Carlo June C.

Tibayan Transportation Law

2B November 26, 2010

Lhuillier v. Bristish Airways

G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010

FACTS: On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint 2 for damages against respondent British Airways
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. She alleged that on February 28, 2005, she took respondent’s flight
548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly requested Julian Halliday (Halliday), one of
the respondent’s flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday
allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that "If I were to help all 300 passengers in this
flight, I would have a broken back!"

Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan
(Kerrigan), singled her out from among all the passengers in the business class section to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly,
Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety
rules and regulations of the plane. Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan that she knew the plane’s safety regulations being
a frequent traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from that of the petitioner
and menacingly told her that "We don’t like your attitude."

On May 30, 2005, respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack
of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that only the courts of London,
United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article
28(1) of which provides:

An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the carrier
or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made,
or before the court of the place of destination.

Motion to dismiss was granted, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Philippine courts have jurisdiction over a tortious conduct committed against a Filipino citizen and resident
by airline personnel of a foreign carrier travelling beyond the territorial limit of any foreign country; and thus is outside the
ambit of the Warsaw Convention?

RULING: The Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country.

The Warsaw Convention applies because the air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred, was between the
United Kingdom and Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention.

Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:

1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by aircraft for
reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport undertaking.

2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international carriage" means any carriage in which,
according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not
there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within the territories of two High Contracting
Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a
territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another Power, even though that Power is
not a party to this Convention. A carriage without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international
for the purposes of this Convention. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated within the territories of
two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an "international carriage". The High Contracting Parties referred to
herein were the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and those which subsequently adhered to it.

In the case at bench, petitioner’s place of departure was London, United Kingdom while her place of destination was Rome,
Italy. Both the United Kingdom16 and Italy17 signed and ratified the Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the
petitioner is deemed to be an "international carriage" within the contemplation of the Warsaw Convention.

Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant case, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is
governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention.
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before –

1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;

2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;
3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
4. the court of the place of destination.

In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United Kingdom with London as
its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case before
the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and
respondent, it appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the
petitioner has the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and respondent aver
that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the routing presented in the said passenger
ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the
RTC of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.
Carlo June C. Tibayan Transportation Law
2B November 26, 2010

Maranan v. Perez
G.R. No. 22272, June 26, 1967

FACTS: Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated by Pascual Perez
when he was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon Valenzuela. On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the
Court of Appeals, Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Batangas to recover
damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-
defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind. Defendant Perez further claimed that the death was
a caso fortuito for which the carrier was not liable.

The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages against defendant Perez. The claim
against defendant Valenzuela was dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the
former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of conviction earlier mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and on May 19, 1964, final judgment
was entered therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not common carrier is liable?

RULING: Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the common carrier liable for
intentional assaults committed by its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states
that
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the
common carriers.

The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. There, the
basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine
of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.

Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his
authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only.

Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the
course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience
of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from
assaults committed by its own employees.

Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their
technical competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of
behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.

Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable
pursuant to Article 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was also correct. Plaintiff's
action was predicated on breach of contract of carriage and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is covered
in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.
Carlo June C. Tibayan Transportation Law
2B November 26, 2010

Santos v. Tolentino
G.R. No. 17394, May 30, 1962

FACTS: Petitioner Amador D. Santos is the owner of several taxicabs being operated in the City of Manila and suburbs
under the name and style of "Santos Taxi". While Dolores Banzon Tolentino, hereafter referred to as Mrs. Tolentino, was at
the intersection of España and Dos Castillas Streets, City of Manila, Vicente Duldulao y Dancel, who was driving a "Santos
Taxi", backed it without blowing his horns and in such a negligent manner that its rear part bumped Mrs. Tolentino, for which
reason she fell down and a rear wheel of the car ran over her, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries. The
corresponding information for serious physical injuries through reckless negligence was filed against Duldulao, which
convicted and sentenced him, accordingly, on November 7, 1951.

Mrs. Tolentino and her husband band, Eulogio, instituted the present civil action against Amador D. Santos and Vicente
Duldulao. In the complaint therein, the Tolentinos prayed that Santos and Duldulao be sentenced to pay, jointly and
severally, damages and attorney's fees, aside from the costs. In their answer to the complaint, Santos and Duldulao alleged
that the accident was due exclusively to the negligence of Mrs. Tolentino. In due course, said court rendered a decision
sentencing Santos and Duldulao to pay jointly and severally to Mrs. Tolentino the sum of P2,549.40, as actual damages, and
P5,000, as moral damages, in addition to the costs. This decision was, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, taken by Santos
and Duldulao, affirmed on July 30, 1960.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in applying Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in this case?

RULING: In Fores vs. Miranda (supra) with reference to the difference between actions ex contractu and actions quasi ex
delicto, which is equally applicable to actions ex delicto.

Upon the other hand, the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of
transportation explains, to some extent, the limitations imposed by the new Code on the amount of the recovery.
The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of
injury to the passenger; the latter is relieved from the duty to establish the fault of the carrier, or of his employees,
and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to unforeseen event or to force majeure. Moreover,
the carrier, unlike in suits for quasi-delict, may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its employees.

The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal concept of quasi delict as essentiallyextra-
contractual negligence, compel us to differentiate between actions ex contractu, and actions quasi ex delicto, and
prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort.