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Content
5 | EDITORIAL
EDITORIAL
Dear Readers,
gerhard.wahlers@kas.de
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 7
Michael A. Lange
Over the last few weeks the world has been watching the
Arab nations with great interest and a certain degree of
admiration, closely following media coverage as the sensa-
tional events have unfolded. For political observers who
thought they knew these countries from past experience,
these events have been both surprising and worrying.
The people of these Arab states who have been oppressed Dr. Michael A. Lange
and bullied for so long are rising up against the arbitrary is head of the team
Political Dialogue
despotism of their rulers, rebelling against their pater- and Analysis in the
nalism and wilful disregard for the views of their citizens. Department for
They are demanding to be heard and to be shown respect. European and Inter-
national Cooperation
They want to be involved in decisions about their future at the Konrad-
and will no longer allow themselves to be fobbed off with Adenauer-Stiftung in
empty promises: “We want democracy – now!” Berlin. For almost 20
years he worked as a
KAS Resident Repre-
UPHEAVAL IN TUNISIA sentative in the Middle
East, including Tunis
(1985-88) and Cairo
Mohamed Bouazizi, a young IT graduate from the small (2001-07).
town of Sidi Bouzid in southern Tunisia discovered it was
impossible to find a suitable job, despite his qualifications
and travelling to the country’s capital to seek work. He
swallowed his pride and returned to his home town, where
he tried to earn a crust in an honest, but less academic,
fashion.
vegetables, beat him for not having the cash to pay them
off and then let him go again.
In 1987, Prime Minister Ben Ali had Almost 25 years earlier, on a peaceful
seized power in Tunisia. With the sup- November morning in 1987, Prime Minister
port of the army and police, he forced
Habib Boughiba, to take retirement. Ben Ali had seized power in Tunisia. With the
support of the army and police, and without
bloodshed, his “medical coup” forced his long-time patron
and founder of the Republic, Habib Boughiba, to take
retirement “on medical grounds” due to his encroaching
senility. The Tunisian people welcomed the end of a long
period of economic stagnation and political procrastination.
The new president immediately created a new political
alliance, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique
(RCD), which tried to break new ground and attracted
many committed young people. The aging governmental
elite of the Bourghiba era was removed. A new official
party committed to the new president gave him the party
political support he needed.
UPHEAVAL IN EGYPT
On the heels of this assassination by radical With the support of the military, Mu-
Islamists, Mubarak concentrated first of barak weeded out the Islamists who
had obviously infiltrated the lower
all on consolidating the domestic political commissioned and non-commissioned
situation. With the support of the military, he ranks of the army.
weeded out the Islamists who had obviously
infiltrated the lower commissioned and non-commissioned
ranks of the army. Since then the armed forces have been
made up of professional soldiers who are loyal to the
regime. He also created a political powerbase in the form
of a new political alliance, the National Democratic Party
(NDP). He made it the official party of government, thus
calling a halt to the tactical party political games played by
his predecessor.
The events in Tunis provided the youth So in the end the outcome seemed inevi-
of Cairo with the hope that change was table. The events in Tunis provided the youth
possible. People were carried away by
the power of the moment. of Cairo with the hope that change was
possible, and the case of Bouazizi brought
back memories of the Egyptian blogger who had been
killed in police custody. Revolution was in the air and
people were carried away by the power of the moment,
overcoming their fear, defying the curfew and demanding
change.
Both presidents and even their secu- The different political constellations in the
rity forces were taken by surprise by two countries now have to deal with current
the outcry. But none of the opposition
parties were prepared for it either. events. Both presidents and even their secu-
rity forces were taken by surprise by the
outcry, but they were not the only ones. None of the oppo-
sition parties were prepared for it, and even the generally
well-organized and well-informed Muslim Brotherhood
were late to jump on the demonstrators’ bandwagon.
Politics
Economy
The removal of presidential corruption So the signs are good that the country will
will certainly be an important factor in soon regain its former economic strength,
motivating Tunisian businesspeople to
start investing in Tunisia again rather though it will not necessarily be in a position
than predominantly abroad. to immediately remedy all its socio-economic
deficits. The removal of presidential corruption
will certainly be an important factor in motivating Tunisian
businesspeople to start investing in Tunisia again rather
than predominantly abroad. This kind of “patriotic” attitude
will help to speed up the process of economic recovery and
make the change process more focused and rigorous.
