered, "it has come a
long way, but we have not yet fully achieved our goals."
Townsend offered USG technical assistance in drafting the law
and training for its implementation, which Saleh casually
accepted. (Note: The Minister of Legal Affairs recently
rejected an offer for the same assistance (ref D). The lack
of an effective CT law sometimes leaves the ROYG without a
legal basis to hold terrorists. Post views passage of a
comprehensive CT Law as a significant step in strengthening
27
counterterrorism bilateral relations. End Note)
12.(C) Townsend recommended a cash courier law to strengthen

Yemen's efforts at combating terrorism and proposed USG
assistance with the drafting of this law as well, which Saleh
also nonchalantly accepted. (Comment: Saleh's informal
manner makes it unclear how resolute he was in accepting, yet
it is certain that he did not reject the offers made by
Townsend and generally agreed to her proposals. End Comment)
13.(S) Townsend said USG agencies want to work with the ROYG
on counterterrorism outside, not just inside, Yemen. Saleh
agreed. He noted that Usama bin Laden's personal bodyguards
are all Yemeni, alluding to the need for USG-ROYG cooperation
in the tribal areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Saleh
added that "violence by governments is not always the
answer," and asked for greater USG assistance in development.
(Note: Yemen is a beneficiary of significant non-CT aid
through the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the US
Department of Agriculture Food for Progress Program and, as
of November 1, returns to the Millennium Challenge
Cooperation's Threshold Country Program. End Note)
Iran, Iran, Iran

---------
14.(S) Throughout the meeting, Saleh repeatedly asked about

Iran and the USG's position vis-a-vis the country. Townsend
replied that if Iran does not get serious, the USG will be
forced to return to the United Nations to request more
sanctions.
15.(S) Saleh warned Townsend about Qatar's relationship with

Iran, cautioning that although the two countries are allies,
Iran could turn on Qatar at any time. Townsend agreed,
saying she had relayed the same message to Qatar, and asked
Saleh if he had spoken to the Qatari Emir about this matter.
Saleh responded, "of course." He also asked Townsend to
deliver a verbatim message to President Bush about Iran: "you
must discipline and tame a child when he is young."
16.(S) On Iraq, Saleh asked Townsend to tell President Bush

that, "Maliki represents Iran in Iraq, he is worse than
28
Ahmedinejad." He repeatedly referred to Maliki as a "dog,"
although the embarrassed interpreter substituted the word
"he."
Foreign Fighters to Iraq

-------------
17.(S) Townsend expressed USG concern over young Yemeni men

going to fight in Iraq and asked Saleh to do more to tackle
the problem. Saleh replied that it is an extremely difficult
task, as Yemeni men do not travel directly to Iraq. They
first travel to Cairo, Damascus, or Riyadh, making it
practically impossible to track who is traveling to Baghdad.
Townsend suggested publicly announcing airport interrogations
of young men suspected of going to Iraq. She noted that the
fear of getting caught itself might stem the flow of foreign
fighters. Saleh agreed and said the ROYG will try to do
more. (Note: Yemeni security services currently try to
scrutinize young male Yemeni travelers, particularly those
traveling to Damascus, as a means to identify foreign
fighters, and sometimes deny them travel. End Note)
Letters Exchanged
----------
18.(C) Townsend delivered a letter from President Bush to

President Saleh. The letter was read by both Saleh and
Foreign Minister al-Qirbi. Saleh responded to it by
emphasizing Yemen's willingness to "cooperate with everything

that is included in President Bush's letter." With this, he
insisted the United States continue to support Yemen, both
financially and politically, and "stand in the way of those
against us." Saleh presented Townsend with a letter for
President Bush and a report on Yemen's efforts to combat
terrorism.
Comment
-----
19.(S) Overall, this meeting was more constructive than some

observers would have expected. Given Saleh's colorful
character and knack for theatrics, the inclusion of a weapons
29
trafficker during his lunch with Townsend was not a complete
surprise. Saleh's action was seen by some as a veiled threat
to Mana'a, but was clearly also a message to the USG that in
his country he will do as he pleases. Like other leaders in
the region, Saleh is loathe to be perceived as subservient to
US or Western interests. His use of the dual threats of
terrorism and instability when referring to internal conflict
is also not new. Saleh consistently uses this tactic when
attempting to garner USG support. Saleh's allowing USG
interrogation of al-Badawi is positive. The fact that Saleh
released this convicted terrorist, despite USG objections,
however, is cause for concern. Saleh's acceptance of
Townsend's proposal of assistance in drafting the CT and cash
courier law and his commitment to joint action to combat
terrorism outside Yemen are welcome developments, as is his
willingness to cooperate to stem the flow of Yemeni fighters
to Iraq, even if his acceptance of these ideas is nonchalant.
Post will continue to work with the ROYG to ensure these
commitments are not forgotten.
20.(U) Minimize considered for Baghdad.

SECHE
30
2009-03- 2010-12-03 Embassy
23 07:07 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #0495/01 0820700

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 230700Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0078
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1614
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NSC FOR APDNSA JOHN BRENNAN AND JOHN DUNCAN

DEPT FOR S/WCI AMBASSADOR CLINT WILLIAMSON
AND SHAUN COUGHLIN, NEA/ARP ANDREW MACDONALD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019

TAGS: KDRG PGOV PINR PTER PINS IZ SA YM
SUBJECT: SALEH SHOWS NO FLEXIBILITY ON GTMO
DETAINEES
Classified By: CDA Angie Bryan for reasons 1.4(b), (c), and (d)
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S/NF) President Saleh on March 16 rejected a proposal by

visiting Assistant to the President and Deputy National
31
Security Advisor (APDNSA) John Brennan that Yemeni
Guantanamo
detainees be sent to a Saudi rehabilitation center jointly
run by Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Saleh instead insisted that
the Yemeni detainees be returned to Yemen as soon as a
proposed rehabilitation center in Aden, funded by the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia, is ready to accept them. End Summary.
SALEH INTRANSIGENT ON DETAINEES

-------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) President Saleh on March 16 repeatedly rebuffed

suggestions by visiting APDNSA John Brennan that Yemeni
Guantanamo detainees be sent to Saudi Arabia, insisting on a
Saudi-style rehabilitation center inside Yemen, funded by the
U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Brennan, accompanied by the
Ambassador, NSC Director John Duncan, S/WCI Ambassador Clint
Williamson, and Pol/Mil Chief, told Saleh that the U.S.
wanted detainees to return to Yemen eventually. In the
absence of a Yemeni program, however, the best near-term
solution was for Saudi Arabia and Yemen to jointly run a
program, at a Saudi-built rehabilitation facility at Abha in
KSA with an immediate capability of receiving up to 120
detainees and open to Arabs from across the region. Saleh
refused to address this suggestion directly, saying Yemen
would build its own rehabilitation center in Aden. "We will
offer the land in Aden, and you and the Saudis will provide
the funding." It will be ready 90 days after receipt of the
USD 11 million required for construction, Saleh said.
¶3. (S/NF) Growing increasingly impatient, Saleh said that the

U.S. could duplicate the Saudi program in Yemen. Brennan
responded that such a program takes time to develop and that
Saleh had his hands full dealing with al-Qaeda in Yemen.
Saleh said that while he personally had no problem with
detainees being sent to KSA, Yemeni opposition parties are
the real obstacle because they will not allow him to give KSA
control over Yemeni citizens. Brennan told Saleh that a
leader of his depth of experience could surely figure out a
way to deal with the opposition,s concerns. Saleh asked why
the U.S. didn,t simply keep the detainees at Guantanamo or
send them to the "Moayad prison" while Yemen builds its own
facility. (Note: Saleh was referring to the federal prison
32
in Colorado where convicted Yemeni terrorist financier
Mohammed al-Moayad is currently being held. End Note.)
Signaling his bottom line, Saleh told Brennan that Yemen
already had plans for a rehabilitation center and repeated
his demand that the U.S. and KSA fund it. At this point,
Brennan asked to speak with Saleh and the Ambassador
privately.
¶4. (S/NF) In the pull-aside with Brennan and the Ambassador,

Saleh said that he wouldn,t object if the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia entered into a bilateral agreement regarding
disposition of the Guantanamo detainees. (Comment: Saleh
said this knowing full well that the Saudis are unwilling at
this point to take in the Yemeni detainees without his
concurrence. End Comment.) In a brief meeting outside
Saleh's gazebo, Ambassador Williamson described to Saleh's
nephew, Deputy Director of the National Security Bureau (NSB)
Ammar Saleh, the USG's review process for evaluating possible
destinations for detainees and praised the Saudi program.
Ambassador Williamson said that Saudi Arabia was closer to
Yemen than Guantanamo and that if the Saudi solution didn't
work, then the Yemenis would be transfered to other
countries, but not to Yemen. Ammar proposed sending the
Yemenis to the ROYG facility for a brief (e.g. 3 month)
period at which time Saleh could announce that they had asked
to be transferred to KSA, and it would be done. He cautioned
that he had not yet proposed the idea to Saleh and that any
such transfers would have to be approved by both the family
and the tribes involved. Ambassador Williamson thanked Ammar
Saleh for his suggestion and said he would take it up with
Mr. Brennan, but noted that he did not think it was a viable
alternative given the caveats imposed.
RETURN OF THE BAATH IN IRAQ??

-----------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) In a bizarre postscript to the morning meeting with

Saleh, the Palace protocol office called an hour later to
request that Brennan meet with Ammar Saleh. Expecting a
continuation of the Guantanamo detainee discussion, the
Brennan delegation and the Ambassador met with Saleh, who
said that he had been instructed by the President to share
"very important" intelligence information with Brennan.
33
Ammar said the NSB had what it considered reliable
information that the Iraqi Baath party was reconstituting
itself and would reclaim power in Baghdad once the U.S.
pulled out. Upon hearing this, Brennan ended the meeting,
telling Ammar that he had come expecting to discuss detainee
issues, and that he would report to President Obama his
disappointment that the ROYG was being inflexible in dealing
with the issue. In a final twist, the protocol office called
to say that Ammar Saleh would meet Mr. Brennan at the airport
as he departed Yemen (raising again the possibility that
there could be further discussion of the detainee issue) only
to call back to say Ammar Saleh had been called away to
another meeting.
ROYG SPIN AND EMBASSY PRESS STATEMENT

-------------------------------------
¶6. (C) Official news agency Saba released a statement after

the meeting saying that Saleh had called on the U.S. to
"extradite" Yemeni citizens at Guantanamo to Yemen so they
could be rehabilitated and integrated into society. The Saba
statement also noted that Brennan had delivered a letter from
President Obama praising Yemen's efforts in counterterrorism
and that Saleh had given Brennan a response letter for
President Obama. (Note: Brennan did deliver a letter from
President Obama, but the letter focused on the danger of
transfering detainees directly to Yemen. Contrary to the
Saba statement, Saleh did not give Brennan a letter for
President Obama. End Note.)
¶7. (U) The Embassy issued the following press release,

cleared by Brennan, the afternoon of March 16.
Begin Embassy press release text:
John Brennan, Assistant to the President and Deputy National

Security Advisor, visited Yemen on March 16, 2009 as part of
a visit to the region to discuss continued cooperation
between the United States and Yemen in combating terrorism.
As part of the ongoing dialogue between Yemen and the United
States regarding the remaining Yemeni detainees at
Guantanamo, Mr. Brennan raised with President Ali Abdullah
Saleh the U.S. Government's concerns about the direct return
34
of detainees to Yemen.
End Embassy press release text.
COMMENT
-------
¶8. (S/NF) To say Saleh missed a good chance to engage the new
Administration on one of its key foreign policy priorities
would be a severe understatement. He appeared alternately
dismissive, bored, and impatient during the 40-minute
meeting. Saleh's knowledge that Saudi Arabia will not accept
Yemeni detainees without at least tacit support from Saleh
has likely emboldened the ROYG to press publicly and
privately for an all-or-nothing push for the direct transfer
of detainees to Yemen. Saleh clearly feels that he has the
better hand in any negotiations on the issue. He may have
concluded that, if he holds out long enough, the USG will
eventually acquiesce to his demands because of the
Administration's timeline for closing Guantanamo in spite of
Mr. Brennan's clear message that the USG is actively seeking
alternatives. End Comment.
¶9. (U) APDNSA Brennan cleared this cable. S/WCI Ambassador

Williamson did not have the opportunity to clear this cable.
BRYAN
35
2009-05- 2010-12- Embassy
31 12:12 03 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #1015/01 1511217

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 311217Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0089
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP:MBLONG

RIYADH FOR ASTEINFELD
BAGHDAD FOR LGURIAN
EO 12958 DECL: 05/30/2019

TAGS PGOV, PREL, PTER, YM
SUBJECT: SALEH SEES FOREIGN HAND BEHIND YEMEN,S
INTERNAL
WOES
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d)
¶1. (S) Summary. During a 40-minute meeting at his residence in

Taiz, President Saleh confirmed to D/D CIA Kappes his intention to
permit Yemenis to enter the Saudi rehab program upon their release
from Guantanamo, an issue that he said he will discuss King
Abdullah during a visit to Riyadh on May 31. Saleh also ranked the
threats to Yemen’s security in the following order: AQAP, the
Houthi rebellion, and the Southern Movement, all of which he
suggested were being driven by external forces. End Summary.
36
¶2. (S) D/D Kappes and his traveling party, accompanied by the
Ambassador and PolMil chief, flew on May 28 to Taiz, some 200 km
south of Sana’a, in a Yemeni Air Force M-171 helicopter, to meet
with President Saleh at his quarters there. Saleh appeared relaxed,
greeting his visitors in an open-collar white shirt and dark trousers.
(Note: over Saleh’s left eye were visible the traces of a cut he suffered
mid-May in a fall on the deck of the swimming pool at the
Presidential Palace in Sana’a. End note.) After opening pleasantries,
Saleh referred to the ongoing debate in the U.S. regarding the closure
of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, especially criticism of the
plan to transfer some detainees into U.S. prisons, noting that “we
have agreed to send Yemenis to Saudi Arabia.” Kappes said he
understood POTUS was very grateful for Saleh’s support in this
matter, and added that details of the prisoner transfer to Saudi
Arabia were being worked out. Saleh said that he would discuss the
issue with King Abdullah when he travelled to Riyadh on May 31.
(Note: We understand that GCC foreign ministers also will meet in
Riyadh next week and that, on the margins of that meeting, they will
convene a separate session on Yemen, to which Foreign Minister
Qirbi has been invited. End Note.)
¶3. (S) Saleh then noted what he characterized as an “agreement” by

the Bush Administration to finance construction of an extremist
rehabilitation facility in Yemen, the estimated cost of which is $11M.
Saleh expressed his understanding that the Yemeni detainees would
be placed first in the Saudi rehab program and then transferred
home once the facility here was built and ready to receive them.
Saleh also mentioned his “appointment with President Obama,”
which he said the two had discussed during their recent phone call.
As to the timing of this visit, Kappes suggested it was most likely that
the invitation would be extended once the transfer of Yemeni
detainees to KSA was underway. Saleh replied: “Send them all to
Saudi Arabia now. They already have a facility.”
¶4. (S) Turning to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),

