Wernher Von Braun and The German Rocket Team in America

WERNHER VON BRAUN
AND THE GERMAN ROCKET TEAM IN AMERICA

________________________
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
East Tennessee State University

_____________________
In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in History

____________________
by
Robert Anthony Carver
May 2001
1
APPROVAL
This is to certify that the Graduate Committee of
Robert A. Carver
Met on the
5th day of December 2000.
The committee read and examined his thesis, supervised his defense of it
in an oral examination, and decided to recommend that his study be
submitted to the Graduate Council, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of the Arts in History.
_________________________
Chair, Graduate Committee
_________________________
_________________________
Signed on behalf of
The Graduate Council ________________________
Dean, School of Graduate
Studies
ii
3
ABSTRACT
WERNHER VON BRAUN
AND THE GERMAN ROCKET TEAM IN AMERICA
by
Robert A. Carver
This study is an examination of the career of the von Braun team in America,
encompassing their time working for the American Army and NASA and the
ongoing controversy surrounding von Braun’s work at Peenemünde and the
Mittelwerk. The purpose of this study is to examine the career of von Braun
specifically, along with the various experiences of tema members in order to
provide a balanced, multi-faceted view of this complex individual and to put in
perspective von Braun and the team’s place in history.
The approach to the study is historiographical, analyzing the historical record

while comparing specific points of the two main views of von Braun and the
team. Both primary and secondary sources are used to examine the team’s
career in America while attempting to provide an accurate account of the
supporters and critics of von Braun and the team.
Conclusions of this study suggest that von Braun and the team made a major
and critical contribution to the American space program as well as to the
socioeconomic progress of Huntsville, even though their legacy has been
intertwined with the unresolved controversy surrounding von Braun’s work at
Peenemünde and the Mittelwerk.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Stephen Fritz who served as
committee chairperson for this project. I also wish to thank those who were of
invaluable assistance to me during my research. They include but are not
limited to Konrad Dannenberg, Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, Gene Cataldo, Bob Ward
and the Huntsville Times, Mike Wright and the History Office at the Marshall
Space Flight Center and the staff at the National Archives in Atlanta.
iv
CONTENTS
Page
5
APPROVAL…………………………………………………………………………
ii
ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS……………………………………………………………..
iv
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………..
viii
Chapter
1. CONTROVERSY…………………………………………………..……….
1
Revisionism………………………………………………………………
2
Personal Correspondence……………………………………………..
12
Neufeld’s Huntsville Lecture……………………………………………

17
French Professor Debate……………………………………………….

19
Forced Labor at the Mittelwerk…………………………………………

21
Objectivity………………………………………..………………………
22
Media Attention…………………………………………………………...
25
2. PRELUDE TO AMERICA…………………………………….……….…….
30
American Choices………………………………………………………...
31
War’s End……………………………………….………………………….
36
Paperclip…………………………………………………………………..
37
Cold War…………………………………………………………………..
40
Chapter
Page
A Proven Leader…………………………………………………………
43
Collective Guilt…………………………………………………………...
45
3. EARLY YEARS IN AMERICA……………………………………………….

48
Fort Bliss…………………………………………………………………..
48
The Search………………………………………………………………..
53
The Difference…………………………………………………………….
55
Local Reaction…………………………………………………………….
56
Space Prophet…………………………………………………………….
61
Assimilation………………………………………………………………..
62
Rocket City USA…………………………………………………………..

65
4. THE MARSHALL YEARS…………………………………………………….

68
NASA……………………………………………………………………….
69 7
Race Relations……………………………………………………………..
72
Huntsville Difference……………………………………………………….
75
Alabama Responds………………………………………………………..
77
Personal Vision…………………………………………………………….
82
Politics……………………………………………………………………….
84
Science and Religion……………………………………………………….

86
Children Reply……………………………………………………………….
90
5. THE AMBIVALENT HERO…………………………………….………………..

93
Changes……………………………………………………………………..
93
vi
Chapter
Page
The End of the Huntsville Odyssey…………………………………..

94
Life at NASA Headquarters……………………………….……………

96
Retirement and Death………………………………………………….

98
Alabama Pays Tribute………………………………………………….

100
A Legacy Questioned…………………………………………………..
101
6. CONCLUSION……………………….…….……….……………………….
106
WORKS CITED…………………………….…….……….………………………..
110
VITA………………………………………………………………………………….
119
vii
INTRODUCTION
Most Americans were not aware of the existence of Wernher von 9
Braun and his team of rocket engineers in Huntsville, Alabama until von Braun had
his articles published in Collier’s, a popular magazine of that era. The Collier’s series
was made into a well received Disney TV show in which von Braun was a featured
commentator. Von Braun became the personal icon of the manned space effort for
Americans. While many contributed vitally to the space program, no one was more
identifiable with space than von Braun. He was seen as a genuine American hero,
even if he did have that noticeable German accent.
So how does the modern scholar judge von Braun and the team? My
intention was to look at the historical record of von Braun and the team while in the
United States, especially the time in Huntsville. The current discussion about von
Braun centers on the time in Germany during World War II. Critics have attacked his
actions and alleged inactions regarding the use of slave labor at the Mittelwerk. This
focus seemed to me to be an attempt to find retribution for those who suffered and
died at the Mittelwerk. Critics have quite an attachment to these people that, in my
opinion, clouds their judgment as historians.
As a historian, I sit today, in the year 2000 and look back at the life and
actions of these men. I am quite removed from the daily reality they experienced as
citizens of the Third Reich during the 1930s and 40s. How can I, a person who was
born and raised in an open democratic society, be able to comprehend what it is like
to live under a totalitarian regime? Then, if this is difficult, how can I also judge these
people for what I believe ethically they should have done regarding the inmates? It
is a difficult dilemma for a historian when dealing with history outside one’s
experience. My goal is not to judge, which I cannot do, but rather to consider their
experience in such a milieu.
I examined the arguments made on behalf of those who have attacked von
Braun and the team and by those who have defended the actions of these men. I
present both sides during my thesis for the reader to examine. I do not stop at these
arguments like so many of this debate now do. I wanted to examine the total record,
giving importance to the team’s time and work in the United States. Any examination
of these men would be incomplete without such an assessment.
Important considerations were given to von Braun’s interaction with the
community and his views on ethics and religion. Given that he faced charges as an
opportunist, I also examine his actions regarding a very controversial issue in
Alabama during the early 1960s, civil rights.
The sources all agree that von Braun was a great engineer who built and
managed a team of brilliant engineers. The sources do conflict when it comes to
deciding on von Braun and the team’s place in history. The controversy surrounding
the Mittelwerk will continue for as long as people wish to take sides. There is no
definitive proof from either side that would end the debate in their favor.
What I hope to communicate to the reader is that a man must be judged on
the full record. There are circumstances that we can never fully know from the
historical record. We must recognize the inherent biases we bring to the subject of
Wernher von Braun and work through them to view the man and the team in context.
This debate cannot denigrate the numerous accomplishments of von Braun
and the team for the American space program. He will remain a founding father of
the space age and his team will continue to be canonized by the citizens of 11
Huntsville as men of honor. Though the controversy will not end soon, we can be
assured of von Braun and the team’s rightful place in the pantheon of space
pioneers.
CHAPTER 1
CONTROVERSY
After his death in 1977, a revisionist movement emerged that sought to
change the image of Wernher von Braun from national hero to Nazi war
criminal. His activities for the American space program were not suspect. It
was his time at Peenemünde during World War II that fell under scrutiny. Von
Braun has been called an opportunist who swore no allegiance to any dogma
except that which assured his own well-being. If working for the German
Army advanced his cause, then he would make weapons of war for them. If
the SS wanted him to make the V-2 work, then he would do so. If slave labor
was used to build his dream, then he would use that type of worker. If
switching allegiance to the United States would gain him access to working
on rockets after the war, then he would sell out his native country.
These accusations and doubts have existed since the von Braun team
came to the United States in 1945. A Time article in 1958 about the
upcoming Explorer II launch looked at the background of von Braun:
To some, von Braun’s transfer of loyalty from Nazi Germany to the U.S.
seemed to come too fast, too easy. Von Braun’s critics say he is more
salesman than scientist; actually, he learned through bittersweet experience
that his space dreams had to be sold (“I have to be a two-headed monster,
scientist and public relations man.”)1
Revisionism
The April 16, 1995 edition of the Huntsville Times had this front page
headline, “Von Braun: Soaring Hero or Cold Opportunist?” The Brett Davis
column went into the recent controversy that had arisen around von Braun’s
time at Peenemünde:
Some recent historians have recast von Braun, a hero in Huntsville and
widely recognized as the father of American space flight, as a high-tech
Faust who compromised his principles with an evil government to continue
his pioneering work. That portrayal contrasts sharply with the traditional
view of von Braun as a space flight enthusiast whose benign efforts were
hijacked by the Nazi government… This von Braun revisionism centers on
the murderous conditions forced upon the slave laborers who built the V-2
at an underground factory known as the Mittelwerk or Middle Works.2
There were many opposed to von Braun and his team being in America
1 “Reach for the Stars,” Time, 17 February 1958, 21-24, 28.

2 Brett Davis, “Von Braun: Soaring Hero or Cold Opportunist?” Huntsville Times, 16 April 1995, pgs.
A1, A12.
after the war. These critics, who often did not know the full situation, 13
pronounced them all as Nazis who should be sent home. These protests died
once it was seen these men were valuable contributors to the Army missile
effort. More recent critics have revived the charge of Nazism, this time with a
harder edge. “Most of the opponents, on the other hand, gave no credence to
the human dilemma of those who lived under the Nazi dictatorship. They
established resistance to Hitler – and possible martyrdom – as the standard
of judgment, and denounced those who had failed to meet its requirements as
unworthy of American citizenship.”3 Because those at Peenemünde failed to
speak out openly against Hitler or Himmler, they must be guilty of war crimes,
runs the logic of this line of reasoning. The more recent Department of
Justice Office of Special Investigation’s inquiry into Arthur Rudolph, an
associate of von Braun’s, Tom Bower’s Paperclip Conspiracy and Linda
Hunt’s Secret Agenda, all condemn the Paperclip scientists and engineers as
ardent Nazis. These were politically motivated attacks on von Braun and his
team. Anyone who stepped up to defend von Braun or the others was
labeled [as] an anti-Semite. It became politically correct to denounce anyone
associated with the Nazi era, no matter how little control they had over their
situation. No new or hard evidence was ever given to support the contention
that these men were guilty of atrocities at the Mittelwerk complex, where
slave labor was used to build V-2 rockets. It was merely guilt by association
for knowing of its existence.
3 Marsha Freeman, How We Got to the Moon: The Story of the German Space Pioneers, (Washington
DC: 21st Science Associates, 1993) 169-70.
The harshest critic of von Braun has been Dennis Piszkiewicz, author of
The Nazi Rocketeers: Dreams of Space and Crimes of War and Wernher von
Braun: The Man Who Sold the Moon. In Nazi Rocketeers, Piszkiewicz
comments on what he imagines to be von Braun’s thinking after visiting the
Mittelwerk, where the V-2 was being assembled and seeing the use of slave
labor from the Dora camp. This is an interesting passage, since it is obvious
that Piszkiewicz projects his own thoughts and feelings onto von Braun:
One can only speculate (italics mine) on von Braun’s internal reaction. After
joining the Nazi party and the SS, after accepting honors and perks from the
Nazi regime, after conspiring to subvert his own dream of space exploration
to the building of a weapon of mass destruction and terror, after accepting the
forced labor of foreign slaves at Peenemünde from the Trassenheide camp,
he now faced the atrocities of the Mittelwerk. Granted, if he made too big a
fuss about the brutal treatment of the workers, he would run the risk of being
sent to join in building the rocket he had designed. Nevertheless, von Braun
chose the course of discretion, silence and complicity.4
both counts but did manage to kill numerous foreign workers. This was the
final event that placed Himmler and the SS in complete control of V-2
production. The irony here is that it was a British action that made it possible
for the SS to gain control of V-2 production. Von Braun described how the SS
achieved this end:
After we had made some progress with our research and development, and
having achieved a number of successful flights with the new V-2, the decision
was made by Speer’s Ministry for Armaments and Munitions in Berlin to begin
mass production of the V-2… After that Hitler himself gave the order to place
the final assembly of the V-2 underground. The installations and equipment
in the three of four factories were transported to an underground oil depot in
the vicinity of Nordhausen, south of the Hartz Mountains…. SS-General
Kammler was assigned by Hitler and Himmler to get as many educated and
uneducated forced laborers as were necessary in order to fulfill the production
goals of the ministry. The prisoners were chosen from various concentration
4 Dennis Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers: Dreams of Space and Crimes of War (Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers, 1995), 139.
camps and transported to Dora, a camp surrounded by barbed wire 15
in the vicinity of one of the entrances of the former underground
depot.5
Piszkiewicz seems to disregard totally von Braun’s situation and expected
him to sacrifice himself in a useless but moral gesture for the slave laborers.
He also disregarded the reports von Braun did try to file with the SS over
Mittelwerk conditions. Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, a member of the Peenemünde
team, who came to the United States with von Braun, gave his account of the
Mittelwerk controversy:
After Himmler had assumed responsibility to mass-produce the A-4 in an

underground factory in 1943, he established production facilities in a former
gypsum mine in the Harz Mountains, later called Mittelwerk. Production of
other weapon systems was also carried out there, among them the Buzz
Bomb V-1 and parts of fighter planes and submarines. Himmler, who was in
charge of all concentration camps in Germany, proposed the use of inmates
as workers in the Mittelwerk, against Speer’s recommendations. New camps
were built near the factory, among them, Dora, Harzungen and Ellrich, and
inmates were transferred there from other camps, such as Buchenwald. As
Speer later wrote, conditions in the camps were “scandalous.” Von Braun,
who had to visit the Mittelwerk occasionally to help solve technical problems
and one of his chief engineers, Arthur Rudolph, who was assigned to the
Mittelwerk as technical director of A-4 production, were horrified when they
saw under what subhuman conditions the inmates had to work and to live.
They tried to persuade the SS guards to treat the inmates more humanely
and to give them better living conditions in the camps, only to be told to shut
up or wear the same striped uniform of the inmates. A large number of
inmates died in the camps from diseases, from mistreatment or simply from
total exhaustion.6
Dr. Stuhlinger’s account provides greater insight into what occurred at the
Mittelwerk. Unfortunately, critics like Piszkiewicz downplay any accounts by
the Peenemünde team as simply them being apologetics for von Braun. They
5 Freeman, How We Got to the Moon, 128-29.
6 Konrad Dannenberg and Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, “Rocket Center Peenemünde - Personal Memories”
(paper presented at the 44th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Graz, Austria, 16-22
October 1993)
have criticized the “Huntsville” school of history as only being positive about
von Braun and the team’s activities at Peenemünde while totally ignoring the
issue of slave labor. Piszkiewicz in fact, only grudgingly acknowledged this
incident by stating rather petulantly that von Braun might have to work on his
own rockets if he complained.
Von Braun was at the Mittelwerk due to the high failure rates for the V-2.
His job was to find ways to improve the quality of the V-2s being produced
there. Yet Walter Dornberger, von Braun’s commander, soon sent him back
to Peenemünde to work on the quality issue. According to Piszkiewicz, in an
important admission of von Braun’s impotence, “There was little they could do
about getting the slaves at the Mittelwerk to produce better quality rockets.
Their motivation and fate were under the control of the SS.7
In a further demonstration of von Braun’s real position within the power
establishment, on March 14,1944:
Wernher von Braun was awakened at three o’clock in the morning by three
men who introduced themselves as agents of Himmler’s Gestapo… If
Gestapo justice took its usual clandestine course, von Braun’s destination
would be a concentration camp, possibly Dora, where slaves were building
the A-4 missiles… Buhle told Dornberger that Wernher von Braun, Klaus
Riedel and Helmut Groettrup had been arrested for sabotage of the A-4
project… Keitel went on to tell Dornberger that his engineers had been
overheard to say when they were in Zinnowitz, just south of Peenemünde,
that they had no intention of making their rockets into weapons of war. They
were working for the army only because it supported the development of
rockets, which they wanted as vehicles for space travel.8
Albert Speer, the Minister for Armaments in Nazi Germany, also discussed
the role of Himmler and the SS in the use of slave labor for armaments
7 Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers, 141.

