ANTITANK

Towed antitank guns should be well to the front and located to cover likely avenues of enemy tank
approach. They must be emplaced so that they cannot be seen beyond their lethal anti-tank range. Self-
propelled anti-tank weapons should be held in reserve to intervene against enemy armored attacks. They
should locate routes to and firing positions from probable sites of future activities. All anti-tank guns
should be trained to fire as field artillery and be provided with a large proportion of high -explosive
shells. (GS Patton, WWII)

The German tanks would appear in the desert and thus attract the attention of their British opposite
numbers, which would sally forth in pursuit. The Germans would stage a fighting withdrawal, the British
would charge after them and then the German anti-tank gun ambush would open fire and that would be
the end of the action. (GerWWII)

The tendency to split up antitank units completely, to have a proportion of antitank firepower
everywhere, is wrong. The smallest unit permissible is the half-platoon. (two guns), except for defense of
streets for which less may be employed. (Ger WWII)

Companies in their entirety, or at least whole platoons, should cover likely tank approaches. To use a
single anti tank gun is to invite destruction. Other terrain over which tanks might approach will be
covered by mines, obstacles or tank-destruction detachments. (GerWWII)

Antitank units will normally be in support; they must be given definite tasks and allowed to make their
own tactical dispositions. (GerWWII)

Engagement of even worthwhile infantry targets must be the exception rather than the rule. Such
employment is limited by lack of mobility, by the bulkiness of the gun as a target, by the sensitivity of
the barrel which is subjected to great strain , and finally by the smallness of high explosive shells. In
addition, accuracy diminishes with bore wear. (GerWWII)

On the move, regimental antitank companies are normally distributed throughout march groups by
platoons--one platoon always with the advance party. No heavy antitank guns should be with the point ,
as too much time is needed to bring them into action. Divisional antitank battalions re normally brought
forward as a body. (GerWWII)

In assembling, locate in areas from which the final movement can also be protected; local protection
should be by machine guns. Positions for antitank guns not immediately employed will be reconnoitered
and prepared. Antitank warning arrangements must be made by the officer commanding the antitank unit
detailed for local protection. Advantage will be taken of unexpected gains of ground to push forward the
antitank defenses.(GerWWII)

In attack, antitank units follow the advancing infantry in areas likely to favor tank counterattacks,
moving from cover to cover in such a manner that the antitank guns always have advantageous positions.
The leading infantry must not be beyond the range of the antitank guns. As many guns as possible must
be ready to fire simultaneously There must be close liaison between the antitank units and the infantry
before and during the attack. When the objective has been reached, or if the attack is held up, a solid belt
of antitank defenses must be organized immediately This is the responsibility of the antitank unit
commander. (GerWWII)

In defensive operations, an antitank defense plan will be drawn up by the responsible antitank
commander. Location of the main defensive belt must give the antitank guns suitable fields of fire. ; This
is a prerequisite for effective antitank support for the infantry. Antitank positions must be established at
some distance to the rear. These positions must be camouflaged so they will not be seen and concentrated
on before the attack. However , in the selection of positions, it must be remembered that these should be
sufficiently far forward to cover the ground in front of the main defensive belt. Normally, regimental
antitank companies are forward and divisional antitank units are to the rear. (GerWWII)
Alternative and dummy positions are essential for continued surprise. Mines and obstacles should be used
in suitable areas. Tank hunting detachments should be held ready in villages, wooded areas, and close
country. Nests of antitank guns under one unified command should be set up Units arriving subsequently
will be incorporated in the general antitank defense plan. (GerWWII)

Open fire as late as possible. Do not be deceived by feint attacks. Use one uniform system of tank
warning. It is important to keep in contact with artillery OP's. Take advantage of all radio and telephone
facilities. Tank warnings have priority over everything. If there is any possibility of creating an antitank
reserve, the reserve units must reconnoiter a number of possible positions and prepare them for
occupation. (GerWWII)

If we can give the infantry divisions first fifty, then a hundred, then two hundred 75mm anti-tank guns
each and install them in carefully-prepared positions, covered by large minefields, we shall be able to
halt the Russians. The anti-tank guns can be quite simple; all that is necessary is that they should be able
to penetrate any Russian tank up to a reasonable range and at the same time be usable as an infantry gun.
Now, let us suppose that the Russians attack in a heavily-mined sector where our anti-tank guns are
forming a screen, say six miles deep, then--for all their mass of material--they are bound to bog down in
the first few days and, from then on, they'll have to gnaw their way through slowly. Meanwhile we shall
be installing more anti-tank guns behind our screen. If the enemy makes three miles' progress a day, we'll
build six miles depth of anti-tank screens and let him run himself to a standstill. We'll be fighting in the
cover of our positions, he'll be attacking in the open. We'll lose guns and he'll lose tanks. To move the
guns we can use Russian horses or any other makeshift we can lay our hands on. That's what the Russians
do and we must adopt their methods. Our last chance in the East lies in equipping our army thoroughly
for an unyielding defense. (Rommel, WWII)

In the rifle division this concern shows particularly in anti-tank armament. In addition to the newly
acquired short range rocket launcher in each squad, and a small number of 57mm guns in each regiment,
the division has an anti-tank battalion of heavier pieces. Armored self-propelled guns are incorporated in
the rifle regiment and in the divisional armored regiment respectively. (USSR, Cold War)

The anti-tank gun was an excellent multi-purpose weapon, since it could be used with great effect as a
direct-fire accompanying gun in the attack or as a light field piece, besides fulfilling its primary mission,
the anti-tank gun, organic down to the battalion level and often attached to companies, formed the
backbone of the entire Soviet forward defensive system. (USSR,WWII)

Anti-tank artillery is not grouped in the same manner as field artillery, but its fires are included in the
over-all artillery fire plan at each successive command level. (USSR,WWII)

In each echelon from regiment up, anti-tank mobile reserves of increasing strength were formed. These
reserves, which were normally composed of anti-tank artillery, engineers, infantry tank-hunter teams,
and heavy field-pieces or assault guns, were used to break up tank and infantry counterattacks. Employed
successively in depth, such reserves proved their worth time and time again. (USSR,WWII)

Anti-tank artillery is based on towed anti-tank guns, but skillful use is made of engineers, assault-guns,
heavy artillery pieces and infantry tank-hunter teams. Combined arms units were held at all levels from
regiment up, to serve as mobile anti-tank reserves, while organic anti-tank guns in the front line units
serve to reduce the initial impetus of the hostile armored onslaught. (USSR,WWII)

Anti-tank artillery in defense, as well as in attack, worked in close coordination with engineers and
assault guns. Mobile anti-tank reserves--composed of anti-tank units, supported by motorized engineers
for mine laying and obstacle work and reinforced by attachment of individual heavy artillery pieces or
assault guns----were thrown in the path of enemy armored units which had penetrated the Soviet lines.
When possible, such units were enticed into so-called "fire sacks", where the Russians could pour direct
fire on them from three sides at close range. (USSR,WWII)

Why towed anti-tank guns were preferred to SP:

 1) easier and cheaper to make, more idiot proof to maintain
2)lower silhouette; easier to hide and harder to hit
3)units were used in two situations
a. in offense to protect the shoulders of a penetration
b. in defense to stop an enemy penetration
in both situations higher command would prefer them to be unable to withdraw and to be forced
to
stop the enemy at all costs ("Suvorov", COLD WAR)

Antitank Fire Plan antitank fire planning is detailed and is coordinated at the highest possible level.
Antitank weapons are held by infantry regiments and divisions (armored divisions and independent
armored regiments rely on their tanks for antitank fire) Flanks and tank approaches are covered by
mutually supporting antitank weapons sited in depth. (Chicom, COLD WAR)

Antitank Reserves Regimental and divisional antitank reserves are formed in both the attack and the
defense. These reserves are made op of both guns and tanks and will include an engineer unit to lay
minefield ii threatened areas. The role of the anti tank reserve is to deploy rapidly to meet tank threats.
(Chicom, COLD WAR)

