In Defence of the Hellenic Logos

The relation of thought to action from Modern to Ancient times

Lesley Madytinou

Note:
For me, one of the most difficult aspects of understanding ancient Hellenic thought was
the unpleasant fact that the Hellenic language is conceptually different to English.
Hellenic thought is thus different to English thought and the mind raised in the
conceptualisations inherent within the common usage of the English language differs
vastly from the same mind raised in the conceptualisations within the common form of the
Hellenic language. Both minds tend to see different qualities and distinctions in the
same objects that, at first, may be confusing and hard to perceive. From the English
perspective, it could be successively argued that the correct and precise use of the
language would serve the problems of literal vs. figurative translations far better than
the modern and common indiscriminate usage of synonymous words that only vaguely resemble
one another but have important distinctions that most people seemingly tend to ignore.
The matter of translation becomes even more complicated with archaic terms that have not
only a modern and common usage but also have a very long historical conceptual
development. Many of these archaic terms play a vital role in the correct
conceptualisation of Hellenic thought and its relationship to action. The Logos is one
such of these terms; it refers to simultaneously to 'word', 'speech', 'ratio' and
'reason' and it is the basic element of the ancient Hellenic civilisation that is, in its
own terms, correctly referred to as the Civilisation of the Logos.

"For this reason it is necessary to follow what is common.

But although the Logos is common, most people live as if they had their own private understanding."
Herakleitos
(from Sextus Empiricus. Against the Mathematicians. 7.133)

For Speusippos, Logos was the articulate voice that was capable of identifying and naming
everything (with reference to the Hellenic language). It was also a dialectic prose
between Nouns as the proper names and identification/meaning of things (i.e. thought) and
Verbs which convey the activities of the Nouns (i.e. action). Herakleitos identified the
Logos as not only a Divine Law but also as an intrinsic and inherent ordering of the
Kosmos that within humans renders all things knowable in terms of the Hellenic
Kosmotheasis (worldview). Furthermore, Herakleitos makes it implicitly clear that it is
the Logos which leads a person to Orthognosia (correct knowledge) and Orthopraxia
(correct deeds). The term Hellenismos in its ancient usage specifically designates the
correct and proper usage, expression and practice of the Logos. Hence, and finally, any
exploration of any aspect of Hellenic civilisation is first and foremost a study of the
Hellenic Logos and more specifically of particular terms and their conceptual development
and usage. I explain this to clarify my rationale in the following essay which bases my
exploration of the modern and ancient understanding of orthodoxy and orthopraxy upon the
guiding principle of the Logos as a study of the Words and Reasons underlying such
conceptions. This is a personal search for what something 'is' in its own truth rather
than what some may argue that it should be according to modern standards.

INTRODUCTION

It takes only a quick glance at many religious anthropological studies of

various different religions from the last few decades to note that orthopraxy is
fast becoming a 'buzzword' and as a concept has been growing in popularity over
the last sixty years. Orthopraxy (defined as correct action) as an
anthropological term is used alongside the term orthodoxy which is defined
generally in English to be correct thought, belief and/or opinion. A slightly
more enquiring gaze at a greater array of anthropologies over the last century
will illustrate that not all anthropologists even use these terms and a vast
majority of anthropological dictionaries do not even list them as official
terminology. Regardless, there are those within the Social Sciences (including
Anthropology) who use the terms and their treatment of these terms range from
(a) the highly selective usage of both terms in conjunction with one another to
(b) what appears to be a dichotomised and simplistic binary classification
system.
Research into these terms as a binary classification system leads directly to
specific anthropological theories that are based upon modernist epistemological
dichotomies such as thought vs. action; body vs. soul; consciousness vs. matter
and nature vs. culture as frameworks of reference for anthropologists to study
foreign cultures and religions. In fact, from an enquiry into these
anthropological theories, two separate theoretical dichotomies emerge as the
causes that have sundered the field of anthropology as a whole into opposing
theories that possess their own internal dialectic. These central dichotomies
are Universalism vs. Relativism and Materialism vs. Idealism.

At the heart of this theoretical opposition in anthropology lie the modernist

epistemological dichotomies between thought/action; body/soul and
nature/culture. Interestingly enough, a common ideology could be identified
among the different anthropological theories that have been used by others to
support and justify such dichotomies.

This ideology is the foundation for an important political revolution that

changed the world and a fervent religious reformation movement that is highly
influential within Christian theology. A Christian religious movement that
advocates an emphasis on orthopraxy rather than orthodoxy as a theological
reform and mission that aims to liberate people from the theoretical, academic,
ecclesiastical and social systems that oppress and render them submissive. It is
important to note that concerning Christian Theology and the Bible I have had to
rely exclusively on the knowledge and opinion of prominent and respected
Christian Theologians and scholars.

Ironically, at the root of all of this stands three Hellenic logoi (words);
Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis. Words that now, in modern times, are isolated in a
foreign language and out of context to their original conceptual usage within
the totality of the Hellenic Logos. Words and concepts which were (on the
surface) written for future political leaders and appropriated by the Christian
church fathers from Classical philosophy and transformed into the underlying
structure of Christian thought and action. These philosophies now stand accused,
by this new Christian liberation movement, of planting the seeds of the ills of
Western society.

The first part of this essay explores orthodoxy and orthopraxy in their modern
form in the field of anthropology while the second part examines the
transformation of Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis into its Christian form of
orthodoxy and orthopraxy as well as the crucial role these three logoi play
within Christian theology. The third section of the essay returns Theoria,
Praxis and Poiesis to their original context and perspective in ancient Hellenic
thought and action. It is only in this return to their source within the
Civilisation of the Logos that these three words and the concepts they embody
may be understood within context to Orthognosia (correct knowledge), Orthopraxia
(correct deeds) and ultimately the Orthos Logos (Correct Reason) in a manner
that is purely Hellenic and free from the distortions of foreign political,
ideological and theological motivations.

The purpose of this essay is neither to repudiate the anthropological or

theological usage of the terms orthodoxy and orthopraxy nor to condemn the
advocates of orthopraxy. This essay seeks the Aletheia (truth as the
correspondence of Reason to Reality) of whether such a binary classification
system is adequate or refined enough to define the role of thought and action
within the civilisation of the Logos. It also seeks to find the answers within
the corpus of ancient Hellenic works to the epistemological question that has
created the dichotomies of certain anthropological and theological ideologies:
"How do we know what we know?" (i.e. thought or action; body or soul). It is
only through finding the answer to this question that the modernist dichotomy
may be understood and reconciled.
PART ONE: Conflicting Theories in the Study of Humanity

1.1. The use of Orthodoxy and Orthopraxy as Classificatory Terms in the

study of religion and culture

Firstly, it is important to note that the terms orthodoxy and orthopraxy

are used by certain scholars as general classificatory terms for
religions in the fields of Theology, Comparative Religion, Cultural
Anthropology and Ethnology. Despite the valid concerns that could be
raised about the general classification of religions in these terms, it
is significant that the scholars who make use of such terminology do so
as observers rather than as members of a religion. Very few of these
religions that have been thus classified have internalised these terms as
the mode by which to define and clarify their own religions. Hence in
Anthropology, orthodoxy and orthopraxy remain largely 'external
qualifying or classificatory terms' as opposed to internal transformative
or clarifying principles.

Secondly, the classification of any religion and/or culture in terms of

orthodoxy or orthopraxy logically indicates that there is a set and
standard criteria that determines the nature of that which is orthodoxic
and that which is orthopraxic. A definitive list of these criteria could
not be found in any authoritative document, book or within the public
information from university anthropology departments. If such a list of
criteria exists it is not a matter of public record. Hence to identify
the criteria, it was necessary to examine the examples of when and how
these terms have been used in actual studies of different religions and
cultures.

"In approaching issues of ritual density, it is has become customary to distinguish the degree to which
religious traditions put an emphasis either on correct belief in theological doctrines or on correct
performance of behavioural responsibilities. The first style of religion is 'orthodoxic' from the Greek words
'orthos' (correct, right, straight) and 'doxa' (belief, thought, opinion). The second style is 'orthopraxic' from
the Greek 'praxis' meaning 'correct action'."
Catherine M Bell [1]

The first criterion that was identifiable was that of ritual density.

"'Ritual density' is a term borrowed from Catharine Bell, Sinologist and theorist at Santa Clara University.
Bell defines ritual density as “why some societies or historical periods have more ritual than others”
(1997:173). But it connotes more. It is aware of a distinction that exists between a group’s ritual activity
and the other components in which its life consists; and, on that awareness, represents the measure of one
in relation to the other at any given point in that group’s history. Ritual density, it can be said, is the degree
to which ritual plays a role in the life/piety of any given society; otherwise put--the ratio of ritual to other
aspects of life in the day-to-day operations of a community. To be sure, conclusions about such a ratio will
much depend on how broadly or narrowly one defines “ritual” over against “non-ritual” activity."
Michael A Daise [2]

Catherine Bell does not adhere to a single definition of ritual activity

and quotes William Geertz in her book 'Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice':

"In ritual, the world as lived and the world as imagined, fused under the same agency of a single set of
symbolic forms, turns out to be the same world" [3]

Bell goes on further to explain the reason why the dichotomy of thought
and action is used in such a context:
 "For Geertz, this opposition of conceptions and dispositions, or the world imagined and the world lived,
constitutes cultural life per se. Moreover our perception and analysis of their opposition and resolution
constitute a theoretical explanation of 'meaning' in culture. …Thus the dichotomous nature of conceptions
of order (worldview) and dispositions for action (ethos) is fundamental to Geertz's approach, as is their
resolution. The temporary resolution of a dichotomy is cast as the central dynamic of cultural life."
Catherine M Bell [4]

From this perspective, a few important points should be noted:

(a) The dichotomy of orthodoxy and orthopraxy presupposes an intrinsic
dichotomy between conception (general ideas) and disposition (prevailing
state of mind and characteristic spirit) and hence a dichotomy between
Ideas and Mind/Spirit, Worldview and Ethos, Perception and Reality as
well as the Sacred and the Secular that exist as a framework of reference
within the mind of the observer rather than in the minds of those who are
being observed.
(b) The use of the dichotomy relies completely on the interaction of both
orthodoxy and orthopraxy as a central dynamic. This central dynamic
functions as a classic tension of the opposites which resolve themselves
into moments of unity through culture and cultural expressions.
Catherine Bell clarifies further on how the dichotomy should be used:

"Whether a community is deemed orthodoxic or orthopraxic can only be a matter of emphasis, of course,
since no religious tradition can promote belief or ritual at the total expense of the other, and many would
never distinguish between them at all. Moreover, whatever the overall emphasis in a tradition as a whole, it
is easy to find sub-communities stressing the opposite pole. …Terms like orthodoxy and orthopraxy cannot
be used effectively if accorded too much rigidity or exclusivity. Nor can they be used to suggest that one style
is more religious than the other; the differences between orthodoxy and orthopraxy appear to emerge
primarily from social organisation and history, not the degree or purity of religiosity."
Catherine M Bell [5]

The function of orthopraxy within this context is thus clarified as the

unification of an individual's beliefs, thoughts and ideas with reality
and orthopraxy thus becomes the medium through which orthodoxy may be
actualised or practiced in the real world.

"Competence realised through situational ideals, is the intermediate level of the attainment of orthopraxy,
when practitioners attempt to make ideals and reality coalesce."
Anna M Gade [6]

From the given accounts it is obvious that the terms orthodoxy and
orthopraxy are two sides of the same coin and work harmoniously in
conjunction with one another in an anthropological framework of
reference. An excellent further example of this is the work of the
Professor of Anthropology at Harvard, James L. Watson whose studies of
orthopraxy in the history of Chinese culture are widely respected and
cited. His usage of the term orthopraxy indicates that it was through
the implementation of orthodoxy that the ritual practices of China were
standardised to promote a unified cultural system that was characterised
by a high level of uniformity of beliefs, attitudes and conceptions. This
example illustrates that both orthopraxy and orthodoxy are emphasised in
a balanced manner and not in the form of an active dichotomy. Professor
Watson also illustrates perfectly that it was only through correct
thinking that a standardisation of ritual action as orthopraxy could be
achieved. Furthermore and importantly, Watson states that it was not the
details of rituals that were standardised but rather the structure of
practice. Now if the term orthopraxy is rather used as an emphasis on
practices as the means of achieving cultural unity (because it has been
proved that actions assimilate foreign cultures faster than ideas do) as
was done in China to promote the concept of internal unity and
uniformity, it acts in the same manner as a dogma and conformity to such
orthopraxy becomes the determining factor in whether an individual is
Chinese or not. [7]

"The proper performance of the rites, in the accepted sequence, was of paramount importance in
determining who was and who was not deemed to be fully 'Chinese' "
James Watson [8]

This leads directly to a second and very vague criterion that appears to
be a factor in the use of orthodoxy and orthopraxy as anthropological
frameworks of reference. This is the conditions upon which an individual
is considered to be a member of a religion or culture and the conditions
that would constitute an individual's exclusion from a religion or
culture. According to Professor Watson's studies, in China the non-
conformation to the standard practices or orthopraxy is simultaneously a
non-conformation to the orthodoxy or correct thought that guides and
informs actions. Conformity to these standards is essential to being
recognised as Chinese and non-conformation is tantamount to the loss of
cultural identity. Membership to religions such as Christianity is based
upon the adherence to certain beliefs and to Judaism through matrilineal
birthright or a long conversion process. Certain religious traditions set
different conditions for membership; i.e. location (i.e. citizenship and
landownership) and/or common language. How religions within a cultural
framework are classified is largely determined by the definition of
culture employed by the anthropologist studying them.

With reference to classifications of religions and cultures in terms of

either orthodoxic or orthopraxic rather than in conjunction with one
another; a third criterion of orthopraxy is identified through the study
of the Creek Native American Indian religion where there is evidence of a
religious philosophy based on actions and activities without the presence
of any actual philosophical schools, doctrines or texts. [9] Other
religions that have been classified by this criterion include Shinto
because of its lack of formulated doctrine and theology as well as a
primary focus on ritual interaction with the Cosmos. Interestingly enough
it is largely upon this criterion [i.e. no evidence of being orthodoxic]
that some academics have classified the ancient Hellenic and Roman
religions and cultures to be orthopraxic but this will be discussed more
fully in the later in this section. Certain scholars also classify
Judaism as orthopraxic based on this criterion due to the fact that they
have no word for theology and observe a strict adherence to prescribed
and proscribed activities. [10]

Professor Fritz Graf, Director of Epigraphy and Chair of the Greek and
Latin department at Ohio State University and Professor Sarah Iles
Johnston, also of the Greek and Latin department at Ohio State, provide
the reason underlying the classification of Hellenic religion as
orthopraxic. A reason which is based on the fact that the current Western
understanding of what an orthodoxy is, is determined by the Christian
Church's definition of it; i.e. defined by what the Church Fathers called
the Heiroi Logoi (sacred texts).

"Accordingly the Heiroi Logoi implicitly comprised authoritative canonical writings in which the central
beliefs and history of a religion were set down. By this reckoning, neither Greek nor Roman 'mainstream
religions' could be said to have real Heiroi Logoi. Their religions which focused more on the correct
performance of certain acts such as sacrifice (orthopraxy)than on correct belief (orthodoxy), [and] had
neither any need or desire to record what a person was supposed to think or feel as he or she practiced its
 rituals. …Another trait that earlier scholars often applied to heiroi logoi was that they had been divinely
transmitted to primordial figures such as Moses. In the early 19th century, this characteristic, encouraged
Max Müller to attempt to enlarge the category of 'heiroi logoi' beyond Jewish and Christian texts. Müller
argued that many eastern texts were just as sacred as the bible, largely based on their reputation as revealed
wisdom. Müller's endeavor, although admirable in its intention, to move 'heiroi logoi' out of exclusively
Western circles, had the side-effect of making virtually any text with any connection to religion "sacred"…
As for history, most Greek and Roman religions were strongly local in their focus. A given town might have
stories about how particular cults or rituals came into existence but these were of history primarily to the
inhabitants or to unusually curious travelers such as Pausanias. Such local "histories" moreover, were open
to quite a bit of change as the need or whim arose. …And even when the basic "plot" of a myth remained
stable, poets changed details from version to version. …"Canonical" sacred histories therefore were unlikely
to exist even at a local level…" [Graf and Johnston continue on to discuss the evidence that may be found
within ancient Hellenic texts declaring the existence of 'heiroi logoi' within Hellenic religion] "Having
determined that earlier scholarly definitions of 'sacred text' are not quite adequate to the task at hand, let
us start anew from what the ancients [Hellenes] themselves said. The first thing we notice is that ancient
heiroi logoi are often presented, implicitly or explicitly, as explanations for what is done in a ritual, why a
given god is portrayed as he or she is, or why some aspect of the world is the way it is. "
Fritz Graf and Sarah Iles Johnston [10]

Graf and Johnston go on to offer an example of how at least four 'heiroi

logoi' may be found in Herodotus as well as references to the 'heiroi
logoi' of the creation of the Kosmos and the nature of the Underworld as
used by ancient scholars such as Pausanias and Plutarch. [10] Furthermore
Graf and Johnston make especial reference to the aition that accompanied
every cult and every ritual as the 'narration of why a ritual or cult
had come into existence'. They also make mention of the secrecy
surrounding the heiroi logoi of the cults based on the order by Ptolemy
IV for all Bacchic initiators to seal copies of their heiroi logoi when
handing them in to his ministers (which explains why Herodotus and
Pausanias do not narrate the heiroi logoi that they mention). Graf and
Johnston also indicate that there is ample evidence of written copies of
the various heiroi logoi that were circulated in ancient times. Some
accounts and narratives of which has survived the passage of time in
either allegorical form or within the usage of particular epithets in
hymns such as those of Orpheus, Pindar, Homer, etc. Other narratives were
discussed quite openly by various philosophers, albeit heavily cloaked
with logic and rhetoric and without the emphasis or context which would
draw 'profane' attention. So it is thus not a matter that Hellenic
religion does not have 'heiroi logoi', it is merely the fact that current
Western definitions of Orthodoxy refuse to recognise any text outside of
Judaism or Christianity as being validly sacred.

There are, of course, problems with classifying certain other religions

in these terms too.

"There are of course many problems in defining what is 'mainstream' in such a diverse set of traditions
that comprise the Hindu religions and in which there is no tightly defined hierarchy
to define orthodoxy and orthopraxy"
George D Chryssides, Religious Studies, Birmingham University [11]

The role of a religious hierarchy within a religion introduces a key

point to the subject of classification, as Professor Watson and the other
anthropologists have noted, it is correct thinking that guides any action
into becoming correct action. Without any formal religious pan-hierarchy
that governs all religious traditions and cults within a large indigenous
religion and whose function it is to define what either correct thought
or correct action is, the task would fall to a diversity of individual
cults and traditions where multiplicity may well lead to diversity.
Identifying mainstream religious thought or action under such
circumstances becomes problematic.

Studies of Hinduism and the difficulty in classifying it, as a totality,

either orthodoxic or orthopraxic, illuminates yet another criterion for
the classification of a religion as orthopraxic. Generally, Religious
Studies academics have noted that orthopraxic religions are related to
ethnicity and the religion is inherited by birth into an ethnic
collective. In these ethnic religions, studies indicate that adherence to
ritual observances and practices are indicative of whether a member is
one of good standing or not within the religion. So based on the ethnic
nature of their religion, some academics classify Hinduism as
orthopraxic. Another factor in their classification as orthopraxic is
based on their adherence to the Vedas as an authoritative ritual text
while some note the orthodoxy within Hinduism based on their common
theological formulation. [12]

The difficulty in discerning the difference between orthodoxical and

orthopraxical elements within certain religions and cultures have led
some anthropologists to subdivide this binary system further and
introduce what is known as an orthodoxic ritual. This term is used
because it has been noted that the mere presence of ritual activity (i.e.
a primacy of ethical behaviour, a focus on ritual practices and a wealth
of cultural traditions) within a religion are not a clear enough
indication of whether a religion is orthopraxic or not. Academics have
noted that when the elements of a ritual (including its ritual gestures)
are symbolic of theological ideology and formulations there is a distinct
difference in ritual styles from those who are purely orthopraxic.
Because of the specific theological knowledge necessary to perform the
ritual, orthodoxic rituals are said to express something that already
exists within the participant as opposed to a ritual style that is said
to cause something that does not already exist within the participant to
happen. [13] This illustrates another criterion; namely ritual style and
whether a ritual is symbolic of formulated theological principles or not.
This criterion has a deeper connotation too as an orthodoxic ritual is
also distinguished from all forms of magical agency where the participant
and their correct and precise practice of ritual is thought to act as an
'agent' to bring about something that does not already exist within the
participant. [14] Furthermore, orthodoxic rituals imply that the
participant bears knowledge as to the proscribed meaning of the symbolic
elements within their ritual while orthopraxic rituals are thus defined
by ritual gestures and elements which have no proscribed meaning and are
open to interpretation.

Finally there are scholars, one such example being those associated with
the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church, who do not make the distinction
between orthodoxic and orthopraxic rituals but rather determine the
distinction between orthodoxy and orthopraxy to be the difference between
macro-theology and micro-theology. [15]

From these examples, the criterion for classification as an orthodoxy is

further clarified. In an orthodoxic religion or culture there needs to be
common thought or worldview concerning a common theological formulation.
There also needs to be evidence of an organised religious and/or
philosophical system (including actual schools and/or a pan/local
religious hierarchy) with a recorded common theological/philosophical
structure in the form of actual doctrines and/or texts that emphasise a
formulated way of thinking. This correct formula for thought would guide
human actions into becoming orthopraxic. Finally, the ritual style of an
orthodoxic religion must be symbolic and comprised of known and
recognisable symbolic elements that represent common theological
formulation. The meanings of these symbolic elements and gestures have
thus a proscribed meaning and are not open to interpretation.
Furthermore, an orthodoxic ritual does not employ 'magical agency' to
achieve its ritual goal and the orthodoxic ritual is merely an expression
of something that already exists within the participant.

1.2. Universalism, Relativism and the Anthropological definitions of

Culture

A further factor in the classification of religions and cultures in

dichotomous terms is the matter of the definition of culture (and/or
religion as a cultural expression) that is used in different schools of
anthropology. Logically, the definition of culture and religion employed
by an observer is a crucial feature in how the observer will analyse and
report their conclusions concerning a religion or culture. It is within
these definitions of culture and the opposition to them that the first
aspect of the epistemological nature of the dichotomies used in
anthropology is revealed. This is the theoretical opposition between
those who believe that human modes of thought (and by implication
knowledge) are universal and those who believe that it is structured by
cultural influences such as language, location, etc, and hence is
relativistic in nature. As an anthropological dichotomy, Universalism and
Relativism illustrate a presumed duality between Nature and Culture.

Universalist anthropology schools such as the Structuralist, Evolutist,

and Diffusionist stress shared human characteristics and modes of
thinking that transcend culture in a manner that may suggest a universal
psychic unity. Their studies thus appear to use a methodology called
Cross-Cultural Analysis to identify common characteristics within a
general and/or abstract framework of reference. Structuralism, in
particular, suggests that the structure of human modes of thinking is the
same regardless of culture and that all humans think of the world in
terms of binary opposites (i.e. the mind dichotomising the world) and
this binary thought is reflected in various cultural institutions
(including religion). Within Structuralist research all differing
opinions observed within any particular culture are recorded as
dichotomies. [16]

The development of Cultural Relativism as a theory finds its roots in the

German Enlightenment thinkers, Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottfried Herder.
Kant stated that humanity was incapable of direct and unmediated
knowledge of the world. He went on to explain that all human experience
was mediated through the human mind which structures perceptions
according to sensibilities of time and space (i.e. spatial awareness).
During the same period, Herder was one of the first to argue that
language determines human thought which two centuries later would become
central to the Sapir Whorf Hypothesis (that now stands in opposition to
P.I.E. linguistic theories). Herder also stressed the positive value of
cultural diversity. Wilhelm von Humboldt, philosopher and linguist,
called for a formal anthropology that would synthesise Kant and Herder's
ideologies. The sociologist William Graham Sumner added further that
culture is an important factor in structuring human perceptions. Sumner
called this principle ethnocentrism and identified that cultures that
displayed ethnocentric qualities tended to see their own cultures as the
centre of the world against which all other foreign cultures and people
were measured. Franz Boas proposed that the mediation of culture was
perhaps more subtle than commonly assumed at the time. Accordingly Boaz
determined that culture was far more than just certain tastes in food,
music, art or beliefs in religion. His definition of culture is thus:

"[Culture is]…the totality of the mental and physical reactions and activities that characterize the behaviour
of the individuals composing a social group collectively and individually in relation to their natural
environment, to other groups, to members of the group itself, and of each individual to himself. "
Franz Boas [17]

Boas went further to state that because scientists (and in this specific
case anthropologists) grow up in a particular culture they too are
ethnocentric. [18] This illustrates that the anthropologist as an observer
evaluates and analyses a foreign culture only in comparison to their
personal culture. Hence, the anthropologist's view of another culture is
relativistic to their own culture. It is likely that this innate
relativistic bias of the observer, which is now commonly accepted in
anthropology, is the reason why anthropologists are concerned about non-
anthropologists employing their theories indiscriminately. It is also
interesting to note that cultural relativism was transformed into moral
relativism in the context of the Commission for Human Rights of the
United Nations in preparing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Moreover, Boaz discussed the field of Ethnology to be one that sought to

find comparisons and distinctions between vast ranges of different
cultures so that the impetus of human action could be discovered. The
method used by Ethnologists to achieve this goal was based upon a
'common assumption' that presupposes that all things within any culture
may be subjected to standard abstract classification. Boaz disputed this
method:

"It is only since the development of the evolutional theory that it became clear that the object of study is the
individual, not abstractions from the individual under observation. We have to study each ethnological
specimen individually in its history and in its medium.... By regarding a single implement outside of its
surroundings, outside of other inventions of the people to whom it belongs, and outside of other phenomena
affecting that people and its productions, we cannot understand its meanings....
Our objection ... is that classification is not explanation."
Franz Boaz [19]

From Boaz's observations it is evident that classification alone is not

truly explanatory of cultural expressions if its criteria [of
classification] is based on abstract general assumptions. Such general
categorisations thus are only useful to ethnologists as they compare
various cultural studies to determine the impetus for human action.

From this perspective, regardless of their epistemological opposition of

Universalism or Relativism, the anthropological/ethnological theories of
Cultural Relativism and Universalism remain scientific heuristic tools
that anthropologists use as a general strategy of analysis when
approaching different cultures. As a heuristic tool [20], these theories
work in much the same manner as mathematical formulations that measure
the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the Observer Effect, i.e. the
position of the observer must be taken into account. This fact is
recognised in anthropology and even Poststructuralists who still support
a Universalist binary classification system factor the culture of the
observer into the analysis of anthropological data. [21]
Although the basis of the theoretical opposition between Universalism and
Cultural Relativism may indeed be epistemological in nature, it is rather
an opposition in educated opinion, derived from field research
experience, concerning what is the most appropriate and effective
heuristic tool by which to study different cultures as individuals within
a collective that will yield the most accurate conclusions.

In understanding the basis of the heuristic tools within anthropology,

the necessity to identify anthropological classification in terms of the
culture of the observer is evident within both Universalist and
Relativist theories.

With reference to the actual epistemological theoretical opposition, it

is also evident that the function of the dichotomy between orthodoxy and
orthopraxy differs depending on the theoretical perspective of the
observer. Those who use the cultural relativist models are aware of the
purely theoretical nature of the dichotomy and use it as a methodology to
analyse the dynamic unity of real human life that they observe. It is
thus a method by which an observer may, in their terms, understand the
relationship between thought and action in the compound and complex
nature of particular collectives of living, moving, breathing human life
where thought and action is not always seen in a dichotomised form. From
those who use orthodoxy and orthopraxy in universalist theories, it is
assumed that all people think and act alike, regardless of whether they
are aware of it or not. Conclusions reached from these two vastly
different approaches, to orthodoxy/orthopraxy or any other apparent
dichotomy an observer may make use of, will also yield different
conclusions within the data they may collect.

From this it is apparent that general readers of anthologies should not

only take note of the culture of the observer but also their theoretical
perspective.

1.3. Thought versus Action in Idealist and Materialist Anthropology

The second opposition in the field of anthropology arose as a direct

result of the thought/action dichotomy in a manner that is not only
epistemological but also political by association. The dichotomy between
thought and action within this theoretical and methodological opposition
is no longer used as a classificatory term applied as a tool in cultural
observation but in the form of an active tension of the opposites that
divides anthropological thought into two distinct camps; Idealism and
Materialism.

"Materialism, in anthropology, is methodologically and theoretically opposed to Idealism. Included in the

latter (Idealism] are culture and personality or psychological anthropology, structuralism, ethnoscience,
and symbolic anthropology. The many advocates of this idealistic approach "share an interest in
psychological phenomena, and they tend to view culture in mental and symbolic terms" (Langness
1974:84). "Materialists, on the other hand, tend to define culture strictly in terms of overt, observable
behavior patterns, and they share the belief that techno environmental factors are primary and causal"
(Langness 1974:84). The contemporaneous development of these two major points of view allowed for
scholarly debate on which approach was the most appropriate in the study of culture. "
Elliot Knight and Karen Smith [22]

Materialist anthropological theories (including American Materialism) are

influenced in either part or whole by Marxist Anthropological theory.
Marxist theory immediately rejects the existence of (a) anything outside
of the material or (b) anything transcendent to the material. This
repudiation of Idealism renders thought to be a purely material function,
i.e. Materialism; as opposed to the Idealist theories where thought is
seen as spiritual or intellectual and transcends the material.
Materialist theory, as a heuristic or methodological tool, is used to
study humanity based upon the statistical foundation that any collective
consists of a majority class of physical 'doers' (workers) as opposed to
a small and elite minority class of thinkers. Here the thought/action
dichotomy becomes a matter of majority or minority interests according to
the determination that within any collective the majority focus on action
and only a small minority focus on thought. Furthermore, within
Materialist anthropology the different (and complementary) functions of
thought and action become a dynamic dichotomy through the socio-
political, historical and ideological opposition between the doers and
thinkers of humanity.
The definitions of culture within Materialist and Idealist anthropologies
also differ; materialists tend to see culture more empirically and in
terms of overt behaviour patterns while idealists determine culture to be
abstract, ideological or symbolic, etc.

Materialist anthropologies include:

(a) Cultural Materialism whose aim is; "the task of cultural materialism
is to create a pan-human science of society whose findings can be
accepted on logical and evidentiary grounds by the pan-human community"
(Harris 1979: xii). This form of materialist theory is based on an
expansion of the Marxist model with a few distinctions and is a
reactionary theory to Cultural Relativism and its methodologies. It is
thus essentially a Universal Materialist theory whose methodologies are
based upon empirical science as the basis of knowledge for the observer
(i.e. the cultural materialist) and approaches the study of humans as
native thought and behaviours arising from material consideration. [23]
(b) American Materialism as a theory which bases its understanding of
cultural systems upon three key principles: Cultural Materialism,
Cultural Evolution and Cultural Ecology. This anthropology finds its
theoretical roots in the works of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels and even
further back to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. [24]

Even though Structuralism is an Idealist theory and thus in essential

opposition to Materialism; Marxist and Hegelian theory were introduced
into its theoretical structure to explain the evolution of cultures. [25]

Symbolic or Interpretative Anthropology as an Idealist theory arose as a

direct reaction to Materialism and Marxism. It uses Hermeneutics (the art
of interpretation) to study the symbolic systems of any culture to
determine how people think and act in religious, social and economic
contexts within a culture. Hermeneutics is also employed to study the
expressions of a culture in terms of art, drama, dance, music, etc. [26]
One of the prominent scholars in this school of anthropology is the late
Clifford Geertz (1926-2006) and leading anthropologist who served until
his death as the professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study
at Princeton. In what is now called Geertzian Theory, Professor Geertz
determined culture to be:

"[Culture is] …a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which people
communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life"
Clifford Geertz [27]

Geertzian Theory also concludes religion to be one of the cultural

systems of a society and defined religion as:
 " [Religion is] …1) a system of symbols (2) which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting
moods and motivations in men (3) by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence
and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem
uniquely realistic. [28]

Other Idealistic Anthropological theories include:

(a) Cognitive Anthropology studies how people understand and organise the
events, experience and material objects that comprise their world and
cognition thereof (i.e. worldview). It is an approach that stresses how
people make sense of reality according to their own indigenous cognitive
categories and not those of the anthropologist. The roots of this
anthropological theory, which was only officially recognised in the
1950's, can be found in Enlightenment Thinkers such as Rousseau, Hobbs
and Locke and later to Franz Boas. It includes within its methodology a
'Cultural' Model which allows for many different kinds of cultural
knowledge. [29]
(b) Culture and Personality Anthropology seeks to define the character,
psychology and personality of a culture through the study of its
individual members. [30]

While certain anthropologies reconcile these theoretical polarisations

(i.e. Universalism/Relativism and Idealism/Materialism) into
interconnected and distinctive methodological or heuristic tools within a
single theory, it is important to note that some anthropologists have
completely rejected and repudiated the validity or efficacy of such
dichotomies. Since the 1990's Ecological Anthropology, who deem both
human behaviour and actions to be important frameworks of reference
within culture, rejected 'modernist' dichotomies such as thought/action,
body/mind and nature/culture. [31] Postmodern Anthropology, as a strictly
anti-objectivist theory, not only rejects the dichotomies but actively
seeks to deconstruct and demystify epistemological and ideological
motivations in the social sciences. [32]

The basis of this anthropological opposition in theory and methodology

illustrates yet another facet of the thought/action dichotomy within
context to the usage of terms such as orthodoxy and orthopraxy;
Materialist anthropologies will, as a natural consequence of their
theoretical framework of reference, focus on human activities and
highlight the elements of praxis (action) and/or orthopraxy in a
collective while de-emphasising or negating transcendent, abstract,
symbolic or intellectual thought and/or elements of orthodoxy in the same
collective. Moreover, Idealist anthropologies will do the exact opposite
if their definitions of culture do not include human actions and
activities as frameworks of reference together with thought.

The accuracy of information derived from anthropologies is thus dependent

upon the application of an appropriate anthropological model to any
particular culture or religion.

1.4. The Epistemological and Ideological Basis of Anthropological

Theories

At the roots of opposing theories and methodologies in anthropology lie a

great epistemological question and an ideological movement that are both
interconnected and yet remain distinct.
The epistemological question concerns humanity as a species and as
individuals within cultural collectives. Since ancient times man has
wondered about the nature of thought and knowledge and asked the question
of "how do we know what we know?" Man has also questioned human actions
and behaviours to ask "what causes us to act?" Many great thinkers have
pondered these questions; each contributing to the dialectic of
epistemology as the philosophy of knowledge. Some have determined that
the intellect is more than just the sensory awareness of the material
body while others have gone as far as to say that the material world is
just a thought form. Many religions and religious philosophies have
determined the intellect to be divine in nature. Others have reacted to
this emphasis on intellect and the thought processes of man and denied
its primacy while placing the onus for knowledge on physical actions and
experience of the world that informs the human brain. Some say that true
reality is not the physical world that we see but rather a hidden order
that underlies all things and that knowledge and truth derives there
from. There are also those who say that the physical world is all that
there is and only that which is empirically observable is secure
knowledge. Finally, there are men, like Karl Marx, who looked at the
suffering of the masses and thought if our knowledge has led us to such
ills, we should learn a new way that will serve the majority rather than
just the select few thinkers of the world."