8 Ibid., 145-46.
production: 17
After Hitler had become excited over the V-2 project, Himmler entered the
picture. Six weeks later he came to Hitler to propose the simplest way to
guarantee secrecy for this vital program. If the entire workforce were
concentration camp prisoners, all contact with the outside world would be
eliminated. Such prisoners did not even have any mail, Himmler said. Along
with this, he offered to provide all the necessary technicians from the ranks of
the prisoners. All industry would have to furnish would be the management
and engineers. Hitler agreed to this plan. And Saur and I had no choice,
especially since we could not offer a more persuasive argument. The result
was we had to work out guidelines for a joint undertaking with the SS
leadership-what was to be called the Central Works. My assistants went into
it reluctantly and their fears were soon confirmed. Formally speaking, we
remained in charge of the manufacturing; but in cases of doubt we had to
yield to the superior power of the SS leadership. Thus, Himmler had put a
foot in our door and we ourselves had helped him do it.9
That passage makes it abundantly clear who wielded the power in Nazi
Germany. Himmler made sure that the SS had its hand in any operation he
believed would increase its power. Once Hitler decided that the V-2 was
important for the war effort, Himmler decided it was important to him and the
SS. Speer also talked about how Himmler would confer honorary SS ranks
upon people he wanted to influence. Speer claimed to have turned down
offers from Himmler to be a SS general on several occasions. He also battled
Himmler for control of V-2 production. As a testimony to the power of the SS,
Speer gave his description of what happened to von Braun:
On March 14, 1944, he had Wernher von Braun and two of his assistants
arrested. The official reason, as given to the chief of the Central Office, was
that these men had violated one of my regulations by giving peacetime
precedence over their war-production tasks…When Hitler visited me at my
sickbed in Klessheim and treated me with such surprising benevolence, I took
this occasion to intercede for the arrested specialists and had Hitler promise
that he would get them released…Actually, Himmler had achieved one of his
ends. From now on even the top men of the rocket staff no longer felt safe
9 Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1970), 369.
from his arbitrary hand. It was conceivable, after all, that I might not always
be in a position to free them if they were arrested again.10
Is it little wonder that von Braun was careful to avoid any confrontations
with the Gestapo after this incident? He was arrested simply for stating he
wanted to explore space with the A-4 and not use it as a weapon of war. This
incident has been downplayed or reinterpreted by critics of von Braun, who do
not want to admit that he might have been intimidated into inaction for fear of
Gestapo reprisals. Certainly, if one were arrested for idle talk, then what
would happen to someone who voiced opposition to the SS use of slave
labor? Logically, one reaches the conclusion that either being sent to a
concentration camp or being executed were the likely outcomes of such
opposition. If von Braun was an opportunist in this regard, it is very difficult to
blame him for wanting to stay alive or out prison.
Michael Neufeld, curator of World War II history at the National Space and
Air Museum, Smithsonian Institution, is also a von Braun critic. His book, The
Rocket and the Reich, does not directly accuse von Braun of being a Nazi
war criminal, but he does say von Braun was morally responsible for the use
of slave labor at the Mittelwerk. Dr. Walter Haeussermann and Dr. Ernst
Stuhlinger, both von Braun team members, have been highly critical of this
conclusion by Neufeld. “Haeussermann said that Neufeld interviewed
surviving team members, but twisted their words in his book. ‘As far as I
know, everybody is shocked about the book,’ Haeussermann said. ‘We didn’t
expect anything like this after the interview.’”11 Neufeld, like Piszkiewicz and
10 Ibid., 371-72.
11 Brett Davis, “Von Braun: Soaring Hero or Cold Opportunist?” Huntsville Times, 16 April 1995, p.
Speer, explored von Braun’s arrest: 19
The chief of OKW allegedly told him (Dornberger): “The charges were so
serious that arrest was bound to follow. The men are likely to lose their lives.
How people in their position can indulge in such talk passes my
understanding.”… von Braun, meanwhile, languished in jail for nearly two
weeks without the slightest indication of the charges against him and with no
contact with the others… Dornberger was able to free von Braun for a
preliminary period of three months. After Speer’s return from Italy, Hitler
grumbled “about the trouble he had gone to” in this case but promised the
Minister in mid-May that, “As long as [von Braun] is indispensable to me
[Speer], he will be exempted from any punishment, however serious the
resulting consequences might be.”12
After this narrow escape for von Braun, Neufeld still criticized him as being
“lucky” and an “opportunist.” He said the arrest gave the false impression that
von Braun was an anti-Nazi who was used by the Nazis for their own ends.
“But he has no moral qualms about building missiles for the Third Reich, even
when slave labor became involved; the same goes for almost everyone else
at Peenemünde, insofar as they had any choice in the matter, which most of
them did not. [Italics mine]”13 Neufeld intentionally stated that von Braun and
the team members were morally responsible for the use of slave labor and yet
in the same paragraph he admits they had no choice in the Nazi system.
Neufeld admited the dangers of going against the SS at Dora in an
introduction he wrote for another book on this subject. He wrote about the
peril of trying to help the inmates, “A few civilians did surreptitiously pass
prisoners food or do other small favors, but those who were inclined to be
more humane were intimidated by the threat of denunciation by others and
A12.
12 Michael Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile
Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press paperback edition, 1996), 218-9.
13 Ibid., 219.
the possibility of sharing the prisoners’ fate.”14 It is as if he believes that
everybody was afraid of the SS and unable to act except for von Braun and
some of his team. How von Braun became so powerful in Neufeld’s mind is
unknown. It is clear from his criticism that he expected that von Braun not
only could have, but should have interceded to help the Mittelwerk inmates.
Von Braun would have had to be very devious to fool the SS. Neufeld
admited, “… surveillance by the Gestapo/SD counterintelligence apparatus
was all-pervasive and threatening.”15 Neufeld does not seem to comprehend
the fear for von Braun and his team working under such oppressive
conditions.
Von Braun described his own feelings about the futility of trying to help the
inmates of the Mittelwerk:
It’s hellish, he said. My first reaction was to speak with one of the SS posts.
He responded with unmistakable gruffness that I should mind my own
business or I would end up in the same prison attire. I would never have
believed that men would have been able to sink so low. But I knew that any
attempts to persuade them with arguments about humane considerations
would have been totally senseless. These individuals had become so distant
from the most fundamental principles of human morality that they were
completely unmoved by this showplace of indescribable suffering.16
Neufeld contradicted himself consistently in his own writing. He used a
meeting that von Braun attended where the participants discussed the need
to bring in more skilled French workers. This was intended to damn von
Braun for collaboration but then Neufeld stated, “Von Braun was now in a
difficult position because he had been arrested by the Gestapo in March and
14 Yves Béon, Planet Dora: A Memoir of the Holocaust and the Birth of the Space Age, ed. Michael J.
Neufeld, trans. Yves Béon and Richard L. Fague (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), XVII.
15 Ibid., XVII.
held for two weeks, presumably for refusing to go along with a 21
Himmler plan to take over Peenemünde.”17 Again, the gap between
totalitarian reality and present day moral condemnation appears.
Personal Correspondence
Neufeld’s fascination with von Braun’s motivation and thinking are
apparent. The focus of his research led him away from testimony from those
who actually knew, lived and worked with von Braun from Peenemünde on. It
makes it easier to consider the differences if we cast Neufeld as the (self-
proclaimed) Apostle Paul, who never met Jesus to Stuhlinger’s Apostle Peter,
who lived through the trials and tribulations of Jesus. Neufeld’s von Braun
was not the man who got us to the moon. Von Braun was the ‘apolitical
opportunist’ who somehow shouldered the responsibility of not sacrificing his
life to help the inmates at the Mittelwerk.
Neufeld and Stuhlinger corresponded over their differences of
interpretation regarding von Braun’s motives. In a letter to Stuhlinger,
Neufeld wanted to meet to discuss the behavior of von Braun and the team in
Nazi Germany. He asked for some documentation that Stuhlinger might have
and ended the letter with the following comment: “Contrary to what you may
believe, I do not have a predetermined agenda to attack the Peenemünde
group, but I do have a strong point of view which is nevertheless open to
modification in the face of new evidence.”18 It does not seem that Stuhlinger,
17 Ibid., XIX.
18 Dr. Michael J. Neufeld to Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, 26 August 1998, personal collection of Dr. Ernst
Stuhlinger.
or the other team members were assuaged by such claims on the part of
Neufeld. Stuhlinger’s replies to Neufeld were filled with irritation and regret
that Neufeld disregarded the stories of the team to revise the interpretation of
von Braun’s life and work. Stuhlinger took Neufeld to task on many points:
Your book shows again how extremely difficult, or even impossible it is for a
non-technical person to write a reliable and correct history about a primarily
technical project in which he had no part. This is even more so when the
events to be described took place under a ruthless dictatorship that did not
allow any dissenting thought or voice to enter into a document that was to be
stored in the archives, a fact of which you obviously are not aware.
Unfortunately, most of my former colleagues are no longer alive, so it is too
late now for such a joint book. Soon after your book was published, a number
of my (American-born!) colleagues who knew von Braun well, and who were
very familiar with all the phases of the Peenemünde Project, urged me to
write a detailed review of your book, pointing out where you had relied on
unreliable sources, or where you misunderstood, misinterpreted, omitted, or
overlooked historical facts well known to those closely familiar with the history
of the Peenemünde project.19
Neufeld responded to Stuhlinger’s letter by discounting Stuhlinger’s point
of view. After all, Neufeld suggested, Stuhlinger may have lived through
these events with von Braun but he was no historian. The first part of his
letter disparaged Dr. Stuhlinger’s book about von Braun as being poorly
written. Then he followed with a claim as to which of them could more
rationally and objectively judge the von Braun experience. His tone was quite
condescending towards Stuhlinger:
I won’t go on about your comments about my book, as they betray

incomprehension of what professional historians do. Let me just say that
participants virtually always make poor historians of their own experiences
(memoir is another form of writing altogether), and almost all scientists and
engineers who have tried to be historians of science and technology have
failed at it – although there have been brilliant exceptions, of course. History
takes a measure of training and distance from the topic, plus a distinctly
19 Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger to Michael J. Neufeld, 1 September 1998, personal collection of Dr. Ernst
Stuhlinger.
different cast of mind than is the case in science and engineering; in 23
some cases, however, only those with dual training in the technical
subject and in history can write deeply technical histories.20
The tone of this letter was similar to that of an adult to a particularly slow
thinking child. Because he disagreed with Dr. Stuhlinger, it was obvious that
Stuhlinger just didn’t understand the correct history of events that he
experienced. Only historians like Neufeld had the depth of insight an
intelligence to glean the truth from the volumes of sources. In case Stuhlinger
wasn’t sufficiently impressed, moreover, then Neufeld was going to make
sure he knew with whom he was dealing: “However, my receipt in 1997 of the
coveted Dexter Prize of the Society for History of Technology for ‘an
outstanding book in the history of technology’ would indicate that others do
not agree with your assessment of the engineering aspects of the book.”21
Now that he had put Stuhlinger in his place, Neufeld did admit that history
was about the interpretation of the past, based on the information the
historian had available. He also admitted that two historians who had the
same exact source material might reach different conclusions. But given his
opening to this letter, he nonetheless knew his interpretation was correct.
Neufeld did state he was willing to examine new evidence that might place
von Braun in a better light regarding Dora and the Mittelwerk. He admitted
that his “friends” who wrote about this topic were closed minded in regards to
favorable evidence for von Braun. He ended this letter with a postscript that
suggested that Stuhlinger might have inquired if Neufeld had Jewish roots.
20 Dr. Michael J. Neufeld to Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, 4 November 1998, personal collection of Dr. Ernst
Stuhlinger.
21 Ibid.
Neufeld then went on a tirade about anti-Semitism and how this attitude
retarded the truth about the Dora camp.
Stuhlinger responded to this letter from Neufeld, in which it was obvious
that their correspondence had not helped to bridge the gap between them.
“Our world views and training are separated by a gulf that makes effective
communication difficult.”22
Neufeld had made the accusation that Stuhlinger was an anti-Semite.
Stuhlinger denied this charge and then went into a discussion of more errors
that had been made by Neufeld. After a discussion of these errors, Stuhlinger
made a final point to Neufeld regarding writing the history of von Braun and
his team:
It should not be surprising, therefore, that a historian relying only on the

scarce and brief documents that he can still find 45 years later of a complex
and protracted project involving a number of different personalities, working
groups and agencies will not be able to put together a true history of the
event. That situation is even aggravated if the historian systematically denies
the correctness of the knowledge, insight, and memories of eyewitnesses
who were active participants in the project and the events the historian wants
to describe.23
Von Braun’s critics never resolved their contradictions in this regard,
preferring simply to blame von Braun, as if that would validate the suffering of
the Dora inmates. Piszkiewicz and Neufeld both cited the Dora workers and
the others who died because of the V-2 in their dedications. They both
seemed determined to find a way to blame von Braun and his team for the
atrocities of Dora, evidence of their lack of complicity be damned.
22 Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger to Michael J. Neufeld, 4 December 1998, personal collection of Dr. Ernst
Stuhlinger.
23 Ibid
Neufeld and Piszkiewicz were not the first to raise questions 25
about the Mittelwerk. The West German government investigated allegations
of wrongdoing and came to the conclusion that there was a lack of credible
evidence to link von Braun with having any control regarding the use of slave
labor. Brett Davis elucidated upon this subject in his Huntsville Times story:
Criticism of von Braun’s alleged involvement in the work camps is not entirely
new. In 1987, the then West German government completed an investigation
of Arthur Rudolph, a former von Braun deputy both in Germany during the
war and in Huntsville who left the United States in 1984 under charges of
being a war criminal for his work at the underground V-2 factory. Four of the
26 former forced laborers interviewed by the Germans linked von Braun to the
persecution of the workers, according to a translation of the German
document obtained by The Huntsville Times. In one case, a prisoner said von
Braun witnessed a hanging. But the government concluded in each case that
the testimony probably was not credible. Von Braun, who rarely visited the
underground plant, was aware that slave laborers were used but said he
never saw a death in the factory.24
The critics of these men want to hold them accountable for the use of
slave labor at the Mittelwerk, based not on any hard evidence but rather it
seems upon the fact that von Braun and his team came to the United States
and were prominent, invaluable contributors to the American space effort.
Being successful and respected by their American peers makes the alleged
sins of the Mittelwerk even worse to these critics.
Even as they engage in moral condemnation, his critics admit that von
Braun and the others were powerless to act and that von Braun was arrested
for simply discussing using the V-2 for space travel instead of as a weapon.
They use innuendo, association and the blatant abuse of facts to mislead the
reader into thinking that von Braun had the power and ability to intervene on
A12.
behalf of the Mittelwerk inmates. Any contradictory evidence is ignored or
labeled unimportant to their thesis. While von Braun certainly was no saint,
neither was the Nazi war criminal they wish to present. These critics have
been unable to prove that von Braun was a willing participant in exploiting the
Mittelwerk inmates.
Neufeld’s Huntsville Lecture
Neufeld came to Huntsville in November 1998 to give a lecture about von
Braun at the local university. In his speech, Neufeld stated categorically,
“Von Braun was involved in using slave labor and therefore had a moral
responsibility for this action. He went along when he had to with the Nazis.”25
Still, Neufeld’s summation revealed the extreme complexity of assigning
blame, even for one so critical of von Braun. “He had the moral
responsibility,” Neufeld concluded. “Whether he had legal responsibility is a
different question. Indeed, I can’t see him being convicted. Other people
were far more guilty. He is not perfectly innocent. He is not the worst.”26
During a question and answer session following his lecture, I asked Mr.
Neufeld about the political realities of opposing Himmler and the SS. During
his lecture, he said that there were examples of people who openly opposed
the SS. His example regarded soldiers who no longer could shoot Jews and
refused to do so anymore. They were normally not punished but were
transferred to other areas. What consequences would von Braun have faced
25 Michael Neufeld, “Wernher von Braun and the Third Reich” (lecture presented at the University of
Alabama Huntsville, 17 November 1998)
26 Martin Burkey, “Historian: Von Braun Indifferent to Nazi Hate,” Huntsville Times, 18 November
1998, B8.
if he had pushed the Mittelwerk issue? He never directly answered 27
my
question but instead told me that I was “making excuses for von Braun.”
What Neufeld didn’t consider was that Himmler felt a great concern for the
men under his command who had to shoot all of these people personally. He
allowed them to refuse to shoot and made sure they received help if any
emotional problems arose. Von Braun’s situation vis-à-vis the SS and
Himmler was very different. Therefore, Neufeld’s use of this example,
soldiers successfully refusing to shoot, is not valid.
Like Piszkiewicz, Neufeld would not elaborate on what he felt von Braun
should have done to render legitimate aid to the Mittelwerk inmates. Neufeld
also stated in his lecture that von Braun was an opportunist, looking out for
his own benefit. This was a constant theme of his book and throughout the
lecture. An incident with French laborers was raised to illustrate his point.
Rudolph, Dornberger and von Braun were at a meeting on May 6, 1944,
where the topic of adding more prisoners was discussed. Georg Rickhey was
director of the Mittelwerk at this time. He was going to ask the SS for more
workers to be brought in, specifically 1,800 French prisoners. In his book,
Neufeld wrote about von Braun’s reaction, “Objecting would have been risky,
of course and because von Braun had been conditionally released from a
Gestapo jail just a month before, he was clearly in no position to object.”27
Instead of accepting, as he had just admitted, that von Braun was not in a
realistic position to act, Neufeld then added, “Von Braun’s post-arrest
27 Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich, 228.

situation makes the evaluation of his responsibility more complex, but there is
no doubt he remained deeply involved with the concentration camps.”28
Neufeld does not see the ironic double meaning in his statement. Von Braun
would have been an inmate if he had acted to help the French, which would
have truly made him “deeply involved.”
French Professor Debate
On August 15, 1944, after a visit to Buchenwald, von Braun attempted to
get a French prisoner, who was a physics professor, granted special
privileges. In response to this action, Neufeld contended, “Humanitarianism
may or may not have entered into that appeal, but it is clear that von Braun’s
visit to Buchenwald and its commandant further implicated him in the system
of slave labor.”29 Piszkiewicz also commented on this request: “Von Braun
became an active partner with those who would use slave labor by personally
selecting top quality technical people to work as slaves on his project. This
activity, had it been known at the time, could have made von Braun subject to
charges of having committed war crimes, similar to those faced by Albert
Speer at Nuremberg.”30 Ironically Oskar Schindler specifically selected
people to work in his factory and today is hailed as a hero. The matter seems
to be based on one’s perception of the person involved.
Neufeld discussed von Braun’s request regarding the French physics
professor during his lecture and in the following Q&A session, where von
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
Braun team member Gerhard Reisig refuted Neufeld’s interpretation 29
of von Braun’s interest in the prisoner. Reisig said, “I was present when von
Braun was talking about the physics professor and he said he wanted to help
him. He was a humanitarian and was upset over the plight of the laborers but
knew he could do nothing to help them. I was also present when von Braun
was told Himmler had given him membership in the SS. Von Braun did not
want to accept it and asked Dornberger for his advice. Dornberger told him
he had better take it to stay out of trouble and so von Braun reluctantly did
so.”31 Neufeld responded, “I never said von Braun wasn’t a humanitarian and
I do not question that von Braun was disinterested in becoming a member of
the SS.”32 The discussion ended with Neufeld not answering the question of
how von Braun could have aided the slave laborers.
Forced Labor at the Mittelwerk
Brett Davis pointed out that Neufeld “does fault Rudolph and von Braun for
sometimes showing what he said was a ‘callous’ disregard for the fact that
thousands of forced laborers died while putting the V-2 together.”33 In writing
about their memories of Peenemünde, Dannenberg and Stuhlinger also
discussed the Mittelwerk inmates:
Von Braun’s and Rudolph’s efforts to ease the plight of the Mittelwerk inmates
led to some improvements in the harsh treatment they received from the SS,
but, as von Braun remarked much later, “the vision of those luckless prisoners
has haunted me ever since. The most depressing thought is the fact that I
31 Gerhard Reisig, oral comments to Neufeld during lecture at University of Alabama Huntsville, 17
November 1998
32 Michael Neufeld, response to Reisig after lecture at University of Alabama Huntsville, 17 November
1998
A12.
was absolutely without power to do anything substantial. Even if I had left the
place and my work and gone to jail, Himmler would have given orders to
continue, but only under harsher and more stupid conditions. The inmates
would have undoubtedly have suffered even more.34
Von Braun team member Gerhard Reisig wrote to the Huntsville Times
about the Neufeld lecture. For reasons unknown the editorial section decided
not to print the letter. Reisig gave an intense defense of von Braun against
the view presented by Neufeld at the lecture:
Mr. Neufeld lives in a too distant time period from the Third Reich to have the
slightest feeling and proper appreciation of the meaning of living under a cruel
dictatorship. Any individual living in those times knows only the merciless
alternative “Do (and think!) as ordered or risk your life”. As to W.v. Braun’s
alleged “approval” of the use of forced labor: Mr. Neufeld again seems to
miss the historical fact that W.v. Braun was the technical director of rocketry
developments at Peenemünde. In his position in the organizational order, he
had no authority of deciding on the employment of forced labor. He had to
report his pertinent objections to the “Executive Director” of Peenemünde,
General Dornberger. But even this General had to report about such
fundamental matters to A. Speer, Minister for Armaments Production. But
here surfaces the critical point about A. Speer’s authority: He was the
archenemy of Himmler, the High Commander of the SS, who hated Speer just
as much as Speer hated him. Himmler managed to obtain Hitler’s approval
for the employment of concentration camp prisoners in the Mittelwerk’s
production. How could W.v. Braun act directly against Himmler in the matter
of forced labor? In spite of being appointed an “Honorary SS Officer” by
Himmler, W.v. Braun ended up in prison, having been seized at night by
Himmler’s justice negating “Gestapo”. This craven act was Himmler’s
revenge for W.v. Braun’s unshakable loyalty to General Dornberger. This
steadfastness of W.v. Braun to his immediate superior, in itself, proves W.v.
Braun’s moral integrity.The only activity required of W.v. Braun at the
Mittelwerk was the inspection of the quality of the end product, the complete
A-4 rocket (Goebbels: “V2”). His staff personnel for these control functions
were members of his Peenemünde development team who were, of course,
independent of the permanent technical staff of the Mittelwerk.35
34 Konrad Dannenberg and Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, “Rocket Center Peenemünde - Personal Memories”
(paper presented at the 44th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, Graz, Austria, 16-22
October 1993)
35 Gerhard Reisig, unpublished letter to the Huntsville Times, 4 December 1998, letter in possession of
the Huntsville Times.
31
Objectivity
At the time of Neufeld’s scheduled appearance in Huntsville, University of
Alabama, Huntsville, President Frank Franz received a letter from Dr.
Friedwardt Winterberg, physics professor at the University of Nevada, Reno.
This letter concerned erroneous stories about von Braun that Neufeld might
have received from Communist officials on a visit to the former East German
republic. Dr. Winterberg also raised issues about the National Air and Space
Museum, where Neufeld was employed. The museum had made an error in
an exhibit in which they failed to credit Dr. Winterberg. He wrote to them to
correct this error. His request was refused and he stateed, “I did not pursue
this matter any further, but it serves as an example for the intellectual
dishonesty of the National Air and Space Museum, in not accurately reporting
the historical truth.”36
The fallout from Neufeld’s lecture continued with Martin Burkey of the
Huntsville Times writing about the difficulty of judging von Braun. He gave
numerous examples of moral ambiguity in American history, from the
treatment of the Native Americans to the present day controversy over gun
violence. He continued:
It’s arrogant for most people to say with certainty what they would do in von
Braun’s situation. Separated by different societies, sensibilities and 50 years
of history, we can’t comprehend the luxury of sitting on the couch of moral
certitude and toasting our toes before the fires of hindsight… If von Braun had
his faults, it doesn’t mean people should have to repudiate the man’s entire
life and the contributions he made. Some people won’t be happy till they
indict every German living in Germany between 1932 and 1945.37
36 Dr. Friedwardt Winterberg to Dr. Frank Franz, 6 November 1998, copy in Huntsville Times archive.
37 Martin Burkey, “Von Braun: Still No Easy Answers,” Huntsville Times, 22 November 1998, D1.
On another front, a Professor Rainer Eisfeld had come across a letter from
von Braun written to the Director of the Mittelwerk. Eisfeld claimed this letter
alone was enough to prove von Braun guilty of war crimes. Eisfeld claimed
the letter was a new discovery but Dr. Stuhlinger countered it had been in the
public domain for years and that he had a copy of it in his personal files. The
topic was a discussion about the French professor that Neufeld had
mentioned previously. Dr. Stuhlinger commented on this situation:
I heard about these events the first time in Peenemünde in 1944, although
very briefly – longer discussions on such subjects were extremely dangerous.
I learned that there was a French professor of physics in the KZ camp Dora,
and that von Braun will try to first have him on some special tasks, and also
have him put under less harsh living conditions than other Camp Dora
inmates, and later have him transferred to Peenemünde where he could work
in close contact with Peenemünde scientists, and under more decent
conditions than possible at the Mittelwerk. “I really don’t know whether his
specialty in physics would be of any use to us, von Braun was quoted, “but a
situation like this is about the only one where I personally can do something
to ease the lot of at least one, and possibly some more individuals like him, by
helping them get out of this absolutely hellish environment of a concentration
camp.”38
This letter is also the centerpiece of an exhibit in Berlin entitled “I Only
Worked for Technology,” the point of the exhibit being that slave labor was
used in the construction of the V-2. Excerpts from von Braun’s letter are used
to show he sought to use the French physicist to work on the rocket. It also
included the conclusion of the letter where von Braun asked for better
conditions for this physicist.
Dr. Stuhlinger also received a letter from a British Lt. Colonel who had
read that Stuhlinger was writing a biography about von Braun. This man had
38 Personal reply to charges made by Professor Rainer Eisfeld, Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, July 1996.
visited America and came to see the space center at Huntsville in 33
1991. He was shocked to see that the space center had positive prominent
displays about von Braun and his work. He stated his feelings about von
Braun quite clearly. “There is no doubt, of course, that von Braun was, with
others, responsible for the mass slavery and murder of thousands of slave
laborers forcibly gathered throughout Europe… It is to the undying shame of
humanity that we have to use such men, as the Americans had to do in a time
of great danger.”39 The revisionist history bias had obviously affected
England. This man obviously was greatly consternated about having von
Braun regarded as anything but a war criminal.
Media Attention
When the revisionist view garnered media attention, articles appeared in
magazines to discuss this change in the view of von Braun. The headlines
they used were quite sensational. Telegraph Magazine had a cover
emblazoned with the words “Inside Hitler’s Tunnels of Death.” The magazine
claimed to have an exclusive that would break the silence on the scientists
who came to America to work on the rocket program. The report opened
describing the miserable conditions suffered by the Mittelwerk slave laborers.
Then it gave a detailed narrative about what the Allies found when they
39 Lt. Col. Robert Wythe, Suffolk England to Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, Huntsville Alabama, 22 May 1993,
personal letters of Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger.
arrived in the small town of Nordhausen and then the area camps. It also
pointed out that the camp, Dora, was not different from other camps used by
the Nazis. This camp was just never termed a death camp. The irony is that
this camp was not filled with Jews, Gypsies or others that were to be
exterminated by the Nazi regime. But the article did make a good point about
how the harsh conditions mandated by the SS retarded the inmates’ ability to
produce V-2s:
They were of 21 nationalities, mainly deportees from German-occupied

