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KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|11


INTERNATIONAL REPORTS Upheaval in the Middle
East – What Comes Next
After the Events in Tunisia
and Egypt?
Michael A. Lange

Southern Sudan Before


Independence – Local Cele-
brations, Disappointment
in Northern Sudan and
International Concern
Martin Pabst

Kenya’s New Constitution:


Triumph in Hand, Testing
Times Ahead?
Tom Wolf

Economic Policy in South


Africa – Growth Plans and
Growth Obstacles
Werner Böhler

Pakistan After the Flood


Karl Fischer

The Long Shadow of


the Belarus Presidential
Elections
Stephan Malerius

The German Minority


in Poland
Stephan Georg Raabe
KAS
INTER N A T I O N A L R E P O R T S
3|11
ISSN 0177-7521
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V.
Volume 27

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Editor:
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Editorial Team:
Frank Spengler
Hans-Hartwig Blomeier
Dr. Stefan Friedrich
Dr. Hardy Ostry
Jens Paulus
Dr. Helmut Reifeld

Editor-in-chief:
Stefan Burgdörfer

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Content

5 | EDITORIAL

7 | UPHEAVAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST –


WHAT COMES NEXT AF TER THE EVENTS
IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT ?
Michael A. Lange

32 | SOUTHERN SUDAN BEFORE INDEPENDENCE –


LOCAL CELEBRATIONS, DISAPPOINTMENT
IN NORTHERN SUDAN AND INTERNATIONAL
CONCERN
Martin Pabst

52 | KENYA’S NEW CONSTITUTION: TRIUMPH


IN HAND, TESTING TIMES AHEAD?
Tom Wolf

67 | ECONOMIC POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA –


GROWTH PLANS AND GROWTH OBSTACLES
Werner Böhler

92 | PAKISTAN AF TER THE FLOOD


Karl Fischer

110 | THE LONG SHADOW OF THE BELARUS


PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS – PROCEDURES,
RESULTS AND POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Stephan Malerius

130 | THE GERMAN MINORITY IN POLAND


Stephan Georg Raabe
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 5

EDITORIAL

Dear Readers,

If you stand in Tahrir Square, there is no escaping the


waves of joy and optimism radiating from the young men
and women around you. They are proud of what they have
achieved and determined to drive forward the changes
they have started. These young people and all those who
risked their lives to drive out the old rulers should indeed
be proud of what they have done. A police state which had
brutally oppressed thousands of people was finally forced
to give way. The police no longer dare to show their faces
on the streets, for people have not forgotten the cries of
torture victims ringing out from the open windows of police
stations. Many places of torture and arbitrary violence
have gone up in flames, the prisons of the secret police
have been stormed. Thousands of piecemeal acts are a
strong reminder of the events of 1989.

It is sad to hear despondency being voiced in certain parts


of the west in the face of these changes. Of course we are
left with a feeling of great uncertainty as to what the future
will bring. And we have learned the lesson that those who
start a revolution do not necessarily emerge as the victors.
But this should not stop us welcoming the changes whole-
heartedly and offering energetic support to those who are
striving to build a constitutional, democratic and socially
just nation.
6 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

The challenges are overwhelming. They include outmoded


economic structures, high unemployment, low levels of
education, an absence of the rule of law, a barely developed
civil society and an organised Islamist movement. Of
course there is no room for naivety, but we should not miss
the chance to celebrate the fact that an Arab people have
succeeded in standing up to despotism and to rulers who
have for years disregarded basic human rights.

Dr. Gerhard Wahlers


Deputy Secretary-General

gerhard.wahlers@kas.de
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 7

UPHEAVAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST


WHAT COMES NEXT AFTER THE EVENTS IN TUNISIA
AND EGYPT?

Michael A. Lange

Over the last few weeks the world has been watching the
Arab nations with great interest and a certain degree of
admiration, closely following media coverage as the sensa-
tional events have unfolded. For political observers who
thought they knew these countries from past experience,
these events have been both surprising and worrying.

The people of these Arab states who have been oppressed Dr. Michael A. Lange
and bullied for so long are rising up against the arbitrary is head of the team
Political Dialogue
despotism of their rulers, rebelling against their pater- and Analysis in the
nalism and wilful disregard for the views of their citizens. Department for
They are demanding to be heard and to be shown respect. European and Inter-
national Cooperation
They want to be involved in decisions about their future at the Konrad-
and will no longer allow themselves to be fobbed off with Adenauer-Stiftung in
empty promises: “We want democracy – now!” Berlin. For almost 20
years he worked as a
KAS Resident Repre-
UPHEAVAL IN TUNISIA sentative in the Middle
East, including Tunis
(1985-88) and Cairo
Mohamed Bouazizi, a young IT graduate from the small (2001-07).
town of Sidi Bouzid in southern Tunisia discovered it was
impossible to find a suitable job, despite his qualifications
and travelling to the country’s capital to seek work. He
swallowed his pride and returned to his home town, where
he tried to earn a crust in an honest, but less academic,
fashion.

He tried to make a living selling vegetables on the street.


The town’s authorities treated this “rogue” academic with
suspicion and refused to issue him with a street vendor’s
licence, partly because he could not or would not pay the
necessary bribes. When he continued trading regardless,
the police locked him up, confiscated his donkey cart and
8 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

vegetables, beat him for not having the cash to pay them
off and then let him go again.

The young graduate felt deeply humiliated. After this


procedure had been repeated several times, in his despair
and shame he saw suicide as his only way out. He doused
himself in petrol and tried to kill himself, but he initially
survived the attempt. The country’s President, Zine
El-Abidine Ben Ali, was so shocked by this terrible act
that he hastened to the desperate victim’s hospital bed
to express his sympathy as telegenically as possible. But
it was too late; the symbolic handshake was not enough
to save either the desperate “victim” or the worried
“perpetrator”. On January 4 Mohammed Bouaziz died of
his injuries.

In 1987, Prime Minister Ben Ali had Almost 25 years earlier, on a peaceful
seized power in Tunisia. With the sup- November morning in 1987, Prime Minister
port of the army and police, he forced
Habib Boughiba, to take retirement. Ben Ali had seized power in Tunisia. With the
support of the army and police, and without
bloodshed, his “medical coup” forced his long-time patron
and founder of the Republic, Habib Boughiba, to take
retirement “on medical grounds” due to his encroaching
senility. The Tunisian people welcomed the end of a long
period of economic stagnation and political procrastination.
The new president immediately created a new political
alliance, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique
(RCD), which tried to break new ground and attracted
many committed young people. The aging governmental
elite of the Bourghiba era was removed. A new official
party committed to the new president gave him the party
political support he needed.

The events in neighbouring Algeria after electoral victory


by the Islamists and the resulting civil war helped the new
president to win the support of the majority of his people
for the subsequent massive persecution of Islamists in
Tunisia. Islamist leader Rachid Ghannouchi ended up being
isolated and forced to flee into exile in London.

The president also dissolved the association between


Tunisia and the PLO and distanced himself from the
pan-Arab dream and the Palestinian conflict. This meant
he could now count on increased western cooperation in
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 9

the political and economic sphere. With its new internal


stability and foreign policy positioning, Tunisia could now
concentrate on opening up the economy, encouraging small
and medium-sized businesses and tourism. The economy
grew in the shadow of a police-controlled state.

The president then married a daughter of the well-known


Trabelsi clan, one of the biggest and most economi-
cally powerful families in Tunisia, though their operating
methods were highly controversial. Under the president’s
protection the family became even more brazen, bending
the law to suit themselves. The Trabelsi
clan or the president’s family had their Even Tunisian entrepreneurs who had
fingers in every large company or profitable previously been close to the president
now found themselves suffering under
concession. Even Tunisian entrepreneurs who rather than profiting from his presi-
had previously been close to the president dency.
now found themselves suffering under
rather than profiting from his presidency. They saw their
profits disappearing due to the forced shareholdings of the
Trabelsi clan, and they increasingly began to refuse to pay
the regime’s “protection money”. They stopped investing
in their own country, turned their faces towards Europe
and gradually drained the country of urgently-needed
investment capital. Once Tunisia’s economy was hit by the
economic and financial crisis, and there were fewer and
fewer jobs available for the growing number of highly-
qualified college graduates, the resurgence in confidence
among the Tunisian population was replaced by mounting
frustration.

Finally the young student’s suicide rocked the country and


this latent discontent manifested itself in attacks on police
stations, first in rural areas and then in the capital. People’s
displeasure with the dehumanizing actions of the (police)
authorities could no longer be controlled and it spilled over
into protests. These were even joined by the urban middle
classes, who nurtured the simmering unrest in the capital
with the support of large numbers of their discontented
compatriots who flooded into Tunis from the country’s rural
areas. The presidential clan panicked and tried to mobilise
the loyal state police and security services to get a grip on
the situation. But when this proved unsuccessful and the
army refused to fire on the people, the game was up.
10 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

The president fought back only briefly, then fled the


country like a common thief. However, he still managed
to appropriate the central bank’s gold reserves with the
help of his wife. He headed for France first of all, thinking
this was a friendly country, but soon had to learn the hard
lesson that a fleeing head of state soon becomes an ostra-
cized head of state, even in a country which had such close
historical ties.

UPHEAVAL IN EGYPT

Khalid Said, a young Egyptian student, loved the new


world of the internet, social networking and all the new
ways he could get in contact with like-minded people to
debate the latest issues, including politics. But his network
did not only consist of like-minded people. It included
the well-equipped and highly-educated Egyptian secret
service, who felt they had to keep an eye
The internet controls were originally on this much-trumpeted internet freedom
aimed at watching over the Islamists and who were prepared to intervene when it
and their protagonists, who were sur-
prisingly proficient in the area of tech- came to politics. The controls were originally
nology. aimed at watching over the Islamists and
their protagonists, who were surprisingly proficient in the
area of technology. But the secret service ended up having
total control over the internet, using it for such things as
ferreting out gays and student activists.

This young student also became an activist. He became a


blogger, soon attracting attention in the Egyptian blogger
community, and  – unfortunately  – further afield. The
security services gave him the usual warning to keep his
activities within the limits tolerated by the state. When he
defied this warning the police repeatedly arrested him, and
finally beat him so badly that he died of his injuries. When
the blogger community and then students in general heard
this news, their resentment grew, as did their desire to
protest. Then they heard the news from Tunis.

Almost thirty years earlier, after the assassination of


President Anwar As Sadat in October 1981, Hosni Mubarak
took over power in Egypt, a constitutional act as he was
Vice-President at the time. In light of rumours that Sadat
had chosen his former air force chief to hold this important
office because he thought he did not have the charisma
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 11

to be a serious rival, many people thought he was just an


interim president.

On the heels of this assassination by radical With the support of the military, Mu-
Islamists, Mubarak concentrated first of barak weeded out the Islamists who
had obviously infiltrated the lower
all on consolidating the domestic political commissioned and non-commissioned
situation. With the support of the military, he ranks of the army.
weeded out the Islamists who had obviously
infiltrated the lower commissioned and non-commissioned
ranks of the army. Since then the armed forces have been
made up of professional soldiers who are loyal to the
regime. He also created a political powerbase in the form
of a new political alliance, the National Democratic Party
(NDP). He made it the official party of government, thus
calling a halt to the tactical party political games played by
his predecessor.

After successfully achieving domestic stability, Mubarak


then turned his attention to the rehabilitation of Egypt in
the eyes of the world. The country had lost its seat in the
Arab League and the support of the majority of Arab states
after the Camp David Peace Accords. Mubarak managed to
uphold the essence of the Accords and even made them
“acceptable” to the Arab League upon Egypt’s return to
the fold.

This proof of his steadfastness and reliability makes him


the West’s most trusted ally in the Middle East in terms
of foreign and security policy. As a tireless, though of late
not particularly successful, mediator in the Middle East
conflict, if nothing else he benefited from the financial
support of his western allies and the willingness of foreign
investors to put money into his country. He succeeded
in opening up Egypt’s economy by making it possible for
local entrepreneurs to become involved in his party, even
allowing them to join high-level committees, which up to
then had been dominated by the old guard from the army
and civil service.

However, in recent years this balance of power has been


increasingly overshadowed by the unresolved question of
who would be his successor. The Egyptian president still
seemed to have good reasons to continue to shoulder
the burden of office, despite ever-growing discontent and
12 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

increasing repressiveness on the part of the security forces.


Over the last few months there has been much debate
about whether Mubarak should stand again, but his critics
seem to have no clear or uniform idea of who could stand
in his place. Any potential candidates have spent too many
years standing in the president’s shadow, and have not
managed to carve out their own individual identity. A
dynastic successor in the form of a transfer of political
power to Mubarak’s son Gamal was vehemently rejected
by the largely republican-leaning military.

So once again it was a case of “wait and see”. The ability of


the regime to map out policies which looked to the future
and set in motion clear reforms was fading with every
month that the ailing president remained in power. And
the governing party failed to send out the right signals at
the right time by gathering a group of younger politicians
around Gamal Mubarak who would have actually been able
to take over many executive functions.

The events in Tunis provided the youth So in the end the outcome seemed inevi-
of Cairo with the hope that change was table. The events in Tunis provided the youth
possible. People were carried away by
the power of the moment. of Cairo with the hope that change was
possible, and the case of Bouazizi brought
back memories of the Egyptian blogger who had been
killed in police custody. Revolution was in the air and
people were carried away by the power of the moment,
overcoming their fear, defying the curfew and demanding
change.

THE NORTH AFRICAN BREAK-UP

Egypt and Tunisia have been the most stable countries in


North Africa, with both having only a small number of presi-
dents over the last 50 years: two in Tunisia (Bourghiba,
Ben Ali) and three in Egypt (Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak). If
we take a look at the latest events and developments in
these two countries we can see many similarities, but also
clear differences, in the underlying causes of these recent
events.

In both countries, the new presidents had to take immediate


steps to stabilise a domestic situation which was in crisis.
In Tunisia the government was in danger of becoming
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 13

unduly involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because


of personal sympathies on the part of members of the
president’s family. This led to radical Islamists threatening
to destabilise Tunisia, spurred on and supported by the
events in Algeria. In Egypt, after the Islamist motivated
assassination, the secular state had to defend its core
and the country had to find its way back to the family of
Arab nations. It was a real achievement to
manage this without turning away from the In Tunisia a growing middle class
West or going back on economic and political took root, while in Egypt too few peo-
ple shared in the prosperity to have
“openings” such as Infitah or the peace a long-term stabilising effect on the
process. These countries continued their country’s political situation.
programme of economic liberalisation which
brought a degree of prosperity, though not for everyone. In
Tunisia a growing middle class took root, while in Egypt too
few people shared in the prosperity to have a long-term
stabilising effect on the country’s political situation.

The presidents’ two monolithic alliances, the RCD and NDP,


also contributed to the fact that there was no real room for
competing parties, because of their exclusivity and close
ties to the president. Indeed, there were times when the
illusion of party politics had to be created. Even vague
hopes of achieving political change through democratically-
run parties were destined to be disappointed.

The two countries followed a similar course in the way


the people were increasingly subjected to repressive
measures. They both declared a state of emergency at
the time of the transfer of power, which they subsequently
never lifted. Repression not only increased, but control of
their citizens infiltrated almost every area of everyday life
thanks to new tools such as the internet and mobile phones.
Nothing remained hidden from the security services: the
“transparent citizen” inescapably became the target of
intimidation and reprisals as soon as he did anything which
caused ripples in ruling circles.

Young people in Arab states were starting to come of age,


largely thanks to the globalisation of the media. Their
sense of frustration mounted, along with their protests
that they were being robbed of their basic human rights
and freedoms. Their barely-controlled anger was soon to
spill over. To make a cycling analogy, it is a sign of the
14 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

excess pressure which has been building up amongst the


youth of the two societies that it only took a tiny hole in the
inner tyre for the whole tyre to go flat. There is no chance
of riding the bike home on a soft tyre – the tyre is flat and
urgently needs to be repaired. A patch is no good; it needs
a whole new inner.

Both presidents and even their secu- The different political constellations in the
rity forces were taken by surprise by two countries now have to deal with current
the outcry. But none of the opposition
parties were prepared for it either. events. Both presidents and even their secu-
rity forces were taken by surprise by the
outcry, but they were not the only ones. None of the oppo-
sition parties were prepared for it, and even the generally
well-organized and well-informed Muslim Brotherhood
were late to jump on the demonstrators’ bandwagon.

So former fighter pilot Hosni Mubarak will not be sneaking


off like his Tunisian counterpart Ben Ali. He still is much
more widely accepted by the majority of the Egyptian
population (though not by the demonstrators in Tahrir
Square) than the flown Tunisian president. But both of
them have already missed their chance to hand over power
with dignity, something which Mubarak certainly deserves
more than Ben Ali. The Egyptian president relies mainly
on his armed forces, while Ben Ali draws on the support
of the (secret) police. In both countries, the army is
generally well-thought-of, while the police have a dreadful
reputation.

In Tunisia it was not just the young unemployed who


wanted to get rid of the president. They were joined in
large numbers by the middle classes who had been
battered by the corruption of the presidential family and
the economic and financial crisis. In Egypt the protest is
mainly being led by angry young people, with the army
and huge state bureaucracy (for the time being) standing
on the sidelines. They have too much to lose if not only
the president but also the whole regime is forced to stand
down. So let us now take a look at some possible scenarios
for future political developments in these two countries.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 15

TUNISIA’S FUTURE SCENARIO

Politics

The understandable attempt by the remaining government


members to hang on to power as the “interim government”
was destined for failure. The fact that the president had
directly and largely voluntarily escaped being sentenced
by the people meant that the Tunisian demonstrators were
looking for other victims of the revolts. It is true that the
RCD party headquarters in Tunis was not damaged as badly
as the NDP’s building in Cairo, but the protesters called for
ministers in league with the RCD and other political officials
to also be “punished”. Leaving the party was no solution,
as politicians remained “contaminated” by their closeness
to the regime. In the end the prime minister
was allowed to lead the government on an New political beliefs need time and
interim basis, only because he agreed that space to reformulate themselves. Time
is also needed to create the constitu-
his role and function were temporary and tional basis for different selection and
that he would not stand for public office. election procedures.