The influence of Marx's theory, as both a social revolution and a

theoretical reform movement, is indisputable. His theoretical reworking
of Hegelian philosophy was a direct reaction against the inferred
capitalism of a school of thought known as North American Pragmatism,
which also finds certain of its roots in Hegelian philosophy. The impact
of Hegelian philosophy and of Marxism (with its deliberate emphasis on
praxis and de-emphasis of theoria) has changed not only the field of the
social sciences but also that of Christian theology.

PART TWO: Orthodoxy versus Orthopraxy in the Christian era

2.1 Relevant Theological and Philosophical Terms

There are similarities in the manner in which the terms orthodoxy and
orthopraxy are generally used in the Social Sciences and how they are
used on the most basic level in Christian theology. However, while the
Social Sciences generally tend to use the terms in a philosophical or
epistemological sense to study and classify the origin of and relation
between human thought and action in particular cultural collectives;
Christianity tends to use the same words and others in a theological
sense to clearly delineate correct thought and action in Christian terms
and in accordance with the bible and its derivative doctrines. Hence as
Christian theological terms, orthodoxy and orthopraxy denote correct
actions guided by the correct thought as determined by Christian
doctrines while the Social Sciences' usage of the term studies a culture
in respect of the role dogma, rules or correct thought plays in human
actions and behaviour. The difference between these usages is fairly
evident; in Christianity the terms are used as agents of transmitting
Christian culture and in the Social Sciences they are used as projected
frameworks of reference to see the same cultural pattern in other
religious collectives.

Thus for the sake of clarity, it becomes necessary to study the terms and
concepts borrowed from the ancient Hellenic Logos to better understand
the relation between ancient Hellenic thought and action with that of
Christian theology. A relation, which primarily, is both a deliberate
'borrowing' and a natural consequence of writing the New Testament in and
translating the Old Testament into the Hellenic language (which has a
particular world view and Reason in the basis of the concepts of the
words and language; i.e. the Logos). The conjunction between Christian
theology and ancient Hellenic thought and Reason is hence as much a
matter of the results of using the Hellenic language to write and
translate their canonical texts as it was that of using Classical and
Neo-Platonic philosophical thoughts to structure their theological
understanding of the use of Hellenic words in the bible. A New Testament
written in Aramaic (and hence with an Aramaic worldview) would have led
to different Christian theological doctrines as, after all, many of the
early Church fathers were not native to Hellas and only had the medium of
the Classical philosophers through which to understand the deeper and
more profound meanings of Hellenic logoi (words). This becomes self-
evident when one looks at the subtle differences in meaning of these
terms when used by the Eastern Orthodox Church in Hellas who still
preserve the original Hellenic text of the bible compared to those of
Western Christianity whose canonical text has been translated into Latin
and then further into a host of other languages.

The first of these words is Logos itself that Christian theology tends to
embrace in the same manner as Herakleitos (whom St. Justin claims was a
Christian before Christ) when he says that it is the Logos that will lead
people to Orthognosia (correct knowledge) and Orthopraxia (correct
actions).

2.1.1. The Christian Logos:

The Christian usage of the word Logos is, first and foremost, a
'collecting' or 'collection' of things within the mind and of the words
by which they are expressed. This is as result of Logos' root word being
'lego' referring to gathering or collecting which later referred to
speech.
The Christian Logos is thus both the 'inward thought' and the 'outward
form' by which the 'inward thought' is expressed. It was used to denote
a 'saying' of God or of man [Matt Matthew 19:21,22; Mark 5:35,36]; the
ten commandants [i.e. deka logous; Septuagint: Greek Deut.10.3];
doctrine [Acts 18:15,2; Timothy 4:15] and more specifically the doctrine
of salvation through Christ [Matthew 13:20-23; Philippians 1:14]; inward
thought as the faculty of thought and reason [Hebrews 4:12]; cause or
reason [Acts 10.29].
The term Logos was compared to the Latin oratio and ratio and also the
Italia ragionare referring to both thought and speech.
It is, however, largely upon the writings of John (who originally wrote
in the Hellenic language) and his usage of Logos that much of the
theological doctrine about the divine nature and salvation through Christ
was originally derived. The Logos of John is (a) a real and personal God
[John 1:1]; (b) the Word which was with God before Creation and was one,
in essence and nature with God and yet distinct [John 1:1,18]; (c) the
revealer or interpreter of the hidden being of God; (d) the reflection
and visible image of God and the organ of all His manifestations to the
world.

"We say that Jesus is the 'on' (existent), the 'on' before all things through whom are all existents. For this is
the name above every other name. For 'to on' (the existent) is the principle of names and the principle of
substances…indeed have we not said that Jesus is the 'Logos' "with God". Even more. We say he is the
Logos "in the principle" and we say this Logos is God. This reality proclaims itself through the herald John.
Even demons claim that this is so… Let us consider something if Jesus is the Logos. What is the Logos? I say
it is a certain active paternal power which so moves itself and disposes itself that it is in act, not in
potentiality. If it is thus why is the Logos with God? Necessarily on account of this: so that through this
Logos there might be produced "all things" and without Him, nothing. Therefore God acts through the
 Logos and always acts. The Logos is therefore the active power which puts itself in motion so that which is
potentiality might be actuality… For the gospel says "in the principle" was the Logos and the Logos was
with God.
Again it says "the only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father"…
For in God is the Logos and thus in the Father is the Son."
From Marius Victorinus' letter to Candidus explaining the Christian Doctrine of the Logos [33]

2.1.2. The Christian Orthodoxia

In much the same manner as the Social Sciences, it is generally accepted
in Christianity that orthodoxia derives from the Hellenic orthos meaning
'straight', 'upright' and by implication 'correct' and doxia which they
translate to mean 'opinion', 'belief' or 'thought'. Western Christian
Theology determines Christian Orthodoxia to be that which is considered
correct or proper belief, and in particular with reference to the
teachings of the early ecumenical church councils from Nicaea to
Chalcedon and including the doctrines and practices of Eastern Orthodoxy.
[34] It is important to note that Eastern orthodoxia refers to both
correct opinions and correct actions deriving from the Church's doctrines
and dogmas. Here orthodoxia and orthopraxia are not dichotomous in nature
as within the Hellenic conception of thought and action there can be no
orthopraxia without orthodoxia to guide and inform it. [35] This is
evident by the corollary of orthodoxia and its emphasis upon the
performance of correct doctrine in accordance with biblical teachings and
doctrines. Furthermore, within the Hellenic conception, the antonyms of
orthodoxia are heterodoxia (other opinions/beliefs/thoughts) and
kakodoxia (bad opinion) and not orthopraxia. Within this conception of
orthodoxia, orthopraxia becomes the correct reaction or response to
correct teaching in the manner of a reflective and reflexive action. Thus
orthodoxia in a Christian sense is based upon the orthognosia (correct
knowledge) of the biblical teachings and doctrines which make up the
corpus of Christian theology or theologia (as the Word of God in
Christian terms).
The roots of the apparent dichotomy between thought and action becomes
more identifiable when the development of the word theologia within the
early Christian corpus is considered.

"We should point out only that during the period directly preceding Plotinus,…'theoria' came to be
interpretated in such a way that it was said that in 'theo' - there lies the root of 'theion', 'theos', 'theorein'
means: 'looking upon the divine'. This is one specific Greek etymology, as provided, for example, by
Alexander of Aphrodisias. We are here concerned with a reinterpretation, one that has its grounds in certain
of Aristotle's accounts, yet does not identify the proper sense of the word. 'Theoria' is translated into Latin as
'speculatio' which means pure contemplation; [by this translation thus] 'speculative' means the same as
'theoretical'. The word 'theoria' then came to play a major role in [Christian] theology; where it is opposed
to 'allegoria': [in this sense] 'theoria' is that kind of contemplation that identifies historiographical facts just
as they are, prior to any 'allegoria'. Finally it [the word theoria] becomes identical to biblical theology
and theology pure and simple. The fact that the translation of 'theoria', [namely] 'theologia speculatio' later
represents precisely the opposite to exegetical theology [i.e. interpretative or explanatory theology] is one of
those peculiar contingencies that occur from time to time in the history of a meaning. (GA, 19, 63) [36]

The significance of the synonymous association between the terms

theologia and theoria with regard to a dichotomy between orthodoxy and
orthopraxy is explained [in a Christian understanding] by Max L.
Stackhouse, Professor at the Princeton Theological Seminary:

"In classical philosophy, PRAXIS was understood to be one of the three basic ways of Knowing, Living and
Being in the Kosmos. Praxis stands distinct from, but in a complementary relationship to both POIESIS and
THEORIA. Poiesis involves imaginative creation or representation of evocative images. It includes the kind
of awareness and orientation to life that can be discovered by aesthetic and kinaesthetic experience. Theoria
involves observation, reporting, interpretation and critical evaluation. It thus includes all that can be known
by analysis, systematic study, reflection and contemplation. The central issues of Theoria are less aesthetic
or kinaesthetic than ontological, metaphysical and epistemic. In contrast to these, Praxis involves
intentional practical engagement whereby people seek to something for the common good. However the kind
of life or world orientation that derives from Praxis is not unrelated to Poesis and Theoria."
Max L. Stackhouse [37]

Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis are the terms used by Aristotle to denote his
tripartite divisions of activities through which the soul's potential for
knowing could be realised. Within Christianity, orthodoxia, orthognosia,
theologia and theoria became synonymously associated. Thus the
Aristotelian distinction between Theoria and Praxis and between Praxis
and Poiesis thus results later in Western Christianity as a dichotomy
between orthodoxia and orthopraxia in an Idealist/Materialist form.
Within the Western Christian context, the developing dichotomy between
theoria (as exemplifying Christian thought) and praxis (as embodying
Christian action) is complicated further by the translation of theoria
into the Latin speculatio; a process by which the 'observation' aspect of
theoria loses its innate activity and inferential knowledge and is
reduced to passive and speculative opinion. It is one instance of the
devaluation of ancient Hellenic Reason.

The epistemological nature of the anthropological dichotomy between

orthodoxy and orthopraxy is thus indicated to be between two of the
original three Aristotelian activities of knowing; theoria and praxis or
what they have translated into English as contemplation/thought versus
action. Anthropologists thus seek to identify the forms of knowledge and
human activity as theoria and praxis and their interaction or primacy
within a collective culture. As has already been noted, some
anthropologists reconcile this dichotomy in the manner of a tension of
the opposites that illustrates thought and action as interconnected and
complementary human activities while others leave it as a binary
classification system.

2.1.3. Christian Orthopraxia

In its earliest form, Christian orthopraxia referred to the participation
in Christian sacraments such as the regular attendance of church
services, fasting, prayer and receiving communion. This developed into
action which was worthy of the call of God and conformed to the image of
Christ [Eph.4:1; Rom.8:29].
In its modern and generalised form orthopraxia has come to mean literally
the right practice as the reflective and responsive action or the
practical reflection of the knowledge gained through one's concrete
experience or reflection on the truth of Christian faith in love and
justice. [38]

"Praxis, in short, has become the technical term for the 'action/reflection' mode of teaching and learning,
one that does not focus primarily on either speculative theory or aesthetic expression but accepts these as
possible resources for action."
Max L Stackhouse [39]

In many Christian theological circles, the relation between theoria and

praxis is still not dichotomised but rather exists in a harmonious and
unified manner.

"The relationship between theory and praxis is nevertheless not simply to be determined in such a way that
out of theory, in the form of a conclusion, a practical case of application is made…. In praxis 'theory is
 manifested'. From the realisation, i.e. in the praxis of friendship, love, self-giving and forgiveness, is
disclosed what friendship, love, self-giving and forgiveness are, what they contain and what they mean."
Heinrich Fries [40]

From this interrelated concept of the function of Christian praxis in

theoria, a further epistemological aspect of these two terms is
identifiable; praxis is transformed from its Aristotelian activity
through which common sense or practical wisdom could be known into both a
specific type of teaching and learning which focuses on the reflection
that comes from human action; i.e. learning from experience which differs
from the learning and teaching derived from speculative theory or
aesthetic expression. It is also through praxis that the Christian values
may be truly actualised and known through experience. This sheds a new
light on the anthropological use of orthodoxy and orthopraxy as modes of
theoria and praxis that identify the manner in which a human cultural
collective teaches and learns.

However orthopraxia, in its modern Christian form, has gained a new

emphasis and active advocacy that actively seeks to promote a primacy of
praxis and a deliberate de-emphasis on theoria. This purposeful religious
movement brings the true nature of the growing popularity of the usage of
the term orthopraxy into perspective and explains the modern dichotomy
between orthodoxy and orthopraxy in Christian theology that has
simultaneously expressed itself as a theoretical reform movement in the
Social Sciences.

"These [Christian] theologians moved away from the ancient Greek notion of Praxis and develop a new
meaning based on the insights of Hegel, Marx, Freire, and contemporary Christian social thought. Under
the combined influence of Aristotle and Plotinus, early Christian thought conferred a greater dignity on
theology. Doctrine assumed a primacy, sometimes even an exclusiveness, over praxis in early Christian life.
In their critique of the Greek emphasis on theory, liberation theologians have deliberately sought to develop
a theology that better integrates theory and practice, doctrine and pastoral action, contemplation and active
service of others. Liberation theologians depart from the Aristotelian meaning of praxis as a solely ethico-
political activity. They hold that the goal of praxis is not simply any good action in the political world, but
liberative action that frees people to participate in the polis….liberation theologians also speak of two types
of praxis enunciated by Marx; praxis as creative work which satisfies basic needs and praxis as
revolutionary work that changes alienating structures. …Following Hegel, Friere underscores the
importance of praxis that heightens awareness and changes human patterns of thinking and action. His
distinguishing praxis of denunciation and annunciation will be adopted by certain liberation theologians. "
Thomas L Schubeck [41]

2.2 The Dynamics of Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis in a new form of Praxis

"[Matthew L] Lamb believes that what the Greeks and, even more, the Enlightenment minds generated as
theory has in modernity developed into a rationale for imperialistic domination. The fact that much of
[Christian] theology has become wedded to the [Hellenic] Theoria has brought theory to the brink of
nihilism. ...At points, very large claims are made about how certain ideas have shaped oppressive structures
of civilization. But is it really the case, for example, that the terrors of racism, classism, imperialism, sexism
and colonialism have been especially engendered by Classical and Enlightenment theories, especially those
taken up by [Christian] theology? ...One side of this point is that Praxis is based upon Theoria and the
former is only as good as the latter upon which it is based. That is a point which the neo-conservative
advocates of Praxis also stress. And it is against the way that Classical (especially Greek) philosophical
tradition has influenced Catholic social and political life."
Max L Stackhouse [42]

The Hellenic primacy of Logos as Reason and order was inherent within the
very development of the language and the structure of the Hellenic
worldview always held that thought directed action. The rise of
philosophy and the politics of the time led to philosophers such as
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle holding a personal preference for a more
contemplative life in accordance with the ancient Hellenic concept of
Theoria (which will be discussed in Part Three) rather than one wrought
with the corruptions and vices of the socio-political sphere of activity
(termed praxis by Aristotle). This preference for a life of theoria is
believed by certain scholars to have influenced a disjunction in early
Christianity and induced its emphasis on theology under which the socio-
political aspect of praxis became limited and poiesis thus became
restricted to only appropriate theological expression. [43]

During the Age of Enlightenment (18th century), thinkers further

abstracted theoria until it was so detached from poiesis and praxis that
its theory of knowledge (i.e. epistemology) no longer had a stable
ontological, metaphysical or material nature. As a reaction to the
Enlightenment thinkers and to correct what he believed was their
erroneous conclusions, the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel (1770 - 1831) began to focus once more on the more practical and
historical accounts of the attainment of human knowledge. Hegel's use of
the German term Aufhebung as the 'simultaneous preservation and
transformation of a concept through its interaction with an opposing
concept' became thought of as a recasting of the Hellenic praxis in the
historical formation of political unities. Hegel's concept of the German
Geist (as the 'Spirit' that moves man and his interactions in the making
of history and thus is the means by which human knowledge of the world is
gained) became the influential concept within this new praxis. From this
Hegelian perspective theoria in its sublimated form is the human attempt
to convey the patterns made by poiesis and praxis in the reasoning
processes that arrive at the truth. In direct antithesis to the
Enlightenment thinkers, Hegel repudiated the belief that theoria was the
guiding principle of poiesis and praxis. He recast theoria as that which
identifies and expresses the human reasoning process which is both
poetic and pragmatic. [43]

"…Pragmatism as the North American form of Praxis presumes that a creative spirit is at work in human
progress and that the purpose of theological, ethic, metaphysical and moral theory is the exploration of
existing conditions, to identify possibilities that can be actualized to create values, enhance satisfactions,
supply solutions to problems and lend integration in conflicts."
Max L Stackhouse [43]