Kappes praised cooperation between U.S. and Yemeni intelligence
agencies. He noted that the USG remains as determined as ever to
destroy AQ worldwide, to which Saleh replied, “I hope this campaign
continues and succeeds. We’re doing the same here. Our position is
unshakable.” Kappes expressed concern that AQAP was targeting
Saleh himself, a point Saleh agreed with, asserting that ROYG
security services had recently arrested an individual they believe was
37
going to fire a surface-to-air missile at the Presidential plane during a
recent trip to Aden. (Comment. We hadn’t heard of this incident
previously, although there were reports of plans to attack Saleh’s
plane in a similar manner earlier this year as he prepared to depart
Sana’a for Kuwait. End Comment.)
¶5. (S) On current unrest in the south, Saleh asserted that “we are
not that worried. This is not new. These are the same people who
tried to break away in 1994. Then, even with an army and an air
force, they failed. They will fail again without external assistance.”
He noted that one difference now is that the secessionists are
exploiting international media such as Arabic-language satellite
channels Al Jazeera and Al Hurra. (Note: Saleh was referring to an
interview with Haidar al-Attas, a former southern leader, that Al-
Hurra aired earlier this month. End Note.) Kappes noted that U.S.
policy in support of Yemen’s unity remains unchanged, and Saleh
said that such support was “most important.” He asked that the U.S.
pressure other countries to do the same, referring to the U.K. which,
he said, is housing the movement’s leaders and providing them media
access. “Leave the internal situation to us,” Saleh said. “We’ll handle
it.” Asserting that the military option was a last resort, he said that
the ROYG strategy will rally the voices of
southerners in support of unity, which he described as the majority
of the population, as a counterweight to the minority in favor of
independence. He also sought USG support for ROYG efforts to
persuade GCC countries to permit Yemenis to enter their labor
markets. “Our young people need jobs,” he said, especially if they are
to be immunized against the lure of extremist ideology. (Comment.
At a dinner for Kappes on Wednesday night, the Saudi Ambassador
said that his embassy has issued 36,000 visas to Yemenis seeking
work in KSA in the last two and one-half months. End Comment.)
¶6. (S) Kappes said that the latest economic figures from Yemen
must be a cause for concern, a point Saleh didn’t dispute,
characterizing the current economic situation as “very bad.” Kappes
then asked Saleh to rank-order the threats to Yemen’s security,
noting a conversation last fall when discussion focused on Al-Qaeda,
the Houthi rebellion and southern unrest. Saleh initially said that all
three were “on the same level,” then corrected himself to prioritize
AQAP as the most severe threat, followed by the Houthis and then
the situation in the south. “Even if we told the south tomorrow, ‘You
are free to separate,’ they would turn around the next day and start
to fight with each other,” he said, adding that such a lack of internal
38
cohesion greatly diminished the risk to Yemen’s security. On the
other hand, he said, AQAP terrorists prepared to detonate explosive
vests pose a much greater risk to internal security, as does the Houthi
rebellion, given the external support the ROYG insists it receives
from Iran and Hizballah.
¶7. (S) Comment. Saleh’s decision to reverse himself and

characterize AQAP as the most serious threat facing Yemen was
almost certainly taken with his USG interlocutors in mind, as was,
one suspects, his dismissal of the risk posed to his regime by the
increasingly militant southern-independence movement. Nor was it
coincidental that Saleh was quick to blame foreign powers for the
nation’s woes. From the U.K., Qatar and Libya aiding the
southerners, to Iran and Hizballah engineering the Houthi rebellion
in the north, to an international terrorist conspiracy fueling AQAP’s
growth, the implication is that Yemen is beset by forces that it will be
hard-pressed to repel without substantial external support. This
argument is, of course, also tailored to Saleh’s USG audience, and
meant to elicit the necessary level of political, economic and military
assistance to forestall Yemen’s collapse, and the negative effects it
would have on regional stability and security. End Comment.
SECHE
39
2009-08- 2010-12- Embassy
04 11:11 03 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #1402/01 2161158

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 041158Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0236
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0458
DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND PM/WRA

SPICO AND
SCOSTNER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2019

TAGS: PARM PREL PTER MASS YM
SUBJECT: (S/NF) PROGRESS ON US-ROYG COOPERATION
TO REDUCE
MANPADS THREAT
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. On June 20-22, a PM/WRA delegation

visited Yemen to discuss MANPADS threat reduction efforts
with ROYG officials. Since 2004, US-ROYG cooperation has
dramatically reduced the availability of MANPADS on the black
market in Yemen. Although the program has likely recovered
40
the bulk of the illicit MANPADS available on the black
market, several more will likely be collected in the coming
years. MOD insists that there are no official MANPADS
stocks, and that they have already implemented necessary
stockpile security and inventory controls, but the
intelligence community and the National Security Bureau (NSB)
believe that is not the case. The USG will offer the MOD,
through NSB interlocutors, payment for destruction of MOD
MANPADS and stockpile security upgrades. ROYG officials seem
more receptive to a TSA-sponsored MANPADS Assist Visit. END
SUMMARY.
BACKGROUND
----------
¶2. (S/NF) After years of uncontrolled weapons imports and the

chaos of the 1994 civil war, MANPADS were widely available on
the illicit arms market in Yemen, making these systems a
critical proliferation threat. MANPADS that leaked from
official Yemeni stocks were used in al-Qaeda (AQ) operations
in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in 2001 and 2002. In 2003,
the ROYG began collecting MANPADS from weapons souks
throughout the country, and in 2004 the USG agreed to
compensate the ROYG for the acquisition and destruction of
these and other black market MANPADS. In February 2005,
US-ROYG cooperation resulted in the destruction of 1,161
MANPADS.
MEETINGS READOUT
----------------
¶3. (S/NF) On June 20-22, a PM/WRA delegation consisting of

Dennis Hadrick, PM/WRA Program Manager; Santo Polizzi, DHS
liaison; Nils Talbot, PM/WRA technical expert; and Laurie
Freeman, PM/WRA Foreign Affairs Officer, visited Yemen to
discuss US-ROYG cooperation to reduce the threat of MANPADS.
The delegation began with a June 20 meeting at the NSB with
Col. Hefed Al-Jamrah, the NSB official in charge of airport
security in Sana'a. Polizzi briefed Jamrah on the MANPADS
threat to civilian aviation. He also offered a MANPADS
Assist Visit (MAV), in which experts from the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) identify airport
vulnerabilities to MANPADS attacks and recommend ways to
41
mitigate them. Following the meeting, the delegation toured
the current airport and the site of the new airport. During
the tour, several lapses in airport security practices were
observed regarding passenger screening, cargo security, and
Secure Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge and access
procedures. Polizzi recommended that the TSA Representative
(TSAR) in Amman, Jordan be contacted for follow-on
discussions with airport officials. NSB officials seemed
receptive to the MAV offer.
¶4. (S/NF) On June 21, the delegation met with NSB Deputy
Director Ammar Saleh to discuss ongoing efforts to acquire
MANPADS from the black market in Yemen. Since the program's
inception in August 2004, this program had resulted in the
destruction of 1,161 black market MANPADS in 2005. Hadrick
thanked the ROYG for its efforts, expressed the USG's
continued interest in supporting the program, and pressed the
ROYG to destroy an additional 102 MANPADS they had collected
since 2005.
¶5. (S/NF) Ammar Saleh agreed with USG assessments that the
majority of black market MANPADS had been collected in Yemen,
and said that a few more might trickle in with the increase
in price. (Note: In July 2008, the price for first
generation systems was increased from $7,700 to $15,000. End
Note.) The small quantity of illicit MANPADS that still
exist outside of state control in Yemen are in the hands of
tribal leaders or AQAP, neither of which is likely to part
with them at any price. He could not estimate how many
MANPADS Yemeni tribal leaders possess, but he believes that
AQAP has six MANPADS (NFI). Finally, he expressed skepticism
that the MOD would accept U.S. assistance to destroy its
official MANPADS stocks (an offer on the table since 2005).

He believes MOD would want a more modern air defense system
in return, not cash payment or stockpile security upgrades.
He offered to attempt to broker a cash-for-destruction deal.
¶6. (S/NF) Accompanied by NSB official Akram al-Qassmi, the

delegation visited a warehouse to view 96 MANPADS collected
between 2005 and May 2009 that were awaiting destruction.
(Note: These systems had already been verified by U.S.
personnel and disabled. End Note.) The delegation verified
42
an additional six SA-7s, four SA-7 gripstocks, and six
batteries collected by the NSB since May 2009. The
delegation disabled the six MANPADS and expended the six
batteries.
¶7. (S/NF) On their last day, June 22, the delegation

accompanied the Ambassador to a meeting with Minister of
Defense Mohammed Nasser Ahmed. Ahmed denied that the MOD
has
any MANPADS in its official stocks, saying that they had
already been handed over to NSB and destroyed. (Note: This
is in direct contradiction to NSB,s June 21 assertion that
the MOD had excess stocks of MANPADS, but would part with
them only in exchange for a more modern air defense system.
End Note.) The Minister described the MOD's progress on SA/LW
issues since S/E Bloomfield's July 2008 visit. He noted that
more than 250 weapons souks had been closed and more than 140
weapons dealers prosecuted. Furthermore, he remarked that
the MOD has established an inventory system for all Armed
Forces and MOD weapons, all of which are now marked. He
invited U.S. officials to visit the warehouses to see how the
system works. Finally, the Minister shared the delegation,s
concerns about the airport,s MANPADS vulnerability, and said
that as a member of the Supreme Security Committee, he would
support a MAV.
NEXT STEPS
----------
¶8. (S/NF) Post worked with NSB to ensure that all 102
collected MANPADS were destroyed on July 27 (septel). Post
has requested a meeting with the MOD Chief of Staff to
observe the stockpile security and inventory control system
reportedly in place. Post will follow up with NSB to find
out whether it will accept a MAV and, if so, identify
possible dates for the assessment. (Note: Despite
ministerial-level support, the final decision on the MAV will
be made by President Saleh. End Note.) Finally, Post will
work with the Department to present a specific offer to the
Yemeni government for assistance with physical security and
stockpile management (PSSM) and destruction and marking of
Yemeni SA/LW.
43
COMMENT
-------
¶9. (S/NF) It is hard to know what to believe regarding the

presence or absence of MOD MANPADS. In a subsequent meeting
on June 27, XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOffs that the MOD does
indeed have
MANPADS, but would never speak of them because they are
considered a state secret. While MOD realizes their MANPADS
are of little military value, they consider them better than
nothing and would turn them over for destruction only if they
were able to get a modern air defense system in return,
according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. PolOffs agreed to continue
negotiating
the destruction of MOD MANPADS through NSB interlocutors,
since the MOD appears unwilling to discuss the issue with USG
officials directly. END COMMENT.
SECHE
44
2009-09- 2010-12- Embassy
12 14:02 03 21:09 Sanaa
Appears in these articles:
http://www.spiegel.de
VZCZCXRO4184
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHYN #1662/01 2551411
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FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0694
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD, NEA/IR CDEJUANA, INR

SMOFFATT
NSC FOR KMAGSAMAN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2019

TAGS: PINR PREL PGOV ECON ENRG EIND IR YM
SUBJECT: IRAN IN YEMEN: TEHRAN's SHADOW LOOMS
LARGE, BUT FOOTPRINT IS SMALL (c-ne9-01257)
REF: A. STATE 86584

¶B. SANAA 1628
¶C. SANAA 876
45
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Despite repeated ROYG accusations of
Tehran's material and financial support to the Houthi rebels
in Sa'ada and increasingly belligerent media exchanges
between Yemen and Iran, Iranian influence in Yemen has thus
far been limited to informal religious ties between Yemeni
and Iranian scholars and negligible Iranian investment in the
energy and development sectors. While Iran has good
strategic reasons to involve itself in Yemeni affairs -
including Yemen's proximity to Saudi Arabia and the presence
of a large Zaydi Shiite population ) the only visible
Iranian involvement remains the Iranian media's proxy battle
with Saudi and Yemeni outlets over support for the Houthis.
Significant gaps exist in post's knowledge of Iranian
activities in Yemen due to the sensitivity of the subject and
post's very limited access to events in Sa'ada. Post
believes that while documented influence is limited, Iran's
strategic interests in Yemen merit close monitoring in the
future. END SUMMARY.
Iran-royg relations
-------------------
¶2. (S/NF) After two high-profile Iranian official visits to

Sana'a in early 2009, the formal bilateral relationship has
rapidly deteriorated as a result of renewed fighting in
Sa'ada governorate. Iran maintains an embassy in Sana'a
headed by Ambassador Mahmoud Zada. According to DATT
sources, Iran is not providing any military training to the
Yemenis, and there have been no announced military sales
between the two countries in recent years. Iranian Speaker
of Parliament Ali Larijani visited Yemen in May 2009 to
discuss Iranian investment in Yemen's energy and
infrastructure sectors and the bilateral relationship.
During Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki's June
visit to Sana'a, his second in two years, both nations
maintained at least a public appearance of normal bilateral
cooperation. Mottaki told local media at the time, "Iran is
pursuing an honest and friendly approach towards Yemen. Iran
wants progress, security and prosperity for Yemen."
¶3. (S/NF) With the August onset of the sixth war in Sa'ada,
however, the ROYG has reverted to its previous position that
Iran is intent on meddling in Yemen's internal affairs.
46
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Chief of Protocol Abdullah
al-Radhi, who spent over a decade in Tehran as a student and
diplomat, including a tour as Yemen's ambassador to Iran,
echoed the near-unanimous attitude of ROYG officials when he
told the DCM on August 23 that he believes Iran wants a
strong political card to play in Yemen similar to Hizballah
in Lebanon. He said that Yemen tried to normalize the
relationship with the visits of Larijani and Mottaki, but
Yemen "cannot accept" Iranian attempts to convert the Yemeni
Zaydis to Twelver Shiism. (Note: The ROYG views Zaydi
Shiites as less extremist and closer in practice to Sunnis
than the Twelver Shiism predominant in Iran. End Note.)
Radhi also said that the Iranians are still upset about
Yemen,s support for Iraq during and since the first Gulf War.
Iran and the houthis

--------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Although the ROYG maintains that Iran is providing

material and financial support to the Houthi rebels in
Sa'ada, little evidence has surfaced to date that supports
this claim. President Saleh told General Petraeus in a July
26 meeting that the National Security Bureau (NSB) had a DVD
showing Houthi rebels training with Hizballah uniforms and
tactics. (Note: In a follow-up conversation, NSB Deputy
Director Ammar Saleh claimed no knowledge of the DVD. End
Note.) In an August 17 meeting, Saleh told Senator McCain
that Iran was working against Yemeni stability because it
believed that a weakened Yemen would hurt the U.S. and Saudi
Arabia, both traditional enemies of Iran. In the same
meeting, NSB Director Ali Mohammed al-Ansi claimed that the
ROYG had arrested two separate "networks" of Iranians in
Yemen on charges of espionage in connection with the Houthis
and that one of the accused admitted to providing $100,000
every month to the Houthis on behalf of the Iranian
Sanaa 00001662 002 of 004
government. Ansi told Deputy National Security Advisor John

Brennan on September 6 that the ROYG was unable to share the
evidence from this case because it was still in the courts.
(Comment: Since the outbreak of hostilities in 2004, the ROYG
47
has used many different arguments, including the Houthis'
alleged ties to Iran and Hezballah, to attempt to convince
the USG to declare the Houthis a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). In 2008, the ROYG gave post a dossier of
information purporting to show ties between the Houthis and
Iran. Post passed on the file to the inter-agency community
in Washington. Analysts agreed that the information did not
proove Iranian involvement in Sa'ada. End Note.)
¶5. (S/NF) ROYG spokesman Hassan al-Lawzi has repeated

statements throughout the three weeks of fighting in Sa'ada
accusing Iran of supporting the Houthi rebels. On September
1, Foreign Minister Abubakir al-Qirbi publicly warned Iran
that interference in the Sa'ada conflict would have a
negative impact on bilateral relations and that, if such
interference continued, Yemen could be forced to make "hard
decisions," according to media reports. Qirbi also lodged an
official complaint with the Iranian Embassy in Sana'a
detailing Yemen's displeasure with Iranian support for the
Houthis. Director for External Financial Relations at the
Ministry of Finance Fouad al-Kohlani told PolOff on August 19
that the Houthis' level of organizational sophistication and
military successes against government forces indicate a
higher level of financial resources than the Houthis could
attain on their own. He speculated that because of its
strategic interest in gaining a foothold near Saudi Arabia,
Iran was likely the Houthis' financial backer. The Iranians,
for their part, continue to deny any interference in Sa'ada.
On August 23, the Iranian Embassy in Bahrain stated that Iran
had no connections to events in Yemen and "supports any
movement that works to unify the ranks of the Yemeni people,"
according to Bahraini media. The Iranian Embassy in Sana'a
repeated these statements on September 7, Yemeni media
reported.
¶6. (S/NF) Media reports on August 22 cited ROYG officials

claiming to have uncovered six storehouses of Houthi-owned,
Iranian-made weapons ) including machine guns, short-range
rockets and ammunition ) near Sa'ada City. In an August 25
meeting, however, Ministry of Defense Chief of Staff Major
General Ahmed al-Ashwal told the OMC Chief that a limited
number of weapons "of Iranian manufacture" were found in the
area, but would not provide information on the quantity or
48
type, and avoided a direct request from EmbOffs to view the
weapons. In June, ROYG military contacts told the DATT that
relations between the two countries were "strained" because
of Iran's support for the Houthis, and denied that the ROYG
was either communicating or in cooperation with Iranian ships
conducting counter-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden.
(Note: GRPO reporting confirms ROYG refusals to allow Iranian
vessels access to Aden harbor, reportedly over ROYG concern
that Iran was using Eritrea to ship weapons to the Houthis.
End Note.) According to xxxxx, however, the
Houthis do not need to receive weapons from outside of Yemen
because they can easily capture or purchase them from the
Yemeni military. xxxxx, who communicates on a daily basis with
Houthis and
other Sa'ada residents, agreed that the Houthis' weapons came
from the Yemeni military ) either through capture or
abandonment on the battlefield or via black-market arms deals
by corrupt military commanders - and not from an external
source such as Iran.
¶7. (S/NF) The general consensus among civil society is that

Iranian government influence in Sa'ada is minimal, but the
Houthis might receive some financial support from Iranian
groups or individuals. xxxxx, who travels to Sa'ada
frequently, told PolOff on August 26 that Iran had not been
involved historically in the conflict in Sa'ada, but with
changingdomestic circumstances in Iran, might have become
involved in the latest round of fighting. He addd, however,
that he has no knowledge of any Iranian nationals in Sa'ada
in recent years. (Note: The ROYG used to grant Iranians
living in Yemen hajj visas to travel overland to Mecca, but
stopped issuing the visas some time ago because the ROYG was
uncomfortable about Iranians traveling through Sa'ada into
Saudi Arabia. End Note.) xxxxx speculated that Iranian groups are
likely giving
Sanaa 00001662 003 of 004
money to the Houthis, but he does not know to what extent.

