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AJP Taylor's haze, on the face of it, is the natural reaction for the historian
when confronted with the issues of European history. Where does Europe
begin? Can it be defined? Does its influence on the globe distort the way we
view the rest of the world? The arguments that rage, in particular, around
Europe's legacy, mean that daunting as writing a history of Europe is, it still
economic club – but does this have the right to be presented as an event as
continent. Moreover, it can blind readers to the fact that while there may
1 AJP Taylor et al, 'What is European History?' in What is History Today?, ed Juliet Gardiner
(London: The Macmillan Press, 1988), p 143.
2 N Davies, Europe: A History (London: Pimlico, 1997), p 14.
2
The idea that the 'experiences' of Europeans are too diverse for a
reasons, not least because the postmodern desire for discrete histories of
every ethnic and cultural group invalidates the notion that histories can be
family life, work, domesticity, leisure are so altered by the borders of nation
approaches and the contents of various histories of Europe can reveal how
those definitions affect the writing of the continent's history. The vexed
important, not least because if there are such creatures then that suggests
suggests that diversity can inhibit meaning. This is not necessarily the case:
twentieth century, as well as the rise of capitalism before 1900. In this way
the practice of writing European History will be shown to be one which still
has a relevance, and one which can transcend such limiting notions as the
search for unity rather than the search for the past.
3
Defining what Europe is, as we have seen, a task to vex even the most of
Gaulle, that most capricious of Europeans, here has defined Europe as most
scholars and thinkers conceive of it, stretching from the shores of Portugal
majority of the landmass and its Western peninsula, is only the beginning of
drawn. Other descriptions are available to us. The division of Europe into
Western and Eastern halves is well documented, and almost natural in the
acute when Europe became the one of the frozen battlegrounds of the Cold
can be seen in terms of a North/South divide. Most notably this has been
espoused by Fernand Braudel who was able to see the history of the
Europe.
part of the continent. The Czech novelist Milan Kundera was one of the first
1984, he argued that World War II had created a new Europe distinct from
and Czechoslovakia (as was) he argued that this Third Europe was a Europe
The big question mark over any geographical definition of Europe has
part of Europe, there are others which point to her isolationist, imperialist
accepting Russia but only up to a point. This ambivalence has often also
5Quoted in Bronislaw Geremek, The Common Roots of Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press,
1996), p 5.
5
via Western education, "I want to take a trip to Europe, Alyosha… I know
it's a cemetery I shall be going to, but it's the dearest, dearest of
Defining the very idea of Europe, the essence of its civilization, is just
qualities that are the polar opposite of those that the notion of Western
Civilization implies. But those two intertwined legacies are the alpha of
'Christendom'. Denis Hay argues that not only was Christendom's virtual
identity with the area of Europe one of the most important factors in the
latter's development through the course of the Middle Ages, but that their
6Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, (London: Penguin, 1993 edn [1st pub
1880]), p 264.
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politically one. Of course it must be recognised that the idea of Europe was
7
one that was developed and driven by Europe's elite, a political and cultural
debate over whether Europe was an intelligible field to study was only
really settled by the end of the 1950s. But with that question settled, the
9
rather than the regional level can be seen by the range of European
History
reveal that not only is the very definition of Europe still constantly being
refined and tested, but that meaningful histories of the continent can
of European histories available; from those that tell the story of the entire
viewpoint.
"It is the view of one pair of eyes, filtered by one brain, and translated
7 Denis Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1957), p 120.
8 Peter Rietbergen, Europe: A Cultural History, (London: Routledge, 1998), p xvii.
9 Hay, op cit, p ix.
10 Davies, op cit, p x.
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history on their head, the greatest of these being the idea that the history
Europe, the part of the continent that Davies feels has been unjustly
The book is also novel in its presentation of the evidence that Davies
has gathered. In addition to the central narrative, which now gives equal if
not greater weighting to the events that occurred in the Eastern half of
ranging from democracy to the origin of 'Irish jokes', and littered them
European history.
also makes it clear that in the absence of any universal political institutions,
is the most important strand of this. With this in mind, Davies then goes on
civilization as superior, and only looking for their own beauty. This is then
that Davies feels has clearly been a distorting factor. His core complaint
with the concept appears to be that it has not been rigorously applied to
through the distorting lens of 'Western Civilization' can hide the East's
again emphasises the fact that the East/West division only has the
and that Western supremacy has not been true all the time, drawing a
events of the East within the narrative does lead to new perspectives. For
example, the barbarian invasions become the 'drive to the west' by the
vital for redressing the gap in knowledge of Eastern Europe, and presenting
it in a different light from that of 'also ran' status. But to imply that
previous histories have not focused on the Eastern half of Europe because
not talk of an 'Eastern Civilization' is surely not just down to historians' bias.
