Misbah Volume 3 Issue 1

Winter 2010
 Mission
Misbah is Arabic for ‘lamp’, a symbol of illumination. Misbah Magazine
explores and engages the ideas, history and development of Muslims and
Islam in the world. It is offered free of charge to all students, faculty and staff
of Princeton University and the surrounding Community.

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Exploring Islam and the Muslim World Printing of this journal is made posible by private donations. Please direct all
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tions, off-campus subscriptions and advertising to:

Editor in Chief Misbah Magazine

Nabil Abdurehman ‘11 misbah@princeton.edu
5449 Frist Campus Center Princeton, NJ 08544
Executive Editor
Zeerak Ahmed ‘13 All donations are tax-deductible. Letters to the editor may be edited for
length and clarity.
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Views expressed in Misbah Magazine do not necessarily reflect those of the editors,
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ment of the content they accompany.
Cover Image: Wazir Khan Mosque courtesy of Muzaffar H. Bukhari
2

Table of Contents

Editor’s Note 3

The Politicization of Islamophobia 4

Tasnim Shamma ‘11

The Martyrdom of Hamza and Husayn 7

Nebil Husayn GS

Navigating by Islamic Ideals 13

Derya Honca

In the Footsteps of the Sahabaat: Muslim 17

Women and Religious Knowledge
Hagar ElBishlawi GS
 3

Editor’s Note

Greetings from a new Misbah board. We are pleased to present, as always, a

diverse selection of articles. Whereas one article presents a synopsis of a campus
debate concerning the Park 51 project in New York, another analyzes how new
technology is providing women with unprecedentedly large audiences to engage
with in religious discourse. While the cover story addresses a historical overview
of the struggles of two prominent figures in Islamic history, also included is a
book review which also discusses the importance of precision in the expression of
theological issues.

With much of the attention given to Islam and the Muslim world recently tend-
ing to focus primarily on turbulent political situations and controversial legal
rulings, what we hope through these submissions is to provide perspectives not
usually seen, stories not usually told. Just as the terms “Muslim” and “American”
are not mutually exclusive, also there is no strict binary divide between “Islamic
history” and plain “history.” There are and have been Muslim communities all
over the world, and so it is important that these perspectives be given and be
understood, whether as an aid to combatting extremism or simply as a building
block towards establishing cooperative efforts between different communities in
the future.

Nabil Abdurehman ‘11

Editor in Chief

Errata:

The printed version of this magazine contained a number of typographic errors

in the piece by Nebil Husayn. Also missing was a footnote that noted the author’s
insipration from the work of Ali Shariati. These errors have been corrected in the
online version. The editors would like to express their sincerest apologies to both
the author as well as our readers for these errors.
4
The More than nine years after the at-
tacks of 9/11, it is surprising to learn
Politicization of that suspicion and hostility against
people who are Muslim in the
United States has continued to grow.
Islamophobia Even groups or individuals who are
not Muslim but are perceived to be
Tasnim Shamma ‘11 Muslim, because of their ethnicity or
clothing, have been victims to this
rise in hostility.
On October 11, the Council for
American Islamic Relations (CAIR)
announced the launch of a depart-
ment devoted solely to “addressing
the alarming rise of Islamophobic
sentiment in American society.”
One of the most recent and public
forms of anti-Islamic sentiment has
emerged this summer during protests
over the building of Cordoba House
or the “Ground Zero Mosque,” later
renamed Park51. Through formal
and informal discussion, lectures,
debates and opinion columns in
The Daily Princetonian, members
of the Princeton community have
tried to understand why there has
been so much opposition not only to
Park51, but also to mosques around
the country.
Park 51
In July 2009, a rundown Burlington
Coat Factory was purchased and
used as an overflow prayer space to
another mosque in lower Manhat-
tan, Al Farah, where Feisal Abdul
Rauf is the imam.
In December 2009, The New York
Times reported that there was inter-
est in building a cultural center on
the land that was purchased. Rauf
explained that it would send “the
opposite statement to what hap-
pened on 9/11.” This summer, over
a year after its purchase and use as
a prayer space, opposition groups
and politicians mobilized to publicly
protest construction – sometimes us-
ing hateful speech against Islam and
labeling the religion as inherently
violent.
On September 27, a panel discus-
sion about Park51 was held in
McCosh 10 with Woodrow Wilson
School Professor and Provost Chris-
topher Eisgruber ‘83, Near Eastern
Studies Professor Mark Cohen
and Associate Professor of Politics
Amaney Jamal. All three professors
concluded at the end of their talks
that Park51 should be built.
Cohen, who specializes in Jewish
history in the Near East, explained
that he preferred the name “Cordo-
ba House” because it was evocative
of the peaceful coexistence of Mus-
lims, Jews and Christians in Cor-
doba, Spain in the eighth century.
Cohen said the proposed Park51/
Cordoba House could serve as a
symbol of “tolerance and mutual
understanding between Muslims and
non-Muslims today.”
Jamal cited the politicization of
Islamophobia with politicians using
the issue to gain political points and
reports of opposition to mosque