With that money, the Houthis buy weapons from corrupt
elements of the Yemeni armed forces that sell weapons and
munitions, xxxxx alleged. Civil society actors, however,
49
were also unable to provide any concrete evidence of the
involvement of any Iranian nationals in Sa'ada.
¶8. (S/NF) To date, Iran's most visible involvement in the

sixth war in Sa'ada has been the Iranian media's proxy battle
with Saudi and Yemeni outlets over Iranian support for the
Houthi rebels (Ref B). Continuing a tradition that dates
back to the earliest stages of the Sa'ada conflict, the ROYG
has accused Iran of financially and materially supporting the
Houthi rebels. For its part, Iran ) through state media
outlets including English-language Press TV and
Arabic-language al-Alam TV ) has claimed that Saudi Arabia
is directly involved in the military campaign against the
Houthis. The Sa'ada conflict has thus become a propaganda
war between Yemen, eager to enlist the support of its Sunni
Arab neighbors and the U.S., and Iran, allegedly seeking to
nurture a Shi'a proxy force on the Arabian Peninsula. On
August 24, Iranian al-Alam TV quoted rebel leader Yahya
al-Houthi as denying Iranian support for the Houthis.
Iranian media have consistently shown video footage intended
to embarrass the ROYG, including images of alleged soldiers
fleeing the fighting and Houthis dancing on top of abandoned
ROYG armored vehicles.
Iran and the south

------------------
¶9. (S/NF) Little evidence ) or even debate ) exists

regarding Iran's role with the Southern Movement. The
southern secessionist movement, which is formally a secular
organization that has among its ranks former Sunni jihadists,
has, to date, no established connections with either the
Houthis or Iran.xxxxx, told PolOff in May and July that the
movement
had repeatedly rejected offers of collaboration with the
Houthis. xxxxx told PolOff on September 6 that the
movement's leaders wanted to continue peacefully advocating
for separation, rather than affiliating themselves with the
Houthis or external actors willing to advocate violence such
as Iran. Some limited evidence, on the other hand, indicates
that Iran might be a more willing partner with southerners
fed up with the current regime. According to DATT contacts,
the ROYG asked the then-Iranian military attache to leave
50
Yemen in 2008, purportedly because he had attempted to make
contact with separatists in the southern governorates. He
has not been replaced. Former Yemeni Ambassador to Iran
Radhi said that the Iranian Ambassador in Muscat had been
instructed to "study the south of Yemen," especially
Hadramout and Shabwa governorates.
Iran's soft power in yemen

---------------------------
¶10. (S/NF) Perceived Iranian influence in other arenas is

limited to informal religious ties between Yemeni and Iranian
scholars and negligible Iranian investment in the energy and
development sectors. Despite Yemen's 40% Zaydi Shiite
population, religiously-based interaction between Yemen and
the world's largest Shi'a country is limited, perhaps because
the form of Shiism Zaydis practice hews closer to Sunni Islam
than the Twelver Shiism of Iran. Ambassador Radhi, however,
told the DCM on August 23 that he believes there is a lot of
"coordination on Yemen" between Qom and Najjaf, with 40-50
Yemenis studying Islam in Najjaf, and some (NFI) studying in
Qom as well. (Note: Given that Yemen has over 9 million
Zaydis, it appears that the number of religious students
studying in Iraq and Iran combined is very small. End Note.)
¶11. (S/NF) Iranian direct investment in the Yemeni economy

is negligible, according to local Iranian businessmen xxxxx,
and xxxxx.
The only recent significant Iranian commercial activity in
Yemen involves the ROYG,s tortuous experience hiring the
Tehran-based Parsian HV Substations Development Company to
build the substation of the Marib 1 power plant (Ref C).
ROYG officials at all levels told EconOff that the decision
to hire the Iranian firm was purely political, rather than
economic, stemming from a desire in 2005 to expand relations
with Iran. The delays caused by the technical incompetence
Sanaa 00001662 004 of 004
of the Iranian firm have resulted in hundreds of millions of

U.S. dollars in foregone savings from switching away from
expensive diesel and towards natural gas in the power sector.
51
(Comment: Post believes Iranian commercial activity will
remain limited in Yemen, absent future politically-driven
bilateral trade missions. End Comment.) The Iranian
government funds two hospitals in Sana'a that are among the
better medical facilities in the capital. The management of
the hospitals is Iranian, but the staff is largely local.
Comment
-------
¶12. (S/NF) Yemen's formal relationship with Iran is by all

accounts relatively fragile, and has continued to deteriorate
in recent months. Since the start of the Sa'ada conflict in
2004, Yemen has looked to pin the Houthis' strength and
resilience in fighting the ROYG on the Iranians. Despite
Yemen's seemingly heartfelt concerns that Iran is backing the
Houthi rebels and the ROYG's desire to convince its powerful
friends (the U.S. and Saudi Arabia) of Iran's nefarious
intentions in Yemen, it has to date been unable to produce
any concrete evidence of what it says is wide-scale meddling.
It is post's firm belief that if Yemen had any concrete
evidence that the Houthis had connections to either Hizballah
or Iran, it would have produced it immediately; the lack of
such evidence likely indicates that the ROYG lacks any real
proof of such links. On the other hand, Iran has clear
strategic interests in gaining a foothold in Yemen (Sa'ada)
and developing a proxy ally in the Houthis similar to
Hizballah in Lebanon. Post believes that, while it is worth
keeping an eye on Iranian activities in Yemen, Tehran's reach
to date is limited. END COMMENT.
Seche
52
2009-09- 2010-12- Embassy
15 06:06 03 21:09 Sanaa
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NOFORN
NSC FOR APDNSA JOHN BRENNAN AND DENISE MORAGA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019

TAGS: PTER PGOV PINR KDRG PINS SA YM
SUBJECT: BRENNAN-SALEH MEETING SEP 6, 2009
REF: SANAA 01549
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen Seche for reasons 1.4(b),

(c), and (d).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. In a September 6 meeting with Deputy

National Security Advisor John Brennan, President Saleh
pledged unfettered access to Yemen's national territory for
U.S. counterterrorism operations, suggesting that in the
process, the USG assumed responsibility for the success - or
failure - of efforts to neutralize AQAP in Yemen. Saleh
53
expressed dissatisfaction with the USG's current level of aid
for CT and security operations and insisted the ROYG began
its war against the al-Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen on
behalf of the U.S. Saleh stated his preference for Saudi
Arabia over Jordan as a potential rehabilitation site for
Guantanamo detainees of Yemeni origin, but claimed the ROYG
was willing and able to accept them in Yemeni prisons. In a
one-on-one that followed, Brennan extended an invitation to
Saleh to visit President Obama at the White House on October
¶6. END SUMMARY.
"OPEN LAND, AIR, AND SEA" FOR U.S. STRIKES AGAINST

AQAP
--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶2. (S/NF) In a September 6 meeting with Deputy National

Security Advisor John Brennan, President Saleh insisted that
Yemen's national territory is available for unilateral CT
operations by the U.S. Dissatisfied with current levels of
USG funding and military training provided to the ROYG's CT
forces, Saleh asserted that the USG has produced "only words,
but no solutions" to the terrorism issue in Yemen. Saleh
repeatedly requested more funds and equipment to fight
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), while at the same
time placing responsibility for any future AQAP attacks on
the shoulders of the USG now that it enjoys unfettered access
to Yemeni airspace, coastal waters and land. (NOTE. The USG
has been actively engaged since 2001 in training elements of
Yemen's CT forces, including the Counter-Terrorism Unit
(CTU), the Yemen Special Operations Force (YSOF), the
Presidential Guard, the Yemeni Border Troops, Yemen Air Force
(YAF), and the Yemen Coast Guard (YCG). The USG has expended
over $115 million equipping CT forces since FY02. In 2009
alone, U.S. teams have instructed Yemeni CT forces in
training valued at $5 million. END NOTE.)
¶3. (S/NF) While Saleh offered assurances that the ROYG is

"determined to continue the war against al-Qaeda because
they're targeting U.S. and Yemeni interests," he continued to
link increased U.S. access to AQAP targets with full
responsibility for achieving CT goals. Highlighting the
potential for a future AQAP attack on the U.S. Embassy or
other Western targets, Saleh said, "I have given you an open
54
door on terrorism, so I am not responsible."
THE SA'ADA WAR: "THE HOUTHIS ARE YOUR ENEMIES

TOO"
--------------------------------------------- -----
¶4. (S/NF) President Saleh expressed his frustration with the

USG refusal to view the Sa'ada war against the al-Houthis in
the north in the same light as the fight against AQAP.
Claiming a need for increased aid and support, Saleh asserted
that "this war we're launching is a war on behalf of the
U.S....the Houthis are your enemies too," citing videos of
al-Houthi followers chanting, "Death to Israel, death to
America." (NOTE: The Houthis have not attacked U.S.
interests or personnel in the six rounds of fighting between
the ROYG and the Houthis that began in 2004. END NOTE.) The
USG's failure to view the Houthis as terrorists and equip
ROYG forces to fight them in Sa'ada undermines the USG's
claims of friendship and cooperation, according to Saleh.
Commenting on the status of ROYG forces in Sa'ada, Saleh
said, "we are suffering a lot of casualties and loss of
material." Renewing his requests for armored personnel
vehicles, aircraft, and medical evacuation vehicles, Saleh
echoed his criticism of U.S. efforts. "We need deeds, not
only words," he said. Brennan responded that the USG is
prohibited by law from providing military support to the ROYG
to be used against the Houthis since the USG considers the
group a domestic insurgency.
¶5. (S/NF) Restating claims of Iranian support to the Houthi

movement, ROYG officials present said they had provided
files supporting an Iranian-Houthi connection to USG
officials and would provide more if necessary. (NOTE. The
Ambassador acknowledged receiving a file that was reviewed
here and in Washington; however, no conclusive evidence of an
Iranian-Houthi link has been made from these or other
records. Brennan said that he would request a fresh scrub of
all available intelligence to see if it turned up any
evidence of Iranian involvement. END NOTE.) Saleh said,
"Iran is trying to settle old scores against the U.S. by
ruining relations between Yemen and GCC countries and the
U.S." He also made a tangential reference to Hezbollah,
claiming the organization's influence in the region also
55
rendered the ROYG-Houthi war a fight on behalf of the U.S.
Referencing the high poverty rate and illicit arms flows into
both Yemen and Somalia, Saleh concluded by saying, "If you
don't help, this country will become worse than Somalia."
MUDDLED MESSAGES ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

----------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) Saleh expressed his preference for the existing

Saudi Arabia option as a potential site for rehabilitating
Guantanamo detainees of Yemeni origin over a proposed
Jordanian option, citing closer familial ties and cultural
bonds in Saudi Arabia as mechanisms for more effective
treatment. Saleh commented that he thought the Jordanians
were &too poor8 to support a rehabilitation program, but
did not dismiss Jordan as an option. However, he signaled
that rehabilitation is not his concern, but rather "the
U.S.'s problem" as he is ready and willing to accept all
Yemeni detainees into the Yemeni prison system. (COMMENT.
Saleh would, in our judgment, be unable to hold returning
detainees in jail for any more than a matter of weeks before
public pressure ) or the courts ) forced their release.
END COMMENT.) Saleh urged the USG to design and implement a
rehabilitation and education program for the detainees and to
build a rehabilitation center in Yemen, but reiterated that
the U.S. would have to fund these projects, repeatedly
asking, "How many dollars is the U.S. going to bring?"
However, when Brennan offered $500,000 as an initial
investment currently available for the crafting of a
rehabilitation program, Saleh dismissed the offer as
insufficient. Saleh also assured Brennan that he was
committed to "freeing the innocent people after a complete
and total rehabilitation," suggesting a lack of clarity on
his own policy and on the status of Guantanamo detainees in
the ROYG legal system.
ECONOMIC REFORM AND CORRUPTION

------------------------------
¶7. (S/NF) Saleh welcomed the letter from President Obama

that Brennan hand-carried, and expressed appreciation for
U.S. concern over the stability and economic hardships facing
the country. He agreed to move forward with the 10-point
56
plan outlining necessary economic reforms (reftel) but did
not provide details regarding dates or implementation goals.
Responding to Brennan's concerns that economic and other
assistance might be diverted through corrupt officials to
other purposes, Saleh urged the U.S. to donate supplies and
hardware rather than liquid funds in order to curb
corruption's reach. Saleh also told US officials that they
could have full access to financial records to ensure proper
usage of donor funding. (COMMENT. Saleh's preference for
infrastructure and equipment over cash displays a lack of
confidence in his own regime's ability to handle liquid
assets and hardly provides a viable solution for stemming the
curb of corruption in the long run. END COMMENT.)
VISIT TO WASHINGTON & OTHER ISSUES

----------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) Saleh again asked to visit the U.S., arguing that
it was necessary to resolve issues regarding the Guantanamo
detainees and increased military assistance. "We see this
visit as very important to reach mutual understanding and so
that you understand our requests and demands." Brennan
undertook to look into Saleh's claims of "promised" military
equipment that has not been delivered. In a one-on-one
session that followed the formal meeting, Brennan extended an
invitation to Saleh to meet President Obama at the White
House on October 6. Saleh also stated that there would be no
more delays in the U.S. Embassy's request to purchase lands
for the building of more secure housing facilities and that
the Shari'a Council would approve the transfer of the lands
from waqf (or publicly held) status to free-hold status.
COMMENT
-------
¶9. (S/NF) COMMENT. Saleh was in vintage form during the two
hours he spent with DNSA Brennan, at times disdainful and
dismissive and at others, conciliatory and congenial. One
might easily conclude that his repeated assertion that
Yemen's national territory is open to the US to conduct
operations against AQAP reflects his interest in outsourcing
the CT effort in Yemen to the USG, especially in view of his
somewhat ominous claim that, should AQAP attacks occur in the
57
future, they will be the result of the U.S. having failed to
do enough to put the organization out of business.
Additionally, a concerted USG anti-terrorism campaign in
Yemen will free Saleh to continue to devote his limited
security assets to the ongoing war against Houthi rebels in
Sa'ada. The net effect, and one we strongly suspect Saleh
has calculated, of both the American and ROYG "iron fist"
unleashed at the same time in Yemen will be a clear message
to the southern movement or any other party interested in
generating political unrest in the country that a similar
fate awaits them.
¶10. (S/NF) COMMENT CONTINUED. Not surprisingly, Saleh was

far less animated when Brennan attempted to focus his
attention on the need for immediate action to relieve Yemen's
deteriorating socio-economic situation, largely limiting his
response to a pitch that the USG persuade recalcitrant donors
to speed up and increase their assistance to Yemen. After
stating petulantly in the group session that he was no longer
interested in an invitation to the White House, telling
Brennan that "my relationship with you is sufficient,"
Saleh's mood changed noticeably for the better when the
invitation was extended, and he had captured the prize he has
been chasing after for months. END COMMENT.
SECHE
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2019

TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: SAUDI AIRSTRIKES AT YEMEN BORDER
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Local sources confirm that Saudi Arabia

continued to launch airstrikes against Houthi rebels in Jebel
al-Dukhan area on the Saudi-Yemeni border, despite ROYG
statements to the contrary. In an unusual twist, the Houthis
are now casting themselves as defenders of Yemen's
sovereignty against an unwarranted Saudi attack, while
President Saleh's public remarks point to his delight that
the KSA has officially joined his war against the Houthis.
While Saudi airstrikes may succeed in driving the Houthis
from some of their border strongholds, they are unlikely to
have much impact on the Sa'ada war without an accompanying
59
ground invasion. END SUMMARY.
Local sources: saudi airstrikes continue, but where?

