MOISES JOCSON, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON- date of the registration w/the Register of Deeds.
n w/the Register of Deeds. All documents actually &
VASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents
Petition for Certiorari to review CA decision [February 16, 1989]
Facts:
 Spouses Emilio Jocson & Alejandra Poblete had 2 children: Moises Jocson &
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is married to Ernesto Vasquez. Alejandra
died intestate.
 April 1, 1972 – Emilio died intestate.
 June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing validity of 3 documents
executed by Emilio during his lifetime. He prays that the following be declared
null & void and that the properties involved be partitioned bet him & his sister:
1. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein Emilio sold to Agustina 6
parcels of land in Naic, Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included Emilio’s
manifestation that the lands was sold at a low price because it was his
loving, helpful & thoughtful daughter who bought the property. He says his
son possesses such qualities too. He further claims that the sale did not
violate any law & that he did not touch his wife’s properties. He
acknowledged receipt of payment.
2. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling 2 rice mills & a camalig in
Naic, Cavite to Agustina for P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged receipt too.
3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition & Adjudication w/Sale executed March 9,
1969 wherein Emilio & Agustina, excluding Moises, extrajudicially
partitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing such into 3. Emilio sold
his share to Agustina.
 All documents were executed before a notary public. Nos. 1 & 2 were registered
w/the Register of Deeds. Old certificates were cancelled & new certificates
issued in the name of Agustina.
 Moises allegations:
1. #1 is null & void because his father’s consent was obtained by fraud,
deceit, undue pressure, influence & other illegal machinations. He also
alleges that property was sold for a simulated price considering that his
sister had no work or livelihood of her own. Also, he claims that the
contract is fictitious, simulated & fabricated.
2. Same allegations re #2 & #3 with additional allegation that he was
deliberately excluded & they intended to defraud him of his legitimate
share. He also claims that defendants were employed in their parents’
business & they must have used business earnings or simulated
consideration in order to purchase the properties.
3. No real sale between dad & daughter living under same roof.
4. Dad didn’t need money since sold properties were all income-producitng.
5. #1 & #2 are unliquidated conjugal properties that Emilio can’t validly sell.
6. #3: he only questions sale of dad’s share to sister but not extrajudicial
partition.
 RTC: decided in favor of petitioner. Documents were simulated & fictitious
because: 1) no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties, 2) prices were
grossly inadequate tantamount to lack of consideration at all, 3) improbability
of sale considering circumstances. Designed to exclude Moises. Declared #1 &
#2 properties as conjugal by virtue of registration papers w/c
declared: “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete.” Ordered
registration of prop to 2 children.
 CA: reversed. Nos. 1 & 2 barred by prescription because annulment of contract
based on fraud must be filed 4 yrs from discovery of such w/c begins on the
intended to be binding & effective against Emilio. Proof of such: issuance of new
titles. Partition w/sale in #3 is valid since it was done in accordance w/New CC
Art. 996 on intestate succession & Moises’ 1/3 has not been prejudiced.
ISSUES & RATIO:
1. WON suit is solely based on fraud and as such is barred by prescription
NO. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as when consent’s obtained by fraud
is voidable (CC Art. 1330) & action for annulment must be filed w/in 4 yrs from time
of discovery of fraud (CC Art. 1391 par.4). Discovery means the time when contract
was registered w/Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman).
If this was the only consideration, then it is barred by prescription. But he further
assailed that sale was w/o consideration since amount paid were merely simulated.
Contracts w/o cause or consideration produce no effect whatsoever (CC Art. 1352).
A sale w/simulated price is void (CC Art. 1471 & 1409[3]) and action for declaration
of its nullity does not prescribe (CC Art. 1410).
2. WON sales were w/o consideration.
NO. Since Moises alleges such, it is incumbent upon him to prove his allegations,
especially since documents show that his dad (vendor) acknowledged receipt of
price & they are notarized. He failed to do so and thus he was not able to overcome
the presumption that a contract is with consideration (CC Art. 1354). Even his own
witness contradicted his claim that his sister & her husband had no source of
income. Witness Bagnas said that Agustina & Ernesto were into buy & sell of palay &
rice. Even he himself said that he didn’t know if his sister had other businesses.
Agustina testified that she was into buy & sell even prior to her marriage.
3. WON prices were simulated
NO. No proof of inadequacy of price. In fact, purchase price was higher than
assessed value (#1: P10k vs. P8920.00, #2 P5k vs. P3,500, and #3 P8k vs.
P24,840.00). Besides difference bet market value & purchase price is
understandable considering father’s filial love for his daughter. Gross inadequacy of
price alone does not affect the contract except perhaps an indication of defect in
consent (CC Art. 1470). No proof of defective consent.
4. WON sale is improbable.
NO. Improbability of sale is purely speculative. Not relevant considering that all
essential requirements for contract are clearly present: consent, object & cause.
5. WON properties in #1 & #2 were conjugal properties of Emilio & wife.
NO. CC Art. 160 provides that all property of marriage is presumed to belong to CP
unless proven otherwise. Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for party
who invokes this to prove that properties were indeed acquired during the marriage
(Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin). Thus, Moises has to present proof that properties in
question were indeed obtained during the marriage of their parents before he can
invoke the presumption. However, titles used by RTC in declaring properties as CP
(see RTC decision in bold letters) are insufficient proof. Doesn’t say when properties
were obtained. Acquisition of title (actual owning of land) is different from
registration. Possible that Emilio acquired properties when he was still a bachelor &
only registered such after marriage.
“Married to” phrase is a mere description of Emilio’s civil status at the time of
registration (Litam v Rivera). It should be interpreted as Emilo is the owner,
property registered in his name alone & that he is married. Consistent w/principle
that registration of property in name of only one spouse doesn’t negate possibility of