Ground Zero View - Courtesy of Karen Blumberg
construction across the country as a
troubling trend.
“The mosque itself is more or less
under attack in the United States,”
Jamal said.
The role of mosques
Jamal explained that impeding the
natural expansion of Islamic insti-
tutions like mosques is an attempt
to “de-link the Muslim population
from one of its most important links
to mainstream America” because
mosques serve as the most trustwor-
thy civic institution for many Mus-
lim Americans.
Instead of promoting buildings that
encourage political participation
and community involvement, Jamal
said that “mosque projects are being
stifled” and are becoming “sites of
political scrutiny and sites to moni-
tor Muslims.”
Government officials revealed in
December 2005 that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation had been
secretly monitoring over a hundred
sites of Muslim homes, businesses
and mosques for radiation levels
since 2002.
“There’s this ongoing belief that
mosques have direct link to terrorists
abroad,” Jamal said.
In 2004, Representative Peter King
of New York said he believed that
85 percent of mosques in America
5
were controlled by Islamic extrem-
ists and that “this is an enemy living
amongst us.”
In 2005, Massachusetts Governor
Mitt Romney suggested wiretapping
mosques because he believed terror-
ist attacks in London and the United
States justified such monitoring.
“The reality that is the Park51 de-
bates are almost a natural culmina-
tion of the last ten years,” Jamal said.
“It’s no surprise that 61 percent of
the US public is seeing the Park51
mosque as part of this attempt of
the Muslim “other” to assert them-
selves in an un-American way in the
United States.”
At least three other local mosque
6
projects in California, Tennessee and
Wisconsin have also seen protests or
faced significant opposition.
In Murfreesboro, TN, on Octo-
ber 18, the Department of Justice
Department’s Civil Rights Division
filed an amicus brief to support
construction of a mosque that was
facing a lawsuit and major commu-
nity opposition over the past year.
In the brief, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral for Civil Rights Thomas Perez
wrote, “A mosque is quite plainly
a place of worship, and the county
rightly recognized that it had an
obligation to treat mosques the same
as churches, synagogue, or any other
religious assemblies. This is not only
common sense; it is required by
federal law.”
Legal and Ethical Arguments
The brief cited the tenth anniver-
sary of the Religious Land Use or
Institutionalized Persons Act, which
Eisgruber said at the panel that he
testified against, believing the first
amendment to be sufficient in pro-
tecting religious freedoms.
Eisgruber began his talk by explain-
ing that he would try to present the
other side of the debate by examin-
ing the Park51 debate from a legal
and ethical point of view.
“The legal argument is easy,” he said.
The right to build Park51 is pro-
tected under the First Amendment
and additionally under the Religious
Land Use or Institutionalized Per-
sons Act unless there is a “compel-
ling government interest,” meaning a
national security or health concern.
He then went on to the ethical
arguments by raising the question
of whether there is a “limited duty
to honor a perimeter of neutrality
around culturally significant sites.”
He made the distinction between
temporary marches or protests and
permanent markers like Park51.
Eisgruber referenced the analogy
frequently brought up this summer
regarding the crosses placed near the
grounds of Auschwitz and then later
moved in 1998.
Only a few blocks away from the
former Nazi death camp, a Catholic
group founded the Center for Dia-
logue and Prayer in Auschwitz. The
center serves as a place for “reflec-
tion, education, sharing and prayer”
according to its website, much like
the goals of Park51.
Eisgruber explained that the ethi-
cal argument did not stand because
it was not clear what would count
as a perimeter of neutrality in this
context and reasons for opposing
the center seemed to be grounded
in prejudice because opposition to a
Christian center would probably not
have been opposed.
“Would opponents be opposed to a
Christian center? I seriously doubt
that,” he said, continuing, “I don’t
think we have a duty to respect
other people’s sensibilities grounded
in prejudice.”
Jamal said that as a Muslim, an
academic and member of the Princ-
eton community, she has found the
debates surrounding Park51 mosque
particularly demoralizing.
“There’s been very little discussion
about the basically un-Americanness
of the current climate of Islamo-
phobia,” Jamal said. “Once we start
relegating space and where Mus-
lims should be and where Muslims
should worship and where perhaps
they should work and perhaps how
they should behave, we’re on a slip-
pery slope and we all know where
that leads.”
As Jamal explained, the rise in the
use of Islamophobia as a political
tool to curry favor with constitu-
ents is alarming. With the Muslim
community facing opposition to
mosque projects on both the local
and national level, hateful rhetoric
and second-class treatment will only
make a community desperate for
acceptance in their own country feel
further alienated.
Tasnim is a senior at Princeton, an
English major on the creative writ-
ing track and Executive Editor for
Multimedia Emerita at The Daily
Princetonian. She can be reached at
tasnim.shamma@gmail.com.
Sectarian strife in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq has led a number
of analysts to consider some of the historical differences between Sunni and The
Shi’i Muslims. In contrast to most Sunni Muslims, Shi’i communities annu-
ally mourn the martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Husayn Martyrdom of
b. Ali. Although Husayn is universally revered in the Islamic intellectual
tradition, his murder occurred during a volatile period in Islamic history. His Hamza &
murder raises a number of theological questions that are considered con-
troversial to most Sunni scholars. These questions include: why did Husayn Husayn
refuse to pledge allegiance to the Caliph? Was he rightful in doing so? Is the
Caliph liable for Husayn’s death? Some writers have inaccurately character- Nebil Husayn GS
ized Husayn’s rebellion as a failed military or political movement. This article
shall briefly elucidate the difference between military conflicts and move-
ments of protest as well as the terms jihad and shahada in narrating the story
of Husayn’s martyrdom.

I. The Holy Struggle

Imam Ali b. Abi Talib once said: “God decreed The Holy Struggle to exalt
[Man’s] Submission... and The Holy Declaration to reveal a Truth hitherto
repudiated.”1

Man has never ceased in his age-old pursuit of felicity. Love offers but a
taste of this rapture, yet like all things in this World, it is ever fleeting. Faith
teaches us that Man’s only hope is to surrender his love to the Divine. “To
become detached from the impurities of the world ... requires an intense ji-
had [Holy Struggle], for our soul has its roots sunk deeply into the transient
world which [it] mistakes for reality.”2