--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (C) In response to Houthi incursions into Saudi territory

and a November 2 Houthi attack on Saudi border guards, Saudi
Arabia continued to launch airstrikes against Houthi rebels
in the Jebel al-Dukhan area on the Saudi-Yemeni border, local
sources told PolOffs in early November. In contradiction to
AP reports that Saudi Arabia regained control of contested
Jebel al-Dukhan on November 8, the Houthis denied that the
Saudis had taken the mountain, claiming they were still in
control. Also on November 8, a ROYG aircraft crashed in
Razih district (which borders Saudi Arabia to the north of
Malahit); the Houthis took credit for downing it, while the
ROYG claimed mechanical failure. Independent Yemeni
journalists report that, contrary to official Saudi
statements, Saudi airplanes have entered Yemeni airspace and
hit targets inside of Yemen.xxxxx told PolOff on November 6 that the
Saudi
Air Force bombed Tihana, Malahit, and Hasama districts within
Yemen. He also reported the Saudis were massing troops
stationed near the border.xxxxx confirmed that airstrikes have
occurred in Yemeni
territory. "The Yemeni government denies this, but the Saudi
government is acting in full coordination with the Yemeni
government," he told PolOff on November 6.
¶3. (S/NF) The Houthis, too, have accused the Saudi Air Force
of bombing Yemeni territory, including residential areas in
al-Hattamah, al-Malahit, al-Hassamah, al-Majda'ah, and
Ghamar, killing and wounding civilians in the latter. The
Houthis also claimed to have captured some Saudi soldiers,
which the SAG denied. (Note:xxxxx promised to air footage of the
captured
Saudi soldiers, but none has been broadcast to date. End
Note.) UNHCR Representative Claire Bourgeois told PolOff
that 135 families fleeing the area caught in the conflict
arrived at the Mazraq IDP camp in Hajja governorate on
November 7. "Seven hundred people - this is a huge increase
in one day," she said. (Comment: Bourgeois expects a report
from UNHCR on November 10 with the recent arrivals'
60
eye-witness accounts from the conflict zone, which could
provide more clarity on the fighting. End Comment.)
Border confusion...
-------------------
¶4. (C) According to xxxxx, the contested area in Jebel

al-Dukhan is officially part of Saudi Arabia, but when the
border between Yemen and Saudi Arabia was drawn through the
area, it cut through the territory that had traditionally
belonged to a Zaydi Yemeni tribe. He told PolOff on November
8 that because "tribal territories transcend international
borders," the tribes living in that area consider it Yemeni
even if it is officially Saudi. Furthermore, while the
members of the tribe whose territory straddles the two
countries identify first and foremost with their tribe, they
identify secondly as Yemenis, not Saudis - regardless of
which side of the border they live on. Adding to the
confusion about whether Jebel al-Dukhan falls in Yemeni or
Saudi territory is the fact that ROYG forces continue to
fight throughout the area.
... And allegations of cross-border collaboration

--------------------------------------------- ----
¶5. (C) xxxxx believes there was probably an agreement

between the ROYG and KSA to encircle the Houthis by attacking
them simultaneously from the north and the south. According
to xxxxx the SAG had granted the ROYG military access to
Jebel al-Dukhan in order to gain leverage over the Houthis,
but the Houthis were able to rout them, so the Saudis
launched airstrikes to clear Houthis from the area. The
Houthis claimed to take control of Jebel al-Dukhan on
November 2. In a telephone interview with al-Jazeera xxxxx accused
the Saudis of
allowing the Yemeni military to access Jebel al-Dukhan from
the Saudi border in order to launch a counter-offensive to
re-take the mountain. xxxxx said, "We do not target Saudi
territory and we are not fighting them in their territory or
in the areas under their control. The problem is that we are
facing aggression, and there is clear cooperation between the
Saudi regime and the Yemeni regime."
61
Houthis: we are defending yemen's sovereignty
---------------------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) In an unusual twist, the Houthis are now casting

themselves as defenders of Yemen's sovereignty and
territorial integrity. In a November 6 statement, the
Houthis accused the Saudis of launching a ground offensive
into Yemen after heavy bombardment of the Malahit and
Hassamah regions. The Houthis continued to deny having any
presence in Saudi territory and claimed that "the Yemeni
people will take a stand regarding these infringements on
Yemen's sovereignty, and we hold the Saudi authorities fully
responsible for the results of these uncalled for
infringements on Yemen's sovereignty and territories."
Saleh: the war in sa'ada has only just begun

--------------------------------------------
¶7. (C) Local observers report that President Saleh is

thrilled that the Saudis have become militarily involved in
the conflict. Saleh's enthusiasm was evident in his November
7 speech at a ceremony launching the first shipment of
Yemen's liquefied natural gas project. He said the "real
war" against the Houthis had begun only two days before )
the day the Saudi airstrikes began. He described the
previous six rounds of the Sa'ada war as "a rehearsal to test
our capabilities," adding that the war will not end until the
Houthis are crushed entirely. Abdullah Ahmed Ghanem, Chief
of the Political Department of the ruling General People's
Congress (GPC) party, agreed that Saudi involvement was a
positive development. He told PolOff on November 9 that
"Yemeni-Saudi relations are very good now, and because of
this war they're going to get better and better. The Houthis
are our joint enemy."
Yemenis weight in: what to expect from saudi involvement

--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶8. (S/NF) xxxxx suspects the ROYG approached the Saudis and
asked for their support because it is suffering tremendous
losses in Sa'ada. According to xxxxx military sources, the
ROYG has lost scores of military positions in Sa'ada
governorate. "It's a big fiasco," he said, "and that's why
62
(Saleh) wants Saudi involvement." xxxxx also noted that
President Saleh is increasingly losing faith in his own
military, which is another reason he needs Saudi help. The
President has placed trusted family members at the helm of
campaigns to retake embattled Malahit and Sa'ada City.
According to Aden Press, President Saleh put his son Ahmad
Ali Abdullah Saleh, commander of the Republican Guard, in
charge of the military campaign in Malahit, taking it out of
the hands of the ROYG military's Northwest Region commander
Ali Muhsin. According to DAO reporting, the Ministry of
Interior's (MOI) Yemeni Central Security Force )
Counterterrorism Unit (CSF-CTU), led by presidential nephew
Yahya Muhammad Abdullah Saleh, has been tasked with
formulating an operational plan for clearing the Houthis from
their stronghold in the old quarter of Sa'ada City.
¶9. (C) Some observers, such as xxxxx, believe

Saudi military involvement will bring the war to a swifter
conclusion. But others do not see Saudi involvement as a
silver bullet. xxxxx expects Saudi involvement to continue,
pointing to media reports that KSA is massing ground troops
at the Saudi-Yemen border. In his view, the "big
mobilization" of troops signals the intention to be engaged
for a long time. He does not see a quick end to the war,
though, because it has expanded to include tribes whose
territories span the Saudi-Yemeni border. With the tribal
dynamics of blood feuds and revenge killings, "the Saudis
have gotten themselves caught in a big swamp" from which it
will be hard to extract themselves, he believes.
Comment
-------
¶10. (C) By all accounts, the ROYG has welcomed Saudi
involvement against the Houthis. The ROYG is likely to
encourage the Saudis to deepen their involvement, perhaps by
taking action in border areas north of Jebel al-Dukhan still
under Houthi control. While Saudi involvement may succeed in
driving the Houthis from some of their border strongholds, it
is unlikely to substantially weaken them or have an impact on
the overall war in Sa'ada. Continued Saudi military
operations in the border regions could actually fuel the war,
since the local populations have a great deal of distrust for
central government authority, whether Saudi or Yemeni. END
63
comment.
Seche
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2009-11- 2010-12- Embassy
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FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019

TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL SA YM
SUBJECT: SAUDI STRIKES IN YEMEN: AN INVITATION TO
IRAN --
AND THE U.S.?
REF: SANAA 2053
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. Saudi airstrikes on the Yemeni border

continue but have not managed to clear the area of Houthi
rebels. Yemeni journalists and the Houthis report Saudi
strikes are hitting Yemeni targets, claims that are denied by
the ROYG and SAG. Multiple media sources report the Saudi
Navy is imposing a blockade on ports along northern Yemen's
Red Sea coast. As Yemen's neighbors rush to offer the ROYG
65
additional weapons and munitions, Iranian officials denounce
the Saudi strikes and are calling for Islamic states to
defend innocent Shi'a from ROYG and SAG attacks. Yemeni
analysts fear that military action by Saudi Arabia is
creating a regional, sectarian war that will lead to direct
Iranian involvement. It is also possible that the Houthis
have sought to internationalize the conflict, either to
attract international support or to ensure that any
negotiated political solution would include international,
not ROYG, mediators. President Saleh appears to have gained
the most from recent developments, as he has finally obtained
direct political, financial, and military support for the war
from powerful neighbors -- who also happen to be close U.S.
allies. END SUMMARY.
Saudi strikes and clashes intensify

-----------------------------------
¶2. (SBU) Saudi airstrikes on the Yemeni border continue, but

have not managed to clear the area of Houthi rebels. On
November 14, Houthi fighters reportedly killed two Saudi
soldiers and injured five others in the Jebel al-Dukhan area,
which reportedly had come under Saudi control days earlier.
Though the ROYG and SAG deny it, the Houthis claim Saudi
bombardment of Yemeni territory continued November 12-15,
including in Malahit, Shada, Hasamah, and Haydan districts.
Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam told AFP on November
13
that Saudi bombing reached up to 60 kilometers inside Yemeni
territory.xxxxx told
PolOff xxxxx that the KSA is "hitting targets in
Yemen." Both xxxxx and xxxxx,
pointed out that Saudi officials have announced their
government's intention of establishing a "buffer zone" by
pushing the Houthis dozens of kilometers away from the
border. To achieve this goal, they argue, SAG would have to
bomb targets inside Yemen. According to Yemeni press, Saudi
newspaper al-Riyad reported that Houthi spokesman Abdulsalam
was killed in a November 15 Saudi airstrike on the Houthis'
media center in Razeh district )- a district that is inside
Yemeni territory.
Saudi ships patrolling off yemeni coast
66
---------------------------------------
¶3. (S/NF) Meanwhile, multiple media reported that Saudi

Arabia imposed a blockade on ports along northern Yemen's Red
Sea coast to prevent arms smuggling to the Houthis.
(Comment: These accounts of a blockade appear exaggerated, as
analysts question whether the Saudi Navy could physically
enforce one. End Comment.) However, the DATT reports the
Yemeni Coast Guard reached an agreement with the Saudi Navy
to blockade Midi Port. The two nations' maritime forces are
communicating about their anti-smuggling efforts, but it is
not clear to what extent, nor if their efforts are being
coordinated. (Comment: The maritime forces' activities are
presumably a reaction to the October 25 seizure of an
Iranian-crewed ship off the coast of Yemen's Midi Port that
was allegedly smuggling arms to the Houthis. The ROYG has
yet to produce evidence that Iranians were smuggling arms to
the Houthis, as the ship was apparently empty when it was
seized. However, echoing a claim Yemen Ambassador al-Hajjri
made recently, Foreign Minister Qirbi told PolChief on
November 15 the fact that the ship was empty indicated the
arms had already been delivered. End Comment.)
Neighbors rush to aid the royg

------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Across the region, governments are rushing to aid

the ROYG in its battle against the Houthis. The Saudis have
agreed to provide the ROYG with APCs, weapons, and ammunition
and to assist in the purchase of helicopters for the Yemeni
Air Force. The SAG is also offering to purchase weapons and
ammunition from the Czech Republic and Slovakia, while the
UAE has agreed to broker a similar deal with Bulgaria
Sanaa 00002070 002 of 003
(reftel). Official media reported that the Kuwaiti

Ambassador to Yemen met with Minister of Interior Rashad
al-Masri on November 15 to discuss security cooperation,
presumably related to the war in Sa'ada.
Iranian indignation
67
-------------------
¶5. (SBU) On November 15, the Iranian parliament condemned

Saudi interference in the conflict and denounced the "killing
(of) Yemeni people by Saudi Arabian fighter jets." In its
statement, the Majlis urged "all sympathetic officials in the
Islamic world ... to utilize all their potential to stop this
tragedy and put an end to the killings," according to Tehran
Mehr News Agency. The Yemen Post reported on November 15
that the Speaker of Iran's Shura Council, Ali Larijani,
accused the US and Saudi Arabia of targeting Shi'ite rebels
in Yemen. In a statement posted on the Council's website, he
said the USG was an accomplice in the attacks against the
Houthis. Meanwhile, ROYG officials repeated their
accusations that Iran is funding the Houthis. In a November
15 al-Jazeera interview, General Yahya Saleh, the Qident's
nephew anQmmander of the Central Security Forces
Counter-Terrorism Unit, said there is "no doubt" Iran is
supporting the Houthis )- "the Houthis cannot fund and fight
this war with pomegranates and grapes or drugs," he said.
Houthis: "u.s. Plan to silence us"