it being conjugal (Bucoy vs. Paulino). Both require sufficient, clear & convincing
proof to rebut the presumption. Moises should have presented sufficient proof to
show that properties were acquired during the marriage so that he may enjoy the
presumption under Art. 160. Due to lack of proof, presumption does not exist, thus,
properties are considered exclusive to Emilio.
HOLDING: Petition dismissed. CA affirmed.
FRANCISCO v. CA
299 SCRA 188 (1998)
Facts:
 Teresita (petitioner), is Eusebio’s (private respondent) legal wife second
marriage. Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco (private
respondents) are children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
 Teresita’s allegations:
o Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, they’ve acquired properties in Barangay
Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal.
o These properties were administered by Eusebio til he was invalidated on
account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, which rendered him unfit to
administer them.
o Private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general
power of attorney which authorized Conchita to administer the house and lot
together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal.
 Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of
attorney, thus enjoining its enforcement and sought to be declared
administratrix of properties in dispute.
 RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding that Teresita did not show that
said properties were acquired during the second marriage, or that they
pertained exclusively to her. As such, those properties belong exclusively to
Eusebio, and he has the capacity to administer them. On appeal, CA affirmed
this decision. Teresita files this petition, claiming that:
o CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of new CC as said title has
already been repealed by art. 253, FC
o It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC
 However, issue in Teresita’s reply: WON Art. 116, FC applies to this case as Art.
253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil
Code" 4
Issue: WON properties are not conjugal but capital properties of Eusebio
exclusively.
Held and Ratio:
 Yes. Petition denied. Arts. 158 and 160, New CC have been repealed by the FC,
specifically by Art. 254, FC (not Art. 253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 in
relation to Art. 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art. 158&160 doesn’t operate to
prejudice or otherwise affect prior vested rights. Rights accrued and vested
while these articles were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then be
resolved based on provisions of New CC.
 Art. 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this presumption must
first show proof of acquisition during the coverture (marriage). The presumption
refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate
when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with strong,
clear and convincing evidence showing exclusive ownership of one of the
spouses.
 In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the
properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage
with Eusebio.
 As regard land in Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut Eusebio’s testimony that
he inherited the same from his parents. She even admitted that Eusebio brought
into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it
was not yet registered in his name.
 Whether Eusebio inherited the property before or after his 2nd marriage is
inconsequential as the property should be regarded as his own exclusively,
pursuant to Art. 148, New CC.
 Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties acquired gratuitously and
include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance,
devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio's
acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the
land would still be his "exclusive property" because it was acquired by him,
"during the marriage, by lucrative title."
 As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner showed building permits for the
house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of
Eusebio and the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone
in support of her claim that it was conjugal property. These, however, do not
prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. The
fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to
whether or not the property is conjugal or not. They even counter her claim as
her documents all described Eusebio as the owner of the structures (Art. 1431,
New CC; Rule 129(4), Revised Rules on Evidence).
 Further, she cannot argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of
Eusebio has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the
proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their partnership (Art.
158(2), New CC). Presumption of conjugality for lack of absence of evidence on
the source of funding (Art. 160, New CC) cannot be invoked because there is
also lack in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage.
 Certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim over the property at
San Isidro is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of
"Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the property
was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. Registration merely confirms title already existing
and phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio.
 Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator of the properties
considering that the assets are exclusively his capital. Even if the properties are
conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not so ill as
to incapacitate him to administer property.
Efren Mendoza, Inocencia Mendoza, petitioners
vs
Ponciano S. Reyes
1983
Ponciano Reyes is the husband of Julia de Reyes who executed a deed of sale of 2
parcels of land with their improvements in favor of (petitioners) spouses Mendoza.
The land in question was bought on installment basis from JM Tuazon & Co. ages were already registered in Registry of Deeds by the time the contract of lease
represented by G. Araneta. Since the spouses were always in arrears in the was registered. Moreover, they initially demanded Ponciano’s consent when they
payment of the said land because of lack of money, they had to borrow from RFC leased the property but dismissed it upon sale. How stupid was that?
(Rehab’n Finance Corp’n). Thus, they loaned money for purposes of completing the
construction of a one-storey building and paying balance of price of lot. A
corresponding deed of absolute sale, in which Julia Reyes was named as vendee and
her husband signed under the phrase, “with my marital consent,” was executed by
Araneta on Nov 1948. From thereon, the sps secured another loan for the payment
of balance of lot and additional security, for the defrayment of the expenses
incurred in the repairs, etc. As a result the transfer certificates of said lots issued by
Registry of Deeds was in the name of “Julia Reyes married to Ponciano Reyes.”