Divisional Antitank Force. The Chinese may use an artillery support group (possibly battery size) in the
antitank role. It will be sited to cover the most likely enemy thrusts or to cover a killing zone into which
enemy armor has been purposely canalized. (Chicoms, COLD WAR)

Antitank Plan. The division plan basically implements the army antitank plan employing organic antitank
units and those units allotted from army resources. It expands the army's concept to include the manner in
which the battalion and sometimes the company organize their antitank defense.
Normally the antitank defense comprises four belts; three belts in front of the FEBA and a fourth in the
defense-in-depth position.
The first belt is located in the division security position and is manned by the regimental security
force. It consists of antitank minefields and obstacles covered by supporting fire. In addition, special
antitank teams organized from the regimental security force are employed.
The second belt, also located in the division security position, is manned by the battalion security
force. It is organized in a similar fashion to the first belt mentioned above.
The third belt generally coincides with the belt of final protective fires established by front-line
units of the main defensive position. It consists of obstacles and minefields covered by small-arms fire
and organic antitank weapons.
Defense in Depth. Antitank weapons are sited to cover the main tank approaches and areas into
which tanks are hopefully being canalized. They are located principally in the Main Defensive Position
and the area between the MDP and the Position in Depth.
In addition special antitank teams of three to five men may be formed to seek out and ambush enemy
tanks in the main defensive position.
A mobile division reserve of antitank weapons is co-located with the mobile elements of the second
echelon in the area between the MDP and PD. Its role is to deploy rapidly to meet and contain enemy
tank thrusts.
Antitank guns, recoilless rifles, and artillery employed in the antitank role are usually sited in pairs.
These weapons are normally moved after each firing to avoid detection.

Anti-tank tactics

Set up so that you can fire into your fire sack/kill zone/engagement area
without being observed by anything which is outside the sack. Ideally the
guns are positioned so that they will be firing into the flank of vehicles
passing through (firing in enfilade, from defilade.) Use dismounted
infantry to protect the guns, if possible (flanks and rear). Dig the guns
in and dig foxholes for the crews. Camouflage everything. Use obstacles to
channel tanks into the sack. When tanks enter the sack, engage with
artillery to force them to button up and force any accompanying dismounted
 infantry to go to ground. Fire in salvoes. The combination of artillery
and salvo fire makes it difficult for the enemy to identify and engage
individual guns. Without self-propelled weapons, it will be necessary to
fight until the enemy is destroyed or withdraws. Then a move to another
(prepared, or at least reconnoitred) position is probably a good idea.
I just want to add that Soviet
"pakfronts" were trained to open volley fire in sequence, as German tanks
would turn into the first volley, subsequent ones would hit them in the
flank or rear.
Two other factors can put the icing on the cake; (1)to have AT guns with
longer effective range than the tanks effective range and (2) to ambush in
terrain where it is very difficult for the tanks to manoeuvre either away
or round your flanks.
Yes, the use of minefields to channel tanks to your preferred ground. Also
to knock out the leading tanks which were following a path cleared through
minefields so that the incapacitated tanks blocked the pathway. Finally,
when things got too hot, hook up the guns to their tractors and withdraw
along a previously recced route to new positions.
Forgot to mention the use of ditches and other artificial constructions to
force tanks to enter your chosen ground.

British Antitank Operations

a. Organization
Since the number of guns in use in Cyrenaica has been inadequate, all available
are used or emplaced before the close of each operation. The antitank weapons,
which are considered artillery by the British, are under the command of the
division artillery commander in the British forces, and he is responsible for so
placing his artillery and antitank guns that they will be mutually supporting. For
any action the artillery commander issues the necessary orders alloting the
antitank weapons to both artillery and infantry units.
Antitank artillery regiments of 2-pounders consist of 3 battalions of 2 batteries of
8 guns each, totaling 48 guns. They are organized exactly in the same manner
as the artillery units except for the number of personnel assigned. A few 6-
pounder and 18-pounder batteries are being used. The 6-pounder guns are
mounted portee, and the 18-pounders are truck-drawn. These units are also
organized in the same fashion as the artillery batteries. The trucks used for the
2-pounders and 6-pounders portee are in general of the 1 1/2-ton type.
The minimum amount of antitank guns required with units necessarily depends
on the type of country; the more open the country, the larger the number of guns
needed. In the desert where there are no natural tank obstacles an attack may
come from any direction. Headquarters and rear echelons must be protected.
The large frontages covered and the wide dispersion necessary to minimize the
efforts of air attack make this problem of protecting rear elements a difficult one.
In the western desert there have been in use no antitank warning systems, but
the British make use of armored car patrols to prevent any surprises, and, as a
rule, when one weapon fires, all prepare for action. OP's [observation posts] to
the front and flank warn by visual signals of the approach of the enemy armor.
b. Positions
In some cases one battery of twelve 2-pounder antitank guns is detailed to
protect each infantry regiment. Each attached supporting battery of artillery is
often given one troop of four anti tank 2-pounder guns. Organic artillery has the
support of one antitank troop per artillery battery. These 2-pounder antitank units
are not usually grouped or held in reserve at any point but are actually placed in
positions from 100 to 300 yards from the unit protected.
British artillery regiments are armed with 25-pounders which, although not so
designed, have formed the basis of the antitank defense. This has been
necessary, because the 2 pounder antitank gun has not proved effective. The
25-pounders are sited to give protection in depth, and, where the terrain permits,
to give all-around protection to the position.
Antitank guns are placed to cover the 25-pounders in front, in intervals, and on
the flanks. A proportion of them may be kept on wheels to counter a threat from
an unexpected direction. The fewer the total number of antitank guns, the larger
will be the proportion kept in mobile reserve. But positions which guns may have
to occupy will in most cases be reconnoitered and prepared beforehand.
Despite the fact that the British have usually operated with one and sometimes
two 48-gun antitank regiments to the division, they have still found the number to
be too small, and consequently have had their choice of positions affected by the
necessity of choosing terrain which could allow them the maximum use of their
inadequate number of antitank guns. Unless otherwise dictated by the terrain, it
is considered better to place the few antitank guns in comparatively small
localities for all-around defense rather than to attempt a complete defense in
depth over a wide area. The batteries of 25-pounders are used to provide depth
to the defense. Antitank weapons are often placed from 100 to 300 yards on the
flank of a battalion in action. For all-around defense of an organization, they are
placed from 500 to 1,000 yards in front or on the flank of a battalion with
instructions to move close to the battalion position when tanks approach within
1,000 yards of their positions....
. . . Harassing and bombardment tasks are carried out by the 25-pounder guns
that are situated in covered positions.
The efforts to avoid observation are directed toward concealment and protection.
Scrub ground, or other rough ground, is chosen wherever possible, and digging
is done with great care. Movement of all personnel is rigidly controlled.
Guns are placed so as to give effect to the principle of concentration of fire. This
is necessary, as the German tanks usually attack in a mass, which cannot be
engaged effectively by single guns.