The difficult, personal path to spiritual enlightenment describes the vast

majority of cases in which Muslims participate in a “Holy Struggle.” How-
ever, scholars of jurisprudence also agree without exception on the permis-
sibility of armed conflict in two instances, both of which are characterized as
defensive. In the first instance, a person is permitted to take up arms for the
purposes of self-defense against persecution or a general aggression towards
life, family and property. The second case is when the Islamic faith in its en-
tirety is a target of destruction, which may be manifested in a blatant attack
on all persons, symbols, places of worship, and any remnants of the religion.
Although the use of force is permitted in both cases, only the second is gen-

1. Nahj al-Balāghah, ed. Muhammad Abduh. Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1963, 4:55 (sermon
252).
2. From Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s essay ““The Spiritual Significance of Jihad.” See S.H. Nasr,
Traditional Islam in the Modern World. London: KPI, 1987, p. 32.
8
erally characterized as a “Holy Struggle” and obligatory.3

In addition, jurists also permit one to physically defend one’s self, family,
and property from an attacking entity. Opinions may differ in calling this
case a ‘Holy Struggle,’ but jurists universally uphold the innate human right
to self-defense.4

II. Warfare

In a state of warfare, a soldier strives to achieve three primary goals: he must

fight to stay alive by defending himself from attacks, he must neutralize
enemy targets and he desires that the war concludes with his own army’s vic-
tory. Scripture certainly praises the faith and bravery of a soldier who fights
for freedom and justice.

“God has conferred on those who strive with their wealth and live a rank
above those who remain passive [sitting]...And He has distinguished those
who struggle above those who sit by a great reward.” – Qur’an 4:95

A companion once asked, “How is it that the faithful face tribulations in the
grave, but the martyrs do not?” The Prophet replied, “The glimmer of the
sword – raised above his head (before it takes his life) is enough of a tribula-
tion.”5

Early Islamic history is filled with stories of companions of the Prophet

fighting in many battles throughout their lives. Although many of them
lived long lives, many also died in war. One must pose the following ques-
tion: Is the death of a comrade advantageous to his own army when consid-
ering the aforementioned three goals of warfare? The answer is a flat ‘no’.

The victory of an army rests squarely on the survival of its soldiers. Once
an army’s soldiers are killed, its power is vanquished and logically loses the
war. The death of a soldier, however great his reward in the Hereafter, is an
agonizing loss to his army, community and loved ones. Furthermore, if his

3. Ibid., 29-30. The Shāfi’ī jurist Ahmad b. Naqīb al-Misri (d. 769AH/1367) and the Shi’i
Muhammad b. Hasan al-Tūsī (d. 460 AH/1060) concur that defending the faith from
annihilation is obligatory, although the latter still hesitates in referring to armed struggle
as jihād in the absence of a divinely appointed leader. See Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri,
The Reliance of the Traveller; a classic manual of Islamic sacred law. Ed. and Tr. by Noah
Ha Mim Keller. Dubai: Modern Printing Press, c1991, Book O, Edicts 7.2, 9.1 and 9.3;
Muhammad b. Hasan al-hūsī, al-Mabsūt fī fiqh al-imāmīyah, [Tehran]; al-Maktabah al-
Murtahawīyah li-Ihyā’ al-Āthār al-Ja’farīyah, 2:8.
4.Both Sunni and Shi’i jurists state that this is a consensus. See Muhyī al-Dīn Ābī
Zakarīyā Yahyá b. Sharaf al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277), al-Majmū‘. Beirut : Dār al-Fikr, n.d.,
19:251; al-‘Allāma al-Hasan ibn Yūsuf b. al-Muhahhar al-hillī (d. 726/1325), Tadhkirat
al-fuqahā’. Tehran: [n.p], 1856, 9:7, 48.
5. Ahmad b. Shu‘ayb al-Nasā’ī (d. 303/915), Sunan al-Nasā’ī. Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1930,
4:99.
 9
prowess and ability were great, then his death may even affect the outcome
of the battle.

III. Hamza

How can we even begin to understand the agony of the Prophet when his
beloved “Lion of God” Hamza fell in the battlefield? In Mecca, the noble-
man and skilled hunter was a symbol of strength among a small band of
meek men. In Medina, tales of Hamza’s feats in battle made him a hero
amongst Muslims.

Although the faithful companions of the Prophet entered the battlefield and
secretly hoped to die as martyrs, to rid themselves of the troubles of this
world and to attain eternal bliss, their primary concerns were to defend Is-
lam’s existence, the very life of the Prophet, and the right to live and worship
freely. It was in the heat of battle and in pursuit of victory that a soldier was
cut down; Hamza was in the middle of defending Islam when death found
him.

The martyrdom exemplified by Hamza represented the loftiest of deaths in

Islamic history. He was named the ‘Leader of Martyrs’ in Muslim tradition,
an appellation that recognized his sustained struggle in defending Islam
through truthful speech to the arrogant, patience in times of hardship and
courage in the face of death. He surrendered his soul to glorifying the Di-
vine for many years before finally surrendering his body. Thus, his final sac-
rifice only exalted and accentuated his previous submission and personified
the maxim of Imam Ali, “God decreed The Holy Struggle to exalt [Man’s]
Submission.”

IV. The Holy Declaration

But what of al-Husayn? Why is the paradigm of Husayn’s martyrdom so dif-

ferent that he becomes the ‘Leader of Martyrs’ after the massacre at Karbala?

The Holy Declaration [shahada] refers to sworn testimonies, as in court

cases, or in the declaration of Islam, when Muslims bear witness there is no
deity but God and Muhammad is His messenger. Husayn exemplifies a dif-
ferent kind of martyr than Hamza. Husayn’s significance lies in his lofty role
as the ‘Leader of Witnesses.’6

Those who have read the history of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties
are aware of the countless examples in which leading Muslim scholars from
every school of thought were persecuted or killed.

6. While witnesses in court cases are referred to as “shuhadā,” this same term can also
mean “martyrs.”
10
Descendants of the Prophet, beginning with Husayn, led various religiously
motivated revolts during this tumultuous period.