Society
Egypt will not find it so easy to get back to normal. There are
various factors which will make the healing process much
more difficult. What happens in Egypt has an enormous
impact on developments in other Arab countries. Of course
not every change in the Arab world originates in Egypt,
but anything new generally only becomes significant for
the whole region once Egypt has adopted it. A democratic
awakening in Sunni countries will doubtless have ramifica-
tions for other Islamic nations.
The political system in Egypt has always been Almost every public position was filled
highly-centralised and bureaucratic, with the by party members. It was impossible
to find a decent job without proof of
civil service, military, various security forces your loyalty to the regime.
and previously even more numerous state-
controlled companies being closely tied in with the ruling
party. Almost every public position was filled by party
members; indeed it was impossible to find a decent job
without proof of your loyalty to the regime.
All this can and will make it much more difficult, if not
impossible, to start on the country’s urgently-needed
economic revival, unless the international community
decides now to support Egypt with all the economic means
at its disposal. Without some kind of “Marshall Plan” the
Egyptian banking sector will be totally overextended in
trying to finance the reconstruction.
If they do eventually hand over Ben Ali, Commenting on the recent develop-
it could prove to be a destabilising loss of ments in Egypt, Iran’s revolutionary
leader Khameini indirectly positioned
face for the Saudi leadership. It has to be himself on the side of the demons-
assumed that Iran, their biggest competitors trators.
for hegemony in the region, would be more
than happy to exploit this situation if it arose. Commenting
on the recent developments in Egypt, Iran’s revolutionary
leader Khameini indirectly positioned himself on the side of
the demonstrators, even though they have little common
ground, by suggesting that there was clearly an Islami-
sation of the Egyptian people underway. The Egyptian
leadership were furious at this attempt to interfere in the
country’s internal affairs.
In Jordan and Morocco, there is certainly The Arab monarchies, particularly Jordan and
more serious political frustration hidden Morocco, seem even less threatened by the
behind the social and economic prob-
lems, but it collides with the loyalty domino effect. As in the past, the controlled
which is still afforded to the monarchy. protests were aimed at economic problems
and their governments, which have much
less influence on the stability of these countries. As a result
the rulers were able to soothe the unrest in the population
by making a few cosmetic changes. There is certainly more
serious political frustration hidden behind the social and
economic problems which were brought to the fore, but
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 27
The Israelis are well aware of all this, which is why they
have so far been very cautious in their statements about
the “democratic movement” in Egypt and other Arab
states. While it is true that democracies tend not to turn to
war as often (or as quickly) as dictators, especially against
other democracies, it is also true that an Arab dictator who
is “sick of war” is still better for Israel than a “bloodthirsty”
Arab majority.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 29
CONCLUSION
They are now facing a much more difficult and How to structure this change and
wide-reaching change to the political order. achieve a successful transition in a
peaceful way is the task which is now
How to structure this change and achieve a facing everyone, especially those in
successful transition in a peaceful way is the political office.
task which is now facing everyone, especially
those in political office, but also all the new players on the
stage. The people started this process with their demands
for freedom and democracy, and at the end of the day they
will be the ones who will bring it to its natural conclusion.
30 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011
Offering unsolicited advice or trying While foreign countries may talk about their
to get involved in the political pro- hopes and concerns, it will be the key players
cess from the outside is not going to
help. The Tunisian and Egyptian peo- in the effected countries themselves who will
ple would not be prepared tolerate it be responsible for the political developments
anyway.
to come. Offering unsolicited advice or trying
to get involved in the political process from the outside is
not going to help, and the Tunisian and Egyptian people
would not be prepared tolerate it anyway.
