Publicity's Secret

Author(s): Jodi Dean

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 5 (Oct., 2001), pp. 624-650
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3072532
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PUBLICITY AND DELIBERATION:
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS IN DISPUTE

PUBLICITY'S SECRET

JODI DEAN
Hobart and WilliamSmithColleges

REQUIRINGSECRECY
Critical democratictheory and capitalist technocultureconverge today
arounda single point-the necessity of publicity.Publicityis the organizing
element of democraticpolitics and the golden ring of infotainmentsociety.
Few on the Left arewilling to theorizedemocracywithoutsome notionof
publicity.No matterhow entangledpolitics becomes in networksof senti-
ment and spectacle, many continue to think that rule by "the public" is
enhancedby practicesthatenablethe productionanddisseminationof public
opinion, practicesgenerally implicatedin technologies of surveillanceand
expectations of entertainment.So, they emphasize public spheres and
oppositionalcounterpublicsas if these conceptsreferredto morethanmedia
productions,interestgroups, or rhetoricalcategoriesinvoked to mobilize a
particularpointof view. Theyunderscorethe public'srightto know,positing,
as it were, a secrettheknowledgeof whichwould solve theproblemsprevent-
ing the publicfrombeing all thatit can be. In short,manycriticaldemocratic
theoristsassumethe democraticpotentialof an ideal of publicityeven as they
avoid explainingwhat, today,thatpotentialmight be.1
Publicityis also the governingconceptof the informationage. Contempo-
rarytechnoculturerelies on the convictionthatthe solutionto anyproblemis
publicity.More information,greater(faster,better,cheaper!)access seems
the only answer.It doesn't even matterwhat the questionis. People are sup-

AUTHOR'SNOTE:Thanksto ThomasDumm,Paul Passavant,Lee Quinby,John Shovlin,and

StephenWhitefor their insights and criticisms.
POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 29 No. 5, October2001 624-650
? 2001 Sage Publications
624
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 625

posed to find out for themselves, to search for the truth,to form their own
opinions-and the way to do that is throughnew communicationtechnolo-
gies. Conversely,in mattersas disparateas science, violence, economic suc-
cess, andpersonaladvancement,the key concernis with publicity,gettingthe
finding before the public, alertingthe public to a potentialdanger,gaining
mindshare,or establishingbrandidentity,againby takingadvantageof net-
worked communications.These days, for example, subculturalsuccess is
depictedless in termsof the risk of "selling out"than it is in the promiseof
"makingit,"that is, of gaining recognitionfrom the largerculture.If some-
thing isn't public(ized), it doesn't seem to exist at all.
It would be stupidto claim thattechnologies,practices,andnormsof pub-
licity never make valuable contributionsto democraticpolitics. Suspicious
inquiriesinto potentialwrongdoingoften uncoverreal crimes and produce
significantreforms.That an event is spectacularized,we might say, doesn't
meanthatit won't have positive political effects.2It is neverthelessalso clear
that the vast networksof news and entertainmentthat enable contemporary
practicesof democracyalso threatendemocraticformsof life-especially as
they producesearching,suspicious subjectsever clicking for more informa-
tion, ever drawnto uncoverthe secret and find out for themselves.
To call into questionthe obviousness of publicityas the normof contem-
porarydemocracy,to unsettlepublicity'staken-for-grantedness and affiliate
myself with theories and of
practices democracy articulatedthroughnotions
of antagonismandnetworksof desire,I look at publicity'slimit-the secret.
My concernis not with the contentsof secretsor the properdeterminationof
what should be made public. Rather,it involves what this "makingpublic"
meanswith respectto the functionof the secretwithinthe logic of publicity.I
arguethatdemocraticpolitics has been formattedthrougha dynamicof con-
cealmentand disclosure,througha primaryoppositionbetween what is hid-
den andwhatis revealed.The fantasyof a publicto which democracyappeals
andthe ideal of publicityat its normativecore requirethe secret as theirdis-
avowed basis.3
My inquirydoesn't amendits critiqueof the publicwith a reassuringalter-
native;such an alternative,it seems to me, can't precedecriticalengagement
insofaras critiquemarksa certainimpassein thinkingandseeks to bringthis
impasse to expression.4Since to offer an alternativetoo quickly risks stop-
ping critiquebefore it starts,it suggests a demandthatprotectssome, gener-
ally dominant,formsof thinkingeven as it refrainsfromaskingwhy, exactly,
such thinkingmight need to be protected.Thus, to bring to expression the
impasse in an ideal of publicitythatworks simultaneouslyto encode demo-
craticpracticeand marketglobal technoculture,I focus on the limit point of
626 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

democraticvalidity-the secret-and the sense in whichpublicity"requires"

the secret.
I consider three aspects of the requirementof secrecy. First, publicity
requiresthe secretas its constitutivelimit, as thatpoint of exclusion through
which the public becomes intelligible. Using Jeremy Bentham'sEssay on
Political Tactics,I showhow thepublicis structuredthrougha splitthatis dis-
avowedandheld in place by the secret.Second,the publicrequiresthe secret
historically. During the Enlightenment,publicity as a democratic ideal
emerges in encounterswith the sovereignprivilegeof secrecy.I readJtirgen
Habermasand ReinhartKoselleck for their accounts of Freemasonryas a
practicalrealizationof this ideal. Finally,the public requiresthe secret in a
sense thatI understandas ideological, as partof the dynamicof a mediatized
technoculturegluttedin screensandcelebrity,scandalandindignation.Here,
the secretsustainsthe fantasythatdisparateaudiencesarea collectivitycapa-
ble of being representedas a unitaryactoror political site. Such a fantasy,I
argue, damages possibilities for democracy as it becomes materializedin
technoculturalpracticesof spectacle and suspicion.
To say more aboutthis thirdsense in which the public requiresthe secret:
my claim is thatthe ideal of a public spherefunctionsas the ideological sup-
port for global technoculture.The key element among the presuppositions
pervadinghow we imagine andpracticedemocracy,publicityis the organiz-
ing concept ("quiltingpoint")of the ideology thatinformsthe desireto make
the links and discover the secrets.5By ideology, I mean the "generative
matrix that regulatesthe relationshipbetween visible and the non-visible,
between imaginableandnon-imaginable,as well as changes in this relation-
ship."6Whatis seen and imagined,practicedand understood,as democracy
today operatesthroughand as the materializationof publicity.
Many political theorists no longer regardideology-critiqueas a viable
analyticaltool. For example,critics of the Frankfurtschool have arguedthat
thebasic notionof ideology restson anuntenablynaiveview of people as vic-
tims of false consciousness.Too simply put,the (early)Frankfurtschool pre-
sumesthatthe fundamentalproblemof social dominationis thatpeople don't
know what they're doing. Its correspondingview of ideology-critiquepro-
ceeds by unmaskingmistakes to disclose the underlyingtruth.As critics of
the Frankfurtschool have rightly pointed out, this account of ideology
comes up against all sorts of problems-epistemological questions of the
nonideological, material issues regardingdistinctions between ideas and
apparatuses,and persistingpracticalconcernswith respectto how facts and
truths(knowledge) areproduced(and deployed) in the service of prevailing
power relations.7
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 627

In response, Slavoj 2izek presentsa strongcase for a psycho analytically

informed concept of ideology capable of theorizing the ways our deepest
commitmentsbind us to practicesof domination.2izek arguesthatideology
critiquetodaymustdo morethansimply "unmask"the lie. Indeed,in the face
of contemporarytechnoculture'spervasivecynicism, unmaskingis clearly
pointless:cynicism alreadyincorporatesan ironicdistancefrom official cul-
tureandeverydaysocial reality.People know very well whatthey aredoing,
butstill they do it. Thus,Zizek emphasizeshow ideology comes into play not
just at the level of knowing(uncoveringtruth)butat the level of doing (mate-
rializing belief). Cynics may have a distance from social reality,but their
actions still accordwith it.
An example from Bum Rate, Michael Wolff's account of the gold rush
years of the Internet,helps clarify the way thatthis doing persistsin the face
of seemingly contraryknowledge. The book describes Wolff's generally
futile effortsto attracthigh-level investmentin his Internetcompany.No one
was interestedin talkingwith him untilhe was mentionedin an articleon the
frontpage of the WallStreetJournal.Wolff writes,

Because publicityis the currencyof our time, it is not unreasonableto assumethatthere

is a Darwinistic capitalistic earning process to such riches. Even people who should
know better (even those for whom manipulationsof the press are a daily accomplish-
ment) are almost always impressed, or rankled, by someone else's publicity. Even
thoughnine times out of ten thatfix is in, we somehowcan't helpregardin rich people as
having earnedtheirmoney, or publicityhounds as deservingtheir fame.