The works of Hegel greatly influenced the philosopher, psychologist and

[Christian] theologian William James, who is often referred to as the
father of American Psychology. Using the Hegelian recasting of praxis and
along with concepts from the works of Bacon, Kant, Hume, Reid and Mill;
William James developed the North American form of praxis known as
Pragmatism. He then applied and developed the definitions of religious
experience used in practical theology in accordance with this new
Pragmatism. John Dewey later applied this Pragmatism to the formation of
professions and in particular the teaching profession and furthermore to
the democratic theories of education. It should be noted that theory and
practice were deliberately not dichotomised in Dewey's conception and he
saw theory as making practice intelligent rather than uninformed.
Furthermore he proposed to "intellectualise practice rather than
practicalise the intellect". [43]

These motifs became highly influential in the development of practical

theology in North American seminaries where theology and piety were held
to be personal 'inference' policies. The validity of any form of theoria
or poiesis was determined by its usefulness to individuals and
communities in general as well as the measure of success and prosperity
that any theoria may secure in pragmatic or praxic terms. [43]

Karl Marx was hugely influenced by Hegelian philosophy and so much so

that he objected to the capitalistic notions that American Pragmatism had
associated with Hegelian praxis. To combat this, Marx replaced Hegel's
Geist with a human understanding of material and social reality that was
stripped of illusion and based purely on rational thought. Through his
belief that philosophy was a tool of change in the world, Marx brought
forward his ideology that theoria, as the enabler of praxis, was often
cast as the tool that oppressed and subjugated the agents of praxis (the
workers) through false theoria and the illusory power of poiesis in the
form of religion. Within this Marxist ideology, all social dimensions,
artist expressions and theories must serve only to clarify the role and
function of praxis. The Marxist de-emphasis of theoria was brutal and any
individual or collective who placed a primacy on theoria was held to the
agents of a manipulative, selfish and controlling form of praxis. [43]

During the 1950's and 1960's, the development of dependent capitalism in

countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Cuba was based on
industrialised growth in the form of import substitution. Its impact was
a deep economic chasm between a minority ruling/middle class and the
majority who ended up in marginalised rural areas and large urban shanty
towns. The conditions under which the majority lived were a source of
concern for the Christian evangelists and missionaries who ministered to
the poor in these regions. These conditions led to strong popular
movements that sought to bring about socio-political change in their
countries. The Socialist revolution in Cuba became an inspiration to
other impoverished people and small armed uprisings broke out in many
countries aimed at overthrowing the ruling class and installing a
Socialist regime. [44] It was in the midst of this ideology that
Liberation Theology began to take form. Catholic missionaries brought
their concerns to the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) and a strong
sense of a need for change filled the council. Influenced by Marxist
ideology, South American bishops and missionaries began to see Socialism
as the orthopraxis of true Christian values and other Christian
missionaries (both Catholic and Protestant) employed the tools of Marxism
without the emphasis on materialism to affect social reform through
raising the consciousness of the communities they served. This Christian
work amongst the impoverished and marginalised was the basis of
Liberation Theology in practice and inspired the formation of lay
Christian communities within these areas where an emphasis was placed on
community orthopraxis as their means to liberation and independence.

Certain theologians, missionaries and evangelists integrated Marxist

tools (i.e. de-emphasis of theoria and emphasis upon this new form of
praxis) that would liberate the impoverished and dependent masses by the
effects of Christian orthopraxis. In 1971 these new religious reform
movements who favoured a social revolution became known as Liberation
theologies. The term Liberation theory came to refer to various 20th
century theological movements who saw the gospel "in praxis" as
liberation from all forms of economic, political, social and spiritual
oppression. Their orthopraxis is the practical methods by which they
liberate the oppressed as a call of God. [45] The importance of action
(and activism) in Liberation theology has both practical and political
content within the Christian Faith. [46]
These new Liberation theologies were and are opposed by traditional
Christian theologians. However, regardless of opposition, the religious
reform movement spread rapidly in some Western countries and influenced
even the Social Sciences and other fields of study in a more secularised
form. The distinction between orthodoxy and orthopraxy became an active
socio-political dichotomy and new advocates of orthopraxy emerged from
all over and in all forms.

2.3 The New Advocates and Forms of Orthopraxy

There are modern theologians, both living and dead, who have sought to
reconcile the growing disjunction between theoria and praxis by
attempting to mediate the dichotomy and balance the socio-historical and
existential needs of Christian people. This is done in terms of both
faith and practice while upholding both the transcendence of their
theology and the immanent needs of their people. [47]

There are also those who sought to strengthen the dichotomy, such as the
Canadian Jesuit Priest Bernard Lonergan and Johannes B. Metz who believed
that it was the responsibility of the Christian Church to guide the
direction of history.

"Lonergan's primary focus is not the known, but the knowing. Knowing, according to Lonergan, has a
compound structure. First, insight is always insight into sensible or imaginable presentations. Thus there is
a distinction between experience and insight. Experience occurs on one level, understanding on another.
Second, insights occur spontaneously, but it remains to determine whether they are correct or not. Thus
there is a further distinction between insight and judgment or reflective understanding."
The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology [48]

[Johannes B Metz proposes that the Church should] "…seek to contribute to the liberation of noetic praxis
from the oppressive academic, ecclesial and social structures which both condition and are conditioned by
those [other] theories."
Matthew L Lamb from 'Solidarity with Victims: Towards a Theology of Social Transformation' [49]

The 'other' theories Metz and Lamb mention in the quotation above refer
to those of ancient Hellenic origin, theories whose influence Liberation
theologians particularly resent and oppose.

Princeton Professor Max L Stackhouse in his book 'Apologia:

contextualization, globalization, and mission in theological education'
identifies four distinct groups that advocate this new orthopraxis:

"[The first group of] Contemporary advocates of Praxis frequently hold that western thought has taken some
wrong turns, specifically when, in the history of piety, it elevated Poiesis over Praxis and when, in the
history of theology, it elevated Theoria over Praxis. The one becomes preoccupied with religion in its cultic,
mythical and liturgical dimensions; the other with reason in its speculative, abstract senses….It is in any
case ironically convenient that these three Greek terms represent a typology of current attempts to repudiate
the connection between theology and classical philosophy."
Max L Stackhouse [50]

"Ironically, a second group advocating a recovery of Praxis consists primarily of conservative political
philosophers who believe that Post-Enlightenment religious, intellectual and political life is so entranced by
abstract theories of modern science that it loses contact with those basic 'natural' structures of human
virtues so necessary for any Polis (State)
….A third group consists of 'new philosophers of deconstruction', a still rather inchoate group of
intellectuals who hold that theology, ontologically based ethics and classical political philosophy are
basically dead topics, as Nietzsche has declared. Radicalising the 'hermeneutics of suspicion' they argue that
talk of the true, the good and the beautiful is basically an echo of faded dreams that were never valid in the
first place. [They] …claim that humans today are liberated by knowing that Theoria has no foundations
beyond the poetic fantasies of those who play with them and that Poiesis is the Praxis of the strong, devoid
of any pretence that it is rooted in any objective vision of the true, the good or the beautiful
…the fourth group consists primarily of 'radical' Christians who share with other groups a series of
presumptions about intellectual and social history. Many are convinced that religious Poiesis and
intellectual Theoria must be subjected to a radical hermeneutics of suspicion, although few know about or
care about the practical implications of modern deconstructionism. "
Max L Stackhouse [51]

This new Western orthopraxy has also attracted the attention of scholars
of Eastern Orthodoxy whose research has also identified four different
types of orthopraxy within Christianity in the United States alone. They
identify these four forms of orthopraxy as:
(1) Ultra Conservative/Fundamentalist orthopraxy which consists of strict
adherence to old fundamental practices without embracing change or
innovation;
(2) Traditional orthopraxy as the fulfilment of the requirements of a
tradition without applying doctrine;
(3) Reform orthopraxy as gradual changes of tradition to best suit new
environments and circumstances;
(4) Reconstructionist orthopraxy as complete innovation and rethinking of
orthopraxy to best suit an American environment.
These four types directly correspond to the four types of orthopraxy from
Judaism and each of the types can be found in all Christian orthodox
jurisdictions. Research indicates that all four types of orthopraxy are
also found in converts as well as evangelical and ethnic groupings within
Christian orthodoxy. [52]

From these scholarly analyses of the new orthopraxy, it is apparent that

it is a plurality and not a single form even though as a totality it
appears to have arisen from a single source (i.e. Hegelian epistemology).
These forms are either religious/spiritual in nature or entirely secular.
In both its radical secular and religious forms it is used as a type of
deconstructionism to liberate people from theoretical structures believed
to be the source of the ills and/or illusions of Western society. The
motivations of this deconstructionism are general socio-political reform.
The advocates of these orthopraxies are many and promote orthopraxis with
a de-emphasis on theoria and poiesis from both religious and secular
platforms.

Aside from the hope and promises of liberation these new orthopraxies
bring, there is another side to the dichotomy and one fraught with
genuine concerns about the practical implications and consequences of
this new movement.

2.4 Concerns about the New Orthopraxies

"It is, of course, very bad form in many centers of theological education today to raise any questions about
the priority of Praxis or the current forms of intellectual characterization, socio-historical analysis and
liberation theology that turn it [Praxis] into an Orthopraxis. To let it be known that one might have some
reservations about any of these is frequently taken as a failure to discern the movement of the Holy Spirit
(Geist?) among oppressed people of the world, or as a moral blindness to the practical demands of life in
favour of the 'idealist' ideology of white, male, bourgeois and Western cultural imperialism."
Max L Stackhouse

In the first part of this essay, the implications of non-conformation to

orthopraxy as a standard were discussed within context to Professor
Watson of Harvard's research into Chinese culture where conformation to
orthopraxy is essential to maintaining cultural identity. As was noted,
orthopraxy as a rigid standard thus acts in exactly the same manner as a
dogma that effectively excludes or marginalises those who do not act or
think in the standard manner. Within this new orthopraxic movement in
Christian theology much the same has begun to happen as has been observed
by Princeton's Prof. Stackhouse.

"Those with other [than Orthopraxis] orientations are unofficially excommunicated (by being told that their
views represent the consciousness of oppressive classes). Thus the appeal to Orthopraxis engenders a new
sect of fideist [Faith as independent of and/or opposed to Reason] politics for which theology is an
instrumental ideology."
Max L Stackhouse

Hence the very movement that proposes to liberate people from oppressive
theoretical structures simultaneously limits the freedom of people by the
establishment of another oppressive theoretical structure.

Another concern and one that may engender many questions is the
simultaneous usage of theology as a tool for fideist politics that heed
Metz's call for the Church to direct the course of human history.

"There is no doubt that responsible participation in societal life includes political responsibility but some
areas of living should be exempt from political interest or manipulation, especially since all serious politics
finally involve command over, the use of, or the threat of use of coercive force.
This focus on politics by Praxis-orientated liberation theology could easily make [Christian] theology (and
religion) into an instrument of power only."
Max L Stackhouse [53]

Professor Stackhouse also indicates that such liberation does not

encourage a critical analysis of the problems of the oppressed people it
seeks to make autonomous.

From Christian theology in all its forms and especially through the
growing popularity of these new orthopraxies, the ancient Hellenic
influence upon the situation is evident. The recasting of the Hellenic
concepts of logos, theoria, praxis and poiesis and the dichotomy between
orthodoxy and orthopraxy that has resulted is not a true reflection of
Hellenic thought on the matter or the realities of Classical philosophy
and the sacred concepts they expressed frequently by means of allegory.
Yet the ancient concepts that these words represent have been blamed by
some of these new advocates of orthopraxy for seeding the ills of Western
civilisation while other advocates have merely dismissed them as poetic
illusions of the past that were never real to begin with.

The third part of this essay deals with these concepts in their own
culture and in accordance with their original definitions and reason.

PART THREE: The Hellenic Logos

It is relevant that in anthropological terms and according to leading

anthropologist William Geertz (as was discussed in part one), the
dichotomy between thought/action; orthodoxy/orthopraxy is also expressed
as the dichotomy between the conceptions of order (worldview) and the
disposition for action (ethos). This is a crucial understanding of what
orthodoxy in a cultural or religious sense truly is; a conception of
order or, what in more common terms is called, worldview. In other words,
in the same manner as the Christian biblical teachings and theological
doctrines develop the Christian worldview through guiding people to view,
understand their place and act within the Christian order of the world;
so too does any culture or religion. In places where there is no clear
delineation between culture and religion because the religious beliefs
are ethnic and shared by the collective, there will simultaneously be no
clear disjunction between the cultural and religious conceptions of order
or worldview as they will be completely integrated. This is especially
evident when the ethnic religion of a collective is simultaneously their
State religion or the religion of their leaders.

With this in mind, it bears mention that certain religious anthropologies

classify ancient Hellenic religion as strictly an orthopraxy with little
or no emphasis on any related orthodoxical elements. This classification
is based on what anthropologists tend to identify as a lack of cohesive
religious thought and theological formulation. As there is no clear
delineation between religion and other cultural elements of ancient
Hellas, this would also mean that, according to these anthropologists,
there was no cohesive formulation of thought or common conception of a
religious order in ancient Hellas that provided the impetus for human
action/activity or guided and informed the conduct of the people. It
would also thus indicate a disjunction between their worldview and their
ethos (used in this context to mean the distinctive spirit of a culture
in the manner of Hegel's Geist). In simpler terms, anthropologists
identify an absence or lack of adequate theoria in amidst what they
perceive to be evidence for a primacy of praxis.

There is a certain irony in this classification when one considers that

it is the very preference for theoria that the advocates of this new
orthopraxy accuse Classical ontology of. It is also inconsistent with the
verifiable fact that all philosophers did not write only of ontological
matters concerning the nature of beings but many of their writings also
randomly discuss the nature of the Gods which is, in the ancient Hellenic
language, called theologia. The philosophers did not, of course, clearly
separate the discussions of the ontologia and the theologia in their
works under separate headings or in separate papers as it was generally
presumed that everyone who studied such things knew the common Logos
(Reason and order). A common Logos which was not only inherent within the
very structure and development of the Hellenic language but was also
transmitted in a more elaborate form through that which more accurately
is called the Palaios Logos (Reason of Old). This Palaios Logos forms the
foundation and mainstay of Hellenic thought as the seed from which the
dialectic process began as well being the dialectic's formative and
cohesive principle. The dialectic process is thus not one of disagreement
of opinions but in reality that which refines and develops the Palaios
Logos.

3.1 The Palaios Logos and Common Conceptions of Order

Those who wish to hear about the Gods should have been well guided from childhood, and not habituated to foolish
beliefs. They should also be in disposition good and sensible, that they may properly attend to the teaching. They ought
also to know the common conceptions. Common conceptions are those to which all men agree as soon as they are
asked; for instance, that all gods are good, free from passion, free from change.
Sallustius - On Gods and the Kosmos

The search for order and ordering principles, in one form or another, is
innate to ancient Hellenic culture. Regardless of whether such order
appears in the form of theogenies, cosmogonies, genealogical myths,
founding myths, the tuning of instruments, the meter of poetry or within
the framework of philosophy or the law; the search for, discovery of and
elucidation of order and the ordering principles is evident as a constant
motivation for Hellenic thought, expression and action. Herakleitos calls
this order, which is hidden under the phenomenological appearance of
things, the Logos and the Pythagoreans discovered that it could be
expressed in mathematical terms. Stoic linguistic theory later
differentiated between the internal logos as thought and the external
logos as speech. In philosophy, the search for the principles that
clarify the Logos of the Kosmos was made sensible by the development of
the concept of Nous (Mind) as an intellectual principle, which for
Xenophanes was the means by which the Divine accomplished their ends
within the Kosmos and for Empedokles was distinctive from (but not in
opposition to) the matter which it worked upon from 'within' (in a manner
that is simultaneously transcendent and immanent).[54] In fact, under
Empedokles, the Herakleitan and Pythagorean concepts of order were placed
under the governance of the purposeful and intellectual force called the
Nous whose knowledge encompassed past, present and future simultaneously.
By the time of Plato, Logos and Nous along with other important concepts
became what is known as the Palaios Logos (Reason of Old) in the same
manner as the ancient laws and customs were called the Nomos Arkhaios. As
the Nomos Arkhaios was the basis for the development of civilisation (as
a verb) and the foundation of the Thesmon (customs) of Hellas so too was
the Palaios Logos the basis for not only the development of the language
but also the structure of Hellenic thought and the Hellenic worldview.
The Palaios Logos is the Reason and Words of the Ancestors and it was and
is kept with respect and honour. It is within the Palaios Logos that the
common foundation of Hellenic thought and actions may be found.

Now in modern times, the entire body of ancient Hellenic writings has
effectively passed into the Palaios Logos and this is affirmed by the
Supreme Council of Ethnikoi Hellenes who state that:

"We don't have one sacred book containing the commands or revelatory words of 'God', whose purpose is to
regulate humanity's servile obedience to a celestial dictator. On the contrary, the large number of our texts,
numbering many thousands, presents the truth in its entirety. Sacred texts are for us the whole corpus of
(ancient) Hellenic Learning, at least those works that have survived the sinister flames of Christian pyres
(fire). These texts are the condensation of human reasoning in its attempts to validly interpret the Cosmos in
a way liked by the Gods, that is, logically." [55]

As the corpus of ancient and primary text Hellenic works are generally
accepted by the Ethnikoi to be truth in its entirety it is necessary to
move beyond personal opinions and personal terminology to discover the
true significance of concepts such as Orthodoxy and Orthopraxy in purely
ancient terms and in accordance with the Palaios Logos.

As orthodoxy versus orthopraxy deals purely with mortals and their

ordering principles or worldview as well as the means by which humans
gain knowledge and what guides their impetus for action; it is the corpus
of Hellenic ontologia that must be consulted to determine what such terms
meant to the ancient Hellenes and how they were used. This may seem
strange because in Christianity the same dichotomy is examined in terms
of theology. This is only comprehensible when one considers one of the
most important differences between Christianity and ancient Hellenic
thought. In Christianity, its ontology is incorporated within its
theology while in ancient Hellenic thought it is always understood as
separate as an absolute convention and necessity. This separation is the
means by which to clearly differentiate between the existences of the
Gods and the classes of onta (essential or substantial beings).
The reason for this separation is simple and derives back to some of the
earliest concepts of the Palaios Logos, i.e. that the individual Gods are
immortal and therefore not subject to the eroding effects of time in the
world of changes [56] while the prosopon (the phenomenological world and
mortal beings) [57] is subject to mortality and divisiveness and hence
obviously belongs to a different taxin (order). The theologia deals
purely with the nature of the Gods while the ontologia deals with the
nature of Beings. The separation begins to take shape with Xenophanes and
his repudiation of anthropomorphism. The reason underlying his concern
was that for the Gods to be immortal and unchanging, they must be
immobile and to accomplish their ends by the power of Nous
(intellect/mind) alone. Hence the Gods are seen as immortal and immobile
rather than in motion and subject to mortality.

By the time of Proclus, the separation between theologia and ontologia

was highly developed and the distinction was made clear between the
existence and power of each God. From this distinction the difference was
clarified between (1) that which transcended ousia (substance) and formal
unity and was not bound by the ontic laws of unity and multiplicity or in
other words those who were supra-essential, i.e. the theologia and (2)
that which was subject to the ontic laws derived from the domain of the
Eide or Forms (and was subject to ousia as either essence or substance,
i.e. the ontologia). Furthermore, for Proclus, the distinction between
Ontology and Theology was the difference between a discourse on taxein
(classes or ordering principles) and proper names. The theologia studies
the proper name of an individual God as individuated from other Gods
while the ontologia deals with taxein (classes or ordering principles).
[58]

This convention of separating the ontologia and the theologia is another

good example of a common conception of order within the Hellenic
worldview and brings the often difficult subject of the myths into
perspective. Myths are largely ontological in nature and concern the
powers of the Gods rather than the existence of the Gods. The
genealogical myths are very often expressions of ontological orders or
the classes, functions, essence or permeations of the Gods within the
Kosmos. The theologia differs in that it is a study of the Proper Names
and nature of the Gods. In this sense the Gods are referred to as
Makarês to denote their chief characteristic of Makariotis (the blissful,
inert state of perfection and goodness that is the true nature of the
Gods). [59] The adjective Theoi is used to refer to the Gods as the
multiplicity of organised, systematic, uniform, self-actuating, recurring
and perfect Onta (beings) who constitute the Essence of Intellect in the
Universe which extends and permeates all things [59].

The adjectives and proper names used to refer to the Gods collectively
and individually are thus evidence of a highly formulated and developed
religious sense of order and worldview that exists within the ancient
Hellenic language itself and is remembered in the logoi (words) that
perfectly express each conception of the Hellenic Kosmotheasis. The myths
are thus symbolic, interpretative and poetic human gnosis of the nature
and order of an essential and substantial reality beyond the
phenomenological appearance of things [60] that depicts the essences and
permeations of the Theoi ontologically.

3.2 Psyche, Human Knowledge and the Impetus for Praxis (Action)
Some of the most archaic concepts of Psyche (soul) are found in
Anaximenes, Anaximander, Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia. These are
associated with pneuma and aer (air) as that which life depended upon.
However, Pneuma was a far deeper concept than it is commonly translated
to in the form of breath. It was wind in Homer's usage and used to
indicate the inner fervour within people by Xenophanes while for
Aristophanes it was the demeanour of a person. [61]

In Herakleitos, the concept deepened through the correlation of human

breathing during sleep with the unconscious cognitive system that was
active while the senses were closed off from the Kosmic Logos of the
waking world. By the 6th century BCE, the concept of Psyche incorporated
the early functions of the Homeric thymos (as the animating factor of the
body and the impetus for heroic virtue) and was understood to be the term
that described the psychical totality of a human that correlated to the
totality and unity of body parts into the soma (body). The Pre-Socratic
philosopher Empedokles took this psychical totality to be a daimon
(spirit) that had to undergo various incarnations within a soma (body).
In Pindar, Psyche was divine in nature and immortal in so much as it
survived the death of the soma (body) and [in the manner of Herakleitos]
was active while humans slept and its processes could be observed through
dreams.

All the motifs of this Palaios Logos are later found in the works of
Plato and his tripartite division of Psyche in which he integrates,
deepens and expands upon the works of those who went before him. Plato's
anamnesis (recollection) is also founded upon Palaios Logos based upon
the account which is given of Pythagoras' recollection of his previous
incarnations as well as the thoughts of Empedokles and Pindar. Through
Plato anamnesis is raised to the level of episteme (secure knowledge) and
Psyche becomes that through which we may recollect knowledge of the Eide
(Forms). The recollection of this knowledge is made possible because
Psyche shares certain qualities with the Eide in that both are immortal,
immaterial and invisible. [62]
Plato's tripartite division of Psyche is an acknowledgement of the
rational and somatic (bodily) functions of the psychês which enables
human reflection, observation and participation within a totality of
human potential for consciousness, awareness and activity. [63]
These three parts of Psyche are:
(1) The Logistikon is the rational division of Psyche that in Plato's
Phaedo takes on the characteristics of the unitary Psyche. The Timaeus
states that it is divine in nature, was created by one of the Demiourgoi
and is located in the human head (but not in the brain itself which is
allocated as the seat of aesthesis (sensation) which Pythagoras states is
one of the supports of Psyche). The logistikon also has a prenatal vision
of the eide (forms) and as such is the cognitive archê (principle) of a
non-sensory dianeia (genius and associated with Nous which Pythagoras
determines to be another support of Psyche). This division of Psyche is
the 'ethical' ruler of the lower two parts of Psyche. Its natural
function is dianeia (genius) and logismos (logic) and when it is beset by
the pathoi (passions) of the body, aesthesis (sensation) results. [64]
(2) The Thymoeides (the enspirited) receives communication from the
logistikon and acts upon it. This division is very much in line with the
Homeric Thymos as an early conception of Psyche which was heroic in
nature and in motion and animated the soma (body) during life and was the
impetus for heroic activity although it was only in the later work of
Aristotle that it was formally associated. Upon its departure at death,
only the motionless soma remained. In Thales, an identical notion of
Psyche is found in that he concludes that the power to produce kinesis
(motion) is evidence of the existence of Psyche. He extends this early
conception of Psyche to include the ensouled nature of inanimate objects
which can cause kinesis (motion) in other things, such as the magnesian
stone (magnet). The Atomists also held Psyche to be the source of motion.
Their perception of Psyche was that of an aggregate of spherical and
fiery atoms that were both in motion and the cause of motion. [65]
(3) The Epithymetikon (the appetitive) receives no communication from the
logistikon and pursues physical pleasures and is sometimes tempered by
dreams and divination. [66] It is the division of Psyche which the seat of
epithymon (desires in terms of longing or wilful desires). [67]

Each division of Psyche has its own appropriate arêtes (virtues) and
pathoi (passions). [68] Furthermore, Plato distinguishes between primary
motions that are of Psyche itself and secondary motions that are somatic
(related to the physical body). As the logistikon is autokineton (self-
moved) and in aeikineton (perpetual motion), Plato's conception of Psyche
is very similar to the Pre-Socratic motif of Kinesis (motion) and
Alkmaeon's conception of Psyche in aeikineton (perpetual motion). Plato
develops and refines this earlier Pre-Socratic motif in that the self-
moved Nous (mind) which is within the logistikon participates in true
reality through its connection to the Eide (Form) of Kinesis and this
'self-motion' is the ousia (essence) and definition of Psyche. [69]

Aristotle determined the kinesis (motion) of Psyche to be circular in

nature thus identifying that Psyche is in motion because it is the final
cause [of Psyche] and movement is originated by noesis (thought) and
proairesis (choice). Aristotle revises the Platonic concept of Forms and
in a more materialist sense states that Psyche has no innate knowledge of
the Eides (Forms) but is in itself the eide (form) of the soma (body).
Aristotle was not however referring to the shape of the body but rather
the Psyche as the actuality of the soma (body), i.e. Psyche is that which
enables the capacity for life and upon which life is dependent (which is
the same as with all other conceptions of Psyche except said with far
more complexity). [70] He identifies this actuality as a potentiality or
more simply put a dunameis (capacity/influence/power) [71] for Psyche to
engage in functions or activities. Aristotle returns to the tripartite
division for the dunameis of Psyche which he categorises in the form of a
nested hierarchy (i.e. the higher powers of Psyche possess the lower
powers as well):
(1) Plant (Phyton) Psyche which possesses the Threptikon (the Nutritive
power) which is the basic requirement for Zoë (Life) and gives the
capacity for growth, decline and nourishment.
(2) Animal (Zöon) Psyche which possesses the Threptikon but also the
Aesthetikon (the power of Sensory Perception) thus gaining the additional
capacity for perception/awareness as well as the capacities of Orekiton
(appetitive), Epithymia (desiderative) and Voulesis (will), Thymos
(enspiritedness) and Kinetikon kata topon (motion according to
place/environment)
(3) Rational (Logikon) Psyche which has the powers of Threptikon and
Aesthetikon as well as the capacity for Intellect (or thought) through
the power of Dianoetikon (Genius)

These dunameis roughly correspond to the various functions within earlier

concepts of Psyche such as the Homeric Thymos, etc as well as the
Platonic tripartite division with a few slight changes in detail but no
change in structure. Aristotle differs in that he includes plants within
his ensouled life forms and does not separate the appetitive or
desiderative capacity of Psyche from the Logikon as Plato does with the
Epithymetikon. Aristotle, like Demokritos, Epikouros and Speusippos,
determines Aesthesis (Sensory Perception) to be the beginning point of
all knowledge. Aristotle too, like Pythagoras and Demokritos believed
that the conclusions of Logiki (rational thought as a function of both
Aristotle's Logikon and Plato's Logistikon) had to be supported by
sensory input. This correspondence of Reason to Reality (i.e. total
comprehension/understanding) was held by the ancient Hellenes to be
Aletheia (Truth). [72] Aristotle, in his discussion on the Logos of Psyche
further identified five hexeis (ways of knowing as moral and intellectual
virtues) by which the Logikē Psyche (Rational Soul) could arrive at
Aletheia (truth).

"Let it be assumed that there are five [ways of knowing; hexeis] through which the [rational; logikē] psyche
comes to truth by way of affirmation and denial, namely art [technē], scientific knowledge [episteme],
practical wisdom [phronesis], wisdom [sophia], and nous. Judgement and opinion are capable of error [and
are therefore excluded].
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics [73]

The Hexeis are, however, only potentialities and for them to be

actualised, they must be put to use, i.e. the potential for knowing
through different kinds of knowledge must find an appropriate activity
through which that which may be known can actually become known. Thus
Aristotle assigns each hexis (way of knowing) to have a corresponding
energeia (activity). As the hexeis (ways of knowing) of Nous and
episteme (scientific knowledge) are both ways of knowing that are
products of the intellectual process (namely induction and deduction)
they are unified under Sophia (Wisdom) and assigned a single activity.
Aristotle determines these three energeia (activities) to be [73]:
(1) Theoria as the activity of Sophia (including Nous and Episteme)
(2) Praxis as the activity of Phronesis
(3) Poiesis as the activity of Technē [73]
(Note: these will be discussed at greater length in the next section)

In the same manner as Aristotle, Epikouros of Samos also proposed that

Psyche was materialistic and vitalising in nature and that its full
potential was actualised within a soma (body). By unifying certain
concepts from the Palaios Logos, Epikouros (like the Atomists) held
Psyche to consist of atoms which act upon and are acted upon by the atoms
of the soma (body) and resembled pneuma and heat mixed (as per the Pre-
Socratic concept of pneuma). Epikouros differed in that, for him (and
later Lucretius), Psyche was not immortal and had no existence outside of
the soma (body). [74]
The Stoics too revisit the Palaios Logos and determine Psyche to be fiery
or heated pneuma. For them, the ruling part is the Hegemonikon which in
humans is called the Nous (mind) or Dianeia (genius) which is very
similar to that of Plato's Logistikon and Aristotle's Logikon. The
Hegemonikon is completely rational when fully developed or matured and
manifests four mental powers; (a) the capacity to receive impressions;
(b) to assent to or concur [with these received impressions]; (c) to form
intentions to act in response to them and (d) to do these things
rationally. [75]
Epictetus also determines the ruling part of Psyche to be the
Hegemonikon and defines it as the epistemic and moral way of
knowing/disposition of a human. [75]
The Neo-Platonists expanded and developed Plato's relation between
Psyche and the eides (forms) with their highly developed theory of
sympatheia and assign a medial position for Psyche between the noeta
(mental) and the aestheta (sensory impressions). [76] Plotinus affirms
this and elucidates that Psyche is a product of and eikon (likeness) of
Nous that is both turned inward to its source [toward the Nous] and
outward towards the world [which it vitalises]. In turning inward Pysche
is fertilised by the Nous and produces activities that 'move outward'
such as aesthesis (sensation) and growth. By participation in the En,
Psyche becomes a plurality of individuated Psychês that are unified
through sharing a common source and natural function but are
differentiated in that they operate in and over distinct somata (bodies).
Through the unitary nature of Psyche, Plotinus identifies a systematic
plurality of Psychês within the framework of Kosmic sympatheia. The
distinctions and gradations of the Psychês provide the foundation for the
continuation of belief in palingenesia (rebirth). The function of
Psyche in Plotinus remains synonymous with the Palaios Logos, Plato and
the Stoics before him and Psyche is thus said to vitalise and govern
matter. [77]
In Proclus, Psyche is seen in terms of the trias (mean and two terms) and
hence there are three types of Psychês: (1) the divine Psychês (the
Ouranioi, including those of the planets); (2) the Psychês that pass from
intellection to ignorance (noesis) and (3) [in the manner of Empedokles
before] the Daimones (further subdivided by Proclus into the Psychês of
angeloi (messengers); daimones (spirits) and heroes). Proclus too
affirms the Palaios Logos and Psyche maintains its intermediary position
through its participation in eternity by reason of its ousia
(essence/substance - as per Plato) and within time through its energeia.
So too does Proclus preserve palingenesis (rebirth) although he denies
that psyche can be reborn into animals. Proclus discusses Psyche as being
both Zoë (Life) and zoön (living things) thus affirming Plato's 'ousia
(essence/substance) of Psyche. [78]

From this account of the ancient Hellenic ontological thought regarding

the origins of human knowledge and the impetus for human action, it is
clear that such functions/capacities belong to the Hellenic conception of
Psyche (soul). It is also evident that there is cohesion of thought
concerning Psyche that affirms and develops the Palaios Logos through the
centuries. This consistency of thought exists within the very structure
of order as the Logos within the Hellenic Kosmotheasis (worldview)
regardless of minor variations in expressing the ratio (as another form
of Logos) of the divisions of capacities, powers and functions to one
another within Psyche. The ontology implicitly specifies that it is
intellect that guides actions and actions that actualise the intellect
through activity. Thought and action is thus co-equal, complementary and
harmonious within the ancient Hellenic ontology.

This consistency of thought concerning Psyche is found too within the

body of myths. In Homer, the Theoi as the essence of the Intellect within
the Kosmos interacts with the world of mortals and guides their actions.
This is especially apparent in the Iliad through Zeus' (who is identified
with Nous) guidance of the heroes' thymos (as not only the Homeric
conception of Psyche but also the source of heroic arête and the co-
ordinated motion of the heroes virtuous thoughts and actions). Another
example is given by the Stoic Kleanthes who states that the myth of the
birth of Athena from the head of Zeus concerns the emergence of Wisdom
from Nous and the location of the Hegemonikon as within the Nous of Zeus.
A final and elegant example is that offered by Damaskios: [79]

“By the method of Kore the psyche descends in genesis [conception/creation],

 By the method of Dionysos it is fragmented at genesis [i.e. [conception/creation],
By the method of Prometheus and the Titans it is bonded with the body,
It is liberated [by] acquiring the powers of Heracles,
It is gathered through Apollo
And, by Athena Soteira it is cleansed through the true philosophy,
[and] it is brought cause/purpose by Demetra”
Damaskios

Damaskios thus explains much of the formulated ontological structure

underlying many of the myths in this quotation. It illustrates not only
the fragmentation of Psyche in the manner of the relation between unity
and multiplicity which is an ontic law but also shows the intimate bond
between Psyche and soma (body). The method of liberation is also
clarified by the power of Herakles which is the heroic thymos as the
coordination of thought and action in arête. The gathering of Psyche by
Apollon is a direct reference to the harmonising power of the Logos (i.e.
the tripod and the lyre) while the katharsis (cleansing) of Psyche is the
'saving' wisdom (i.e. true philosophy) of Athena Soteira and given
cause/purpose by Demetra who, as the mother of Kore, is both the
beginning and the end of the motion of Psyche thus indicating a circular
motion.

This affirms the existence of orthognosia (correct knowledge) concerning

Psyche within the ancient Hellenic ontological writings of both
philosophy and mythology. This orthognosia not only offers a
spatiotemporal perspective of the place of the human Psyche within the
Kosmos but it also gives a sense of order to the Hellenic Kosmotheasis
concerning the origins of human knowledge and the impetus for action.