The mortgage contracts executed by sps in favor of RFC were duly registered as
well. SPS put up a school and a camarin in the lots. When the school was
transferred someplace else, the camarin was leased to Mendoza sps in 1952 for ten
years. Th contract of lease was signed by Julia as lessor with marital consent of
Ponciano. Because of failure to pay their obligations to RFC, sps asked for extension
on their obligation and was granted such.

On March 1961, while they were separated in fact and her husband was in
Pampanga, Julia sold the lots to the Mendoza sps without the knowledge and
consent of her H.

WON the deed of sale was null and void on grounds that the property is conjugal
property, which means the W is prohibited from selling such without consent of
spouse.

WON issue of estoppel can be raised against Ponciano

First Issue:
YUP.
1. Property is conjugal following the presumption found in A160, CC, which
states that all property of the M must be presumed to belong to the CP
unless it be proved that it pertains to exclusive property of sps. This
presumption is strong as stated in A153, CC, which provides that such
presumption must be overcome by one who contends otherwise. The only
character that they could come up with to rebut the presumpt’n is Julia
whose testimony is contrary to Araneta’s records as well as info on
mortgage contracts (which are favorable to her H).
2. It was acquired by onerous title during M and the funds used to purchase
the lots, which are funds from loan secured by both spouses from RFC,
were conjugal funds (A161, CC, all debts and obligations contracted by the
H and W for benefit of CP are liabilities of partnership).