We know thatpublicity,like money,has no intrinsicworthor merit,thatit is

easily manipulatedandhas no connectionwith some kindof valueinheringin
its object; nevertheless,we act as if we did not have this knowledge. Our
actions,in otherwords,suggest an underlyingbelief thatpublicityis a sign of
somethingmore, somethingreal.
2izek emphasizes that these actions themselves produce social reality.
Social reality is sustainedby the "as if," the fantasyof what things are like.
Fantasyemergesto cover over the antagonismsandinconsistenciesthatper-
vadethe social field. Oureverydaypracticesandthe technologiesandinstitu-
tions within which they are embedded,moreover,materializethis fantasy;
withoutit, social realitywould dissolve. 2izek gives the exampleof the com-
munist governmentsin easternand centralEurope:what happenedwas not
thatpeople stoppedbelieving in the system;rather,they stoppedacting as if
they believed it. Similarly,in the feeding frenzy arounddot.coms, the invest-
ment bubble popped not when people stoppedbelieving the hype-for the
constantrefrainwas thatthe whole thing was hype-but when they stopped
628 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

acting as if they believed it. Zizek's upgradednotion of ideology-critique

operates,then,not at the level of knowledgebutat the level of the fantasythat
sustainsbelief, that informsaction. Its basic procedureinvolves identifying
what fantasy holds a belief togetherand analyzingthe way it enables us to
escape a certaintraumaor deadlock.9
The last aspectof 2izek's theoryof ideology importantfor my critiqueof
publicity involves this materializationof belief. For 2izek, belief cannotbe
reducedto an internalmentalor emotionalstate. Rather,belief is "radically
exterior,embodiedin the practical,effective procedureof people."'0On one
level, belief involves what we do even when we know better-crossing our
fingers for good luck, laughing at a joke that isn't funny, buying into
consumeriststandardsof beauty.But on anotherlevel, belief is embodiedin
more than our own actions: as the example from Burn Rate demonstrates,
belief is exteriorizedin largerculturalpracticesand technologies. In effect,
no one todayreallyhas to believe;ourinstitutionsdo it for us. 2izek gives the
example of cannedlaughteron television. These laughs do morethantell us
when to laugh(for why wouldwe need to be told?).Cannedlaughteractually
relieves us of our duty to laugh. It laughs for us. Anotherexample might be
talkingheads debatingpolitics on television:they debatefor us, relievingus
of our duty to develop an opinion or even care aboutpolitics.
To returnto secrecy and publicity, as I show three different relations
between the two-constitutive exclusion, concretehistorical,and ideologi-
cal-I am also presentinga dynamicof conceptualchange. The localization
of democraticpotentialin the public is inevitablyaccompaniedby percep-
tions of conflict, failure,andweaknessin the public.Differentlyput,the more
publicity is idealized as the key to democracy,the greaterthe pressureto
materializea publicthatcan live up to or instantiatean ideal of publicreason.
Yet precisely this concretematerializationof an ideal of publicityunleashes
and multipliesthose suspicions thatunderminethe public sphere.Publicity,
in realizing or materializing itself in the practices of contemporary
technoculture,negatesitself. The materializationof publicitymakesexplicit
the antagonismswithin the ideology of the public sphere.

A "SYSTEMOF DISTRUST"

Whatfantasysustainsbelief in the public?Bentham'saccountof the law

of publicitypointsto the secret.The secretfills out the gapbetweentwo com-
petingnotionsof the public,compensatingin advancefor the public'sfailure
to serve as the unitarysubjectof democracy.It pointsto the fantasyof a unity,
of the inclusive social body to come afterthe hiddenbarrierto its realization
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 629

has been disclosed. Practices of concealment and revelation materialize

belief in this fantasy,makingthe public appearas preciselythatsubjectfrom
whom secrets are kept and in whom a right to know is embedded.
Two notions of the public inform Bentham's attack on governmentby
secrecy." First, Bentham supports the idea of a powerful, incorruptible,
undeniablycertainpublic tribunalthatunites "all the wisdom andjustice of
the nation"and "decidesthe destinyof public men."12 I referto this universal
public tribunal as the to
public supposed know.'3 What it knows is less impor-
tantthanthis public's fundamentalclaim to know,its constant,active know-
ing. Second, Benthamdefends the public supposedto know againsta differ-
ent notion of the public, thepublic supposedto believe. A flux of conflicting
opinions, this public is easily seduced and unableto judge its true interests.
Itsjudgmentsstem from trust("beliefin the belief of the other")ratherthan
knowledge.
Benthamintroducesthis split in the public when he addressesobjections
raisedto the principleof publicity.He explainsthatsome defendgovernment
by secrecy with the argumentthatthe public lacks a capacityfor judgment.
But theirview, he argues,mistakenlyunifies whatis in fact divided:the pub-
lic is actuallysplit into threeclasses-the manywho have no time for public
affairs,the middle who believe throughthejudgmentsof others,and the few
whojudge for themselveson the basis of the availableinformation.Bentham
is clearthatthe manyandthe middlecan't reallyjudge. Guidedby theirneeds
and desires, they are inconstantand likely to err.The thirdclass, however,is
certainandconstant.It has the abilityneededto judge butnot the information
it needs to judge well: "if this class judge ill, it is because it is ignorantof the
facts-because it does not possess the necessary particularsfor forming a
good judgment."'4So ratherthan trumpingthe public supposed to believe
with the public supposedto know, Benthambuildsboth concepts into a sys-
tem of publicity.Publicitywill supplythe informationthatwill stabilizeand
guide the judgmentof the public supposedto know.
Benthamallows thatthe benefitsthatinformationprovidesto thejudging
portionof the public don't directly affect the mass of people at the bottom.
Instead,thereis a trickle-downeffect thatleads to the bettermentof those in
the middleclass becausethey adoptfor themselvesthe opinionsof the small,
well-informedjudging class. The way the middle class forms its opinions
doesn't change throughenlightenment;it still believes. It becomes enlight-
ened not becauseits beliefs arereplacedby knowledgedirectlybutbecauseit
believes throughthe more certainknowledge of others, that is, throughthe
few who judge well. It believes thatothersbelieve; its opinion is thatothers
have an opinion thatis valid, knowledgeable,and well informed.The law of
publicity doesn't transformthe public supposed to believe into the public
630 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

supposedto know;it affirmsthe split withinthe public, giving some the cer-
tainty of knowledge necessary for judgment while positing others who
believe in them.
Thatpartof the public believes but doesn't know should not be read as a
failureof publicityor an exclusionarylimitingof the public.On the contrary,
thatnot everybodyknows is necessaryto sustainthe fantasyof the public. It
reassuresBenthamas well as his audiencethatthey need not worryaboutthe
middle and the many making all sorts of horribledecisions, sticking their
noses into politicalmattersthatthey don't understand,andgenerallydisrupt-
ing the orderof things.The splitpublic securesin advancepreciselythatbar-
rierto a tribunalof the manythatenablesBenthamto appealto a principleof
publicity.He can arguefor a public tribunalbecause he can be sure that the
whole public won't reallyjudge.
The public is constant and inconstant,informedand ignorant,knowing
and believing. The limits of each notion are deferred,displacedthroughthe
invocationof the opposingconcept.Of course, this deferralis asymmetrical.
Foreven as the belief of the two lowerclasses operatesat a distance,alwaysas
a belief in the public supposedto know,theirbelief has to stop somewhere;it
has to rely on the sense thatsomeonein fact knows. This is wherepublicityas
a principlecomes in. Publicitywill providethe informationthatwill enable
the public supposedto believe to believe that someone knows.
Recall that Bentham'sargumentagainst those who oppose publicity on
the groundsthatthe public is ruledby passion andignoranceemphasizesthe
competenceandcertaintyof thejudgingclass. The institutionalconditionsof
governmentby secrecy hinderthis class fromjudging well; they preventthe
public supposedto know fromknowing.Thisjudging portionof the public is
constantandcertain,butits certaintyis suspended,held out as the possibility
thatthe public will judge well so long as it has the properinformation.What
publicity as a system provides is the possibility of informedjudgment, the
guaranteethat someone will know, even though no one can say precisely
who. Publicityholds out the possibility of good judgmentto the public sup-
posed to believe. Fromthis angle, the public supposedto know seems only
thatpresuppositionnecessaryfor the public supposedto believe. It provides
the guaranteeof knowledge that stabilizes belief. The public supposed to
believe, then,does not representpublicity'slack. Nor is it a cynical rejection
of the ideal of a constantanduniversalpublictribunal,a reductiveacceptance
of the way thingsareinsteadof a utopianembraceof the way thingsmightbe.
Onthe contrary,the publicsupposedto believe installsthatelementof believ-
ing throughthe othernecessaryfor publicityto functionas a systemof demo-
craticgovernance.
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 631