"The ancient debate on the substance of the soul is clearly different from that of the later Western tradition
about the mind which is centred on the dichotomy between consciousness and matter.
For there is no question in antiquity that body and soul interacts with one another and that consciousness
entails certain physical processes."
Roberto Polito [80]

3.3 Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis

According to the accounts of Cicero and Iamblichus, Pythagoras identified

three different types of people that attended the Festival Games. The
first type consisted of those who went as observers, the second were the
competitors and the third comprised those who sold their wares at the
games. These three distinctions were revisited by not only Plato but also
later Aristotle and the Stoics.

Plato's tripartite division of the psyche (soul) into logistikon,

thymoeides and epithymetikon roughly corresponds to these three
Pythagorean 'types' as does Plato's three functional 'class' divisions as
found within his Republic: (1) Philosopher 'Guardians', (2) Political
'Auxillaries (in the form of civil servants and military) and (3) those,
either rich or poor, who engage in economic activities.
Aristotle affirms the traditional divisions with his five hexeis (ways of
knowing) and the three energeia (activities) that correspond to these
five hexeis.
(1) Theoria as the activity of Sophia (including Nous and Episteme)
(2) Praxis as the activity of Phronesis
(3) Poiesis as the activity of Technē
These three energeia (activities) correspond to the three different
lifestyles which people tended to gravitate towards according to their
activities or disposition (and as per Pythagoras' insight):
(1) The contemplative (nous/episteme/sophia and theoria);
(2) The practical (phronesis and praxis);
(3) The productive (technē and poiesis).

Now it is important to note that each of the hexeis (ways of knowing) and
each of the energeia were held to be co-equal in Aristotelian thinking
although Aristotle's own personal preference lay with a life of theoria.
It is also important to remember that in Aristotelian terms the kinesis
(motion) of Psyche is circular. The hexeis are thus both the impetus for
the energeia and the telos (purpose/perfection) of the energeia. [81]
Hence without engaging in theoria, the soul potential for nous, episteme
and Sophia will never be realised or known and without praxis, one will
be without any true knowledge of phronesis in the same manner as without
technē the perfection of poiesis will never be attained. Furthermore, the
importance of theoria is usually stressed because without it, nous (which
most agree to be the ruling part of Psyche) and its intimate relationship
with logos (reason) will not become an actuality and Reason or
rationality (as the guiding principle for thought and action) will remain
unrealised thus leading to irrationality and disorder. This brings
Herakleitos' identification of logos as the guiding principle for
orthognosia and orthopraxia into a new perspective as it is through the
nous that logos guides thought/opinion into becoming orthognosia and
action into becoming orthopraxia.

Aristotle clearly determines the dynamics of these energeia (i.e.

theoria, praxis and poiesis) to consist of two separate and distinct
relations; (1) theoria to praxis and (2) praxis to poiesis.

Before discussing the significance between the Aristotelian relation of

theoria to praxis and praxis to poiesis it is necessary to explore how
the terms were used in the ancient Hellenic language.

3.3.1 The ancient meaning of Theoria, Praxis and Poiesis

(a) Theoria

"We can, in conclusion, say that the constant in Greek philosophy is theorein, now emphasised in its
speculative value and now in its moral value, but always in a way where the two values reciprocally are
involved in a structural way. Moreover, a proof of this is in fact previously expressed by C. de Vogel that the
Greeks always maintained that true philosophers are only those who know how to exemplify a coherence of
thought and living, and hence are teachers not only of thinking but living."
Giovanni Reale and John R Catan [82]

Originally, in Pre-Socratic times, the term theoria referred to

observation and theoroi (plural) to those observers who were sent to
games, oracles or religious festivals within Hellas and abroad to report
on or observe the events that transpired. Theoria is not an activity that
involves just looking at particulars (i.e. in the manner of the verb
skopeo) but is rather a mode of apprehension and comprehension through
observation. [83] Within philosophy, theoria retained its meaning of
observation and simultaneously came to refer to the contemplative life in
a metaphorical manner that retains all the nuances of its earlier usage.
As a contemplative mode within philosophy theoria thus comes to denote
the activity of apprehending and comprehending universals such as Logos,
Nous, Psyche, Agathon, Dikeosyne (Justice), etc, through observation.
"In his title essay 'In Praise of Theory', the German philosopher, Hans Georg Gadamer suggests two senses
of theoria [theory in the Hellenic sense of the word], both derived from its Greek etymon. It is a form of
seeing. This does not mean 'seeing that which is' simply in the sense of observing ambient phenomena,
rather it involves seeing things of fundamental importance, catching a glimpse of the secrets beneath the
surfaces of the visible. At the same time theoria refers to the functions of an envoy sent to participate in, for
example, a religious ceremony or communal games. Since the envoy is an official representative of his home
city, his role has a political aspect. The 'theoros' is both witness and participant and his presence is also a
mode of intervening in public affairs. Theory then is not disinterested, disengaged contemplation of
immutable truths; it is a form of involvement which alters the context in which it appears."
Colin Davis [84]

Furthermore and very importantly, from the ancient perspective, there is

no distinction between the observer and what is being observed. Hence the
modern distinction between subject and object does not exist. Observation
or contemplation is thus simultaneously participation. [85] This type of
observation/participation (i.e. participation mystique) was also the mode
by which the ancients approached theatre as a didactic medium. The
theoria of the philosopher is merely a metamorphosed observation of the
universal principles in real life and the Kosmos in much the same manner
as theatre goers would observe the principles of human life reflected
through poiesis upon the stage.

"In the same way, Greek metaphysics, still conceives the essence of 'theoria' and of 'nous' as being purely
present to what is truly real and for us too, to act theoretically [in the Hellenic sense of the word] is defined
by the fact that in attending to something, one is able to forget one's own purposes. But theoria is not to be
conceived primarily as subjective conduct, as a self-determination of the subject, but in terms of what is
contemplating. Theoria is true participation, not something active but something passive (pathos), namely
being totally involved in and carried away by what one sees."
Hans Georg Gadamer [86]

"Plato in the Phaedrus already portrayed the lack of understanding shown by rational analysis in mistaking
the ecstasis of 'being-outside-oneself' by regarding it as the mere negation of being collected and thus as a
kind of derangement. In truth, being-outside-onself is the positive possibility of being fully there in the
presence of something. Such being has the character of self-forgetfulness.
It constitutes the essence of the spectator to be given over, in self oblivion, to what he sees."
(GW 1, 131) [87]

Karl Kerenyi believed this to be an important facet of Hellenic religion

which he interprets to be a religion of Schau (German: showing or seeing)
which in the words of Hannelore Rausch may be understood as:

"For the Greeks, festivity and the point of view of the spectator are inextricably connected and we now
understand that in the Greek feast this situation of thea [the act of seeing and the root word of theoria] is
always repeated as the one in which the Gods and the human beings come together."

Kerenyi also notes that the Gods too come to festivities as theoroi
(observer/participants) and he describes the fundamentals of Hellenic
religion as one that is "a reciprocal, active and passive, vision, a spectacle in which men are
both viewers and viewed."

In Plato's Republic, the philosophical theoros ascends to the Eide

(Forms) not only to apprehend the Good but also to take the pattern for
Arête in ordering their own life as well as that of society and the
individual. [88] Hence it is through Theoria that the philosophical ascent
to the Forms occurs and through contemplation that the basis for virtuous
praxis (action) is found. Perhaps the finest manner in which to
understand the sacred nature of this philosopher's ascent to the Eide
(Forms) within a Platonic framework may be found in Plato's Symposium
where Diotima likens the contemplation of the Eide as akin to the
epotika (revelation) of the Greater Eleusinian Mysteries. Diotima uses
the technical language of the Eleusinian Mysteries to refer to the
theoroi (observers) who come for the first time as mystes (initiates) and
afterwards as epoptes (watchers). [89] Another good Platonic analogy of
the journey of the theoros and the activity of theoria is that of what is
commonly called Plato's Cave (which is again offered as 'alike unto' to
the Eleusinian mysteries that began in darkness and ended in a blaze of
light). One particular reference to the 'Cave' explains the type of
'seeing' that is the activity of the theoros:

"But our argument indicates that the capacity for knowledge is innate in each man's mind and that the organ
by which he learns is like an eye which cannot be turned from darkness to light unless the whole body is
turned; in the same way the mind as a whole must be turned away from the world of change until its eye can
bear to look straight at reality, and at the brightest of all realities which is what we call the good… The rest,
therefore, of what are commonly called arêtes of the mind perhaps resemble those of the body, in that they
are not in fact innate, but are implanted by subsequent training and practice." [90]

From this it is possible to see that the highest virtue is thus goodness
which is innate and found both through and within Psyche. Bringing this
internal goodness to the fore is thus the aim of the ascent of the
theoros.

Aristotle also uses the word 'theorein' in manner that illustrates the
totality of its ancient meaning and describes observation in the manner
by which one would observe a custom referring not only to the watching or
seeing of something but also to the participation therein. His exact
treatment of the word has an implicitly ethical implication within its
conceptual usage as he refers to 'the observation of neighbours actions
as the means by which eudaimonia (happiness) may be attained'. In other
words, if a neighbour greets you, it is appropriate to greet them or if a
neighbour invites you to his house, it is appropriate to invite him to
yours. Aristotle also thus implies that it is only in the total
understanding of one's neighbour's actions that happiness may be
achieved. [91]

(b) Praxis

The word praxis derives from the verb pratto which means to act. It
refers directly to the activity of taking action or 'acting' and is not
concerned with what is accomplished or results from the act. However, it
does not refer to any or all physical actions but firstly to that of a
reciprocal act or participation in an interactive act. In other words, in
a similar manner to eudaimonia (happiness), praxis is not isolated but
requires the presence of others or something else in an interactive way.
As such, any interactive act may be called praxis and the ancients used
the word to both describe political or communal actions as well as sexual
intercourse. As an interactive act, praxis may refer to the act of loving
someone or taking revenge upon them equally. It is also the root of the
word eispraxis which means 'I earn' in the manner of reciprocal
compensation. Praxis may also be used to denote participation in a
military operation where individuals are coordinated and act together
interactively. In the same manner praxis also denotes the actions of the
individuals who collectively govern a polis via their corresponding and
interactive civic functions. [92]
In more technical terms, praxis denotes an action whose result is its own
telos (purpose/perfection/end) and it is in this sense (as well as
etymologically) that praxis stands in opposition to poiesis.

"To be practical in the Aristotelian sense does not only mean the competence to apply 'theoria' to concrete
situations; it, in fact, refers to a world of free and creative 'praxis' (action) beyond the noisy world of
productive technological endeavours."
Daniel Franklin Pilario [93]

From the above quotation, praxis in Aristotle's usage of the word becomes
clearer. For him, praxis refers to the skilled application of theoria
(i.e. using rationale or critical analysis to make a decision or solve a
problem) indicating that praxis is neither purely reason or purely action
but a combination of the both with theoria acting in conjunction with and
informing praxis. [94] Yet praxis is more than this too and is
simultaneously any rational action that is voluntary and does not seek to
produce anything other than its own activity. Aristotle further makes a
distinction between praxis and those actions which produce things through
craft (such as shipbuilding, shoemaking, poetry, etc)

Aristotle put forward that for arête (virtue/personal excellence) to be

actualised, it must become praxis (i.e. an interactive action) for it is
insufficient to hold the potential for and have knowledge of virtue and
never use it or apply it. This is an important statement as it
illustrates that personal virtue is not a reality unless it is reflected
in one's actions towards one's fellow human beings. The praxis of
personal arête is thus not a solitary activity that one pursues on one's
own but is rather an interactive and communal action. If one considers
this statement within context to the Pythagorean/Socratean/Platonic
association of the innate talents and abilities inherent with Arête and
Agathon, this is Aristotle's call for such talents and abilities to be
initialised within students of Ethics and Political Sciences if they
should truly wish to be a benefit to the polis. Praxis is caused by and
is the perfection of phronesis (common sense/practical wisdom).

(c) Poiesis

The term poiesis derives from the verb poiō referring to the
construction of something. Poiesis also denotes the technē (craft of
writing poetry) from whence derives poiema (poem) and poietis (poet). The
word has also been used in manner to denote the actualisation of the
power of a God, i.e. "Zeus is making it rain". [95]
Aristotle uses poiesis to denote the activity related to any technē
(craft) and furthermore defines poiesis (in a manner that is antithetical
to praxis) to refer to the making or construction of something that has
an aim (telos) that lies outside of its own activity; i.e. the telos
(purpose) of building a ship is not the building itself but rather the
sailing of the ship. [96]

Within context to poiesis as the energeia (way of knowing how it works)

of technē (craft); Aristotle defines technē as any craft, skill or art
which is the purpose/result or perfection (i.e. telos) of poiesis. He
furthermore determines technē to be a productive potential or capacity
which is informed by an understanding of its own intrinsic rationale;
i.e. the rationale of building a ship is different to the rationale of
writing a poem and simultaneously the rationale of building a ship is
related to the rationale of sailing a ship.
In the mass production of crafts, the multiple applications of a
particular skill or in the performance/creation of an art there is also a
level of inherent mimesis (artistic imitation) within poiesis which
renders it reflective of life. Within context to human life, Aristotle
observes that the development of culture is, in part, the evolution of
technē (craft) and that the first products of human society were
necessities while further developments improved the quality of life.

The definitions alone of these terms only begin to show the significance
of the ethical concerns posed by Aristotle in his separation of theoria,
praxis and poiesis into the dynamics of the two separate comparisons of
theoria to praxis and praxis to poiesis.

3.3.2 Theoria, Praxis and Human Fulfilment

The first distinction between Praxis and Theoria centres on the Classical
debate about which type of lifestyle is best suited for human happiness
and fulfilment, i.e. a life of contemplation (theoria) or a life of
political and interactive activity (praxis).

Even though Aristotle too favoured Plato's emphatic emphasis on the

superiority of choosing a contemplative life, it is important to bring
Plato's choice into the context of his own life and experience of
political life. This is important because it is this very preference for
theoria that Christian Liberation theologians blame for causing the ills
of Western civilisation. Plato's 7th Letter which he wrote as an old man
reflecting on his younger years may bring his own experience of political
life into the context of his choice for a contemplative life.

"The existing constitution, which was subject to widespread criticism, was overthrown…and a committee of
Thirty [was] given supreme control. As it was some of them were friends and relations of mine and they at
once invited me to join them, as if it were the natural thing for me to do so. My feelings were what to be
expected in a young man: I thought they were going to reform society and rule justly, and so I watched their
proceedings with great interest. I found that they soon made the earlier regime look like a golden age.
Among other things they tried to incriminate my old friend Socrates, whom I should not hesitate to call the
most upright man then living, by sending him, with others, to arrest a fellow citizen and bring him forcibly to
execution; Socrates refused, and risked everything rather than make himself party to their wickedness. When
I saw all this, and other things as bad, I was disgusted and drew back from the wickedness of the times. …
Finally I came to the conclusion that all existing states were badly governed and that their constitutions
were incapable of reform without drastic treatment and a great deal of good luck. I was forced, in fact, to
the belief that the only hope of finding justice for society or for the individual lay in true philosophy and that
mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians
become, by some miracle, true philosophers."
Plato [97]

Socrates further justifies abstention from a political life in Plato's

Republic:

"One who has weighed all this keeps quiet and goes his own way, like the traveller who takes shelter under a
wall from a driving storm of dust and hail; and seeing lawlessness spreading on all sides, is content that he
can keep his hands clean from iniquity while life lasts…" [98]

The true matter at hand then is not only what type of lifestyle is best
suited for human happiness but what type of lifestyle is best suited for
personal arête (virtue as excellence) when faced with the corruptions of
political life. Plato firmly believed that the contemplative philosopher
should participate in the political life of a good city but to refrain
from participation in the politics of corrupt regimes which were (and
are) commonplace.
In the Republic, Plato identifies the ideal role of the theoros (i.e. a
person who engages in theoria) as one of the Philosopher/Guardians:

"Then our job as lawgivers is to compel the best minds to attain what we have called the highest form of
knowledge, and to ascend to the vision of the Good as we have described and when they have achieved this
and see well enough, prevent them from behaving as they are not allowed to… [They are not allowed to be
left] remaining in the upper world and refusing to return again to the prisoners in the cave below, and share
their labours and rewards, whether trivial or serious. …The object of our legislation is not the special
welfare of any particular class of society, but of society as a whole, and it uses persuasion or compulsion to
unite all citizens and make them share together the benefits which each individually can confer on the
community; and its purpose in fostering this attitude is not to leave everyone to please himself, but to make
each man a link in the unity of the whole" [98]

This statement clarifies Plato's vision. Socrates believed the concepts

of Arête (Virtue) and Agathon (Beneficial Good) included innate talents
and abilities and the cultivation thereof. This association of Arête and
Agathon was first held by Pythagoras who determined Arête to be the
harmony of Psyche (soul). Socrates and Plato affirm this Palaios Logos by
logically concluding that if the cultivation of individual talents and
abilities lead to the harmony of Psyche in the individual thus the virtue
and harmony of a State would be determined by the harmonious and
appropriate placement of each citizen (as a part within a whole)
according to their individual talents and abilities. These intrinsic
potentials within each individual were what Aristotle was referring to in
his identification of three life styles and three types of energeia (ways
of knowing).

