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Few new nations have endured a birth as traumatic as that endured by Asia's youngest
nation, East Timor. East Timor has suffered from Indonesian tyranny since the Indonesian
invaded the territory in 1975, yet despite this the international community did not demonstrate
a genuine effort to solve the problem until the late 90s. Australia took the lead and launched
the 1999 peacekeeping missions in order to put an end to the ethnic cleansing and to restore
peace and security in the territory. It intervened for the second time during the 2006 crisis, in
An humanitarian intervention is ³the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or
group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the
fundamental human rights of individuals other than their own citizens, without the permission
of the state within whose territory force is applied´ (Holzgrefe, J.L. in Holzgrefe and
Keohane, R. 2003: 18). These interventions must adhere to certain conditions in order to be
authorized and legalised by the United Nations (UN): for the UN holds the responsibility of
enforcing the legal regulation of armed conflict according to the guidelines of the Charter of
the United Nations. The legitimacy of an intervention is, however, worth analysing as much
as its legality under international law. Indeed, justifying an intervention as being humanitarian
is an issue that is at the centre of many debates. Exploring this question will eventually lead
us to think about the relevance of calling something « humanitarian », especially its political
importance.
Timor in 1999 and 2006. The issue tackled is to determine whether both missions can be
gaudged as legitimate, in terms of their legality under the law, as well as the accuracy of their
This paper is divided into three parts. Firstly, we will lay out a general framework of
humanitarian intervention and contextualise both conflicts in order to assess the political and
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legal legitimacy of the Australian peace building missions. Secondly, we will focus on the
new interventionist norm, acknowledge some of the key disagreements on the question of
humanitarian intervention, and eventually demonstrate that, because it did not act with
discuss Australia¶s humanitarian concerns for intervening in East Timor and question the
and intentions, and explore this debate between the two approaches. We will demonstrate that,
although it did not have altruistic motives to intervene, Australia acted out of a humanitarian
definitional significance of motives for those who hold an Utilitarian view, and eventually
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the principle of human rights as
one of the foundations of contemporary societies. Hence, its protection is one of the main
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of the UN. In cases where populations are derogated their fundamental rights, it
is the duty of the UN to enact and watch over the restoration of these rights, so that these
in cases where the state is considered the perpetrator of mass killings of the population, or
where the state has collapsed into lawlessness (Wheeler, N. 2000). Such interventions are
agreement with its purposes, the UN Charter is much more explicit on the prohibition of
armed intervention and the obligation to respect territorial integrity ± articles 2.4 and 2.7 ±
than on the duty to uphold and promote human rights. Sovereign authority, as « the right to
rule over a delimited territory and the population residing within it », induces, by the
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community of states, external recognition of a state¶s internal control (Ayoob, M. 2002 :82).
Yet, one may wonder to what extent a state in violation of the principles of human rights may
shield itself from armed intervention with the Charter prohibiting intervention. The UN
institutions of the state are disabled to provide a peaceful and secure environment to their
populations. For sovereignty is no longer absolute and should, by no means, be used as a tool
to breach the human rights of citizens. Therefore, according to the General Assembly
resolution taken in 1991 in the context of an international order in which the national
unity and sovereignty of states must be fully respected, ³humanitarian assistance should be
provided with the consent of the affected country´ (Taylor and Curtis 2008:322). Also,
forcible intervention within a country is legitimised in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN
enforcement operations, these peacekeeping missions acknowledge the need to use force to
achieve humanitarian ends. A very paradoxical fact must be stressed then. Whilst the
violation of human rights is strongly condemned by the United Nations, if situations do not
reach a point to where it is recognised that a threat to the peace and security of other states is
We shall now focus on the historical context in which the 1999 and the 2006 East
Timorese conflicts arose, in order to assess the legality and legitimacy of Australia¶s
interventions.
Portugal, the colonial power, committed itself to decolonization in 1974 and withdrew from
East Timor on the following year. The politically unstable island declared its independence
and the establishment of its Democratic Republic in November 1975 (Barbedo de Lagalhaes,
A. in Retboll, T. 1998). A few weeks later, Indonesia claimed control over it and began what
would become one of the longest and most restless ethnic cleansing of the twentieth century.