The SPLM/A were not fighting for indepen- SPLM/A leader John Garang de Mabior,
dence, but for a reformed “New Sudan” – a Dinka from Southern Sudan, fought
for a socialist, secular and united Su-
which is why the freedom movement’s name dan.
did not include the word “South”. The SPLM/A
leader John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka from Southern
Sudan, became interested in Marxism during his time as
a lecturer in Tanzania and he fought for a socialist, secular
Sudan which guaranteed all its citizens equal access to
power and resources. He had no time for nationalism based
along ethnic and cultural lines, and as a former colonel in
the Sudanese army his thinking was rooted in the idea
of a united Sudan. He led the liberation movement with
a rod of iron, allowing no different opinions. But many of
38 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011
Despite its oil income, Sudan had huge debts and by the
end of the 1990s it could no longer sustain the enormous
cost of the war, which was running at one to two million
U.S. dollars per day. The SPLA were also constantly
making successful guerrilla strikes on oilfields, pipelines
and roads. In 1999 President Umar al-Bashir offered the
rebels peace talks and even dangled the
possibility of secession. Peace negotiations
A series of protocols on specific issues started in Kenya in 2002 under the auspices
finally resulted in the Comprehensive of the regional organisation, the Inter-
Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9,
2005. The UN Security Council had governmental Authority on Development
shown their support for the agreement (IGAD). Led by the USA, the international
in a special meeting in Nairobi.
community strongly promoted peace, as the
humanitarian consequences of the war had
been catastrophic. Between 1983 and 2005 more than two
million people were killed and four million were driven from
their homes. A series of protocols on specific issues finally
resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on
January 9, 2005. The UN Security Council had shown their
support for the agreement in a unique meeting in Nairobi
(UNSR-Resolution 1574 dated November 19, 2004). The
UN, the African Union, the Arab League, the IGAD, the EU,
Egypt, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Great Britain and
the USA signed the Agreement as guarantors. A military
and civil peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission
in Sudan (UNMIS) was sent to offer support during the
transition period from 2005 to 2011.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 39
Internal and external observer missi- The referendum took place between January
ons judged the process to be “free and 9 and 15, 2011 and went off peacefully.
fair”. A turnout of 60 per cent was hit
within three days. Internal and external observer missions
judged the process to be “free and fair”. A
turnout of 60 per cent was hit within three days; indeed
97.6 per cent of registered voters cast their vote.
It seems likely that the NCP have decided that the South
has been lost and that they should concentrate on holding
on to power in the North. And the USA has
The Islamic wing of the NCP sees the offered some tempting incentives: removal
South’s secession as an opportunity to from the terror list, lifting of sanctions,
exercise Sharia law more intensively
in Northern Sudan. generous debt relief. The Islamic wing of
the party also sees the South’s secession as
an opportunity to exercise Sharia law more intensively in
Northern Sudan.
clean drinking water, and only 6.4 per cent have adequate
toilet facilities. 92 per cent of Southern Sudanese women
are illiterate and less than 50 per cent of children complete
five years of elementary schooling.9
For the time being the SPLM is basking in the aura of the
successful liberation movement and enjoying landslide
victories, such as Salva Kiirs’ election as Pre-
sident of Southern Sudan with 93 per cent of The SPLM now has to make the transi-
the vote in April 2010. The SPLM now has to tion from being a liberation movement
to a democratic party and provide an
make the transition from being a liberation equal playing field for its future poli-
movement to a democratic party and provide tical rivals.
an equal playing field for its future political
rivals. If the country’s domestic problems escalate, the
government could be tempted to divert the tensions
outwards by seeking confrontation with Northern Sudan
or other neighbouring states. Southern Sudan is not “a
failed state in the making” as some observers are rather
prematurely suggesting, but there are certainly testing
times ahead.
Tom Wolf
Dr. Tom Wolf, from
Detroit (USA), works
in Nairobi as a gover-
nance consultant and
Following a tortuous path of some two decades, Kenya
opinion researcher.
Earlier, he taught finally obtained a new constitution when on August 4, 2010
Politics at the Univer- two-thirds of Kenyans who participated in the national
sity of Nairobi and
referendum voted to adopt it, and President Mwai Kibaki
served as an advisor
for USAID. He came promulgated it at a festive ceremony in Nairobi three
to Kenya in 1967. weeks later.
The constitution commits the Govern- But the Bill of Rights goes considerably
ment to carry out its human rights beyond these, offering an expansive ‘platter’
obligations under international law.
It is only the world’s fourth of this of socio-economic rights, including those to
nature. basic welfare such as housing, sanitation,
water, and freedom from hunger, while protecting children
and the aged from “neglect.” Moreover, the state has
judicially enforceable obligations to the progressive reali-
zation of such rights, even on behalf of groups or individuals
who are unable to demand them, and which must not
involve undue complexity or excessive (and in some cases,
any) costs. These may be applied especially to particular
“disadvantaged groups” – children, youth, persons with
disability, the elderly, and to the “marginalized” in general.