At the same time, thatthejudgingclass acts for the lowertwo classes frees
them up to amuse themselves.15Because they are not involved in finding
informationand making judgments, they can enjoy publicity's pleasures,
"theamusementwhich resultsfrom it."'6Forthem, publicationof the goings
on in the assembly is entertainment.Benthamthus sees addedvalue in free-
ing some in the public fromthe dutyto judge-a measurablyhappiernation.
So the pleasuresof publicity enable the multitudeof "all classes in society"
to become more attachedto and confidentin government.'7Justas the lower
classes act andjudge throughthe thirdclass, so does thejudging class enjoy
throughthem. Again, what sustainsthe fantasyof the public is the barrierto
its realization,the unlikelihoodthateveryone will be burdenedby having to
dig aroundfor information,weigh it, evaluateit, andreallymakeajudgment.
In Bentham'sdiscussion,certaintyis held out as a promise,a possibility.It
is neversimply groundedin a particularset of facts. Indeed,the very certainty
of the public precedes andjustifies its right to know the facts. The informa-
tion thatproves the truthof publicjudgmentis out there,althoughit may be
(andis always) withheld,out of reach.To this extent,the authorityof the pub-
lic supposedto know carrieswith it an aura,a sense of mystery.How do they
know?
The answeris the secret, or, more precisely,the secret is the answer.The
secretfills outthe gap andconceals the inconsistencybetweenthe public sup-
posed to know andthe public supposedto believe. It holds open the possibil-
ity that the judging public will judge correctly,the possibility in which the
believing public needs to believe. The secretmarksthe absencenecessaryto
sustainbelief in the public supposedto know. It's that missing information
warrantingthe rightnessof the opinionof the publictribunal.Once they have
the information,the truth,their judgment will embody the certaintythey
alreadyhave.
For example, Benthampresentsthe "enemies"of publicity-the "male-
factor,"the "tyrant,"and the "indolentman"-as benefiting from secrecy.
These threehave good reasonto flee from the judgmentsof public opinion:
they have already forfeited their reputations.Their very preference for
secrecy is a sign of their guilt: "Suspicion always attaches to mystery. It
thinks it sees a crime where it beholds an affectationof secrecy; and it is
rarelydeceived. For why should we hide ourselves if we do not dreadbeing
seen?"'8The certaintywith which the publicknowsin these cases indicatesin
advance thatthereis somethingfor it to know.Thereis a secret. Someone is
guilty.The innocent,the good, and the wise have nothingto fear.One might
say that the public tribunaloperatesas a secret tribunal-the public knows
the secret guilt of the malefactor,tyrant,and indolent man, and this is why
they hide.
632 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

The public suturedtogethervia the secret is overwhelminglysuspicious.

Publicity operatesthroughthe threatof publication,throughthe motivating
force thataccompaniesriskof exposureanddesirefor attention.Withoutthat
risk, therecan be no public. In Bentham'swords,the regime of publicityis a
"systemof distrust."'9 The suspicionthatsomethinghas been withheld,that
the information needed for judging properly is hidden and needs to be
exposed, sustainsthis system. As I mentioned,the law of publicitydoes not
simply provideinformationthatwill stabilizethejudgmentof the public tri-
bunal;thatjudgment is alreadythere. No, this law is a practice-generating
program installed into the social for the very production of the public.
Demandingthatnothingbe concealed, this law posits and in so doing inter-
pellatesthe public tribunal.It providesthe objects of judgment,the issues to
try.Publicityholds out thepromiseof revelation,the lureof the secret.Itsper-
vasive mistrustdrivesthe will to seek out and expose. At the same time, the
certaintyof the public supposedto know becomes materializedin practices
of revelationand disclosureas the guaranteethatits searchis justified, right,
and universallyvalid.

FREEMASONSRULETHE WORLD!
I now turnto secrecy as the historicalconditionfor the emergenceof pub-
licity as a normativeideal in the Enlightenment.How, exactly,did the "pub-
lic" come to be imbued with an authorityto know? JurgenHabermasand
ReinhartKoselleckprovidecompellinganalysesof the social materialization
of the "public"in seventeenth-and eighteenth-centuryEuropeas thatwhich
can be invokedas a criticalauthority.Forboth,the materializationof the pub-
lic dependson the protectionsprovidedby secrecy andproceedsthroughthe
productionof suspicious subjectivities.
Yet,the differencesin theiraccountsof the practicesthroughwhich these
subjectivities are produced lead them to opposing assessments of public
power.Despite the fact thatKoselleckis the theoristwho emphasizesthe ritu-
als and arcanaof Freemasonry,Habermasis the one whose failureto main-
tainthe splitbetweenthe public supposedto know andthepublicsupposedto
believe makes uncovering the secret the key to democracy. Briefly put,
Habermas'saccountof the concreterealizationof publicityas a normof rea-
son should be read as its own inversion, as an account of the processes
throughwhich popularsovereigntyis configuredas a politics of suspicion.
I begin with Koselleck, whose Critiqueand Crisis preceded and influ-
enced Habermas's Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.
Koselleckarguesthatthe "freedomin secret"presentedabstractlyin Hobbes
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 633

andLocke was madeconcretein Freemasonry,becoming "thesecretof free-

dom."20The lodges were secret inner spaces within the absolutist state,
spaces separatedfrom the political by the very mysterieswhose protections
enabled the lodges to serve indirectlyas a counterto the state.
First,Koselleck's accountof Hobbesemphasizesthatthe Hobbesianstate
is constitutedthrougha splittingof politics frommorality,a splitheld in place
by reasonandinstantiatedin the sovereign.Beyond politics andmorality,the
sovereigndecision groundslaw in an act of purewill. The Hobbesiansubject,
Koselleck argues,is also split. It exists in an exteriorpolitical sphereof acts
subject to law and in an interior sphere of conscience. Only in the latter,
"secret,"sphere is man free. In effect, Koselleck explains, this space is the
secretat the heartof the absolutiststate,the secretthatman as a humanbeing
has been eliminatedfromthe structureof the stateand,indeed,thatthe state's
very claim to neutralitydependson this omission.
Second, KoselleckreadsLocke's accountof "TheLaw of Opinionor Rep-
utation"as a broadeningof Hobbes's interiorconscience into a secretmoral-
ity. For Locke, citizens' views about virtue and vice are more than private
opinions; they are judgments with the characterof moral laws. Although
these judgments remain secret from the state, Locke expands their scope:
they now determinethe moralvalue of actions. These opinions, these judg-
ments,areno longermerelyindividualas they arewith Hobbes.Instead,they
receive "theiruniversallyobligatorycharacterfrom an unspokenaccord of
the citizens 'by a secretandtaciteconsent'."21Actions thatwere once subject
only to the laws of the sovereignare now subjectto the praise and blame of
one's fellow citizens, to the law of reputation.
In what practices were such ideas concretized? Koselleck, like others,
looks to the lodges, to secretsocieties like Freemasonry.The lodges were rit-
ualized enactmentsof nonfamilial,nonmarketrelationsoutside of the state.
They providedforms of association and experiences of connection beyond
those delimitedby absolutism.On one hand,this freedomwas establishedby
the new bonds of belief created by shared initiation into Freemasonry's
arcana-the organization'sritualandhierarchydemandedthatsome believe
in others' arcaneknowledge. On the other hand, the mysteries of Freema-
sonry imbuedit with the auraof the unknown.This auracompetedwith the
aura of the crown, counteringthe representationalpower of the sovereign
with its own mysterious authority.Members were thus bound together
throughthe secret as well as throughtheirexceptionalposition in relationto
the absolutiststate.
Freemasonry'ssecrecy enabled the interior space of the conscience to
expand into larger social connections. "Joint participationin the same
arcanum"linked initiates from various classes and estates, establishing a
634 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

secret mutuality that "separatedthe brethrenfrom the rest of the outside

world."22 It attachedmembersto the lodge by makingthemsuspiciousof out-
siders.And it functionedas a disciplinarymechanism,providingan incentive
for initiates to practice the obedience necessary for advancementinto the
higherranksof the lodge. To achieve enlightenment,to discoverthe secrets,
membershad to submitthemselvesto the authorityof the Masonicleaders,a
leadershipthat, in some versions, remainedinvisible to those in the lower
orders.Those who believed, in otherwords,had simply to believe thatthere
were some above them who knew.
Koselleck notes how lodge practicematerializedthis belief: the Bavarian
Orderof Illuminatiinstitutedan elaboratesecretreportingsystem, requiring
brethrento write extensive monthly reportson themselves and each other.
Application to and promotionwithin the Illuminatiincluded filling out a
thirty-two-pagequestionnaireconsistingof severalhundredquestionsaimed
at revealingthe variousdimensionsof the candidate.Koselleck writes,