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The then Indonesian President Suharto, who launched the invasion, opposed any change to
East Timor¶s status despite 10 UN Resolutions demanding its withdrawal (Gunn, G. 1997).
His actions were tacitly supported by Australia who had challenged resolutions in order to
maintain good relations with the Indonesian state. Indeed, Australia first acknowledged the
delineating the sea boundaries began in 1978, it announced that it would grant the
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recognition. It was only in 1999 that the Australian government withdrew its support of the
Indonesian regime due to extensive pressure to act from the international community as well
as Australian public opinion, as images of the Santa Cruz massacre began to appear on
With Suharto¶s successor Habibie, Indonesian policy regarding the East Timorese state
slightly changed. The island still remained under the control of Indonesia, yet importantly, it
had been granted a ³special status´ ± a form of provincial autonomy (White, H. 2008).
Moreover, Habibie agreed on a referendum allowing the Timorese to vote for autonomy
inside Indonesia (subsequently an important step towards full independence). The breaking
out of violence immediately after the ballot results, however, prompted the international
community to take firm action, launching the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET)
Despite the special status granted to East Timor, operation INTERFET could not have been
security crisis. For even if one state¶s government falls into lawlessness, no modification can
be done about the resolution holding that ³UN peacekeeping operations are always conducted
with the consent of the government exercising control over the area of deployment, and if the
government has lost control over some of the territory, also with the consent of the effective
authorities´ (Griffiths, Levine & Weller 1995:44). In fact, no state in the international
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community was willing to confront the Indonesian army within the East Timorese territory,
even if they had the military capacity to do so. Economic interests were at stake and not worth
risking according to the Western powers. Also, as Jennifer Welsh expresses it: ³No country
suggested following the Kosovo precedent for unauthorized intervention » h2003: 152 . That
importance. Australia¶s 1999 intervention consequently was politically and legally legitimate.
However, I find the decision by most countries to seek Indonesian approval very
controversial, for the UN had never recognized Indonesia¶s control over East Timor as being
legitimate. Requiring Indonesian consent for intervention was therefore another way of
INTERFET was a temporary mission, but certainly played an effective role in restoring peace
and security in the country. Unfortunately, in 2006 the power imbalance between East
Timor¶s major political party, Fretilin, and its opponents led the country to the unavoidable
collapse of state authority. The institutional lack of stability disabled the state¶s capacity to
cope with its internal dilemmas. After independence in 1999, the UN mission was mandated
annually, but it was progressively scaled down. And because the UN mandate was due to
expire on 20 May 2006, to maintain its own security, East Timor was forced to resort to the
use of its own police force and military ± both of which had been formed by the UN
administration ± until the Australian peacekeeping force landed on the territory upon official
request for international military support by the East Timorese government (Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2001). Although Australia did not benefit from a UN mandate in
2006, the fact that it acted upon the Timorese government¶s request legally legitimized its
intervention. In this regard, critics may argue that the two interventions in the island are not
³enforced action in the internal affairs of a state without the consent of all major parties, and
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particularly that of the governing power´ (2008:17). I do not agree with the fact that the
interventions cannot be called humanitarian, inasmuch as Smith¶s statement does not imply
that Australia did not have humanitarian motives or did not act out of a humanitarian intent ±
The 1999 intervention in East Timor came in the context of a change in the
The principle of sovereignty has fundamentally ruled the international system since the war of
Westphalia, yet it has been redefined in the last twenty years. Although sovereignty remains a
powerful legitimating principle, it is no longer conceived as an inherent right of the state. This
era of new interventionism has seen some form of internationalization of the human
conscience arise ± which East Timor has benefited from. Interventions in the post-Cold War
era aim at universality and humanitarianism, whereas before the 1990s they generally were
undertaken by powerful states for specific political and strategic ends. This notion of new
(ICISS), states have a ³responsibility to protect´ the security of their citizens. As a result, if
they fail their duty, the international community is entitled to interfere in the internal affairs of
the affected state (Welsh, J. 2003). Solidarists advocate a very similar view, as they believe in
the internationalisation of moral standards in world society and assert that it is states¶ duty to
emergencies, the Solidarist perspective asserts that the principle of sovereignty cannot remain
valid and that any intervention may be legitimised (without being legally approved by the
Security Council). They indeed believe that our morality legitimates the use of force ±
regardless of the political and legal legitimacy one may find in intervening. On the contrary,
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Pluralists argue that the non-intervention norm reinforces the concept of a mutually respected
international order. Indeed, if states were allowed to act following their will, international
disasters would be soon expected and cooperation and agreements between states could
hardly be outlined. Additionally, we must say that the promotion of human rights is only
One may easily agree with the Pluralist view, for history has shown that states tend to be
biased and that there is always a risk that force may be used for one¶s own interest (Waltz, K.