With further regard to this; it is crucial that the allegorical nature of

Plato's Republic not be forgotten:

"And so the recapitulation of 'The Republic' which appears before the section on physics addresses itself to a
consideration to the structure of the universe by means of eikonikos [as likeness/representation/reflection]"
Proclus

Hence whatever distinctions exist between Plato's Republic and

Aristotle's Ethics are simultaneously metaphorical differences.
Aristotle's lifestyles and the energeia with which they are associated
are thus not so much a political statement about social classes as they
are a metaphor for and of the multidimensional (and holographic) order
within all things. From this perspective they are the innate potentials
and activities of: (a) The Universe; (b) the State as a collective of
individuals and (c) an individual. While the energeia of theoria, praxis
and poiesis are within each rational Psyche; they create a disposition or
tendency in individuals towards certain types of knowledge and
lifestyles. However, all three are necessary for the different aspects of
life and are developed to a greater or lesser extent as a natural
consequence of living.

"We must be content, in speaking of such subjects and with such premises to indicate the truth roughly and
in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with premises of the same
kind to reach conclusions which are no better… "
Aristotle [99]

In this quotation Aristotle clarifies that such distinctions as between

three energeia and the three types of lifestyles are structural paradigms
through which the student of Ethics and Political Science may reduce the
complex compound of human life and knowledge into simplistic elements in
order to know the 'whole' by a study of its parts. The purpose of
Nichomachean Ethics is thus not an instruction manual for action but
rather the means of accumulating the knowledge which will inform our
actions.

The concept of restructuring a corrupt society is also visited by Zeno in

his Politeia where he restricts membership to only those who are good and
virtuous and excludes wretched people on the basis of them being
'hateful', 'enemies', 'slaves' and 'aliens to one another'. This was
Zeno's way of illustrating that no true community is possible while the
wretched are mixed among the good because the wretched destroy the basis
for true fellowship in their passion-ridden pursuit of false values.
Although later Stoics would reject some of Zeno's proposed 'reforms', his
central position was affirmed by Cleanthes and Chrysippos who adhered to
the wise/ignorant dichotomy. The central Stoic concern was achieving
homologia with their rational nature and that of the Kosmos. The earthly
political life was transcended within their thinking due to the
inconsistency between earthly laws and constitutions with the Orthos
Logos (the will of Zeus and the 'plan' of Physis/Nature). The homologia
which the Stoics sought to attain is similar to the harmony of psyche as
a state of Arête (virtue).
Zeno's dichotomised society of men, like Plato's and Aristotle's, is an
allegory of the parts of Psyche and the struggle of the individual to
find from freedom from the governance of the irrational, appetitive and
desirous tendencies (that are not governed by the Orthos Logos/Nous).

Such allegories admirably represent the holographic and geometrically

three dimensional Logos of Hellenic conception that is perhaps best
summed up by Thales when he said "All things are full of Gods". The
Divine Logos is thus within everything and orders everything in
accordance with the design of Physis (Nature as 'self-emergent'). The
same Logos (as an underlying order) is found in the Kosmos as it is found
within Psyche. The structure of a polis reflects this Logos too but sadly
is subject to the irrational desires or passions of its leaders/lawgivers
and the corrupt state of political life in many places bears witness to
this. [100]

The corruption of a polis is thus an important factor in whether

participation therein (i.e. praxis) could truly be ethical or not. It
would, after all, not be ethical to assist a politically corrupt regime
to the detriment of both personal arête as well as the beneficial good of
the human collective. Within Plato, the ethical options of life under a
corrupt regime are limited to either complete withdrawal or political and
constitutional reform. For Socrates, Plato and later the Stoics, no
eudaimonia (happiness) was possible in the political life under the
governance of wicked men.

The question is thus raised by Aristotle whether eudaimonia, as happiness

which may only be complete by the eudaimonia of others, is a possible
achievement within the contemplative and sometimes solitary life of a
theoros.

"All this indicates clearly that the being of self as 'praxis' which is developed in books VI and X of
Nichomachean Ethics and which appears to argue that 'theoria' is ultimately a solitary, free and
independent activity makes sense only insofar as this solitary activity first arises and remains a genuine
possibility of human existence, only in a political context, of being with others each of whom are equally
free in their being. The continuity and solitariness of 'theorein' [observation as contemplation] as the highest
 way of relating to being (to the worldly being of beings as a whole) should thus, in its intrinsic import,
properly be understood ontologically (as finitude and individuation of one's freedom) and not as an ontic
isolation of the individual from others."
William McNeill [101]

Aristotle determines theoria as the activity of the mind (i.e. the

energeia of the nous) for its own sake. From this it is clear that
theoria and praxis are not a dichotomy because they share a similar
characteristic in that they are both fulfilling purposes in themselves
and have no product other than their own activity. Aristotle furthermore
identifies that theoria is distinguished from praxis (action) in that it
[theoria] is directed either to reality or to the object of physis
(nature) and applied to such things such as philosophy, astronomy,
cosmology or mathematics. Theoria is distinguished as an intellectual
rather than moral virtue and for Aristotle, the contemplation of the
universe for its own sake results in self-sufficiency or autonomy. [102]
Theoria within Psyche is hence the act through which reason and rationale
may become the ruling part of the soul and free it from enslavement to
the pathoi (passions). This is illustrated in the metaphorical analogy of
the primacy of the contemplative life in Aristotle and the rise to power
of the class of Philosopher-Guardian rulers in Plato. The use of such
metaphorical analogies is merely the philosophers' way of pointing out to
students that much may be learnt of universals and principles from
observing life.

Both theoria and praxis are a source of virtue and eudaimonia (happiness)
because theoria is not a solitary experience but rather an autonomous one
where the theoros participates in the true reality of things through
their observation both in participation mystique and through informing
praxis in a complementary and interdependent manner.

To further understand the significance between actions that are an end in

themselves and those that result in products outside of their own
activity, the comparison and distinction between praxis and poiesis is
relevant.

3.3.3 Praxis, Poiesis and Human Motives

The second distinction between Praxis and Poiesis concerns the difference
between action and production and the difference between 'doing' and
'making'. This distinction derives from the roots of both words and their
opposition to one another; praxis derives from the root verb of pratto
meaning "I am working" (indicating a work in process or a 'doing' of
something already in existence) while poiesis which derives from the verb
poiō which means "I am attempting for something to happen" (indicating
the making or construction of something from its beginning). [103]

"The reasoned capacity to act is different to the reasoned capacity to make. Nor are they included one in the
other; for neither is acting making nor making acting."
Aristotle [104]

The reasoning behind this [second] distinction is made clear by the

statement:

"While making has an end other than itself, good action is itself its own end"
Aristotle [105]
This distinction is thus one between activities which are an end in
themselves (i.e. praxis and theoria) and those that are intermediaries
for ends other than their own action. This differentiation comes into
better perspective when one considers the meaning of the ancient word
telos which is simultaneously purpose, fulfilment and perfection. [106]
The distinction is thus between activities that are their own telos and
those activities that are not. Aristotle clarifies this further in
Metaphysics:

"[when] the result is something apart from the exercise, the actuality is in the thing being made; i.e. the act
of building is in the thing being built and that of weaving in the thing that is being woven…but when there is
no product apart from the actuality is in the agents, e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing subject and that of
contemplation in that in the object of contemplation and that of life in psyche (soul)"
Aristotle [107]

This statement serves metaphorically for Aristotle as he makes a central

assertion to his ethical theory:

That certain human activities such as ethical virtues, political practice and even the philosophical
contemplation of the 'theoros' are all ends in themselves and have no ulterior motive other than their own
'praxis'; i.e. neither does one act in a virtuous manner to earn praise nor does one engage in a political life
for financial security. These activities which rightfully belong to the moral sphere as they have no ulterior
motives and seek no reward are called Praxis in the Aristotelian sense of the word. In contrast and distinct
from Praxis is Poiesis that refers to any activity whose meaningfulness lies in their external effect,; i.e.
Rhetoric, the ends of which are persuasion or shoemaking, the ends of which is protection for feet.

This brings Aristotle's separation and comparison of theoria to praxis

and praxis to poiesis into a clearer light. The first distinction is thus
one of disposition towards either goodness or [through the pathoi]
corruption (i.e. metaphorically expressed as a preference towards either
a contemplative or a political life) which simultaneously speaks of the
human capacity for virtue and passions depending on whether one is ruled
by reason and rationale or desire. The second distinction between praxis
and poiesis is thus the difference between an action that is a reward in
itself and those actions that are only a means to an end. This
distinction Aristotle illustrates metaphorically by drawing on the root
distinction between praxis and poiesis i.e. the difference between the
verbs pratto and poiō. This second distinction thus serves to support and
develop conclusions of the first distinction in that the Psyche that is
enslaved and ruled by pathoi (passions) will forever be desiring or
longing and all actions will merely become the means by which people
attempt to actualise their passions. Such actions have a telos
(purpose/perfection) that exists external to the action itself; i.e. the
purpose of such actions are never the activity themselves but rather
something that may be achieved by the actions. These actions, as a means
to an end, Aristotle likens to the skill of a craftsman whose activity
produces a product other than its own activity. [108]

This is an important ethical distinction as it illustrates a crucial

factor within the Hellenic kosmotheasis which is 'understanding why we
do things'. A good example of this is the distinction between a shoemaker
who makes shoes according to a pattern based on the 'rules of making a
shoe' but with no understanding of what the purpose of shoes are in
comparison to a shoemaker who understands that the purpose of making
shoes is the protection of feet and that the perfect shoe is thus one
that perfectly protects the feet. In the shoemaker who lacks the
understanding of the cause of shoes there is no purpose in his actions
other than the technological production of shoes for commercial and
economic reasons. The telos (purpose) of this shoemaker is thus not the
protection of feet but the commercial production of shoes as a by-product
to the activity of making the shoes. However, for the shoemaker whose
telos (purpose) is the protection of feet, the activity of making the
shoe that perfectly protects the feet fulfils his purpose and is an end
in itself.
The same may be said of the difference between a politician who is
elected to public office without understanding either the cause of his
office (i.e. to serve the common good of his constituents) or the cause
of common good itself, i.e. Dikeosyne (Justice) in comparison to the
politician who knows both the cause of his office and the cause of the
common good.
Aristotle may be understood further, if one considers the earliest
meaning of the word Aitia (cause) which refers to the portion of
responsibility allocated to something or someone. It is thus the aitia of
an activity that is the impetus of human action through being not only
the causation of an activity but also being the responsibility to fulfil
the cause through action. In terms of praxis, the aitia is also the
telos (purpose/end) of an activity including the responsibility to act in
a manner which fulfils the cause as its end.

Understanding the causes of activities and basing ones actions on

fulfilling the cause of the activity is thus self-determined praxis that
is in accordance with Physis (Nature) and hence is Sophrosyne (common
sense) which is the Metron (measure) of Psyche concerning natural desires
and pleasures. [109] This is the basis of Aristotelian Praxis as an
ethical act which is distinguished from any action that seeks something
other than its own cause as its purpose or end. Furthermore, it is
through the activity of theoria that these causes may be known and an
action chosen that may best exemplify the ethical determination of
Aristotelian praxis.

The introduction of the concepts of Physis (Nature) and aitiês (causes)

into the discussion of which actions may rightfully be called praxis and
which fit more accurately under the term poiesis yields a further factor
that sheds light on the matter.
In early Hellenic thought the human artisan or agent of poiesis was an
'intermediary' who merely aids or abets an already existing impetus of
Physis as 'self-emergence'. Regardless of whether it was in the making of
wine, the growing of wheat or a midwife assisting in the birth of a
child, the person acting was not seen as the prime mover but rather as
the necessary agent of the unseen prime mover of Physis (Nature). [110]
This differs from the modern world where Physis has been conceptually
subordinated to man who is now perceived as its prime mover.

The role of Physis in early concepts of poiesis brings to mind the

importance of Kairos (appropriate time or timely) within such
intermediary activities. Speusippos stated that Kairos referred to the
appropriate time to accomplish a task, perform a function or fulfil a
need. It is Kairos that determines which action or activity co-operates
with the Agathopraxia (good deed) and as such Kairos is considered the
Ortho Metron (correct measure). Kairos itself is determined by Ananke
(Necessity) who is both a Goddess (according to the Orphics) and a sacred
institution/decree of the Gods (according to Empedokles). Philosophically
Ananke is the compelling nature and force that regulates past, present
and future events. [111] Due to the determining factor of Kairos in
certain activities that deal directly with Physis (Nature) such as
agriculture, midwifery, etc, and regardless of their technical nature
would thus be considered as participation in an agathopraxia (good deed).
The concept of Ananke is central to the determination of aitiês (causes)
and hence what may considered ethical, moral or beneficial praxis and
what may not. The reason for this is simple. Ananke (Necessity) is an
aitia (cause) that is a deep seated impetus for action that governs both
the need for protective footwear as well as the need for politicians who
truly do serve the common good of the people. Any action that is not
caused by Ananke is thus unnecessary.

The criterion of praxis is thus not only an action where its aitia
(cause) is simultaneously its telos (purpose/end) and is self-fulfilling
in its own activity but it is also an action determined by the decree of
the aitia of Ananke (Necessity). The connection of Ananke with both order
and the regulation of desire and appetite may be attested to in the
following example of Plato's criticism of a man for "being a jumble of
desires" while of the same man Socrates says: "There is no 'taxis'
(order) or 'Ananke' (necessity) in his life". [112]
Ananke as Necessity and the Orthos Metron of Kairos is consequently also
associated with Sophrosyne as the Metron of Psyche and the selection of
only that which is required and at the appropriate time.

3.3.4 Theoria, Praxis, Poiesis and the Reconciliation of Opposites

There is a very ancient and common conception concerning duality and

dichotomies found in the Palaios Logos which is as a direct result of the
ontic law of the relation between unity and multiplicity. This common
conception is that which in English is referred to as the tension of the
opposites that derives from the famous quotation from Herakleitos:

"They do not understand how, though at variance with itself, it agrees with itself. It is a backwards-turning
attunement like that of the bow and lyre."
Herakleitos [113]

Every tension of opposing forces is a unity alike unto a unified

structure with the tension of parts that constitute this unity being an
essential component to produce both form and function. It thus only
through the tension of the parts that the multiplicity of parts may
function as a harmonious unity which produces variance while still
allowing each part to retain its own nature and its relational nature
within the unity. The essence of this is found in an Orphic fragment in
which Zeus addresses Mother Nyx.

"And how will all things but as one subsist,

Yet each its nature separate preserve?"

The tension of opposites is a relation of parts within a whole. Examples

of this are;
(a) The relation of the planets to the sun that creates a solar system
(b) The lyre which is constructed by the convergence of two 'arms'.
Energeia (energy/activity) is stored in potential within the frame. To
further unify the structure the strings of a lyre are stretched from the
yoke to the frame (in the manner described in the myth of Hermes who is
the Messenger of the Logos and his construction of the lyre) to produce a
continuum of circular dynamics. Each part causes an opposing reaction in
the other parts while serving the purposes of the unified state. Through
the tension of the strings, the energeia which is stored in potential
within the frame is released as a harmony or actualised.

"Things taken together are whole and not whole, [something which is] being brought together and brought
apart, in tune and out of tune; out of all things there comes a unity; and out of a unity all things."
Herakleitos [114]

If one part within a tension should be removed, the tension that holds
the unity of multiple parts in a form will simultaneously slacken and the
form and function of the unity will exist only in raw potential rather
than actuality. In its place all that will be left is a disparity of
individual parts.

Due to the fact that there are three terms in this particular instance,
theoria, praxis and poiesis are seen within context to the trias (two
terms and a mean) and placed diagrammatically upon the ancient tool of
the metron i.e. the balance beam.

Theoria Praxis Poiesis

These three divisions hence create two separate relations, i.e. praxis to
theoria and praxis to poiesis.

Theoria Praxis Poiesis

Praxis is the mean because Aristotle distinguishes it from both theoria

and poiesis while simultaneously being the common term in both
distinctions. The real tension of the opposites is thus not between
praxis and theoria but between theoria and poiesis. This tension of the
opposites is akin to the opposition between Idealism and Materialism in
that theoria is concerned with the reality underlying the surface
appearance of things while poiesis is concerned with the material reality
and that which reflects life.

"One party is trying to drag everything down to earth, out of the heavens and the unseen, literally grasping
rocks and trees in their hands; for they lay upon every stock and stone and strenuously affirm that real
existence belongs only to that which can be handled and is resistant to touch… And accordingly their
adversaries are very wary in defending their position somewhere in the heights of the unseen, maintaining
with all their force that true reality consists in certain intelligible and bodiless Forms. "
Plato: The Sophist.

It is thus through Aristotle's distinction between praxis and theoria by

way of the essential opposition between praxis and poiesis that he
resolves the tension of the opposites between theoria and poiesis by
illustrating that praxis shares a common characteristic with both; i.e.
(a) praxis and theoria both have their aitia (cause) as their telos (end)
while (b) praxis and poiesis are both physical actions distinguished only
by the difference between acting and making. This distinction is resolved
by praxis as an interactive act with both the underlying reality (as
informed by theoria) and the surface appearance of life (as guided by
poiesis). Praxis is also the means by which poiesis may be improved
ethically and productively by theoria. Simultaneously though its material
nature, poiesis through praxis becomes the foundation of knowledge for
theoria.

Within the ancient Hellenic language, this tension of the opposites is

called the palintonos armonie and as such refers to a counterbalancing
harmony that is stretched equally in all directions. As the palintos
armonie of theoria, praxis and poiesis is a trias (triad) as a unity it
is a triangular number which is diagrammatically illustrated as below:

Praxis

Theoria Poiesis

This is the expansion and contraction of the On (as that which

objectively exists in reality) which is changed into various forms
through the metron (measure) without losing its true identity according
to Herakleitos.