Here the secretwas initially considereda vehicle of moraleducation,as "man'sleaning

towardthe hiddenand mysteriousis used in a way so advantageousto morality,"but at
the same it deliveredthe neophyteto the "moralregimen,"to that "directorateof toler-
ance"which on the strengthof the secretwas alreadyterrorizingbrethrenin the nameof
morality.23

At each stage of initiation,ritualpracticesenabledadeptsto believe thatoth-

ers believed. Functionally,then, the secretenabledequalityand hierarchy;it
replacedthe distinctionscharacteristicof the old regimewith a new elitism of
rank,knowledge, and enlightenment.
Of course, Masons could not guarantee that members would keep the
secret. So, they substitutedthe moralforce of reputationfor the state's coer-
cive force. Because of theirposition outside the state, Masonsjudged them-
selves accordingto theirown moralstandards.In practice,this meantthatthe
lodges trainedtheirmemberstojudge, to invokeandfollow the law of reputa-
tion and censure. The need for secrecy, then, installed trust, duty, and
self-control at the basis of Freemasonry'ssocial order.The sense of being
entitledto judge, an entitlementBenthaminvestsin the public, thus emerges
in Freemasonryout of the ritualizedtransmissionof rites and arcana.As the
process of initiationworks on the wills, actions, and bodies of lodge mem-
bers, they interiorizea set of beliefs andhabitsof judgment.They believe in
theirordereven as they must increasinglydistrustthe world outside.
Koselleck emphasizesthatthis new moralforce thathad to forego direct
coercion "was always simultaneouslyan act of passing moraljudgment on
the State."24 The secrets thatprotectedMasons from the outside world pro-
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 635

duced in them the sense that they were entitled to judge this world: 'The
mediumof the secretwidened the privateconscience into a society; the soci-
ety came to be a large conscience, a conscience of the world from which the
society voluntarilyexcludeditself by way of the secret."25Freemasonry'srit-
uals allowedthis moralinteriorto expandandin so doing emergeas a counter
to a politically, and increasinglymorally,unworthystate. Because it distin-
guisheditself fromthe absolutiststateas deliberatelynonpoliticalandavow-
edly moral,Freemasonrythreatenedstate sovereignty.As Koselleck writes,
"Politicalabsencein the name of moralityturnedout to be an indirectpoliti-
cal presence."26 The system of values circulatedsecretly,linking lodges in a
sharedspirit,a conspiracy,of judgment.Extractedfrom the political field of
the absolutist state, the morality nourished in secret could claim a new
dominion,a sovereigntyof reasonapartfrom and above politics. Like abso-
lutist sovereigntyitself, this moralitywas exceptional.Like absolutistsover-
eignty, it, too, made a claim to reason.
For Koselleck, Masonic secrecy is the key to Enlightenment:Freema-
sonry'smysteriesandarcanaestablisheda networkwithinthe state-indeed,
a network that traversedand transgressedthe boundariesof the European
states, that occupied the same location of exception claimed for the sover-
eign. Concealmentprotectedpracticesof freedomandnew forms of alliance
as it produceda unity by sustaininga division between those supposed to
know and those supposed to believe. The sense of an entitlementto judge
grew out of practicesof belief in the contextof suspicion.Because Koselleck
anchorsthisjudging in secrecy,moreover,he can theorizebourgeoismorality
as a trump,as a dogmatismthatrejectsas tyrannyanypowerthatit itself does
not acceptorjustify.The lodges didn'tengage politically.In this refusal,they
replacedaction with moralizingjudgment.
Koselleck links the republicof lettersto Freemasonryanalogically:criti-
cism's initial separationfrom the absolutiststatealso became the basis of an
authoritativeright to judgment.As the influence of the bourgeoisieenabled
them increasingly to challenge the state's legitimacy, moreover,criticism
"assumedthe role Locke had at one time assigned to moral censorship;it
became the spokesmanof public opinion."27Claiming a capacity to argue
both for and againsta position, criticsrepresentedthemselvesin termsof the
triumphof reason. Precisely because they were the instantiationof reason,
they had the right and capacityto judge; anythingor anyoneunwilling to be
subjectedto theircriticalgaze, now claimedas the publicgaze, was automati-
cally suspect. The invisible authoritycirculating secretly throughoutthe
lodges therebyextendedits reach,representingitself to itself as "public"as it
became orientedto a readingaudienceandmore directlypolitical in its criti-
636 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

cism of the state. The opinion of this new public, its assessmentof the right-
ness or legitimacyof thatwhich itjudged,establishedthe terrainandtermsof
the political-precisely because the public spherewas beyond, above, poli-
tics. At the same time, the invisibleauthorityof Enlightenmentmoralitycon-
tinuedto presentitself as universal,rational,and above politics.
Although JtirgenHabermas'stheory of the bourgeois public sphere is
widely read for its account of publicity as the rational achievement of
Enlightenmentuniversality,it also acknowledgesthe constitutiveplace of the
secret.Habermasconsiderstwo linksbetweenpublicityandsecrecy.The first
involvesHobbes.HabermasreversesKoselleck'sreadingof Hobbes,empha-
sizing the emergenceof rationallegal norms.Habermaswrites,

Historically,the polemicalclaim of thiskindof rationalitywas developed,in conjunction

with the critical public debate among privatepeople, against the reliance of princely
authorityon secrets of state. Just as secrecy was supposedto serve the maintenanceof
sovereigntybased on voluntas,so publicitywas supposedto serve the promotionof leg-
islation based on ratio.28

ForHabermas,the sovereignpowerof decision was protectedby the secret.It

was the arbitraryelementatthe heartof the machineryof a rationalstate.Pub-
licity was a way to counter,to rationalize,this arbitrarypowerby subjectingit
to the scrutinyof reason.
But Habermas'snext argumentis the one I wantto emphasize.Takingup
the practicesout of which the sense of a public sphereemerged,Habermas
includesin his accountof salons andcoffeehousesthe secretsocieties typical
of Freemasonry.He writes,

The decisive element was not so much the political equality of the membersbut their
exclusivenessin relationto the politicalrealmof absolutismas such:social equalitywas
possible at firstonly as an equalityoutsidethe state.The coming togetherof privatepeo-
ple into a public was thereforeanticipatedin secret, as a public sphere still existing
largelybehindclosed doors.... Reason,which throughpublic use of the rationalfaculty
was to be realizedin the rationalcommunicationof a publicconsistingof rationalhuman
beings, itself neededto be protectedfrombecomingpublicbecauseit was a threatto any
and all relationsof domination.As long as publicityhad its seat in the secretchanceries
of the prince,reasoncould not revealitself directly.Its sphereof publicityhadstill to rely
on secrecy; its public, even as a public, remainedinternal.... This recalls Lessing's
famous statementaboutFreemasonry,which at thattime was a broaderEuropeanphe-
nomenon:it was just as old as bourgeois society-"if indeed bourgeois society is not
merely the offspringof Freemasonry."29

HereHabermascomplicatesthe equationof reasonandpublicity,secrecyand

will thathe employs in his discussion of Hobbes.ForHabermas,secretsoci-
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 637

eties were proto-publics.Secrecy was a conditionfor the publicityof reason.

Outsidethe state,Freemasonry'sclaim to reasontransformsit into something
"morepublic"thanthe stateor government.Because secret societies sought
to cultivatereasonin theiradepts,they betterrepresentthe public spherethan
nonsecretassociationsbased in custom and tradition.Masonic brothers,as
they transmittedtheir principlesfor enlightenment,their rationalmeasures
for moraldisciplineandself-cultivation,were, for all theiresoterica,vehicles
for the reconstitutionof political society in termsof a public sphere.
Habermascombines this reading of secret societies as rational proto-
publicswith aninterpretationof the publicityof the sovereignas merespecta-
cle. The sovereign'spublicitywas anirrationalauraof powerfashionedthrough
practicesof display before an audience.Unlike this audience-orientedpub-
licity of king, realpublicity,in Habermas'sview, has nothingto do with spec-
tacle and display.In fact, it may well be secret. Again, Habermas'spoint is
that, in the historical context of the absolutist state, the norms of reason
thoughtto underlieanexpansionof rightsandlibertiesof the peopledepended
on remaininghidden.
The usual emphasison Habermas'sdiscussion of the family andthe liter-
ary public thus needs to be complicatedby attentionto Habermas'saccount
of the emergenceof a public sphereagainstandthroughsecrecy.Privatepeo-
ple came togetheras a public in secret. Practicedsecretly within the lodges,
publicityas a set of claims to reasoncounteredthe secrecy at the core of the
absolutiststate.
The secrecyof the public,then,is not as paradoxicalas it firstseems: what
mattersfor Habermasis the claim to reason, not the claim to inclusivity.
Associationsthatjudge on the basis of reasonarefor Habermasby definition
public.They arethe tribunalthatinevitablyand inevitablyrightlyjudges. So
even with his reiterationof Koselleck's accountof Freemasonryas a vehicle
for the cultivation and circulation of the law of censure and reputation,
Habermasends up acceptingFreemasonry'sclaims.WhereasKoselleckfinds
the Masons ultimatelyhypocriticalin theirsubversionof the absolutiststate
throughmoraltrumping,Habermastreatsthem as partof a generalEnlight-
enmentprocess of the rationalizationof power.Emphasizingthe rationality
of Freemasonry,Habermaspositions them as a public supposedto know, a
publicwhose absolutecertaintyis a productof practicesof criticalreflection.
In contrast,Freemasonryin Koselleck's accountworksas a split public.As a
public supposed to believe, it is an affiliation conjuredup throughrituals,
arcana,and mystery. As a public supposed to know, it relies on certainty,
knowledge, and unerringjudgment.Whatholds it togetheris its secrecy,its
positionbeyondthe boundaryof the stateas well as its fantasyof a powerful,
unifying knowledge.
638 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