territory and prisoners of war; a few were British, a disproportionately high
number were French or Belgian, suspected members of the Resistance and
Russian. It was in the Germans’ interests that they be productive; given
better conditions and a little more food, who knows what they might have
been forced to achieve… As the camp commandant, Otto Foerschner,
reported to his SS superiors, ‘Normal output is demanded of the prisoners
without giving them even the most primitive sustenance or care.40
The magazine stated that Dora was kept quiet after the war to protect the
Germans brought over to the United States to work for the military. They
interviewed author and Dora camp survivor Jean Michel about his
experiences at the Mittelwerk and his crusade after the war for justice:
The purpose was to suppress the embarrassing truth that some of the
German scientists who went to the United States immediately after the war to
pioneer the American space programme had played important roles in the
administration of Dora… Eventually it became too much to bear. For Michel
the final straw was watching television pictures from America of the
celebrating after the Apollo astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin “buzz”
Aldrin had taken man’s first steps on the moon; Wernher von Braun, who had
visited Dora’s tunnels on at least 20 occasions, carried shoulder high by
cheering crowds; Arthur Rudolph, whose knowledge of the conditions at Dora
was even more intimate, accepting congratulations and awards. There was
no mention of the fact that, in Michel’s words, ‘that triumphant walk was made
possible by our initiation to inconceivable horror.’ He became determined to
set the record straight.41
40 Paul Eddy, “Inside Hitler’s Death Tunnels,” Telegraph Magazine, 5 June 1993, 28.
41Ibid., pgs. 28, 30, 32.
35
Another Dora survivor, Yves Béon, wrote his memoir, Planet
Dora, as a
personal account of his time at the Mittelwerk. In his preface, Béon thanked
Neufeld for his friendship and help getting this book published in America.
Neufeld wrote the introduction to this book, again being highly critical of von
Braun and the Germans. It was a rehash of what he wrote in his own book,
but it gave him another opportunity to attack von Braun. Neufeld wrote:
Under Sawatzki was Arthur Rudolph, who had been assigned from
Peenemünde to be production manager of the Mittelwerk. Rudolph was a
close friend of Wernher von Braun’s and had worked under him as a rocket
engineer since 1934. He had been a Nazi party member since mid-1931 –
two years before it became expedient to become one. Von Braun himself
became a party member in 1937 and an SS officer in 1940 but was basically
an apolitical opportunist. As the technical director of the army side of
Peenemünde, he visited the Mittelwerk more than a dozen times during its
short existence. Von Braun admitted in a TV interview not long before his
death in 1977 that the “working conditions there were absolutely horrible” and
that he had once seen the mining operations close up – it was “ a pretty
hellish environment,” he said.42
You can see how Neufeld used association and loaded words to slant the
reader’s opinion against von Braun. He started with the camp commandant,
Sawatzki, then connected him to Rudolph, who was a friend of von Braun.
Then he commented on their Nazi party membership. He interjected his
unfounded opinion about why Rudolph joined the party in 1931. He then cast
aspersions on von Braun’s motives. It is true he joined the Nazi party, but it
was because he felt he had to do so. It is true he was made an officer in the
SS, but Neufeld neglected to point out that this was an honorary post
conferred by Himmler to gain control and influence over von Braun and the
42 Béon, Planet Dora, XV, XVI.

Peenemünde operation. In all of his research, Neufeld could only find one
picture of von Braun in his SS uniform, which does not indicate that he was
enthused about being a part of the SS.
Piszkiewicz did not care about von Braun’s situation. The following
showed his inability to grasp the reality of life under a totalitarian regime. He
also failed to explain how they acted like Nazis or where they were ever
directly responsible for any deaths:
In the final analysis, any debate of whether von Braun and his partners in
developing modern rocketry were dedicated Nazis is semantic. They
belonged to the Nazi party, the SS and other Nazi organizations. They were
honored by the Nazis generally and by Hitler specifically. They dressed in
Nazi uniforms and most damning of all, they behaved like Nazis. They were
indirectly, some cases directly, responsible for the deaths of thousands of
concentration camp slave laborers. The damage and deaths caused by their
creation, the V-2 rocket, was slight in comparison.43
One of the best descriptions of Dora and the Mittelwerk came from the
British military magazine, After the Battle. Issue 101, from 1998, is devoted to
Nordhausen, Dora and the Mittelwerk. It covered all of the war material
production that emanated from the Mittelwerk. It gave the history of how V-2
and other war production was organized and carried out at the Mittelwerk. It
did so in a rather balanced fashion, unlike the work done by Piszkiewicz and
Neufeld.
We have seen how critics have called the team’s actions at Peenemünde
and the Mittelwerk into question. Still, the accusation that von Braun was
morally, if not legally, responsible for the use of slave labor has not been
proven. The debate over this issue continues to fall into two categories; the
43Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers, x.

‘Huntsville School’ that defends von Braun and the team and the 37
‘Revisionist School’ that accuses von Braun of immoral acts while dismissing
the personal testimony of the team. Each ‘school’ seems to be unwilling to
compromise its position and the two remain in direct opposition.

CHAPTER 2
Prelude to America
Critics have pointed out how easily von Braun went from being a German
working for the military during the war to signing up with the United States
Army to come to America and continue to work on the V-2. They used this as
evidence that von Braun was only out for his own best interest. Piszkiewicz
discussed what was going on as the Russians advanced deeper into
Germany. He stated that von Braun made the decision to surrender to the
Americans while avoiding the Russians and trying not to be killed by the SS.
During the evacuation to Bleicherode, von Braun made use of his SS rank of
Major. That, along with forged documents, allowed the rocket team to move
across Germany and away from the oncoming Russians.
Instead of writing that von Braun simply wanted to avoid the Red Army,
Piszkiewicz placed his own spin on the story, without any valid evidence to
support his opinion. Von Braun wanted to move to meet the Americans,
claimed Piszkiewicz, because “there was an awkward possibility of having to
explain to the Soviets what they were doing in the proximity of the
concentration camp that was building rockets they had designed. A safe
surrender to the Americans could only be helped by distancing themselves

from the Mittelwerk.”44 He went on to imply that von Braun was glad 39
for the confusion of the final days, as this allowed him to get away from the
Mittelwerk and surrender himself “at an innocent distance from Dora and the
Mittelwerk.”45 If von Braun had wanted to ‘escape’ any connection to the
Mittelwerk, he would have surrendered to the Soviets. It was the Americans
who were the most determined to pursue Germans for war crimes. Nowhere
did Piszkiewicz or Neufeld present any evidence that von Braun and his team
made the move to surrender to the Americans as a means of escaping
responsibility. Both do not hesitate to speculate that this was what von Braun
was thinking. They failed to mention that it was not unusual for Germans to
prefer surrendering to the Americans, as many Germans feared the Russians’
reprisals.
American Choices
The criticism, past and present, has focused on von Braun and the team’s
desire to come to the United States. This would not have been possible
unless the United States desired the services of these engineers. “Before
American troops even entered into Germany, teams of scientists had been
“drafted” by the armed forces to scour each nation liberated from the Nazis.
Their mission was to locate prominent scientists, examine their facilities, and
interrogate them for critical information, such as the progress of the German
atomic bomb project. A new concept of “intellectual reparations” emerged.”46
44 Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers, x.

45 Ibid.
46 Freeman, How We Got to the Moon, 147.
Neufeld, in his work for the Smithsonian, interviewed several of von Braun’s
team and asked them about their motives for coming to America after the war.
In his discussion with Karl Heimburg, Neufeld asked about going to the United
States:
Neufeld: Did you question much the idea of going to the United States, or did
it seem pretty natural? Heimburg: It seemed to me natural, in this way. Here
is a lost war. This takes quite some time until everything is reorganized. So
you are better off when you are not in Germany but you are outside of
Germany, because I knew the company in which I was in, they would have a
slow start until they could work again. So I figured you are better off if you are
for one year outside, and we figured, well, probably one, two years we will be
outside and then we will come back, because the idea was mainly not to start
a rocket business, but the United States was interested what were the rockets
like, how far can you use them, what can you do with them. And we even
started our second stage for the V-2 at Fort Bliss. But it never came to bear,
because after two years, you know, then, or three years, it finally was
decided, no, the United States will go into the rocket business too, and we
would stay there.47
Neufeld also talked to Konrad Dannenberg about the same topic. Neufeld
was very interested in the motivation behind the Germans’ desire to come to
America:
Neufeld: And you didn’t think at that time, it’s hard, you have to think back,
negatively about the United States as such? Dannenberg: Well, in a way,
when, in the last days in Peenemünde, we already philosophized quite often,
well, what is going to happen after the war? And one of our favorite subjects
in the discussion was to eventually come to the United States and to keep on
building bigger and bigger rockets here in the United States. So we really, we
were certainly not antagonistic, and I think in a way our early dreams even
really finally got being fulfilled. And also von Braun, I think von Braun had
very well planned the whole thing through… Now, again von Braun was a
pretty good negotiator. He finally got completely out from under the reach of
the SS, so we made the contact with the Americans directly.
Neufeld: As far as your discussions then about possibly going to the United
States are concerned, when you were in the last phases of Peenemünde,
was that a discussion that had to be kept in a fairly tight group? Dannenberg:
Oh yes. You only talk to your closest friends about that. Neufeld: That’s the
47 Karl Heimburg, interview by Michael Neufeld, Peenemünde Oral History Project, 9 November,
1989, Smithsonian Air and Space Museum Archives Division, Washington DC, 77-78.
kind of talk that lands you in a concentration camp. Dannenberg: 41
Right. Definitely. So you didn’t talk to strangers about it all, and
even among our closest friends we were very careful about talking about
these things.48
I find it very interesting that in this exchange with Dannenberg, Neufeld
made an explicit reference to ‘the kind of talk that lands you in a concentration
camp.’ In his interviews it is obvious he sought some kind of self-serving plan
by these men. What he found was an interest about the United States
coupled with a visceral fear of the SS. So Neufeld contradicted his own
thesis about von Braun’s being able to act to help the slave laborers. Neufeld
kept this thread running in his talk with Walter Wiesman. Neufeld talked to
Wiesman about the attitudes at the end of the war. Wiesman discussed his
view of what was occurring and then he went into his decision to come to
America:
…my wife and I, made a decision even in ’44, at least early ’45, if we ever had
a chance to get to America, that would be it. Because see, with nothing left in
the Ruhr district where we lived, when the war ended, my parents had just
moved to their eighth habitat, see. So all this is a sobering effect on a young
man who had heard nothing but Nazi philosophy, see, and you begin to just
put it all together, and too late says too, let’s think about this.49
As the interview continued, Neufeld did not appear to be satisfied over
what Wiesman had described. He probed further into his motives, despite
being raised to think of the Nazi philosophy as the only way, Neufeld still
asked a question about Nazi party involvement at Peenemünde. Neufeld
then commented to Wiesman, “You know, because there are a lot of people
48 Konrad Dannenberg, interview by Michael Neufeld, Peenemünde Oral History Project, 7 November,
1989, Smithsonian Air and Space Museum Archives Division, Washington DC, 64.
49 Walter Wiesman, interview by Michael Neufeld, Peenemünde Oral History Project, 24 January,
1990,
Smithsonian Air and Space Museum Archives Division, Washington DC, 19.
at the top levels who were members of the party, mostly because they had to
be and didn’t have much choice about it.”50 Wiesman responded saying in
trying to exert authority, the SS used honorary titles to bring important people
into their sphere of influence. But it is once again clear that Neufeld had no
illusions about the power of the SS and the Nazi party in controlling its
people. He saw that these men did not have a choice in the matter. Just like
von Braun had no choice when it came to making changes at the Mittelwerk.
So somewhere in between these interviews and the writing of his book,
Neufeld either forgot this situation or blatantly chose to ignore it since it was
inconvenient for his book’s premise.
In regards to the von Braun team coming to America and working for the
United States, Dr. Stuhlinger addressed that issue during a 1995 lecture at
the University of Alabama, Huntsville. After being offered the chance to go to
the United States, Stuhlinger spent a week pondering this move:
Could we hope that our move to America, and our willingness to live and work
with our former enemies, may help build a bridge, however tenuous at first,
from people to people, and convince our American colleagues that not every
German was an ardent Nazi? Could we hope that Americans would accept
us as co-workers and take us at our face value, in spite of all the war
propaganda that had painted a very different picture of the Germans… To go
to America did not simply mean a change of country or a switch in loyalty…
The powerful flow of German emigrants to America during the past 300 years
has certainly contributed its share to the development of freedom and
democracy in America. Emigration of young German engineers and
scientists to America after World War II would not be merely a move to
another country; it would be a step in the natural demographic evolution, an
expansion from one nation into another one to which that nation had been
related for 300 years by strong ties of kinship in body and mind.51
50 Ibid., 20.
51Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, "German Rocketeers Find a New Home in Huntsville" (lecture presented at
University of Alabama Huntsville, 21 September 1995).
This explanation certainly contains a good measure of self- 43
justification but there is also within it a sense of hoping to earn a redemption
of sorts, not only personally but also collectively for other Germans who
served the Third Reich but felt powerless to oppose it. Critics will not agree
with this conclusion, but it is a matter once again of your perspective on this
group.
The United States Army obviously felt that these Germans were not
pushovers when it came to having them come to the U.S. to work for our
government. In a War Department report, members of the German group had
experienced some difficulties and had filed a complaint. This report detailed
these issues and noted, “It took considerable effort to persuade many of the
German group to come to the United States. One of the influencing reasons
was that they believed they could rely on the honesty of this country more
than that of any other country in the world.”52
War’s End
When von Braun and the team surrendered to the Americans, Piszkiewicz
felt that any illegal or immoral activities were glossed over due to their value
as V-2 engineers. According to Piszkiewicz, an American Lieutenant was told
by the Seventh Army command to see if these Germans were Nazis. His
reply was, “Screen them for being Nazis! What the hell for? Look, if they
were Hitler’s brothers, it’s beside the point. Their knowledge is valuable for
52 “Report on jet-propelled guided missile field,” Major R. B. Staver, Ordnance Department, Memo to
Office Chief of Ordnance, Chief, Research and Development Service, 14 December, 1945, enclosure A,
p2.
military and possibly national reasons.”53 Piszkiewicz took this one man’s
statement as official Army and U.S. policy, “before long, the American
authorities would accept Lt. Stewart’s point of view. The bombardment of
London and Antwerp would be forgiven. The Mittelwerk and the tens of
thousands who slaved and died there would be forgotten. Nothing but the
rockets and their creators would matter.”54
After the war ended, various American personnel interrogated the German
rocket team. The Germans were quizzed often and by people with varying
degrees of technical skill. When the Germans became frustrated and wanted
to move on Piszkiewicz stated they had a hidden reason to want this.
“Perhaps they were apprehensive that they might be asked embarrassing
questions about the Mittelwerk. Apparently the subject did not come up. In
any case, they were rocket scientists; the Mittelwerk was the business of the
SS.”55
If the United States had believed these men were not useful to be
exploited, they would have been left to their own fate in Germany. The
opportunism went both ways, von Braun and the team were able to come to
the United States and the Army automatically upgraded its rocket capabilities
exponentially. In the chaos following the war, the team must have wondered
just how competent the Allies really were. A state of confusion reigned:
At Garmisch, the process of interrogation was chaotic. Dr. Zwicky reported

after his three-month stay in Germany that “There were too many technical

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., 235.
teams, both British and American, the members of which conducted 45
interviews helter-skelter without any coordination with others and
little regard to what had been previously done. General Dornberger, a very
energetic and astute man, and his collaborators on the V-2… watched the
unexpected and disorderly procedures of the British and American teams with
discerning eyes and it became apparent that they considered our missions
pretty much of a farce.”56
Paperclip
Operation Overcast was the project to locate and then exploit the
knowledge and talents of German scientists, engineers and technicians as an
aid in the continuing war against Japan. Operation Overcast was the
precursor to Operation Paperclip, which operated under much the same
premise but on a much more limited scale. Operation Overcast was headed
by Colonel Holger Toftoy, who came to Germany on a mission to find as
many V2 scientists and technical experts as possible for exploitation by the
United States. It was Toftoy who paved the way for the Germans to sign
contracts to work for the Army and to come to Fort Bliss in Texas when
Project Overcast became Project Paperclip.
Neufeld stated that the Army had to bend the rules to bring in and keep
these German scientists and engineers. The use and exploitation of former
enemy workers was established under Operation Paperclip, which started in
March 1946. That did not mean things were to go smoothly, according to
Neufeld, as many questions were raised about the Germans at Ft. Bliss. As
Neufeld tried to prove a cover-up, however, the flaw in his premise was that
neither von Braun nor other members of his team ever refused to answer any

questions. Still, Neufeld persisted:
But security reports for a number of individuals, including von Braun, had to
be revised or fudged to circumvent the restrictions that still existed. Some
writers have seen those actions as evidence of a conspiracy in the Pentagon
to violate a policy signed by President Harry Truman, but it reflected a
conscious choice by the U.S. government, approved up to the level of cabinet
at least, to put expediency above principle. The Cold War provided ample
opportunity after 1947 to rationalize that policy on anti-Communist grounds,
but the circumstances of restrictions on Nazis and war criminals would have
gone ahead at some level anyway, because the Germans’ technical expertise
was seen as indispensable. Thus when the Army’s own investigators came
looking for witnesses and evidence for the Mittelbrau-Dora war crimes trial,
which was held at Dachau in 1947, it is no surprise that Ordinance was none
too cooperative in granting access to the Ft. Bliss Germans. The whole story
of the Mittelwerk and its prisoners was to be obscured as much as possible,
because it would besmirch Army rocket development. Indeed, from the very
end of the war, if not before, the Peenemünders had divorced themselves
from any responsibility for slave labor; the SS provided a convenient
scapegoat for all the crimes associated with the program. It was a position
American authorities found easy to accept.57
Neufeld claimed that after the initial questioning was avoided by unknown
government agencies, the team was left alone until much later:
For the German rocket engineers in Huntsville and elsewhere, the issue
essentially vanished after 1947. For obvious reasons, they spoke little about
it, and there is not much evidence that it weighed on their consciences. For
most but not all of them, events in Germany had indeed been beyond their
control; in any case, the SS provided a convenient scapegoat for all crimes
committed in the V-2 program. Because of the Cold War and space race, the
U. S. Army and other government bodies had a strong interest in
whitewashing the Nazi issue, and the press was only too ready to
cooperate.58
Neufeld claimed in that passage to have known what each of these
men felt in their conscience. He did not know how they felt but he biases the
way he reported this to lead you to think none of the Germans cared about
what occurred at the Mittelwerk. He again admitted they did not have control