Further, the constitution commits the Government to carry
out its human rights obligations under international law.
Indeed, the inclusion of all the above, together with such
enforcement provisions, makes this constitution only the
world’s fourth of this nature.
6. A re-invented judiciary
With Kenya’s annual debt obligation at Perhaps even more serious, the mandated
some 40 percent of all such revenue, proportion of total revenue that is to be
this allocation is likely to leave central
government with a major expenditure shared out to these units (15 per cent, as
shortfall. noted above) may simply be unsustainable.
With Kenya’s annual debt obligation at some 40 per cent
of all such revenue, this allocation is likely to leave central
government with a major expenditure shortfall, especially
since counties themselves have no responsibility to
contribute to such national debt obligations.
Some two months before the referen- The other pre-referendum incident occurred
dum, three hand-grenades were tossed near the close of an open-air Christian
into the crowd at a ‘prayer meeting’,
killing six and injuring more than one ‘prayer meeting’ in Nairobi’s Uhuru Park,
hundred. some two months before the referendum.
Three hand-grenades were tossed into the crowd, killing
six and injuring more than one hundred. Given the fact
that this meeting was in reality part of the ‘No’ campaign,
many assumed that the perpetrators’ goal was to discredit
its ‘Yes’ opponents. Moreover, given the nature of the
weapons used, and the subsequent failure of the Police
to make any progress in the investigation, some drew the
conclusion that the NSIS itself must have been behind it,
on instructions from ‘above’.
1. the vast scale of inequality in society so The highly fractious political class
that without at least the promise of greater tends to see most attempts at compro-
mise only in terms of short-term parti-
equity (if not equality) no substitute for san gains and losses.
the old constitution was likely to win suffi-
cient public support for adoption,
2. a related widespread popular mistrust in government
based on quite bitter experience of many Kenyans, and
3. a highly fractious political class that likewise tended
to see most attempts at compromise only in terms
of short-term partisan gains and losses, and thus
unwilling to leave details to future interpretations of
‘basic principles’ – let alone to ‘good faith’ – so that
much of the text constitutes the broadest (if not
lowest) ‘common denominator’.
past, will the latter – still very much in place – allow this
to happen? Or will the ‘Kenyan people’ be able to hang on
to and thus confirm their referendum victory in its fullest
sense?
Werner Böhler
10 | http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2010/10021119051001.
htm (accessed February 2, 2011).
72 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011
The chief editor of the weekly Mail & Guardian, Nic Dawes,
commented on the launch of the NGP in November
2010: “As of this week, South Africa has three economic
policies – or is it four? And that’s just the government. The
ANC and its alliance partners account for several more.”16
The well-known cartoonist, Jonathan Zapiro expressed this
in his cartoon of the proverbial broth and the Ministers as
the cooks, with President Zuma asking: “How can I help?
… Need more Cooks?”17 Justice Malala on the other hand,
in his commentary in The Times on January 10, criticises
the uncritical trust in the state as an agent of change and
laments the lack of vision of the political leadership.18
It is not only since the financial crisis that the ANC and
the government it forms have shown an interest in the
economic systems developing in Asia. The
It is very doubtful whether the so- positive economic development in some
called Asian model of a Developmental countries and the rapid overcoming of the
State is transferable to the African re-
gion or individual countries. consequences of the financial crisis, as well
as the increasing trade exchange are key.
However, it is very doubtful whether the so-called Asian
model of a Developmental State is transferable to the
African region or individual countries. Although each quite
different, the Asian development models do have certain
constituent conditions in common. These include, first and
foremost, a clear definition of goals and a focused strategy,
a strong state with an efficient and independent public
administration and effective leadership.21
POLITICAL ERRORS
all in the global South.26 In the last three years the political
exertion of influence in South Africa came alongside the
expansion of economic cooperation. Since the takeover of
party leadership from Jacob Zuma delegations from the
ANC leadership to China take place on a regular basis. The
expenses are shared by ANC and China’s Communist Party.