V. The Caliphate of Yazid

Yazid I was a caliph who ruled for only three years in Islamic history. In his
first year in office, the caliph’s army massacred Husayn and the great-grand-
children of the Prophet. In the second year, the caliph’s army raided Medina
and the children of the Ansar (those in Medina who supported the Prophet
after he emigrated there) were massacred. In his final year of office, Yazid’s
army partially destroyed the Ka’ba when they attacked the Sacred Mosque in
Mecca with catapults.7

Medieval Islamic historians have overwhelmingly condemned those actions,

if not the character himself. Several historians cited contemporaries of the
caliph who admitted he knew nothing of Islamic scripture or law. The same
man had the audacity to force the Prophet’s companions and his community
to pledge him allegiance under the threat of his vast army. In the absence of
the Prophet, the Caliph was supposed to symbolize and embody the teach-
ings of the Prophet. Imagine this man saying “I am the successor to the
Prophet Muhammad. I sit in his place and stand at his pulpit as the leader of
the Islamic community.” This man was Yazid, the son of Mu’awiya the son of
Abu Sufyan.

The Prophet is reported to have said to Ali, Fatima, Hasan and Husayn, “I’m
at peace with the one at peace with you. I am at war with the one at war
with you,”8 yet despite that, this caliph’s army decapitated Husayn and nearly
all of the Prophet’s descendants and paraded their heads across the empire’s
cities.

Let us return to Yazid’s second year of office, when he sent his army to
Medina – the city of the Hijra, the city of the Prophet, the city of the Ansar.
The Prophet once said “Love of the Ansar is a sign of faith and hatred of the
Ansar is a sign of hypocrisy,”9 and in a similar narration, “No one hates the
Ansar except a Hypocrite.”

No one loves a people by killing them or destroying their homes and fami-
lies, yet Yazid sent an army to fight the Ansar and their children. The army
of the Ansar was led by Abdullah b. Hanzala, Ghasil al-Mala’ika (the One
Washed by Angels). He became a beloved hero in Muslim tradition after it

7. These events are recorded in most books of Islamic history, including the works of
Tabari, Baladhuri, Mas’udi, Ya’qubi, Isfahani, ibn Qutayba, Abu al-Fida, ibn Athir, Suyuti,
Dhahabi and ibn Kathir. Consult the collections regarding the relevant years [61-63 AH]
or the caliphate of Yazid b. Mu’awiya.
8. On the authority of Tirmidhi, ibn Maja, and Imam Ahmed b. Hanbal.
9. On the authority of Bukhari, Muslim, Ahmed, Nasa’i
 11
was learned that he had wed only the night before –but had left his bride the
next morning to fight in the battle without having completed the ceremonial
wash (ghusl). It was reported that the Prophet saw the angels descending
upon Hanzala and administering this wash after he was killed – so he was
called “the One washed by Angels.” The Companions chose Abdullah b.
Hanzala as their leader and they fought bravely against the larger army of
Yazid to protect the city of the Prophet from the Caliph’s transgressions. This
battle fought on the outskirts of Medina is recorded in history as the “Battle
of Harra.” The Muslim residents of the city obviously recognized the sanctity
of Medina and did not wish to fight Yazid’s army in its precincts. So they
defended the holy city by waging their last stand in the outskirts of Medina.
However, after Yazid’s army defeated the Ansar, the army attacked their
women and pillaged the city.

In his final and third year as Caliph, Yazid sent his army to Mecca to destroy
the opposition led by the Companion Abdullah b. Zubayr. Historians write
that the army attacked the Sacred Precinct with catapults and fire, which re-
sulted in the burning and destruction of the Ka’ba itself. There are some who
wish to excuse the caliph of any wrongdoing in the murder of Husayn. Some
attempt to blame a few soldiers or a governor instead of the commanding
Caliph whom they obeyed. However, a well-wisher cannot consciously de-
fend the caliph and the conduct of his army in Mecca and Medina.

Every community has that innocent and righteous man who stands as a wit-
ness against the oppression of his day. The shahid is a man who uncovers a
hidden injustice – a whistle blower – when everyone else is unaware.

At that point in time, some thought that it was heresy to disobey the Caliph
who represented the Prophet. Was anyone left with enough authority to
flatly reject the pledge of allegiance to Yazid but the noble Husayn? Did not
the Prophet bear witness to the community that Hasan and Husayn were
leaders of Heaven?10

Husayn and his companions watched in horror as thousands pledged al-

legiance to Yazid (under threat of death), without voicing any discontent. If
Husayn followed suit, he would have solidified Yazid’s power once and for
all. If Husayn stayed silent, he would have watched the religion of his grand-
father be destroyed before his eyes; few would ever stand up to Yazid, or any
other Caliph for the matter and have the courage to say “you may not pub-
licly disobey the Qur’an and Sunna and reign as successor of the Prophet.”
Caliphs after the Prophet not only enforced laws, but greatly influenced their
genesis by way of their edicts. If Husayn stayed silent, Islamic law, both in its
formation and implementation, would fall victim to the whims of Caliphs
and the silent men who feared to disobey them. The vicious cycle would

10. On the authority of Imam Ahmad, Tirmidhi, Tabarani and others.

12
continue indefinitely. So Husayn set the precedent. Husayn rose.