58 Yves Béon, Planet Dora: A Memoir of the Holocaust and the Birth of the Space Age, ed. Michael J.
Neufeld, trans. Yves Béon and Richard L. Fague (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), XXV.
over events in Germany but then said the SS was a “scapegoat” 47
even though in his own writing he has stated how dangerous and oppressive
they were at the Mittelwerk. In both of the previous quoted passages,
Neufeld passed off the SS as a scapegoat, which might lead the reader to
think that, like the proverbial animal, the SS were innocent of wrongdoing. I
am certain this was not his intent, but rather he wrote in a manner to
downplay the SS role in the use of slave labor to try to incriminate von Braun.
He wanted the evidence to support only his thesis and he ignored anything
that would contradict this, even his own material.
Cold War
Another point raised was the emergence of hostilities with the Soviet
Union. By the end of the war in Europe, American officials knew, or at least
suspected, that the communists would be our next adversary. So there was
an urgency to find all of the important scientists and engineers for use by
America. American officials did not want these valuable men to fall into the
hands of the Soviets to be used to further their programs against the United
States. For example, at the Mittelwerk “Major Staver had found a treasure
trove of V-2 parts in the underground factory at Nordhausen. Colonel Holger
Toftoy, who was in Paris as the Chief of the Ordinance Department of
Intelligence Services, agreed with Staver that the components should be
moved and ‘as many as 100 of [the specialists] be evacuated within 30
days.’”59

This haste would get them out before the Soviets took over Nordhausen
and it had the added bonus of securing them for the Army. Not only was
there a competition with the Soviets but also the U. S. Army wanted these
men for their exclusive use. “This, Staver said, must be done ‘before such
time as the U. S. Navy or the British decide to do the same.’”60 The British did
sign up some of the Peenemünders to come to England under the aegis of
Operation Backfire which test launched V-2’s from Cuxhaven. The
Americans were angry over the British attempt to take away some of the
Peenemünders, but the Army was successful in getting the vast majority of
the team to come to the United States.
One reason why these critics seem to be driven to assign blame to von
Braun is due to his success and popularity. If von Braun had suffered
setbacks, failures and had never become such a prominent figure with the
popular public profile, would we be hearing about these charges against him
today? During his UAH lecture, Neufeld got to the heart of the matter of why
he was so critical of von Braun and the team. He specifically pointed out how
he was “disturbed by the lack of contrition” on the part of the Peenemünders
for the use of slave labor, over which they had, as he also admitted
elsewhere, no control. Neufeld was upset that von Braun did not speak
publicly on the subject until the 1960’s:
Another case was Wernher von Braun, who essentially made a pact with the
devil in order to build large rockets. Although he became disillusioned toward
the end of the regime, that did not alter his basic motivations; after the war he
bore proudly the nominal reasons for his arrest - putting space flight before
military missile work - but there is no evidence that he ever stuck his neck out
60 Ibid., 153-54.
for the concentration camp prisoners before his arrest, nor did he 49
show any obvious pangs of conscience about their fate until the
1960’s and 1970’s, when protests by French prisoner survivors forced him to
confront the issue more directly.61
After my interview with Konrad Dannenberg and after reading the
comments of Dr. Stuhlinger, it seems obvious that von Braun was concerned
and did think about the plight of the Dora-Mittelwerk inmates. But as one can
see from the previous citation, Neufeld discounted every example of von
Braun’s efforts to help ameliorate the lot of the workers as simply personal
opportunism, while simultaneously damning him for not showing any
contrition until the 1960’s. He wanted it both ways, to portray von Braun as
an immoral opportunist while he dismissed the record when it contradicted
this thesis. Piszkiewicz and Neufeld damn von Braun because he did not
come out and hold a press conference where he broke down publicly and
cried about how miserable the conditions were for the inmates. The post-
Watergate era has seen the advent of this confrontational style of historical
writing. A look back over the 1990’s highlights the need we now have for
public figures to humiliate themselves and beg forgiveness for alleged sins.
This is now considered a sign of personal contrition by the mass media.
Evidently, Piszkiewicz, Neufeld and other critics are angry that von Braun
never made such a public confession and they have taken it upon themselves
to punish him by attacking his legacy.
Dr. Stuhlinger has the reputation of being the keeper of von Braun’s
memory. When I talked to him about this revisionist history, he became quite
61 Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich, 270-71.

disconcerted. He obviously takes this criticism of von Braun very personally.
He and Dr. Haeussermann have been critical of Neufeld’s conclusions:
But Haeussermann cataloged a list of technical and historical errors he said

Neufeld made, and said he is among those outside observers who “have no
idea what happens in a dictatorship.” Stuhlinger said Neufeld obviously did a
lot of work in archives, but he said the documents there are the records of the
SS, the hated security forces, and aren’t necessarily accurate. “He goes
through mountains of documents and believed the SS ones, “ Stuhlinger said,
but “while he is doing that he neglects to really take a good look at those
documents and those books that were written by our Peenemünde people…
the real player in the play. He pushes them aside and calls them inaccurate
and untrue.”62
A Proven Leader
What is justice for von Braun? It will be for him to be remembered for
what he did do and not by what his critics say he should have done during a
war they did not experience. Von Braun will be remembered for his work in
launching the first American satellite and for his work on the Saturn booster
that got America to the moon. In interview after interview, members of the
von Braun team that came with him from Peenemünde praise him as their
inspirational and irreplaceable leader. They say without his genius and
leadership, the booster program and the moon landing would have been
impossible.
Nor is this simply a case of Germans covering for one of their own.
Interviews with those Americans who worked with von Braun and the
Germans, from Ft. Bliss, Huntsville and elsewhere, all indicate the same high
regard for von Braun and his team. In an interview, Gene Cataldo discussed
A12.
his work at Redstone Arsenal, which he joined in July 1951. He was 51
hired as a chemist and then went into metallurgy. He worked under Dr.
Wolfgang Steurer and then Rudolph Schlidt, both part of the Peenemünde
group. According to Mr. Caltaldo:
I never heard anything bad said about the Germans. We were in awe of them
and their experience. They were great to work for. Most of them had
American deputies to help them interact with the workers. I was able to
socialize with them quite often. There was a tremendous spirit of excitement,
cooperation and good communications among the personnel, and we were
steadily increasing in manpower… There were 130 Germans in the original
von Braun group that signed short-term contracts with the government. At the
end of the Ft. Bliss period, several returned to Germany and others took jobs
in the U.S… About 115 of them came as a team to Huntsville, as a
consequence. The Germans and those of us that were employed in
Huntsville dived into the new projects with lots of enthusiasm. We found that
the Germans were easy to get along with and we worked well together, even
though they had many years of experience in the rocket field. We seldom
heard any disparaging remarks about our own lack of experience. I worked
closely with a large number of them, since the Materials and Processes field
was so closely allied with the rocket development work.63
Mr. Cataldo was involved in working on the Jupiter-C, which were
Redstones modified to fly developmental ablative nose cones. He had to
work with new materials sent to him by industry representatives. In 1956, he
heard about a new aluminum alloy that had better salt water resistance and
better weldability than the aluminum currently in use. He obtained a small
sample and did tests on the new alloy. He described what happened next:
Within a few days, Dr. von Braun called me into his office and began asking
questions about this new alloy. “I read your report,” he said. “How good is
this new alloy?” I went over with him the tests that I had made and the
information I had received from Alcoa… “Good,” he said, “I think we will use
this alloy for the next vehicles. You must investigate further, as quickly as
possible and tell me if I must stop. Because I will proceed from now to plan
on using this material.” Von Braun was knowledgeable enough to be this
63 Gene Cataldo, “Wernher von Braun” interview by author, Huntsville, AL., 16 November 1998.
involved in all phases of rocket production and yet always treated everyone
as partners and not as subordinates.64
Collective Guilt
Piszkiewicz, Neufeld and other critics of von Braun are guilty of having the
simplistic notion of collective guilt. Simplistic because it disregards the factor
of personal fear and the intimidation of living and working in a totalitarian
system. Collectively, they viewed all of the Germans involved with the V-2 as
being, to a greater or lesser extent, guilty of the atrocities committed at the
Mittelwerk. They also have judged von Braun by today’s standards,
dismissing the situation in which von Braun found himself working in Nazi
Germany. They exhibited the need to see von Braun and his team make a
satisfactory, to them, act of contrition for absolution in the use of slave labor
at the Mittelwerk. They have been judge, jury and, especially in Piszkiewicz’s
case, a willing ‘executioner’ of von Braun’s reputation. Von Braun’s critics
never detail what he could have done to help the inmates at the Mittelwerk.
They are left saying von Braun should have done a nebulous “something.”
This leads you to believe that something reasonably could have been done.
Things like sabotaging their work, joining a partisan resistance cell, or
maybe even trying to assassinate the SS command staff at the Mittelwerk.
Naturally, that any of these things, when discovered, would have led to the
execution of von Braun is irrelevant to the critics. So what difference would it
have made for von Braun to sacrifice himself for the Mittelwerk inmates?
None, the conditions would not have changed, even without the V-2, the
64 Ibid.
Mittelwerk had plenty of military work to do. 53
At war’s end, Germany had used 8 million forced laborers. To say that
von Braun could have made a lasting, positive difference for those who
worked at the Mittelwerk is ludicrous. He did turn himself and the team over
to the Americans for their own self-interest. It didn’t take a rocket scientist to
figure out the difference between internment by the Americans versus the
Russians. Von Braun’s dreams were to continue his work on rockets for
space exploration. In surrendering to the Americans, he could best pursue
this vision. But in no uncertain terms should we think this is just von Braun
exploiting the Americans for his own ends. The Americans were glad to have
him and the team to use in our own exploitation in building missiles. This
team was the nucleus of the Army’s ABMA group that later became the
Marshall Space Flight Center of NASA. This was the team that was vital in
getting the United States to the moon. This does not matter to von Braun’s
critics, who are still stuck at the Mittelwerk, looking for someone to blame.
It is a question we face today. Why do we want to explore space? The
dream of exploring the heavens has fired the imaginations of many
throughout history. Von Braun was a man who was able to make his dream
come true. It comes down to choices. When the Nazis took over Germany,
they were a new party and gave Germany the promise of better days to
come. Neither Von Braun, nor anyone else at that time, knew what was
coming over the next 12 years. So when the GermanArmy was willing to fund
his work in rocketry, it seemed like a godsend at that time. The moral
dimensions were not apparent to him. “’I was still a youngster in my early
20’s and frankly didn’t realize the significance of the changes in political
leadership’, von Braun wrote years later. ‘I was too wrapped up in rockets.’”65
The team’s desire to come to the United States after the war has not
been seen by critics as a positive aspect of their character. There has been
no evidence to prove the accusation that agents of the United States
performed a ‘cover-up’ of alleged war crimes by the team. The von Braun
team was an important weapons technology coup for the United States Army
in its coming competition with the Soviets in the Cold War, so the claim of
opportunism of necessity ran both ways. Still, an enormous gulf, both moral
and actual, separate claims of professional opportunism after a lost war and
allegations of collusion in war crimes. Neufeld and other critics seem unable
or unwilling to credit this distinction.
65 Robert Zimmerman, “Brave New World: American Colonial History as a Guide to Building Space
Societies,” Ad Astra, July/August 2000, 35.
CHAPTER 3
Early Years in America
At the end of World War II, consideration had been given to how to exploit
German technology and make use of experienced personnel. Colonel Holger
N. Toftoy was chief of the Army Ordinance Technical Intelligence in Europe.
He set up a program to find and ship 100 V-2 rockets back to the United
States for testing. The Germans responsible for the V-2 were also to be
rounded up and shipped to America under Operation Overcast. Overcast
was used to pick the best minds of Germany for tasks in the United States. It
allowed for up to 350 people to be allowed to come to the United States to
assist in the war against Japan. Known war criminals would not be allowed to
participate and the use of the men would be a temporary measure. This
project was later incorporated into Operation Paperclip. This brought 642
German and Austrian specialists to America through 1952. Toftoy had to
decide which specialists to hire for the nascent Army missile program. Using
recommendations from von Braun, Toftoy chose 127 Germans who accepted
contracts to work for the Army.
Fort Bliss
After being transported from Germany, the Army settled the von Braun
team at Fort Bliss, just outside of El Paso, Texas. “As Krafft Ehricke
described their situation at Fort Bliss, the German rocket specialists were
‘prisoners of peace.’ No provision, only a promise, had been made for their
families to join them in their new land. They had been offered no visa that
could lead to citizenship and only a six-month work contract.”66
It was here at Ft. Bliss that the team worked on disseminating the V-2
technology for the Army under the watchful eye of Colonel Toftoy. Since post
war American budgets for rocket research were severely limited, many of the
team felt useless sitting around being underutilized. Von Braun and the
others wanted to be working on building bigger and better rockets for space
exploration. They were also limited to escorted excursions into El Paso and
were constantly monitored by the Army.
The locals had been kept in the dark about von Braun and his team until
December of 1946, when the El Paso Times and other media were allowed to
report on the Germans. The secrecy was broken due to the Soviets’
deportation of thousands of German technicians to Russia. Charges were
made that the United States had allowed the Soviets to take the best
scientists for exploitation in Russia. To counter this claim, the Army sent out
a press release about the von Braun team at Ft. Bliss. The Times detailed
the reason the Germans had been brought to Ft. Bliss and the work on
rockets they were doing. It went into detail about the major players involved,
including Major James Hammill and von Braun. The paper reported the
Germans were seeking citizenship and were looking forward to getting their
families over here from Germany.

Another local paper, the El Paso Herald gave a more personal look at the
Germans. The headline was about how tasteless American cooking was as
compared to German cuisine. It was a non-threatening manner to introduce
these former enemies to the American public. The article covered the
differences in eating styles and did enlighten the reader that the Germans
liked American beer, especially Schlitz. They finally hit a political note toward
the end of the article. It discussed how the Germans were amazed by free
speech. The Germans informed the Herald that despite propaganda to the
contrary, most Germans did not harbor resentment for America. Other
articles discussed how well behaved the Germans had been and that no local
hostility had been encountered.
The national media also ran stories on the German rocket team. Time’s
report gave a brief history of the group and how they were rounded up and
brought to America. It went on to describe their current situation: “Last week
120 V-2 men were living in former hospital buildings at Fort Bliss. According
to Major Hammill, who commands them, their group is almost as complete as
it was at Peenemünde. With the Germans came stacks of documents: plans,
blueprints, sheets of experimental data.”67
Newsweek ran an article about the team with much the same information.
It also discussed their Nazi party connections: “With only a few exceptions
(who were sent back to Germany) the imported scientists have turned over
their specialized information without reserve. All of them are officially still
under the jurisdiction of the United States occupation forces in Germany and
67 “We Want with the West,” Time, 9 December 1946, 67.

can be disciplined under the denazification program. Many were former Nazi
party members, although none was in the political leadership.” 68 So the fact
that von Braun and the other team members were in the Nazi party was not
withheld from the general public.
James Fagan was a tech sergeant with the Army stationed at Ft. Bliss,
who stayed on as a civilian employee when released from the Army in 1946.
In 1980 he reminisced about those early days. He recalled how it was a small
group of people who developed a close fraternity-like atmosphere working
together. The conditions were primitive, which at times made working with
the V-2 exciting. During one test launch, the V-2 veered off in the wrong
direction. The cutoff switch was hit but too late to prevent the rocket from
landing on the rim of a cemetery in Juarez, Mexico. “That was the first U.S.
missile ever fired in(to) foreign territory,’ Fagan said. ‘In fact, it was probably
the only guided missile ever fired in(to) foreign territory. Because no one was
hurt, it became sort of a joke.’”69
In a 1962 presentation, von Braun discussed the Ft. Bliss years:
The next five years period came at Fort Bliss, Texas, from September 1945 to
April 1950, where we worked for the U. S. Army. About 120 handpicked
members of the V-2 team were gradually supplemented by about 4000
civilians and soldiers of the U. S. Army Ordinance Corps. Our first year here
was a period of adjustment and professional frustration. Distrusted aliens in a
desolate region of a foreign land, for the first time we had no assigned project,
no real task. Nobody seemed to be much interested in work that smelled of
weapons. Now that the war was over and space flight was a word bordering
on the ridiculous(sic). We spent the time in study and teaching and assisted
with the V-2 evaluation firings at White Sands, New Mexico. In addition to
rocketry, the German-born members of our team studied the American
language, American government and the American way of life. These were
68 “Secrets from Hitler,” Newsweek, 9 December 1946, 64.

69 Skip Vaughn, “Erratic Rocket Lands in Mexico,” The Redstone Rocket, 8 October 1980, p. 14.
our years of wandering in the wilderness.70
Things finally changed with the advent of the Korean War. The base
hospital would be required for returning GI’s and Ft. Bliss did not offer room
for expansion so the Army needed to find a new facility.
The Search
Toftoy set out across the United States to find a new base of operations
for the Guided Missile Development Division. He located what he felt would
be a prime location in Huntsville Arsenal, now a defunct Army post outside of
Huntsville, Alabama. This location, combined with Redstone Arsenal, would
give his group the room needed to expand, since they were located on a
broad bend of the Tennessee River, a navigable waterway with good road
and rail connections. Since the facility was not being used, it seemed like this
would be an easy acquisition. When Toftoy contacted officials in Huntsville,
though, he encountered opposition. It turned out that Huntsville was in the
running for a new Air Force aeronautical research facility. Huntsville was up
against Tullahoma, Tennessee as finalists for the facility.
Alabama Senator John Sparkman fought to get the Air Force facility but
failed to do so. Once Tennessee was chosen by the Air Force, Sparkman
then turned to Toftoy for the Army to take the facility over for missile
development. The first group from Ft. Bliss arrived in March of 1950. The
Army established the Guided Missile Center at Redstone Arsenal in April.
Von Braun was named as Chief of the Redstone Arsenal Guided Missile
70 Dr. Wernher von Braun, (untitled speech presented to the Sixteenth National Conference on the
Management of Research, French Lick, Indiana, 18 September, 1962.)
Development Division.
The city where von Braun and the team were moving, Huntsville, was a
depressed cotton mill town whose claim to fame to that point was being the
Watercress Capital of the World:
At that time, the population of Huntsville was under 20,000 and the major
economy was cotton mills and farming. Though Huntsville Arsenal had at one
time provided many jobs, it was closed down at the end of the war, leaving
mass unemployment. The apprehension felt by the citizens at having former
enemies living among them was overshadowed by the anticipated shot to the
local economy and employment opportunities. Although history books portray
their arrival in Huntsville with open arms, they were actually shunned by some
local businesses and guards were posted at work-sites to prevent them from
being physically and verbally abused by the local citizens. Von Braun’s movie
star good looks and charisma, combined with his intelligence and enthusiasm
for his work, soon overcame any antagonism felt for him and the other
Germans.71
The Huntsville Times chronicled the influx from Texas. A front-page story
on April 16, 1950, described the incoming group: “This is the first major step
in the move from Ft. Bliss, which will add approximately 500 military
personnel, 130 German scientists, 80 civilian employees and some 100
General Electric employees to the Redstone Arsenal Command.”72 On April
24, the Germans were once again on page one as the newspaper noted, “A
Lutheran church... is being established here for the benefit of an estimated 75
families of German scientists who are moving here.”73
The team welcomed the move to Huntsville. While in Ft. Bliss, they had
been self-titled ‘prisoners of peace’, limited in their off-base activities. They
were not allowed to mingle with the locals and had to reside and work on the
71 Tom Carney, “Portraits in Time: Stories of Huntsville and Madison County” (Huntsville: Old
Huntsville Publishing, 1998) 240.
72 “Major Hamill and Advance Group Arrive,” Huntsville Times, 16 April 1950, 1.
73 “Lutheran Church is Planned Here,” Huntsville Times, 23 April 1950, 1.
base. The change in Huntsville was significant now that they were free to
choose their own housing, interact freely with the local residents and to join
local churches and civic organizations. At first the local citizens were unsure
about this intrusion by German engineers. At that time, rocketry did not
sound promising as a future base for economic expansion. Naturally there
was some resentment that the Army had brought in former enemies to live in
their community. “Merchants, for example, took a while to get used to the
German habit of visiting maybe a dozen stores, making detailed notes, before
deciding to make a purchase.”74
The Difference
The situation in Huntsville could have easily turned out differently. If von
Braun had kept the team secluded from the citizens, having them live in an
enclave without integrating into the local culture, it is doubtful that the
Huntsville natives would have been able to embrace them as their own. The
insight of von Braun was to see the need to become ‘locals,’ invested in the
community. “The Alabamians were intrigued by these foreigners and
entertained by their eccentricities. The assimilation was extraordinarily fast…
as time went on, Huntsville became intensely proud of its Germans, and
especially of its most famous German of all, Wernher von Braun.”75
During an interview, I asked Konrad Dannenberg about coming to
Huntsville in 1950 from Ft. Bliss:
74 “National Affairs Special Report,” Newsweek, 30 January 1956, 28.