Why didn't these Eastern countries go and get empires, and go on to rule
the world? It’s a question worth asking, that Davies seems not to want to
answer.
does, but in roughly half the number of pages. His approach is markedly
that Davies may wish to lay at the door of other historians working
both are discussing the same events; it is their interpretations that differ.
and the resources that helped to shape the continent. Both show the
(although Roberts might go further and argue that it ergo was the cradle of
World Civilization.) Davies writes that, "enough has survived for that one
Europe', 'the Source of the West', a vital ingredient if not the sole fountain-
shaping Europe and its future." Both suffer from what could be described
12
pace prevails.
of both books highlighted what he felt to be Davies' weakest suit, his near
neglect of economics and the importance and effects upon Europe of the
'The World's New Rich.' The balance given in both to the relative weighting
13
crucial difference. Both books' final sections deal with Europe in the age of
the Cold War, Roberts prefers to deliver the narrative from a mostly
Western view, the events in Eastern Europe being dealt with in a sub-
events in both West and East. Davies scores in his (slightly superficial)
record of some of the cultural changes of the last fifty years. Roberts makes
up for this shortcoming with a more nuanced discussion of both the causes
and roots of de-colonization, and the effect that that particular process had
12 Davies, op cit, p 139; JM Roberts, The Penguin History of Europe (London: Penguin,
1996), p 23.
13 Tim Blanning, 'Gibbon goes East', The Times Literary Supplement, 20 December 1996, p
3.
11
that of the Victorians about the Chinese. He agrees with the view that
Europeans did believe that they were 'better' than those that they
history of the world, was for a period, greater than that of Asia, Africa and
the Americas. It was Europeans that took up the study of other cultures.
However, "It is a simple fact that the practices of some other societies
There are other histories, while not necessarily sharing this continent
wide focus, give equally important insights into the history of Europe.
Europe can looked at regionally. Here it is less the continent of Europe that
is the shared characteristic but rather that of the sea – it shared a common
destiny, the Turkish Mediterranean sharing the same rhythms as that of the
French historians of the 1920s, who first achieved notice in the eponymous
magazine.
Annales school believed that the historian had to look at the landscape
itself to uncover the personal forces which were the ones that shaped
man's destiny and future. This also meant a focus upon the slower rhythms
and the region before looking at the social and economic trends that these
historians, identifies these divisions clearly, and the structure is one that is
years) are denoted conjunctures. And the short-term political history, the
'froth of history' involving individual actors is what sits atop this structure. 15
Braudel put it more elegantly: "[The] actions of a few princes and rich men,
the trivia of the past, bear[ing] little relation to the slow and powerful
Due to the startling nature of his work, Braudel has often been
Bloch. The lack of linkage between the tripartite structure does question
focus attention on one part of Europe, and show (in part) how the sea’s
continental historian, this one Spanish. Josep Fontana's The Distorted Past:
external enemy conceals the fact that the interests of Europe and her
then goes on to argue for a dismantling of the linear view of history, which
universal and will also restore to us the diversity of our own European
idea of the struggle against 'invaders' of any sort priority. One might
be of as much value as works that focus upon politics and the environment.
explored. He questions the age of the 'European concept': "the Europe that
now projects itself with such a pretence of historical inevitability is, indeed,
only a recent creation; some would even say that this Europe is really a
was open to everyone. His approach leads to some insights less easily
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gained from other histories, most notably that 'European' can be used as
genuinely revelatory.
seem like 'bad history', its traditional framework avoiding any new
personages from Europe’s past. While the epilogue of 1925 is a bleak affair,
ruminating on the aftermath of the Great War, what has gone previously is
impression of the great surging movements which rose in the hearts of men
In view of the obvious effects that Europe has had upon the rest of
Europe say, and whether they concur with much of this 'Europe first'
templates of how they could strengthen their own civilization in the face of
the nineteenth century challenge from the West. Fukuzawa Yukichi, in his
Japan. There is a trenchant critique of the havoc that the West is causing in
Japan. But he also argues that, despite the problems that he sees in
strengthening our national polity and increasing the prestige of our imperial
line." Fukuzawa was here arguing for an adoption of the spirit of Western
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Civilization rather than a wholesale absorption of its outer trappings, but for
civilization.
that there are so many different approaches to its history. This diversity is
Such has been the pervasiveness of nationalism in the last 200 years that
very few people would consider their primary identification would be with
their continent rather than their nation. That testifies to its success – one of
been different from them, in terms of ethnicity, race, and also religion. Yet
a European history which, for example, does not feature an Islamic threat
what she did not recognise in herself; but she also relied upon these hostile
sources. For example it was only in the academic and religious institutions
of the Near East that the study of those Greek texts fundamental to
Elizabeth Tonkin et al point out, groups and individuals don't have one
As in the American case, if stress was laid upon the shared experiences of
the various peoples of the continent, then this could lead to a new supra-
national identity.
