Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ت ارة
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2009-07-28 2010-12-06 Embassy
09AMMAN1689 SECRET
14:02 15:03 Amman
VZCZCXRO8322
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #1689/01 2091427
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281427Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5609
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001689
SIPDIS
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¶2. (C) Jordanian police intervened to stop fan violence and the
chanting of anti-regime slogans during a July 17 match between
Amman soccer clubs Faisali and Wahdat in the industrial town of
Zarqa. The unrest began when Faisali fans started to chant slogans
against Palestinian-origin Jordanians, including Queen Rania. Some
Faisali fans threw bottles at Wahdat players and their fans. The
coaches of both teams ordered their players off of the field in the
middle of the game for their own safety, and the remainder of the
match was canceled. (Note: It ended in a scoreless draw. End Note.)
A Storied Rivalry
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¶3. (U) Faisali and Wahdat serve as the proxy champions of the East
Banker and Palestinian communities, respectively. Faisali, whose
name refers to the Hashemite King Faisal, is controlled by a
prominent tribe (the ‘Udwan) which hails from the East Banker
stronghold of Salt. It is known as the favored team of tribal East
Bankers, even though many of its players are of Palestinian origin.
Since the formation of the Jordanian Football Union (JFU) in 1944,
Faisali has won thirty national championships.
¶4. (C) Wahdat, which takes its name from the large Palestinian
refugee camp on the southern side of Amman, is seen as the favored
team of Palestinian-origin Jordanians. Wahdat has won eleven
national soccer championships since 1944, including the last three.
The club’s current president is Tareq Khoury, a successful
businessman who allegedly bought his seat on the Wahdat board. He
has since leveraged that position into a political career, and was
elected to the Lower House of Parliament in 2007.
Game Over
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“divorce her you father of Hussein, and we’ll marry you to two of
ours.” The newly appointed Crown Prince did not escape comment
either, as he is half Palestinian (and one quarter British) himself.
Official Fallout
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¶7. (C) Despite all of the official condemnations of Faisali and its
supporters, none of Jordan’s self-censoring media featured
descriptive news stories about the game and why it was called off.
Columnists and commentators, even those who are usually used to
advance pro-government views, were noticeably silent. The heads of
the Faisali and Wahdat fan clubs were allegedly invited to appear on
Al-Jazeera, but refused in recognition of the sensitivities surrounding
criticism of the royal family.
Comment
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¶9. (S) There is broad recognition throughout Jordan that the
Faisali-Wahdat incident exposed the uncomfortable gap between
East Bankers and Palestinian-origin Jordanians -- one that most
would rather keep well-hidden for the sake of political stability. The
connection between this rift and the Hashemite monarchy, including
the newly-appointed Crown Prince, makes the incident even more
unsettling. Even our most forthcoming contacts are reluctant to talk
with us about the issue, recognizing that it strikes at the core of
Jordanian identity politics. One contact reluctantly admitted that the
game brought out the “ugly side of Jordanian ultranationalism” and
said that it would be difficult to contain now that it was publicly
expressed. Another pointed to the “increasingly explicit and
provocative” Faisali slogans as proof that status quo-oriented East
Bankers are uncomfortable with the increasing pressures for reform
that will inevitably lessen their near-monopoly on political and social
power.
¶10. (S) The King’s silence on the game and its political implications
is deafening. High level government contacts and members of the
diplomatic community are puzzled by the King’s failure to respond
to a verbal attack on his family that also dips in to Jordanian identity
politics. While he is on “internal vacation” in the southern part of
Jordan, the King’s public exposure has been limited to meetings with
scattered foreign officials. While perhaps unintentional, the King’s
silence has effectively empowered the pro-status quo establishment.
Mandel
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
2004-02-19 2010-11-29 Embassy
04AMMAN1288 SECRET
20:08 23:11 Amman
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of
the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001288
SIPDIS
Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b) (d)
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SUMMARY
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¶1. (S) FonMin Muasher told the Ambassador February 18 that the
Iraq neighbors Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuwait had been frank
and productive, with the neighbors arguing strongly for guarantees
of Iraqi unity and the rights of Iraqi minorities. Iraqi FonMin Zebari
responded that Kurds do not want a separate state, but will seek to
preserve some of the independence they have enjoyed for twelve
years. Muasher complained to Zebari that IGC member Ahmed
Chalabi had spoiled two Jordanian bank deals in Iraq. According to
Muasher, Syrian FonMin Sharaa was the only negative voice at the
Kuwait meeting, and is increasingly an irritant in inter-Arab
relations. END SUMMARY
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PRODUCTIVE FONMIN MEETING IN KUWAIT
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for the first time, Iraqi FonMin Zebari had fully participated in the
discussions. For their part, the neighboring states had told Zebari
that, without a strong Iraqi commitment to unity, Iraqi federalism is
a regional -- not only internal -- issue that affects the interests of
neighboring states. Similarly, the lack of protection of minority rights
in Iraq could cause instability and become a regional issue as well.
¶4. (S) Muasher said that Zebari had underscored the desire of the
Iraqi government to cooperate closely and cement good relations
with Jordan, “regardless of the opposition of Ahmed Chalabi.”
Muasher said he told Zebari that Jordan, too, wanted close
cooperation with Iraq, but blamed Chalabi for spoiling deals
negotiated by Jordan’s Arab Bank and Export and Finance Bank
with Iraq banks. Muasher said he would be raising this issue with
senior USG officials on his upcoming trip to Washington.
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SYRIA THE ODD MAN OUT
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¶7. (S) Muasher was enthusiastic about the frank and positive tone of
the Kuwait neighboring states meeting. However, he is focusing more
and more on Syria -- and Farouq Sharaa in particular -- as the cause
of friction in inter-Arab relations and an impediment to progress.
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Reference IDCreated Released Classification Origin
2009-04-02 2010-11-28 Embassy
09AMMAN813 SECRET
05:05 18:06 Amman
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
SIPDIS
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aspirations. Jordanian officials argue that the best way to
counter Iran's ambitions is to weaken the salience of its
radicalism on the Arab street by fulfilling the promise of a
"two-state solution," resolving other Arab-Israeli disputes,
and making sure that Iraq's political and security
institutions are not overwhelmed by Iranian influence when
the U.S. drawdown is complete. If U.S.-Iran engagement does
proceed in earnest, Jordan hopes to be closely consulted in
advance and for its interests to be taken into account. End
Summary.
¶4. (S) In Lebanon, the GOJ fears Iran's Hizballah proxy has
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been given too much rope and could be poised to increase its
political influence during upcoming parliamentary elections.
The King sees the Lebanon-Israel War of 2006 as having
benefited Iran and Hizballah, by allowing a Sunni Arab street
enamored of "resistance" to see past its suspicions of the
Shia. And then-Foreign Minister Salah Al-Bashir in late 2008
described the spring 2009 vote as "when we will know who won
last May," referring to the outcome of the Doha Accords that
put an end to Lebanese infighting. Much like with the
Palestinian issue, Jordanian leaders have argued that the
only way to pull the rug out from under Hizballah - and by
extension their Iranian patrons - would be for Israel to hand
over the disputed Sheba'a Farms to Lebanon. With Hizballah
lacking the "resistance to occupation" rationale for
continued confrontation with Israel, it would lose its raison
d'etre and probably domestic support.
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forward, believing that they can benefit from perceived
acceptance after years of isolation without paying a price.
¶7. (S) Upper House President Zeid Rifai has predicted that
dialogue with Iran will lead nowhere, arguing that if the
U.S., the EU, and the Arab states agree that under no
circumstances should Iran be allowed to obtain a nuclear
weapon, military force becomes the only option. "Bomb Iran,
or live with an Iranian bomb. Sanctions, carrots, incentives
won't matter," was how he put it to visiting NEA DAS David
Hale in November. While Rifai judged a military strike would
have "catastrophic impact on the region," he nonetheless
thought preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would
pay enough dividends to make it worth the risks (Ref D).
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the Israeli-Arab conflict into an Islamic-Israeli conflict"
and that this strategy was already working with Syria and
Qatar. Even more conspiratorially, then-FM Bashir in
September 2008 highlighed Arab fears to a visiting CODEL that
the United States and the West would allow Iran to play a
hegemonic role in Iraq and throughout the region in exchange
for giving up its nuclear program (Ref E).
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Visit Amman's Classified Website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman
Beecroft
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