As a result ANC announced the establishment of a political
school for party members which is oriented towards the
Chinese model.27 It shall be headed by Toni
During the campaign for the presiden- Yengeni, former Chief Whip of the ANC in
tial elections in 2009 the ANC confir- the National Parliament, who was sentenced
med receiving monies from friendly
parties – including China’s CP. to four years in prison for corruption in
connection with the “Arms Deal”28. At the
gala dinner before the 99th Party Convention the Chinese
Chapter of the Progressive Business Forum (PBF) appeared
as the main sponsor. The PBF is one of the ANC’s most
important fundraising organizations.29 During the campaign
for the presidential elections in 2009 the ANC confirmed
receiving monies from friendly parties – including China’s
Communist Party.30
Because a departure from “Cadre Deploy- The ANC government brought about
ment” is not possible for ideological reasons, two reform plans: the inspection of
the role, number, and borders of the
the ANC government brought about two provinces, and the “Single Public Ser-
reform plans: the inspection of the role, vice Bill”.
number, and borders of the provinces, and
the “Single Public Service Bill”. Both reforms inevitably lead
to more concentration of power for the national executives.
The change in the province borders, or their merger, not
only undermines the “Three-Sphere-System” anchored in
the constitution, but would also eliminate the opposition
government of the DA in the Western Cape and create a
long-standing structural majority for the ANC. The imple-
mentation of the Single Public Service Bill would, however,
give the national government the opportunity to appoint
their cadres at all political levels, at will. Unpleasant public
servants could, in this way, be arbitrarily changed, even in
opposition-ruled provinces and municipalities.
PARASTATALS
42 | http://www.afribiz.info/content/parastatals-and-government-
structures-of-south-africa (accessed February 2, 2011).
43 | Cf. Brendan Boyle, “The Big Bang – New unit mooted to take
control of 13 parastatals wit hthe president in charge,” Sunday
Times – Business Times, March 22, 2009, 1.
44 | Cf. Brendan Peacock, “Fat-cat parastatal boses come and go
but the get the cream,” Sunday Times –Business Times,
December 2, 2010, 1.
45 | Cf. Mandy Rossouw, “ANC ponders Chinese Policy,” Mail &
Guardian, January 26 - Febraury 2, 2011, 39.
46 | Cf. Zwelethu Jolobe, 2010, “Financing the ANC: Chancellor
House, Eskom and the dilemmas of party finance reform,” in:
Anthony Butler (ed.), Paying for Politics – Party Funding and
Political Change in South Africa and the Global South, Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, 2010, 201-217.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 81
The most recent survey from September 2009 According to a survey in 2009 25 per
conducted by P-E Corporate Services, estab- cent of managers in first-line manage-
ment of companies are black people. In
lished significant increases in the percentage 1994, this figure was five per cent.
of black managers in Senior Positions and
middle management. According to this survey 25 per
cent of managers in first-line management of companies
and 28 per cent of middle management are black people.
In 1994, these figures were five per cent and seven per
cent.58 In his calculations, Lawrence Schlemmer comes
to a comparable increase in the development of a “Black
Middle Class”. However, he concludes that these growth
rates cannot be continued due to the mediocre educational
system.59 Numbers prove the steeply increasing demand
for qualified managers over the coming years. Already in
1998, an additional need for up to 500,000 managers in
middle and first-line management was established. With
a growth of two to three per cent per year in the next 15
years an additional 750,000 managers will be needed. This
number increases to 1.25 million with a growth rate of five
to six per cent.60
Even 16 years after the beginning of demo- Minister Angie Motschekga declared in
cracy, education results do not correspond January 2011 that it would take two
decades to make up the lag in the edu-
to the financial means employed. Minister cation system.
Angie Motschekga declared in January 2011
that it would take two decades to make up the lag in the
education system.63 Poor teacher training programs, under-
payment of teachers, problems with recruiting teachers for
schools in rural areas, school management deficits as well
as wide-spread poor school infrastructure and insufficient
equipment for teaching and learning materials are among
the causes. Corruption through Cadre Deployment is
another. It is apparent that the qualification requirements
were “standardized” for the last matric exams. The director
of the quality assurance office “Umaluse”, Professor
Sizwe Mabizela, in an interview with the Sunday Times,
confirmed that a change in the performance requirements
was planned. However he maintained that he could not
give any further details because of the danger of misinter-
pretation. He stated that it was a “confidential process but
not a secretive one”.64
FURTHER ASPECTS
OUTLOOK
The potential of this country, a first- The economic performance of South Africa
rate tourist destination with access to has, in the two decades since the beginning
significant raw materials and a rela-
tively well-developed infrastructure, of democracy, developed positively though at
is not used adequately. a low level, with the exception of the year
of crisis in 2009. In the nineties, the growth rate was a
moderate two to three per cent. In the context of the positive
world economic development, it rose in the last decade to
four to 5.5 per cent. South Africa however remains signifi-
cantly behind other emerging countries such as Brazil,
India, Indonesia, or Vietnam. The potential of this country,
a first-rate tourist destination with access to significant
raw materials and a relatively well-developed infrastruc-
ture, is not used adequately due to false political directions.