1. INTRODUCTION
 The Russian Army had forced upon it in June 1941 the major portion of
Germany's armored forces. The Russians were driven back several hundred
miles eastward during the first few months of the campaign, but, at the same
time, they were studying the German tactics. And in the fall of 1941, when the
Germans made an all-out attack for Moscow, the Soviets put into effect certain
antitank tactics that finally halted the German drive.
These tactics, in general, involve placing the various antitank weapons in
considerable depth and supporting them with heavy artillery, infantry, and
frequently with aircraft. They are designed to break up the massed attacks made
at relatively weak points by German tanks.
2. VARIOUS METHODS EMPLOYED
a. Organization of Terrain
Selection of terrain which limits or prevents the maneuvering of tanks is a
major factor in breaking up armored attacks. In fact, the Russians consider that
denial of maneuverability is half the battle—the enemy must not be allowed to
choose his ground or the time of attack.
The Russian defenses against armored vehicles are based mainly on
"islands of resistance" disposed in depth. More often than not, these areas of
resistance are centered around towns and villages or other built-up places. The
Russians acquired considerable experience in organizing defenses in towns and
villages during the revolutionary and Polish campaigns of 1918-1921. Their
facilities for such defensive activity have been increased since that time by the
systematic training of women and children, who operate the aircraft warning
system, help to organize the defenses, and sometimes act as snipers.
To consolidate a town's defenses, armed detachments of soldiers and
civilians are disposed at strategically important sites. Stone dwellings are used
for emplacing heavy machine guns, either on the roofs or through windows.
Antitank and antiaircraft guns are emplaced so that they can be fired down roads
or streets, along with machine-gun fire. Tank mines and barriers are placed
along likely approaches. Barricades are constructed for street fighting in case a
penetration should occur.
Over areas selected for defense against tanks, the Russians frequently
construct thousands of X-shaped tank obstacles by crossing three pieces of
heavy steel rails or beams, and by driving them partly into the ground or wiring
them together on top of the ground. Tanks approaching these obstacles must
either slow down or maneuver around them. Artillery is sited to open fire as the
tanks approach the obstacles—which, therefore, serve much the same purpose
as the British minefields in North Africa.
Well in advance of their defended positions, the Russians install thousands of
prefabricated individual concrete pillboxes. These are moved on trucks to the
areas which need them. Holes are dug into the ground according to a planned
scheme, and the pillboxes are then dropped into the holes. The pillboxes are
distributed in great depth along the main highways. They are arranged so that an
enemy, concentrating on destroying a certain pillbox, encounters oblique or
flanking fire from others.
b. Use of Artillery
The Russians rely on artillery as their main weapon in fighting tanks. They
make particular use of an 85-mm dual-purpose gun. Other pieces used
extensively include 76-mm and 45-mm guns.
Usually the artillery opens up with long-range fire against moving or
assembling tanks. Barrages are employed to disorganize tank combat
formations, to cause casualties, and to separate the tanks from the infantry and
accompanying artillery. In addition to stationary guns, a mobile reserve of
antitank guns is always available.
If the Germans are able to attack after the long-range shelling, the Russians
do not put their antitank system into effect until the tanks cross their line of
departure and break through the forward positions.
How the Russians emplace their 45-mm and 76-mm guns and fortify the
areas where they are located are told in the following article written by a Soviet
artillery officer:
"Fortifying 45- and 76-mm gun positions is hard work, but it pays large
dividends in combatting German tanks. Crews are taught not only to dig in and
to camouflage quickly, but also to mine sectors in front of their batteries. When
time permits, two or three alternate positions are dug for each gun and are used
to confuse the enemy in spotting our gun positions. Artillery fire from these
positions is also frequently imitated in order to draw enemy fire.

"Open positions are soon knocked out by enemy tanks or aircraft. Therefore,
a platform with all-around traverse is built first. Beside it is dug a hole into which
the gun may be lowered. Ditches, 1 1/2 yards deep, for personnel and
ammunition, are dug on each side of the platform. The hole and the ditches are
covered with logs, poles, and a 1/2-yard thickness of earth to guard against
shell and bomb splinters. About 2 to 3 yards from the emplacement, another
ditch is dug—this one for reserve ammunition. In battle, enemy tanks and
planes make it very difficult to bring up additional ammunition from the rear. At
some distance from the gun positions, dugouts 3 to 4 yards long and 2 yards
wide, with inclined entrances, are dug for the horses. These dugouts are
covered with poles, leaving a gap 1 to 1 1/2 feet wide to admit enough light to
prevent restlessness.

"In the spring battles, the Red Army artillery was organized in depth. The 45-
mm guns were emplaced on the front lines, and were protected by other
antitank defenses. The crews were able to set up minefields in front of the gun
positions, as well as obstacles, and also to lift the mines when necessary. In
addition, each artillery battalion and, in some cases, each artillery battery, had a
mobile reserve of 5 to 8 combat engineers equipped with 4 to 5 mines each.
Their function was to mine unguarded tank approaches after the direction of the
 enemy attack had been definitely ascertained. These mines proved highly
effective in stopping and even in destroying many enemy tanks."