At the moment constitutional requirements are largely


being followed in Tunisia, even though most of them origi-
nated under Ben Ali. So far there are not enough political
parties with close ties to the people to build a true parlia-
mentary democracy. An urgent reorganisation of the (pre-)
political arena is needed before new parliamentary and
presidential elections are held. Unions and professional
associations also need to reinvent themselves, as they are
necessary for the state but have in the past been too close
to the government. In any case, new political beliefs need
time and space to reformulate themselves.

Time is also needed to create the constitutional basis for


different selection and election procedures and to agree on
how to make them the basis of a new political direction.
It now has to be decided how to do this, whether by the
elected parliament, which is now discredited, by a consti-
tutional convention of “elders” or by a round table of all
the political parties. In many, though not all, respects, the
situation in Tunisia can be compared to the break-up of
the GDR.
16 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Economy

Along with the restructuring of political players and


entities it is also necessary to make use of the country’s
quickly-restored stability to get the economy back on
track. Fortunately the tourist resorts have not suffered too
much damage at the hands of the demonstrators. And the
medium-sized contract manufacturers also seem to have
largely survived the protests without too much harm.

The removal of presidential corruption So the signs are good that the country will
will certainly be an important factor in soon regain its former economic strength,
motivating Tunisian businesspeople to
start investing in Tunisia again rather though it will not necessarily be in a position
than predominantly abroad. to immediately remedy all its socio-economic
deficits. The removal of presidential corruption
will certainly be an important factor in motivating Tunisian
businesspeople to start investing in Tunisia again rather
than predominantly abroad. This kind of “patriotic” attitude
will help to speed up the process of economic recovery and
make the change process more focused and rigorous.

Society

The fact that the revolts in Tunisia were caused by the


despairing act of a frustrated IT graduate is symptomatic of
the economic and particularly the demographic challenges
which are currently facing the Arab world. When 50 per
cent of the population of the Arab nations is under 30 and
the Facebook generation of 20-30 year-olds alone makes
up 20 per cent of the population, there is serious potential
for protest. Their different way of communicating means
that most demonstrators are not going to just give in, like
the Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi, but are more likely to
boldly demand their right to a share in economic prosperity
and political decision-making.

The scale of the potential for conflict is even more obvious


if we consider how in Tunisia the ratio of sixty-year-olds
(the power elite) to twenty-year-olds (the youth) is at 2:3,
and in countries like Egypt it is even more pronounced
at 1:4. This provides the potential for long-term protest
or even violence, something which is currently clearly
targeted at the old power elites. Even if the present elite
were to be completely removed from power, there would
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 17

be at least three applicants for every position becoming


vacant in business and society. This means that Tunisian
society cannot feel quite comfortable when facing a future
with an average age of “only” 30. But Tunisia has fewer
potentially frustrated or violent young people than its
neighbours. Countries such as Egypt with an average age
of 24 or Yemen and the Gaza strip with an average age of
17 have even greater concerns.

EGYPT’S FUTURE SCENARIO

Egypt will not find it so easy to get back to normal. There are
various factors which will make the healing process much
more difficult. What happens in Egypt has an enormous
impact on developments in other Arab countries. Of course
not every change in the Arab world originates in Egypt,
but anything new generally only becomes significant for
the whole region once Egypt has adopted it. A democratic
awakening in Sunni countries will doubtless have ramifica-
tions for other Islamic nations.

The political system in Egypt has always been Almost every public position was filled
highly-centralised and bureaucratic, with the by party members. It was impossible
to find a decent job without proof of
civil service, military, various security forces your loyalty to the regime.
and previously even more numerous state-
controlled companies being closely tied in with the ruling
party. Almost every public position was filled by party
members; indeed it was impossible to find a decent job
without proof of your loyalty to the regime.

There could well be a lot of people who have something to


lose – too many perhaps, if their loyalty to the “old” regime
becomes a selection criteria for future political functions
and professional assignments, as the present development
in Tunisia has shown. At the same time in view of the
continuing mass protests, the military as well as the
security forces will play an important, if not a decisive role,
during the political restructuring process.

Ever since the beginning of the republic, every Egyptian


president, who has always had a military background,
embodied the honour and dignity of the military forces. It
is for this reason that the military was not interested in
seeing their “highest” representative, even if he was now
18 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

“civilianised”, chased from his position by some demon-


strators in a most undignified manner. Therefore the newly
installed “Highest Military Council” who implemented the
president’s deprivation of power, announced that the
president had “resigned”, although Mubarak had not ini-
tiated this at all.

When we are talking about “some demonstrators” then


the reason for this is that even 50,000 or 100,000 coura-
geous opponents do not represent the wishes and hopes
of a majority of 80 million Egyptians by a long way. Even
if the protesters’ opinions are getting an
Only free elections can accurately re- impressive amount of coverage in the inter-
flect the preferences of the Egyptian national media, it is only free elections which
people in terms of both policies and
personalities. can accurately reflect the preferences of the
Egyptian people in terms of both policies
and personalities. Care must be taken not to assume that
the opinions of anti-regime demonstrators will necessarily
be mirrored in upcoming elections. These interviews just
present a snapshot and may even be helping to distort the
picture of the real mood prevailing in the country.

This particularly applies to the hopes of new leadership


which are held by the majority of Egyptians, not just
the demonstrators in Tahrir Square. At the moment it is
difficult to really make these out due to the frightening lack
of substance in the opposition’s demands, both in terms
of policy and personnel. The country’s observers have
known for a long time how the country’s (party) political
opposition is totally fragmented, as is still shown both
between and within the opposition parties. The groupings
are always capable of being against something but very
rarely for something.

So the opposition’s view that Mubarak cannot remain in


power cannot hide the fact that there is very little that
unites the protesters in Tahrir Square. And this does not
take into account all those Egyptians who on a daily basis
face quite different problems to those of the predominantly
middle-class students thronging Tahrir Square.

If the aim of the protests is somewhat vague and undefi­


ned, the opposition also lacks a leader who can unite all
the parties  – the same is true in Tunisia. The Egyptian
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 19

Foreign Minister of many years’ standing, Amr Moussa, is


the only one who can claim to be something of a “dissident”
because he resigned his post after differences of opinion
with the president and became Secretary-General of the
Arab League. In this way he distanced himself to some
extent from the Mubarak regime, something which could
stand him in good stead in light of current developments.
Mohamed El Baradei, whose name is constantly mentioned
by the Western media, has won a degree of recognition for
his work and awards, and perhaps holds a certain appeal for
the international public, but he remains largely unknown to
the majority of Egyptians because of his many years spent
abroad. Egyptians who turn their backs on their country for
long periods are still to some extent viewed as “traitors”,
particularly by the many rural Egyptians who feel close
ties to their homeland. He can use the excuse that he was
carrying out international missions, but, unlike the demon-
strators, he cannot claim to have suffered for years at the
hands of the regime. This is why he will not be the one to
lead the liberation movement, despite the hopes of certain
western governments.

This leaves the army and security forces as the main


protagonists who will not allow themselves to be pushed
about by civil society. But when one sees the hatred aroused
by Interior Minister Adli and knows that he and the other
representatives of the security forces are in
agreement over the necessary political steps, It would be reckless to leave the future
it seems doubtful that these forces can really of the insurrection and hence the fu-
ture of the country solely in the hands
meet all the protesters’ demands. It would of the army.
be equally reckless to leave the future of the
insurrection and hence the future of the country solely in
the hands of the army, particularly as a return to autocratic
structures and processes could then not be ruled out. So
there will be no successful outcome without a process of
“reconciliation” between civil and military ways of acting
and thinking. Politicians and military must come together
to lead this country from its current impasse towards a
brighter future.

Many political observers, who assumed that Egypt might


choose to use a “revolutionary council” with executive
powers, as has been practised before, were proven right.
The “round tables” with representatives of the Egyptian
20 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

civilian society, could not develop a permanent strategy,


mainly due to obvious disputes between the various
groups. Instead the “Highest Military Council” suspended
the Egyptian constitution and installed a committee con-
sisting of trusted experts to present a new draft consti-
tution within two weeks, which will be used as a sort of
“transitional constitution” to be brought into force by
a referendum. This will then serve as a basis for new
elections in six months’ time.

The “Highest Military Council” made a resolute decision by


dissolving the present Egyptian government, which was
elected under questionable circumstances and nobody
expected this government to play a constructive role in
the restructuring process of the Egyptian governmental
system.

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD –


CAN THEY TAKE OVER POWER?

One of the great imponderables of this whole restructuring


process in Egypt is of course the possible future role of the
Muslim Brotherhood. The alleged or actual threat to the
Egyptian regime posed by this organisation has for many
years been the main reason why Western governments
have accepted the Egyptian leadership’s “robust” style of
government.

There are wide-ranging views on how ready or able this


group may be to fill the political vacuum which is opening
up and to influence or even determine the
Very few Egyptians who have contact process of political transformation taking
with western representatives admit place in Egypt. For many people, the Egyptian
to being members of the Muslim Brot-
herhood. Muslim Brotherhood is still a black box. Very
few Egyptians who have political contact with
western representatives in Cairo admit to being members
of this organisation which is officially banned but which
has at times often been tolerated by the regime. This is
why the size of its membership remains unclear and it is
hard to assess their potential appeal to voters in a free and
secret ballot.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 21

Many experts believe their election chances are actually


less now than they were a few months ago. This may
be due to the new alternatives which have presented
themselves, but could also be a misapprehension as a
result of clever political manoeuvring on the part of the
Brotherhood. Their behaviour during the current Tahrir
Square protests – where, amazingly, hardly a single Islamic
slogan has been in evidence – should not hide the fact that
Egypt’s long-term political future will not be decided in the
centre of Cairo but rather in a new, freely-elected Egyptian
parliament. Then the young students who are today so
readily providing foreign TV stations with interviews will
certainly find themselves in a minority.

What is more, the Brotherhood has for some time had a


declared strategy which is not geared towards the short
term (legislative terms) but is aimed at the Islamic “infil-
tration” of all political institutions. If we take at face value
their previous successes in various Egyptian professional
association elections, it would seem their strategy has
borne fruit.

It is not absurd to assume that the Brotherhood’s present


impressive restraint is actually a calculated manoeuvre
to allow the Cairo students who are so popular with the
Western media to push through democratic change, which
the Brotherhood can then utilise in order to take over
power in a democratic and hence legitimate way.

At the moment it is equally unknown to what extent


the Brotherhood will cling to their rigid ideology once
they become a political party, or whether a part of the
organisation would be prepared to tread
a parliamentary path similar to that of the Political position papers have been
ruling AKP in Turkey. One thing is certain: presented, which can be traced back
to the Muslim Brotherhood. But clarity
the leaders of this mysterious organisation will only be achieved by the political
have always been very reticent about their dialogue which is to come.
political position whenever they have made
public appearances. Political position papers have of course
been presented by certain representatives in parliament,
which can be traced back to the Muslim Brotherhood. But
clarity will only be achieved by the political dialogue which
is to come.
22 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

However it does not hurt to study these papers if we want


to evaluate the wide spectrum of political opinion which will
soon be asking for the support of the Egyptian electorate.
It is hard to conceive that the aging leaders of the existing
opposition parties could actually be effective in countering
this well-organised and ideologically hardened movement
in a way that is ideologically consistent and which promises
results.

It seems more realistic that the new Egyptian government


will include representatives of the army and security
services and that as a result some of this body’s many
privileges will be retained, at least for the time being. It
is equally questionable whether it the old generals will still
have an influence in this direct transition phase. Younger
army officers would be better placed to record the new
constructive distance to the political process than those old
generals who just a few days ago had to appear on state
television alongside the embattled president.

NDP representatives will find it difficult to exert any political


influence in future. There seems little chance that the old
regime’s great white hope, the president’s son and head of
the NDP political committee, Gamal Mubarak, will have a
future role to play.

THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY

The future of the Egyptian economy has, at least for the


time being, been overshadowed by the latest protests.
The recent chaos has led to property and assets being
destroyed, not only in Cairo, and many small and medium-
sized businesses have fallen prey to vandalism and looting.
These businesses have formed the backbone
The country’s position as the third lar- of Egypt’s astonishingly robust economic
gest Arab economy is in acute danger. growth over the last few years. The country’s
Economic growth rates of up to seven
per cent will be hard to emulate. position as the third largest Arab economy,
built up as a result of the former Nacif-led
government’s economically liberal policies, is now in acute
danger. Economic growth rates of up to seven per cent
(more recently five per cent) will be hard to emulate,
and then only with foreign assistance. The depressing
experiences of young Egyptian businessmen during the
protests need to be converted into new hope and a new
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 23

readiness to engage and invest. The support of domestic


and international banks and new lending will be required to
save these businesses and encourage new start-ups. A lot
will depend on how the international financial institutions
assess the crisis and what happens next. It will be impos-
sible to avoid the country’s credit rating being downgraded
in the medium term, along with a slide in the Egyptian
stock exchange and significant weakening of the Egyptian
currency.

All this can and will make it much more difficult, if not
impossible, to start on the country’s urgently-needed
economic revival, unless the international community
decides now to support Egypt with all the economic means
at its disposal. Without some kind of “Marshall Plan” the
Egyptian banking sector will be totally overextended in
trying to finance the reconstruction.

A future role will also be sought for representatives of


the Egyptian (private) economy who are not tainted by
corruption. Along with their political comrades-in-arms,
they will have to shoulder equal respon-
sibility for keeping the ship of state afloat. Egypt will only be able to create a new
Egypt will only be able to create a new political order without running into
conflict if it can guarantee the survival
political order without running into conflict if of its industry and tourism.
it can guarantee the survival of its industry
and tourism. Without this, there is the danger that radical
autocrats of every hue could once again take control as
a result of a widespread economic crisis in the country.
But it is also clear that economic growth and the resulting
prosperity cannot be limited to the few as has happened in
the past. It is true that the government, and particularly
the president, fought for years against the IMF’s demands
to cut subsidies on basic foodstuffs and energy, thus saving
the majority of the population from suffering a drop in their
standard of living, but state-controlled wages could rarely
keep up with inflation. This prepared the ground for the
present insurrections.

Any new Egyptian government will have to find flexible


ways to confront corruption and the continuing close ties
between the political and economic oligarchies. Egypt
can only look forward to a bright future if there is a fairer
distribution of income and assets which allows the “simple
24 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Egyptian” to also benefit in a material way from all the


upheavals which are taking place.

THE POSITION OF THE COPTIC CHRISTIANS

Any future democratic government in Egypt will face a


particular challenge in dealing with the question of relations
between the Muslim majority and the Coptic Christian
minority. In light of recent attacks on Coptic Christians it
will be necessary to calm the situation and at least return
to a peaceful co-existence, even if an equal cooperation is
not on the cards.

The previous administration under President Mubarak stood


up for the Copts’ right to religious freedom and managed
to give them protection, even if it was unable to prevent
every attack. It is debatable whether this minority would
get better treatment under a democratic system. It mainly
depends on the denominational make-up and direction of
the new democratic political institutions and
It is not clear to what extent a politi- government bodies. A request for dialogue
cally-strengthened Muslim Brotherhood with the Muslim Brotherhood without offering
would be prepared to guarantee the
Coptic minority the same rights granted the Coptic minority the same opportunity or
to them by the previous administration. at least consciously involving them would
prove that the religious minority’s represent-
atives were laying claim to special rights. At the moment
it is not clear to what extent a politically-strengthened
Muslim Brotherhood would be prepared to guarantee the
Coptic minority the same rights and protections granted to
them by the previous administration.

REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE ARAB WORLD

It was to be expected that the events in Tunisia and now


also in Egypt would lead to demonstrations in other Arab
countries. After all, the political and socio-economic frame-
works in these countries are not much different to those
of Tunisia and Egypt. At the same time many independent
observers were predicting that events would unfold in a
similar way to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in Europe.
And while that possibility cannot be excluded, there is also
good reason to suppose that there will not actually be such
a direct domino effect. It is more likely that we will see a
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 25

more flexible but nonetheless serious reaction by individual


regimes to the latest developments that have taken place.

What is clear is that the former Tunisian president Ben Ali


did his colleagues in power no real favours when he fled
the county so quickly. What will be interesting to see will
be how the Saudi leadership reacts to his apparent request
for asylum, bearing in mind that an international warrant
has been issued for his arrest.

His current temporary asylum could be a double-edged


sword for Saudi Arabia as it cannot fall back on the old
argument that they should protect Muslim rulers from
“retribution by non-Muslims”, as they did with Idi Amin.
However, to protect a Muslim “thief”, who is not particularly
well-known for his religious beliefs, from his equally Muslim
“victims” and to offer him long-term sanctuary, could
prove to be a difficult undertaking, even if the reasons for
doing so are clearly apparent. Taking the example of the
Egyptian leadership’s behaviour towards the Persian Shah
Pahlevi is not really going to help the Saudi leaders.

If they do eventually hand over Ben Ali, Commenting on the recent develop-
it could prove to be a destabilising loss of ments in Egypt, Iran’s revolutionary
leader Khameini indirectly positioned
face for the Saudi leadership. It has to be himself on the side of the demons-
assumed that Iran, their biggest competitors trators.
for hegemony in the region, would be more
than happy to exploit this situation if it arose. Commenting
on the recent developments in Egypt, Iran’s revolutionary
leader Khameini indirectly positioned himself on the side of
the demonstrators, even though they have little common
ground, by suggesting that there was clearly an Islami-
sation of the Egyptian people underway. The Egyptian
leadership were furious at this attempt to interfere in the
country’s internal affairs.

The present situation of the former Egyptian president


is, however, a different matter. It is assumed that he was
forced to resign against his expressive wish and was placed
under house arrest in his villa in Sharm el-Sheikh by the
“Highest Military Council”. It is obvious that the change of
power in form of a military coup was not constitutional,
however, since the “Highest Military Council“ suspended the
26 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

constitution meanwhile, this has become irrelevant. There


are rumours about Mubarak, being deeply disappointed­by
“his” generals, is at present refusing to take his medication
following an operation in Germany. According to some
Arabic press releases he has secretly been taken to receive
medical treatment, possibly in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.

Amongst Tunisia and Egypt’s neighbouring states, it is


Yemen that seems most at risk of losing its last vestiges of
internal stability. This may well be the reason for the hasty
announcement by Yemen’s president that, in contrast to
his earlier declared intentions, he will now no longer stand
for another term of office in 2013. In doing so he was
basically offering to go along with what is still an uncertain
process of change and to give it some kind of organisa-
tional framework.

The situation in the former “socialist” inspired republics of


Algeria and Syria is somewhat different. Here too there
have been demonstrations, but the demonstrators’ griev-
ances have been less about the country’s leadership than
about socio-economic issues and the need to address
them. (So far) there has not been sufficient revolutionary
impetus in these countries for these demonstrations to
pose a direct threat to the governments themselves. The
state security apparatus in both countries would have soon
put a stop to that anyway. The demands of the protesters,
which were much less potentially explosive than in other
Arab countries, and which were possibly even initiated
by the governments themselves, or at least controlled by
them, were met by the regimes with a sudden lowering of
prices and a raising of subsidies that took the wind out of
the sails of the protests.

In Jordan and Morocco, there is certainly The Arab monarchies, particularly Jordan and
more serious political frustration hidden Morocco, seem even less threatened by the
behind the social and economic prob-
lems, but it collides with the loyalty domino effect. As in the past, the controlled
which is still afforded to the monarchy. protests were aimed at economic problems
and their governments, which have much
less influence on the stability of these countries. As a result
the rulers were able to soothe the unrest in the population
by making a few cosmetic changes. There is certainly more
serious political frustration hidden behind the social and
economic problems which were brought to the fore, but
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 27

it collides with the loyalty which is still afforded to the


monarchy in these countries. What is more, the security
forces in these countries, particularly the army, are solidly
behind the monarchy and not on the side of the people, a
result of its composition and methods of recruiting high-
ranking officers.

The Libyan regime seems also to be provoked not only just


by the confusing statements of its “revolutionary leader”
Ghaddafi. Whether the still ongoing demonstrations in the
country will reach the “critical mass” to represent a serious
threat to Ghaddafi, who has been in power for more than
40 years, remains to be seen. Just as other autocrats in
the region before him, he recently successfully suppressed
revolts originating in Bengasi with military force.

REPERCUSSIONS FOR ISRAEL

A look at the potential impact of events in Tunisia and Egypt


on the region as a whole would not be complete without
considering Israel’s situation and its possible reactions to
what is happening. It is clear to every political observer in
the region that the current destabilisation of the “southern
front” increases the likelihood of another war on two fronts.

After the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and


the international intervention in Iraq, Israel was able to
concentrate on the military threats from the “north”, that
is to say the direct threat from Lebanon and Syria as well
as the indirect threat from Iran. While it is true that there
was still a threat from the Gaza strip, this
did not really require any strategic change Israel must be aware of the fact that
to the country’s defence efforts. However, “democratisation” in Egypt will mean
that their relationship will become more
depending on how events unfold, especially of an issue in future debates between
in Egypt, a strategic change may now prove the various political camps in Egypt.
to be necessary.

Even Israel must be aware of the fact that further


“demo­cratisation” in Egypt will mean that the relationship
between Egypt and Israel will become more of an issue
in future debates between the various political camps in
Egypt. This will not be a major problem for Israel if these
debates are confined to democratic institutions such as
parliament or the government. However, if this central
28 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

foreign policy issue becomes a political football during a


democratic election, there could be incalculable conse-
quences for Israeli-Egyptian relations. It is well known that
a majority of the Egyptian people are against the idea of
peace with Israel and in the past have repeatedly called for
the cancellation of the peace agreement with Israel, the
expulsion of Israeli embassy staff or even the (eventual)
closure of the embassy itself. These sorts of demands
have always been popular in Egypt and it would be very
surprising if there are no factions which take up these
issues in future democratic election debates.

Israeli observers’ biggest reservation about whether the


Muslim Brotherhood should be officially recognised is
based on the realisation that, should the Brotherhood be
allowed to take part in democratic elections as a recog-
nised political party, they would bring their well known
critical opinions of Israel (which is putting it mildly) into
the debate to try and gain support from large numbers of
Egyptian voters. There could be untold consequences. Even
if only 20-30 per cent of members of a future parliament
held similar views, which is a best-case scenario, it would
not be possible for any Egyptian coalition government to
avoid having to change the current foreign
It is very unlikely that there will be a policy approach to dealings with Israel. And
parliamentary majority for one faction in future it seems very likely that Egypt will
in the Egyptian parliament due to the
expected number of new parties that have a coalition government along the lines
will be formed. of that in Lebanon. It is very unlikely that
there will be a parliamentary majority for one faction in
the Egyptian parliament due to the expected number of
new parties that will be formed. The founding of a party
political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood is just as likely as
the creation of a Coptic party.

The Israelis are well aware of all this, which is why they
have so far been very cautious in their statements about
the “democratic movement” in Egypt and other Arab
states. While it is true that democracies tend not to turn to
war as often (or as quickly) as dictators, especially against
other democracies, it is also true that an Arab dictator who
is “sick of war” is still better for Israel than a “bloodthirsty”
Arab majority.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 29

The Israeli leadership is also fully aware that if a future


democratically-elected Egyptian government decides to
scrap the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, then Jordan will
be forced to follow suit in order for its regime to hold on
to power. If this happens then all the successful attempts
over recent decades to create stability in the region will be
lost and Israel’s future will be as uncertain as it was before.

However, many observers are more optimistic and believe


that there will in fact be a relaxation of relations as the
practice of many despotic Arab regimes to use criticism
of Israel’s policies as a convenient way of providing an
outlet for the totally unrelated frustrations of people
in their countries will come to an end. The hope is that,
at the point where genuine internal political and socio-
economical problems start to dominate political debate
in Arab countries that are going through the process of
democratisation, foreign policy issues and relations with
Israel in particular will start to disappear from the front
pages of newspapers. Whether this is just a pipe-dream
remains to be seen.

CONCLUSION

This article is not meant to give the impression that the


demands of sections of the Egyptian population for more
freedom and justice and a change in the political order
towards democracy and the rule of law is not universally
popular. There is no doubt that such changes were long
overdue and that the established regimes, especially in
Egypt, have not shown sufficient willingness to introduce
the kind of reforms necessary to lead their countries out of
the quagmire of unresolved succession issues and political
reform processes.

They are now facing a much more difficult and How to structure this change and
wide-reaching change to the political order. achieve a successful transition in a
peaceful way is the task which is now
How to structure this change and achieve a facing everyone, especially those in
successful transition in a peaceful way is the political office.
task which is now facing everyone, especially
those in political office, but also all the new players on the
stage. The people started this process with their demands
for freedom and democracy, and at the end of the day they
will be the ones who will bring it to its natural conclusion.
30 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

The accusations by die-hards that recent events had been


instigated by radical fundamentalists in collaboration with
the usual “foreign enemies” and with the help of naive,
innocent citizens in order to bring down the regime, have
been rejected by most observers as typical self-serving
fabrications by the government.

What the American government has failed to do in eight


years, namely to force the Egyptian president to introduce
comprehensive reforms, has been achieved in eight days
by brave citizens who have overcome their normal apathy.
This just goes to prove that the influence of outsiders
and the supposed omnipotence of autocrats are in fact
relative. Many of those in positions of power in the region
will be rightly concerned about this and will hopefully be
encouraged to introduce reforms of their own.

Offering unsolicited advice or trying While foreign countries may talk about their
to get involved in the political pro- hopes and concerns, it will be the key players
cess from the outside is not going to
help. The Tunisian and Egyptian peo- in the effected countries themselves who will
ple would not be prepared tolerate it be responsible for the political developments
anyway.
to come. Offering unsolicited advice or trying
to get involved in the political process from the outside is
not going to help, and the Tunisian and Egyptian people
would not be prepared tolerate it anyway.

Dignity and pride, together with a new-found self-confi-


dence will be what drive the internal process until that
point is reached where the representatives of the new
political order are happy to discuss their hopes and ideas
with other countries. It is conceivable that Egypt will not be
able to deal with all these upheavals on its own or without
the help of other countries or financial assistance. Egypt’s
economy may need to be helped just as much as the new
democratic order within the (pre-) political arena. The
necessary new elections will require fundamental as well
as legislative change. They can only take place once the
new democratic political players have consolidated their
positions to such an extent that they can compete not only
with the well-organized Muslim Brotherhood, but also with
those who profited from the old political order and who will
surely have regrouped by the time of the elections.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 31

In this respect there is now an opportunity, especially for


Europe, to play a constructive part in the change process
and to give a fresh impetus to those institutions and instru-
ments of Mediterranean politics that have been created in
recent times. Germany, along with other East European
countries, still has fresh memories of experiencing similar
political upheavals. Obviously not every step along the
path of change will be the same, and not every instrument
will be suited to this very different cultural and religious
frame of reference, but that does not mean they are totally
irrelevant. It is now for the Egyptians to decide whether
and to what extent they want to accept the help that is
offered. They should not have to wait long for these offers
of help to arrive.
32 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

SOUTHERN SUDAN BEFORE


INDEPENDENCE
LOCAL CELEBRATIONS, DISAPPOINTMENT IN
NORTHERN SUDAN AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERN

Dr. Martin Pabst is


Martin Pabst
a freelance political
scientist based in
Munich who specia-
lizes in Sub-Saharan
Africa. In 2008 a new After the people of Southern Sudan voted overwhelmingly
edition of his book in favour of an independent state in the recent referen­dum,
“South Africa” was
the new state is expected to be established on July 9,
published by C.H.
Beck as part of their 2011. 55 years after independence, Sudan is now to be
series “Länder”. split in two, and the regional balance of power must be
established all over again.

The decolonisation of Sub-Saharan Africa began with Sudan


being granted independence on January 1, 1956. The
number of new countries grew rapidly. The Organisation of
African Unity, founded in 1963, was at pains to avoid the
continent becoming a plethora of tiny states and one year
after being established it spoke out in favour of retaining
the old colonial borders. Both the superpowers and the
old colonial powers feared there would be uncontrolled
destabilisation, so they supported the territorial integrity
of the new states, even when they were ruled by dicta-
torial regimes, and discriminated against particular ethnic
groups and outlying regions.1 Until 1990 there were no
successful attempts at secession. In this year the process
of decolonisation was completed with the acceptance of
Namibia as the 151st member of the United Nations.

The stability which was largely maintained externally


during the East-West conflict was now clearly a thing of

1 | There are few exceptions to the rule. From 1960-1963 Belgium


made significant efforts to help Katanga split away from the
Congo, and France provided clandestine military support to
Biafra when it broke away from Nigeria between 1967-1970.
Both these secessions were driven by European support, but
in the end were put down by the central governments.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 33

the past. Today the international community has to deal


with a Sub-Saharan Africa characterized by “failed states”,
insurrections and civil wars, the plundering of resources,
massive human rights abuse, piracy and secessions. In
1991 Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia
and today is a de-facto state which is waiting for diplo-
matic recognition. In 1993 Eritrea split away
from Ethiopia after a referendum which was Now the first African country to gain
recognized by the international community. independence, is the subject of seces-
sion. After a long conflict, Christian
Now the first country to gain independence, Southern Sudan is splitting away from
Sudan, is itself the subject of secession. the Islamic North.
After a long conflict, Christian/Animist black
African Southern Sudan is splitting away from the Arab/
Islamic North. The biggest country in Africa (2,5 million
km² and 39 million inhabitants) will lose 620,000 km² of
its territory, around 9 million inhabitants, three-quarters
of its oil reserves and large areas of fertile agricultural and
grazing land.

The international community is watching developments in


Sudan with some concern. In the short term it is feared
that the North will resort to force to prevent a secession
which is so detrimental to its interests. In the medium
term there is the threat of destabilisation in both of the
new states, with a worst-case scenario of further territorial
disintegration. The international community is also wary
of the long-term effects of Southern Sudan’s secession.
Will it encourage secession movements in the north-east
and other areas of Africa? Will the dividing lines between
black Africa and Arab/Muslim Africa become even more
pronounced? Will Jihadists use the developments in Sudan
to their own ends and make Sub-Saharan Africa a favoured
field of operation?

NORTH VERSUS SOUTH – THE PERENNIAL


CONFLICT IN SUDAN’S HISTORY

In Khartoum there is disappointment about the South’s


“secession”. Many Northern Sudanese suspect it is part of
a Western-led conspiracy  – hardly anyone is prepared to
accept that they may themselves bear some responsibility
for the situation. In contrast, the Southern Sudanese are
celebrating their “independence” from Khartoum, which
they consider to be a foreign and autocratic regime. For
34 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

them, the process of decolonisation is only now coming


to an end, a view which is echoed by many Africans from
Nairobi to Cape Town.

The rift between North and South is far deeper than


many international observers ever realised. The Southern
Sudanese suffered greatly in the 19th century. Under the
rule of the Egyptian-Ottoman Khedive (1821-81), slave
hunters made forays into their villages. The Mahdi regime
which ruled from Khartoum from 1881-99 introduced
Sharia law into Southern Sudan and tried to forcibly
convert the “infidel” to Islam.

During the Anglo-Egypt Condominium (1899-1955)


Southern Sudan was administered separately from the
North and largely isolated. Northern Sudanese and
foreigners needed special permits to enter the “closed
districts” of the South. English, rather than Arabic, was
the language of administration and schools, and Christian
missionaries were encouraged, while the advance of Islam
was halted. London invested in strategic regions of the
North and shielded the Southern Sudanese population, who
still lived in their traditional ways, from the encroachment
of the modern world. Although it was not the
At the Juba Conference in 1947 the sole administrative power in Sudan, Great
British government made a momen- Britain planned to add Southern Sudan to
tous U-turn: from now on they would
advance Sudan’s independence as a its East African colonies, in line with a 1930
single political entity. directive.

However, at the Juba Conference in 1947 the British


government made a momentous U-turn: from now on they
would advance Sudan’s independence as a single political
entity. And the less-developed South was now taken in
hand. The lack of qualified local people meant that civil
servants were sent in from the North, which encouraged
the spread of Arab language and culture.

The Southern Sudanese were not represented at the Juba


Conference and were not asked for their opinion. Many of
them feared the North would take control and soon out-
number them. They placed their hopes in a federal struc-
ture, which was promised by the British, but when Sudan
was granted independence on January 1, 1956 Northern
Sudan set about building a centralised government. Over
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 35

the next five decades the rulers in Khartoum constantly


tried to foist a single identity upon the country, first Arab
nationalist, then Arab socialist and finally Arab Islamist.

They also broke the promise made at independence that


all areas of the country would be developed equally. Today
there are immense differences, as can be seen in the
following example. In 2006 86.3 per cent of all children in
the state of Khartoum attended primary school, in Sinnar
66.6 per cent, in South Kurdufan 53.3 per cent, and in
West Darfur 46.4 per cent. The figures are even worse
for the South: Central Equatoria, which contains Juba, the
capital of Southern Sudan, had 43.0 per cent, with neigh-
bouring East Equatoria at only 13.9 per cent. Bringing up
the rear were Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Unity with 5.7
per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively (country average:
53.7 per cent).2

Just like in the period of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium,


investment and development projects were focused on
the Dongola/Sinnar/Kosti triangle with the Khartoum-
Omdurman conurbation at its centre. In 2005, in a paper
delivered to the ruling National Congress Party (NCP),
Finance Minister Abdul Rahim Hamdi proposed to continue
with this strategy.

Since independence, the ranks of Sudan’s political and


economic elite have been drawn from three ethnic groups
based to the north of Khartoum: the Ja’aliyyin, Shaigiya
and Danagla, which together make up five per cent of the
Sudanese population. General Umar al-Bashir, who took
over the country’s presidency following a military coup in
1989, is a Ja’aliyyin, and Vice-President Ali Osman Taha
is a Shaigiya. The long-standing leaders of the opposition
parties in Khartoum are also members of these ethnic
groups. The political and economic elite justify their
pre-eminence by stressing their “pure Arab ancestry”, with
the Ja’aliyyin even claiming they belong to the tribe of the
Prophet Mohammed, the Quraysh.3 However, it is clearly

2 | Summary Table of Findings. Sudan Household Health Survey


(SHHS) and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) indicators,
Sudan, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/pdf/pn/SHHS
report.pdf (accessed January 20, 2011).
3 | The Southern Sudanese call the unpopular Northern elite
“jellaba” after their traditional Arab robes.
36 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

visible that most Arab-speaking ethnic groups in Northern


Sudan are of mixed Arab-African descent.

In Sudan, skin colour and religion are factors which deter-


mine access to prestige, power and resources. At the top
of the pyramid are light-skinned, Arabic-speaking Muslims,
in the middle come black African Muslims, and right at the
bottom of the pile are the black African Christians and Ani-
mists. Even today it happens that the Northern Sudanese
inflame their black African compatriots by using discrimi-
natory terms such as “kufr” (infidel) or “abid” (slave).

The power of the small central elite was consolidated by


building alliances with local leaders in the outlying regions
and through the co-option or corruption of representatives
from other ethnic groups. If necessary, Khartoum stirred
up unrest and recruited auxiliary forces in the outlying
regions. It made little difference whether power was in the
hands of democrats, single party rulers or generals.

As sceptical British administrators had prophesied,


resistance broke out in Southern Sudan against the single
state, even before independence in 1955. At first the rebels
demanded a federal system, then later independence for
Southern Sudan which they called “Azania”, the Latin name
for East Africa. The Anya Nya (“snake poison”) were left
to wage a fierce war against the greatly-superior forces
of the North. In 1972 a peace treaty was agreed in Addis
Ababa which granted Southern Sudan autonomy and self-
government. The Anya Nya were incorporated into the
army.

The people of Southern Sudan enjoyed a short period


of peace and development during the 1970s, and the
University of Juba was established. But
The declaration of Southern Sudanese when the socialist head of state General
autonomy in 1983 and the rollout of Jaafar Mohammed al-Nimeiri reconciled
Sharia law across the whole country
brought a new outbreak of resistance. with the conservative Islamist Umma Party
and the Islamist Muslim Brothers in 1977 it
was another nail in Southern Sudan’s coffin. The cancel-
lation of Southern Sudanese autonomy in 1983 and the
rollout of Sharia law across the whole country brought
a new outbreak of resistance. Sharia law also extended
to non-Muslims, bringing with it not only an alcohol ban,
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 37

corporal punishment and a strictly-enforced dress code


but it also affected the education system, the allocation of
land, the economy and banking systems.

The newly-formed Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/


Army (SPLM/A) also fought against large-scale economic
projects which served the interests of the centre but which
threatened the homes and livelihoods of local people and
were environmentally damaging, such as the exploitation
of Southern Sudanese oil and the construction of the
Jonglei canal through the vast swamps of the White Nile
(the Sudd).