----------------------------------
¶6. (SBU) The Houthis are also accusing the USG of

involvement in efforts to subdue them. On November 15,
Hizballah's al-Manar TV aired a telephone intervQwith
Houthi spokesman Abdulsalam in which he said the Saudis had
been compelled to strike the Houthis after the ROYG failed to
implement the "U.S. plan" to silence and subjugate the
Houthis. He said the allegations that the Houthis
infiltrated Saudi Arabia are nothing more than a pretext to
justify a "U.S.-Yemeni security plan" to prolong the war.
(Comment: This may refer to false reports in the official
Yemeni media that the USG and ROYG signed a military
agreement at the November 10-12 joint staff talks. While
Post issued a statement clarifying that no such agreement was
signed, the initial report, implying that the agreement will
aid Yemen's battle against the Houthis, was picked up by
Iran's Press TV and even Voice of America. End Comment.)
Implications of regionalization,
fears of saudi over-reaction
68
----------------------------
¶7. (C) Yemeni analysts believe Saudi involvement is creating

a regional sectarian war that will serve as an invitation to
Iranian involvement.xxxxx, told the Ambassador on November 15
that
Sa'ada residents are increasingly seeing the conflict as a
religious one and believe that the Houthis achieve
battlefield victories because God is on their side. He added
that Saudi Arabia's involvement is only encouraging the
Houthis and their supporters to see the conflict in sectarian
terms. He claimed the situation in Sa'ada is as bad as it is
because the religious factor helps the Houthis garner support
from the local population; by sharpening that aspect of the
conflict, Saudi involvement could mobilize additional support
for the Houthis, he concluded. Moreover, xxxxx
believes the Houthis might begin supporting Zaydis on the
Saudi side of the border, home to an estimated 2,000 Zaydi
Saudis. While they may not share the same grievances as
Zaydis in northern Yemen, if the conflict becomes
increasingly sectarian, Saudi Zaydis may find a new champion
in the Houthis, and the Houthis may find a new base of
support among the Saudi population. Furthermore, Qadhi told
PolOff on November 15 there is growing sentiment among
Iranians that they "should not leave Yemen's Shi'a alone to
face aggression from the Saudi and Yemeni governments."
¶8. (C) xxxxx fears that the guerrilla nature of the

war, in which small groups of Houthi fighters familiar with
the rugged terrain launch sneak attacks at a mighty foe,
could provoke the Saudis into over-reacting and causing
serious harm to civilians caught in the crossfire. Saudi
Arabia is using state-of-the-art weaponry against the
Houthis, but in more than a week of heavy bombings apparently
have not been able to clear them from the area. xxxxx says
if the "little brat in the neighborhood" can continue to
Sanaa 00002070 003 of 003
capture and kill Saudi soldiers, the KSA may not react
rationally and may begin targeting villages, markets, and
other civilian gathering places in order to root out the
69
insurgents.
Houthi gambit?
--------------
¶9. (C) What prompted the SAG's involvement in the war is a

subject of considerable speculation in Yemen. While
President Saleh has long been encouraging Saudi Arabia to
join the fight, most analysts believe the Houthis had reason
to provoke their involvement as well. xxxxx thinks the
Houthis attacked the Saudi border guards in order to
internationalize the conflict. "Maybe they drew in Saudi
Arabia because they wanted to negotiate with the master
rather than the servant," he told PolOff on November 15.
Havez al-Bukari, President of Yemen Polling Center, agrees
that the Houthis wanted to draw Saudi Arabia into the
conflict in order to get more attention from the
international community. According to Bukari, by
internationalizing the conflict, the Houthis' demands for
international mediation )- which the ROYG has refused,
insisting that any negotiations will be handled domestically
-) become much stronger. He believes the Houthis want a
foreign government or international body to broker dialogue
between the ROYG and the Houthis, since previous peace talks
were predominantly internal affairs. They want a "partner"
in the talks, not a "sponsor" of them, as he characterized
Qatar's role in mediating the 2008 Doha peace accord.
Comment
-------
¶10. (S/NF) The ROYG and the Houthis both stand to gain from
expanding the conflict beyond Yemen's borders: the ROYG
benefits from the military and financial might of its
powerful northern neighbor, while the Houthis are better
positioned to receive overt Iranian backing or to spur some
sort of international political settlement. Yet the benefit
to Saudi Arabia seems less clear. While the need to protect
its border is obvious, the airstrikes could backfire in a
number of ways. First, the SAG risks becoming embroiled in
an intractable guerrilla war. Second, Saudi involvement
fuels the ROYG's perception that the real, immediate threat
to the Arabian Peninsula is the Houthis, not al-Qaeda.
70
Third, as noted reftel, by transferring millions of dollars
worth of weapons to the ROYG, there is a strong chance the
very same weapons will leak into the gray market and end up
being used against Saudi Arabia by terrorists. Fourth, it
invites Iranian involvement )- which creates a
self-fulfilling prophecy, since the fear that Iran was at
Saudi's doorstep is partly what motivated the strikes in the
first place.
¶11. (S/NF) COMMENT CONTINUED. In the short-term at least,

it seems like President Saleh has gained the most from the
Saudis' entry into the conflict. His glee when the Saudis
launched their airstrikes indicates he finally received what
he has been pushing for )- political, financial, and direct
military support for the war from Yemen's powerful neighbor
and principal benefactor. He will use this support to battle
the Houthis as well as to send a signal of the regime's
staying power to other domestic actors who may seek to
undermine it. Saleh will not rest with Saudi support,
however, and will doubtlessly rely on the SAG to advocate
some measure of USG involvement, given our strong ties to
Riyadh. END COMMENT.
Seche
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2019

TAGS: PTER MOPS PINS MASS PGOV YM
SUBJECT: YEMEN'S COUNTER TERRORISM UNIT
STRETCHED THIN BY
WAR AGAINST HOUTHIS
REF: A. SANAA 01995

b. SANAA 02079
c. SANAA 01669
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. As the sixth war against the Houthis

continues to squeeze Yemen's conventional military, the ROYG
has looked to its U.S. and U.K.-funded and trained
72
counterterrorism forces to provide some relief to battered
army forces. The Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) - trained to
detect small terrorist cells and investigate and prevent
terror attacks on civilian targets - is a poor tactical
choice for use against a long-term domestic insurgency. The
ROYG, desperate to defeat the Houthis at any cost, has
largely ignored USG concerns regarding deployment of the CTU
to Sa'ada. The CTU has been unable to go after genuine
terrorist targets like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) while it has been tied down in Sa'ada. CTU
involvement in a ROYG operation against AQAP on the morning
of December 17 is a welcome return to its core mission,
although it remains to be seen if this was any more than a
one-off occurrence. END SUMMARY.
Signs of royg desperation in sa'ada

-----------------------------------
¶2. (C) As the sixth war in Sa'ada, now in its fifth month,
drags on in a tit-for-tat struggle between ROYG military
forces and Houthi rebels, the ROYG has attempted to use its
elite CT forces to provide needed extra muscle.xxxxx,
told PolOff in late November that he felt his forces were
being pulled into the Sa'ada conflict because of the
perception that the CTU is made up of "super-men that can
solve any problem and defeat anybody." (Note: CTU forces
were initially sent to Sa'ada in July to investigate the
kidnapping of a group of Western aid workers. Post assesses
that the CTU was drawn into the Houthi conflict in early
September. End Note.) Such a misperception of the CTU's
capabilities and mission was hurting the unit, xxxxx added.
During the U.S.-Yemen Joint Staff Talks hosted in Sana'a
November 8-11, xxxxx publicly impressed upon Brigadier
General Ali Dahan of the Yemen Special Operations Forces
(YSOF), another elite military unit also involved in CT
operations, and other senior Ministry of Defense (MOD)
leadership the severity of the situation in Sa'ada and the
toll it was taking on the CTU. He told Dahan, "You may not
be feeling the hurt of this war, but the CTU is fighting in
Sa'ada and is taking casualties." (COMMENT: xxxxx was angry
with Dahan for stating that the YSOF was "ready and available
for more training exercises with U.S. forces" while the CTU
was being deployed in Sa'ada. He believes the YSOF should be
73
doing more in Sa'ada, which would allow the CTU to return to
its primary mission. END COMMENT.)
¶3. (S/NF) Increasingly desperate to defeat the Houthis, the

ROYG continues to insist that fighting the Houthis is a
legitimate component of CT operations, thus justifying the
use of CTU forces in Sa'ada. The National Security Bureau's
Colonel Akram al-Qassmi told PolOffs on December 9, "The war
against the Houthis is not a distraction from the CT fight.
It is the CT fight." xxxxx Despite the injection
of CTU forces into the fight three months ago, the Sa'ada war
drags on and, according to CTU leadership, the CTU is taking
"heavy casualties" due to their lack of training for this
type of warfare. At the urging of CTU leadership, the
Supreme Security Council agreed to move all CTU forces (two
platoons) out of Sa'ada on December 9. xxxxx confirmed that
the MOI Regional Commander ordered elements of the CTU,
believed to be one platoon, to remain in Sa'ada until Sa'ada
City is cleared of Houthi fighters.
Ct operations constrained due to sa'ada war

-------------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Following the return of one platoon to Sana'a, the

CTU undertook its first CT operation against AQAP in four
months on the morning of December 17. However, according to
xxxxx deployment to Sa'ada has hurt the CTU's readiness
capabilities. Ideally, the unit is primed for rapid response
to any CT threat in and around Sana'a within 10 minutes. The
Sanaa 00002230 002 of 002
CTU is broken into four platoons which rotate every two

weeks: one on leave, a second in training, a third on
standby, and a fourth as a Quick Reaction Force (QRF). With
one platoon in Sa'ada, and another on active duty in Sana'a,
the CTU has no surge capacity. xxxxx said that the CTU's
training and operational cycle has been disrupted by the
Sa'ada war. "Since August, the QRF has been in Sa'ada,
taking heavy casualties because they have been engaged in
heavy fighting. We have only had a chance to send a relief
team twice since the latest conflict started." He said that
74
the use of USG-provided armored vehicles and humvees has
"been fundamental in preventing casualties." (NOTE: Post has
repeatedly questioned ROYG use of U.S. military equipment and
U.S.-trained forces intended to combat AQAP in the war
against the Houthi rebels. END NOTE.)
¶5. (S/NF) The CTU was established just six years ago at the
urging of the USG and has received substantial funding and
training from U.S. special operations forces and British
conventional army trainers. Their training has focused on
detecting and neutralizing the AQAP threat, not fighting a
long-term, domestic insurgency. In particular, the CTU is
predominantly trained for CT "direct action missions" in
which they isolate an AQAP cell and capture its members based
on specific intelligence. Referring to the guerilla warfare
tactics the Houthis have been using against traditional ROYG
military forces, xxxxx U.S. training in
"unconventional warfare" and tactics used by the U.S. forces
in "asymmetric warfare" of the type encountered in the
mountains of Afghanistan, suggesting the CTU expects to
continue to use its forces in Sa'ada.
Comment
-------
¶6. (S/NF) Bogged down in a seemingly unwinnable war that

pits conventional forces against determined rebels, the ROYG
has resorted to using its specialized CT units. Untrained to
fight this type of conflict, the overstretched CTU has
reportedly sustained significant casualties, missed training
opportunities and been derailed from its principal mission:
to combat AQAP. While U.S. concerns over diversion of troops
and equipment have been acknowledged, they have clearly not
resulted in a significant change of ROYG focus from the
Houthis to AQAP. CTU deployment to Sa'ada, while a
distraction, is not a crushing blow to all potential CT
activities, as demonstrated by the December 17 CT operation.
However, it remains to be seen if this indicates a balancing
of priorities between the Houthi conflict and AQAP, or if it
is simply a momentary return to the CTU's primary mission.
End comment.
Seche
75
2009-12-21 2010-12-03 Embassy
09SANAA2250 SECRET
13:01 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #2250/01 3551328

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 211328Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
SECRET SANAA 002250
SIPDIS
FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE

NSC FOR AJOST
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019

TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL MOPS MASS YM
SUBJECT: YEMEN ABUZZ WITH TALK OF CT OPERATIONS;
TTENTION SLOWLY TURNS TO U.S. ROLE
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. Yemenis have talked of little else but the
counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula since news broke of the pre-dawn raids on December
¶17. Official media and ROYG officials have focused on the
successful aspects of the operation, including an alleged 34
terrorists killed and 51 arrested. Independent and
opposition media as well as the opposition Joint Meeting
Parties and members of the Southern Movement have used the
operations ) specifically the deadly airstrikes in Abyan
76
governorate ) to criticize what they view as the ROYG's
heavy-handed policies. After a series of stories on U.S.
involvement broke in the U.S. media in the days after the
strikes, local and pan-Arab media have begun to focus on this
aspect of the story. ROYG media reported the conversation
between President Obama and President Saleh and released an
official statement that there was no U.S. military
involvement in the raids. While President Saleh and the ROYG
seem determined to move forward with similar strikes in the
future (septel), still-nascent public support will depend on
the ROYG's ability to effectively manage the evolving
coverage of the events. END SUMMARY.
Heavy media coverage along partisan lines

-----------------------------------------
¶2. (C) The ROYG made swift work of announcing the preemptive
dawn strikes against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
in Sana'a and Abyan governorates on December 17. But ABC TV
news reports of U.S. intelligence and logistical assistance
to the ROYG were picked up on the same day by Yemen's
opposition media, and were quickly followed by charges of
scores of civilian deaths due to the "joint" airstrikes in
Abyan by ROYG and U.S. forces. Opposition demonstrators and
media outlets, as well as members of Parliament, have called
for an investigation of the civilian deaths in Abyan due to
the airstrikes. The story, heavily reported in the
international press, of an extensive role by U.S.
counter-terrorism forces in assisting the ROYG will linger as
long as interest in the civilian deaths continues.
¶3. (C) Raids against AQAP at dawn on December 17 in Arhab (a

suburb of Sanaa) and a training camp located in a village in
Abyan's al-Mahfad district were reported immediately by the
Ministry of Defense Web site 26sep.com and picked up by local
and international media by noon on December 17. Reports of
U.S. logistical and intelligence assistance to ROYG
counter-terrorism forces were reported on ABC TV later the
same day. That TV broadcast was swiftly reported on the
opposition Islah party's Web site, al-Sahwa, repeating
assertions of U.S. assistance to the ROYG, and citing unnamed
eyewitnesses claiming that 18 children and 41 men and women
were among the civilians killed by airstrikes. Also on
77
December 17, al-Jazeera aired footage of civilian casualties
and quoted locals as saying that U.S. aircraft were sighted
on overflight surveillance on the eve of the airstrikes in
Abyan. The official media was slow to respond to rapid
coverage critical of the raids by opposition media and to
organized protests in the region, instead focusing its
initial reporting on AQAP leaders killed or captured in the
raids.
Official media defends strikes, denies u.s. Involvement

--------------------------------------------- ----------
¶4. (SBU) By December 18, the regional and international

media, led by the report in the New York Times that the U.S.
had given intelligence, firepower and other assistance to the
ROYG in their raids against AQAP, began to cover the question
of U.S. involvement. The sensationalist and often inaccurate
Almenpar.net, the Houthis' official Web site, and Iran's
PressTV.net both reported 63 people dead in the raids in
Abyan, including 28 children. On December 19, the ROYG went
on the offensive, reporting on the MOD's Web site that
operations against AQAP militants were targeted to foil
suicide bombers planning attacks against Yemeni and foreign
installations, that the raids resulted in killing four
suicide bombers and arresting four others, and that the
attack on the training center in Abyan resulted in the deaths
of 24-30 AQAP members. Al-Jazeera, meanwhile, broadcast a
report on December 19 that the number killed in Abyan was
over 60, according to eyewitnesses, and that most of the
deaths were civilians. The satellite channel also showed
video of artillery shells with visible serial numbers and
claimed that "U.S. warplanes or cruise missiles probably
conducted the strike." On December 21, official media
attempted to get the damaging story of civilian deaths off

the front pages by diverting focus to the war in Sa'ada.
Elites react with reserve, some praise

--------------------------------------
¶5. (S) Gauging public opinion on the December 17 CT strikes

is difficult since the majority of Yemen's population is
78
rural and no national polling systems exist. The political
elite as represented by Embassy contacts, however, have
generally reacted with reserve, and some have even offered
praise for "long-overdue" action. In an e-mail to EmbOffs,
xxxxx
congratulated the USG on the successful CT operations, which
he praised as necessary to rid Yemen of terrorist elements.
xxxxx, told PolOff that the strikes were necessary to bring
Abyan back from the edge of extremism. "Al-Qaeda travels
freely throughout Abyan and Shebwa, using their training
camps. They now number in the thousands in these areas," he
said. Criticism among the elite classes has so far been
limited to loss of civilian life and largely avoided any
criticism of the U.S. xxxxx to PolOff on December
20, "We do not support religious, ideological or political
extremism, but to use military violence that kills innocents
on the pretext of pursuing criminals is wrong." xxxxx often critical of
ROYG
policies - told PolOff on December 18 that he perceived the
operations as successful, but wished the Arhab operation had
netted the "big fish," AQAP Operational Commander Qassim
al-Rimi, which would have provided a better justification for
any civilian losses.
Opposition hits back, citing civilian deaths