Second Issue:
NO. The principle of estoppel rests on rule that whenever a party has intentionally
led the other to believe a particular thing true to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising from his act, declaration or omission, falsify it. It can be
invoked only between persons making the misrepresentation and person to whom
such misrepresentation is addressed. There is no showing that Ponciano led the
Mendozas to believe that the land wasn’t conjugal…
On their good faith, they can’t be considered to have acted with such because the
RFC mortg
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition
appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of
the spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from
the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each
spouse;
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the
finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the
number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting.
However, losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc. [January 8, 1973]
Motion for Reconsideration of a decision of the Supreme Court
Facts:
 Mr. Zulueta, Mrs. Zulueta and Ms. Zulueta were passengers of Pan Am.
 Mr. Zulueta left the terminal and went to the beach in search for a place
that would be suitable for his purpose (where it would not be visible for the
people in the plane and in the terminal). He came to a place abound 400
yards away from the terminal.
 Mr Zulueta was gone for almost one hour (but before the plain left) and
Pan Am was contending that it could have not taken him that long relieve
himself and that there were 8 commodes at the terminal toilet for men.
(his search for a place to answer the call of nature)
 Capt. Zentner claims that Mr. Zulueta has been off-loaded “due to drinking”
and belligerent attitude but according to plaintiff (Zulueta) the order to off-
load all Zuluetas, their luggage and overcoats and other effects
handcarried by them came as a result of the altercation that happened
between Capt. Zentner and Mr. Zulueta when the latter was not cowed by
the arrogant tone of Capt. Zentner.
 After Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, Capt. Zentner had the intention of
keeping him stranded for a minimum period of one week at a cost of
$13.30 per day.
 Mrs. Zulueta filed for the dismissal of the case as far as she is concerned
because she settled all her differences with Pan Am for P50,000
Issues
1. WON the amount of damages awarded were excessive
2. WON Mr. Zulueta has the right to recover moral or exemplary damages
3. PERSONS ISSUE: WON the non-enforce of the compromise agreement
between the defendant and Mrs. Zulueta was valid. NO
Ratio:
1. NO
 Award for damages is purely academic value.
 Zuluetas had a contact of carriage with Pan Am which binds the latter, for a
substantial monetary consideration paid by the Zuluetas, to transport them
to Manila with utmost diligence. Pan Am did not only fail to comply with its
obligation but they also acted in a manner calculated to humiliate Mr.
Zulueta, chastise him, make him suffer, and cause him the greatest
possible inconvenience, by leaving him in a desolate island.
2. YES
 Exemplary damages are not recoverable in quasi-delicts except when the
defendant has acted with gross negligence. In the present case, the agent
of Pan Am has acted with malice and evident bad faith. If gross negligence
warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason it is
imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and
tainted with bad faith.
3. NO
 The payment that was made to Mrs. Zulueta is effective insofar as it is
deductible from the award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount
due) from the defendant with or without its compromise agreement with
Mrs. Zulueta. It is ineffective insofar as the conjugal partnership is
concerned.
 Article 113 of the Civil Code provides that the husband must be joined in
all suits by or against the wife except (2) if they have in fact been
separated for at least one year. – This provision refers to suits in which the
wife is the principal or real party in interest. In this case it is the husband
that us the main party in interest, both as the person principally aggrieved
and as administrator of the conjugal partnership he having acted in this
capacity when he entered into the contract of carriage with Pan Am and
paid the amount due with funds from the conjugal partnership to which the
amount recoverable for breach of the contract belong.
 She is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership,
before the dissolution thereof. She cannot even acquire any property by
gratuitous title, without the husband’s consent, except from her
ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the
fourth degree.
 The law does not favour a settlement with one of the spouses, both of
whom are plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such as the defense
of the rights of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect,
of the compromise is to jeopardize “the solidarity of the family”.
 The award was made in their favour collectively. Presumption is that the
purpose of the trip was for the common benefit of the spouses and that the
money had come from the conjugal funds, for, unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
 Pan Am claims that the damages are not among those forming part of the
conjugal partnership pursuant to art. 153 of the CC.
Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of
the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work, or as salary of the spouses, or
of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interests received or due during the marriage, coming from
the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse. (1401)
 Damages have arisen from a breach of plaintiffs’ contract of carriage with
the defendant, for which the plaintiffs paid their fare with funds
presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership. Damages fall under
paragraph (1)
 Art. 148 does not include damages as exclusive property of each spouse
Art. 148. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other
property belonging to only one of the spouses;
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.
(1396)
 Defendant claims that the use of conjugal funds to redeem property does
not make the property redeemed conjugal if the right of redemption
pertained to the wife. No proof that right of redemption pertains to the
wife.
→ Victoria’s will: bequeathed to sps Aranas & Villanueva, and to the illegit children
of her H all of her interests, rights and properties, real&personal, as her net
share from conjugal partnership w/ H.
ISSUES:
1) WON Villanueva had right over Lot 13-C and improvements thereon by virtue of
Victoria’s will
2) WON improvements on said lot was conjugal
HELD: Judgment affirmed. Jesus Bernas deemed to have acquired indefeasible &
clear title to Lot 13-C him having acquired it by a regular, untainted mortgage sale.
RATIO:
1) No, Victoria died 2 yrs ahead of her H. She never inherited any part of Lot 13-
C w/c she could bequeath by will to anybody. Moreover, even if Modesto’s
acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took place during the marriage, the lot
would still be regarded as his own exclusive, private property because it was
acquired during the marriage by lucrative title.
2) If improvements on Lot 13-C were conjugal, Villanueva may have acquired a
right over them by succession. However, proof as regards when the
improvements were made on the exclusive property and the source of funds
used were not presented. Therefore, the presumption that it belongs
exclusively to the H stands.

Consolacion Villanueva v. The Intermediate Appellate Court, sps Jesus

Bernas & Remedios Bernas (1990)
Petition for review from the judgment of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court

FACTS:
→ Sps Graciano Aranas & Nicolasa Bunsa were owners in fee simple of Lot 13.
→ Upon their death, their children, Modesto & Federico Aranas, adjudicated the
land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial partition. N portion belonged
to Federico, and S portion, described as Lot 13-C under Torrens title in
Modesto’s name.
→ Modesto’s W Victoria died in July ’71. Modesto himself died in April ’73. They
had no children.
→ However, it appeared that Modesto was survived by 2 illegitimate children
named Dorothea Aranas Ado & Teodoro Aranas. The 2 borrowed PhP18K from
respondent Jesus Bernas
→ In the loan, as security, they, as absolute co-owners, mortgaged to Bernas Lot
13-C. Raymundo Aranas, a relative was there as witness.
→ The siblings failed to pay the loan. Bernas then acquired ownership over the
land, cancelled the siblings’ title and issued another in his name.
→ About a month later, witness Raymundo Aranas & his sp Consolacion Villanueva
filed a complaint w/ RTC of Roxas City asking that they be declared co-owners
of the land and title of Jesus Bernas over Lot 13-C be cancelled on the ground
of their alleged discovery of 2 wills.
→ Modesto’s will: bequeathed to his illegit children all his own capital property &
all interest in his conjugal partnership w/ W Victoria .