When a Leader of Heaven set the paradigm and clarified the necessity of
opposing allegiance to such a person, then all other Muslims became cer-
tain that such dissent was neither a sin nor did it mean apostasy. A Leader
of Heaven does not lie nor could he turn apostate as some of his enemies
claimed.11 Husayn was the first to protest and sacrifice himself to reveal the
repudiated truth. He became the first witness to testify to the injustice that
existed in his day. He became a shahid the moment he received the com-
mand to pledge allegiance to Yazid and he refused. Despite direct intimida-
tion from government officials, surrounded by the Caliph’s men, Husayn in
all his courage, said “no.” He knew the moment he refused to pledge alle-
giance to the Caliph that he would pay for such dissent with his life12. The
Umayyads did not tolerate any dissent in their kingdom. By bearing witness
against a community’s wrongdoing, Husayn assumed a role previously oc-
cupied by prophets. Scripture states that such witnesses reprise their role on
the Day of Judgment:

“And the Day We shall raise from every community a Witness from amongst
them {testifying} against them – and We shall bring you as a Witness against
them...” – Qur’an 16:89

When Husayn lived in Mecca with a warrant for his capture or death for
many months, the community fully understood the facade of Islamic piety
that the Umayyads displayed as they searched for this dissenter. Although
everyone, including Husayn, knew that a small band of men could not
defeat the Caliph’s army, Husayn clarified that his intention was not political
supremacy or warfare, but shahada “to reveal a Truth that has been rejected.”
He was a shahid long before he reached the hot deserts of Iraq. The shahid
– who knows he faces certain death for protesting – does so anyway, so the
community learns an inspiring lesson from his martyrdom. There is a funda-
mental difference between the martyrdoms of Hamza and Husayn. Hamza,
the brave soldier, fought in pursuit of a victory and inadvertently fell before
its realization, while Husayn, the protestor, consciously chose a path that
would end in death. However, when future generations remember his sacri-
fice and follow in his example, the shahid’s legacy lives on.

Yazid claimed to be the rightful successor to the Prophet and God’s deputy
on earth. Husayn sacrificed his life to reveal the truth of the matter.

Nebil is a graduate student in the Near Eastern Studies department at Princ-

eton and can be reached at nhusayn@gmail.com.

11. Abu Mikhnaf (d. 157 AH/774) and Tabari cite leading Umayyad generals and officials
taunting Husayn and his family as liars and apostates in Iraq and in Damascus.
12. Ali Shariati argues this point eloquently, in A. Shariati, Husayn Wārithu Adam, Bei-
rut: Dār al-Amīr, 2004. His enlightening comparison fully inspired this article.
A timely and compelling commen-
tary on the uneasy relationship today
between Muslim individuals, societ-
ies and self-proclaimed Islamic gov-
ernments, Ali Allawi’s The Crisis of
Islamic Civilization at once mourns
the diminishing of the Islamic world
of old and attempts to define what
is needed to allow it to flourish once
more. The book’s lamentation is pro-
found, and most of its insights into
the causes of the crisis are equally so.
As a Muslim reader, however, I find
a few of its arguments to be lacking
in coherence, making use of meta-
phors that obscure the core aspects
of Islam, to which all Muslims strive
to submit.
I believe it is worthwhile to re-
view some of the many legitimate
threads of argument in this book
and to inquire into those that appear
questionable, particularly in the final
chapter, where the author seeks to
delve deeper into what is beautifully
described at the book’s outset as “the
transcendent reality which lies at the
heart of Islam.” (p. 10) Through this
review, I would hope to refocus Al-
lawi’s ultimately accurate diagnosis,
to make it speak more intelligibly to
those, like me, who were taught to
take scrupulous care when choosing
metaphorical language to distinguish
the Creator from His creations.
Perhaps the principal theme of the
book is the need for balance in
any and all societies. Allawi deftly
identifies the many aspects of this
necessary balance – between the
needs of the individual and those
of the community, the inner beliefs Navigating by
and values of societal members and
the laws, institutions, and culture Islamic Ideals
that they build. Traditional Islamic
civilization, like any religiously based
Derya Honca
endeavor, provided a continuum
through rituals of worship, which
connected the individual to the com-
munity and vice versa. Yet perhaps
unique to Islam is balance of another
kind; the inescapable dependence of
the individual upon God, even with
respect to personal free will. Allawi
points out that the Divine Attributes
are absolutely transcendent over
those of the human, who can never
attain them (p. 11); still, the concept
of individual autonomy is recognized
as illusory by the Muslim believer,
whose very life and consciousness are
granted by the Creator.
As Allawi’s narrative develops, a
second theme emerges – the contrast
between secular, individual-centered
human rights language that claimed
universal priority in the 20th centu-
ry, and the broad skepticism initially
voiced in Muslim societies toward
this language, as many Muslims felt
that these claims were being forced
upon them. The author argues that
the rights articulated in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights are a product of western
societal separation from its ethical
roots in religion; modern human
rights effectively affirm the lowest
common denominator of humanity,
which is human dignity (p. 191).
In traditional Islamic civilization,
Kılıç Ali Pasha Complex, Istanbul - Courtesy of Michel Roland-Guill

human rights are inseparable from
human duties to each other and to
God. There exists a right to work
so humans can improve their lot
in life and provide for those who
depend upon them, and a right
to free expression so as to seek the
truth. The individualist ethic that
prevails in secular societies today
does not allow its adherents to admit
that rights may not exist separately
from responsibilities. By the same
token, today’s Muslim societies may
be criticized for not providing any
mechanisms to ensure that the rights
and responsibilities of their members
are being simultaneously fulfilled.
Precisely this failure to induce
individuals and communities to live
up to the responsibilities that coex-