1979).
In this era of new interventionism, states who undertake interventions act on behalf of
the international community and are expected to achieve « humanitarian » goals. However,
one must note that decisions to intervene are not taken at the international, as the appellation
international community suggests, but at the national level. One may therefore question
states¶ incentives for intervention as we cannot prevent national interest considerations from
influencing the resolutions countries take at the international level. For that matter, Realists
widely agree on the fact that states offer a selective response depending on how an
intervention could benefit them (Ayoob, M. 2002). In this respect, Thomas G. Weiss also
argues that states are more likely to act out of a humanitarian impulse when humanitarian and
strategic interests coincide; whereas very few are the cases in which the international
community has acted out of humanitarian imperative, in the sense that states would have
acted with a certain degree of disinterest (2004). And even though they altruistically commit
themselves to intervene, states will not implement an intervention given its high cost at the
national level (both human and financial) ± unless they have something to gain from it. For
states have no duty to save the lives of strangers. They are fundamentally entitled to protect
their citizens and provide them with a secure environment in which their human rights are
secured. It is therefore understandable that states have self-interested motives for intervening
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in another country. Australia¶s interventions in East Timor are no exception. Indeed, as we are
about to see, it is hard to find humanitarian motives in the 1999 and the 2006 Australian
missions.
The events of the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 were the first images of ethnic cleansing
to be shown on television screens worldwide. Against all expectations, these images did not
trigger concrete action at the international level (Steve, C. in Retboll. 1998). Many times the
East Timorese have been let down by the international community, whose members had for
years ignored and denied the continuing reports of Indonesian brutalities by several non-
come back from the island with photographic and filmed evidence. It is evident that the fact
that the community of states agrees it is morally unacceptable to allow a massacre happen
without intervening does not mean that when such a situation does happen, states do react.
Why did Australia not intervene before? If it had truthfully wanted to stop the genocide, it
would not have waited until the last-minute: in other words, until the last massacre that could
possibly happen± post-referendum ± did happen. Both Indonesia and Australia knew that the
majority of the Timorese would vote in favour of independence and the Australian
intelligentsia before the ballot had foreseen a high risk of ultimate violence (Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2001. Therefore, why did the Howard government not prone a
policy of anticipation instead of resolution? The answer is not surprising and will certainly
please the Realists; for it merely is that the Howard government¶s economic interests in
Indonesia far outweighed the humanitarian concerns for the rights of the East Timorese.
Integration, therefore, was not going to be challenged since doing so would turn at the
advantage of neither party. I find quite delusional and naive the argument that Australia
waited until 1999 to intervene in order to be sure that that was what the East Timorese
wanted. For no one can deny that the East Timor case was, since the early 90s, as well known
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to worldwide public opinion as it was to Western intelligentsia. Also, what kind of nation
Australian complicity in Indonesia¶s crimes up to the year of 1999 is a fact. Not only did the
Howard government tacitly approve the Indonesian annexation of the island (as Howard¶s
letter to President Habibie shows in December 1998), but it had also regularly supplied
Indonesia with the arms that served to murder the East Timorese population for years
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2001). The only reason why the Australian
government, all of a sudden, radically changed its foreign policy towards East Timor was
because it was suffering from extensive pressure from the international community and
international public opinion. Australian public opinion was particularly strong and
considerably influenced the decision of the Howard government to ³do the right thing´.
Indeed, in 1999, Australian citizens were willing to pay a new tax imposed by the government
in order for the latter to collect the necessary funds to equip the military that would rescue the
Finally, one may remark how convenient the intervention in East Timor was regarding
Australia¶s imperialist aspirations. Firstly, in 1999 it allowed its forces to be deployed more
extensively in the Asia-Pacific region ± thereby increasing the Australian military budget.
