Name: Dat Nguyen

BUS-230-HA
Instructor: Prof. Raphael J. Glinbizzi
Date: Feb.23, 2009
Homework #1

Chapter 3:

3.1 Federal Question:

Yes, the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear this case because the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases involving patent cases.

3.2 In Personam Jurisdiction:

Yes, the service of process is good. In this case, if the process server cannot give the
summons directly to the defendant, he is permitted to leave the papers in the mailbox.

3.3 Long-Arm Statute:

No, Oklahoma has no jurisdiction over Magna Verde Corporation because this firm had
never done any business in Oklahoma, and no relationship existed between the state and
this case.

3.4 Minimum Contacts:

Yes, the defendants are subject to suit in California. The magazines had a significant
circulation in California – selling about 600,000 copies each week out of a total national
circulation of about 5,000,000 copies per week. Moreover, a plaintiff was a resident in
California and information which was written in the article made harm plaintiff’s career
there. In another words, Enquirer committed torts within the state.

3.8. Arbitration
Yes, the arbitration agreement is enforceable under The Federal Arbitration Act. The
advertisement about Armor Plate 3000 was published after the agreement in 1983. And it
referred to comparative superiority of a Brunswick bowling product over one of AMF.

Chapter 4:

4.1 Intentional Tort:

Yes, the defendants are liable for the injuries suffered by David Manning when a ball
thrown by Grimsley struck him. The Court held that the defendants were liable for the
intentional tort of battery under the transferred intent doctrine. Under this doctrine, the
law transfers the perpetrator’s intent from the target person to the actual victim of the act.

4.2 Merchant Protection Statute:

No, K-Mart is not liable to Johnson for false imprisonment because K-Mart was protected
under Merchant Protection Statutes. First, K-Mart had reasonable grounds to suspect
Johnson of shoplifting because the price tag remained on the child’s seat and Johnson
was hurrying to leave the store. Second, Johnson was detained for a reasonable time, in
this case, for not more than 20 minutes. And third, the investigation was conducted in a
reasonable manner. The security guard requested Johnson to return to the store, she was
questioned in a reasonable manner, and was released as soon as the evidence indicated
that she had not shoplifted the child’s seat.

4.3 Trespass:

McKinsey wins because Wade committed willfully and wantonly injures a trespasser by
setting traps. And its consequence is that the trespasser was killed.

4.4 Negligence:

No, the Auto Club is not liable. The Auto Club’s Tourbook never made a claim that the
listing and rating service included a finding that the neighborhood surrounding the motel
was safe or that its security measures were adequate. The Tourbook only addressed the
motel’s accommodations as to the quality of its lodging, food, and services. The scope of
any duty of care owed by Auto Club to its members did not extend to neighborhood
safety and security measures.

4.5 Causation:

Yes, there is causation linking the negligence of the defendants to the fatal accident in
which Mr. Davis was killed. A person who commits a negligent act is not liable unless
this act was the actual cause and proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. In this case, if
General Motors had not negligently manufactured the alternator, the truck would not
have stalled, and there would not have been a stationary vehicle on the freeway for the
decedent to hit. Therefore, causation in fact existed.

4.6 Negligence Per Se:

Julius Ebanks wins. The Court held that he could recover damages from the New York
City Transit Authority for the injuries suffered when his foot became caught in the
escalator under the doctrine of negligence per se. The building code established the
requirement that a “gap” between an escalator step and escalator wall not exceed 3/8-
inch. Evidence showed that the gap in this case in which Ebanks’ foot became caught
was 2 inches, therefore violating the building code. The building code was adopted by
the city to prevent the type of injury suffered by Ebanks and that he was within the class
of persons to be protected by the building code. Therefore, Transit Authority is liable.

4.7 Liability of Landowners:

Wagners wins. In this case, Doehring was a trespasser. The court heal that an owner does
not owe a duty of ordinary care to a trespasser. Wagners does owe a duty not to willfully
or wantonly injure Doehring. In fact, he marked the chain with reflectors and signs. Thus,
Wagners is not liable.

4.8. Liability of Common Carrier:

Carmen and Carla Lopez win. The Court held that the Southern California Rapid Transit
District breached its duty of care and failed to protect Carmen and Carla from the violent
attack they were victims of while riding an RTD bus. RTD imposes a duty of utmost care
rather than ordinary care on its passengers. The driver was notified of this problem but
ignored it. There is a special relationship exists between the carrier and the passenger
because bus passengers have no control over who is admitted onto the bus, and are fully
dependent on the bus driver to summon help or provide a means of escape when an
occasion arises where such assistance is necessary. Further, the RTD was aware of
previous violent attacks that had occurred on its bus routes. For all of these, therefore,
RTD should be liable.

4.9 Emotional Distress:

Gregory wins. In this case, Gregory sued the defendants (1) for negligence to recover for
his sister’s death and (2) for negligent infliction of emotional distress to recover damage
for the severe distress he suffers and (3) this emotional distress was caused by observing
his sister’s death.

4.10 Defense:

The defendants win. In this case, Maddox (1) had knowledge of the specific risk with the
fact that he commented about the wet field several times to the club’s manager and (2) he
voluntarily assumed that risk with the fact that he continued to play.