ist with rights has led to the current
crisis of Islamic civilization, accord-
ing to Allawi. Two vestiges of that
civilization remain today – private
Islamic faith and self-proclaimed
Islamic governments. Allawi argues
that personal piety is increasing
among Muslims, but the excesses of
political Islam are endangering any
rebirth of the broader civilization.
(pp. 251-252)
Although I agree that political Islam
today fails to promote necessary
social balance, it is here that I begin
to disagree with Allawi. I do not see
that either Islamic government or
personal piety in the fullest sense of
that word has strengthened in recent
times. Piety, Islamically defined as
adherence to the obligations (re-
sponsibilities) and avoidance of that
which is prohibited in the religion,
depends strongly on knowledge of
the correct Islamic beliefs and prac-
tices conveyed by the three primary
sources of knowledge in the religion
– the Qur’an, the Hadith and the
consensus of the scholars. While
personal practice of the religion does
appear to be increasing in recent
times, the practitioners’ knowledge
of Islamic beliefs and practices,
I would argue, has declined sig-
nificantly, not least because of the
failure of Islamic government and
educational institutions to provide
the requisite knowledge to Muslims
on a broad level.
The prospects for Islamic civiliza-
tion today are dim, because Islamic
knowledge has grown fainter on all
levels, from the individual to the
societal. History tells a similar story
in reverse. In contrast to western
historians, who appear challenged
when they try to explain the rapid
rise and spread of Islamic civilization
in the first centuries after the death
of Prophet Muhammad, Muslim
historians would argue that Islamic
civilization of old developed on the
basis of correct beliefs and practices
of the Muslims who spread it. As
long as the Muslims adhered to these
beliefs and practices, their civiliza-
tion flourished.
And this is not an entirely parti-
san argument; the same events are
unfolding today in the context of
global economic development and
its travails. Allawi concurs on this
point; he writes: “The economic
growth which has accompanied
globalization begins to lose its luster
if the benefits are disproportionately
distributed. In a 2005 report, the
UN estimated that the income of
the fifty richest people on earth is
greater than that of the 400 million
poorest… The mass rejection, from
the modern mind-set, of the cardinal
virtues, not least wisdom and mod-
eration, seems to be complete. But
the world cannot anymore sustain
the cult of the rampant individual,
except at its peril. There are too
many ‘externalities’ and costs for
which other individuals, communi-
ties and countries have to pay the
price. … The rugged, autonomous
individual, so beloved by liberal phi-
losophers and by Hollywood movies,
simply cannot exist outside the vir-
tuous community. And Islam would
add that neither the individual nor
the society can be whole if they are
not infused with the sense of the
transcendent. The wheel returns full-
circle.” (pp. 258-259)
15
From that eloquent articulation of
need for a virtuous community, Al-
lawi develops his ultimate argument,
which is that Muslims, in addition
to practicing the rituals of Islam,
must sense its truth for themselves,
through mystical knowledge. He
argues that Muslims must redevelop
a spiritualized language in order to
regain the creative potential of their
own society. He contrasts the mysti-
cal tradition in Islam with the west’s
love of the imaginary realm; in the
west, imagination or self-knowledge
has been cut off from knowledge
of God. If Islamic knowledge is to
flourish once more, it must, accord-
ing to Allawi, become more than
“simply a matter of method and
technique, or the elaboration of an
ideology of metaphysical spirituality.
Knowledge of God is at the heart
of the Islamic Sufi tradition, and its
‘modernization’ must acknowledge
the prior existence of a visionary
realm, where God’s reality is also
manifested.” (p. 260)
As with the earlier argument regard-
ing piety, my understanding of the
necessity of mystical Islamic knowl-
edge starts in parallel with Allawi’s,
but it soon diverges. We agree that
to achieve mystical awareness, one
must have knowledge of God and
know oneself. But Allawi defines the
human being itself as a contradic-
tory mixture of the corporeal and the
“potentially divine.” (p. 261) In con-
trast, I understand the human being
to be no more or less than a creation,
albeit owned entirely by its Creator,
and God alone has the status of Di-
vine Creator. Muslims may not mix
their inherent sense of the Transcen-
dent, Whose Existence is necessary
16
and Who creates all other categories
of existence, with either their empir-
ical knowledge of the mundane, or
their inherent sense of the imaginary,
both of whose existence or non-exis-
tence is merely possible, contingent
upon other factors.
As articulated in his book’s final
section, Allawi’s understanding of
the human being appears incoher-
ent or contradictory, both in and
of itself and regarding the human
relationship to the Creator. He
writes: “On the one hand, a human
being is no different from an animal;
on the other, he or she can aspire to
the highest forms of knowledge…
the true seeker knows that, in the
end, perfecting the qualities of God
within oneself is the sole purpose of
existence.” Yet, on the same page,
he admits: “The ethics of spiritual-
ized Islam are based on a foundation
of courtesy and modesty; courtesy
towards the names and attributes
of God, modesty in terms of the
individual’s affirmation that these
traits are God’s alone. A person can
aspire to perfect them, but their full
measure will always belong to God
alone.” (p. 261)
In my understanding, human be-
ings do have the aspiration toward
perfection, as well as the yearning
to comprehend God’s Attributes.
But we do not have the capability
to fully do so. All our attributes,
including that of knowledge, are
God-given creations, and we are
always merely striving to perfect
them. The sole purpose of existence
is to strive toward perfect obedience
to our Creator. This is where the
meaning of piety that I gave above
becomes more powerful than the
meaning that Allawi implies, when
he speaks of personal belief. The
striving in which we engage is ulti-
mately an act of obedience to God.
Those who achieve piety have done
so by performing what God ordered
humans to perform and by avoiding
what God ordered us to avoid, in
obedience to God’s orders.
Allawi returns to a coherent sum-
mary of the moral compass of the
human – the Sharia. He writes:
“Nevertheless, the moral drive
which generates the actions of the
ethical human being cannot be left
unregulated and entirely answerable
to reason or whim. The Sharia – in
the broadest sense of the word –
becomes the means to effect a true
and lasting guidance for the ethi-
cal individual. The word ‘Sharia’ is
derived from the Arabic root word
shar’, which means road or path;
so the Sharia is, etymologically, the
pathway to guidance and felicity.”
(p. 262) But he does not explicitly
articulate what makes the Sharia
so powerful to a Muslim – namely
the Will of God that this pathway
be revealed, the inerrancy of the
prophetic Revelation, and the lack
of contradiction between any of the
primary sources of its truth. Just as
those verses of the Qur’an that con-
tain more than one possible meaning
are never to be understood in ways
that contradict those verses that con-
tain only one meaning, so Muslims
do not diminish their knowledge of
God by metaphorically comparing
their own contingency and potential
to His Necessity and Reality.
Are my differences with Allawi
merely of rhetoric or also of
substance? I lean toward believing
they are rhetorical. Allawi admits
the incompleteness of the mysti-
cal knowledge he is espousing. He
writes: “The type of knowledge
embodied in intuition, inspira-
tion and guidance is firmly of
the non-rational kind, one that
cannot be subject to the empirical
tests of scientific inquiry or to the
rationalizing logic of the intel-
lect...It is a knowledge for which
certain people have a profound
taste, but their commitment to it
does not necessarily lead to their
denial of other forms of knowl-
edge. … Once again, Islamic inner
spirituality has little to do with
emotion and passion, but a lot to
do with the systematic striving for
an understanding of the attributes
of God and the imperative of
moral conduct that such seeking
generates.” (pp. 263-264) May
the issues that I take with Allawi’s
writing become part of the path
toward true knowledge that he, I,
and all Muslims must undertake
with patience, humility, and good
humor, all in obedience to God.
Derya can be reached at
derya_honka@hks.harvard.edu
 Photo Courtesy of Sajda Ouachtouki ‘13