After the Islamist military coup led by General Umar


al-Bashir and chief ideologist Sheikh Hasan al-Turabi in
1989, the North/South civil war became increasingly
brutal. The rulers in Khartoum tightened up Sharia law,
declared “Holy War” on the “infidels” in 1992 and recruited
fanaticised young men to their newly-created militia, the
“Popular Defence Forces“ (PDF). They also escalated the
war to include the Nuba mountains in South Kordofan,
north of the North/South divide. This area was settled
by the black African, mainly Muslim Nuba. As some of
the Nuba sympathised with the insurgents in Southern
Sudan, Khartoum declared war on them as a whole, using
the same methods of attack in the Nuba mountains and
Southern Sudan as they were later to use in Darfur: violent
evictions and expulsions, air force bombing of civilians, the
systematic starvation of whole regions, and the recruitment
of militias with orders to plunder and rape.

The SPLM/A were not fighting for indepen- SPLM/A leader John Garang de Mabior,
dence, but for a reformed “New Sudan”  – a Dinka from Southern Sudan, fought
for a socialist, secular and united Su-
which is why the freedom movement’s name dan.
did not include the word “South”. The SPLM/A
leader John Garang de Mabior, a Dinka from Southern
Sudan, became interested in Marxism during his time as
a lecturer in Tanzania and he fought for a socialist, secular
Sudan which guaranteed all its citizens equal access to
power and resources. He had no time for nationalism based
along ethnic and cultural lines, and as a former colonel in
the Sudanese army his thinking was rooted in the idea
of a united Sudan. He led the liberation movement with
a rod of iron, allowing no different opinions. But many of
38 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

his followers still wanted independence, as did other rival


liberation movements in Southern Sudan.

In 1995 the SPLM joined with the banned Northern


Sudan opposition parties and became part of the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA). This meant they were also a
factor in Northern Sudanese politics, and they garnered
support among Southern Sudanese living in the North
and among reform-minded Northerners. From 1997 the
SPLM/A put pressure on the government by opening up
a second front in the east. They joined with Northern
Sudanese resistance groups and Eritrean troops to fight
against the Khartoum government.

Despite its oil income, Sudan had huge debts and by the
end of the 1990s it could no longer sustain the enormous
cost of the war, which was running at one to two million
U.S. dollars per day. The SPLA were also constantly
making successful guerrilla strikes on oilfields, pipelines
and roads. In 1999 President Umar al-Bashir offered the
rebels peace talks and even dangled the
possibility of secession. Peace negotiations
A series of protocols on specific issues started in Kenya in 2002 under the auspices
finally resulted in the Comprehensive of the regional organisation, the Inter-
Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9,
2005. The UN Security Council had governmental Authority on Development
shown their support for the agreement (IGAD). Led by the USA, the international
in a special meeting in Nairobi.
community strongly promoted peace, as the
humanitarian consequences of the war had
been catastrophic. Between 1983 and 2005 more than two
million people were killed and four million were driven from
their homes. A series of protocols on specific issues finally
resulted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on
January 9, 2005. The UN Security Council had shown their
support for the agreement in a unique meeting in Nairobi
(UNSR-Resolution 1574 dated November 19, 2004). The
UN, the African Union, the Arab League, the IGAD, the EU,
Egypt, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Great Britain and
the USA signed the Agreement as guarantors. A military
and civil peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Mission
in Sudan (UNMIS) was sent to offer support during the
transition period from 2005 to 2011.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 39

HOW NATIONAL UNITY WAS FRITTERED AWAY

At the commencement of peace talks in 2002, the notion of


national unity was still a promising possibility. Both sides,
Garang’s SPLM and the NCP of President al-Bashir, were in
favour of this goal, which also took into account economic
realities. Negotiations were based on the IGAD Declaration
of Principles of July 20, 1994, which was accepted by both
parties and which granted the people of Southern Sudan
the right to determine their future political status through
a referendum. However its declared priority was the unity
of Sudan and there was no mention of the right to secede.

After 2002, a variety of factors led to the goal of national


unity fading more and more into the background and to
developments focusing increasingly on the secession of
Southern Sudan. The refusal of the NCP government to
give up Sharia law in Northern Sudan  – in contravention
of the IGAD Declaration of Principles which it had ratified
in 1997  – had the most far-reaching consequences. The
Declaration stated: “Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic,
multi-religious and multi-cultural society.
Full recognition and accommodation of these The NCP asserted that Sharia was
diversities must be affirmed. [...] A secular still the most important legal basis in
Northern Sudan. Without a separation
and democratic state must be established in of religion and state, national unity
the Sudan. Freedom of belief and worship would cease to be an attractive option
for the Southern Sudanese people.
and religious practice shall be guaranteed
in full to all Sudanese citizens. State and
religion shall be separated. The basis of personal and
family laws can be religion and customs.”4 Despite this,
the NCP asserted in the CPA that Sharia was still the most
important legal basis in Northern Sudan and any Christian
or Animist Southern Sudanese people who lived there were
merely exempted from it during the interim phase. Without
a separation of religion and state, national unity ceased to
be an attractive option for the Southern Sudanese people.

Garang had previously had the right to secession enshrined


in the first agreement in 2002 – not because this was his
preferred solution but because he wanted to keep it as
a fall-back position. Garang did not trust Khartoum after
their earlier broken promises, and he insisted on retaining

4 | Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought (former name of


the IGAD, MP): Declaration of Principles, July 20, 1994.
40 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

two effective bargaining chips in the CPA: the continuance


of his military arm the SPLA until the end of the transition
phase, and the right to secession subsequent to a refer-
endum on self-determination. However the first item 1.1
of the CPA made national unity the priority for the two
parties, in line with the IGAD Declaration of Principles, and
in item 1.5 they agreed an undertaking to sweep aside
historical differences in the way growth and resources
were distributed in order to make unity more attractive.5

When John Garang was killed in a helicopter accident on


July 30, 2005 the Southern Sudanese lost their strongest
advocate for national unity. His successor and former
deputy Salva Kiir Mayardit was more inclined towards
secession. As the interim Vice President of Sudan he
hardly appeared in public but instead concentrated on
his job as President of autonomous Southern Sudan. The
SPLM sent their B-team to sit in the multi-party transitional
government in Khartoum, and their performance was
correspondingly bland. In contrast to the weak Northern
Sudanese opposition, the SPLM-North led
An alliance between the Southern Su- by the Arabic-speaking Muslim Yasir Arman
danese, marginalised areas of Northern could have proved to be a dynamic force. An
Sudan and the opposition in Khartoum
would create a political heavyweight. alliance between the Southern Sudanese,
margina­lised areas of Northern Sudan and
the opposition in Khartoum would create a political heavy-
weight. Garang’s triumphant reception in Khartoum on July
9, 2005 was unforgettable – after so many years away he
was welcomed by hundreds of thousands of people from
both South and North.

The NCP’s policies during the transition period between


2005 and 2011 finally put paid to all hopes of national
unity. The democratic reforms stipulated in the CPA failed
to materialise, as did the development projects promised
for the whole country. Clearly the NCP felt it was more
important to hold onto power in Northern Sudan than
to win the people of Southern Sudan over to the idea of
national unity. Even neighbouring Egypt, strong supporter

5 | The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between The Govern-


ment Of The Republic of The Sudan And The Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/ Sudan People’s Liberation Army,
Naivasha January 9, 2005. These framework conditions had
already been agreed on 26.5.2002 in the Machakos Protocol,
which formed part of the CPA.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 41

of Khartoum and advocate of Sudanese unity, criticized


the al-Bashir government for its failure to make unity
attractive.

Against this backdrop, the Southern Sudanese can hardly


be blamed for voting for secession in huge numbers. This
vote cannot only be explained in terms of the
desire for prestige among SPLM politicians, Over the last six years Khartoum had
nationalist hysteria and (unrealistic) expec- finally frittered away the trust of the
people of Southern Sudan. Their desire
tations of rapid economic improvements, for their own nation reflected their
though of course these factors played their existential need for respect and dignity.
part. Over the last six years Khartoum had
finally frittered away the trust of the people of Southern
Sudan. Their desire for their own nation reflected their
existential need for respect and dignity, which had been
denied them for decades by the North. This is what fired
up the Southern Sudanese people to cast their votes in the
referendum.6

THE PROGRESS AND OUTCOME OF THE REFERENDUM

The referendum was organised by the Southern Sudan


Referendum Commission (SSRC), a body which is
independent of both the Sudanese government and the
autonomous government of Southern Sudan. All citizens
who had reached the age of 18 and were “of sound mind”
were eligible to vote, as set out in the Southern Sudan
Referendum Act of 2009. Voters had to prove that one of
their parents came from one of Southern Sudan’s native
ethnic groups which had been domiciled in Southern Sudan
before or on January 1, 1956, or that their ancestors could
be traced back to these ethnic groups. People were also
allowed to vote if they, their parents or grandparents had
lived continuously in Southern Sudan since January 1,
1956.

Polling stations were set up in Southern Sudan, Northern


Sudan and in eight countries with appreciable Southern
Sudanese populations (Egypt, Ethiopia, Australia, Canada,
Kenya, Uganda, USA, UK). The choice was between unity

6 | In Juba a story went round that an illiterate man had confused


the symbols on the voting slip and inadvertently voted for
unity. It was said that he was so upset that he committed
suicide the next day.
42 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

and secession. For the result to be valid there had to be a


60 per cent turnout of registered voters and one of the two
alternatives had to win more than 50 per cent of the vote.
During voter registration from November 15 to December
8, 2010, more than 3.7 million people were found to be
eligible to vote in Southern Sudan, 116,000 in Northern
Sudan and 60,000 overseas. In view of the fact that 1.5
to 2 million Southern Sudanese live in Northern Sudan,
the number of registered voters was astonishingly low.
It seems that most people decided to travel to Southern
Sudan for the vote because they were afraid of government
pressure. It is also clear that there was no attempt to inflate
the numbers of eligible voters in Northern Sudan. It was
feared that the government in Khartoum would try various
tricks including falsifying documents in order to increase
the numbers of unity supporters who did not come from
Southern Sudan.

Internal and external observer missi- The referendum took place between January
ons judged the process to be “free and 9 and 15, 2011 and went off peacefully.
fair”. A turnout of 60 per cent was hit
within three days. Internal and external observer missions
judged the process to be “free and fair”. A
turnout of 60 per cent was hit within three days; indeed
97.6 per cent of registered voters cast their vote.

There was a landslide majority of 98.8 per cent in favour


of secession. An exception to this was the partial result in
Northern Sudan, where 57.65 per cent voted for secession
and 42.35 for unity. The split was probably between those
Southern Sudanese who were planning to return home and
those who wanted to stay in the North and who feared
they would be personally disadvantaged by secession.
In fact they are in danger of discrimination, and possibly
even violence and expulsion, as happened to the Ibos in
Northern Nigeria during Biafra’s secession.

In accordance with the Southern Sudan Referendum Act,


the parties have to clear up all disputed issues relating to
their bilateral existence before the expiry of the CPA. Then
the independent state of Southern Sudan can be estab-
lished on July 9, 2011.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 43

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT?

There is much international speculation as to whether


Northern Sudan will accept the South’s secession or
whether it will try to prevent it by force. Khartoum made
a contractual agreement to accept secession in the event
of a valid referendum result, but secession will mean the
loss of three-quarters of its oil reserves. According to the
IMF, in 2008 oil made up 95 per cent of Sudanese exports
and 60 per cent of the state’s income. There are fears that
Khartoum will use military force to prevent the South’s
secession or at least to seize control of the lucrative
oilfields south of the North/South dividing line.

But Khartoum has already missed its best opportunity


for military intervention  – it should have prevented the
referendum taking place. In view of the huge
majority which has legitimised demands for At the moment Sudan is attracting a
secession, military intervention would now great deal of international attention.
The USA is keen to prevent any esca-
leave the North in total political isolation. At lation of the situation.
the moment Sudan is attracting a great deal
of international attention. The USA is keen to prevent any
escalation of the situation and is wooing Khartoum with a
mixture of incentives and threats. In 2009 U.S. President
Barack Obama sent General (Ret.) Scott Gration as Special
Envoy and Nathan Princeton Lyman as Ambassador. Lyman
had already accompanied South Africa’s transition from
apartheid to democracy between 1992 and 1995 and played
a significant role in working out a compromise between
black and white South Africans. The African Union assigned
its African Union High-Implementation Panel (AUHIP),
which had actually been set up to deal with Darfur, to work
out a sustainable post-referendum arrangement, under the
leadership of former South African President Thabo Mbeki
and with the support of the two sides involved. The UN
sent a three-person panel headed up by former Tanzanian
President Benjamin William Mkapa to observe the refer-
endum. Since July 2010 all the international players
involved have been coordinating their activities under the
umbrella of the Sudan Consultative Forum.

President Omar al-Bashir and other high-ranking NCP


politicians have repeatedly emphasised over the last few
months that they would indeed be sorry if the South voted
44 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

in favour of secession, but that they would accept it.


They know that they cannot win another civil war. Military
intervention would endanger oil production, as the SPLA
would be sure to counter by immediately attacking wells
and pipelines. Even though there are projects afoot for
a pipeline to Kenya and a refinery in Uganda, Southern
Sudan will still be reliant on Northern Sudan to refine and
ship the oil for many years to come. A negotiated share in
the oil business would seem to present a more attractive
option for Khartoum.

It seems likely that the NCP have decided that the South
has been lost and that they should concentrate on holding
on to power in the North. And the USA has
The Islamic wing of the NCP sees the offered some tempting incentives: removal
South’s secession as an opportunity to from the terror list, lifting of sanctions,
exercise Sharia law more intensively
in Northern Sudan. generous debt relief. The Islamic wing of
the party also sees the South’s secession as
an opportunity to exercise Sharia law more intensively in
Northern Sudan.

Khartoum will be negotiating hard over the next few


months and will not be afraid to use bargaining chips such
as the unresolved conflict in the Abyei region in order to
wring out maximum concessions from the secession talks.
There is much to agree, including the distribution of state
assets and liabilities, international agreements, the exact
demarcation of the border, the distribution of economic
resources, questions of citizenship, the rights of minorities
and freedom of movement.

Once international involvement has receded, Khartoum


may once again try to put pressure on the South in the
usual way, e.g. through targeted destabilisation. On the
day before the referendum began, President al-Bashir said
in an interview with al-Jazeera, that Southern Sudan had
neither the capacity to look after its citizens nor the ability
to establish and administer a state.7 In Juba these words
were viewed as a blatant threat.

7 | “Bashir doubts south’s viability,” al-Jazeera, January 8, 2011,


http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/01/20111718
39053529 (accessed January 20, 2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 45

The most dangerous trouble spot at the moment is the


region of Abyei which lies north of the North/South dividing
line. In line with the CPA, it was planned that the region
should hold a separate referendum on January 9, 2011 to
decide whether it should be part of Northern or Southern
Sudan. The people of Abyei had been promised this oppor-
tunity to decide for many years. However, the sides have
not been able to reach an agreement on who is eligible to
vote, which meant that the parallel referendum has been
postponed indefinitely. The majority of the population in
Abyei are black African Ngok Dinka, who support the SPLM
and lean towards the South. At certain times of the year
Arab-speaking Misserya nomads come to Abyei for grazing.
Many Misserya believe that they will lose this right if the
region becomes part of Southern Sudan, a belief that is
encouraged by Khartoum. The governing NCP supports the
Misserya’s demand to be able to vote in the referendum
in large numbers, something which the Ngok Dinka are
vehemently opposed to.

Both sides sought arbitration from The Hague, and a ruling


was made on Abyei’s borders in July 2009. It was relatively
favourable for Khartoum – the North was awarded a strip
of land which included two profitable oilfields (Heglig and
Bamboo). The remaining contested territory
contains another oilfield (Diffra). But NCP In May 2008 there were fierce battles
representatives soon distanced themselves in Abyei between the army and the
SPLA, resulting in dozens of people
from this ruling, apparently wanting to keep being killed and 60,000 being driven
the whole region within Northern Sudan. In from their homes.
May 2008 there were fierce battles in Abyei
between the army and the SPLA, resulting in dozens of people
being killed and 60,000 being driven from their homes.
Abyei’s eponymous capital was totally destroyed. This was
the most serious breach yet of the ceasefire agreement.
During the turn of the year 2010/2011 and even during
the referendum there were armed skirmishes between
Ngok Dinka and Misserya. It took a hastily-brokered peace
agreement to restore some calm. It is possible that the two
sides will now seek a compromise solution in Abyei rather
than hold a referendum. But this emotionally-charged
dispute could ignite a new North-South conflict, especially
46 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

as the tribal groups involved are heavily armed and to


some extent outside the control of Khartoum and Juba.8

The division of Sudan into two nations also means there


will be a new dynamic in the medium-term. In Southern
Sudan the euphoria over independence will soon evaporate,
leaving everyday reality to take its place. Up to now, South
Sudanese identity has been defined by resistance against
the Arab-Islamist North. It is symptomatic that there was
still no agreement on the new country’s name at the time
of the referendum. Southern Sudan is home to more than
200 different ethnic groups. In 2009 there were numerous
local armed conflicts, often over land or water, which left
2,500 dead and around 350,000 refugees – more victims
than in the Darfur conflict in the same year. In the 1990s
the antagonism between the Dinka, who
Over the last few years the SPLM lea- dominated the SPLM, and the Nuer led to a
der Salva Kiir has shown considerable fierce civil war being fought within Southern
tactical skill in bringing rival groups
and dissidents into the party. Sudan itself. Over the last few years the SPLM
leader Salva Kiir has shown considerable
tactical skill in bringing rival groups and dissidents into
the party. It was also a clever manoeuvre by the SPLM to
make Juba the capital of Southern Sudan rather than the
Dinka city of Rumbek. Juba lies in an area which is mainly
settled by smaller tribes (Bari, Makaraka, Nyanwara,
Pajulu). Nevertheless, it will be a difficult challenge for the
government to hold the country together.

Southern Sudan is very under-developed, large areas of


the country have been laid waste by civil war, and the
people live in extreme poverty. The UNDP drew attention
to the huge challenges ahead in its September 2010 report
entitled “Scary Statistics – Southern Sudan”. 50.6 per cent
of the population live on less than one U.S. dollar per day
and 4.3 million people are reliant on food aid. One in seven
expectant mothers dies during pregnancy or during child-
birth. Over 50 per cent of the population have no access to

8 | The situation is also volatile in two other regions north of the


border, South Kordofan and Blue Nile.The CPA made no pro-
visions on whether they belonged to Northern or Southern
Sudan, merely stipulating non-binding “popular consultations”
about their future status in Northern Sudan. The region’s resi-
dent black Africans such as the Nuba largely support the SPLM
and could be tempted to affiliate their regions with Southern
Sudan.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 47

clean drinking water, and only 6.4 per cent have adequate
toilet facilities. 92 per cent of Southern Sudanese women
are illiterate and less than 50 per cent of children complete
five years of elementary schooling.9

There is still a dearth of skilled labour and civil servants


from Northern Sudan will be leaving the country. Neigh-
bouring countries are preparing to send temporary
officials as a stop gap and to help with on-the-job training.
Corruption has soared in Juba over recent years because of
the high levels of oil income and aid. It should be remem-
bered in this respect that Southern Sudan’s autonomous
government of 1972 to 1983 was a hive of conflict, ineffi-
ciency and corruption.

For the time being the SPLM is basking in the aura of the
successful liberation movement and enjoying landslide
victories, such as Salva Kiirs’ election as Pre-
sident of Southern Sudan with 93 per cent of The SPLM now has to make the transi-
the vote in April 2010. The SPLM now has to tion from being a liberation movement
to a democratic party and provide an
make the transition from being a liberation equal playing field for its future poli-
movement to a democratic party and provide tical rivals.
an equal playing field for its future political
rivals. If the country’s domestic problems escalate, the
government could be tempted to divert the tensions
outwards by seeking confrontation with Northern Sudan
or other neighbouring states. Southern Sudan is not “a
failed state in the making” as some observers are rather
prematurely suggesting, but there are certainly testing
times ahead.

In Northern Sudan, the loss of the South has put President


al-Bashir and the NCP on the defensive. The CPA was
negotiated exclusively by the NCP and the SPLM/A, so the
opposition parties bear no responsibility. Therefore they
are able to accuse the NCP of selling out. President al-Bashir
is under pressure, with a warrant for his arrest being issued
by the International Criminal Court. The elections of April
2010 were fraudulent, and the CPA expires. This means
that al-Bashir will lose the last vestiges of international
legitimacy.

9 | UNDP, “Scary Statistics – Southern Sudan September 2010,”


http://unsudanig.org/docs/APPROVED%20High%20Level%20
Scary%20Statistics%20-%20Southern%20Sudan.doc
(accessed January 20, 2011).
48 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Two factions within the NCP are fighting to take control


of the party’s future direction. The pragmatists want to
introduce economic reforms to provide a new basis for
the economy and a cautious opening-up of the political
system in order to make the most of the current climate of
international goodwill and to remove the causes of brewing
resistance. This had led to plans for development projects
in Darfur to the tune of two billion U.S. dollars. Ranged
against this faction are the hardliners and Islamists who
want to clamp down still harder against opposition and
rebel movements.

At the moment the latter seem to have the upper hand.


On December 24, 2010 opposition politician Mariam
Sadiq al-Mahdi and members of her Umma Party suffered
severe beatings at the hands of the police, followed by
her detention on February 10, 2011. On January 18, 2011
the Islamist opposition politician Sheikh Hasan al-Turabi,
who had fallen out with the NCP in 1999,
President al-Bashir announced that was arrested along with members of his
Southern Sudanese remaining in the Popular Congress Party (PCP), charged with
North would not be allowed to conti-
nue working in the civil service if the plotting to overthrow the state and sabotage.
South seceded. President al-Bashir announced that Southern
Sudanese remaining in the North would not be allowed to
continue working in the civil service if the South seceded.
They would also not be granted North Sudanese citizenship
nor dual citizenship. The transitional constitution would be
changed so that Islam and Sharia law would become the
sole basis of the new constitution, with Arabic becoming
the only official language. There would no longer be any
possibility of cultural and ethnic diversity.10

Faced with these pressures, the NCP could be tempted


to play the anti-Western card in order to divert attention
from its own accountability. In September 2010 Foreign
Minister Ahmed Ali Karti complained that the West and the
USA wanted to divide up Sudan in order to inflict damage
on the Arab and Islamist camp. Khartoum is filled with
propaganda posters claiming that the USA and EU have
caused Southern Sudan to split away from the union, with

10 | “Islamic law in Sudan if south secedes: Bashir,” Gulf Times,


Doha, December 20, 2010, http://gulf-times.com/site/topics/
article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=405481&version=1&template_
id=37&parent_id=17 (accessed January 20, 2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 49

Israel conveniently being drawn into the equation. These


accusations­ have found favour in parts of the Arab and
Islamic world: the Iranian journalist Hassan Hanizadeh, a
close supporter of the government, has aired his suspicion
that there was a British/American conspiracy behind
Southern Sudan’s secession with the aim of reducing Islamic
influence and establishing an Israeli presence.11 There are
however more moderate voices. The London-based Saudi
newspaper Asharq al-Awsat made the following laconic
comment on Karti’s accusations: “Here we say that there
is no hope in a solution to maintain Sudanese unity, since
the wound is much bigger than the band-aid”.12

The successful secession of Southern Sudan will also give


new impetus to the Darfur rebels. It seems likely that
they will step up their armed resistance and increase their
demands, perhaps even taking up a separatist agenda.
It should be remembered in this respect that there is no
historical model for a Southern Sudanese state. On the
contrary, between around 1650 and 1916 Darfur was an
independent sultanate. Indeed, the Darfuris have always
maintained strong ties with Khartoum. The strongest
rebel movement, the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) maintains good relations with the PCP and Umma
Party. But at the moment the NCP government is taking a
hard-line stance towards the Darfur conflict.
At the end of 2010 they walked away from With international attention focused
the Doha (Qatar) peace talks and stepped on Southern Sudan, the opposing sides
in Darfur have an opportunity to esca-
up their military operations against rebel late the conflict.
groups, including aerial bombing of villages.
With international attention focused on Southern Sudan,
the opposing sides in Darfur have an opportunity to
escalate the conflict.

For Northern Sudan, losing the South is both a warning sign


and an opportunity. It would be possible to prevent further
destabilisation and disintegration by allowing the outlying
regions to have their fair share of power and resources
and by extending democratic participation. But if the

11 | Hassan Hanizadeh, “British hands behind Sudan referendum,”


Teheran, January 8, 2010, http://mehrnews.com/en/news
detail.aspx?NewsID=1227710 (accessed January 20, 2011).
12 | Tariq Alhomayed, “Sudan: Crying over Spilt Milk,” Asharq al-
Awsat, September 28, 2010, http://aawsat.com/english/news.
asp?section=2&id=22484 (accessed January 20, 2011).
50 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

regime decides to follow hard-line policies in order to hold


onto power, the country will never find peace. Northern
Sudan is also not made up of a single ethnic and cultural
group. Although Arabic-speakers make up the majority of
the population, they in fact number only around 55 per
cent. There is also a certain amount of religious diversity:
although the overwhelming majority of Northern Sudanese
are Muslims, not all Muslims follow the line propagated by
the NCP.

As things stand, the government is still in the driving


seat thanks to their control over the security forces and
economic resources. The opposition is financially weak,
short of ideas and divided. However, the significant drop in
oil income will have an effect on this system of patronage.
The government has already had to reduce its subsidies
on petrol and sugar. An alliance of Northern Sudan’s
opposition parties  – SPLM-North, PCP, Umma Party,
Democratic Unionist Party, Communist Party  – with rebel
and opposition groups could cause the NCP problems in the
medium-term. But to achieve this, the opposition parties
need to develop a better understanding of the needs of the
outlying regions.

At the moment we must be a little wary of trying to predict


the long-term consequences of the secession. The country
which has been the most important bridge between black
and (Arab) Muslim Africa no longer exists. This is only likely
to exacerbate still further the continent’s
The secession of Christian South brings division along the 12th parallel and increase
Sudan into the firing line of internati- tensions between population groups in other
onal Jihadists. Al-Qaeda cells and sup-
porters are already active in the Sahel. countries such as Chad, Niger, Nigeria or
Mauritania.13

The secession of Christian South brings Sudan into the


firing line of international Jihadists. Al-Qaeda cells and

13 | AU mediator Thabo Mbeki is trying to counter the impression


that “African” Southern Sudan has split away from “Arab”
Northern Sudan. In a speech at Khartoum University in
January 2011 he stressed that the whole of Sudan was an
African country and that Islam was a part of Africa. Speech
by Thabo Mbeki, Chairperson of the AUHIP, for the University
of Khartoum. Friendship Hall, Khartum, January 5, 2011,
http://thabombekifoundation.org.za/files/downloads/speech-
thabo-mbeki-friendship-hall-khartoum-january5-2011.pdf
(accessed January 20, 2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 51

supporters are already active in the Sahel (Algeria, Mauri-


tania, Mali, Niger) and in Egypt and Somalia. In the 1990s
there were ties between the Khartoum government and
Islamist terror groups, leading to the temporary imposition
of UN sanctions. Osama bin Laden lived in
exile in Khartoum from 1991 to 1996. In Since the end of the nineties the NCP
October 2008 a group called “Al-Qaeda in government has turned away from ter-
rorism, and the spiritual form of Islam
the Land of the Two Niles” threatened to which is practised by the North Suda-
attack westerners in the Sudan, preceded by nese population does not lend itself to
Jihadist ideas.
the killing of a U.S. diplomat in Khartoum.
However, since the end of the nineties the
NCP government has turned away from terrorism, and
the spiritual form of Islam which is practised by the North
Sudanese population does not lend itself to Jihadist ideas.

North East Africa’s precarious balance will be upset by the


division of Sudan and will have to be recalibrated. If the
two new states become destabilised and start to disinte-
grate, they have plenty of neighbours who would be keen
to fill the vacuum, including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, Libya,
Uganda and Kenya. This could lead to war in the region.

And the possibility of a domino effect on other secession


movements in the region (Oromia, Ogaden, Somaliland)
and in other parts of Africa cannot be ruled out, despite
the efforts of politicians who are currently insisting that
Southern Sudan is a one-off situation. The biggest threat
to stability would be territorial disintegration in Nigeria, the
most important regional power in Sub-Saharan Africa after
South Africa.

The situation in Sudan is presenting the international


community with one of its greatest challenges. It has
the Herculean task of helping under-developed Southern
Sudan to statehood, both politically and economically. At
the same time it cannot take its eyes off Northern Sudan,
where it needs to offer support to the reform-oriented
actors. A UN follow-up mission is needed over the next few
years. It should to patrol a demilitarised buffer zone along
the newly-created border and support Sudan’s process of
statehood.
52 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

KENYA’S NEW CONSTITUTION:


TRIUMPH IN HAND, TESTING
TIMES AHEAD?

Tom Wolf
Dr. Tom Wolf, from
Detroit (USA), works
in Nairobi as a gover-
nance consultant and
Following a tortuous path of some two decades, Kenya
opinion researcher.
Earlier, he taught finally obtained a new constitution when on August 4, 2010
Politics at the Univer- two-thirds of Kenyans who participated in the national
sity of Nairobi and
referendum voted to adopt it, and President Mwai Kibaki
served as an advisor
for USAID. He came promulgated it at a festive ceremony in Nairobi three
to Kenya in 1967. weeks later.

Yet even prior to its actual implementation, it should be


stressed that from global perspective, adopting a new
constitution, or even just substantially revising an existing
one is not something that very often happens in a country –
or even in the whole world. Moreover, such transforma-
tions occur in a quite limited set of circumstances, most
accompanied by violence: when a section of an existing
state breaks away and declares its independence; when a
revolt or rebellion results in the overthrow or replacement
of an existing order, or leads to a ‘compromise’ agreement
that accommodates at least the principal demands of the
various parties.

By contrast, in Kenya this sort of ‘tectonic shift’ was


largely lacking. Moreover, the main impetus for reform
has come over the years not so much from within the
political class as from outside, led by prominent individuals
from the religious sector and various civic organizations,
even if particular political leaders periodically championed
proposals of one sort or another for a complex mixture of
motives.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 53

These very long, drawn-out and often met-with-violence


efforts reflected a growing body of opinion regarding flaws
in the country’s constitutional order in terms of both content
and practice. These included especially the following:

1. a concentration of largely unchecked power in the


executive,
2. a concentration of power in Nairobi at the expense of
the regions,
3. frequent (if geographically specific) electoral violence
(often orchestrated by those in power) and other
(violent and non-violent) forms of victimization of
political opponents, including torture and several high-
profile assassinations other ‘mysterious’ deaths,
4. large-scale if periodic extra-judicial killings and
minimal protection of human rights,
5. an absence of any compensatory guarantees for
women, ‘marginalized groups’, and people with
disabilities , reflecting deeply entrenched cultural
biases against them.

Three main factors account for the new constitution’s


remarkable success. First, the length and frequent turmoil
of the period during which such (if largely
fruitless) efforts were made produced consi­ Even many public figures who had ne-
derable ‘reform-fatigue’, so that even many ver been personally committed to or
involved in ‘the struggle’ now associ-
public figures who had never been personally ated themselves with the reform.
committed to or involved in ‘the struggle’
now associated themselves with it if only to enable the
nation to finally put this milestone behind it, giving space
for innumerable other pressing issues. In particular, the
failure of the preceding effort during Kibaki’s first term –
resulting from a major schism that emerged within the
assemblage that was responsible for his electoral triumph
in 2002 – when a draft constitution was defeated 57 to 43
per cent in the referendum of November, 2005, energized
important players in both the political class and the wider
society to ‘get it right’ this time.

Second, the election crisis in the years 2007 and 2008,


easily the gravest threat to the country’s integrity in terms
of the scale and geographic distribution of violence since
independence, had three main positive reform-effects.
54 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

First, it demonstrated, especially to key political and pri-


vate sector actors, the fragile nature of social cohesion
in the country, and the now-manifest dangers of holding
national elections under existing rules and institutions.
Second, it allowed for the robust entrance of international
players (especially certain Western governments through
their diplomatic representatives, the UN, and the African
Union) in an effort to end the violence and achieve a short-
term political settlement, as well as lay out a longer-term
reform agenda (known as “Agenda Four”) that included
major constitutional reform. Third and closely related to
the previous two factors, it encouraged those subsequently
tasked with authoring the Review Act itself to insulate the
process from ‘late-hour sabotage’ by the political class and
the members of parliament (MPs), even if it did allow for
their substantive input at particular stages.

A third and more immediate factor was that many individual


political careers stood to gain by ‘riding the wave’ of popular
support for any new constitution. Specifi-
Several leading figures considered it cally, considering the early wide winning-
best to conceal their misgivings about margins predicted by various opinion polls,
any new constitution. Kibaki was seen
by some as a quite reluctant ‘convert’ several leading figures who were reported to
to the cause of reform. have serious misgivings about it considered
it best to conceal these. For his part, and in view of his
performance during his first term, President Kibaki was
seen by some as a quite reluctant ‘convert’ to the cause
of reform.

Whatever the accuracy of such a characterization, the fact


is that, devoid of any 2012 presidential ambitions, Kibaki
was encouraged by many to leave a “positive legacy”
by leading from the front, which he eventually did, and
he earned considerable credit for doing so. These three
broad realities, whatever their relative contributions to
reform success, will have profound implications for the
course of the new constitution’s implementation and future
operation.

THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: MAIN FEATURES

A brief listing of several central features of Kenya’s new


constitution will demonstrate the major departure that it
represents.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 55

1. A presidential system, with much clearer separation


of powers, with checks on the executive especially
by a significantly empowered (and enlarged)
legislative branch

Relevant here are such provisions that:

1. Cabinet members can neither be officials of political


parties nor (as they must be at present) MPs,
2. the parliament would have a fixed, five-year term, with
a specified election date,
3. the deputy-president must be formally identified as a
presidential running-mate,
4. the Senate may impeach a president by a two-thirds
vote, following a similar vote by the National Assembly,
5. all major executive appointments are either vetted by
the National Assembly or stem from the decisions of a
number of commissions that are largely independent of
presidential influence, and
6. the size of the Cabinet is limited to 22 ministers and
44 assistant ministers.

Regarding the re-fashioned National Assembly itself,


beyond the 80 additional regular constituencies, there will
be a female representative from each of the 47 counties and
another twelve nominated MPs by political
parties based on their proportion of MPs (as There will be twelve nominated MPs by
now) but only “to represent the interests of political parties based on their propor-
tion of MPs (as now) but only “to repre-
youth, persons with disabilities and workers”, sent the interests of youth, persons
making a total of 349 compared to 222 at with disabilities and workers”.
present (of whom 210 are elected). The
Upper House (Senate), concerned exclusively with county-
level issues, will be comprised of: 47 regularly elected
members, 16 nominated by political parties based on
their shares of the elected Senators, and two members
representing the youth and disabled, respectively (of each
gender).

Other examples of the legislature’s enhanced stature are


that:

1. a bill passed a second time (with a two-thirds majority)


by parliament becomes law after two weeks even
without presidential assent,
56 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

2. a declaration of war requires National Assembly assent,


as does
3. an extension of a state of emergency (declared by the
president) beyond two weeks.

At the same time, in terms of ‘in-house’ accountability,


several features seek to ‘tame’ MPs as well. Among
these is that an independent Salaries and Remuneration
Commission will set their terms of service (as it will for
all public officials), so that they no longer (through the
Parliamentary Service Commission) can determine their
own salaries and benefits, which have made them among
the highest-paid elected officials in the world. And at the
individual level, a recall provision (initiated by a public
petition at the constituency level) could encourage them to
be more careful about such matters as campaign promises,
adherence to party policy, and general constituency service
than they have in the past.

2. New presidential election rules to mitigate conflict

The ‘toxic’ nature of presidential election contests is


somewhat reduced by means of a requirement for a
second round, run-off, contest between the top two
candidates unless one of them obtains more than half of
all votes cast on the first round including at least 25 per
cent in at least half of the counties. In addition, the role
of the new Supreme Court in resolving any presidential
election petitions within two weeks should also help to
ease potential tensions, as should the provision that no
winner needs to be sworn in for seven days following the
official declaration of the results. Finally, here, the credi-
bility of the (to be established) Election and Boundaries
Commission seems assured, based on its insulation from
the influence of any particular office – in marked contrast
to the Electoral Commission that oversaw the disastrous
2007 election. This should boost public confidence in its
decisions.