can only be achieved within a certain type of history. For our purposes let
chronologically continuous order, and then analysed for their causation and
their consequences. 28
27 Elizabeth Tonkin et al, (eds), History and Ethnicity, (London: Routledge, 1989), p 17.
28 Lawrence Stone, 'The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History', Past &
Present 58, 1979, defines narrative as the organisation of material in a chronological
19
This has been the way in which traditional history, that of kings,
politicians, wars and diplomats has been presented. But the increasing
academic influence of the social sciences in the last 35 years, and that of
affected this conception of history. For one, subjects that can be considered
cultural history, the history of gender, Afro-Caribbean history and so on. But
just one of many possible discourses, whose language does not relate to
as Barthes and Derrida have challenged the very idea of Rankean history
based on analysis of text based sources. Arguing that language changes its
sequential order, where the content is focused in a single coherent story with subplots,
where description rather than analysis is present, p 3.
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meaning every time it is read, and that everything is a text, this therefore
outside of the text, and fact and fiction become indistinguishable. Hence,
history loses its validity as the search for the truth and merely becomes
and the attack on narrative and therefore history itself which can lead to
are too diverse to lead to a history that is meaningful. For history is nothing
Fortunately help is at hand to plot a new way for history in the light of
concerns can have a valuable influence on history, argues that the lengths
writes:
on a text, this does not mean that any meaning is possible. "We are limited
by the words it contains, words which are not, contrary to what the
sources are not necessarily the same as literary texts. Hence some
postmodern critiques tumble – the tools of literary analysis are not useful
when dealing with a set of statistics for example. The postmodern attack on
are applied to itself, he implies, many of its arguments collapse under the
'discrete' or 'diverse' narratives.) This does not necessarily mean that these
Narratives can also reflect the uneven nature of historical time; Evans takes
created, then our picture of what constitutes the past can only become
are the start, not the end of any historical process. Far better for attempts
for doing history. A Marxist framework for history, for example, merely sees
diverse experiences as having the same root causes somewhere within the
Europe, it is apposite to remember that histories will not just 'emerge' from
the intellectual morass. Historians will create European history from any
allow for a better, deeper and more complete understanding of what the
past is.
not blind us to the idea that there are certain experiences that all peoples,
nationalities in Europe have been through. This does not mean that all
social, political, economic and cultural trends – in the same way, at the
same time, that they were caused by the same factors and that they had
boundaries.
that can be defined as a trend of some form or other. One could argue that
most European peoples have been touched at one point by the effects of
cultural trends. For example, the growth of secular thought in the last 200
countries, and the way in which more and more people view themselves as
atheist rather than religious, all show that the twentieth century in
particular has meant that what was once assumed to be an experience for
one might assume all European peoples had been subjected to at some
Before the advent of the twentieth century, it can be said that all
shorthand for the what is the central zone of the world economy, which has
contention that modern European history is the story of the genesis and
most clearly common to all European peoples. The obvious one is that of
war. The calamitous effects of the two world wars that had Europe as their
cockpit were clear enough. Even those that stayed out of the fighting were
neutrality during World War II have shown. Civil war is another facet of the
murderous experience that all European countries have had the horror of
of the three ideologies that were competing for global dominance at the
time. The idea of this conflict as a struggle to the bitter end between
After 1945, one could forgive most Europeans for asking where the
peace dividend was. Their continent yet again became divided, this time
benefited from the other side of war; the evolution of modernity. For
which have the same caterpillar tracks as the tanks which once ranged
War II and since, helped the process of cultural transference that most
played a major role in the political and economic reconstruction and the
Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan) and later the creation of NATO. The
scope and scale of cultural transmission which also took place across the
Atlantic was staggering. Food, TV, movies, music and fashion were all
35Michael Howard, War in European History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p
119; Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, (London: Allen Lane,
1998), p x-xii.
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European identity, then this suggests that every European has experienced
leads to the idea that the only meaningful history of Europe would be a
Has the haze lifted? Would AJP Taylor be any happier in looking at European
history now? One would suspect so, if he bore in mind that diversity is the
experiences, as well as those that are common, that the history of the
peoples of Europe lies. Diversity does not prevent the emergence of any
Europe may stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals, from the Arctic Circle to
the Sahara, may be responsible for all of the world's glories and all of her
can apply to herself and the challenges that they pose in recognising her
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borders. Diverse are the historians and their approaches to the task of
writing European history. So diverse are the European peoples that a single
European identity may never be created. And diverse are the reactions to
cultures, histories and values does make it hard for Europeans to act
diverse experiences into discrete ones, and then proclaim that there is no
need for them to be integrated into a narrative. There is, and there will
always be a demand for histories that tell the story of Europe, even if it is in