75 Charles Murray and Catherine Bly Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon, (New York: Simon and
Schuster Inc., 1989) 51.
Basically, we were very happy to move to Huntsville... The team brought a
number of young kids with us... Most of us, including myself, wanted to buy
houses... I bought my first house for less than $10,000. But I left Huntsville
after half a year, I was sent to Los Angeles to work on engine development...
All my immediate neighbors were Americans. We, of course, pretty soon
established some pretty good friendships. In fact we did mutual babysitting
with the neighbors. The first German living close by lived six houses away
from us... What we had done before could be discussed with our neighbors
and that was quite extensively discussed. Initially, the leader of Huntsville
was not too hot about the rocket group coming here. Rockets were not a
known commodity in those days, they knew they had been used during the
war. There was a possibility, a chance that a new Air Force facility could be
located in Huntsville. But then it went to Tullahoma, Tennessee. The Air
Research and Development Center or ARDC. Huntsville businessmen were
greatly disappointed not to get this major Air Force facility. But in the long run
it turned out they really got the crown jewel. Of course, after the Army had
grown and then the Marshall Space Flight Center, established out of the Army
personnel in 1960, it was a much bigger catch than the facility in Tullahoma.
We were welcomed to Huntsville; the Southerners are friendly people and
even before we never had any problems in Ft. Bliss. The Texans are a great
bunch of people. We were active in the church, we are mostly Lutherans.
We established the St. Mark’s Lutheran Church when we moved to Huntsville.
Dr. Von Braun encouraged the team members to be active in the community.
I was in Huntsville only a short time, so I never got to join any civic clubs, but
other team members did participate.76
Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger talked about his memories of coming to Huntsville.
His view will provide another German perspective regarding the Huntsville
move:
That move to Huntsville was certainly the most significant event in the history
of the German rocket team... we were free to move around, to rent or buy
houses, to join churches and civic organizations, to attend scientific
congresses and even to start the lengthy procedures to become normal
immigrants, to acquire ‘First papers’, and eventually to become real citizens of
the United States of America...Our neighbors called us by our first names and
were eager to help wherever they could; there would be no fences or walls
between the houses; initial reservations that sometimes could be felt always
changed quickly into curiosity; and then into genuine interest and sincere
friendship.77
76 Konrad Dannenberg, interview by author, tape recording, Huntsville, Al., 15 November 1998.
77 Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, “German Rocketeers Find a New Home in Huntsville” (lecture presented at the
University of Alabama in Huntsville on 21 September 1995)
Local Reaction
Dr. Stuhlinger met a young history professor one night shortly after moving
to the area. Dr. Frances Roberts said that if the area could survive Yankees,
they could handle the Germans. Forty years later she was asked how the
German invasion went. “Our city,’ she replied, ‘has grown in steps... By far
the most decisive step came when von Braun and his crew moved here from
Texas in 1950. Just everything began to grow in leaps and bounds.”78
In discussing whether or not to live together in an enclave or to mingle
with the native residents von Braun said, ”We must meet the people and learn
to share their problems and their activities. Only in that way can we become
real Americans instead of transplanted Germans.”
Ms. Walters went on to describe the ease of assimilation by the Germans
without making any negative remarks. “Local schools took in the new
children without any ‘incidents.’ Churches opened doors of welcome and
soon church suppers served Sauerbraten, a German pot roast and
Apfelkuchen, an apple cake. It was not long before hostesses were inviting
German wives to their
parties on the excuse that such actions were keeping with Southern
hospitality. Merchants began stocking their shelves with European foods and
delicacies. Before many months the foreigners were being regarded as “first
generation” Americans. And the Germans boasted that they were Americans
78 Ibid.
by choice.”79
Ms. Walters may have overstated the team’s reception, as there was an
initial hesitancy to accept these newcomers with the strange customs. Also,
no need to get excited about a government project that may well shut down
and leave Huntsville, as in previous instances. But the citizens of Huntsville
quickly grew to accept these Germans and what they had to offer the
community:
What inspired it suddenly to embrace new ways and new attitudes as well as
new and outlandish people is hard to say, for Huntsville, in one part of its
soul, still treasures an addict’s somnolence. Perhaps the Germans
themselves had something to do with it. When they came to Huntsville most
of them were broke, but they wanted roots… Three of them built houses with
their own hands. Other pooled all their money to create a $2,5000 bank
account that they transferred from one to another to satisfy a real-estate
agent who felt anyone buying a home should have that amount on tap. They
did not “clan up”; rather they plunged into community affairs with a proprietary
interest. If they had any odd ideas they were regarded as military men – at
least until they were better known – and the South forgives eccentricity in
warriors. But without people like Huntsville’s mayor, R. B. Searcy, a man who
changed himself and then called on his town to change itself, things might
have been different.80
The Huntsville Times kept up with the changes in Huntsville. Most of the
early stories were about the shortage of housing and the arrival of the
workers, including the Germans. One story did detail a special issue for the
incoming Germans about a Lutheran Church, also previously mentioned by
Dannenberg:
Plans are being completed rapidly to establish a mission church here of the
United Lutheran Churches of America, Dr. C. A. Linn of Atlanta, president of
the Georgia-Alabama synod, said yesterday... A Lutheran church of the
79 Helen Walters, Wernher von Braun: Rocket Engineer (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964),
117.
80 Paul O’Neil, “The Anachronistic Town of Huntsville,” The Space Industry: America’s Newest Giant,
ed. Editors of Fortune (New York: Prentice Hill, 1962.) 54.
United Lutheran Churches of America is being established here for the benefit
of an estimated 75 families of German scientists who are moving here. They
are all of the Lutheran faith. All services will be in English, however, Dr. Linn
commented yesterday. Dr. Linn is being assisted by the Chamber of
Commerce in meeting German scientists who are already here and obtain a
meeting place. It certainly appears from newspaper accounts that efforts were
made early on to accommodate the German workers and their families. One
can also see how Von Braun used the media to present his ideas for space
flight and how the local writer perceived him. In a front-page interview with
the Times, Von Braun explained how space travel was possible. He is
described by the paper as the “foremost authority in the world today on
rockets.”81
The article went on to describe his background and the development of
the V2 rocket in Germany. In June 1950, it was announced that the Chamber
of Commerce was going to hold a Newcomer Party. “Huntsville newcomers
since Jan. 1 will be special civic guests.”82 Local clubs must have read Von
Braun’s paper article, for soon after he spoke to the Kiwanis Club. “Dr.
Wernher von Braun, project director, Guided Missile Center, Redstone
Arsenal was the guest speaker at the meeting of the Kiwanis club on Friday
night at the Russel Erskine hotel. He gave a lecture on the German
experimentations with rockets and showed slides illustrating his talk. He led
the development of the well-known German V-2 rocket. Dr. von Braun heads
the group of German scientists at Redstone.”83
The Newcomer festivities had been delayed due to rain and were finally
held on August 9th. The newspaper gave in depth coverage but did not single
out the Germans. “Yesterday was more than just a celebration and a
barbecue. It proved that Huntsville is anxious and glad to extend the hand of
81 Bob Axelson, “Dr. von Braun Says Rocket Flights Possible to Moon,” Huntsville Times, 14 May
1950, 2.
82 “Chamber to Hold Barbecue Party,” Huntsville Times, 23 June 1950, 1.
83 “Dr. Von Braun Speaks At Local Kiwanis Club,” Huntsville Times, 25 June 1950, 1.
neighborliness and hospitality to the newcomers in its midst.”84 So if
Huntsville had any concerns about having an influx of German V2 engineers,
it certainly did not show up in the local newspaper.
It must be noted that their arrival was not quite as open as some have
portrayed it over the years. A local historian gave a slightly different
perspective on those early days:
At that time, the population of Huntsville was under 20,000 and the major
economy was cotton mills and farming. Though Huntsville Arsenal had at one
time provided many jobs, it was closed down at the end of the war, leaving
mass unemployment. The apprehension felt by the citizens at having former
enemies living among them was overshadowed by the anticipated shot to the
local economy. Although history books portray their arrival in Huntsville with
open arms, they were actually shunned by some local businesses and guards
were posted at work-sites to prevent them from being physically and verbally
abused by the local citizens. Von Braun’s movie star good looks and
charisma, combined with his intelligence and enthusiasm for his work, soon
overcame any antagonism felt for him and the other Germans.85
She ended her article by stating, “Suffice to say that Wernher von Braun
and his small team of German scientists helped make Huntsville, Alabama
and the United States of America what it is today.”86
Years later, in a presentation to industrialists, Von Braun commented on
the welcome the rocket team received from Huntsville. “If any of you Yankee
industrialists are wondering what kind of reception you would get if you
moved to Alabama, let me tell you about our arrival. We were greeted with
open arms, open minds and open hearts.87 He then detailed some of the
problems Huntsville faced from the huge influx of Redstone workers and how
84 “2,700 Attend Newcomer Fete Despite Rains,” Huntsville Times, 10 August 1950, 2.
85 Jacquelyn P. Grey, Wernher Von Braun, in Portraits in Time: Stories of Huntsville and Madison
County ed. Tom Carney (Huntsville: Old Huntsville Publishing, 1998) pg. 240-41.
86 Ibid., 245.
87 Dr. Wernher Von Braun , “Industrialists Touring Alabama, Welcome to Marshall Center” (speech
presented at the Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama, 18 May 1967)
those problems had been overcome. Then he said, “The response of the
people of Huntsville, Madison County and the surrounding counties to these
problems was magnificent. They were friendly and eager to provide for the
needs of the employees of the Army, the Marshall Center and our contractors
who poured into the Tennessee Valley from all over the nation.”88 Of course
this was a persuasive speech intended to draw business and industry to the
Huntsville area, but Von Braun did seem to be genuine about his affinity for
the area.
The Germans were kept busy at Redstone while acclimating to this new
city. With the Korean War as a backdrop, the Arsenal was asked to build a
500-mile range rocket. This rocket later became the Redstone, which were
deployed in large numbers in Europe as defense against the Soviet bloc.
Then the team went to work on a longer-range rocket, the Jupiter. When the
Jupiter was announced in 1955, so was the formation of the Army Ballistic
Missile Agency, or ABMA. The ABMA became operational on February 1,
1956. Brigadier General John Medaris was assigned to command the new
agency. The ABMA brought in an influx of workers including many Germans
who did not originally join the team at Fort Bliss. The new agency still
revolved around the core group of von Braun and his team.
Space Prophet
Von Braun was a popular speaker around the region. But his reputation
as a prophet for space would acquire a more national flavor with a series of
88 Ibid.
articles in the popular magazine Collier’s. “The first set of articles appeared in
March 1952, with the cover illustration showing a cargo rocket at the moment
of staging, high above the Pacific. ‘MAN WILL CONQUER SPACE SOON,’
blared the cover. ‘Top Scientists Tell How in 15 Startling Pages.’”89 Many
books appeared around this time with the theme of space exploration. In Late
1952, Time had a cover story on von Braun and his ideas for space. But the
Collier’s articles really were the impetus for interest by the American public.
The next leap of popularization came when Walt Disney wanted to do a show
based on the Collier’s articles.
Von Braun helped Disney produce the Man in Space series and also
appeared in it as a featured commentator. It placed von Braun in the living
rooms of Americans, not as a former Nazi collaborator but as a patriotic
American with a fantastic plan to get America into space. It energized many
of the youth of the day who saw in it a dream of space travel instead of
playing cowboys and Indians.
Assimilation
As the news of the success of the ballistic missile team spread, they
attracted the attention of the national print media. The story about Germans
in a small Southern city was too good to pass up. Collier’s had gotten a lot of
positive response to von Braun’s articles and they sent a reporter to
Huntsville to get the German team’s story. “This is the story of the Huntsville
89 T. A. Heppenheimer, Countdown: A History of Space Flight, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1997) 89.
Germans...”90 The writer, Hodding Carter, goes on to detail a visit to a public-
affairs forum. People with strange accents asked a lot of intelligent questions
during the forum. He asked the city librarian who these people were. “
‘They’re the guided-missile folks,’ she said. ‘Our Germans.’ Then she added
apologetically, ‘But I shouldn’t call them Germans anymore. They’ll all be
American citizens soon and they’ll be good ones.’ “91
Carter documented local reaction to the team’s arrival. Father T. L. Flynn
was Huntsville’s Catholic priest. He told Carter, “Certainly we thought they
were a little odd when they first came here and not just because of their
speech. And then we found out what we thought strange was that they
practiced virtues like we like to think of as old-fashioned American ones, but
which we have in such great part forgotten.”92 Locals told Carter that the
Germans had what we would call today good family values. They were thrifty,
loved their home and America, had a desire for quality education, were pious
and had the will to work. These values sound trite to some of us today, but
imagine being in 1950’s Alabama and how this must have been appreciated.
It certainly helped that the Germans were all white, many were blonde and
most locals were of the opinion they were good looking. If they had been
some other racial type, this positive view might not have been as prevalent.
Carter’s article also noted that the Germans were great credit risks, a not
insignificant consideration in the early 1950’s.
They took out library cards almost immediately and helped open a new
90 Hodding Carter, “The Rocket Scientists Settle Down,” Collier’s, 12 November 1954, 102.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 103.
Lutheran Church. Locals were amazed how the Germans’ wives attended the
men and their household’s needs. Carter singled out a few of the major
Peenemünde members to highlight. He detailed how involved they were with
civic clubs and in city business. Their wives were almost always described as
attractive. One team member’s wife worked as a volunteer swimming
instructor of polio-stricken children and also was the chairwoman of the
county Humane Society. One team member’s daughter won the Daughters
of the American Revolution medal as the best history student in Huntsville.
Carter described how the Germans built beautiful houses on Mount Sano.
As the article closed, Cater described the feelings of Otto Eisenhardt: “He
believes that it was the hand of God that led him safely from Peenemünde to
America.”93 Carter then ended in praise of the Germans, “They are
Americans in the old pioneering sense, carving out a new home and a new
life in a new land. They have the strongest imaginable pride in themselves as
a creative team, which has gone through real hell, and won together. We’re
fortunate to have them (the Army admits that without them we’d be five years
behind in guided missile research) and they know they’re fortunate to be
here.”94
With articles in national publications that presented the Germans in such a
positive manner, it is easy to see why Americans would form a good
impression of them. In the writings of those who met the Germans, those
who worked with the Germans all seem to agree how wonderful they were to
93 Ibid., 105.
94 Ibid.
be around. They did not isolate themselves and were active in the
community. Von Braun led the way in this regard. He went any place
possible to promote his dream of space exploration. He was well received
even by those who did not agree with his ideas.
Rocket City USA
By the mid-50’s, von Braun and the team were fully integrated into
Huntsville society. Besides the boost to the local economy, there was also a
sense of pride that important work was being done at Redstone. After all,
Sputnik had shown the Soviets were not just capable of but willing to launch
satellites into orbit. Von Braun and his team would provide the nation’s
response. The residents of Huntsville also shared the success of the team’s
efforts. After the Redstone launched Explorer I into orbit as America’s first
satellite, Huntsville exploded in celebration:
The successful launch set off acts of celebration in Huntsville and broke
down the suspicions that Huntsville natives had held against the Germans.
“Huntsville became hysterical with pride and joy,” recalled Tiesenhausen.
“There was spontaneous celebration downtown at the court square and the
people carried Wernher Von Braun on their shoulders around the courthouse.
Everybody was blowing their horns and saying, ‘We made it.’ But it had been,
‘Those Germans,’ but now it was, ‘We made it.’ From that moment on,
Huntsville identified with the space program,” Tiesenhausen said.95
Von Braun summarized the ABMA period in a 1962 speech:
Then on February 1, 1956, the Army Ballistic Missile Agency was formed to
field the Redstone missile as quickly as possible and to develop an
intermediate range ballistic missile, the Jupiter. About 1600 people were
transferred from the Guided Missile Development Division of Redstone
Arsenal to form the nucleus of ABMA. Our years at ABMA were as hectic as
95 Mike Williams, “Rocket Fever Began in Huntsville with a Group of German Scientists,”
Montgomery (Alabama) Advertiser, 1 July 1985, 1.
the ones at Fort Bliss were halcyon. The strength of our organization grew
rapidly to about 6,000 and under the urgency of high national priorities, the
pace of development quickened. We worked hard to make up for lost time
and the Army supported us in depth. Here we received our first true space
exploration assignments. Using modified Redstone and Jupiter missiles, we
succeeded in launching within one year the Western world’s first satellite
around the earth and sun. Development of the huge Saturn rocket was
started.96
The transformation of Huntsville into Rocket City, USA occurred after
Explorer I. The space race against the Soviets had begun even though
President Eisenhower was a reluctant participant. Public outcry forced his
hand to act to counter the Soviet program. Up to this point, the ABMA and
other military agencies were the prime movers of designing, building and
launching rockets. Eisenhower wanted to avoid a military confrontation with
the Soviets over space. He wanted civilian control over the exploration of
outer space.
In order to keep space in the hands of civilians, Eisenhower submitted and
Congress approved of the National Aeronautics and Space Act in July 1958.
Thus the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or NASA was born.
Dr. Keith Glennan became the first NASA administrator. The question of
what military people and programs to transfer into NASA stirred a heated
debate:
Although the Space Act gave some ABMA projects to NASA, it did not specify
whether the von Braun team should remain with the Army or transfer to
NASA. By the middle of October, Glennan requested transfer of more than
half of the Ordinance Missile Command (von Braun’s group) to NASA.
Medaris was enraged at the prospect of losing the heart of ABMA and by the
lack of support from Assistant Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles, who
96Dr. Wernher von Braun, (untitled speech presented to the Sixteenth National Conference on the
Management of Research, French Lick, Indiana, 18 September, 1962.)
seemed to accept the prospect of transfer with undue equanimity. Von Braun
opposed transfer, fearing it might lead to the dispersal of his team. He owed
Medaris loyalty and feared that NASA might not be as supportive of in house
development. He and some of his lieutenants told of lucrative offers from
private industry and threatened to resign from government service if the team
was divided.97
The planning and implementation of Project Overcast demonstrated the
importance of the Von Braun team. The team was ‘kept on ice’ at Fort Bliss,
as the Army tried to decide how to best exploit this group. The move to
Huntsville was the most important, and the most pivotal in the team’s goal to
get into space. While the assimilation in Huntsville wasn’t as straightforward
as popular myth provided, it was made much easier by the charisma and
leadership of von Braun.
97 Andrew J. Dunar and Stephen P. Waring, Power to Explore: A History of Marshall Space Flight
Center 1960-1990, (Washington DC: National Aeronautics and Space Adminsitration, NASA History
Office, 1998) 25.
CHAPTER 4
THE MARSHALL YEARS
Despite the bureaucratic tug-of-war, von Braun and the team remained
with the ABMA, at least for the time being. With the advent of NASA, though,
discussions continued over the role of the ABMA and their mission. Von
Braun’s team was thus coming to the end of their time with the Army. The
need for a super-booster for space exploration, named Saturn, provided the
impetus to move the team out of the Army’s control. If they stayed with the
Army, which was limited to the development of short-range missiles, then they
would not be able to work on Saturn. Therefore, it came down not to if, but
when, for von Braun’s team:
Discussions between Defense and NASA continued through the summer and
into the autumn of 1959. York, who later claimed that he was “largely
responsible” for the transfer of the von Braun group, approached Glennan
and proposed another attempt. Glennan agreed, although York admitted
“there was more push on my part than there was pull on his part.” York
conferred with McElroy and the President, and won their concurrence. By 6
October, negotiators hammered out an agreement to transfer von Braun’s
Development Operations Division of ABMA to NASA, and to assign to NASA
“responsibility for the development of space booster vehicle systems of any
generation beyond those based on IRBM and ICBM missiles as first stages.
Medaris and von Braun attacked the agreement. Medaris announced that he
would retire, and von Braun threatened to do the same. Brucker privately
assured von Braun that his team could stay together and continue to work on
Saturn under NASA, and later claimed that von Braun “expressed to me at
the time not only a willingness, but finally a desire” for the transfer.98
98 Andrew J. Dunar and Stephen P. Waring, Power to Explore: A History of Marshall Space Flight
Center 1960-1990, (Washington DC: National Aeronautics and Space Adminsitration, NASA History
Office, 1998) 28.
75
The local media paid close attention to the fate of the ABMA and
the von Braun team. They had seen the government pull assets out of
Huntsville before and were unsure of what would happen next. Once the
complications of keeping the team together were solved, von Braun wanted to
get the transfer completed. “Dr. Wernher von Braun told the House Space
Committee today he would ‘greatly favor’ immediate transfer of his Huntsville
team to civilian control in accord with a resolution under committee
consideration.”99
NASA
It certainly was in the best interest of all involved for the von Braun team to
remain intact and working on the building of more powerful rockets. The
greater lift capabilities would be needed to launch both man and machine into
orbit and then later onto the moon. “Shortly before activating its new field
Center in 1960, NASA described the Marshall Center as ‘the only self-
contained organization in the nation which was capable of conducting the
development of a space vehicle from conception of the idea, through
production of hardware, testing and launching operations.’ The Center’s
earliest projects included the Redstone, Juno II, Agena B and Centaur
vehicles.”100
It was also good for a fledgling agency like NASA to get the star power of
someone like von Braun. The importance of having this visionary, now well
99 Jules Witcover, “Quick Move to NASA Favored by Von Braun,” 2 February 1960, A1.
100 Mike Wright, “Creating a Rocket Building Institution: The History of the Marshall Space Flight
Center” (paper presented to the American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics Space Programs
and Technologies Conference, Huntsville, Alabama, 1990)
known to Americans, who was the personification of space exploration cannot
be overestimated:
Von Braun was the only non-astronaut in the space program who became a
household name. In Congress, his prestige was enormous. Movie-star
handsome, with an expansive smile and European charm to which he added
a touch of Alabama folksiness, he could dominate a congressional hearing as
easily as he dominated the media. Other senior people in NASA envied him
(“That damned Nazi,” one was known to mutter when he had had several
drinks), intimating that von Braun spent too much time worrying about his
public image and that the real work at Marshall was being done by others.
What was hard for some of his NASA peers to swallow was that von Braun
was a natural. He was exceptionally good at being a public person, and none
of the other engineers of Apollo could compete.101
Even the official NASA history reflects the importance of von Braun as
salesman for the space program. Roger Lanius, chief historian for NASA,
wrote about von Braun’s prolific use of mass media to promote the
exploration of space. Von Braun was not the only person in this field to speak
out for space exploration, but according to Lanius, he was one of the most
important:
Among the most important of these was Wernher von Braun, ensconced in
his Army rocket center at Huntsville, Alabama. Von Braun, in addition to
being a superbly effective technological entrepreneur within the government
system, by the early 1950’s had learned and was applying daily the skills of
public relations on behalf of space travel. His background as a serious rocket
engineer, a German émigré, a handsome aristocrat, a charismatic leader all
combined to create a positive impression on the U.S. public. When he
managed to seize the powerful print and electronic communication media that
the science fiction writers and filmmakers had been using, no one during the
1950’s was a more effective promoter of spaceflight to the public than von
Braun.102
Lanius also recognized the Collier’s articles as being the major
101 Murray and Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon, 51.
102 National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NASA History Office, Exploring the Unknown:
Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I: Organizing for
Exploration, ed. John M. Logsdon with Linda Lear, Jannelle Warren-Findley, Ray Williamson and
Dwayne Day (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995) 17.
breakthrough by von Braun into the American public’s mass 77
consciousness. “In 1952 von Braun burst on the broad public stage with a
series of articles in Collier’s magazine about the possibilities of spaceflight.”103
Lanius recounted how von Braun laid out a logical, detailed plan that finished
with man exploring Mars in the not too distant future. This was science as
opposed to the diet of wild fantasy that the public had received from popular
science fiction. Lanius discussed the events that opened up for von Braun
after the Collier’s articles hit the news stands:
It set up interviews on radio and television for von Braun and the other space
writers, but especially von Braun, whose natural charisma and enthusiasm for
spaceflight translated well through that medium. Von Braun appeared on
NBC’s “Today” show with David Garroway, and on CBS’s “Gary Moore”
program. While Collier’s was interested in selling magazines with these
public appearances, von Braun was interested in selling the idea of space
travel to the public.104
Lanius then explained how this evolved into the Disney series:
Following close on the heels of the Collier’s series, Walt Disney Productions
contacted von Braun – through Willy Ley – and asked his assistance in the
production of three shows for Disney’s weekly television series. The first of
these, “Man in Space,” premiered on Disney’s show on March 9, 1955, with
an estimated audience of 42 million. The second show, “Man and the Moon,”
also aired in 1955 and sported the powerful image of a wheel like space
station as a launching point for a mission to the Moon. The final show, “Mars
and Beyond,” premiered on December 4, 1957, after the launching of Sputnik
I. Von Braun appeared in all three films to explain his concepts for human
spaceflight, while Disney’s characteristic animation illustrated the basic
principles and ideas with wit and humor.105
Race Relations
Mass media had helped von Braun work on the public perception of space
103 Ibid., 17-18.