In the Counter to what your television

may have told you, not all Muslim
Imagine a woman today approaching
the Head of State that also happen to

Footsteps of the women are subjugated second-class

citizens with intellects crushed
be the religious authority and disput-
ing an archaic marriage practice on

Sahabaat: down by oppressive male counter-

parts. Muslim civilizations hold rich
the strict basis of injustice.1 And not
only is this ordinary woman heard,

Muslim Women examples of outstanding women

who have fought for their faith and
but she is also honored for the rest
of her life by her contemporaries.

and Religious stood firm in maintaining their God-

given rights. Rather than importing
Khawlah bint Tha’labah stood firm
in defending her position because

Knowledge a sometimes incompatible western

type of feminism, modern Muslims
can seek inspiration from the ex-
Hagar ElBishlawi GS traordinary heroines of their tradi-
tion.
she had faith in her religion as just to
all, not only for men. What kind of
situation was present in Arabia over
1400 years ago where a woman not
only had a stage to voice her discon-

1. Abdul-Rahman, M. S. (2009). Tafsir Ibn Kathir Juz’ 28 (Part 28): Al-Mujadila 1 To At-
Tahrim 12, Part 28. London: MSA Publication Limited.
18
tent to authority, but more impor-
tantly held the mindset that she had
the ‘right’ to do so?
For the people of this time, both
men and women, implementing
their faith was of utmost concern.
When they obtained a new morsel
of religious knowledge, they would
immediately try to incorporate it
into their lives, even if counter to
old social norms. For example, the
wife of Umar Farooq, Aliqah, at-
tended the mosque for prayer even
though her husband did not prefer
it.2 However, he never prevented her
from going because they both were
well aware of the Prophet’s saying:
“When a wife of one of you asks
for permission to go to mosque, she
should not be refused.” (Muslim
and Bukhari). Once aware of their
rights, or, more specifically, their du-
ties, women of this time saw it as an
obligation to perform them. Their
goal was not to tear down customs,
but to flourish within the bounds of
their faith. There is little doubt that
Aliqah went to the mosque because
she wanted to learn and pray rather
than merely challenge her husband’s
authority. Rather than a battle of the
sexes, the early Muslims’ goal was
living the faith as exemplified by the
Prophet.
And rather than as an exception,
Khawlah and Aliqah characterized
the women of early Islam. They were
empowered by their religion and
2. Husain, S. (2004). Women’s Role under Islam. New Delhi: Anmol Publications.
3. O’Connor, K. (2010). Gender and Women’s Leadership: A Reference Handbook. California: SAGE.
4. Women’s Role under Islam.
5. Nadwi, M. A. (2007). Al-Muhaddithat: The Women Scholars of Islam. London: Interface Publications.
6. Salvatore, A., & Eickelman, D. F. (2004). Public Islam and the Common Good. Netherlands: Brill.
would actively inquire about, imple-
ment, and spread the wisdom they
attained. Women could often be
found asking questions to the Proph-
et in the mosque whether seeking
religious judgments for themselves
or on behalf of others. And just as
significantly, they would seek the
company of the Prophet’s wives to
gain knowledge. Women had a place
in religious institutions and a grass-
roots networks to learn from each
other. The arrival of Islam presented
women with many new freedoms,
unheard of in Arabia. However, they
learned about these rights by attend-
ing the mosque and through circles
of learning. Today we are just barely
catching up to this Prophetic model.
Women have always held pivotal
roles in the establishment of Islam.
The first believer of the Prophet’s
message was a woman: Khadija3; the
first martyr was a woman: Sumayya.4
Women who lived within a genera-
tion of the Prophet were huffadh of
the Quran (i.e., had memorized all
of the Quran), narrators of hadith
(Prophetic reports), jurists, Quranic
commentators, muftis, and scholars.5
Since the time of the Prophet, men
and women have strived to learn and
interpret their religion as a duty. In a
prophetic narration we learn: “Seek-
ing [a certain amount of religious]
knowledge is obligatory upon every
Muslim (male and female),” (Ibn
Majah). In Al-Muhaddithat: The
Women Scholars in Islam, Moham-
med Akram Nadwi provides textual
evidence describing 8,000 stories
of Muslim women scholars. His
text published in 2007 is a startling
reminder that women’s contribu-
tions to Islam are, rather than being
non-existent, may have simply been
largely forgotten. We know that
Companions and Successors would
seek knowledge from teachers re-
gardless of gender. Then why thou-
sands of years later are some asking
the question, “Do women belong in
the mosque?”
As time moved further away from
the Prophet’s era, tighter restrictions
were placed on women limiting their
role in the public sphere. As the
Muslim world expanded, obtaining
religious knowledge required travel-
ing to the locations of scholars. With
access to religious knowledge lim-
ited, we find a decline in female-pro-
duced scholarship. Higher education
in the realm of religious scholarship
and authority became the preserves
of men. While lower literacy rates
and hindrance on free movement
may have once caused a decline in
the contribution of women to the
annals of Muslim history, this digital
age may prove to be a catalyst in re-
viving that women’s spirit of involve-
ment. Remarkably, it is this revolu-
tion in the “oral” tradition that is
giving women a new voice. Women
have been largely excluded from for-
mal places of learning. Often barred
from traditional institutions, they