Although Habermasincludes the lodges in his accountof the rise of the

public sphere,it would be misleadingto say thatthey play a majorrole in his
theoryof bourgeoissubjectivity.Rather,his theoryof interiorizedsubjectiv-
ity privilegesthe domestic sphereand the literarypublic. Withrespectto the
domestic sphere,Habermasemphasizesthe autonomyof the bourgeoissub-
ject, anchoringhis accountof privateautonomyin the self-understandingof
the bourgeois family.30The ideal of the family was the ideal of an emanci-
patedinnerworld, a world of purelyhumanrelationsin contrastto the com-
petitionandcommodificationwithinmarketrelations.Withrespectto the lit-
erarypublic, Habermasfocuses on the importanceof self-clarity.The novel
provideda vehicle for the explorationof the personalitycultivatedwithinthe
family. Not only did structuralchanges in literary genres introduce new
forms of psychological identificationand experimentation,but the rise of
readingcircles also extendedthe practicesof explorationandreflectionfrom
the immediacyof the family to a largersocial audience.In the literarypublic
sphere,Habermaswrites, "The subjectivityoriginatingin the interiorityof
the conjugal family, by communicatingwith itself, attainedclarity about
itself."3'Ratherthan irrevocablyopaque and unspeakable,the subjectivity
Habermastheorizes strives for transparency.It is fundamentallyopen and
ready for discussion. Interiorityis to be communicated;it is not simply the
conditionof communicationbut its content.
Paradoxically,Habermas'semphaseson autonomyandtransparencylead
to preciselythat"systemof distrust"or suspicioussubjectivitythatKoselleck
associates with secret societies. For Habermas,interioritydesignatesa field
of conscience thatcomes underthe domainof the morallaw, thatis autono-
mous in the Kantiansense. Tounderstandandrealizeitself as free, the subject
needs self-clarity;it needs to reflect-and to be able to reflect-on its moti-
vationsandaffections.Tounderstandandrealizeitself as moral,as in keeping
with the law, the subjectorientsitself towardpublicity,towarda largeraudi-
ence of which it is a part,one, and towarduniversallyknowable and valid
principles, two. Interiorityemerges throughpractices of self-clarification
and public presentation.
The problemwith Habermas'saccountappearsin his acceptanceof Rous-
seau's and Kant'snotion thatone can be forced to be free. This force under-
lies the necessity of transparency:freedomdependson attainingclarityabout
the pure will.32The autonomythatdependson clarity mistrustswhat is hid-
den from it, what could secretly be enslaving it. Freedomdepends on this
information.Belief is dangerous.Withoutcriticalreflection,therecan be no
freedom.As Kantexplains in the Prefaceto the Critiqueof Pure Reason,
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 639

Religion throughits sanctity and law-giving throughits majesty may seek to exempt
themselvesfromit [criticism].But they then awakenjust suspicion,andcannotclaim the
sincere respectwhich reasonaccordsonly to thatwhich has been able to sustainthe test
of free and open examination.33

So the autonomoussubjectin need of clarity is also the suspicious subject.

Habermascan't accountfor the invasivecharacterof the demandsof public-
ity because for him they are the same as the demandsof reason.
The seriousness of Habermas's omission becomes evident in those
instanceswhen he acknowledgesthatthe subjectivityemergingin the family
was orientedtowardan audience.Recall thatthe orientationto an audience
was an aspectof the publicityof the king. In connectingthis orientationto the
family,Habermasenables,first,the conceptualtransferof the monarch'saura
to the public.When attachedto the sovereign,audienceorientationconnotes
the force of display,the ineluctablemysteryor "Thing"thatgives the king his
"kingness."Yet, while the sovereign'saurais linked to his exceptionalposi-
tion, to his secrecy or powerof concealment,the auraof the public functions
differently.When Habermasbrings audience orientationtogether with the
subjectivityemergingin the bourgeoisfamily,he connectsit to the command
to reveal,to publicityas a systemof distrust.This complicatespublicity'slink
to the privilege of display: now publicity serves as a norm embodying the
rightness of the demand to disclose, a norm premised on suspicion of the
hidden.
Second, Habermas'saccount of the subject's orientationto an audience
suggestsless a reasoningsubjectthanone deeplyboundto the opinionsof oth-
ers (althoughthis may well be the same thing). The subjectin need of trans-
parencyis compelled (by reason and freedom!) to create and presentitself
before a judging and normalizingaudienceof others.This normalizingand
judging role was alreadypresentin Locke's accountof the public tribunalin
terms of the law of reputationand censure. In Habermas,however, this
impact of publicity on behavioris dissolved into publicity's equation with
reason,an equationthatassumespublicity'srationalityanduses this assump-
tion to increasepublicity's compulsive force.
Ultimately,Habermas'sbourgeoispublic sphereis as unitaryas his indi-
viduatedsubject.Justas autonomyis theresultof reflectiveself-clarification,
so does critical debate lead to a free, enlightened public. Indeed, critical
debateis the very processof transformingthe public supposedto believe into
the public supposed to know. Discussion is a kind of purificationthrough
which whatis revealedis held up to the scrutinyof reflection.Withconsensus
as the anchor,the ultimateoutcomeof the criticalexchangeof reasonsin the
640 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

publicsphere,thereis neveranydoubtregardingthe rightnessof publicjudg-

ment. All it needs is information.

HABERMASOCHISM
Radical in the Enlightenment,this certaintyof reflection now pervades
contemporarytechnoculture.Froman affiliationbornof arcanecontents,of
reason, ritual, and abstractedknowledge, the public has emerged as the
model for reasonable,democratic,political attachment.No longer confined
to the exclusive arrangementsof an emerging bourgeoisie, the suspicious
demandsof a public supposedto know have escaped Freemasonry'ssecret
societies and taken materialform as the basis of science, law, politics, and
media.New technologies have virtuallyeliminatedthe barrierto the realiza-
tion of the public sphere. In the networksof mediatedtechnoculture,there
seems to be no differencebetweenthejudgingpublic,the many,andthe mid-
dle. The demandto know goes all the way down. It extends throughoutthe
social as the compulsionto search,find, and link exteriorizesbelief in tech-
nologies of disseminationand surveillance,on one hand, and the idea that
each is entitledto an opinion changes the terms of inclusivity,on the other.
Thatthe public has a rightto know is one of the most prominentpolitical
cliches. It's the mantraof the informationage, the ideological presumption
that powers the networkedeconomy of nonstop media and seamless inter-
connection.Why did we need an "informationsuperhighway"?Because we
neededto be informed.Informationmakesus strong,makesus "us."Itjusti-
fies ourcertaintyin ourconvictions.In a statementtakingfor grantedthe link
between publicity and suspicion,Joseph Nye and William Owens write,

Knowledge,morethaneverbefore,is power.The one countrythatcan best leadthe infor-

mationrevolutionwill be morepowerfulthanany other.... This advantagestems from
Cold WarinvestmentsandAmerica'sopen society, thanksto which it dominatesimpor-
tant communicationsand informationprocessing technologies-space-based surveil-
lance, direct broadcasting,high-speed computers-and has an unparalleledability to
integratecomplex informationsystems.34

Let the technology believe thatthe truthis out there.We need to know!
It's odd that,in a society of spectacleand simulacra,publicityhas contin-
ued purchaseas a criticalpolitical and moralideal, thatit refersto morethan
celebrity,PR, andthe fearsof superstars.It's odderstill thattheoristssuch as
Nancy Frasercan presumethattodaypublicityneeds no defense:"Iam going
to takeas a basicpremisefor this chapterthatsomethinglike Habermas'sidea
of the public sphere is indispensableto critical social theory and to demo-
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 641

cratic political practice."35As I see it, the new configurationof technology,

publicity, and secrecy in the informationage pushesus to challengetheprem-
ise of the public sphere-indeed, to thinkaboutthe ways publicityfunctions
as technoculturalideology.
Adding an "s" to the theorizationof the public in no way suffices as a
responseto this challenge.36Habermas,in his recentwork,follows Fraserin
appealingto multiple,differentiatedpublics as a solutionto the problemof a
unitarypublic sphere.37But the multiplepublics argumentis moreconfusing
thanit is convincing.The "s"gives a sameness and equalityto radicallydif-
ferentnetworksand spaces. It createsthe illusion of options in some sort of
marketplaceof ideas and opportunities.And, despite its best intentions,the
multiplepublic spheresapproachreinforcesthe priorityof an official public
sphereas the goal, arbiter,andideal of inclusion.This appearsin Habermas's
account in his language of "center"and "periphery,"his emphasis on the
porosityof publicsto each other,andhis notionof the "finalauthority"of the
public. In short,with his referencesto "the"public-the notion of the public
as an audiencebeforewhich "actors"appear,appealto "therules"of commu-
nication,andclaim thatthe publicmustbe "informed"and"convinced"-it's
hardto find any different(iated)public spheresat all.
In his initial influential theorization of the public sphere, Habermas
opposes two versions of publicity,one orientedtowardcritiqueand one ori-
ented towardconsumption.38He links critical publicity to reason with the
requirementthateverythingincludedin publicdiscussionbe open to critique.
He connects consumer-orientedpublicity with staging and manipulation.
Here public opinion doesn't arise out of critical debate; it's engineered
throughadvertisingor "publicrelations."This, for Habermas,distorts the
normativeforce of publicity. Public relations treats the public sphere as a
political space, a space of conflict, power, and engagement,ratherthanas a
space for critical-rationaljudgment. Habermasacknowledges that public
relationsmay very well effect desirablechanges,buthe arguesthatit's at the
cost of the public sphere'stransparency:once the image and event-making
strategiesof public relationsstartto establishthe termsof public discussion,
we startquestioningthe motivesandworryingaboutthe styles used in critical
debate.
In this early argument,Habermasis more pessimistic than in his later
work, finding politics hopelessly imbricatedin public relationsand lament-
ing the consumeristreconfigurationof the public sphere. Nevertheless, he
concludes thatthe contest between critical-rationaland consumerist-manip-
ulativepublicityis farfromdecided.Indeed,Habermassuggests thatthe suc-
cess of democracyin social-welfarestates dependson reorganizingthe pub-
lic sphereso as to enable publicity to fulfill its criticalpotential.
642 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

The key to this reorganizationis more publicity.Why? Because the prob-

lem with consumer-orientedpublicity lies in its continued reliance on
secrecy.Habermasexplains,

At one time publicity had to be gained in opposition to the secret politics of the mon-
archs;it soughtto subjectpersonor issue to rational-criticalpublic debateand to render
political decisions subject to review before the court of public opinion. Today,on the
contrary,publicity is achieved with the help of secret politics of interestgroups.3

So for Habermas,the continuedimpactof these secretsmeansthatpublicity

doesn't go farenough;it stopstoo soon. Publicityneeds to extendall the way
down, to all the institutionsandpracticesthathave "livedoff the publicityof
otherinstitutionsratherthanbeing themselvessubjectto the public'ssupervi-
sion."4The very means of publicdiscussionmustbecome mattersfor public
inquiryand discussion.
In contemporary technoculture, trying to distinguish between con-
sumer-orientedandcriticalpublicitymakesno sense. Clearly,mediaengage
in both at once. Mediarepeatedlycriticizethemselvesand use this self-criti-
cism to sell copy and generateaudience.Talkingheads attackthe polarizing
emotion and spectacle of television shows featuringtalking heads. What's
easier thanreversingthe cameras,tapingthe taping?Reflecting on the pro-
cess of productionis now more appealingthanfocusing on what'sproduced.
Habermas'searly call for more publicitythus seems to have been answered
by andin the informationage. But the resulthas not been a new rationalpub-
lic sphere. Instead, permanentmedia-interconnected television, newspa-
per,radio,andInternet-use theirown "critical"self-reflectionto strengthen
theirnetworkedhold on popularimaginations.In the face of this materializa-
tion of belief, critical publicity seems a norm out of control, a kind of
Habermasochismof media self-cannibalization.
To be sure, critical reflection is much more thanjust a way to generate
audience by claiming a rationalityand objectivity superiorto one's media
competitors.It's the hallmarkof the ideology of the public sphere. 2izek
notes that"anideological identificationexertsa hold on us preciselywhen we
maintainan awarenessthatwe arenot fully identicalto it."41The ideological
hold of an ideal public with the rightto know is strengthenedby the observa-
tion of the manipulativeeffects of consumer-orientedpublicity.The critique
of consumer-orientedpublicity, a critique that generations inculcated in
mediagrow up making,attachesus all the morefirmlyto the mediaof public-
ity: now we know. We are distantand ironic enough not to be seduced.
When we think about the public supposed to know and the public sup-
posed to believe positedin the criticalandconsumeristorientationsto public-
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 643

ity, the ideological function of the distinction between "critical" and

"consumerist"appears in stark relief. The critical account of the public
spherepresumesa publicof citizens who debatemattersof commonconcern.
These debatingcitizens need to be informedaboutpolitical issues. They are
supposed to know. In this view, democracyis threatenedwhen the critical
public is left in the dark,when instead of "debatingthe issues,"it's playing
Doom or yakking in chatrooms. The audience before the staged public
sphere, moreover,is said to be filled with naive, gullible consumers who
either identify with emotionally laden figures and representationsor cyni-
cally dismiss thatwhich is raisedin the public sphereas raisedmerelyfor the
sakeof publicity.Are thesetwo publics,thesedebatingandconsumingpublics,
simply the two halves of the same old public that appearsin Bentham?
No. Although the consuming public looks like the public supposed to
believe, the problemrestsnot with whatit believes butwith whatit doesn't. In
a nutshell,it doesn't believe thatthe public supposedto know knows, and it
doesn't need to-mediated technologies materializethis belief as if there
were some believing public. Let me explain.
Habermas'sargumentpresumes that the problem with publicity comes
fromthe consumerorientationof the public,buthis solutionmisses its target.
The consumingpublic'srelationshipto informationis the same as thatof the
many and the middle in Bentham's account. We know this because to be
manipulatedby mediapresupposesthatone believes the mediain some form
or another.The Habermasochisticsolution to the problem of consumerist
publicitydoesn't affect this. Rather,it suppliesmoreinformation,morecriti-
cism, andmorereflection,targeting,as it were, the public supposedto know.
But they aren't the problem-in either Habermas'sor Bentham's account.
Recall that the system of publicity is supposedto convince the public sup-
posed to believe to believe in the public supposedto know.Informationcan't
solve the problembecause the problemis one of belief, not knowledge. And
the collapse of this belief is what's at stake in contemporarytechnoculture
and displaced from the analysis throughHabermas'sequating of publicity
andreason.The endless exposureof evermoresecrets,the continuedcircula-
tion of criticalreflection, hails each as an expertentitledto know, even as it
underminesany sense that anyone knows anythingat all. Precisely because
each is an expert,no one believes in the expertopinionof anyoneelse. Every-
body has to find out for themselves.
In this context,the technologiesbelieve for us, accessinginformationeven
if we can't. Permanentmediabringus closer to the secretbutcontinueto hold
itjust out of reach.The secretthusno longer suturestogetherthe split public.
Installedin new technologies, it now functionsas the stimulusand currency
of the informationeconomy.
644 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

Mightnot the critiqueof consumeristpublicitybe a way to represspublic-

ity's pleasures,to deny ourenjoymentof publicity?Forexample,by now it is
a commonplaceof the media event that media will comment on their own
excesses. On talk radio, in letterssections of the editorialpages, and on the
Internet,the audience will be addressedin its critical outrage,given ample
opportunityto rage againstthe mediamachinethatyet againhas gone too far.
At the same time, media will reporttheir increasedratings,the multitudes
sharing the collective experience, the poll numbers confirming the
publicness of it all. The excess is what makes the event, what producesthe
pleasuresof publicity.Enjoymentmakesit/the public.Those who hold on to
the ideal of a rationalpublic sphere of course respond to this enjoyment
reproachfully:thereis too muchmedia,too littlerationality;thereis too much
consumerism,too little criticalreflection.So we can't win-if we continueto
engage in the event, we areentrappedby the "toomuch,"andif we dismiss it
we are guilty of "too little."
The criticalmantrathatthereis too much mediabut too little (real)infor-
mationmay often be effective in makingthe audiencefeel guilty.I felt a little
guilty duringthe impeachmentof Clinton,for example,becauseI knew thatI
was following a story of illicit sex, that I had enjoyed Monica Lewinsky's
interviewwith BarbaraWalters,and that I paid much more attentionto the
whole Lewinsky affairthan I ever did to the boring Whitewaterinvestiga-
tions. Does this meanthatI-or any amongus who feels guilty for failing to
live up to ideals of criticalreasonclaimed for the public sphere,for being an
informedmemberof the sector of the public thatjudges-really think that
thereis a rationalpublic sphereor thatone would emerge shouldthe correct
media practicessomehow startto governour political lives? No-the guilty
feelings conceal the fact thatthe public doesn't exist at all.
When subjects act as if they believe, they maintainan orderof appear-
ances, a set of practicescarriedout for the sake of "thebig Other."The realm
of the symbolic, this "big Other"stands outside the subject as a hidden
agencypullingthe strings,a kindof meta-subjectlike "divineProvidence"or
"the public."42With respect to ideology, the big Other operates in various
modes. It can functionas "thesubjectsupposedto believe."It can also andat
the same time serve as "thesubjectsupposedto know"andthe "subjectsup-
posed not to know."43If we treat this as a third notion of the public, "the public
supposednot to know,"we recognizethatthe claim thatthe publichas a right
to know can be supplementedby a sense of whatthe public should not know
(for example, it should not know that its voting machines are hopelessly
inadequateandthatlarge numbersof votes arenevercounted).Most impor-
tant, it should not know that it isn't there, that the secret functions to hold
open the formalspace of the fantasyscreeningout the failureof the public as
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 645

category of political society. 2izek's point is that ultimately what the big
Otheris not supposedto know is thatit doesn't exist at all. To protectthe big
Otherfrom this knowledge, the subject "escapes into guilt."Likewise, it's
easierfor us to feel guilty aboutenjoyingpublicity'sexcess thanto acknowl-
edge the nonexistenceof the public sphere.We assumeguilt becausewe have
to keep up appearances,andthiscompulsionis an ideologicaleffect of thebig
Other.We feel it even when,precisely when,we don'tbelieve the big Otheris
there at all.44

REJECTINGPUBLICITY
In the preceding section, I addressedthree aspects of publicity as ideol-
ogy: our distancefromit, our enjoymentin it, and our sacrificialguilt before
it. This returnsme, then,to the role of the secretin securingthe public sphere
as an ideological construction. i&ek gives "oneof the most elementarydefi-
nitions of ideology" as "a symbolic field which contains ... a filler holding
the place of some structuralimpossibility,while simultaneouslydisavowing
If we applythis to the public sphere,we see thatthe secret
this possibility."45
marksthe constitutivelimit of the public,a limit thatthe public spherecannot
acknowledge.That this limit cannot be acknowledged,that it in fact stimu-
lates not simply the continuedimpositionof the public but the explosion of
networkedmedia, points to the ideological functionof the ideal of publicity
in the informationage. How do we know when we have enoughinformation,
when the ultimatesecrethas been revealed?We don't. We can't. This inabil-
ity to know if and when we are satisfiedunderminesthe normativeclaim for
publicity as it reminds us of power's decisive intervention,of the point of
decision. The public sphererests on the constitutiveimpossibilityof a poli-
tics without,outside of, andbeyondpower,a politics wheredecision is post-
poned in favorof a consensus thathas alreadybeen achieved.
So whatmight appearas the technoculturalloss of the publicisn't the loss
of anythingat all-the public was neverthere.The public is a fiction, a wish
that"fantasizesa unified 'people' where thereis, in reality,a heterogeneous
citizenry,"in Lisa Disch's helpful formulation.46The emphasis on making
public, whethervia the rules and proceduresof the rationalpublic sphereor
the networkedintensitiesof publicityin global technoculture,screensthe fact
thatthere is no public thatcan act. Fascinatedby publicity in its normative,
technological,andcelebrityformats,we disavowthe fact thatthe publicisn't
there.
Of course,the hold of the ideology of the public sphereis strong.Because
technoculturematerializesthe belief thatthe public has a rightto know,that
646 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

which the public doesn't know strikesus as somethingwithheldor denied, a

kindof contrarymalevolence-if thereis nothingto hide, thenwhy not come
out, go public, tell all? But this injunctionto reveal misreadsthe sense that
somethingis withheldas the public's missing authorization.The secretcan't
be told. It can't be filled in. It's simply the formthroughwhich the fantasyof
the public takes accountof its failure in advance.No inclusion, whetherof
groups or information,people or issues, will provide enough legitimacy to
justify what is claimed in the name of the public.
ForBentham,the secretmarkedthe gap holdingtogetherthe split public.
The ultimatesecretwas not the missing informationwarrantingthe rightness
of publicjudgment.No, the secretwas thattherewasn'treallyajudging pub-
lic at all; therewas just a differentelite. The whole solutiondependedon not
havingeveryonejudge and on disavowingthatthis was a constitutiveexclu-
sion within the public. In contemporarytechnoculture,the function of the
secrethas changed.The barrierthatsustainedBentham'sfantasyof the pub-
lic has been removedin the informationage promiseof universalaccess. And
this makes it possible not only to recognize publicity as ideology (the idea
thatthe publichas the rightto know drivesthe infotainmentcultureeven as it
deflects attentionfrom fundamentalantagonismsor turnsthem into the dis-
posablecontentsof entertainmentculture)butalso to acknowledgethe secret
as boththe generativelimit of publicityandits currency.Technoculturemate-
rializes the belief that the key to democracycan be found in uncoveringthe
secrets. Even if no one really believes, satellites, the Internet,and surveil-
lance camerasbelieve for us.
Similarly, in the absolutist state, secrecy protectedthe sovereign deci-
sion's politicalinterventions.It also protectedFreemasonry'smoralopinion,
enablingits certaintyinjudgmentto emergein practicesof belief. In the con-
temporaryideology of the publicsphere,the secretreappearsin the sense that
somethingis always missing, hidden.But what is hiddenis the guarantorof
the legitimacyof anydecision backedby the nameof the public;whatis miss-
ing is the rule that can compel obedience withoutcoercion, the supplement
that will make everythingjust, okay, fair. An exteralization of publicity's
constitutivegap, the secret motivatescontinuedeffort in publicity's behalf.
Somethingor someone standsrightoutside us, our knowledge and our visi-
bility, withholdingour legitimacyfrom us, preventingus from realizing the
rightnessthatwe claim, thatshouldbe ours.Includejust a few morepeople, a
few morefacts;uncoverthose denieddetails,those represseddesires;do this
and therewill be justice. These injunctionsattestto publicity's secret,to the
structuralimpossibilitythat generatesthe public sphere.From the perspec-
tive of the public, the secret always withholdsjust what we need from us. At
the same time, any revelationcalls us together,addressingthe audiencewho
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 647

receives it as the public andcontinuingto reproducesuspicious subjectsin a

system of distrust.
Few contemporaryaccountsof publicityacknowledgethe secret.Instead,
they adopta spatialmodel of a social world dividedbetween public and pri-
vate spheres.Forthe most part,these accountsclaim eitherthe priorityof the
one or the other,ignoringthe system of distrust,the circuit of concealment
and revelation,that actively generatesthe public. To this extent, they seem
unable to theorize the power of publicity, the compulsion to disclose and
driveto surveilthatso pervadesthe contemporary.Recentexpansionin tech-
nologies of surveillanceand publicityremindsus, however,of the impactof
networkedcommunicationson democraticpractices. Media publicize the
private:they produceaudiencesandcollectivities, interpellatinga citizenry,a
tribunal,via individuatedscreens and targetedinvitationsto consume. This
mediatizationaccompaniesa reconfigurationof the political:few contempo-
raryAmericanswould disagree with the claim thatthe personalis political.
Takingup the political claim thatwhat was once hidden shouldbe revealed,
Reagan conservatives,for example, redirectedthe counterculturalmessage
of the 1960s to wage theirown warsaroundsexuality,race,andgender.These
warswere often foughtthroughthe dynamicof concealmentandrevelation-
a particularlyeffective tactic in an entertainmentculturedesperatefor sensa-
tion. Hiddenbehaviorsand desires were forced out of the closet and into the
light of a judging public. It makes sense, then, to reconsider in terms of
secrecy some issues currentlyformattedas "private."How does this internal-
ized limit continueto generateandaffirmthe ideology of publicitythatdrives
contemporarytechnoculture?
Indeed,in light of the importanceof the secretas a generatorof the public,
it may well be thatthe notion of the public hindersmore thanit helps demo-
cratic efforts. The desire to uncover the hidden deflects attentionfrom the
system of distrust,from the seemingly inescapableoscillations between the
public as constant and universal and the public as uncertainand in flux,
between the public supposedto know andthe public supposedto believe. At
the same time, it displaces attentionfromthe belief materializedin the medi-
ated networksof the informationage, the way suspicious subjects are pro-
duced who act as if they believed in a unified public and the truththatis out
there.When conceived within andconfinedto the public sphere,democratic
politics concentrates on access, on questions of inclusion and exclusion
withinthis imaginaryspace-as if the public were constantandthe failureto
redeemits claim to universalitywere simply a contingentnumericalissue of
ensuringthat each and every voice "count."Ostensibly democraticpolicies
arejustifiedthroughthe invocationof a publicwith beliefs, tastes,andprefer-
ences thatall too often confirmthe interestsof whomeveris doing the invok-
648 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