Likewise, the deployment of troops in 2006 permitted the bolstering of military spending and
prevented East Timor from being under any influence other than Australia¶s. Considered as
the power hegemon of the Pacific, it looks like Australia thinks it detains the right to change
another country¶s government; or at least that is what the 2006 intervention tends to show
(Gunnar Simonsen, S. 2006). From 2006 onwards, I believe it is currently achieving a peace
building more than a peacekeeping operation ± with the risk that its cultural imperialism is of
great influence in the country. Its neo-colonial policy regarding East Timor is, as a matter of
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fact, viewed by many as a political strategy designed to pressure Timorese Prime Minister
Xanana Gusmao to sign away rights to the country¶s oil and gas resources. For under
international boundary law, East Timor possesses 80% of these resources. Australia has
always tried to influence East Timor to its advantage during talks about the delineation of the
Timor Sea boundaries, and nowadays requests a 50-50% split of the island¶s resources
(Lowry, B. 2007). I, as a result, find that the term ³humanitarian´ has been misused and too
much employed to the advantage of the promotion of states¶ interests. Also, I will conclude
that because in 1999 and 2006 Australia did not have altruistic motives to intervene in East
Timor, the interventions are not humanitarian. However, I believe such statement to be true
only if one shares the view that motives are the sole legitimating factor of a humanitarian
intervention.
Along with this discussion on humanitarian intervention and the national interest, I
would like to remark that the failure of the UN to act on its own resolutions is quite
perplexing. Also, its handling of the events in East Timor raises doubts about the
effectiveness of the Security Council to decide when to intervene. Remarkably, even the
official report on the Responsibility to Protect acknowledges the Security Council¶s failure to
act in the past, as it states : « In view of the Council¶s past inability or unwillingness to fulfill
the role expected of it, if the Security Council expressly rejects a proposal for intervention
where humanitarian or human rights issues are significantly at stake, or the Council fails to
deal with such a proposal within a reasonable time, it is difficult to argue that alternative
means of discharging the responsibility to protect can be entirely discounted » (ICSS. 2001:
53). One may, as a result, wonder whether forcible interventions are always launched for the
mere interest of the Permanent Five (P5), since they are at the heart of the decision-making
process. Can humanitarian interventions genuinely be impartial and neutral, as they should
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be ? I will not elaborate much more on these points for it is not the purpose of this paper, but I
other theorists who share a similar view, however omit the fact that, with the establishment of
a ³responsibility to protect´ in 2001, there has been a substantial change in the perception and
their sovereign status (Ayoob, M. 2002). This does not, however, change anything to the fact
that states are, and always will be, driven by a mixture of non-humanitarian motives. For
states seem logically more preoccupied about advancing their interests at the international
level, than with saving strangers at the cost of their own citizens¶ lives, as previously noted.
Moreover, it is not because states claim they are acting for humanitarian reasons that one
should not question their real motives. I find naive to believe in every word politicians say,
of an action based on motives, as the sole or primary legitimating factor. Since in most cases
states are unlikely to have altruistic motives, according to ³motives matter´ theorists such as
Wil Verwey, no intervention will ever be humanitarian (Bellamy, Alex J. 2004). This is why
covers the contemplated act, what the agents will do´, whereas ³a motive is a further goal that
one wishes to accomplish with the intended act´ (2005: 5). Consequently, one can have good
intentions, but still act for non-humanitarian reasons. The fact that someone is driven by self-
interested motives does not alter the moral status of the action either ± which is its legality
under the law. Indeed, for example, I may be preventing this person from drowning in the sea
because I do not wish this person to die (which means that I am acting out of a humanitarian
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intent) and, at the same time, saving this person¶s life will make others see me as a hero ±
which is what I was truthfully aiming at. Saving that person¶s life is a very admirable action,
but it does not mean that I am a very admirable person since I did it for a non-humanitarian
reason. As a result, I find that the intention is more important than the motive in evaluating an
action. It allows us to characterize the act and associate it with a moral category of acts, which
in this case are acts of rescue. To be humanitarian, an intervention¶s primary purpose must
therefore be to prevent or halt large-scale atrocities and human suffering ± whatever the
underlying reasons to do so. On the contrary, motives are particularly relevant in evaluating
people (Teson, F. 2005). I, as a matter of fact, do not believe that the evaluation of the agent is
relevant for the moral evaluation of the action. V V, I also disagree with the view that if
an agent does not have altruistic motives to act, the intervention is not humanitarian.