--------------------------------------------
¶6. (S) Members of the opposition Joint Meeting Parties

(JMP), Parliament and the Southern Movement have all used the
airstrikes in Abyan as a means to attack the ROYG for what
the oppositionists call heavy-handed policies. The strike in
Maajala in Abyan's al-Mahfad district, which locals have
reported killed 49 "civilians" (including 17 women and 23
children), comes on the heels of a critical and widely read
Human Rights Watch report focused on the ROYG's violent
suppression of political demonstrations in the southern
governorates released on December 15. (Note: Deputy Prime
Minister for Defense and Security Affairs Rashad al-Alimi
told the Ambassador that civilians killed in the airstrikes
were most likely poor Bedouin from the area providing
logistical support to the terrorists and AQAP family members.
End Note.) Non-stop al-Jazeera coverage of the aftermath of
attacks in Abyan has provided fuel for the opposition. On
79
December 20, Parliament, led by opposition Islah party member
from Abyan Ali al-Ashal, called Alimi and the Minister of
Defense to appear before the legislative body to discuss
reports of civilian deaths in Abyan.
¶7. (S) The JMP immediately seized on reports of civilian

deaths, using the December 17 airstrikes as an excuse not to
participate in President Saleh's National Dialogue, set to
begin on December 26. The Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)
called for the ROYG to compensate victims' families and pay
for treatment of those wounded in the operations. Local
media reported that "thousands" protested in the perpetually
restive southern governorates of Lahj and Abyan, calling for
an investigation into the attacks. Rumors were rampant among
secessionists in southern Yemen that the attack did not
target an AQAP training camp, but rather a civilian
population. xxxxx the airstrikes in Abyan as another occasion to
promote the movement as a better CT partner for the U.S. than
the ROYG. He told PolOff on December 20, "The Saleh regime
is trying to mix up al-Qaeda with the movement. We're
willing to cooperate with you to avoid killing innocent
people and kick out al-Qaeda."
Royg frustrated, but willing to stay the course

--------------------------------------------- --
¶8. (S) The ROYG has weathered the storm of criticism ) most
of it from the usual suspects ) well, and has restated its
commitment to continue similar operations against AQAP in the
near future. Alimi, speaking for President Saleh, told the
Ambassador on December 20 that his government was determined
to keep hitting AQAP in cooperation with the U.S. (septel).
Political observers in Sana'a have suggested that President

Saleh received a significant morale boost from personal,
congratulatory phone calls from President Obama and Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak the day of the strikes. A
weary-sounding xxxxx, "The attack is already causing the
government a headache because the JMP is using it as the
reason not to participate in the National Dialogue," which
will include economic as well as political issues. However,
the ROYG ) often eager to use flack from the opposition as
an excuse not to move forward in controversial CT operations
80
) has indicated that it is willing to weather the most
recent criticism.
Comment
-------
¶9. (S) The December 17 operations against AQAP have proven a

success and served as a significant distraction in the local
media from the government's protracted civil war in the north
of the country. In Sana'a at least, many Yemenis seem to
accept the necessity and inevitability of similar CT action
as al-Qaeda's presence in Yemen's lawless tribal governorates
has ballooned in recent months. The ROYG, however, must be
more proactive in countering inaccurate opposition stories
and AQAP propaganda regarding the loss of innocent lives in
the Abyan airstrikes, especially if future operations are
already in the works. While the U.S. has escaped the brunt
of criticism to date, continued leaks from Washington and
international media coverage of American involvement could
stir up anti-American resentment in Yemen and test the ROYG's
professed commitment to going after AQAP. END COMMENT.
Seche
81
2009-12- 2010-12- Embassy
21 13:01 03 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ1736
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #2251/01 3551334

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 211334Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
SIPDIS
NOFORN
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR JYAPHE
EO 12958 DECL: 12/21/2019

TAGS PTER, MOPS, MASS, PGOV, PREL, YE
SUBJECT: ROYG LOOKS AHEAD FOLLOWING CT
OPERATIONS, BUT
PERHAPS NOT FAR ENOUGH
REF: SANAA 02230
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY. The ROYG views the December 17 CT

operations as a success and a benefit to Yemeni national interests,
and appears not overly concerned about unauthorized leaks
regarding the U.S. role and negative media attention to civilian
deaths. ROYG officials continue to publicly maintain that the
operation was conducted entirely by its forces, acknowledging U.S.
82
support strictly in terms of intelligence sharing. Deputy Prime
Minister Rashad al-Alimi told the Ambassador on December 20 that
any evidence of greater U.S. involvement ) such as fragments of U.S.
munitions found at the sites - could be explained away as equipment
purchased from the U.S. While the ROYG has touted the operation
as a victory in terms of the number of al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) members killed or captured, it hasn’t yet decided
how, or even if, it should begin to modify its public messaging to
address criticism over collateral damage, or the likelihood that the
extent of U.S. involvement may become impossible to deny. END
SUMMARY.
¶2. (S/NF) In a December 20 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy

Prime Minister for Security and Defense Rashad al-Alimi said that
the ROYG, including President Saleh himself, views the December 17
CT operations in Abyan and Arhab as a success, despite negative
press reports (septel) and leaks to the U.S. press regarding a U.S. role
in the operation. Alimi said he was joined by other ROYG officials in
their positive view of the operation against al-Qaida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and a desire for continued collaboration on CT
operations. Referring to an internal ROYG meeting chaired by
President Saleh on December 19, Alimi assured the Ambassador that
Saleh wants these operations against AQAP to continue “non-stop
until we eradicate this disease.”
¶3. (S/NF) Alimi told the Ambassador that Saleh was undisturbed by
press reports citing U.S. officials asserting American involvement in
the operations, saying that the ROYG “must maintain the status
quo” with regard to the official denial of U.S. involvement in order to
ensure additional “positive operations” against AQAP. Alimi seemed
more concerned with the political opposition and Southern
Movement’s use of the Abyan operation as an example of the
government’s heavy-handed response to groups the ROYG deems a
threat. The Ambassador cautioned Alimi that the ROYG may need
to nuance its position regarding U.S. involvement in the event more
evidence surfaces, complicating its ability to adhere to the official line
that ROYG forces conducted the operations independently. Alimi
appeared confident that any evidence of greater U.S. involvement )
such as U.S. munitions found at the sites - could be explained away as
equipment purchased from the U.S. However, Alimi informed the
Ambassador that senior ROYG officials continue to the discuss
media strategy and the public posture of the ROYG.
83
NOT SO INNOCENT
---------------
¶4. (S/NF) According to Alimi, the ROYG has recruited a number of

local political and religious leaders to visit the ares affected by the air
strikes in Abyan to explain o the people the need for the operation
and the dnger that AQAP poses to all Yemenis. The Governr of
Abyan was given YR 20 million (approximatel USD 100,000) to
disburse to the families of those killed or wounded in the strikes in
Maajala, where the AQAP training camp was located. Alimi said that
the civilians who died were largely nomadic, Bedouin families who
lived in tents near the AQAP training camp and were assisting
AQAP with logistical support. Alimi said they were poor people
selling food and supplies to the terrorists, but were nonetheless acting
in collusion with the terrorists and benefitting financially from
AQAP’s presence in the area. He assured the Ambassador that the
Governor of Abyan visited the site after the operation and confirmed
that there were no villages, houses, or civilian institutions that were
damaged, only the training camp, and the encampments of the non-
combatant Bedouin population.
COMMENT
-------
¶5. (S/NF) Given that local and international media will continue to
look for evidence of a U.S. role in the December
17 strikes against AQAP, the ROYG must think seriously about its
public posture and whether its strict adherence to assertions that the
strikes were unilateral will undermine public support for legitimate
and urgently needed CT operations, should evidence to the contrary
surface. Thus far, the ROYG has deployed influential local leaders to
the affected area in Abyan to explain the need for the strikes in an
effort to quell potential unrest; however, it has not attempted to
provide any context for the civilian casualties, which might help to
counter overblown claims of ROYG disregard for the local
population ) in this particular case, southerners. END COMMENT.
SECHE
84
2009-12-27 2010-12-03 Embassy
12:12 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXRO5866
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHYN #2274/01 3611245
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271245Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
SIPDIS

NSC OR AJOST
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/26/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS MOPS PINR YM
SUBJECT: ROYG ACKNOWLEDGES U.S. INTEL ASSISTANCE
IN AQAP
STRIKES, MAKES CASE BEFORE PARLIAMENT
REF: A. SANAA 2251

¶B. SANAA 2250
Classified By: CDA Angie Bryan for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
85
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and
Security Affairs Rashad al-Alimi for the first time publicly
acknowledged U.S. intelligence assistance in the December 17
strikes during a presentation to Parliament on December 23.
Preliminary reports from Post contacts indicate that Alimi's
presentation, which included both a description of al-Qaeda's
growing threat to Yemen going back to 1992 and an explanation
that the civilian casulaties were in fact AQAP family members
living in terrorist training camps, was well received by the
pro-government MPs in attendance. Opposition MPs largely
stayed away from the session because they have been
boycotting Parliament since early December due to an
unrelated dispute with the ROYG over parliamentary elections.
End summary.
Royg makes the case for aqap strikes before parliament

--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶2. (SBU) After repeated calls in Parliament for the ROYG to

explain the December 17 AQAP strikes, Deputy Prime Minister
for Defense and Security Affairs Rashad al-Alimi described to
MPs the al-Qaeda threat in Yemen during a December 23
presentation. Alimi said that the strikes were carried out
"using intelligence aid from Saudi Arabia and the United
States of America in our fight against terrorism." He pinned
the occurrence of civilian casualties squarely on AQAP's
leadership, saying that "militants" had brought their own
family members to the training camps. Alimi's presentation
before Parliament, which included a history of al-Qaeda's
attacks on Yemeni targets since 1992 and a list of AQAP
operatives killed in the December 17 strikes, was open to the
press and received prominent coverage the following day in
official and independent media outlets. Most of the strikes'
harshest critics -- members of the minority Joint Meeting
Parties (JMP) -- did not attend the presentation due to an
ongoing boycott of Parliament since early December resulting
from a dispute with the ROYG over the last round of
parliamentary elections, according to opposition leader MP
Hamid al-Ahmar. The JMP did send one opposition member,
Islah Party MP Ali Ashal, from Abyan, to press Alimi on the
issue of civilian casualties.
86
¶3. (C) For days following the December 17 strikes, Post
contacts who supported the strikes lamented the ROYG's
silence on the issue of civilian casualties. Alimi's
presentation, which included satellite images and photographs
of the training camps, was generally well received by MPs
from the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) party, many
of whom had previously expressed frustration with the
government's tight hold on details of the strike. MP Nabil
Basha told Pol FSN that Alimi's presentation was the subject
of a heated debate over the issue of civilian casulaties,
despite the majority GPC's overall support for aggressive
action against al-Qaeda. On December 26, Parliament anounced
the formation of a 10-member fact-finding commission, chaired
by Deputy Speaker of Parliament Himyar al-Ahmar, to
investigate reports of civilian deaths, according to
government media.
¶4. (C) MPs pressed Alimi to answer why the strikes had not
been carried out earlier, what measures were in place to
limit collateral damage, and how best to compensate the
civilian victims in Abyan, according to a Finance Ministry
official who witnessed the session. "At long last, the ROYG
addressed the issue of so-called innocent civilians being
killed. Once it understood that these were training camps
and that civilians were relatives of al-Qaeda people,
Parliament respected the government's actions," xxxxx,
told EconOff.xxxxx, told EconOff that the
presentation impressed MPs and would go a long way in helping
future CT operations. "Why did the government wait so long
after the strikes to explain everything?" is a common refrain
heard among Post political contacts, referring to Alimi's
Sanaa 00002274 002 of 002
presentation to Parliament.
Foreign minister asks u.s. To stay quiet on support role

--------------------------------------------- -----------
¶5. (C) Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi told the Charge on
December 23 that the U.S. should continue to refer inquiries
to the Yemeni Government, highlight the ROYG's indigenous CT
87
capabilities, and stress that al-Qaeda represents a threat
not only to the West, but also to Yemen's security. Qirbi
also attacked the opposition Islah party and the Southern
Movement for "speaking in defense of al-Qaeda" by
characterizing the strikes as targeting innocent civilians.
Bryan
88
2009-12-28 2010-12-03 Embassy
10:10 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXRO6290
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DE RUEHYN #2279/01 3621044
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281044Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP ANDREW MACDONALD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2019

TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SA IR YE
SUBJECT: YEMENI TRIBAL LEADER: FOR SALEH, SAUDI
INVOLVEMENT
IN SA'ADA COMES NOT A MOMENT TOO SOON
REF: A. RIYADH 1617

¶B. SANAA 2227
¶C. SANAA 1617
¶D. SANAA 1611
Classified By: CDA Angie Bryan for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
89
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: President Saleh believes the Saudi
Government's military actions in Sa'ada will alleviate
mounting domestic political pressure on him to demonstrate
progress against the Houthi rebels, according toxxxxx
with close personal ties to
Saleh and his inner circle. xxxxx told EconOff that Saleh
views Saudi involvement in the war, and the concomitant
increase in direct Saudi budget support to the ROYG, as an
incentive to prolong the ROYG's campaign in Sa'ada. xxxxx
also claimed that members of the Saudi Special Office for
Yemen Affairs, in contrast to the Saudi Government's official
support for the ROYG, are privately very skeptical of Saleh's
claims regarding Iranian assistance for the Houthi rebels.
The long absence from Saudi Arabia of Crown Prince Sultan, a
Saleh skeptic who normally heads the Special Office, has
meant that the Yemen file has largely been in the hands of
King Abdullah, a firm supporter of Saleh, according to xxxxx
End summary.
Saleh relieved by saudi involvement, but still overwhelmed

--------------------------------------------- -------------
¶2. (C) In the past month, President Saleh has told a number
of his top advisors that continued direct Saudi involvement
in the Houthi conflict will alleviate domestic political
pressure on the ROYG to produce tangible gains against the
Houthis, according to xxxxx with close
personal ties to Saleh. Saleh also views continued Saudi
involvement as the key to keeping the tap of Saudi budget
support open (Saudi monetary support for ROYG military
operations will be reported septel). The greater financial
incentives attached to direct Saudi participation in the
conflict mean Saleh now has an incentive to prolong the
conflict rather than seek a mediated solution. (Comment:
xxxxx comments on Saleh's thinking support similar accounts
from other Post contacts reported in REF B. xxxxx speaks
frequently with Saleh, xxxxx. The chummy relationship between
xxxxx that EconOff also attended. End
Comment.)
¶3. (C) Like other Saleh watchers (REF C), xxxxx characterizes
the multitude of threats facing Saleh as qualitatively
different and more threatening to the regime's stability than
90
those during any other time in Yemen's history. "Saleh is
overwhelmed, exhausted by the war, and more and more
intolerant of internal criticism. Saudi involvement comes at
just the right time for him" xxxxx said. Largely
unprecedented criticism of Saleh's leadership within the
rarified circle of Saleh's closest advisors has increased in
recent months, even including longtime Saleh loyalists such
as Office of the Presidency aides xxxxx, according to xxxxx
These names add to the growing chorus of Saleh loyalists that have
shed their
traditional aversion to disparaging the man they call "The
Boss" (REF D).
Saudis divided on confidence in saleh's sa'ada claims

--------------------------------------------- --------
¶4. (C) Members of the Saudi Government's Special Office for

Yemen Affairs, a committee normally headed by Crown Prince
Sultan, are privately skeptical of Saleh's claims of Iranian
involvement and of his desire to regionalize the Sa'ada
conflict, according to xxxxx told
EconOff on December 14 xxxxx that Saleh was providing false or
exaggerated
information on Iranian assistance to the Houthis in order to
enlist direct Saudi involvement and regionalize the conflict.
xxxxx said that xxxxx told him that "we know
Saleh is lying about Iran, but there's nothing we can do
about it now."
Sanaa 00002279 002 of 002
¶5. (C) The prolonged absence from Saudi Arabia of Special

Office chairman Crown Prince Sultan (REF A), who xxxxx claims
is also highly skeptical of Saleh, left the Yemen file in the
hands of King Abdullah, who has greater confidence in Saleh's
motives and leadership abilities. Committee members have
kept their doubts about Saleh's leadership abilities private
since the departure of Crown Prince Sultan, creating a vacuum
of Yemen policy advice in the Saudi Government that resulted
in the decision to intervene directly in the Houthi conflict,
xxxxx. King Abdullah was much more receptive to
91
Saleh's entreaties for direct Saudi involvement than Crown
Prince Sultan ever would have been, xxxxx.
¶6. (C) RIYADH COMMENT: We agree with xxxxx observation that

Saudi support is enabling Saleh to weather increased domestic
political pressure and continue his campaign against the
Houthis. However, xxxxx assumption that King Abdullah's
"greater confidence" in Saleh is driving this support may be
flawed. We have seen no evidence that the King has any
particular regard for Saleh beyond exasperation that borders
on disgust. Senior Saudi officials make no secret of their
distaste for Saleh, but see him as the "devil they know."
Aware of his growing weakness, they view their support as
essential to keeping Yemen's problems contained. Further,
contacts say Second Deputy PM and Minister of Interior Prince
Nayif, widely believed to advocate a tougher approach to the
Yemen problem, has been heavily involved in the Yemen file in
Sultan,s absence. Some suggest that the border actions --
while temporarily propping up Saleh -- may be indicative of
Saudi plans to take a harder line towards Yemen in the longer
term. END RIYADH COMMENT.
¶7. (U) Embassy Riyadh has cleared this cable.