ing. And becausepublic opinionis always displacedas the opinionof some-

one who isn'tthere,theseinvocationsthemselveshavepoliticaleffects:if a big-
city majorjustifies effortsto increasethe presenceof the police anddecrease
the presenceof the homeless on the basis of public opinion,is it not possible
that some will believe that others have this opinion, and hence might this
mayorthenactuallyproducetheopinionto whichhe claimsto be responding?
When based on the notion of the public, democraticpolitical theory is
likely to focus mistakenly on revealing, outing, and uncovering what has
been concealed or withheld from the public. Practically,these restrictions
narrowthe rangeof thinkingaboutpolitics, distractingus from fundamental
social and economic antagonismsand deflecting attentionfrom questionsof
biopolitics, transnationalalliance, and the place of fantasy,to mentionjust a
few. Theoretically,this restrictivefocus rendersdemocracy as a failure in
advance:becausethe publiccan neverlive up its promise(a failuremarkedby
the secret), a dynamic of suspicion and surveillance(now materializedin
technoculture)is installedas the next best thing. In this respect,whatpasses
as democraticpolitics seems to dependon not telling the biggest secretof all:
thatdespite the rhetoricof publicity,there is no public.

NOTES
1. In this essay, I use "publicity"to designatethe normsand practicesassociatedwith the
"public."These normsandpractices,as well as the collectivity to which they refer,arenot fixed
butembeddedin specific contexts.Foran accountof the emergenceof notionsof the public and
publicopinionin earlymodem Europe,see JiirgenHabermas,TheStructuralTransformation of
the Public Sphere,trans.Thomas Burger(Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, 1989).
2. Slavoj 2izek makes clear thatthe "rulingideas are neverdirectlythe ideas of the ruling
class."Instead,they incorporatethe "motifsand aspirationsof the oppressed... rearticulating
them in such a way that they [become] compatiblewith the existing relationsof domination";
The TicklishSubject (London: Verso, 1999), 186. So, of course, there are good, democratic
things aboutpublicity.
3. Sisela Bok takes "concealment,or hiding, to be the defining trait of secrecy."She
explains that secrecy "presupposesseparation,a setting apartof the secret from the non-secret,
andof keepersof a secretfromthose excluded.... The separationbetweeninsiderandoutsideris
inherent in secrecy; and to think something secret is already to envisage potential conflict
between what insiders conceal and outsiderswant to inspect or lay bare."Bok, Secrets (New
York:Pantheon,1982), 6.
4. My ideas here arenot originalbutaredrawnfrom a talkgiven by JudithButler,"WhatIs
Critique?"at the Society for the Humanities,CornellUniversity,July 14, 2000.
5. See SlavojZizek, TheSublimeObjectof Ideology (London:Verso, 1989), 87-88.
6. SlavojZizek, "TheSpectreof Ideology,"in MappingIdeology,ed. SlavojZizek (London:
Verso, 1994), 1. See also Michele Barrett'sexcellent study,ThePolitics of Truth(Stanford,CA:
StanfordUniversityPress, 1991).
 Dean / PUBLICITY'SSECRET 649

7. See &izek,Sublime Object,chap. 1, and "The Spectre of Ideology."My discussion of

Zizek's theoryof ideology synthesizes the argumentsin these two texts.
8. Michael Wolff, Bur Rate (New York:Simon & Schuster,1998), 54.
9. This indicatesthe differencebetween2izek's accountof ideology andthatdevelopedby
LaclauandMouffe.LaclauandMouffe attemptto demonstratethe way a given field of disparate
elements is suturedtogethervia the totalizing interventionof a hegemonic nodal point. 2izek
arguesthatthis point needs to be supplementedby an analysis of enjoyment,thatis, by an artic-
ulation of the way "an ideology implies, manipulates,produces a preideological enjoyment
structuredin fantasy";SublimeObject, 125. I shouldalso note thatinsofaras iizek does not see
ideology as a problemof knowledge but insteadviews it in terms of the fantasies materialized
throughour practices,he does not position the critic as somehow "outside"of ideology but as
fully within it.
10. Zizek, SublimeObject,34.
11. See also KeithMichael Baker,Inventingthe FrenchRevolution(Cambridge,UK: Cam-
bridgeUniversityPress, 1990) and Roger Chartier,The CulturalOrigins of the FrenchRevolu-
tion, trans.LydiaG. Cochrane(Durham,NC: Duke UniversityPress, 1991). Both historians,in
demonstratingthe rise of a notion of the rational,universalpublic, neverthelessunderestimate
the continuedinfluenceof the earliernotionof the inconstantanduncertainpublic.This notionis
neversimplytrumped.Rather,it continuesto hauntanddisruptunitaryaccountsof thepublic.
12. Jeremy Bentham, "Essay on Political Tactics,"chap. 2 "Of Publicity"(1821), in The
WorksofJeremyBentham,vol. 2, ed. JohnBowring(New York:Russell andRussell, 1962), 310.
13. I'm drawingherefromZizek's discussionof the subjectsupposedto know in ThePlague
of Fantasies (London:Verso, 1997), 106.
14. Bentham,"Essayon Political Tactics,"313.
15. See &izek,Plague of Fantasies, 110.
16. Bentham,"Essayon Political Tactics,"312.
17. Ibid., 311.
18. Ibid., 310.
19. Ibid., 314.
20. ReinhartKoselleck, Critiqueand Crisis (Cambridge:MIT Press), 74.
21. Ibid., 55.
22. Ibid., 77.
23. Ibid., 79.
24. Ibid., 82.
25. Ibid., 83.
26. Ibid., 83.
27. Ibid., 115.
28. Habermas,StructuralTransformation,53.
29. Ibid., 35.
30. Ibid., 46.
31. Ibid., 51.
32. Fora nuancedaccountof the Kantianwill, see WilliamConnolly,WhyI'm Not a Secular-
ist (Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1999).
33. Quoted in Koselleck, 121.
34. JosephS. Nye, Jr.andWilliamA. Owens, "America'sInformationEdge,"ForeignAffairs
(March/April1996), 20.
35. Nancy Fraser,Justice Interruptus(New York:Routledge KeganPaul, 1997), 70.
36. JtirgenHabermas,Between Facts and Norms, trans.William Rehg (Cambridge,MA:
MIT Press, 1996).
650 POLITICALTHEORY/ October2001

37. For a discussion of Habermas'suse of Fraser,see William E. Scheuerman,"Between

RadicalismandResignation:DemocraticTheoryin Habermas'sBetweenFacts and Norms,"in
Habermas:A CriticalReader,ed. PeterDews (London:Blackwell, 1999). Scheuermanprovides
a persuasiveaccountof the tensions that accompanyHabermas'sattemptto combine Fraser's
radicaldemocraticsocialism with the "realist"model of BerhardPeters.
38. Habermas,StructuralTransformation,232. Habermashas since reevaluatedhis pessi-
mistic assessmentof consumer-orientedpublicity,findingthe continueddemocraticpotentialof
the public spheremorepromisingthanhe had firstthought.See his "FurtherReflections on the
Public Sphere,"trans.ThomasBerger,in Habermasand the Public Sphere,421-61.
39. Habermas,StructuralTransformation,201.
40. Ibid., 209.
41. 2izek, Plague of Fantasies, 21.
42. Slavoj ZiZek, Enjoy YourSymptom!(New York:Routledge KeganPaul, 1992), 39.
43. Ibid., 40.
44. Ibid., 39-41.
45. 2iZek, Plague of Fantasies, 76.
46. Lisa Disch, "Civic Virtueand the UncertainPromise of ElectoralFusion"(paperpre-
sented at the annualmeeting of the WesternPolitical Science Association, Seattle, WA, March
25-27, 1999), 14.

JodiDean is an associateprofessorofpolitical science atHobartand WilliamSmithCol-

leges in Geneva, New York.She is the author of Solidarityof Strangers(Universityof
CaliforniaPress, 1996) and Aliens in America(Cornell UniversityPress, 1998). She is
the editor of Feminismand the New Democracy(Sage, 1997) and CulturalStudies and
Political Theory (Cornell UniversityPress, 2000).