104 Ibid., 18-19.
105 Ibid., 19.
travel in a positive manner. But mass media also exposed the dark side of
having a space center in Alabama. Television carried images of the racial
strife occurring throughout the South. Von Braun was faced with having to
deal with the negative perception people had of Alabama to attract people to
come work at Marshall. At the time, von Braun and others did not realize the
impact that this new NASA would have on the turmoil in the South.
In launching the Apollo Program, NASA also launched a reconstruction of the

South. In the Moon program’s “Fertile Crescent” that stretched from Houston
to Huntsville to the Cape and back to New Orleans, NASA helped reconstruct
the region’s economic, demographic, social and educational landscape.
Other changes were unanticipated; “spillover” effects could be seen in the
space program’s effects on civil rights and education. But the impact was
pervasive, permanent and driven by federal dollars. This “Second
Reconstruction,” one historian has suggested, “went beyond pork barrel into
the realm of social planning.106
This “second reconstruction” would take time to have a visible impact.
Von Braun still had to deal with the implications of this racial turmoil. While
Huntsville did not have the racial riots and battles of other Alabama cities, it
was certainly linked to them in the minds of potential scientists and engineers
across America. Von Braun had to overcome the image of Bull Connor to
convince these people to come to Huntsville to work and live. The NASA
history of Marshall painted a vivid picture of Alabama at this time:
In the early 1960’s, the most dramatic story in Alabama came not from the
test stands at Redstone Arsenal, but from the streets of Montgomery,
Birmingham and Selma. The Heart of Dixie was the center of the civil rights
struggle. Alabama evoked images of the scorched skeleton of a bus
abandoned by Freedom Riders in Anniston, the confrontation at the Edmund
Pettus Bridge in Selma, Bull Connor’s dogs and firehoses in Birmingham and
Governor Wallace Standing in the doorway at the University of Alabama in
106 Andrew J. Dunar and Stephen P. Waring , Power to Explore: A History of Marshall Space Flight
Center 1960-1990 , 115.
Tuscaloosa.107 79
The one thing von Braun and Marshall had on its side was that Huntsville
was a different place. The Madison County area had attracted people not
only from Tennessee and Mississippi but thanks to ABMA and then Marshall,
they brought in people from California, Florida, New York and all of the major
universities. Huntsville may have been just 80 miles north of Birmingham but
during this period of racial struggle, it was a world apart. Some might argue
that Marshall put out that view but local citizens also echoed this outlook. A
fifth generation Alabamian told U.S. News and World Report, “We are no
longer like the rest of Alabama. We aren’t Yankees yet, mind you, but if the
Governor tried to shut our schools to keep the colored out, he’d be badly
mistaken. Huntsville just won’t stand for it.”108
Von Braun took a controversial stand for racial justice in this heated
climate. He spoke out in public forums about Alabama’s racial problems. He
could have kept a low profile on this issue or allowed others to take the lead
to publicize Marshall’s attitude. It could be that von Braun, who was 53 in
1965,
now long married with children, had matured in his attitude about speaking
out for those in need. During the time at Peenemünde von Braun went from
being in his late 20’s into his early 30’s and was unmarried. His youth may
have been a factor in not stepping forward to speak out against the SS’
treatment of the slave labor force at the Mittelwerk. Von Braun survived that
107 Ibid., 115-116.

108 “The City That Space Built,” U.S. News and World Report, 12 November 1962, 72.
experience to see the result of the war for Germany and the consequences
for the Jews and those who were forced into slave labor. This hard earned
experience probably weighed heavily upon his conscience. In America, as a
citizen, he now had the opportunity to make a difference. Contrary to what
his critics have claimed, this was something denied to him while working in
Germany.
Huntsville Difference
The difference between Huntsville and the rest of the South was noted in a
1964 Electronic News article. “Newcomers also see a community that works
hard at preserving racial harmony, with biracial committees taking the lead.
The home of two Negro colleges, Huntsville over a period of years has
voluntarily desegregated its motels, hotels, theatres, major restaurants,
community recreation center and municipal golf course. Public school
desegregation, while limited in extent to date, has been achieved without
disorder.”109
It is also true that it was in von Braun and Marshall’s best interest to help
African-Americans in their struggle for civil rights in Alabama. While Alabama
was perceived in such a negative manner, it would be hard to recruit quality
people to come there to work. Critics would point out that it was enlightened
self-interest that drove von Braun to be so vocal in his support of reform in
Alabama. There, every action that was positive for Marshall and for
Huntsville was portrayed in such a manner as simply von Braun’s way of
109 Bob Ward, “Rocket City and Culture Center,” Electronic News, 16 November 1964, 79.
getting to the moon. While the moon was always von Braun’s 81
dream, he also was obviously a man who cared about those in his
community. His outspokenness for change in Alabama could have created a
backlash that would have hindered progress in the Apollo project and
therefore his ambition of getting to the moon. Those who knew von Braun
feel confident that his interest in speaking out was because he believed it was
the right thing to do at that time.
Science magazine gave a lengthy report about the change that had
occurred to Huntsville since the arrival of the von Braun team. They
discussed the poverty that Huntsville experienced and the economic change
that Redstone made and also the social issues of that period. Race relations
were covered as well. “Despite the progress in Huntsville, Alabama’s
reputation in the race relations field still bears the imprint of George Wallace
and of Jim Clark, Selma’s ex-sheriff. This can obviously be a handicap in
recruiting highly trained technical personnel, especially among Negroes.”110
During his time in Huntsville, von Braun was constantly asked to travel the
country to speak at various events. People associated von Braun personally
with the space program and wanted to see and hear him first hand. The
records at the National Archives are filled with these numerous requests while
he was Director at Marshall. The racial issue became important and made a
difference in whether or not von Braun would speak at a group’s event. Von
Braun made it a point to adhere to racial openness in his official and unofficial
110 Luther J. Carter, “Huntsville: Alabama Cotton Town Takes Off into the Space Age,” Science, 10
March 1967, 1228.
speeches.111
The Public Affairs Office would have the group requesting von Braun to
speak fill out Form 2235, the Speaker Invitation Questionnaire. The form
asked the requesting organization the usual mundane questions but also
included were questions regarding race. “Are the facilities to be used during
this meeting open to all, regardless of race? Will any racial group be
excluded from or segregated within your meeting? Is any racial group
excluded from membership in your organization?”112 It was with this form that
the Rotary International requested that Dr. Von Braun speak at their meeting
on April 12, 1965. The National Archives did not have a copy of the speech
given that evening. We can reconstruct the substance of what he said from
the following editorials found in some of Alabama’s daily newspapers.
Alabama Responds
The newspapers’ editorials were positive and supportive of von Braun.
They did not have a problem with von Braun speaking out on such a sensitive
issue as race relations. The Decatur Daily even started off by stating that
they were glad von Braun was a citizen of Alabama and continued in elegant
support of his speech:
Dr. Wernher von Braun, Marshall Space Flight Director, now considers
himself as much an Alabamian as any of us and we gladly accept him as an
111 von Braun to Harry Walker, August 17, 1964; Dr. Von Braun Personal, Box #11; Chief Public
Affairs, Dr. Von Braun’s Personal Letters 1964; Files of the Director 1963-1966; NASA MSFC Upper
Management Files, Record Group 255; National Archives-Atlanta Regional Archives Branch, Atlanta,
GA.
112 Rotary International Speaker Invitation Questionnaire, January 22, 1965; Rotary Club Huntsville,
Box #2; Chief Public Affairs correspondence on 1965; Files of the Director 1963-1966; NASA MSFC
Upper Management Files, Record Group 255; National Archives-Atlanta Regional Archives Branch,
Atlanta, GA.
Alabamian . . . Dr. Von Braun, if accused of jumping into state 83
politics would, no doubt, gladly accept the charge, for he called on
Alabama moderates to take steps which would not only result in improving the
state’s image, but would be steps taken to improve the lot of humanity. “It is
time for the voices of moderation in Alabama to be heard,” he said. He urged
that Alabama “examine our drawbacks, our prejudice and our outlook very
carefully before our opportunities get away from us.” “Believe me,” he said,
“There are other areas of the country just waiting for the chance.” “But,” he
added, “you can’t stir an empty bucket. We must become more conscious of
the conditions that bring criticism. We must remove the film of prejudice from
our eyes, we must listen to our conscience and recognize injustice and
inequities wherever they appear.” Dr. Von Braun’s appraisal of Alabama
should go into every home in this state. The time is long overdue for self-
examination. Let’s put an end to this thing of giving cause for outsiders to
come into Alabama and making a shambles of good race relations. And a
very good place to start is with changing our voter registration laws from
restriction to fairness for all who would become qualified to vote. We may
have, all the people of Alabama, may have, this opportunity a few months
from now. It is a good place to begin.113
The Birmingham News also weighed in to support von Braun’s position:
Dr. Wernher von Braun spoke out the other day on the need for changing
Alabama’s registration laws. He suggested, as a Alabama citizen, that we
hear more voices of moderation. For these comments he has gotten a few
criticisms. He may get more, we would be surprised if he did not. Every
Tom, Dick and Harry in the state has had his say from the Tennessee line to
the Gulf along lines which are not those of Dr. Von Braun. When the space
scientist spoke, however, those same people ready with their own opinions
seemed shocked . . .
The fact that he knows how to get to the moon does not mean he cannot
have and express without cynical rejoinders involving personal attack, views
on how to get one’s name on the voting lists. We repeat, thank you, Doctor,
for the contribution of your thoughts.114
The Birmingham News had a page of opinions from newspapers around
the state regarding von Braun’s speech. They took the following from the Lee
County Bulletin, “It is well that Dr. Wernher von Braun has almost been
deified by the people of Alabama. So respected a man will not be vilified for
pointing out that Alabama voter registration laws “form a Berlin wall around
113 “Von Braun Looks at Alabama,” Decatur Daily, 15 April 1965, 3.

114 “Von Braun’s Right,” Birmingham News, 17 April 1965, 2.
the ballot box.””115 They also had the editorial from the Gadsden Times:
Now it is Dr. Wernher von Braun complaining that Alabama’s voting laws are
too restrictive. “All these regulatory barriers form a Berlin wall around the
ballot box,” he told an audience of 500 at a Rotary Club district governor’s
meeting in Huntsville Monday night. They “discourage the qualified as well as
the unqualified.” The Times agrees. But this newspaper wants Alabama, not
the federal government, in control of our voting qualifications. That is why we
endorsed State Senator Hawkins’ bill.116
While the newspapers were effusive in their praise of von Braun, the
average citizen of Alabama did not always agree. Many wrote to their local
newspaper or called the local radio station to complain. Some wrote directly
to von Braun at Marshall to voice their dissent regarding his speech. The
negative personal criticism von Braun received usually made reference to his
German/Nazi past. Harvell C. Montgomery of Northport, Alabama sent von
Braun such a letter. He wrote:
Dear Sir: I read with disgust the report of your speech before the Rotary
Club. For a man whose native country exterminated better than 6 million of
its citizens and who caused the death of untold millions elsewhere, I do not
feel that you have any right to low-rate or even discuss the voting systems in
this country. Since you mentioned the Berlin wall, if I were in your shoes, I’d
have only praise for a country who saved me from Russia and/or being tried
as a war criminal.117
Stanley N. Partin, address unknown but presumed to be a local citizen,
wrote von Braun the following, “ . . . suppose you mind your own business
and stick to your missles(sic). The way your country treated the Jews during
the last war should be reason enough for you to think twice before censoring
the South or any other section for that matter.”118
115 “State Vote Laws said Ludicrous, too Difficult,” Birmingham News, 17 April 1965, 3.
116 Ibid., 3.
117 Harvell C. Montgomery to Dr. Wernher von Braun, April 13, 1965; Speech Reaction, Box #17;
Chief Public Affairs 1965-66; Files of the Director 1963-1966; NASA MSFC Upper Management Files,
Record Group 255; National Archives-Atlanta Regional Archives Branch, Atlanta, GA.
118 Stanley N. Partin to Dr. Wernher von Braun, April 15, 1965; Speech Reaction, Box #17; Chief
Some concern about the fallout from this speech must have been 85
raised within Marshall or in the community. The reaction must have been
serious enough to garner the attention of Walter Wiesman, one of von
Braun’s original team members. In a letter to Public Affairs Chief Bart
Slattery, Wiesman provided his opinion on the impact of von Braun’s speech
about Alabama’s racial situation to the Rotary District Convention. He
contrasted those who favor of racial segregation with those against it. He
noted that half of the positive letters came from civic leaders and
businessmen. The other half came from Alabama citizens who thanked von
Braun for saying what they felt they could not have said themselves. The
negative letters came from people who thought democracy meant getting
their way alone and people who did not want outsiders to tell them how to
behave. Basically, ignorant, prejudiced people provided the negative opinion.
One illuminating observation that
Wiesman made was when he commented on the probate judge who
suggested that von Braun leave politics to the politicians. Wiesman stated,
“We could tell this man that this is what happened in Germany.”119
It is surprising that so many people reacted with shock to von Braun’s
comments at the Rotarian event. Earlier, in December of 1964, he had given
a speech to the Madison County Chamber of Commerce where he made
specific comments about addressing the racial issue in Alabama. The