In the case of East Timor, I am quite convinced that Australia intervened out of
humanitarian concerns in 2006 as much as in 1999. For in 2006 the Timorese state was
viewed as a failed state (Cotton, J. 2007), part of an ³arc of instability´ ± which is ³a semi-
permanent situation to which any number of regional problems can be connected´ (Ayson
2007:224). The characteristics of a state failure applying to East Timor are the following:
atrophy of the state, decline of its revenues, and diminution of its capacities ± which requires
government¶s conflict with oppositional political parties, the parliament¶s incapacity to enact
a viable constitution, and the dilemmas surrounding the police and the military were the
crisis¶ main political causes, but the weak economy of the country only intensified it.
Prompted by the desire to rescue the East Timorese population, and by the fear that the
situation in the island would substantially affect Australia and the rest of the Asian-Pacific
region, the Howard government deployed its troops, upon the East Timorese government¶s
official request. Australia acted on security grounds: in other words, to protect both the East
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Timorese and Australian citizens, as well as to secure stability in the entire region. In this
regard, Australia¶s grand plan of enhancing security in the region can also be seen as part of
its motivation and, therefore, constitutes a humanitarian motive that further legitimates its
intervention in East Timor. Also, according to J.L. Holzgrefe, we can make here a distinction
being ³aimed at protecting or rescuing the intervening state¶s own nationals´ (in Holzgrefe
and Keohane, R. 2003: 18). The term ³forcible´, therefore, can apply to the 2006 intervention.
Australia¶s humanitarian intent for intervention in 1999 is crystal-clear. Since 1975, the East
Timorese population had been suffering from Indonesian Presidents¶ tyranny. Australia, with
the UN authorization and Indonesian approval, decided to put an end to the atrocities,
employed an adequate strategy to get the desired outcome and did in fact manage to liberate
the East Timorese. As a result, I believe that both interventions are morally justified as being
humanitarian, although it has been demonstrated that Australia did not have sufficient
Should intentions be given that much credit? Some may challenge the ³intentions
matter´ approach by arguing that the outcome of an intervention outweighs the humanitarian
intent of the agent. For if a state claims that it wishes to rescue a population from tyranny, but
adopts an inadequate strategy to do so and eventually fails to give a successful outcome to its
operation, does the good intention of the agent still matter? The fact that people have not been
saved undermines the agent¶s morally good intention. Nevertheless, I believe it is important to
For if an agent acts out of an abominable intent, the intervention can ever be considered as
humanitarian. The outcome, in all cases, will result in tyranny (Wheeler, N. 2000). However,
if an agent acts for non-altruistic motives, the outcome may result successfully ± thereby
justifying the intervention as humanitarian. The belief that outcomes matter more than
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motives or intentions is widely shared among Utilitarians, such as John Stuart Mill (Teson, F.
2005). For them, an action¶s consequence is everything. In fact, Utilitarians acknowledge the
paramount importance of outcomes, but as Teson states: ³they also seek to extend the
Utilitarians would therefore claim that Australia¶s interventions are justified as humanitarian.
Although the ³outcomes matter´ approach is an VV valid way to justify the legitimacy of
a humanitarian intervention, two main objections can be made to it. First of all, I do not think
that the Utilitarian perspective is one you can rely on, for it is impossible to know the
outcomes of an action beforehand. Therefore, states and politicians can only predict an
outcome that they deem likely to happen, without being able to genuinely say that their
actions are legitimate until they know how they eventually resulted. Secondly, it is incoherent
to give legitimacy to an act that is morally wrong, for the sole reason that it resulted in a
fortunate outcome (out of luck). Consequently, I sustain the view that humanitarian
purposes/intentions are the key legitimising fact when it comes to gauging an intervention¶s
legitimacy. As previously said, I reiterate the thought that a state does not need to be
that matter, I believe the 1999 and 2006 Australian interventions in East Timor can be
Last but not least, I would like to briefly discuss the relevance of calling something
it legitimates leaders¶ actions and draws an admirable light upon them. Nevertheless, it does
not impact on the moral status of an action ± which is its legality under the law.