3. Three other aspects of limited/more accountable


executive power

In connection with ‘taming’ executive power, three other


important provisions of the new constitution should be
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 57

briefly mentioned. One is the significant dilution of the


Treasury’s powers, in that the control of public finance will
be split between two offices  – Controller of Budget and
Auditor General – both enjoying institutional independence
from the Office of the President.

Next, the police are subject to certain restrictions in their


powers. Among these is the requirement that criminal
suspects must be released on bail if the maximum sentence
for the offense in question is a sentence of
less than six months. More generally, any The regular and Administration Police
suspect should be released on bail or bond, are to be merged, with both responsible
to an Inspector General who, while
pending being charged or taken to trial, appointed by the president, must be
“unless there are compelling reasons” for not confirmed by parliament.
doing so.

More broadly, the regular and Administration Police are


to be merged, with both responsible to an Inspector
General who, while appointed by the president, must be
confirmed by parliament, and who shall take direction
from a (supposedly) independent National Police Service
Commission. Just how these various branches of the central
government will perform, both in relation to each other
and to the lower (devolved) level of government, however,
will require a considerable period to observe, following the
next election when they are all in place.

4. A more robust system of devolved government

The 47 local government units – counties, representing the


first districts established under the British  – will have a
guaranteed allocation of 15 per cent of the total budget,
apportioned on the basis of a formula (to be worked out)
that combines population with area-size. While some
have argued that the powers assigned to such units do
not go far enough, the fact that a successful presidential
candidate (as noted above) must win at least 25 per cent
of the vote in at least half of them does accord them some
political recognition. So, too, does the fact that they will be
run by a popularly-elected Governor who will be leading a
similarly elected council.

A related issue is the fate of the current 175 local


government councils, since the new constitution makes
58 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

no mention of them. Hence they were not included in


the post-promulgation swearing-in ceremonies of their
national official counterparts (MPs, judicial officials, etc.),
leaving their fate to the post-2012 election parliament. As
with the executive, however, there remain a number of
imponderables as to how these county governments will
actually function, starting, perhaps, with their capacity
to raise revenue (beyond the mandated allocations from
Treasury) and properly account for its use.

5. Greatly enhanced human rights guarantees

While the new constitution includes the most familiar rights


such as freedom of expression, assembly, association,
movement, right to property and to a fair trial, there are
many others also recognized, including: a wider right to
privacy, information, media freedom, the right to vote and
to fair working practices, including the right to strike, to
use the language of one’s choice, consumer rights, to fair
administrative action, and to a clean environment.

The constitution commits the Govern- But the Bill of Rights goes considerably
ment to carry out its human rights beyond these, offering an expansive ‘platter’
obligations under international law.
It is only the world’s fourth of this of socio-economic rights, including those to
nature. basic welfare such as housing, sanitation,
water, and freedom from hunger, while protecting children
and the aged from “neglect.” Moreover, the state has
judicially enforceable obligations to the progressive reali-
zation of such rights, even on behalf of groups or individuals
who are unable to demand them, and which must not
involve undue complexity or excessive (and in some cases,
any) costs. These may be applied especially to particular
“disadvantaged groups”  – children, youth, persons with
disability, the elderly, and to the “marginalized” in general.
Further, the constitution commits the Government to carry
out its human rights obligations under international law.
Indeed, the inclusion of all the above, together with such
enforcement provisions, makes this constitution only the
world’s fourth of this nature.

6. A re-invented judiciary

It is widely acknowledged that corruption and vulnerability


to political interference have plagued Kenya’s judiciary for
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 59

years. As such, reform of the ‘bench’ was seen as essential


ever since the momentum for a new constitution began.

The overall structure of the judiciary remains largely the


same  – with the notable exception of the creation of a
Supreme Court that shall issue final judgments on cases
coming from the Court of Appeal, resolve constitutional
disagreements, and have sole jurisdiction over presidential
election disputes (as noted). Still, a number of other
changes are viewed as positive, if still short of the ideal.
These include the following:

▪▪The mandatory resignation of the current Chief Justice


within six months. Future holders of this critical office
will be selected by the Judicial Service Commission and
approved by the National Assembly (their appointment
by the president being only ceremonial). They will serve
a maximum of ten years. The Attorney-General, though
actually part of the Executive, also has to resign, in his
case within a year.
▪▪A much more independent/professional Judicial Service
Commission;
▪▪A higher level of security of tenure and remuneration
without any possibility of judges’ salaries being cut during
service or in retirement; and
▪▪The use of a vetting process for all current judges who
wish to continue in office to ensure that those serving
under the new constitution meet its stringent ethical
standards. This does not apply for magistrates, who
handle far more cases that affect the general public.

7. Various forms of compensatory treatment for


women and other ‘marginalized’ categories

The position of women has been elevated in various


ways. One regards citizenship, in that a foreign man who
marries a Kenyan woman will now (like a
foreign woman who is married by a Kenyan With regard to representation, 16
man) be eligible for Kenyan citizenship. It seats are set aside for women in
the Senate. Each of the 47 counties
also provides for a woman’s equal rights to shall have a female MP in the National
marital property in the case of divorce, as Assembly.
well as rights regarding land issues more
generally. Next, with regard to representation, 16 seats
are set aside for women in the Senate. Each of the 47
60 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

counties shall have a female MP in the National Assembly.


Moreover, no less than one third of the county assembly
seats will be held by women. Other bodies (e.g., commis-
sions) must also have a certain minimum proportion of
women  – generally, one-third). “Equal opportunities” in
terms of gender must be provided in the public service as a
whole. Beyond these mandated requirements, parliament
is obliged to pass legislation within five years to “promote”
(though not to guarantee) “the representation of women”
more generally.

Just how much the combined impact of such measures will


reduce gender inequality remains to be seen, but they do
appear to offer significant gains in terms of the status of
women.

8. A two-track (if more arduous) amendment process

As noted earlier, Kenya’s independence constitution was


radically altered after 1963 (especially during its first half-
decade), many of the changes serving narrow purposes.
These required the endorsement of 65 per cent of all 222
MPs.

To make such short-term, self-serving alterations more


difficult, the bar has been raised substantially. It allows
for two methods. The first requires the
Amendments to certain provisions – proposed amendment to be introduced in
including all those contained in the Bill the Lower House of parliament where it must
of Rights – will also require obtaining
a majority in a referendum. stay for 90 days, and then win approval from
at least two-thirds of the members of both
Houses. Moreover, amendments to certain provisions  –
including all those contained in the Bill of Rights, certain
of those concerning land, and the structure of devolved
government  – will also require obtaining a majority in a
referendum, which must include getting at least 20 per
cent approval in at least half of the 47 counties. The second
method involves obtaining at least one million signatures
from the public, after which it is submitted to parliament,
which then initiates the first method.

Inasmuch as so many provisions of this constitution


appear more appropriately the content of ordinary legis-
lation, making amendments so difficult to achieve may
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 61

eventually be the cause of regret. Various proposals to


modify Kenya’s ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system failed
to gain sufficient support for inclusion. But with this system
now having constitutional rather than just ordinary legis-
lative status, it will be that much harder to change, should
national opinion shift in that direction. The same applies to
all other provisions.

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES: NOW THE HARD PART

Whatever its margin of victory in the referendum, and


however attractive many of its provisions may be, the
constitution’s actual future impact, even at this very early
stage, cannot be accurately appreciated without noting
some challenges of actually implementing it, especially
with regard to particular sections as identified by various
observers.

These are of two broad types:

1. those that stretch the capacity of the relevant institu-


tions including that of the state as whole despite the
best of intentions, and
2. those that threaten entrenched, status quo, interests
(and which appear to have already met considerable
resistance; see below). As anything approaching full
treatment of such issues is impossible here, only a few
examples of each are presented.

1. Capacity and Other Governance Weaknesses: Easier


Said Than Done?

The promise of a vast array of socio-economic entitlements


is likely to fall far short of fulfillment, however sincere the
commitment to ensure this. Relevant here are the results
of 2009 national census released, six months
late, within days of the new constitution’s Kenya’s escalating population clearly
ratification. It revealed an increase of eight has profound implications for the new
constitution’s promise of a broad array
million over the last decade, now amounting of socio-economic rights.
to nearly one million annually. Such an
escalating population clearly has profound implications for
the new constitution’s promise of a broad array of socio-
economic rights.
62 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Indeed, with 50 per cent of Kenyans still living below the


poverty line, such figures provided a sobering ‘reality-
check’ with regard to all such rights-guarantees, which
include: universal medical care (“of a high standard”),
compulsory and free basic education, shelter, nutrition,
and employment for “youth”, together with the necessary
training to enable them to obtain it, as well as care of
the aged. Beyond services and other prescribed benefits,
costs appear set to massively escalate as a consequence
of the numerous new public positions and bodies (elected
offices, units of government, oversight commissions, etc.),
amounting to an additional 2,441 such personnel.

Another major challenge concerns devolution, in particular,


the financial capacity of these units to perform their
assigned functions, regardless of the basic-minimum
central government grants to which they are entitled,
based especially on the local (potential) tax and natural
resource-base. According to the Director-General of the
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, for example, “Once
they start operating, you will see how others will drastically
move very fast to great heights of economic growth while
some will decline.” At the same time, the leadership and
technical capacity of these units to perform their assigned
functions is also likely to vary widely, with those repre-
senting ‘marginal’ (i.e., especially pastoralist) communities
at a distinct disadvantage reflecting both challenging
natural environments and short-falls in suitable human
capital.

With Kenya’s annual debt obligation at Perhaps even more serious, the mandated
some 40 percent of all such revenue, proportion of total revenue that is to be
this allocation is likely to leave central
government with a major expenditure shared out to these units (15 per cent, as
shortfall. noted above) may simply be unsustainable.
With Kenya’s annual debt obligation at some 40 per cent
of all such revenue, this allocation is likely to leave central
government with a major expenditure shortfall, especially
since counties themselves have no responsibility to
contribute to such national debt obligations.

A further issue regarding financial capacity has to do


with the entire implementation process itself. According
to the just-established parliamentary Committee on the
Implementation of the Constitution (CoIC), some KES 4b
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 63

will be required over the next two years to accomplish


this. Yet, the Minister for Justice “was concerned that the
government had not committed any cash to the process.”

Next, regarding leadership, individuals with sufficient


popularity to win positions of Governor may not possess
the requisite leadership and managerial skills. A final and
related implementation issue is corruption. In this regard,
fears have been expressed that especially at the county
level, oversight mechanisms may be inadequate, and
considering the scale of resources involved, lead to greatly
expanded opportunities for nepotism and graft.

2. Resistance: On Your Marks, Get Set… Not So Fast!

Given the history of governance abuses in Kenya  –


combined with the fact that the political elite that has so
benefited from such abuses is still (as noted at the outset)
largely in place  – it is clear that many provisions in the
new constitution, to say nothing of its stated underlying
philosophy and principles, constitute a potent threat to
deeply entrenched ‘ways of doing things’.

As such, it should be expected that various strategies and


tactics have been and will be made to thwart at least some
of its intended impact. However, in light of the high level
of public support for the constitution as expressed in the
referendum, such efforts may take any (or all of) three
main forms:

1. to ensure that officials sympathetic to those likely to


be most threatened by its various provisions occupy
certain critical offices,
2. to subvert the use of such powers through corrupt
inducements, and
3. to prevent those whose ascent to power in Two incidents that went considerably
2012 and thereafter is considered threa- beyond several (unsuccessful) tech-
nical-legal challenges to the referen-
tening for those implicated in various dum itself appeared to confirm the
abuses from doing so. fears of governance abuse.

Prior to its ratification and promulgation, two incidents that


went considerably beyond several (unsuccessful) technical-
legal challenges to the referendum itself appeared to
confirm such fears. One was the ‘clandestine’ insertion
64 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

of the words “national insecurity” into the Bill of Rights


section of the proposed constitution, just before its official
printing began, with the clear intention of effectively
negating their guarantee, or at least leaving their promise
to the discretion of relevant Government officials. Suspi-
cions mounted when the Attorney-General, whose final
mandate in the process had been to make only “editorial
and grammatical corrections” before publication, revealed
that he had been approached by “a senior official” from
the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) who had
asked him to do just that (and which he claimed he had
refused to do). Yet while he assured the public that an
investigation would be launched into the affair, no further
progress was reported, including any identification by the
Attorney-General himself as to just who had made the
initial request to him.

Some two months before the referen- The other pre-referendum incident occurred
dum, three hand-grenades were tossed near the close of an open-air Christian
into the crowd at a ‘prayer meeting’,
killing six and injuring more than one ‘prayer meeting’ in Nairobi’s Uhuru Park,
hundred. some two months before the referendum.
Three hand-grenades were tossed into the crowd, killing
six and injuring more than one hundred. Given the fact
that this meeting was in reality part of the ‘No’ campaign,
many assumed that the perpetrators’ goal was to discredit
its ‘Yes’ opponents. Moreover, given the nature of the
weapons used, and the subsequent failure of the Police
to make any progress in the investigation, some drew the
conclusion that the NSIS itself must have been behind it,
on instructions from ‘above’.

Moving to the process of implementation itself, its basic


outline should be noted. It requires two key bodies: an
independent Commission of Implementation (CoI) and
a Parliamentary Implementation Oversight Committee
(PIOC). Relevant bills (49 are listed in the new constitu-
tion’s Transition section) are then to be drafted by the
Attorney-General with input and support from the CoI
and the Kenya Law Reform Commission. The process then
moves forward with oversight from the PIOC.

Yet various events suggested that full commitment to


both the process and content of implementation may be
wanting. On the basis of such events, observers have
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 65

identified three main tactics by which this may be done,


depending upon the circumstances:

1. to populate the constitution’s new structures with as


many old-order loyalists as possible,
2. to rely on sympathetic forces within the judiciary to
render favorable interpretations when relevant cases
reach them; and perhaps even
3. to sponsor constitutional amendments that would undo
various ‘offending’ provisions. The scene may thus be
set for an increasingly dramatic struggle between these
opposing forces.

CONCLUSION: THE TOUGHER TEST OF


CONSTITUTIONALISM

One striking feature of the new constitution is its length,


with much of its content more commonly found in ordinary
statutes. This seems to be the result of three reinforcing
factors:

1. the vast scale of inequality in society so The highly fractious political class
that without at least the promise of greater tends to see most attempts at compro-
mise only in terms of short-term parti-
equity (if not equality) no substitute for san gains and losses.
the old constitution was likely to win suffi-
cient public support for adoption,
2. a related widespread popular mistrust in government
based on quite bitter experience of many Kenyans, and
3. a highly fractious political class that likewise tended
to see most attempts at compromise only in terms
of short-term partisan gains and losses, and thus
unwilling to leave details to future interpretations of
‘basic principles’ – let alone to ‘good faith’ – so that
much of the text constitutes the broadest (if not
lowest) ‘common denominator’.

Yet whatever its weaknesses, Kenya’s new constitution


represents a radical break from the past in terms of
significant improvements in all areas of governance. Yet
its fate is likely to depend, above all, on political dynamics.
The ultimate question for Kenya is thus: if the new consti-
tution represents a genuine victory for the underprivileged
and marginalized in threatening to deny the elite much of
the self-serving, arbitrary power they have enjoyed in the
66 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

past, will the latter – still very much in place – allow this
to happen? Or will the ‘Kenyan people’ be able to hang on
to and thus confirm their referendum victory in its fullest
sense?

As argued above, therefore, those with the most at stake


in the status quo were out-flanked by the combination of
local reformers and international actors whose clout was
greatly enhanced by the 2008 crisis. As such, therefore,
the country’s national constitutional drama has, in many
respects, only just begun. And this is so even if, perhaps
remarkably, the two main protagonists in the ill-fated
earlier attempt of 2005  – the current president and
prime minister  – were united on this occasion in support
of ratification. For the basic fault-lines of Kenyan society
and politics remain, and are bound to be activated as the
country moves towards the 2012 elections. The possi-
bility that this contest, or any early challenge to national
integrity that may arise, including the outcome of the ICC
investigations, could undermine the constitution’s promise
must not escape those who struggled so hard for this ‘new
dispensation’, at such cost, for so long.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 67

ECONOMIC POLICY IN SOUTH


AFRICA – GROWTH PLANS AND
GROWTH OBSTACLES

Werner Böhler

In 2010 South Africa impressed the world with an almost


perfectly organised Football World Cup. Major infrastructure
projects and new world-class stadiums impressively
demonstrated the investment and mobilisation capacity of
the country. South Africa has weathered even the economic
and financial crisis relatively well. Negative growth was
1.8 per cent in 2009 and unemployment grew by about
one million. In 2010 however, another good three per cent Dr. Werner Böhler is
growth is expected, the inflation at four per cent is within Resident Represen-
tative of the Konrad-
the three to six per cent region set by the Central Bank. Adenauer-Stiftung in
The rand shows unusual strength against the dollar and Johannesburg.
the euro, triggered by strong (volatile) capital inflow in the
financial market. South Africa is the only African country
in the G20, organises the COP17 climate conference in
November 2011 in Durban, recently joined the BRICS
countries, and is again a non-permanent member of the
UN Security Council for 2011/12.

On the other hand, with a Gini-Index of 65 in 2010 South


Africa shared with Brazil the leading position in terms of
unequal distribution of income. According to the latest
UNCTAD report direct foreign investment fell by 78 per
cent, while in the region the decline was only 14 per
cent.1 The official unemployment rate is 25.3 per cent,
while the actual figure exceeds 40 per cent. According
to a study by the Centre for Development and Enterprise
(CDE), in larger cities, 2.6 million, that is, 65 per cent of
the four million young people between 15 and 24 were

1 | Cf. “FDI slumps 80 per cent as mining debate deters investors”,


The Star – Business Report, January 19, 2011, 1.
68 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

unemployed in 2005.2 The proportion of the young people


in unemployment between the ages of 15 and 34 was 52.7
per cent, according to the South Africa Survey 2009/2010
by the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR).3
Partly responsible for this is the deficient educational
system with a great number of school dropouts and low
standards in, especially, natural sciences. As a result, some
much-needed skilled workforce is not or insufficiently
available in the labour market.

The opposition Democratic Alliance is The governing party ANC programmatically


promoting a liberal economic model set its sights on becoming a “Developmental
that, in the face of the present majority,
has no chance of being implemented. State”. However, up to now this has proved
to be somewhat of an empty phrase, whose
contents have little or contradictory meaning. It is difficult
to clearly identify the cornerstones of the desired economic
system. By contrast, the official opposition Democratic
Alliance (DA), in the Open Opportunity Society, is promoting
a liberal economic model that, in the face of the present
majority, has no chance of being implemented.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM SINCE


THE DEMOCRATIC REBIRTH

Halfway through Nelson Mandela’s term, in June 1996,


the government of National Unity (ANC, NP, IFP)
abandoned the macro-economic Growth, Employment
and Redistribution Plan (GEAR).4 It replaced the Recon-
struction and Development Programme (RDP) established
in 1994 that intended to fulfil the basic needs of the
poor (water, low-cost-houses, electricity) but also led
to a policy change with a negative impact on investor's
trust and economic growth. First, it was the trade union
federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU), that strongly criticised GEAR, rejecting it as a

2 | Cf. Ann Bernstein (ed.), “South Africa’s ‘Door Knockers’ –


Young people and unemployment in metropolitan South Africa”,
CDE In Depth, № 8, July 2008.
3 | Cf. South African Institute of Race Relations (ed.), South
Africa Survey 2009/2010, http://sairr.org.za/services/
publications/south-africa-survey/south-africa-survey-online-
2009-2010/employment-incomes (accessed February 2, 2011).
4 | Department of Finance, Republic of South Africa (ed.),
Growth, Employment and Redestribution. A Macroeconomic
Strategy, in: http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/
gear/chapters.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 69

liberal concept. At about three per cent, the targeted


growth rates remained well below the expectations. Six
per cent had been considered prerequisite for reducing
the high unemployment. While inflation and budget
deficit decreased, between 1996 and 1999, according to
the National Labour and Economic Development Institute
(NALEDI), 400.000 jobs were lost in the formal sector.5
President Thabo Mbeki and the government however
retained the programme in the expectation of a long-term
economic growth.

GEAR was replaced by the Accelerated and Shared Growth


Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) in February 2006, with
the goal of halving unemployment and poverty by 2014.
Six points were identified as factors in preventing higher
growth:

▪▪Volatility of the currency,


▪▪Costs, efficiency and capacity of the national logistics
system,
▪▪Lack of training and lack of skilled workers,
▪▪Entry barriers, constraints on competition, and lack of
investment opportunities,
▪▪Overregulation, in particular with respect to small and
medium enterprises (SMEs),
▪▪Deficits of state administration and leadership.

It was an initiative that was to involve the business, trade


unions, state-owned enterprises, and all government insti-
tutions including ministries.6 The programme was comple-
mented one month later by the Joint Initiative on Priority
Skills Acquisition (JIPSA), aimed at professional skills,
particularly skills in shortage (technicians, engineers).7

The challenge to GEAR was the beginning of the waning


influence of Thabo Mbeki on the direction of the country’s
economic policy. Although Mbeki came from the Marxist

5 | Richard Knight, “South Africa: Economic Policy and Develop-


ment,” July 2001, in: http:/richardknight.homestead.com/
files/sisaeconomy.htm (accessed February 2, 2011).
6 | South Africa Government Information, Accelerated and
Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA), in:
http://www.info.gov.za/asgisa (accessed February 2, 2011).
7 | Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA), in:
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/final-rep2.pdf
(accessed February 2, 2011).
70 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

school, international organisations, the industry and large


sections within the ANC saw in Mbeki a guarantee for an
open, market-oriented economy. In advance of the 2004
national elections, the ANC initiated a debate about the
Developmental State. The concept was part of the election
platform, and aimed above all to keep the radical partners,
COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP)
as well as their voters within the “Tripartite Alliance”.8
The recognition of the African State and Government
Director connected with the New Partnership
The party conference 2007 fundamen- for African Development (NEPAD) to take
tally changed the balance of power on more individual responsibility and to
within the ANC and the Tripartite Alli-
ance. The more radical portions of the thematize the developmental orientation of
Alliance set the agenda. the African elites from within was attributed
to this new debate.

The party conference in Polokwane in December 2007


fundamentally changed the balance of power within the
ANC and the Tripartite Alliance. The more radical and
left-leaning portions of the Alliance set the programme
and the agenda, and, in Jacob Zuma, elected a popular
people’s tribune from KwaZulu/Natal as party president.
Thabo Mbeki and his entire party leadership were voted
out. On 25th September 2008 Mbeki’s forced resignation
as president followed. In this, he was bowing to the new
party leadership, who prompted his resignation. This
was followed by an interim government under Kaglema
Motlanthe. As party leader – in the ANC-Tradition – Jacob
Zuma was leading candidate in the elections on 22th April
2009, in which he was elected president.

In his first State of the Nation address on 17th June 2009


Zuma said that he intended to build a “developmental
state”, improve public service, and strengthen the demo-
cratic institutions.9 In his next speech on 11th February

8 | Cf. Roger Southall, “Introduction: Can South Africa be a


developmental state?‟, in: Sakhela Buhlungu et al. (eds.),
State of the Nation, South Africa 2005-2006, (Cape Town:
HSRC Press 2006), xvii-xliv; Peter Meyns, Charity Musamba
(eds.), “The Develepmental State in Africa – Problems and
Prospects: Introcuction: Recent Debates on the Developmen-
tal State in Africa,” INEF-Report 101/2010, 7-10; Charity
Musamba, “The Developmental State Concept and its Rele-
vance for Africa,” in: Peter Meyns, Chrity Musamba (eds.),
loc. cit., 11-41.
9 | http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2009/09060310551001.
htm (accessed February 2, 2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 71

2010 Zuma praised his government and their hard work


“to build a strong developmental state”.10 It would be
premature to draw any conclusions from the fact that
reference to democratic institutions was not made again.
It is nevertheless significant that a “performance-oriented
state through improved planning” is intended to be estab-
lished, which, according to his further remarks, is to be
responsible for virtually all other sectors, including the
economy. It remains an open question where
the necessary planning capacity and the The private sector as economic actor
appropriate qualifications are envisaged to or the contribution of the economy to
the country’s development is not men-
come from and how these are to be efficiently tioned in Zuma’s first State of the Na-
managed. The private sector as economic tion addresses.
actor or the contribution of the economy
to the country’s development is not mentioned. Likewise
missing are comments on the creation of adequate condi-
tions for private business, in particular the development of
medium-sized productive enterprises by the state.

Before and during the party conference in Polokwane Jacob


Zuma made far-reaching promises and concessions to his
allies from the left political spectrum, COSATU and SACP
and the influential ANC Youth League. In the two State of
the Nation speeches and other speeches at a party level
or as head of government, far-reaching promises were
made. Even two years after taking office there were no
visible achievements in the areas of, especially, closing the
poverty gap, fighting unemployment and the provision of
social and other services (Service Delivery) Zuma came
under growing pressure within the ANC to change political
direction especially with regard to economics. The cabinet
reshuffle of October 2010 consolidated his position.
However, the number of government members was again
extended by six vice-ministerial positions. When forming
the government in June 2009, Zuma had already increased
the number of ministers from 28 to 34 and created an
additional planning department in the presidential office.
In this way, Zuma was able to integrate his internal party
critics especially those on the left of the political spectrum.
A number of departmental responsibilities were created
which were concerned with economic policy and would
submit independent plans. Besides the state of the nation,

10 | http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2010/10021119051001.
htm (accessed February 2, 2011).
72 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

there is the fiscal policy from the Minister of Finance, which


sets fiscal policy, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework
(MTEF) 2009-2014, the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP)
from the Ministry for Trade and Industry, and recently the
National Growth Path (NGP) from the Ministry of Economic
Development. Meanwhile the National Plan-
The National Growth Path (NGP) pu- ning Commission, with ministerial rank in
blished in November 2010 gives the the president’s office, is working on its first
state complete control competence and
was heavily criticised by the Opposition National Plan, containing long-term goals, to
and the society in general. be submitted in November this year.11

The NGP12 published in November 2010 gives the state


complete control competence and was heavily criticised by
the Opposition and the society in general. The NGP defines
virtually no time frames or concrete implementation plans.
It remains, in essence, a declaration of intent, such as were
partly contained within the GEAR und RDP and AsgiSA and
Jipsa. The word “entrepreneur” occurs once in this 35-page
document. It completely ignores the three “Dinokeng”
scenarios, named after the place near Johannesburg13
where they were worked out and discussed in 2009 by 35
respected personalities of different backgrounds. The first
scenario ends in decline and disintegration of the country
because the leadership is overtaxed, weak and divided,
and is unable to solve the most important problems of
the people such as poverty, underemployment, security,
education, and health. In the second scenario the state
assumes the role as leader, managing and strangling
private initiative from the business community or civil
society. State-led development will however fail due to
the state’s inability and lack of capacity, and lead to an
­increasingly authoritarian system. The “Walk Together”
scenario is complex, as it involves citizens in the decision-
making processes, supports initiatives from civil society
and creates stable conditions for economic development.
The result is an inclusive society, as the constitution
requires, and responsible government. The ANC is not at
present taking part in this open dialogue with civil society.

11 | Cf. Anthony Butler, “Sloppy jobs promises set Zuma up for a


backlash,” Business Day, January 28, 2011, 11.
12 | http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=135748
(accessed February 2, 2011).
13 | http://www.dinokengscenarios.co.za (accessed February 2,
2011). Among the initiators was anti Apartheid activist Ram-
phele Mamphela and Graca Machel, wife of Nelson Mandela.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 73

Despite critical comments even from the government


alliance Jacob Zuma asked the party committees and
all departments to begin implementation of the NGP. On
January 8th, in his speech at the 99th ANC party conference
in Polokwane he declared the year 2011 the “year of job
creation through meaningful economic transformation”.14
The primary instrument for achieving this objective is the
NGP, intended to create sustainable employment (decent
work), as required by the new labour laws that came into
force in December 2010. Confusion arose as, at the party
meeting from 12th to 14th January 2011, sec-
tions of the ANC took the position that any “South Africa has three economic poli-
work is better than no work.15 The question cies – or is it four? And that’s just the
government. The ANC and its alliance
of harmonizing all these plans was not one partners account for several more.”
Zuma tackled. (Mail & Guardian )

The chief editor of the weekly Mail & Guardian, Nic Dawes,
commented on the launch of the NGP in November
2010: “As of this week, South Africa has three economic
policies – or is it four? And that’s just the government. The
ANC and its alliance partners account for several more.”16
The well-known cartoonist, Jonathan Zapiro expressed this
in his cartoon of the proverbial broth and the Ministers as
the cooks, with President Zuma asking: “How can I help?
… Need more Cooks?”17 Justice Malala on the other hand,
in his commentary in The Times on January 10, criticises
the uncritical trust in the state as an agent of change and
laments the lack of vision of the political leadership.18

14 | “ANC 99th Anniversary speech by Jacob Zuma,” January 8,


2011, in: http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/ANC-
99th-Anniversary-speech-by-Jacob-Zuma-20110108
(accessed February 2, 2011).
15 | Cf. Terry Bell, “Decent Work and temp jobs tie ANC and Unions
in Knots,” The Star – Business Report, January 21, 2011, 2.
Cf. Christopher Malikan, “Decent work: Key to growth”; Loane
Sharp, “… Or a hidden agenda?”, Mail & Guardian, January
28 - February 3, 2011, 33 and 36.
16 | Cf. Nic Dawes, “Crisis calls for decisive Leadership,” Mail &
Guardian, November 26 - December 2, 2010, 3.
17 | Jonathan Zapiro, Mail & Guardian, November 26 - December
2, 2010.
18 | Cf. Justice Malala, “SA needs visionary at the helm,” The
Times, January 10, 2011, 8.
74 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

WHICH ECONOMIC SYSTEM?

The South African economic model can be accurately


described as “State-interventionist market economy”.
There is no planning policy in South Africa, in the sense
of a clear definition of the economic system. From the
perspective of the dominant ANC this may be purposefully
connected in a de facto existing asymmetric two-party
system19. With the Developmental State as concept, which
is undermined by the direct intervention on the part of the
government, all interest groups of the Tripartite Alliance
can meet under the umbrella of the “Broad Church ANC”20,
and see their interests represented.

It is not only since the financial crisis that the ANC and
the government it forms have shown an interest in the
economic systems developing in Asia. The
It is very doubtful whether the so- positive economic development in some
called Asian model of a Developmental countries and the rapid overcoming of the
State is transferable to the African re-
gion or individual countries. consequences of the financial crisis, as well
as the increasing trade exchange are key.
However, it is very doubtful whether the so-called Asian
model of a Developmental State is transferable to the
African region or individual countries. Although each quite
different, the Asian development models do have certain
constituent conditions in common. These include, first and
foremost, a clear definition of goals and a focused strategy,
a strong state with an efficient and independent public
administration and effective leadership.21

On the one hand, Government intervention destroys the


foundations of a Developmental State, which, in South
Africa, could be a “Democratic Developmental State”. Such
a state would be forged by alliances with a broad base
in society, not only allowing but promoting public parti-
cipation.22 The conditions for this however cannot be
met as long as the ANC and its Alliance partner hold on

19 | Cf. Siegmar Schmidt, “Länderprojekt Südafrika, Evaluierung,”


2010, 19.
20 | Cf. Hans-Georg Schleicher, “Bald 100 – und dann?”, Afrika
Post, 4/2010, 41.
21 | Cf. John McKay, “The Asian ‘Miracle’ after the Global Financial
Crisis: Some Lessons for Africa,” The Brenthurst Foundation,
Discussion Paper 2010/07.
22 | Cf. Charity Musamba, n. 8, 38 et sqq.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 75

to the concept of the National Democratic Revolution


(NDR).23 On the other hand, South Africa has been devel-
oping away from market economy since 2007 and puts
increasing faith in public investment plans. With the NGP,
the ANC government has clearly settled for state control
and intervention, and thus effectively put an end to the
market-oriented GEAR policy. That plan was described
by ANC speaker Jackson Mthembu to the media at the
party meeting as a liberal concept that had led to “jobless
growth”.24 Whether there were other factors or wrongly set
basic conditions at play is a question not considered by the
ANC and its alliance partners. A discussion of the Dinokeng
scenarios would have provided this debate
with a direction in terms of content, and One of the most important goals of the
could have led to new insights. Perhaps this NGP, which is being aggressively mar-
keted by the ANC and the government,
connection would have also been clarified: is the creation of five million jobs in
one of the most important goals of the NGP, ten years.
which, with an eye on the local elections due
in May 2011, is being aggressively marketed by the ANC
and the government, is the creation of five million jobs in
ten years. However, during this period, every year 600,000
young people crowd the labour market.25

POLITICAL ERRORS

It is unclear what form the South African economic system


will take in the future. Based on ideological dissent in the
Tripartite Alliance it appears, however, that for the fore-
seeable future a type of “experimental interventionism”
is forming, not always congruent, occuring at frequent
intervals. At the same time, with increasing centralization,
governmental planning will determine the economic trade
of the government. At this point, the influence of China
should not be underestimated. In view of the economic
sales figures, Peking’s “Market Authoritarian Model”
appears increasingly attractive to many countries – above

23 | “ANC 99th Anniversary speech by Jacob Zuma,” n. 14;


cf. National Democratic Revolution: http://nehawu.org.za/
uploads/Res_political.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011);
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?include=docs/pol/2007/
strategy_tactics.html&ID=2535 (accessed February 2, 2011).
24 | Cf. Sam Mkokeli, “Zuma tells ANC to put Patel plan into
action,” Business Day, January 14, 2011.
25 | Cf. Opinion & Analysis: “ANC cannot wish jobs into existence,”
Business Day, January 10, 2011, 5.
76 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

all in the global South.26 In the last three years the political
exertion of influence in South Africa came alongside the
expansion of economic cooperation. Since the takeover of
party leadership from Jacob Zuma delegations from the
ANC leadership to China take place on a regular basis. The
expenses are shared by ANC and China’s Communist Party.
As a result ANC announced the establishment of a political
school for party members which is oriented towards the
Chinese model.27 It shall be headed by Toni
During the campaign for the presiden- Yengeni, former Chief Whip of the ANC in
tial elections in 2009 the ANC confir- the National Parliament, who was sentenced
med receiving monies from friendly
parties – including China’s CP. to four years in prison for corruption in
connection with the “Arms Deal”28. At the
gala dinner before the 99th Party Convention the Chinese
Chapter of the Progressive Business Forum (PBF) appeared
as the main sponsor. The PBF is one of the ANC’s most
important fundraising organizations.29 During the campaign
for the presidential elections in 2009 the ANC confirmed
receiving monies from friendly parties – including China’s
Communist Party.30

The current party majority seems to be following this line.


The South African Communist Party also trusts central
planning, but rather derives this claim from the Marxist-
Leninist body of thought.31 By contrast, COSATU ignores
the high level of unemployment, and the consequences for
the labor market, by appearing with high wage demands
and implementing minimum wages. This is in direct conflict
with cheap textile imports from China. The example of
Newcastle, in the North of the KwaZulu/Natal Province,
shows the danger of the migration of production facilities

26 | Cf. Stefan Halper, The Peking Consensus: How China’s


Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century
(New York: Basic Books 2010).
27 | Cf. Mandy Rossouw, “ANC ponders Chinese policy,” Mail &
Guardian, November 26 - December 2, 2010, 39.
28 | Cf. Andrew Feinstein, “After the Party – A Personal and
Political Journey inside the ANC,” Jonathan Ball Publisher.
29 | Cf. Mandy Rossouw, “Chequebook politics,” Mail & Guardian,
January 14 - 20, 2011.
30 | Cf. Andile Sokomani, 2010: “Party financing in democratic
South Africa: harbinger of doom?”, in: Anthony Butler (ed.),
Paying for Politics – Party Funding and Political Change in
South Africa and the Global South, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung,
2010, 179; Mandy Rossouv, “ANC’s dodgy funders,” Mail &
Guardian, March 20 - 26, 2009.
31 | Cf. http://www.sacp.org.za/main.php?include=docs/history/
1991/constitution7.html (accessed February 2, 2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 77

to neighbouring countries.32 By contrast, Julius Malema,


Chairman of the ANC-Youth League (ANCYL), continuously
demands the nationalization of the mines, and demanded
at the National General Council (NGC)33 of the ANC in
September 2010 that the subject be included
on the agenda at the next ANC Party Con- ANC General Secretary Gwede Man-
vention in 2012. In an interview after the tashe explained that an independent
think tank will be appointed for ad-
NGC, General Secretary Gwede Mantashe visory support for the Economic Trans-
explained that an independent think tank formation Committee (ETC).
will be appointed for advisory support for the
Economic Transformation Committee (ETC). In comparison,
the spokesperson of the ANCYL, Floyd Shivambu, deman-
ded that in addition to the mines, the study should also
include “other strategic sectors such as banks, energy and
petroleum” and continues: “The political background of the
researchers is vital because they should internalize and
properly understand the ANC’s 3rd NGC characterization of
the ANC, particularly the multiclass character of the ANC,
with its bias towards the working class and the poor.”34 The
UNCTAD study mentioned at the beginning attributes the
drastic decrease in foreign direct investments in 2010 to
the nationalization debate in the ANC.