are utilizing new venues to explore
their faith and voice their opinions
by heading online and on-air for
religious education.
Popular religious media is not lim-
ited to books, pamphlets, audio and
videocassette, but radio, television,
satellite television and the internet,
are increasingly being used to reach
larger and more diverse audiences.6
For example, the introduction of
satellite television in many parts of
the Muslim world, has transformed
the impact of media. Freedom from
on-the-ground censorship and the
development of a “virtual on-air
community” has created a new
forum for women. With burgeoning
opportunities for women as present-
ers in general, Muslim women are
carving out a unique niche focusing
on religious issues. These shows are
extremely popular and have an over-
whelmingly female viewership.
The phenomenon of female preach-
ers, and television preachers in
general, brings up a question of
who holds and controls religious
authority. In the past, scholars have
defined the legitimacy of other
scholars. However, in today’s era of
the “virtual mosque,” the influence
of a preacher is often directly cor-
related with his or her popularity.
The greater the number of listeners
who hear their religious rulings, the
Sattelite Image of Damascus - Google Maps
19
greater the probability their opin-
ions will be adopted by the general
public. Television, internet, and
radio are sources of religious opin-
ions, but without the interactions,
knowledge of personal context, and
qualifications that could be provided
by on-site religious authority. While
this media has its dangers, it is pro-
ducing a forum that women and the
youth are obviously taking advantage
of. With these new forms of commu-
nication, increasingly large pools of
female religious scholars, or Sheikha,
are being afforded the opportunity
to have their voices heard.
Hosts such as Neveen El Guindy,
Doa’a Amer, and an array of others
20

are preaching on satellite television
shows, interacting with viewers,
and dispensing religious advice.7
The women who have entered onto
this stage can generally be placed
into two categories. The first con-
sists of former actresses and sing-
ers who became more religious
and female preachers who dole out
broad-ranging advice to listeners.
Their popularity is on the same level
as other singers and actresses, but
because of their limited religious
education, they can only express
superficial answers devoid of con-
text. The second category consists of
women well-known as interpreters of
religious knowledge. Soad Saleh and
Abla al-Kahlawy, both trained by the
world-famous religious institution
of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, are
examples of the latter category. These
women not only host religious shows
and issue fatwas, but also serve as
deans at their universities. While
present on the same format, their
influence lies in both the general
population and religious scholarship
circles. Their expertise in Islamic law
allows for opportunities to make im-
pactful changes. For example, Saleh’s
fatwa, or legal opinion, on limiting
a man’s unilateral right to divorce is
now the official interpretation of Al-
Azhar and is preached in hundreds
of mosques in Egypt.8
Women have always committed
themselves to the study of religious
knowledge for personal transfor-
mation and development of faith.
Modern Muslim women attend
conferences, study circles, and read
books to informally acquire religious
knowledge.
In a study of European Muslim
women, interviewed women stated
that an increase in their Islamic
knowledge allowed for the capacity
to differentiate between tradition
and religion.9 Women have increas-
ingly been aiming for not only
personal, but also public authority
in religious education. For example,
during the Women’s Islamic Initia-
tive in Spirituality and Equality
global conference, attendees agreed
that, “It is important for women
to take leadership roles in religious
interpretation and spirituality.” In
this vein, they established an Inter-
national Shura, or advisory, council
of Muslim women leaders regarding
women’s issues worldwide. They plan
on establishing endowments spon-
soring scholarships for women to
train as muftiah, scholars certified to
make fatawa or Islamic legal judg-
ments.10
Whereas most Muslims agree that
women should acquire religious
knowledge, training of female
religious authorities is where that
agreement seems to end. Traditional
institutions just need to catch up to
the example set 1400 years ago by
producing, not just popular voices,
but qualified ones as well. Mus-
lim women have been increasingly
demanding inclusion in the religious
arena, and their voices are neces-
sary in the male dominated field of
religious interpretation and applica-
tion of Islamic law. In order to avoid
being marginalized, they need the
support of established seats of formal
religious learning. More institu-
tions which incorporate women into
formal religious education programs,
as Al-Azhar does, are needed. The
tradition of female religious author-
ity is a historical legacy that is being
revived. Rather than just subjects of
religious jurisprudence, women need
to continue the precedent of past
figures, such as Aisha, who shaped it.
Hagar is a graduate student in the
Civil and Environmental
Engineering department at
Princeton and can be reached at
helbishl@princeton.edu

7. Otterman, S. (2006). Fatwas and Feminism: Women, Religious Authority, and Islamic TV. Transnational Broadcasting Journal.
8. Fatwas and Feminism
9. Jouili, J. S., & Amir-Moazami, S. (2006). Knowledge, Empowerment and Religious Authority Among Pious Muslim Women in
France and Germany. The Muslim World , 617-642.
10. McGinty, A. M. (2007). Formation of alternative femininities through Islam: Feminist approaches among Muslim converts in Swe-
den. Women’s Studies International forum , 474-485.