Bryan
92
Reference
ID
2010-01-04 2010-12-03 Embassy
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FBIE-00 VCI-00 H-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 LAB-01
MOFM-00 MOF-00 M-00 VCIE-00 DCP-00 NSAE-00 ISN-
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NIMA-00 MCC-00 PM-00 GIWI-00 SCT-00 ISNE-00
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SP-00 IRM-00 SSO-00 SS-00 NCTC-00 CBP-00 SCRS-00
PMB-00 DSCC-00 PRM-00 DRL-00 SAS-00 FA-00 SWCI-
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SANA-00 /001W
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FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3474
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NCTC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
93
NOFORN
DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/ARP

NSC FOR DPNSA BRENNAN
HQ USCENTCOM/CCCC-CIG FOR JSEATON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2019

TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PINS MOPS MASS MCAP SA
AE, UK, ER, DJ, QA, YM
SUBJECT: GENERAL PETRAEUS' MEETING WITH SALEH ON
SECURITY
ASSISTANCE, AQAP STRIKES
REF: 2009 SANAA 1430

(d).
¶1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Commander of the U.S. Central Command

General David Petraeus congratulated President Saleh on
recent successful operations against AQAP, and informed him
that U.S. security assistance to the ROYG would increase to
USD 150 million in 2010, including USD 45 million to equip
and train a CT-focused aviation regiment under the Yemeni
Special Operations Forces. Saleh requested that the U.S.
provide 12 armed helicopters and train and equip three new
Republican Guard brigades. Saleh rejected the General's
proposal to have USG personnel armed with direct-feed
intelligence present inside the area of CT operations, but
agreed to a have U.S. fixed-wing bombers circle outside
Yemeni territory ready to engage AQAP targets should
actionable intelligence become available. END SUMMARY.
SALEH: HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS, HELICOPTERS

--------------------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus,

accompanied by the Ambassador, CENTCOM aides, the Embassy
DATT, and EconOff note taker, congratulated President Saleh
on successful operations against AQAP during a January 2
meeting. The General told Saleh that he had requested USD
150 million in security assistance for 2010, a substantial
94
increase over the 2009 amount of USD 67 million. Also
present were Minister of Defense MG Muhammed Nasser Ahmad Ali
and Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Affairs
Rashad al-Alimi. Raising a topic that he would manage to
insert into almost every item of discussion during the hour
and half-long meeting, Saleh requested that the U.S. provide
the ROYG with 12 armed helicopters. Possessing such
helicopters would allow the ROYG to take the lead in future
CT operations, "ease" the use of fighter jets and cruise
missiles against terrorist targets, and allow Yemeni Special
Operations Forces to capture terrorist suspects and identify
victims following strikes, according to Saleh. The U.S.
could convince Saudi Arabia and the UAE to supply six
helicopters each if the American "bureaucracy" prevented
quick approval, Saleh suggested. The General responded that
he had already considered the ROYG's request for helicopters
and was in discussions with Saudi Arabia on the matter. "We
won't use the helicopters in Sa'ada, I promise. Only against
al-Qaeda," Saleh told General Petraeus.
¶3. (S/NF) Saleh agreed to General Patraeus' proposal to

dedicate USD 45 million of 2010 security assistance funds to
help establish and train a YSOF aviation regiment, allowing
YSOF to focus on al-Qaeda targets and leaving Sa'ada air
operations to the Yemeni Air Force. Without giving much
detail, Saleh also requested that the U.S. equip and train
three new Republican Guard brigades, totaling 9,000 soldiers.
"Equipping these brigades would reflect upon our true
partnership," Saleh said. The General urged Saleh to focus
first on the YSOF aviation regiment.
AQAP STRIKES: CONCERN FOR CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

---------------------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) Saleh praised the December 17 and 24 strikes

against AQAP but said that "mistakes were made" in the
killing of civilians in Abyan. The General responded that
the only civilians killed were the wife and two children of
an AQAP operative at the site, prompting Saleh to plunge into
a lengthy and confusing aside with Deputy Prime Minister
Alimi and Minister of Defense Ali regarding the number of
terrorists versus civilians killed in the strike. (Comment:
Saleh's conversation on the civilian casualties suggests he
95
has not been well briefed by his advisors on the strike in
Abyan, a site that the ROYG has been unable to access to
determine with any certainty the level of collateral damage.
End Comment.) AQAP leader Nassr al-Wahishi and extremist
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki may still be alive, Saleh said, but
the December strikes had already caused al-Qaeda operatives
to turn themselves in to authorities and residents in
affected areas to deny refuge to al-Qaeda. Saleh raised the
issue of the Saudi Government and Jawf governorate tribal
sheikh Amin al-Okimi, a subject that is being reported
through other channels.
SHIFTING AIRSTRIKE STRATEGIES

-----------------------------
¶5. (S/NF) President Obama has approved providing U.S.

intelligence in support of ROYG ground operations against
AQAP targets, General Petraeus informed Saleh. Saleh reacted
coolly, however, to the General's proposal to place USG
personnel inside the area of operations armed with real-time,
direct feed intelligence from U.S. ISR platforms overhead.
"You cannot enter the operations area and you must stay in
the joint operations center," Saleh responded. Any U.S.
casualties in strikes against AQAP would harm future efforts,
Saleh asserted. Saleh did not have any objection, however,
to General Petraeus' proposal to move away from the use of
cruise missiles and instead have U.S. fixed-wing bombers
circle outside Yemeni territory, "out of sight," and engage
AQAP targets when actionable intelligence became available.
Saleh lamented the use of cruise missiles that are "not very
accurate" and welcomed the use of aircraft-deployed
precision-guided bombs instead. "We'll continue saying the
bombs are ours, not yours," Saleh said, prompting Deputy
Prime Minister Alimi to joke that he had just "lied" by
telling Parliament that the bombs in Arhab, Abyan, and Shebwa
were American-made but deployed by the ROYG.
ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN MIL-MIL RELATIONS

-----------------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) General Petraeus praised cooperation between the

Embassy and the NSB, YSOF, Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG), and
Counterterrorism Unit (CTU), but singled out relations with
96
the Yemeni Air Force as problematic. Only four out of 50
planned U.S. Special Operations Forces Command training
missions with the Yemeni Air Force had actually been executed
in the past year, he said. Saleh said he would personally
instruct Minister of Defense to improve the situation. The
General also urged Saleh to stop Yemeni Customs' habit of
holding up Embassy cargo at the airport, including shipments
destined for the ROYG itself, such as equipment for the CTU.
Saleh laughed and made a vague pledge to have the customs
issue "taken care of." Saleh complained that the ROYG had
not yet received the necessary training to operate 17 Iraqi
Light Armored Vehicle (ILAVs) provided by the USG in 2008,
saying that YSOF needed the training in order to use the
ILAVs for CT operations. The General said he would look into
having U.S. Special Operations Forces personnel conduct the
training.
¶7. (S/NF) Pointing to the ROYG's problems in combating

rampant drug and arms smuggling, Saleh told General Petraeus
that U.S. maritime security assistance was insufficient to
cover Yemen's nearly 2,000 km of coastline. "Why not have
Italy, Germany, Holland, Japan, Saudi, and the UAE each
provide two patrol boats?" Saleh suggested. The General told
Saleh that two fully-equipped 87-foot patrol boats destined
for the Yemeni Coast Guard were under construction and would
arrive in Yemen within a year. Saleh singled out smuggling
from Djibouti as particularly troublesome, claiming that the
ROYG had recently intercepted four containers of
Djibouti-origin TNT. "Tell (Djiboutian President) Ismail
Guelleh that I don't care if he smuggles whiskey into Yemen
-- provided it's good whiskey ) but not drugs or weapons,"
Saleh joked. Saleh said that smugglers of all stripes are
bribing both Saudi and Yemeni border officials.
SALEH WELCOMES LONDON CONFERENCE

--------------------------------
¶8. (S/NF) Saleh told the General that he welcomed PM Gordon

Brown's announcement of the London conference and said that
the cooperation on Yemen between the U.S., EU, Saudi Arabia,
and the UAE would be benefitial. Qatar should not be
involved, however, because "they work with Iran." In this
regard, Saleh also identified Qatar as one of those nations
97
working "against Yemen," along with Iran, Libya, and Eritrea.
¶9. (U) General Petraeus did not have an opportunity to clear

on this cable.
SECHE
98
Reference
ID
2010-01-11 2010-12-03 Embassy
10SANAA45 SECRET
14:02 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #0045/01 0111405

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 111405Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND OPS CENTER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2020

TAGS: PTER PGOV YM
SUBJECT: SALEH STICKS TO HIS CT GUNS, BUT OFFERS A
WAY OUT
TO AQAP RANK AND FILE
REF: A. SANAA 0014

¶B. 09 SANAA 1299
¶1. (S) SUMMARY. After several successful counter-terrorism

operations aimed at uprooting an entrenched al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), President Saleh announced on
January 9 that he was willing to negotiate with AQAP members
who renounced violence, signaling a return to one of the
tactics Saleh has used previously to control the wide
spectrum of Islamic extremists in Yemen. With a variety of
99
domestic actors ) from conservative clerics to the political
opposition and the tribes - protesting the ROYG's recent
strikes against AQAP, Saleh is feeling pressure to shore up
his domestic political base by offering the possibility of a
softer approach to AQAP's lower-ranking membership. He has
not, however, shied away from his commitment to go after
al-Qaeda's top leadership, which he understands is unlikely
to either renounce terrorism or agree to negotiate with the
ROYG, especially after a series of sweeping CT operations in
December and January. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (S) During a January 9 interview with Abu Dhabi TV,

President Saleh said that while he was willing to negotiate
with members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) who
were willing to renounce violence, he would continue to
pursue to the best of his abilities those who continued to
engage in terrorism. "Dialogue is the best way ) even with
al-Qaeda, if they set aside their weapons and return to
reason," he said. Official news outlets, including 26
September, al-Jamhurriya, and al-Mutamar, reprinted the
complete text of the interview on January 10, signaling the
government's official endorsement of the president's comment.
(Note: The interview echoes his January 1 editorial in
official al-Thawra newspaper, in which he called for the
Houthis and AQAP to renounce violence and embrace dialogue
with the government as well as his December 14 call for a
National Dialogue to include a variety of societal actors
(Ref A). End Note.)
¶3. (S) xxxxx told PolOff on January 11 he was surprised

at the president's openness in offering to talk to members of
al-Qaeda, but that the ROYG has a history of dialogue through
the rehabilitation program for "reformed" extremists. (Note:
In the past, Minister of Religious Endowments Judge Hamoud
Hitar ran a now-defunct rehabilitation program for religious
extremists based on dialogue. End Note.) Saleh is known for
negotiating with his domestic opponents, including al-Qaeda.
For years, he has negotiated with, exploited, bribed and
cajoled Islamic extremists in Yemen for his own political
gain (Ref B). Even officials at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA), including Head of the North America Department
Adil al-Sunaini, acknowledged that negotiating with AQAP is
an "old government policy." "Our good president says things
100
to play the old game and keep everyone under his thumb,"xxxxx
told PolOff on January
¶11. (Comment: Despite a history of negotiating with
al-Qaeda, Saleh's current offer of dialogue to AQAP members
who renounce violence is unlikely to apply to the group's
hardened leadership. Instead, the president is likely
appealing to his religious base by offering an "out" to the
organization's rank and file, who, after a series of punitive
operations against AQAP in December and January, might be
looking for just such an opportunity. End Comment.)
¶4. (S) Saleh's remarks come after three weeks of public

criticism of the ROYG's close CT cooperation with the U.S. -
and specifically a December 17 airstrike in Abyan governorate
- from a variety of domestic actors, including religious
clerics, tribal leaders and the political opposition. One of
the most significant challenges has come from the
conservative religious establisment. In a January 8 Friday
sermon, conservative Salafi cleric and powerful Islah member
Abdulmajid al-Zindani railed against Yemen's CT cooperation
with the U.S., accusing it of wanting to "occupy" Yemen,
according to local press reports. Dubai-based al-Arabiya
reported on January 11 that influential Aden-based Salafi
cleric Ali Mohammed Umar said his followers would fight with
AQAP against any American intervention in Yemen. "The
president's two pillars of support are the military and the
Salafis. These comments were for the Salafis," xxxxx said.
xxxxx,
told PolOff on January 11, "Do not give these remarks too
much care. It is just a media statement." xxxxx pointed out
that the remarks, made in Arabic on a Middle Eastern
satellite TV channel, were intended for domestic - not
Western - consumption. xxxxx, told EmbOff on January 11

thatxxxxx
on the president's remarks
because they were "not to be taken seriously."
Comment
-------
¶5. (S) While Saleh's remarks reflect a need to appease

certain domestic constituencies upset by close cooperation
101
with the U.S. against AQAP, he has not given any indications
of shying away from future operations against AQAP
leadership. In the same interview, Saleh said that
terrorists are a "danger not just to Yemen,s security but to
international security, especially al-Qaeda." While the
president likes to keep all options on the table and never
writes off the possibility of negotiations with any political
opponent, his current offer is likely to apply to AQAP's rank
and file - not its hardened, isolated and hunted leadership.
In Yemen, especially, actions speak louder than words, and
Saleh's actions have not yet wavered in uprooting al-Qaeda.
End comment.
Seche
102
2010-02- 2010-12-03 Embassy
03 13:01 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #0221/01 0341341

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031341Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0292
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP ANDREW MACDONALD, S/CT

AMBASSADOR DANIEL
BENJAMIN, DS/ATA JOHN NASON, AND OBO ADAM NAMM
NSC FOR DPNSA BRENNAN
HQ USCENTCOM/CCCC-CIG FOR JSEATON
DHS/TSA FOR TOM WARRICK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/02/2020

TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV PINR PINS MOPS MASS MCAP ASEC
EAIR, ABLD, SA, UK, YM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BENJAMIN DISCUSSES CT
ASSISTANCE,
103
AIRPORT SECURITY WITH SALEH