Public Affairs 1965-66; Files of the Director 1963-1966; NASA MSFC Upper Management Files,
119 Walter Wiesman to Bart Slattery, May 19, 1965; Speech Reaction, Box #17; Chief Public Affairs
1965-66; Files of the Director 1963-1966; NASA MSFC Upper Management Files, Record Group 255;
National Archives-Atlanta Regional Archives Branch, Atlanta, GA.
difference may have been the Rotary Club speech made the papers. Von
Braun told the Chamber of Commerce:
The Mayor is also establishing a bi-racial committee, with full authority to act
on its own, to strive for fair employment and improvement of racial relations in
our city. I think we should all admit this fact: Alabama’s image is marred by
civil rights incidents and statements. I know Huntsville and Madison County
have set the pace for the remainder of the state in the employment of
qualified persons regardless of race, creed or national origin. I am especially
grateful for the splendid example that the Association of Huntsville Area
Contractors has set for the entire state of Alabama in participating in the
Marshall Center’s equal opportunity program. I know that it took more than a
little courage for this association to undertake such leadership.120
There was a bonus for von Braun being director of such a large federal job
source for Huntsville. It gave him the power to influence others to do the right
thing, even if they didn’t really want to go along. Von Braun was not shy
about using the bully pulpit of being director of Marshall to spread his
message:
Are we doing enough for those less fortunate families who are bypassed by
the big space and missile boom and who should pose a great challenge to
our civic leadership, both from the practical and humanitarian point of view…
Although I will not attempt to tell you what we should do to bolster the image
of Huntsville as a highly desirable place to live and work, I will promise to help
as a citizen of Huntsville in every way I can. I promise to help both as the
director of the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center and as a citizen of the
community. Huntsville is my home. I like it here. Together we can project a
truthful image of Huntsville as an advanced scientific, educational, and
cultural center, an image that will help persuade every top level scientist,
engineer or industrial executive that we feel we need, not only to come to
Alabama, but to come willingly.121
120 “Huntsville in the Space Age,” speech given to Annual Banquet, Huntsville – Madison County
Chamber of Commerce, Huntsville, Alabama, 8 December 1964; Box # 1; von Braun Speech Files
1954-1968; NASA MSFC; Record Group 255; National Archives-Atlanta Regional Archives Branch,
Atlanta, GA
121 Ibid.
87
Personal Vision
Even without the hot topic of race relations, von Braun had always been in
demand by his community to lend his stature as Huntsville’s most prominent
and respected citizen. During the “Space Day” Banquet, it was only natural
he give a speech. His speeches usually carried the major theme of promoting
space exploration but he also liked to express his appreciation to the citizens
of Huntsville for their treatment of him and the team:
Now for the benefit of our out-of-town visitors and as a reminder to all of us, I
should like to point out something rather singular about our community.
When I say community, I mean all the surrounding cities and counties as well
as the state and Tennessee Valley as a whole. The rocket people invaded
Huntsville about eleven years or so ago, and since the moment we arrived –
and later multiplied, we have received nothing but help and cooperation… All
we know is that the people and leaders of this area have done a tremendous
job to accommodate the rocket and missile people who have descended on
them. Let me add this: all of these great accomplishments and economic
upheavals have been wrought without Huntsville ever once becoming a
boomtown. We have made steady, progressive growth.122
Von Braun also showed an awareness of the political realities he faced in
working for the federal government in a state like Alabama. He knew he
acted to use his position to speak out on issues that were important to him
such as education, race relations, religion and space exploration. His voiced
such awareness in a speech he gave to the German-American Day Festival
in 1963:
There is always the danger that a newly naturalized citizen will become so
engrossed in his work, and will devote himself so fully to enjoyment of the
122 Space Day Banquet speech, Huntsville, Alabama, 30 June 1961; Box # 7; von Braun Speech Files
1954-1968; NASA MSFC; Record Group 255; National Archives-Atlanta Regional Archives Branch,
Atlanta, GA.
pleasures of comfort and success, that he seldom pauses to appreciate his
citizenship, and does little to preserve the basic freedoms that it represents.
We must never forget that we enjoy freedom of religion, speech, the press,
and peaceful assembly only as long as we are willing to defend them… I
know that those of you who left Germany during the thirties and forties came
here with a passionate desire to escape a system of men above the law. You
came as I did, to a land of hope, freedom and opportunity. I have never
regretted the decision.123
Von Braun sounds like he had given much thought to being a citizen in a
free country where he can actually stand up for what he believes without fear
of retribution by the government. He also seemed introspective about the
dangers of getting caught up in his work and not exercising his rights as a
citizen of a democratic country. This was a man who had experienced both
ends of the political spectrum, the totalitarian and the democratic. He
certainly appreciated living in the democratic system.
If von Braun had a large ego, he kept it well hidden. Modern readers look
back incredulously at the comments by team members that von Braun never
took credit for their success, preferring instead to spread the credit around.
After all, this was a man who had been hammered by some modern
historians as being an opportunist. Surely, he would not hesitate to be
recognized. The opportunity arose for him to massage his ego in 1964. The
Decatur Civitan Club suggested to some of Alabama’s Congress members
that the new Madison County airport be named in honor of von Braun. His
response was one of humility that he did not deserve such an honor. He
appreciated the compliment but had to decline stating:
123 Acceptance of American Citizen Award, 11th Annual German-American Day Festival, North
Bergen, New Jersey, 26 May 1963; Box # 1; von Braun Speech Files 1954-1968; NASA MSFC; Record
Group 255; National Archives-Atlanta Regional Archives Branch, Atlanta, GA.
In the first place, there are many, many people in the Huntsville area 89
who have contributed materially to the United States’ successes in
space. Also, many people in this area have contributed greatly and even for
a longer period than any of us here at Marshall to the growth and expansion
of Huntsville, Madison County and its surrounding cities and counties. As a
result, it would be a matter of some embarrassment for me to be singled out
and have the new airport named after me. Again, my sincere thanks for one
of the highest compliments that could possibly be paid to an individual. I trust
that you will understand my position.124
In this situation, one can surmise that von Braun did not want the attention
that he would receive if the airport were named after him. Is this a remnant
from his days under the Nazis in Germany where being singled out for
recognition could be very hazardous? He talked of being embarrassed. It is
interesting to ponder what his reaction would have been if the airport had
been named for him over his objections. If it didn’t have to do with space
related activities, von Braun seemed to prefer to remain out of the limelight.
Politics
If the airport made him cautious, then dealings with politicians with
agendas positively made him squeamish. His office received a letter from
Governor George Wallace. It was a request for him to autograph a picture
that had been taken of the two of them during Wallace’s recent visit to
Marshall. Harry Gorman wrote a note to von Braun telling him he felt this
request could not be ignored. But he feared that Wallace might use it as an
endorsement of Wallace by von Braun. Gorman suggests having Alabama
Senator John Sparkman come by to get a similar picture made to counter
124 Von Braun to Charles E. Bradford, President, Decatur Civitan Club, 23 January 1964; Box # 11;
Dr. von Braun ’64 letters (personal continued); Chief Public Affairs 1965-66; Files of the Director
1963-1966; NASA MSFC Upper Management Files, Record Group 255; National Archives-Atlanta
Regional Archives Branch, Atlanta, GA.
balance the one with Wallace. Von Braun did not seem to agree that this
could not be ignored. He felt that since Wallace was not running for Governor
or Senator in the next election, so why appease him.
Bart Slattery, von Braun’s Chief of Public Affairs, responded to Gorman.
“We predicted that it would happen – it has. And with a campaign of one kind
or another coming up. I have a feeling that von B will be reluctant to put his
name on it if J.W. isn’t also asked.”125
A call was put into NASA chief James Webb’s office. Colonel Larry Vogel
responded and suggested the following inscription for the photo, “In
appreciation of your presence on the occasion of a static test firing of the SIC
first stage of the Saturn V moon rocket.”126 Using very neutral language, it
provided no political endorsement of Wallace.
To further the distance between Wallace and von Braun, it was Bart
Slattery who sent the carefully considered autographed photo back to
Wallace. The letter was very simple, with Slattery explaining that von Braun
was out of the city, and therefore a letter was being sent, about as non-
political a letter as can be crafted. There was not a notation if the Governor
felt slighted by this response. The Marshall files were full of letters to and
from politicians. The politicians usually wrote to ask von Braun to speak to
some favorite group. Some of them were on powerful committees and it was
125 Bart Slattery to Harry Gorman regarding Gov. Wallace’s request, undated, Box # 12; “U-V-W”; Dr.
von Braun 1965/66 letters; Chief Public Affairs; Files of the Director 1963-1966; NASA MSFC Upper
GA.
126 Bonnie Holmes to Bart Slattery, 9 November 1965; Box # 12; “U-V-W”; Dr. von Braun 1965/66
letters; Chief Public Affairs; Files of the Director 1963-1966; NASA MSFC Upper Management Files,
noted they could not be easily turned down. Even in a democratic 91
system, von Braun still felt pressure from those in power. Thankfully, now it
was not a matter of life and death.
Science and Religion
If von Braun were a soulless opportunist who cared nothing for others, he
must have had an absence of morality. That is what you would think based
on the portrait of von Braun by the revisionist historians. It turns out that von
Braun was a highly moral individual who had a deep and abiding faith in a
supreme being. He felt that this faith in God was important and was not in
conflict with his work as a scientist. He was active during the Cold War to
point out the difference between a democratic “Godly” American system in
competition with the “godless” Soviet totalitarian regime. It may sound trite to
us now, but this was at the height of the Cold War and the start of the Space
Race with the Soviets, where such thinking was widely accepted.
He used his position to spread his message about this topic. In 1958, he
gave a speech to the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce about using the belief in
God and the dignity of the individual as an antidote to Communism. Vital
Speeches of the Day published this speech, which gained a popular following.
In discussing how a totalitarian regime ignores individual rights, he gave this
account of his personal experience under the Nazis. “In Peenemünde, the
security police kept dossiers on all of us, listing all the things we might have
said about the regime or individuals of the upper hierarchy. Personal vices
and weaknesses were catalogued in the files. But they left us alone as long
as our usefulness, in their opinion, was greater than our debit account. Once
they felt they could do without you and you were in their way, they would call
for the dossier and destroy you. It was that simple.”127
Von Braun gave many speeches that had the issue of ethics and belief as
their theme. It was a subject he touched on often. In another 1958 speech,
he stated, “We cannot live without ethical guidance. More than ever before,
our survival depends on adherence to ethical principles. Ethics alone will
decide whether out fabulous new inventions in the field of atomic energy will
provide mankind with an inexhaustible supply of energy and wealth, or
whether mankind will perish by its abuse.” 128
He went on to discuss the perceived antagonism between science and
faith:
It has been frequently stated that scientific enlightenment and religious belief
are incompatible. I consider it one of the greatest tragedies of our times that
this equally stupid and dangerous error is so widely believed. But it is easy to
see why so many people fall for it. We instill in our children a tremendous
amount of what we call factual knowledge, but we deny them knowledge of
what we do NOT know. “You can’t teach what you don’t know yourself,” is
the cheap excuse. But by not telling children about nature’s mysteries, its
infinite number of unexplained and unexplainable miracles, we deny them that
most important dowry for their future life, humility. Nothing has probably
retarded human progress more than idolatry of our own achievements. By
adoring our own scientific achievements, we kill humility, the mother of any
true scientific progress… For only with God reinstated in the heart of the
world, will He furnish mankind and its leaders the ethical guidance though the
dangers and pitfalls of the Technological Revolution.129
This was not a short-term phenomenon for von Braun. If you are to take
127 Dr. Wernher von Braun, “The Acid Test,” Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 May 1958, 434.
128“Commitment in the Modern World,” speech presented to Indiana General College during Religious
Emphasis Week, Indianapolis, Indiana, 17-23 November 1958; Box # 5; von Braun Speech Files 1954-
1968; NASA MSFC; Record Group 255; National Archives-Atlanta Regional Archives Branch, Atlanta,
GA.
129 Ibid.
his writing at face value, this was an important aspect of his belief 93
system. We could cast doubt upon that conclusion if he had confined these
speeches to just a few short years around Sputnik and the start of the space
race with the Soviets. Yet, von Braun continued to speak out on this issue
into the 60’s. He gave a speech to the International Christian Leadership
World Conference in 1965. His chosen topic was Science and Christianity.
In this speech, he once again reiterated his position that the two are not
mutually exclusive, even
in these modern times:
The two dominant forces which are shaping the course of human events in
our revolutionary age are science and religion. It is depressing to witness a
growing misconception that these two powerful forces are not compatible.
And more tragic, some people claim that “knowing” and “believing” cannot
even live in peaceful coexistence; that they actually are the great adversaries
of our time. Nothing could be further from the truth. Science and religion are
not antagonists. On the contrary, they are sisters. While science tries to
learn more about the creation, religion seeks a better understanding of the
creator.130
For a man of von Braun’s experience, science could not function without
the moral guidance of religion. He feared that in these modern times, that
humanity had ceased to look to God for guidance, preferring to believe that
science would save them from themselves. He had experienced a time when
science was not guided by morality and was forever stigmatized by the
Mittelwerk. He went on to say, “In the past, misdirected ambition, moral
shortcomings, or errors in judgment have dragged men, women and children
130 “Science and Christianity,” speech presented to the International Christian Leadership
World Conference, Seattle, Washington, 8 July 1958; Box # 1; von Braun Speech Files 1954-1968;
NASA MSFC; Record Group 255; National Archives-Atlanta Regional Archives Branch, Atlanta, GA.
into terrible wars.”131
These speeches carried a two-pronged message for von Braun. On the
one hand he was speaking about the issues of his day. During the Cold War,
the United States was not just in a space race but also, at times, on the brink
of nuclear confrontation with the Soviets. This could have led to the literal
end of the world for humanity. On the other hand, I believe he was also
speaking of his past experience working on the A-4 program for the Nazis.
He wanted to apply the lessons he had learned from his A-4 experience to the
work being conducted currently on rockets and nuclear weapons:
The blame for the wrongful use of force cannot be pinned on science.
Science, all by itself, had no moral dimension. The same drug that heals
when taken in moderation will kill when taken in excess. The same
international team effort called science that created the bomb has produced
some of the finest and proudest accomplishments of contemporary man. The
society in which he lives – not the scientist alone – determines whether his
discoveries will be used for constructive or destructive purposes. Only when
a society accepts and applies a scientific advance, do we add a moral
dimension to it.132
While promoting a message of morality through a belief in the Christian
God, von Braun never did promote any single denomination over another
one. He always used universal terms in describing God and Christianity. He
stated that humanity could not comprehend this deity. “Finite man cannot
comprehend an omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent and infinite God. Any
effort to visualize God, to reduce him to our comprehension, to describe him
in our language, beggars his greatness.”133
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 American Weekly article, 10 February, 1963; Box # 1; von Braun Speech Files 1954-1968; NASA
MSFC; Record Group 255; National Archives-Atlanta Regional Archives Branch, Atlanta, GA.
Children Reply 95
The effect of these speeches and articles about his faith in the age of
science gained a wide audience, and prompted many citizens to write him.
Most of these letters were in support of his statement, with a few, polite
dissenters. A few letters were from people with a loose touch on reality.
Most of those who wrote to support von Braun’s point of view took a tone as
exemplified by Mr. Davis here:
Both of these are treasured items of the high Christian character of the
leaders of our nation; and I have no patience with the many articles I am
reading now of the decline of Christianity. As long as men of your ability keep
your faith in God, our national future is assured… Just as you are making
history with your space program, so you are also to be one of those who has
made political history by your devotion to the cause of a fee America. God
bless you and have your always in His keeping.134
Adult America was not the only group aware of von Braun as the
personification of the planned moon mission. It wasn’t just Homer Hickam
who was impressed by von Braun. Children also seemed to be impressed by
his charisma and many wrote to him with their questions about the space
program. Thomas Moriarty, 8 years old at the time he wrote von Braun in
1966, had, what he believed to be, a brilliant plan to terraform the moon.
While the physics involved rendered this young man’s plan unfeasible, von
Braun was impressed enough to write him a personal letter explaining the
problems with the plan. He encouraged the youngster to keep on the same
path, thinking about solutions to the problems that faced space flight. He
concluded the letter with the following encouragement. “Thomas, I hope you
134 Luther Davis, Springfield, Tenn. To Dr. von Braun, 1 September 1966; Box # 13; Dr von Braun
personal “D”; Dr. von Braun 1965/66 letters; Chief Public Affairs; Files of the Director 1963-1966;
NASA MSFC Upper Management Files, Record Group 255; National Archives-Atlanta Regional
Archives Branch, Atlanta, GA.
will be one of those who maintains this interest so that someday you may take
your place in one of the greatest undertakings of mankind in the history of the
world.”135
Von Braun’s untiring public advocacy for the space program garnered him
recognition not only in Huntsville or even America, but worldwide. During the
work on the Saturn booster program, von Braun and the team in Huntsville
were on top of the professional universe. But the bloom of their success
could not prevent a shriveling of the manned space effort. The Saturn V
succeeded in getting mankind to the moon and safely back to the earth. The
race with the Soviets, to get to the Moon first, had been won. Von Braun’s
vision for a manned exploration for Mars was not to be given the political
climate of the day. So the question became, what would happen to von
Braun and his team now?
The Marshall/NASA years were the team’s professional and personal
zenith. Von Braun was effective in using the mass media to promote his
agenda. Von Braun spoke out, at personal risk, on race relations and how
different Huntsville was versus the rest of the Deep South. Numerous media
outlets and citizens supported von Braun’s stand on race relations, with only a
few dissenters. Von Braun articulated a personal vision not only of space, but
how science and religion were important to him in tandem.
135 Von Braun to Thomas Moriarty, Belvidere, Ill., 3 June 1966; Box # 13; “M-N”; Dr. von Braun
1965/66 letters; Chief Public Affairs; Files of the Director 1963-1966; NASA MSFC Upper
GA.
Chapter 5
The Ambivalent Hero
With the success of Apollo 11, the United States crossed the finish line for
getting a man to the moon and back safely before 1970. The ghost of
Kennedy had been the driving force that made the moon landing possible.
After Apollo 11, that same ghost would now haunt NASA as to what to do
next. Richard Nixon was the President who basked in the glow of Apollo 11’s
success. Instead of being a supporter of continuing the effort to exploit
space, Nixon saw it as being Kennedy’s baby. Nixon had an aversion to
things associated with the martyred President. In addition, America and
Nixon had other issues to occupy their time and attention. Nixon saw the civil
rights struggle turn militant, protestors were becoming openly opposed to
American participation in Vietnam, environmental issues demanded attention,
and women marched for their rights. America seemed to want to tear itself
apart. Apollo and the space program soon became back page news.
Changes
What would come next for NASA? We had reached the moon, so why
bother to go back? Yet, NASA did have a plan for the future. The problem
was, neither the administration, nor the American public cared to listen. This
would mean a big change for von Braun:
Wernher von Braun built enough Saturns to continue the exploration of space
between the earth and moon. Many at NASA proposed permanent bases on
the lunar surface. According to Webb, von Braun and Mueller wanted to send
two six-man ships to Mars in the hope that one of the ships would
successfully make the arduous journey. Paine, realizing that Marshall had no
immediate future, decided after talking to von Braun’s wife, Maria, to bring
von Braun to Washington, despite the political consequences. “He had
fulfilled his life’s ambitions,” observes Paine. “It was very clear that the only
real strong motivating force left for Wernher was the Mars mission. Now that
we’d been to the moon, let’s get started. He wanted to push for it… And of all
the people in the world, nobody had demonstrated a better vision for the
future than Wernher. He had consistently, decade after decade, said what
was going to be important in the next decade, and then been right.”136
Von Braun reluctantly accepted Paine’s invitation to come to NASA
headquarters. Given the Nixon administration’s cutbacks for NASA, von
Braun knew that Marshall would have little to do in the foreseeable future.
With von Braun’s proven ability to advocate to Congress and the American
people for space exploration, it must have seemed like the logical move to
make. It would mean leaving Huntsville, a city that had stood by him and the
team since the early days at Redstone. Twenty years as the best-known
citizen of this town, they would not give him up easily.
The End of the Huntsville Odyssey
A parade was set for February 24, 1970. This would be Huntsville’s way
of expressing its appreciation for von Braun. Despite inclement weather,
many citizens turned out for one last hurrah for the man who put Huntsville on
the world map. The Huntsville Times documented this festive yet somber
occasion:
136 Joseph J. Trento, Prescription for Disaster, ed. Susan B. Trento (New York: Crown Publishers,
Inc., 1987) 89.
Dr. Von Braun, who rode second in a parade which wound through
downtown, told the crowd he was “deeply touched” by the celebration.
Speaking in the rain, von Braun recalled it was almost exactly 20 years to the
day he first left Texas to find out about “moving to Alabama” and setting up
headquarters for the nation’s missile development program at Redstone
Arsenal. In Alabama, he remembered, he spent 20 “pleasant happy years”
and vowed never to forget the friendship of a community whose support aided
in accomplishing his dream of putting a man on the moon. Huntsville’s
support of NASA, he said, was a major portion of the “team effort.” Among
the many honors presented by the community in his honor, von Braun said
the “most significant of them all” are the two perpetual scholarships, to be
awarded annually, for students at the University of Alabama Huntsville and
Alabama A&M University. He urged continued support of the space program
and recounted the “dancing in the streets” during celebrations here following
the successful launch of Explorer I in 1958 and in the first lunar landing last
July. “Don’t put up your dancing shoes,” warned Dr. Von Braun, now NASA’s
deputy administrator in charge of planning. 137
Other dignitaries spoke at this celebration in praise of von Braun and his
contribution to the growth and success of their city:
Preceding Dr. Von Braun’s address, Alabama Gov. Albert Brewer remarked
“this is a happy occasion because a local boy has made good.” The crowd
tittered at Brewer’s understatement. The governor then went on to praise von
Braun as a man the “state has pride in.” He, more than anyone else,
represents the success of the United States in space exploration and effort.
Brewer said UAH, “largely through his (Dr. Von Braun’s) efforts” is now being
envisioned as the M.I.T. of Alabama and recalled how, 10 years ago, Dr. Von
Braun came before the state legislature asking for a Research Institute to be
located in Huntsville. The rocketry genius’ request, said Brewer, laid the
groundwork for the development of UAH... Mayor Joe Davis presented von
Braun with a plaque of merit and City Council President Ken Johnson said the
councilmen met in a 1 p.m. special meeting and adopted a resolution naming
the $10,000,000 civic center the Wernher von Braun Civic Center. Johnson
said the action was taken in view of the Marshall director’s “contribution as a
civic and cultural leader” to his adopted community... Madison County
Commission Chairman James Record said “all the words of the English
language could not express our appreciation to Dr. Von Braun.”138
Effusive praise came from all corners of Alabama. Von Braun was not
thought of as a foreigner who came to Huntsville. He, along with the
137Bill Sloat, “Rocket City Launches Von Braun,” Huntsville Times, 25 February 1970, 1.
138 Ibid, 1.
members of his team, were looked upon as native Huntsville citizens. In
another column about von Braun, the Times also called him a hero:
Not only was the von Braun era passing Tuesday afternoon, but so, perhaps,
was the era of heroes. Von Braun was a hero not only to Huntsville but to the
world. The dream was going to the moon. Von Braun had the stuff and
know-how to make that dream come true... So it is with von Braun. There will
be other feats in space, but none will have the excitement and heroism of that
first “small step – giant leap.” Dr. Von Braun spoke Tuesday of building
castles in the sky and foundations, the space age is just beginning. And, for
ages yet to come, mankind will look back on the real dawning of the space
age and von Braun’s name will be there. He’s a first class hero, one of the
few remaining for our generation. Man will go to Mars and maybe beyond.
They will be heroes too - but only because von Braun laid a firm foundation -
showed it could be done- and became a hero himself in the process.139
Life at NASA Headquarters
The mood was positive when von Braun got to Washington. It didn’t take
long to find out just how negative an experience being at NASA headquarters
was going to be. Some had raised questions about having a former Nazi in
Washington. It was tolerable if you kept him away in Huntsville, the critics
seemed to be saying, but now he would be in the spotlight. Paine defended
having von Braun in Washington:
“I think most people felt that he had a damned unfortunate past and nobody
liked a Nazi… but he had kind of paid his dues and that he really helped us
get to the moon in developing the Saturn V and showed himself to be a
worthy citizen of this country, and while we won’t exactly forgive and forget,
politeness dictates, at least, we won’t get into a disgraceful knock down and
drag out. So it was sort of a neutral thing. He was neither the terribly
charismatic or popular figure Jim (Webb) feared, nor was he the great target
of anti-Nazis who very properly would object to having a prominent member
of the Hitler regime ensconced in Washington in a policy area.”140
No one seemed to have a problem with von Braun’s past during his time at
139 David Housel, “Huntsville Hero Is Remembered As One Of The Last,” Huntsville Times, 25
February 1970, 1.
140 Trento, Prescription for Disaster, 90.
NASA headquarters. A much more mundane problem caused von Braun to
be discouraged, the lack of funds. Von Braun wanted a budget that included
plans for a space telescope, a space station and a reusable shuttle. Nixon
was presented with three scenarios for NASA. The three options descended
the scale of what NASA would do for the future. The plan von Braun wanted
would cost $10 billion a year but would guarantee the things von Braun
desired, including a trip to Mars. The cheapest option would cut all manned
space flights by 1974 and would give a modest amount for future projects, like
the space shuttle. Von Braun knew his time with NASA was over when Nixon
chose the latter option and killed the manned effort in space for the
foreseeable future. Then when Paine resigned, von Braun was without an
ally in NASA:
As the months went by, von Braun discovered that his arguments for an
aggressive and well-conceived post-Apollo space program were being met
with polite interest but no real enthusiasm or indication of support. Despite
his unique combination of imagination, drive, practicality, and loquacious wit,
so effective in the past, he and his NASA associates could not affect a
changing tide… Without Paine’s presence and backing, he was vulnerable to
those who disliked or disagreed with him, and he had no supporting base
from which to operate. Without an aggressive space program to plan for, he
became less and less effective.141
Retirement and Death
Von Braun faced the feeling of impotence for the first time in a long time in
his career. This was a man who had accomplished so much in the field of
rocketry and space exploration, who was now reduced to being a relic from
the glory days of Apollo. There was only one option left for von Braun over
141 Frederick I. Ordway II and Mitchell R. Sharpe, The Rocket Team, (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell
Publishers, 1979) 454-55.
which he had control, retirement:
In post-Apollo NASA, von Braun was like the fleet admiral back from the
glories of victory at sea who suddenly finds himself walking dazedly along the
Pentagon corridors with nothing important to do. The trials and triumphs of
Raketenflugplatz, Peenemünde, Fort Bliss, Huntsville and Cape Canaveral
were over. The space horizon had suddenly clouded. Thus, when Wernher
von Braun announced his retirement from NASA on June 10, 1972, no one
was surprised. He simply could not work within what had become an
essentially holding operation.142
Von Braun left NASA and the dreams of space exploration behind with his
retirement. He went to work for Fairchild, but that wasn’t the same as
planning a trip to the moon. Not too long after leaving NASA, von Braun was
diagnosed with cancer. His health declined over the next few years. Shortly
before his death in 1977, he wrote an 82-page paper about his philosophy of
life. This paper was presented to a synod of the Lutheran Church of America
in late 1976. Von Braun addressed many issues in this paper, “science,
technology, and morality and the question of taboos; the motivation for
scientific study and research; a list of mankind’s most pressing problems; a
hierarchy of scientific priorities; and some provocative thoughts on the
relationship between science and religion.”143

He gave his view on all these topics ending with his views on science and
religion. This was a topic that von Braun touched upon numerous times in his
career. It is obvious it was a subject that still consumed him, even as he
faced his death. He was upbeat about his relationship with his creator. His
comments reflected those in the speeches and articles he made in the 1950’s
and 60’s. His only new revelation was his thinking that the concept of original
142 Ibid., 455.

143 Peter Cobun, “Dr. Wernher von Braun Presents His Views In a Paper Called ‘Almost a
Confessional,’” Huntsville Times, 19 December 1976. p. D1.
sin was flawed. But he did look forward to the future, where science and
religion would work together to assist mankind and not to help in our
destruction.
The year before his death, von Braun visited with his old friend and
commander, the now Reverend John Medaris. He voiced his regret over
events that occurred after the Apollo 11 mission. “The Rev. Medaris last saw
Dr. von Braun in early 1976, he recalled, when they both ‘prayed together.’
He remembers that Dr. von Braun was ‘greatly disappointed’ because of the
slowdown in the space program following the Apollo 11 landing, and, said the
Rev. Medaris, that his talents were ‘not properly used’ when he was
transferred from Marshall to the Washington headquarters of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1970.”144
Alabama Pays Tribute
Von Braun died on June 16, 1977. His death was noted around the world
but it was felt most poignantly in the city that claimed him as its own,
Huntsville. The Huntsville Times had von Braun’s death as a prominent
headline for June 17, 1977. The coverage dominated the paper. Times staff
writer, Peter Cobun paid tribute to von Braun in his column:
He exuded charisma, before it was popularized by the Kennedys and

demeaned from overuse. With enthusiasm, conviction and personal integrity,
von Braun assembled a team to surmount the obstacles to space flight, and
served as the cohesive force by creating a sense of belonging, of pride, of
achievement… Von Braun spoke unabashedly of ethics, of loyalty, honesty
and justice. Although people became fond of labeling the 109 Germans who
came to Huntsville to form the core for the space program as “Von Braun’s
team,” von Braun would shrug his shoulders and remind a person of the
144 “Soul of a Poet, Prophet’s Vision,” Huntsville Times, 17 June 1977. p. 1.

merits of teamwork.145
Just as it had been when von Braun left Huntsville to work at NASA’s
headquarters, politicians from the region were effusive in their praise for this
local hero:
Sen. John Sparkman, D-Huntsville, said in Washington today that Dr. von
Braun’s death is “a great loss to the nation. It was a great day for our country
when he came here and started the work he did. I remember it well when he
came to Huntsville.” Sen. James Allen, D-Gadsden, contacted in his
Washington offices today said, “Dr. von Braun saw no conflict between
science and one’s faith in God. I hope that the remaining secrets of the
universe have been opened up to him.” Said Huntsville’s Mayor Joe Davis
today: “The world will probably recognize Dr. von Braun’s space exploration
role, but to the City of Huntsville, he was much more. He was a civic leader
interested in the arts and cultural activities and displayed strong leadership in
making the Von Braun Civic Center a reality by working with many
organizations.146
Huntsville’s feelings about von Braun were summed up in the editorial
about von Braun’s passing. The editorial talked about von Braun’s arrival in
Huntsville and how it will never be the same because of von Braun:
For while his genius spun realities of weaponry and space travel out of
dreams and the theories of physics, his humanity wove into the fabric of
community life. When we talk of von Braun’s contributions here, it is not only
the Redstone and Explorer, Saturn V and Skylab we refer to, but the
exceptional quality of life we enjoy. We do not imply, even in this sentimental
moment, that Wernher von Braun single-handedly gave Huntsville its fine
school system, the University of Alabama in Huntsville, the splendid
symphony, the varied social and professional atmosphere we enjoy. But he
aided and abetted them all. And it is undeniable that Huntsville became the
city it is because von Braun and his group came here to live and work.
Without them the city would have been a very different place today. But
because of the nature of people required to pursue his dream, Huntsville grew
and developed and prospered in the special way it did… For most of those
exciting years of cosmic adventure, the fixed point for Wernher von Braun, the
secure place, the home, was Huntsville.147
145 Peter Cobun, “Catalyst, Inspirer, Promoter, Von Braun Forged the Way,” Huntsville Times, 17 June
1977. p. 1.
146 Ibid., p. 4.
147 “The Dream and the Reality,” editorial, The Huntsville Times, 17 June 1977, pg. 8.
A Legacy Questioned
In a way, it was good that von Braun did not live to see the coming years.
Under President Carter, the Justice Department branch, the Office of Special
Investigations, looked into allegations that von Braun and others of his team
had committed war crimes at the Mittelwerk. The result of this investigation
can be looked at from two different perspectives. Those who think von Braun
and the team were guilty by association believe that the OSI was justified in
investigating von Braun and forcing Apollo team member, Arthur Rudolph, to
leave America under a cloud of suspicion. To his defenders, von Braun,
Rudolph and the others were a victim of politically correct zealotry by those
who saw Nazis under their beds. Rudolph was the only person of von
Braun’s team seriously charged with war crimes. These allegations were
never proved and remain in the realm of innuendo.
The years after von Braun’s death also saw the publication of articles and
books that contradicted the view of von Braun and his team as innocent
victims of the Nazi regime. They suggested a much darker vision, where von
Braun and his team used the Nazi system to work on their rockets.
Therefore, they were responsible for the use of slave labor at the Mittelwerk.
The work done by von Braun’s team in the United States was discounted
since it was bought at the price of those slave laborers.
An exchange occurred in the Huntsville Times in the fall of 1995,
discussing von Braun’s “hero” status with the city. Dr. Daniel Schenker
identified himself as the chairman of the English Department at the University

of Alabama Huntsville. He wrote an editorial about von Braun calling his
character into question. “I do wonder, however, about his attainment of
heroic stature locally. A hero is a representative man or woman who
embodies a culture’s highest ideals, including, and perhaps especially, that
quality of moral courage that places doing what is right and honorable before
what is in one’s own self-interest.”148 He went on to contrast von Braun with a
personal hero of his, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer was sent to a
concentration camp for his opposition to Hitler and later died there.
While admitting that one cannot demand that a person die for a cause, he
felt that the hero status now bestowed on von Braun, he should have done
more to make a difference in Nazi Germany. Schenker’s most damning
statement concerned a lack of moral awareness on the part of von Braun. He
went on to take the Times to task for not being more assertive in presenting
all views on von Braun instead of simply the hero point of view. He ended by
asserting that von Braun was not a hero and should not be treated as such by
Huntsville.
This was not a position that would go unchallenged for long. Dr.
Stuhlinger came to von Braun’s defense in a Times column of his own just a
few weeks later. He stated that it was obvious that misunderstandings still
existed over von Braun and his team’s actions in Germany. He did agree that
von Braun was not a hero but rather was a genius. He reiterated the point
that no one but those who experienced the Nazi regime could understand
148 Daniel Schenker, “Should von Braun Be a Local Hero,” Huntsville Times, 30 September 1995, p. 3.
what happened in Peenemünde. He wished that the surviving team members
could meet with Dr. Schenker’s classes to discuss this issue. If left to the
documents, Stuhlinger argued, one did not get a true picture of what
occurred. He ended with the statement, “We would also like to try to make
him understand why for most Huntsvillians von Braun is not a hero, but one of
the most impressive, unusual and ingenious persons who ever lived in this
city.”149
One week later, a letter to the editor from Homer Hickam was published.
Hickam is best known as the author of The Rocket Boys, which was the basis
for the film October Sky. He gave a view of a youth who grew up with von
Braun as a hero. At the time of Sputnik, he explained, America was doubting
its ability to compete with the Communist system. This was exacerbated
when Vanguard I failed to make it three feet off the launch pad in an attempt
to launch America’s first satellite. It was von Braun and his team that saved
the day for American pride with the successful launch of Explorer I. “From my
point of view at the time as a high school student in the coal fields of West
Virginia, I can assure you that Dr. von Braun was a hero to me and my
classmates.”150
So nearly twenty years after his death, the debate about von Braun still
raged in his adopted home town of Huntsville. But Dr. Schenker’s opinion
appears to be in the minority in the Huntsville area. For most of this region’s
citizens, von Braun may not be a hero but he is still someone to be
149 Ernst Stuhlinger, “Von Braun: Not a Hero, But a Genius,” 14 October 1995, pg. 3.
150 Homer Hickam, “Where is there Heroism Without Redemption, Huntsville Times, 23 October 1995,
pg. 3.
remembered and honored as a great citizen of Alabama.
It is clear that Von Braun’s dreams ended along with the demise of the
Apollo Program. Huntsville hailed him as a departing hero and celebrated his
contributions to the city. His time at NASA headquarters was the nadir of his
professional career. This retirement was painful not only because of the
cancer but because of his inability to continue to explore space. Still, his
legacy will always be overshadowed by the unanswered questions regarding
the team’s activities at the Mittelwerk.

CONCLUSION
I believe the concrete conclusion we can draw from the story of von
Braun and his rocket team is how difficult it is to make moral judgments from
the historical record. In the case of Adolf Hitler, it seems clear today what his
intentions were and he used his position to carry out those wishes to the
detriment of millions of victims. The same can be stated for dictators like
Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Their actions in the Soviet Union and
China also resulted in the murder of millions of people. We can make the
universal statement that these actions were immoral based on the ethical
standards of our time but they were perceived differently by many in their
respective historical epochs.
This historian has a different perspective than those who debate von
Braun actions at the Mittelwerk and Peenemünde. The problem one faces in
evaluating the record about von Braun and his team is how much ambiguity
can be tolerated. Many people today, not just historians, want a black and
white picture of historical events and their participants. Either von Braun was
a Nazi who worked with the SS in killing those at the Mittelwerk or he was an
innocent bystander caught in an evil and deadly system. The answer lies in
the gray zone of the unknown. Supporters of both views can spin the record
in their favor.
It is important to emphasize how modern revisionists like Piszkiewicz
seem to be on a self-appointed moral mission to condemn von Braun in the
name of those who suffered and died at the Mittelwerk. Neufeld also seems
caught up in this moral view but he does a much better job of researching the
history of the team. He purports not to brand von Braun a war criminal but
wishes merely to raise the issue of moral ambiguity.
Those who hold von Braun and the team in higher esteem, including team
member Ernst Stuhlinger, maintain that only those who were there know the
real story. After all, how can one judge the content of a man’s character from
questionable historical records? Wouldn’t those who experienced the Nazi
system and were there with von Braun better know the truth of his intentions?
This thesis thus attempted to paint a fuller picture of von Braun. Using his
own words, I brought out the side of von Braun that was very religious and
ethical. We also saw a man that became involved in the debate over civil
rights in the South, at a time it could have been personally and professionally
damaging for him and the program. We also see a von Braun after his dream
has ended. He neared the end of his life but never once did he state that he
had committed any crimes while at Peenemünde.
This controversy over involvement in alleged war crimes overshadows
the importance of von Braun and his team for the American space program.
Without von Braun and his team, it would have been unlikely that the United
States would have been able to land men on the moon in 1969. Also
overshadowed are the contributions von Braun and the team made to the
cultural, social and economic life of Huntsville. Huntsville would still be a
rural, agricultural city without the arrival of von Braun and his team.
Von Braun would not want to be remembered for his time working for
the Nazi regime. He was proud of the A-4, but not as a weapon of war. His
time in the United States all pointed to one place, the exploration of outer
space. When you visit the Alabama Space and Rocket Center in Huntsville,
you immediately see the crowning achievement of von Braun and his team,
the Saturn V now displayed vertically on site. Towering 363 feet towards the
heavens, it stands in silent testament to the dreams of von Braun.
The history of the early days of the space program will always be a
testament to the importance of Wernher von Braun and his team. Huntsville
will always remember the man and team that took the Watercress capital of
the world and turned it into Rocket City USA. One day humanity will set foot
on Mars. This was a dream of von Braun’s, left unfulfilled in his lifetime. In
honor of the visionary who had planned a trip to Mars back in the 1940’s, a
base will be named for von Braun, a fitting tribute to a man who was in the
right place, at the right time, for the United States. The debate about his time
at Peenemünde will remain ongoing until concrete evidence can be produced
to verify one side or the other. This outcome is unlikely in the near future,
while the specter of the Mittelwerk continues to follow von Braun’s legacy for
the foreseeable future.

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Wernher Von Braun and The German Rocket Team in America

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WERNHER VON BRAUN

AND THE GERMAN ROCKET TEAM IN AMERICA

The Faculty of the Department of History

East Tennessee State University

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts in History

Robert Anthony Carver

This is to certify that the Graduate Committee of

5th day of December 2000.

in an oral examination, and decided to recommend that his study be

submitted to the Graduate Council, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Master of the Arts in History.

WERNHER VON BRAUN

AND THE GERMAN ROCKET TEAM IN AMERICA

ongoing controversy surrounding von Braun’s work at Peenemünde and the

specifically, along with the various experiences of tema members in order to

provide a balanced, multi-faceted view of this complex individual and to put in

perspective von Braun and the team’s place in history.

The approach to the study is historiographical, analyzing the historical record

I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Stephen Fritz who served as

invaluable assistance to me during my research. They include but are not

Neufeld’s Huntsville Lecture……………………………………………

French Professor Debate……………………………………………….

Forced Labor at the Mittelwerk…………………………………………

3. EARLY YEARS IN AMERICA……………………………………………….

Rocket City USA…………………………………………………………..

4. THE MARSHALL YEARS…………………………………………………….

Science and Religion……………………………………………………….

5. THE AMBIVALENT HERO…………………………………….………………..

The End of the Huntsville Odyssey…………………………………..

Life at NASA Headquarters……………………………….……………

Retirement and Death………………………………………………….

Alabama Pays Tribute………………………………………………….

even if he did have that noticeable German accent.

opinion, clouds their judgment as historians.

of these men would be incomplete without such an assessment.

Important considerations were given to von Braun’s interaction with the

opportunist, I also examine his actions regarding a very controversial issue in

Alabama during the early 1960s, civil rights.

managed a team of brilliant engineers. The sources do conflict when it comes to

What I hope to communicate to the reader is that a man must be judged on

This debate cannot denigrate the numerous accomplishments of von Braun

After his death in 1977, a revisionist movement emerged that sought to

upcoming Explorer II launch looked at the background of von Braun:

1 “Reach for the Stars,” Time, 17 February 1958, 21-24, 28.

established resistance to Hitler – and possible martyrdom – as the standard

unworthy of American citizenship.”3 Because those at Peenemünde failed to

Justice Office of Special Investigation’s inquiry into Arthur Rudolph, an

associate of von Braun’s, Tom Bower’s Paperclip Conspiracy and Linda

labeled [as] an anti-Semite. It became politically correct to denounce anyone

for knowing of its existence.

comments on what he imagines to be von Braun’s thinking after visiting the

achieved this end:

Piszkiewicz seems to disregard totally von Braun’s situation and expected

Mittelwerk conditions. Dr. Ernst Stuhlinger, a member of the Peenemünde

After Himmler had assumed responsibility to mass-produce the A-4 in an

Mittelwerk. Unfortunately, critics like Piszkiewicz downplay any accounts by

issue of slave labor. Piszkiewicz in fact, only grudgingly acknowledged this

own rockets if he complained.

to Peenemünde to work on the quality issue. According to Piszkiewicz, in an

In a further demonstration of von Braun’s real position within the power

establishment, on March 14,1944:

7 Piszkiewicz, The Nazi Rocketeers, 141.