From 2007 at the latest, the ANC has defined South Africa
as a “developmental state” with a “developmental econo-
my”. Irrespective of whether this is meant to be the classic
development state concept from Asian countries or the
democratic-developmental model practiced in Botswana
and Mauritius, an autonomous and efficient governmental
bureaucracy, which is not present (anymore), is the basic
requirement for this to work. Edigheji defines the Democratic
Developmental State as “one that forges broad-based
alliances with society and ensures popular participation
Karl Fischer
The problem is not only the flooded areas but also the
refugee camps, where around one million people still live,
according to government figures. For weeks now there has
been such an acute lack of the most essential supplies that
well-known NGOs such as ActionAid Pakistan now believe
there is a real danger of hunger riots breaking out. The UN
had warned at the end of October that it did not have the
financial resources to keep the flood victims supplied with
1 | Tahir Ali, “Left in the Lurch,” The News, December 12, 2010.
2 | According to estimates by the World Bank (WB) and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) around 1.7 million people lost their
homes. A Pakistani family comprises eight to ten people on
average.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 93
food and water over the whole winter because they had
only received around a half of the two billion U.S. Dollars
in aid money that had been pledged by donor countries.
DAMAGED INFRASTRUCTURE
For almost a week after the floods began the central and
regional governments in Pakistan did virtually nothing.
During this period around 1,000 people died or were
seriously injured in the mountainous north, where the
disaster started to unfold. On August 1 the Prime Minister
Yusuf Raza Gilani finally announced the setting up of a flood
emergency fund18, into which all cabinet ministers would
give one month’s salary and all civil servants from level 17
and above (22 is the highest level) one day’s salary as an
initial donation.19
Over the last few years Pakistan has faced repeated accusa-
tions from its financial backers – chiefly the USA – that
whenever there is a crisis the country’s knee-jerk reaction
is always to ask for international financial aid rather than
to look for its own solution to the problem. Parallel to this
there is growing criticism within the country
A lack of transparency and control over that the government has wasted international
the way the funds are used has led to aid money rather than using it to initiate
significant amounts draining away into
the morass of corruption caused by the structural reforms to promote sustainable
elite’s self-serving mentality. social and economic development.32 A lack of
transparency and control over the way the
funds are used has also led to significant amounts draining
away into the morass of corruption caused by the elite’s
self-serving mentality. Two years ago the USA were the
first country to stop issuing the Pakistani government with
billions of dollars in annual blank cheques for development
aid. Instead they stipulated what the money should be used
for and demanded that the funds be clearly accounted for.
Responding to accusations that the U.S. was intruding in
Pakistan’s financial and administrative affairs, U.S. ambas-
sador Cameron Munter said at a scientific conference
in Islamabad on January 7: “We appear to be intrusive
because we care, we are the largest donor. Our aid comes
as outright grant of assistance which is different from
loans”33 In addition, the USA and other donors, including
the EU, linked flood aid to the condition that Pakistan’s
dollar millionaires dig equally deep in their own pockets
to help their compatriots and to the requirement for
donations to be documented in a full and transparent way.
This was clearly stressed by foreign speakers at the PDF
34 | Kiani, n. 30.
35 | “Pakistan govt. must do more for flood recovery: Holbrooke,”
The News, September 22, 2010.
36 | “Moving of RGST Bill,” Editorial, The Nation, November 14,
2010.
37 | This delay is reducing planned tax income. It is possible that
a parliamentary recess will be used in order to pass the pro-
posed measures by presidential decree.
38 | One Euro is 110 PKR (Pakistani Rupees), as at January 9, 2011.
39 | July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011.
104 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011
been cancelled.40 The need for austerity has also forced the
government to cut its expenditure for the financial year by
300 billion rupees and to reduce subsidies.
Analysts have criticised the PDF and the flood aid pro-
grammes, saying they do not pay sufficient attention to
the social aspects of the crisis in their political recom-
mendations. Former Secretary to the Government of
Pakistan Roedad Khan has analysed Pakistan’s painful
history of failed attempts to push through radical land
reforms to free the country from the control of feudal
elites and open up the possibility of a healthy democracy
and market economy.42 But instead he sees a movement
in the opposite direction, with the entrenched feudal
classes working together with high-ranking army officers
and government officials who have created a “neo-feudal”
class by acquiring land through fair means or foul, to
expand their political influence and prevent any changes in
43 | Ibid.
44 | Ardeshir Cowasjee, “The national stupor,” Dawn, November
21, 2010.
45 | Zahir Kazmi, “Lessons from China,” Dawn, November 22, 2010.
46 | Zulfiqar Ali und Faiz Muhammad, “Lawmakers cashing in on
Watan cards,” Dawn, October 31, 2010.
106 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011
OUTLOOK
Stephan Malerius is
Stephan Malerius
Head of the country
office Belarus of the
Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung. The office
is based in Vilnius, Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Europe has rarely
Lithuania. seen elections as disastrous as the Presidential elections
held in Belarus on December 19, 2010. This is not because
of President Alexander Lukashenko’s landslide victory in
the so-called elections. After his 16 years in office, no-one
seriously believed that the votes would actually be counted
or that the authorities would not rig the elections to suit
Lukashenko. The real disaster lies in the brutality used to
break up the peaceful demonstration on election night and
the repression which followed over the next few weeks –
something which even the worst pessimists had not
foreseen. Indeed, the election campaign itself had been
surprisingly liberal.
the oil duty row by legal means, in June 2010 the tensions
spilled over to the political sphere: Gazprom gave Belarus
an ultimatum to pay its gas debts, which had supposedly
been mounting up for months, and for a few days it reduced
gas supplies to its neighbours by up to 80 per cent. The
conflict seemed to be aimed at putting Lukashenko under
pressure. Lukashenko replied by publicly going on the
offensive for the first time in an open letter to Pravda and
to Russia’s top business leaders. In this letter, he gave his
view of the gas conflict and compared Gazprom’s demands
on Belarus to Nazi Germany’s offensive against the Soviet
Union.
Minsk, the historic white and red flags were being waved
and no one intervened, no police, no arrests. I’ve never
known this before in all my life.” A whole
A whole generation of people had the generation of people had the feeling that
feeling that they could demonstrate they could demonstrate freely, something
freely, something they had never be-
fore experienced in Belarus during 14 they had never before experienced in Belarus
years of repressive authoritarian rule. during 14 years of repressive authoritarian
rule. And there was another mood among
the people, a feeling that after 16 years they were tired of
Lukashenko and were not afraid to express their support
for other candidates. Everywhere people were saying “I will
support anyone, as long as it’s not Lukashenko.”
But there was no doubt that change was taking root in the
country. As in most countries, gatherings in public places
were forbidden, but the authorities reacted quite diffe
rently to violations of this rule compared to 2006. When
two Presidential candidates called on their supporters to
gather for an illegal demonstration on November 24 in
Minsk’s October Square more than 1,000 people turned
up, but the protest was not broken up by the authorities
and there were no arrests. The instigators received a
warning from the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Central
Electoral Commission, but nothing more.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 117
This is why political scientist Yuri Chausov The regime had promised to give the
talked about a kind of “invisible liberalisation”. people free elections and was now
trying to play this out. But liberali-
The regime had promised to give the people sation was not to be confused with
free elections and was now trying to play this democracy.
out. But liberalisation was not to be confused
with democracy. According to Chausov, the Parliamentary
elections of 2008 served as an example. Candidate regis-
tration and campaigning had been relatively free, but the
end result was a totally sterile Parliament without a single
independent representative. Chausov thought the results
of the 2010 Presidential elections were totally predictable:
“President Lukashenko has kept away from the official
announcement of candidates for good reason. He wants to
show that he is not one of the actors in these elections, but
rather the director.”2
THE CANDIDATES
Lukashenko was faced by two candi- To begin with, Lukashenko was faced by two
dates who either had never stood for candidates who either had never stood for
office before or who acted as kind of
guaranteed opposition candidates in office before (Dmitri Uss) or who acted as
the event that the opposition announ- kind of guaranteed opposition candidates
ced a boycott.