(d).
¶1. (S/NF) Summary. During a 35-minute meeting on January

31, the Department's Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism,
Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, congratulated President Saleh on
the success of the London meeting and counter-terrorism (CT)
operations the ROYG has undertaken in recent weeks against
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) elements, and
described USG interest in increasing airport security and
sharing information on travelers in and out of Yemen. Saleh
agreed to the upcoming Transportation Security
Administration/Anti-Terrorism Assistance (TSA/ATA) visit,
requesting at the same time additional CT support. When
pressed by Ambassador Benjamin about Sa'ada, he indicated
that the ROYG had no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire at
this time. In a separate meeting, Foreign Minister Dr.
Abubakr al-Qirbi agreed on the success of the London meeting,
and suggested that the follow-up meeting in Riyadh would be
important for determining concrete steps. Senior ROYG
security officials expressed support for the Embassy's
struggle to acquire land and a willingness to act on the
Embassy's behalf. End Summary.
SALEH ON CT ASSISTANCE, AIRPORT SECURITY, AND

SA'ADA
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶2. (S/NF) In a January 31 meeting with President Saleh, the

Department's Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, Ambassador
Daniel Benjamin, congratulated Saleh on the success of the
London meeting and suggested that stability in Yemen can be
achieved only through a dual focus on security and
development. He commended Saleh on actions the ROYG has
taken in recent weeks against AQAP elements in Yemen and
assured Saleh that he could count on continued operational
support and intelligence sharing from the U.S. President
Saleh said he was satisfied with counter-terrorism (CT)
assistance to date and with Secretary Clinton's speech at the
London Conference, but said he "would like to be more
satisfied in the future" and appealed for the acceleration of
104
additional support, specifically citing helicopters and
vehicles with IED-jamming devices. Describing Americans as
"hot-blooded and hasty when you need us," but "cold-blooded
and British when we need you," he asked for a "moderate blood
temperature" and measured approach. (Note: Also present were
Deputy Prime Minister for Defense and Security Rashad
al-Alimi, National Security Bureau Director Ali al-'Anisi,
and Political Security Organization (PSO) Director Ghalib
Mutahir al-Gamish, with whom Benjamin met separately after
the conversation with the President. End Note.)
¶3. (S/NF) Ambassador Benjamin reiterated the USG desire to

ensure that no international terrorist attack originates
again from Yemen. He said the USG wants to help the ROYG
strengthen screening procedures at all of Yemen's
international airports, and establish a mechanism for sharing
information on passengers traveling via air to and from Yemen
as well as foreign nationals who have come to Yemen to study
at language or religious institutions. When approached with
the upcoming Transportation Security
Administration/Anti-Terrorism Assistance (TSA/ATA) visit,
Saleh agreed to the idea but deferred to his Supreme Security
Committee (Alimi, et al) on the details. In the follow-on
meeting, Alimi and 'Anisi both concurred with the upcoming
ATA/TSA visit and expressed support for increasing airport
security. 'Anisi, however, had reservations about sharing
information on foreign students in Yemen, and complained that
the USG request was too broad. (Comment: According to GRPO
reporting, the ROYG is willing to share information with the
USG on American students in Yemen and would likewise share
information with other embassies about their nationals.
While Western governments would presumably share information
among themselves, this system would still leave intelligence
gaps about non-Western countries such as Nigeria. End
Comment.)
¶4. (S/NF) Citing Saudi Arabia's decision to suspend its

military operations in Sa'ada and Abdul Malik al-Houthi's
public acceptance of the ROYG's conditions for a ceasefire,
Ambassador Benjamin asked Saleh if he saw an end to the
fighting. Saleh dismissed these points, arguing that the
Saudis gave a ceasefire ultimatum to the Houthis, and will
105
resume fighting in two weeks if the ceasefire is unfulfilled.
He called the Houthis "liars" and declared that they would
violate the six conditions of the ceasefire. He indicated
that the ROYG had no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire at
this time.
¶5. (S/NF) In a visit to Yemen Special Operation Forces

(YSOF) Headquarters, Ambassador Benjamin was treated to a
display of military equipment and briefed by YSOF Chief of
Staff Brigadier General Ahmad Dahan on YSOF activities.
Ambassador Benjamin emphasized common security interests and
congratulated Yemeni forces for their role in recent
operations. Dahan reiterated the request for helicopters and
asked for communications systems and additional training
courses. He lauded Yemeni operations as having a great effect
on AQAP elements, and indicated that the operations were
possible only due to the exchange of intelligence.
FM QIRBI LOOKING FORWARD TO RIYADH

----------------------------------
¶6. (S/NF) In a separate meeting, Foreign Minister Dr. Abu

Bakr al-Qirbi agreed the London Conference was a success and
expressed hope that the February follow-up meeting in Riyadh
would help determine concrete steps to move forward. Qirbi
agreed that a smaller group, focusing on Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) member countries, rather than a broader donor
group, would be more constructive. Qirbi said that the ROYG
wanted to focus on the Top Ten Economic Reform Priorities
over the course of the next year, but would need donor
assistance to accomplish these goals. He expressed support
for discussion at the GCC-hosted meeting of funding for an
extremist rehabilitation center, indicating that an
educational institute with a long-term plan would do much to
counter radicalization and address issues of poverty and
unemployment, particularly in areas where AQAP has a hold.
Qirbi and other ROYG officials expressed support for US
intervention with GCC member countries in an attempt to gain
financial support for a rehabilitation center as an
expression of regional support for Yemen's stability.
EMBASSY LAND DISPUTE

--------------------
106
¶7. (C) The Supreme Security Committee was familiar with the
Embassy's struggle to acquire land, and said they were
willing to act on the Embassy's behalf. Foreign Minister
Qirbi said that he had been in communication with Minister of
Religious Endowments Judge Hamoud Hitar, who indicated the
ROYG's readiness for the purchase and resolution of a dispute
over ownership. Alimi said that Deputy Foreign Minister
Mohyadeen al-Dhabi was following up and had secured the full
cooperation of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Alimi
encouraged Ambassador Seche to sign the contract for the
land, professing that he would personally guarantee the
investment. (Comment: In a follow-on conversation on
February 3, Alimi repeated his assurance to the Ambassador
that the ROYG is prepared to provide for the security of the
proposed housing site both during and after construction. He
suggested that the Ambassador meet with 'Anisi, who President
Saleh has charged with overseeing the process, to discuss
final details of the deal, including our timeframe for
beginning construction. The Ambassador will try to see
'Anisi next week for this purpose. End Comment.)
SECHE
107
2010-02- 2010-12-03 Embassy
17 10:10 21:09 Sanaa
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHYN #0317/01 0481029

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 171029Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0119
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0051
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0016
NOFORN
SIPDIS
CA/OCS/ACS/NEA FOR ERINN STOTT AND PAMELA KAZI,

CA/EX FOR
HENRY HAND,CA/VO/F/P FOR SADIA NIAZI, NEA/ARP FOR
ANDREW
MACDONALD,
DS COMMAND CENTER,
CAIRO FOR RCO CHRISTOPHER ROWAN,
RIYADH FOR ICE ATTACHE RONALD KRISKE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2020

TAGS: ASEC CASC CMGT PTER YM
SUBJECT: (S/NF) SPIKE IN NATIONAL SECURITY-RELATED
ARREST
CASES STRAINS POST,S RESOURCES
REF: A. SANAA 71
¶B. SANAA 151
¶C. SANAA 173
108
¶D. SANAA 230
¶E. SANAA 289
¶F. 09 SANAA 720
¶G. SANAA 202
¶H. MITCHELL/SIMS TELCON 02/16/2010
¶I. MITCHELL/SIMS EMAIL 02/16/2010
¶J. SANAA 214
This is an action request: see paragraph 12.
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Since the start of 2010, Post has seen a
dramatic increase in the number of Amcits arrested. Over 80
percent of these cases (REF A-E) have had a nexus to
terrorism and national security issues that have required
substantial involvement from RSO and LEGATT. This comes as
the Consular Section is attempting to alleviate its six-month
backlog in upcoming CRBA appointments. Post requests TDY
personnel to assist with the anticipated staffing gaps in
Consular from April to September and renews its call to
increase FSO staffing (REF F) to address the sharply
increased workload. End Summary.
Arrests of Americans Up, New ROYG Procedures

--------------------------------------------
¶2. (S/NF) Post has noted a dramatic increase in arrests of

Americans in Yemen since the attempted Christmas Day bombing
of Northwest 253. In the last seven weeks, seven Amcits were
arrested for national security concerns and violations of
immigration laws (Ref A-E), compared to only six in the
entire four months prior. Six of these cases have suspected
links to terrorism that have required significant
coordination with LEGATT and RSO. Comment: This upsurge in
arrests is the result of more scrupulous ROYG focus on visa
overstay cases due to increased international attention to
terrorism in Yemen. End Comment.
¶3. (S/NF) Previously, a visa overstay would present himself

at the immigration authority, pay his fines, and obtain an
exit visa. Recently, however, overstays have been detained
and have required post intervention in securing their exit
109
from Yemen. Four of the arrestees were 'abducted' by the
Political Security Organization (PSO) or National Security
Bureau (NSB) and were held for between 3-10 days before post
was given official notice of their whereabouts. Note: In the
past two years, the Muslim convert community of Amcits living
in Yemen ) who make up the majority of overstays - has been
increasingly linked to extremist activities. End Note. In one
case, Post has still not received official word of the arrest
and is unable to inform the family in the US, who still
believes the individual has been kidnapped. The issue of
timely notification of arrests was recently raised by post's
DCM with the Yemeni Chief of Protocol.
Direct Namecheck Hits Increasing

--------------------------------
¶4. (S/NF) In addition to the spike in arrest cases, post

routinely sees cases of national security interest in the
course of its daily visa and American citizen services (ACS)
operations. On average, post has 3-5 cases per week that
require LEGATT and RSO attention. The processing time
required to clear these hits and allow time for additional
interviews is increasingly straining our ability to provide
routine services in a timely fashion. Comment: Post had
reduced appointment wait time for first-time CRBA
applications from six months to three months. We will not be
able to continue such high appointment numbers given the
recent increase in arrest cases and our current staffing
levels. End Comment.
Status of Arrestees
-------------------
¶5. (S/NF) Post is currently processing five arrest cases,
most of which have begun as welfare and whereabouts requests,

or visa overstays. A sixth, who was not a national security
or terrorist case, was recently released. All five that
remain have had strong links to terrorism or national
security concerns. The following is an update on these cases.
¶6. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX (REF A) was being

held at the Passport Authority pending further investigation
110
into both his visa overstay and possible links to terrorism.
ROYG previously attempted to deport XXXXXXXXXXXX. He was
denied
boarding, however, due to his presence on the no fly list
(NFL). Post had requested guidance from CA on this matter
(REF G), as per applicable FAM NFL guidance. Post,s A/RSO-I
received a call from Consulate Istanbul,s A/RSO-I (REF H)
that XXXXXXXXXXXX arrived in Istanbul on February 16, but was
denied
onward travel to the U.S due to his NFL status. Post later
received notice that XXXXXXXXXXXX is scheduled to board
Turkish
Airlines flight TK1236 to Sanaa on February 17 (REF I). Note:
XXXXXXXXXXXX no longer has a valid Yemeni visa and airport
visas are
no longer available (REF J). End Note.
¶7. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX (REF B) is being held at the

PSO prison. He is currently still under investigation by the
PSO, which plans to deport him. No date for his release has
been set. FBI and DS plan to meet him in the US upon his
return.
¶8. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX (REF C) is being held by the

Passport Authority and is awaiting deportation. Currently,
ROYG authorities are waiting for Mr. XXXXXXXXXXXX to secure
an
itinerary and tickets to the US before his release.
¶9. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX (Ref D) is also being held at

the PSO prison. He is currently being investigated for his
links to terrorism. The ROYG has not given any information
regarding possible charges.
¶10. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX (Ref E) is currently being held at

the Immigration Authority prison pending possible
deportation. It is currently unclear if Mr. XXXXXXXXXXXX will be
able to pay his overstay fines and obtain a standard exit
visa to return to the US or if he will be deported.
COMMENT
-------
111
¶11. (SBU) Post currently has five full-time officers assigned
to the consular section and one part-time officer. Prison
visits must occur during morning hours pulling officers away
from visa and ACS cases. This increase in workload has
pushed our already strained operation beyond capacity and has
hampered our ability to work through existing backlogs in ACS
and IV. In REF F and through Diplomacy 3.0, post requested at
least one additional ACS officer based on workload and
staffing in FY09. Post's workload in IV has increased by
5,722 cases or over 2.5 times from FY08 to FY09.
Additionally, post's NIV workload increased by 918
adjudications, up nearly a third from FY08 to FY09. End
Comment.
ACTION REQUEST
--------------
¶12. (SBU) Post renews its call for a full-time FS-03 ACS
officer and FS-04 Vice Consul, and requests TDY support to
cover officer leave and the anticipated staffing gap from
April through September. In addition, post requests
experienced Arabic-speaking LE Staff and officer TDY support
as soon as possible to assist in working through backlogs in
ACS and IV. Post fully expects that the trends of increasing
arrests and direct hit cases will continue and looks forward
to a positive and expeditious response to this request.
SECHE
...
112
113

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DE RUEHYN #0019/01 0090504

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND ISN/NESS

EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2020

REF: A. 07 SANAA 1905 B. 07 SANAA 2029

DE RUEHYN #2208 3480539

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD

EO 12958 DECL: 12/14/2019

¶2. (S/NF) Below is the text of a one-page document on Slobodan

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND INR SMOFFATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2019

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: An armed robbery rocked Aden on August 17,

HIGHLY COORDINATED ATTACK POINTS TO AQAP

¶2. (C) Armed gunmen robbed an Arab Limited Bank truck

¶3. (C) According to independent and official sources, the

¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX highlighted the similarity between the

SANAA 00001632 002 OF 002

passengers before hijacking the car with the stolen salaries.

¶6. (C) It is unlikely that ordinary robbers were behind the

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski; reasons 1.4 (b), (d).

¶1. (C) Summary. Assistant Secretary of State for Political

¶2. (C) A/S Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr. and Ambassador met

¶3. (C) A/S Bloomfield outlined the MANPADS buyback

¶5. (C) President Saleh assured A/S he was serious about

¶6. (C) Saleh pledged to A/S Bloomfield that Yemen's

¶7. (S) A/S told Saleh he is engaged in ongoing discussions

¶9. (C) "Rest assured," Saleh continued, "Yemen will not

¶12. (S) As expected, Saleh raised extending the buyback to

¶14. (S) A/S emphasized that the program on the table is

¶15. (C) Saleh complained to A/S of ongoing licensing

¶17. (S) All joking aside, Saleh appears serious in trying

STATE FOR NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2010

REF: IIR 6906012405

Classified By: DCM NABEEL KHOURY FOR REASONS 1.4 (b)

¶1. (S) In a conference call with Ambassador and DCM,

¶3. (S) We have presented, through military channels, a list

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2017

REF: STATE 32641

Classified By: CDA NABEEL KHOURY, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)

¶1. (S) On March 27, Yemeni military officers discovered an

¶3. (S) President Saleh expressed doubt as to the plane's

¶4. (S) Comment: President Saleh clearly believes the

DE RUEHYN #1989/01 3030637

NSC FOR ADNAN KIFAYAT; WHITE HOUSE FOR JOHN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017

REF: A. SANAA 1859

1.(U) Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for

2.(S) Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for

Jamal "He is Under my Microscope" al-Badawi and Friends

3.(S) Frances Townsend, Assistant to the President for

4.(S) Townsend expressed dismay over al-Badawi's release and

5.(S) Saleh specifically mentioned two other escapees that

Weapons Trafficking: You Can't Make This Stuff Up

6.(C) As Townsend began to ask Saleh about his efforts to

you can take him... back to Washington in Townsend's plane or

PSO: The Old Guard is the Problem

8.(S) Townsend complimented Yemen's National Security Bureau,

The Gulf Factor: Fueling Southern Unrest

10.(S) Saleh asserted that neighboring Arab countries were

USG Support: CT, Cash Courier Law and Joint Operations

11.(C) Townsend asked about the progress of Yemen's draft

12.(C) Townsend recommended a cash courier law to strengthen