c. Air Support
The Russians insist on thorough air reconnaissance to safeguard their forces
—particularly infantry—from surprise tank attacks. If there is any possibility of a
clash with enemy armor, mixed columns of infantry, artillery, and tanks are
employed, closely supported by aircraft.
Russian close-support aircraft—including the highly respected Stormovik
planes—often have achieved good results in attacking German tanks and other
armored vehicles.
d. Use of Antitank Rifle
The following information about the use of the Russian antitank rifle was
originally published in the Red Star, official Soviet Army publication:
"A Soviet artillery battery was on the march when the column was suddenly
attacked by six enemy tanks. A Red Army private armed with an antitank rifle
jumped off a caisson, took position behind a mound, and opened fire. He
inflicted sufficient damage on the leading tank to cause the remainder of the
enemy tanks to delay their attack for a few minutes. The battery was given a
chance to deploy and open fire, and the surprise attack was beaten off. Four of
the six German tanks were put out of action.

"In many similar instances antitank rifles have proved effective against
enemy tanks. The light weight, portability, and rapid fire power of this weapon
permit its crew to go into action in so short a time that it can cover units on the
march, at rest, or in battle.

". . . The greatest success has been attained by squads consisting of two or
three antitank rifles placed 15 to 20 yards apart. Such units can bring effective
fire to bear on a target, and have a greater chance of putting it out of
commission than fire by a single rifle would have.

In selecting positions for antitank titles, detailed reconnaissance of the target

area should be made, in addition to the usual local reconnaissance. Eliminating
dead spots and protecting against the most likely routes of enemy tank
approach are most important considerations. The positions should be
echeloned so as to be mutually supporting with fire from the flanks. Antitank
rifles in artillery batteries are generally grouped on the most exposed flank of the
gun positions. In all cases, the squad leader should select his own position so
as to have maximum observation and, at the same time, personally control the
actions of the antitank rifles.

In fortifying these positions, it has proved impracticable to construct

emplacements with roofs because of increased visibility to the enemy air force
and lack of 360° traverse. The best types of emplacements are open and
circular in shape, with a diameter large enough to permit free movement of the
crew for all-around traverse and to protect the gun and crew from being crushed
by enemy tanks. Narrow communication trenches connect the gun positions
 with each other as well as with the rear. Both emplacements and trenches are
constructed without parapets; the extra dirt is utilized in building false
installations to draw enemy fire. It is practically impossible for tanks to spot such
fortifications, and the rifles are able to fire on them for the longest possible time.
Also, protection against aerial bombardment is increased.

"In the preparation of antitank fire, the rifleman should select five or six key
reference points at different ranges, measure the distance to them, and study
the intervening terrain. When actually firing, he should fire at stationary tanks
whenever possible and not take leads at ranges over 400 yards. Aim should
always be taken at the vulnerable parts, taking advantage of any hesitation or
exposure of the sides of the enemy tanks.

"Antitank defense must be drawn up so as to protect the antitank rifle units

fully, by means of all available obstacles, mines, and fire power."

e. Recent Trends
Recent trends in Russian antitank tactics are discussed in an article
appearing in the "Red Star." An extract. from this article follows:
Correctly disposed and camouflaged, antitank weapons can and do stop the
German tanks. One case of a recent battle is recorded in which three antitank
guns of the regimental artillery held off 56 German tanks in an all-day battle and
destroyed 5. Another case records 35 to 40 German tanks attempting to cross a
river, over a single bridge. One well-placed antitank gun destroyed 5 German
tanks and forced the remainder to seek other means of crossing.

Communication with the chief of the artillery unit, with the infantry
commander, and with adjacent units is usually by radio.

All artillery and antitank defenses are subordinated to the sector

commander.

No set rule can be laid clown as to the density of antitank weapons on any
sector. The system depends upon the terrain and the local situation. In general,
there should be greater density toward the rear. An attack by a large number of
tanks is met at the front lines by artillery and rifle fire. Then antitank rifles and
destroyer tanks come into play. If the enemy tanks still break through, they run
into tank obstacles defended by flanking and rear antitank fire. Soviet infantry at
this point attempts to cut off the German infantry from its tank support. The
enemy tanks then continue to run into tank destroyers and an increasing
number of minefields.

Where Soviet tanks are used in the defense, they must not be pushed out front, but
must be scattered to the rear and dug in to await a possible breakthrough, where they
can do their best work.