Their unity, however, is indisputable because of the fact that Aristotle

specifically arranges them as a triad which, in Pythagorean terms, is a
triangular number (which is exactly half of oblong numbers) upon which
all interdependent and cyclic/circular harmonies are founded. The
circular harmony of these energeia (theoria, praxis, poiesis) is thus the
foundation of Aristotle's relation of the hexeis (ways of knowing) to the
energeia as both their aitia (cause) and telos (end/purpose/perfection).
This is reasoning supported by Herakleitos' statement concerning the
unification of the opposites:

'The beginning and the end are common on the circumference of a circle.'
Herakleitos [115]

It is also important to note that no formal tension of the opposites is

made by Aristotle between the five hexeis of nous, episteme, sophia,
phronesis and technē. He also specifically states that all five of these
hexeis are ways of knowing through which the Logikon Psyche (as the part
of the human psyche which differentiates us from other animals or plants)
may know Aletheia (as a correspondence of Reason to Reality). It is also
clear from Aristotle that is through the tension of the opposites between
affirmation and denial that these hexeis as aities (causes) find their
telos within their own perfection. It is thus through the tension between
affirmation and denial that the potential within each hexeis i.e. its
energeia is transformed by the metron (measure) into theoria, praxis or
poiesis. The motion of each hexeis through its activity to find its own
perfection/end is thus a refining by distinction process.
Theoria, praxis and poiesis are all thus ways for the potential for
knowing to be known. Together they act as the activities that seek to
know objective reality and as such correspond to Aristotle's tripartite
human Psyche as the activities through which each division of Psyche
interacts with and knows the world. Through poiesis, the basic
requirements for life may be known and perfected while praxis brings the
knowledge of communal co-habitation. Through theoria all things within
the heavens and upon the earth are observed and their underlying patterns
drawn upon to perfect and inform thought and action. Each energeia is
distinct but also interdependent on the others. Their combined effect is
the harmony of the fulfilled Psyche whose potential has been actualised.
The actualisation of this harmony between psyche and its soma (body) is
simultaneously the actualisation of a complete human being. A complete
human being who observes, participates in, interacts with and is an
intermediary of the Orthos Logos, Humanity and the Kosmos in perfect
balance of thought and action and body and soul.

It is through the Divine Law and the beneficial Goodness of the Logos
that all things are ordered and it is within this perfect pattern that
the potential for a fulfilling human life may be known and realised.

Conclusion

Again, every good 'psyche' (soul) uses 'nous' (mind); but no 'soma' (body) can produce 'nous': for how should that
which is without 'nous' produce 'nous'? Again, while the 'psyche' uses the 'soma' as an instrument, it is not in it; just as
the engineer is not in his engines (although many engines move without being touched by any one).
Sallustius - On Gods and the Kosmos

In the end, the true conclusion of whether any modern dichotomy has a
place within the Hellenic religion or whether it is truly representative
of its deepest truths is ultimately the choice of the reader. For one who
chooses to accept the entire corpus of ancient Hellenic works as the
sacred texts which express truth in its entirety, as do the Supreme
Council of Ethnikoi Hellenes and many others (including myself), the
conclusion is quite simple and determined by the comparison between the
modern dichotomy in all its forms and the same words in the Hellenic
language of the ancient texts. It is to these people that I address this
conclusion as it is not my intention to persuade anyone to see the truth
in the Hellenic texts if they do not already. It is also not my intention
to question whether modern dichotomies are truthful for those to whom
they apply but rather to assess whether such modern dichotomies are
truthful within the Hellenic conception of thought and action.

The Social Sciences/Anthropology/Ethnology is the study of humans as

individuals and collectives in diverse cultural settings and at different
periods in time. The basis of the earliest anthropological theories were
entirely epistemological in nature and were concerned with determining
whether human thought was universal or relativistic to culture in nature.
However, actual case studies and research into the universality of
thought have only confirmed approximately thirty elementary human
concepts [116] that are not relativistic to cultural differences. Hence
more modern anthropological theories now mostly adhere to a greater or
lesser degree to varieties of cultural models. In terms of the cultural
models, the uses of abstract principles such as orthodoxy and orthopraxy
as frameworks of reference are not neutral and derive from the
ethnocentric perspective of the observer. As such, epistemological and
ideological dichotomies are heuristic tools through which an observer is
able to measure the ratio and relation of thought and action within a
foreign culture. The ideological dichotomy between thought and action
through Materialism versus Idealism is a very old debate and one that
Aristotle was reconciling when he drew the distinction between theoria
and praxis. However, within anthropology this old theoretical opposition
has gained a new vigour through the growing influence of Marxist
materialism in the West since the 1950's. Marxist materialism
theoretically and methodologically opposes all anthropological theories
that are Idealist in nature. In other words, Marxist materialism opposes
any theory that supports a conception of a true reality based on unseen
principles or ideas. As Materialists, Marxist theory defines culture to
be only behaviour patterns that are overt and observable while denying
the validity or influence of an unseen reality. Research appears to
indicate that it was from the Marxist materialist primacy for orthopraxy
that the dichotomy became a popular framework of reference within
anthropology. As such, orthodoxy and orthopraxy roughly correspond to the
methodological and theoretical opposition between Idealism (orthodoxy)
and Materialism (orthopraxy).

From researching the various ways that orthodoxy and orthopraxy have been
used by anthropologists, I find it perfectly logical to use a dichotomy
between standards of thought as opposed to standards of behavior to
measure the ratio and relation of thought to action within a culture or
religion if both thought and action are represented in an accurate, co-
equal and interconnected manner. This approach has been used admirably by
reputable scholars such as Geertz, Bell or Watson among others.
In the same manner, to my mind, it is not neutral to refuse to note the
patterns of thought in a culture because the observer is a Materialist
and thus culture for them is comprised only of behaviour patterns. In a
culture that truly does have a conception of an unseen reality;
Materialist anthropology would not offer accurate information about the
reality of that culture due to their theoretical perspective. The same
may be said of any binary classification system. For those Hellenes and
Hellenists who accept the Hellenic texts as sacred, any classification by
any scholar who bases their conclusions upon a perceived lack of
canonical writings is both an insult to the ancestral writings and a
misrepresentation of Hellenic religion.

It is also important to note that certain highly respected scholars and

academics dispute the validity of any type of classification and it is
clear that whether such a classification is even supported is determined
by which definition of culture is used within the diversity of
definitions of culture in existence. Classification certainly doesn't
explain anything and in a religion and culture like the ancient Hellenic,
explanation is a vital part of the worldview and the ethos. In the end,
these theoretical oppositions within the Social Sciences remain the
heuristic tools and strategies of analysis for observers while, generally
speaking, most members of any collective being observed will not abandon
their own religion's epistemological answers about thought and the
impetus for human action in favour of an external classification. It
would also be a pity to see any religious collective fracture into
theoretical camps based on modernist dichotomies.

In terms of Christian theology, it is evident that the dichotomy between

correct thought and correct action is not dichotomised within Eastern
Orthodoxy which has retained some of the Hellenic complementary nature of
thought and action. It is also clear from this perspective that there can
be no correct action without correct thought to guide it and logically a
standardisation of action requires a standardisation of thought to
support the correct action and prevent endless diverse interpretations.

It is also self-evident from the comparative study of the three parts of

this essay that there is little but the most basic resemblance between
how the Hellenic terms are used by the ancients as to how they are used
by scholars and Christianity in the West. This is due to the redefinition
of praxis by Hegel, the North American Pragmatists and Marx.

An English dictionary [117] defines praxis to be:

Exercise or discipline for a specific purpose; practical application of
rules as distinguished from theory.

A Hellenic dictionary [118] defines praxis to be:

Praxis derives from the verb pratto which means to act. It refers
directly to the activity of taking action or 'acting. In its ancient
Hellenic form praxis is distinguished from poio (to construct/make). In
an Aristotelian sense the distinction between pratto and poio is used to
specialise the word praxis to denote only those actions whose cause is
phronesis (practical wisdom/common sense) and whose ends are phronesis.

The English grammatical opposition between praxis and theory is carried

forward into and further compounded by the terms orthodoxy and orthopraxy
in their modern English dichotomised form which is firmly based on
Christian theological and post Enlightenment ideological definitions.

In an English dictionary, orthodoxy and orthopraxy are defined to be:

Orthodoxy:
1. Belief in established doctrine
2. Agreement with accepted standards, established doctrines, ideas
Orthopraxy:
1. Correct action
2. Theologically in its earliest form refers to participation in Church
sacraments and regular attendance of Church. Later it developed into an
action which was worthy of the call of God and conformed to the image of
Christ. In its modern and generalised theological form orthopraxia has
come to mean literally the right practice as the reflective and
responsive action or the practical reflection of the knowledge gained
through one's concrete experience or reflection on the truth of
Christian faith in love and justice.

While in the Hellenic dictionary, orthodoxia and orthopraxia are defined

to be:
Orthodoxia:
(1) The correct opinion and action in agreement with specific principles
such as political or economic principles, etc.
(2) The correct religious opinion in opposition to the heretical
opinions; the teachings and dogma of the Orthodox Church.
The antonyms for orthodoxia are: heterodoxia (other and distinctive
religious dogma foreign to a country wherein it is found) and kakodoxia
(bad opinion).

Orthopraxis:
The correct deed; (for one) to act correctly. The dictionary also
includes the following statement: Η ορθοδοξία είναι και ορθοπραξία which
means orthodoxia is also orthopraxia, i.e. orthodoxy and orthopraxy are
interconnected and inseparable from one another as there is no such
thing as correct action without correct thought.
The usage of classificatory terms such as praxis, orthodoxy and
orthopraxy within their modern Western definitions may thus be seen as
problematic in conjunction with the foundation of the Hellenic Logos as
exemplified by the Hellenic language due to the usage of the same or
similar words with different meanings and grammatical antonyms.
Sallustius emphasises the importance of common conceptions and it would
be highly confusing and misleading to newcomers of the religion if they
should be confronted by classifications of the Hellenic religion that do
not precisely reflect the meaning of the word within the Hellenic
language. This is especially important when one considers that
kyriologia (precise wording) is a grammatical virtue. One such instance
is the translation of doxa in both the Social Sciences and Christian
theology to mean opinion, thought, or belief. This is simply not entirely
true of its Hellenic meaning and is thus imprecise. Doxa does refer to
opinion and specifically to opinion based on subjective awareness.
Parmenides determines doxa to be awareness of only the surface appearance
of things. Within this context, it is cannot be associated with theoria
that is an awareness/comprehension of an underlying or higher reality.
The association of doxa with theoria is thus highly imprecise. By this
definition, even doctrines, in the English sense of the word, because of
the reason that supports them cannot accurately be referred to as doxa.
However, the word doxa has another meaning too (and one that is not
included in its English form) and as such it refers to any form of praise
that expresses one's opinion. Doxa refers thus to personal or communal
praise within a hymn or prayer to a God or Goddess as well as a
compliment one may give to another person. Doxa in its Hellenic form does
not include any form of inferential knowledge thus an opinion that is
reasoned and supported by reason is not considered doxa but is rather
considered knowledge as gnosis or even episteme (depending on how
verifiable the knowledge is). To state that inferential knowledge was
merely doxa would be the negation of Reason. Doxa is however a support of
Psyche (soul) according to Pythagoras and is an important process in the
activity of knowing therefore cannot be discounted or negated within the
modern religion.

Simultaneously, the English praxis and the English orthopraxy which both
include an inherent opposition to theory is even more imprecise because
through its negation of theory is becomes antithetical to the term Logos
which includes the capacity to theorise within its general meaning. As
the ancient Hellenic civilisation was called the Civilisation of the
Logos it would be a contradiction in terms to classify it with a term
whose meaning in English would include an opposition to theory. Even in
the modern Hellenic language praxis does not stand in opposition to
theoria. In the ancient Hellenic language, praxis (through pratto) stands
in opposition to poiō (making/constructing). In a Hellenic grammatical
sense the opposition between praxis and theoria is inaccurate. It is only
in the Aristotelian distinction between theoria and praxis (which serves
a specific philosophical and ethical purpose) that this distinction is
made and resolved simultaneously because of the common conception of not
only the meaning and etymology of words but also the ontic law of the
relation of multiplicity to unity.
As has been illustrated in this essay, the epistemological and
ideological influences within the use of these terms by some scholars in
the Social Sciences is indisputable and especially for those whom
orthodoxy is determined by Western standards of Heiroi Logoi (Sacred
Texts). There is an irony in such a classification when one properly
purveys the ancient texts which indicate ample evidence of many accepted
standards, ideas and beliefs of a highly formulated nature. If one should
consider a comparative study of what Marcus Terentius Varro (Divine
Antiquities Frags. 6-10) wrote of ritual orthopraxis in Etruscan and
later Roman religion to be a relevant study of the norms of ritual
praxis that may have too applied to Hellenic religion. It is then
important to note that he referred to the strict observance of what Gods
had to be approached by which priests in which cults and under which
circumstances in which places. Varro called this ritual orthopraxis
'civic theology'. [119] If the Hellenic Gods and the temples or altars
dedicated to them with different epithets are seen within the context of
Varro's definition, there is further evidence of formulated and
established Hellenic religious thought that guided just any action into
becoming a correct action. It is also evidence of a highly organised
communal religious life that may not have been pan-hierarchical but was
nonetheless structured and orderly. The common perceptions of the Gods in
the forms of their proper names, epithets and spheres of activity are
what the Christian theologians would term established doctrines. There is
also little doubt of the presence of fundamental principles that underlie
and support Hellenic religious beliefs when one considers the fact that
each God or Goddess had not only a proper name and epithets but also a
Theotēta which is the abstract meaning of a Theos or Thea as a totality
of their attributes. The Hellenic ontology which is based on reason would
also be considered established doctrine by Christian standards. There is
also the historical example of the committee commissioned by Ipparkhos,
son of Pesistratos in Athens in 6th century BCE to collect together
firstly Homeric fragments and secondly Orphic fragments. One of the
leading members of this committee named Onomakritos was accused by Lasos
of interpolating his own lines into an Orphic text and was exiled (for a
period of time) from Athens. Such a severe punishment for 'selective
insertion' is indeed confirmation that firmly established writings were
not open to adjustment. [120] In other words, new works may be added but
the old works may not be changed. There is also emphasis placed on Ortho
Logos, ortho metron and orthognosia by many of the philosophers and the
Palaios Logos remains, all at once, common reason, a cohesive foundation
and a guiding principle in the development of Hellenic language and
thought. Simultaneously the importance of orthopraxia as a consequence of
orthognosia is a central tenet of the Hellenic kosmotheasis as is evident
by the example of the usage of the Delphic Maxims within the education
system to teach not only the correct knowledge of the language but also
the correct knowledge to produce correct actions.

Within my reasoning and based upon the research used within this essay, I
am forced to conclude that the inclusion of scholarly theoretical
oppositions and religious or secular reform movements within the ancient
Hellenic religion are completely unnecessary. I am also forced to
conclude that defining and classifying the Hellenic religion in terms of
the Christian conceptions of orthodoxy and orthopraxy in its modern
Western form is inappropriate.

For those of us who accept the corpus of Hellenic writings as our sacred
texts and allow the wise and truthful words of the ancestors to guide our
thoughts and actions to find our highest potential in accordance with the
Orthos Logos and Physis, the heuristic tools of external epistemological
enquiry and Christian rhetoric is needless when the reason, profundity
and beauty of the ancient Hellenic writings provide ample epistemological
answers concerning Logos, Nous and the potentials and actualisations of
Psyche. Both external classifications and these new orthopraxies are
foreign to Hellas and a highly probable source of miasma considering the
essential opposition to theoria and the complete negation of poiesis that
they bring with them.

The true implication of any de-emphasis of theoria in Aristotelian terms

is dire; for without the energeia (activity) of theoria, the Nous,
Sophia and Episteme will simultaneously be de-emphasised. Without Nous,
the Logos will be rendered insensible and unknowable. Without Episteme,
all secure knowledge will be lost and everything will descend into purely
a matter of opinion or belief. Without Sophia which is the source of
human Reason and Aletheia as the correspondence of reason to reality, the
highest wisdoms will be lost to us and our means to know truth will
remain unrealised. This would mean the simultaneous loss of the Hellenic
worldview, the theologia, the ontologia and all of the explanations the
Ancestors left to us of why things are the way they are.
The simultaneous de-emphasis on poiesis will be a loss of creative
expression, allegoria, mythos, hymnos, craft, skill and production that
is one of the central means by which a culture evolves.

I am therefore in agreement with those who state that this new orthopraxy
is purely and simply deconstructionism.

It is my earnest hope that those who truly care for the Hellenic Gods,
religion and the civilisation of the Logos will accept and embrace the
full potential of the human Psyche (soul) and to understand theoria,
praxis and poiesis as co-equal, interdependent and complementary
activities through which the harmony of each Hellenic psyche may be
actualised. They are also the means by which the innate talents and
abilities within all modern Hellenes may be actualised into productive
and thriving communities where all the gifts of Psyche are honoured
equally. Without a balance between them, we will be less than we could or
should be.

It is through the Logos that we may each come to know orthognosia and
orthopraxia. We should not choose between them and we have our entire
lifetime (and perhaps many more) to strive towards them. They are
something we have to each come to know for ourselves and in our own time,
it is not something that can be enforced on anyone. To find them we need
look no further than the corpus of ancient Hellenic works and the thought
and action they inspire within us. Orthognosia and orthopraxia are both
equally important and inseparable from the Logos. The Gods willingly
afford us the freedom, happiness and potential to fulfil both as a
consequence of being ensouled in life. Together, orthognosia and
orthopraxia are the most perfect and complete expression of the Logos
that we may aspire to.

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