(Vladimir Tereshtshenko) in the event that
the opposition announced a boycott and it was necessary
to give the illusion of an election. Tereshtshenko at least
was expected to follow the instructions of the President’s
administration or its officials.
Election day itself went off quietly. 23.1 per cent of the
population had already cast their votes over the preceding
five days, 8 per cent less than in 2006. But reports were
coming in from all over the country of how people were
being pressurised to vote early. But this
had been expected. The crucial question The opposition had called on their sup-
was what would happen on election night? porters to gather in October Square
during the evening to wait for the elec-
The opposition had come together to call on tion results and to protest against the
their supporters to gather in October Square anticipated vote-rigging.
during the evening to wait for the election
results and to protest against the anticipated vote-rigging.
Voting on election day itself appeared to go off without a
hitch, and by early evening no verdict could be given on
the vote counting process because the polls did not close
until eight o’clock.
There are many indications that the riots which broke out
in front of the government building had been carefully
planned over several weeks. One of these is the delivery van
which was found packed full of Molotov cocktails in plastic
bottles, stun guns and gas bottles, which had allegedly
been prepared by the Opposition and which was shown on
state television on election day. The deployment of special
forces on election night also bears all the traces of a well-
organised, tried-and-tested action. One thing is sure: the
organisers were members of Lukashenko’s close circle.
They knew exactly how and when they needed to feed
him information in order to provoke the impulsive reaction
which materialised on election night. In her analysis of
the meeting on December 15, Svetlana Kalinkina writes:
“Whoever had Lukashenko wrapped round their little finger,
wrecking the plans to gain international recognition of his
fourth term as President, was at the meeting on December
15. We can only speculate on their motivation, whether it
was due to stupidity, ideology, revenge or fear.”13
Table 1
Population groups in Poland 2002
THE BACKGROUND
The last two years have seen a new generation in both the
leadership of the VdG as well as the Opole Association.
Norbert Rasch, a scholar of German studies born 1971,
is the Chairman of the Social-Cultural Society of the
Germans in Opole Silesia since April 26, 2008. Before that,
the long-time Chairman Henryk Kroll, born 1949, who
represented the minority from 1991 to 2007 in the Sejm,
the Polish Parliament, without interruption, had resigned.
Rasch, who since 2005 is a member of the Parliament of
the Voivodship Opole, stands for the trend towards a shift
in focus, away from economic and infrastructure policies
towards culture and language policies, in order to ensure
the survival of the minority. Since May 11, 2009, he also
belongs to the new board of the VdG, whose Chairman
since has been the trading entrepreneur Bernard Gaida
Vintage, born 1958, from the Upper Silesian Dobrodzień
(Guttentag). Similar to Rasch, Gaida also sees the creation
of schools through comprehensive German lessons as a
priority. He especially wants to take care of the “identity of
the minority” and a maximised utilisation of minority policy
opportunities of Polish legislation.3
Table 2
Communities with a German population over 20 per
cent and/or German mayors
Table 3
Communities with Auxiliary Languages
Kashubian Voivodship
Lithuanian
Lemko
Table 4
Results of the regional elections
in the Voivodship Opole
PO 96,449 31.93
Table 5
Seats won by DMi in regional elections 2010 and 2006
Strzelce Opolskie
9 10 19
(Groß Strehlitz)
Krapkowice (Krappitz) 7 7 19
Kędzierzyn-Koźle
5 8 21
(Kandrzin-Cosel)
Olesno (Rosenberg) 9 8 19
Prudnik (Neustadt) 5 3 17
Opole (Oppeln) 12 16 25
Kluczburg (Kreuzburg) 2 2 19
PROSPECTIVE
While the DMi fits into the given political context because
of the minority law, the RAŚ, due to their aspirations for
greater autonomy of Silesia (eastern Upper Silesia) evokes
irritation in Poland. It will probably continue to play the role
of a specifically cultural and political force in the region,
whereas locally it is not anchored as strongly, which should
give reason for the Polish majority society to handle the
autonomy movement with more composure.