Although issues of legality did not arise in the case of the East Timor conflicts, states often
seem to be divided over the legality of morally influenced interventions. The ex-Yugoslav
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conflict is a perfect example. Indeed, NATO launched an air campaign without the legal
consent of the Security Council, for Russia¶s veto was deeply expected. Since the beginning
of the intervention in 1999, NATO states claimed the highly humanitarian purpose of their
action as they were sensitively trying to put an end to ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity in Kosovo (Smith, M. and Latawski, P. 2003). This dilemma raises, once again, the
issue of power of veto hold by the five permanent members of the UN¶ Security Council.
Should states obey the Security Council if it forbids an intervention that is yet highly
It seems to me that there are some inconsistencies in the way the UN deals with humanitarian
disasters and, as previously said, the ICISS itself acknowledges in the Report on the
Responsibility to Protect the Security Council¶s failure to act (when to intervene, and to
intervene successfully). Therefore, I believe that, as complex as the dilemma over the legality
of morally influenced actions can be, when it comes to legitimating an intervention, the UN
should accept the primacy of both humanitarian purposes and outcomes over legality under
international law.
Australia has played a key role in East Timor. It has restored peace and security, as well
as facilitated its transition into an independent state. However, as previously noted, the
question of whether states may use force to protect the human rights of individuals other than
The 1999 and 2006 peacekeeping operations would not have been launched if Australia had
not fulfilled certain political and legal requirements ± which were the acquiescence of the
affected state (or the authority who controls the territory) and the deliverance of a UN
mandate. As previously noted, both of these conditions had certainly been met in 1999 and
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2006. The East Timor conflicts were part of an era of new interventionism during which some
form of internationalisation of human conscience arise. In the post-Cold War era, the
international law, one could question the legitimacy of its moral incentives. According to
³motives matter´ theorists, the 1999 and 2006 interventions cannot possibly be qualified as
humanitarian, for the mere reason that, as demonstrated earlier, Australia did not have
is not surprising, and simply reflects the way states function in a global world. Each state tries
to advance its own interests by, at the same time, showing preoccupation for the welfare of
other populations. Since no state will ever act for solely altruistic reasons, I do not think that
the Howard government should be blamed for obeying to such reality. I therefore also do not
believe that one can gauge whether an intervention is humanitarian merely based on the
agent¶s motives for intervening. Intentions are of paramount importance; hence why making a
distinction between motives and intentions is crucial. Indeed, I am quite convinced that a state
can act with a humanitarian intent without having humanitarian motives. And I believe that
was the case for Australia. I find motives irrelevant to gauge the morality of an action.
Motives tells us about the morality of the agent who undertakes the action, nevertheless,
whether or not the agent acts for humanitarian reasons, does not affect the moral status of the
action. Therefore, if an agent undertakes an action that is good in itself, but does it for non-
altruistic reasons, the action will be seen as humanitarian, although the agent will not be
case of East Timor ± which is why I sustain the view that both peacekeeping and peace-
building operations were humanitarian interventions. In this respect, I must add that the
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successful outcomes of the interventions give an even higher legitimacy to Australia¶s
actions, according to the Utilitarian view. Nevertheless, I would not preach a wholly
criterion, however I find also important to take into account the nature of the agent¶s intent.
Indeed, there are cases, such as Kosovo, which have raised many doubts as to the will of
states to overtly and forcibly intervene, as well as to the UN¶s ability to decide when to
intervene. One¶s opinion on the question whether states should religiously obey to the
Security Council¶s decisions is, therefore, fairly intertwined with one¶s view on what
legitimises a humanitarian intervention. For if one believes that states should not derogate
from the UN¶s will, then any illegal intervention will ever be legitimised as humanitarian. On
the contrary, and thus is how I believe it should be, if states intervene for humanitarian
reasons, but without the Security Council¶s permission, the intervention still is a humanitarian
intervention. In this respect, I would like to highlight that, at all cases, Australia¶s
interventions in East Timor were humanitarian interventions. Australia had a legal right and a