PARTY AND STATE

Based on the National Democratic Revolution the ANC


views itself as “the forefront of exercising people’s
power”.35 Consequently, the ANC also views itself as the
movement which represents the interests of the people
and combines these within the Party. This leads to the
incorrect assessment by many members and supporters
that the ANC, as an “inclusive Party”, has a claim to sole
representation of the concerns of the people. The result
of this is that the separation between Party and State is
increasingly blurred. This is made particularly clear with
the filling of public offices. With regard to the “Strategy

32 | Cf. Barry Terreblanche, “Minimum-wage threat to factories,”


Business Day, January 20, 2011, 1 et seq.; id.., “Clothing
Industry – Only a miracle will stop Sactwu’s suicidal trajectory,”
Business Day, January 25, 2011, 9.
33 | Cf. Report of the 3rd National General Council, 48-49;
http://www.anc.org.za/docs/reps/2010/3rdngcx.pdf
(accessed February 2, 2011).
34 | Cf. Matuma Letsola, “Nationalisation row grinds on,” Mail &
Guardian, November 26 - December 2, 2010.
35 | “ANC 99th Anniversary speech by Jacob Zuma,” n. 14, 2.
78 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

and Tactics” document from the 2007 Convention Jacob


Zuma said, in his address to the 99th anniversary of the
ANC, “that we place a high premium on the involvement
of our cadres in all centers of power”. And he elaborates
further: “We also need their presence and involvement in
key strategic positions in the State as well as the private
sector, and will continue strategic deployments in this
regard.”36 General Secretary Gwede Mantashe explained,
in connection with the forced resignation of Thabo Mbeki as
President, that the ANC appoints its “Civil Servants” and,
according to their decision, also dismisses them.37

In practice, this means that cadres appointed by the ANC


are seated in practically all functions, above all in public
service and the powerful parastatals, but also in the area
of justice, CSO, and other public sectors. With this large
number, it is questionable whether those who land in these
positions possess the corresponding qualifications. The
practice shows that other criteria, such as achievements
in the struggle for liberation, affiliation to specific party
factions and political machine, are frequently decisive. This
leads to poor administration, in particular, on both subor-
dinate political levels, the provinces and municipalities.
Extensive corruption and patronage are the unavoidable
result. In South Africa, the term “Tender-
A result of the “Cadre-Deployment- preneur” was created for the preferential
Policy” of the ANC is the accumulation treatment for the allocation of public tenders,
of power in the hands of a few offici-
als at the head of the party. above all with infrastructure investments.

An additional result of the “Cadre-Deployment-Policy” of


the ANC is the accumulation of power in the hands of a
few officials at the head of the party, because the ANC
is obligated to the principle of Democratic Centralism,
as Party President Zuma explained. An efficient and not
politicized administration is one of the basic requirements
for the functioning of a social market economy. The Asian
experiences clearly prove that this is also an indispensable
requirement for the economic model of the Developmental
State. More generally, The Economist 1999, formulates
that no country is capable of developing itself without “an

36 | “ANC 99th Anniversary speech by Jacob Zuma,” n. 14, 7;


http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?include=docs/pol/2007/
strategy_tactics.html&ID=2535 (accessed February 2, 2011).
37 | Cf. Werner Böhler, Julia Weber, “Südafrika nach den Wahlen,”
KAS-Auslandsinformationen 4/2009, 38 et sqq.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 79

independent class of public servants”, who free themselves


from their political, ethnic, or other loyalties.38 The ANC
follows the constitutional guidelines in Section 197 only
insofar, that public service should be more representative
with regard to the population. However, it disregards that,
according to the same section, it must also be efficient,
and politically independent.39 Minister Ebrahim Patel shares
concerns with regard to the capacities of the national
bureaucracy when he writes, with an eye towards the plans
of the NGP that the bureaucracy capable of implementing
those plans does not exist.40

Because a departure from “Cadre Deploy- The ANC government brought about
ment” is not possible for ideological reasons, two reform plans: the inspection of
the role, number, and borders of the
the ANC government brought about two provinces, and the “Single Public Ser-
reform plans: the inspection of the role, vice Bill”.
number, and borders of the provinces, and
the “Single Public Service Bill”. Both reforms inevitably lead
to more concentration of power for the national executives.
The change in the province borders, or their merger, not
only undermines the “Three-Sphere-System” anchored in
the constitution, but would also eliminate the opposition
government of the DA in the Western Cape and create a
long-standing structural majority for the ANC. The imple-
mentation of the Single Public Service Bill would, however,
give the national government the opportunity to appoint
their cadres at all political levels, at will. Unpleasant public
servants could, in this way, be arbitrarily changed, even in
opposition-ruled provinces and municipalities.

PARASTATALS

The number of state-owned enterprises in South Africa is


estimated at 300; however the intention is to reduce that
to 80 strategic entities.41 These ranges from Eskom (power

38 | Quoted from Jeffrey Anthea, 2010, Affirmation Action and


Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa, 13; Working
Paper prepared for the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung conference
“Targeting Horizontal Inequality. Affirmative Action, Identity
and Conflict” in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 11/2010.
39 | Cf. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
Section 197, Public Service.
40 | Cf. Ebrahim Patel, “New Growth Path: An attemt to provoke
a long-overdue conversation,” Business Day, December 3, 2010.
41 | Cf. Mandy Mossouw, Lynley Donnely, “ANC ponders greater
role in parastatals,” Mail & Guardian, December 10 - 16, 2010.
80 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

supply), Acsa (airport operator), PetroSA, Rand Water to


South African Tourism, Telcom and Transnet.42 Meantime,
the ANC now rules out privatizations, as discussed in the
first decade of the democratic South Africa. Rather, the State
Owned Enterprises (SOE) are viewed as strategic instru-
ments in the hands of the state43 and should, according
to the NGP among others, contribute to the reduction
in unemployment, to the education of youth, and the
modernization of infrastructure. However, the Parastatals
largely do not fulfill this task. The main reason is again
to be found in the Cadre Deployment policy
The “Service Delivery” protests feared and the ANC’s exertion of political influence.
by the ANC express the dissatisfaction Frequent changes at the management level
of the people with the basic supply of
power, drinking water, and homes. of the state-owned enterprises combined
with high severance pay (Golden Handshake)
are the result.44 The “Service Delivery” protests feared by
the ANC express the dissatisfaction of the people with
the basic supply of power, drinking water, and homes.
In order to correct the widespread mismanagement the
Minister for Public Enterprise, Barbara Hogan, intended to
enable independent management of the Parastatals. She
was replaced during the shuffling of the cabinet in October
2010. Instead, the ANC intends to subject the SOE to
the orders of the ANC government thereby following the
Chinese model.45

However, the Parastatals also serve to protect the power


of the ANC by calling on them for party financing.46 The
ANC has its own Fundraising Company, Chancellor House
Holding (CHH). It is involved with 25 per cent of Hitachi
Power Africa Holdings, which received a multi-million Rand
contract from Eskom. The often-cited comment concerning

42 | http://www.afribiz.info/content/parastatals-and-government-
structures-of-south-africa (accessed February 2, 2011).
43 | Cf. Brendan Boyle, “The Big Bang – New unit mooted to take
control of 13 parastatals wit hthe president in charge,” Sunday
Times – Business Times, March 22, 2009, 1.
44 | Cf. Brendan Peacock, “Fat-cat parastatal boses come and go
but the get the cream,” Sunday Times –Business Times,
December 2, 2010, 1.
45 | Cf. Mandy Rossouw, “ANC ponders Chinese Policy,” Mail &
Guardian, January 26 - Febraury 2, 2011, 39.
46 | Cf. Zwelethu Jolobe, 2010, “Financing the ANC: Chancellor
House, Eskom and the dilemmas of party finance reform,” in:
Anthony Butler (ed.), Paying for Politics – Party Funding and
Political Change in South Africa and the Global South, Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, 2010, 201-217.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 81

this from the General Secretary of COSATU, Zwelinzima


Vavi is: “God help us all.”47 And, this is just one example.
A gala dinner was held on the eve of both the NGC as
well as the ANC Party Convention for the 99th anniversary.
Companies could purchase a seat at the table of President
Zuma for 500,000 Rand or a seat at a table of Minister’s
for up to 300,000 Rand.48 Represented here are, above
all, the Parastatals and BEE Companies. The new party
headquarters of the ANC in the Limpopo Province, one of
the poorest provinces in South Africa, was inaugurated
with the Party Convention. The costs for the Frans Hohlala
House, which was playfully referred to by local politicians
as the Luthuli House II after the original building in Johan-
nesburg, amounted to 40 million Rand. The new Party
Headquarters, according to the statement of the Provincial
Chairperson, Cassel Mathale, cost the ANC nothing.49

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND BLACK


ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT

Leading ANC politicians already confirmed in 2007 that Black


Economic Empowerment (BEE) failed. The former Minister
for Public Enterprises, Alec Erwin, explained in July, 2007
in front of the South African Business Club in
London: “affirmative action is for all intents The General Secretary of the ANC and
and purposes dead”.50 The General Secretary current Vice President of the Country,
Kaglema Motlanthe, said in January,
of the ANC and current Vice President of the 2007 that BEE spurred corruption at
Country, Kaglema Motlanthe, said in January all levels of government.
2007 that BEE spurred corruption at all levels
of government.51 Moeletsi Mbeki, entrepreneur and brother
of Thabo Mbeki, uses strong language to express his
criticism when he says BEE “strikes a fatal blow against
black entrepreneurship by creating a small class of unpro-
ductive but wealthy black crony capitalists made up of ANC

47 | Cf. Janet Smith, “Beacon, compass, watchdog,” The Star,


December 3, 2010, 17.
48 | Cf. Werner Böhler, “Der ANC wird 100 – und ist auf der
Suche nach seiner Idendität,” Länderbericht, September 27,
2010, http://kas.de/wf/doc/kas_20608-1522-1-30.pdf
(accessed February 2, 2011).
49 | Cf. Mandy Rossouw, “Checkbook Politics,” Mail & Guardian,
January 14 - 20, 2011, 8.
50 | Quoted from Anthea, 2010, n. 38, 24.
51 | Cf. Anthea, n. 38, 75.
82 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

politicians”.52 NGP Minister Ebrahim Patel adds: “Govern-


ment has adopted the position that Black Economic Empow-
erment should seek to empower all histori-
“Government has adopted the positi- cally disadvantaged people rather than only
on that Black Economic Empowerment a small group of black investors. Current BEE
should seek to empower all historically
disadvantaged people rather than only provisions have, however, in many instances
a small group of black investors.” failed to ensure a broad-based approach.”53
(NGP Minister Ebrahim Patel)
For the implementation of BEE the Broad
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (BBBEE) was
passed in 2003, which was, however, only brought into
force in August, 2008.54 With this the prior existing sectoral
charters were unified. An integral component of the BEE
law is a complex “Score Card System” which includes seven
elements based on codes, with which the “Empowerment
Progress” of the company can be measured. These are:

▪▪Direct empowerment through ownership and control of


enterprises and assets.
▪▪Management at senior level.
▪▪Human resource development and employment equity.
▪▪Indirect empowerment through: preferential procure-
ment, enterprise development, and corporate social
investment (a residual and open-ended category).55

There are objectives for the individual goals which must be


reached after five to ten years. Their compliance is checked
by accredited agencies. However, the basic problem does
not lie in the lack of willingness of the companies to
implement the BEE requirements. Out of 1,500 companies
questioned 84 per cent implemented Affirmative Action
measures during the transition phase through 1995, which
the South Africa Survey, conducted by the Institute of
Race Relations (SAIRR), proves once a year since 1946.56
This also includes the participation of black people in the

52 | Moeletsi Mbeki, “Ripe for the plunder,” The Citizen, September


21, 2009, cf. id. 2009, “Architects of Poverty – Why African’s
Capitalism needs changing,” Pan Macmillan South Africa.
53 | http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=135748,
21, (accessed February 2, 2011); siehe auch Jana Marais,
“The Billionaires are back,” Sunday Times – Business Times,
1 and 3.
54 | http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68031
(accessed February 2, 2011).
55 | http://www.southafrica.info/business/trends/empowerment/
bee.htm (accessed February 2, 2011); As to the Codes cf.
Anthea, n. 38, 38-57.
56 | Cf. Anthea, n. 38, 20-24.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 83

company and leading management functions. However, the


basic bottleneck exists in the shortage of “Black people”57
with the appropriate training and the necessary experience
for senior positions, share ownership, or ownership.

The most recent survey from September 2009 According to a survey in 2009 25 per
conducted by P-E Corporate Services, estab- cent of managers in first-line manage-
ment of companies are black people. In
lished significant increases in the percentage 1994, this figure was five per cent.
of black managers in Senior Positions and
middle management. According to this survey 25 per
cent of managers in first-line management of companies
and 28 per cent of middle management are black people.
In 1994, these figures were five per cent and seven per
cent.58 In his calculations, Lawrence Schlemmer comes
to a comparable increase in the development of a “Black
Middle Class”. However, he concludes that these growth
rates cannot be continued due to the mediocre educational
system.59 Numbers prove the steeply increasing demand
for qualified managers over the coming years. Already in
1998, an additional need for up to 500,000 managers in
middle and first-line management was established. With
a growth of two to three per cent per year in the next 15
years an additional 750,000 managers will be needed. This
number increases to 1.25 million with a growth rate of five
to six per cent.60

Despite high unemployment companies cannot find


enough trained, skilled workers and managers available
in the labour market. Nevertheless, the companies must
implement the BEE requirements if they want to participate
in public contracts, or if they are dependent on licenses or
permits. The most recent South Africa Survey from SAIRR
proves that even the Parastatals cannot meet the quotas
and that their employee-structure does not correspond to
the overall distribution of the population. This is attributed
to the lack of qualified workers, and is proportionate in
every population group. The manager of the project,
Marius Roodt, confirms this in a press release from January
26, 2011: “This is a reflection of the dire skills shortage

57 | Section 1 of the Broad-Based Black Economnic Empowerment


Act defines black people as “a generic term which means
Africans, Coloureds and Indians”, cf. n. 54.
58 | Cf. Anthea, n. 38, 20-24.
59 | Ibid., 69-70.
60 | Ibid., 48-49.
84 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

in the country. Companies, and indeed Parastatals, have


to take on skilled personnel, no matter what the colour of
their skin.”61 International firms are also subject to these
requirements. If they present an insurmountable hurdle
due to the limitations of the labour market and restrictive
immigration or residency regulations, this could have an
impact on location and investment decisions, which the
German Chamber of Industry and Commerce (Deutsche
IHK) confirms for Southern Africa.

DEFICIENT EDUCATION SYSTEM

With a sum of 165 billion rand, education was the largest


single item in the fiscal policy of 2010. This constitutes up
to about 18 per cent of the budget. South Africa thereby
spends more on education than comparable countries. Still
in comparative studies of education results the country
is regularly among the lower end.62 The Minister for
Education, Angie Motshekga, considered the rise in the
“Pass Rate” for National Senior Certificate (NSC) exams
from 60.6 per cent in 2009 to 67.8 per cent in 2010, a
growth of 7.2 per cent, to be a great success. The highest
quota was reached in 2003 with 7.3 per cent.

A nuanced view however presents a different picture. While


before 40 per cent of the maximum points were required
for receiving the higher grade, the requirements for
passing the NSC are now 30 per cent in individual subjects.
Of 1.3 million school beginners in the year
The “pass-rate” at private schools is 1999, only 579,384, or 44 per cent, finished
98 per cent. State schools, though, are in 2010 with an NSC certificate. When the at
achieving very poor results.
least 100,000 who did not go to their exams
are added to this and this is used as a basis, the “pass-
rate” is only 57 per cent. Further insight is gained when
private and state schools are differentiated. According to
provided by the Independent Examination Board (IEB), the
“pass-rate” at private schools is 98 per cent. There are
certainly also state schools that, with comparatively fewer
available means, achieve very good results. However, the

61 | South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), Press


Release, “Parastatals not compliant with employment equity
demands,” January 26, 2011, http://sairr.org.za/media/
media-releases (accessed February 2, 2011).
62 | Cf. Sue Blaine, “Key sufjects spark pride and concern,”
Business Day, January 7, 2011.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 85

flipside of this is that other state schools are achieving


very poor results. When differentiated according to subject
combinations, it is apparent that math and science were
chosen by fewer candidates than in 2008. It is these skills
however that the economy desperately needs. The NGP
has the goal of training an additional 30,000 engineers by
the year 2014. How this is to be achieved with such a low
“pass-rate” is not illuminated in the plan. In 2009, only
98,000 matriculation candidates, which is equivalent to the
British A-level, passed the physics exam with more than 30
per cent. In order to be accepted by universities special-
izing in natural sciences, 40 per cent is necessary.

Even 16 years after the beginning of demo- Minister Angie Motschekga declared in
cracy, education results do not correspond January 2011 that it would take two
decades to make up the lag in the edu-
to the financial means employed. Minister cation system.
Angie Motschekga declared in January 2011
that it would take two decades to make up the lag in the
education system.63 Poor teacher training programs, under-
payment of teachers, problems with recruiting teachers for
schools in rural areas, school management deficits as well
as wide-spread poor school infrastructure and insufficient
equipment for teaching and learning materials are among
the causes. Corruption through Cadre Deployment is
another. It is apparent that the qualification requirements
were “standardized” for the last matric exams. The director
of the quality assurance office “Umaluse”, Professor
Sizwe Mabizela, in an interview with the Sunday Times,
confirmed that a change in the performance requirements
was planned. However he maintained that he could not
give any further details because of the danger of misinter-
pretation. He stated that it was a “confidential process but
not a secretive one”.64

Solutions could be found in a study by the CDE65 published


in August 2010 on “low-fee private schools”, as they were
introduced in countries like India, Chile and Ghana as
“private schooling for the poor”. In South Africa, as the
study proves, these were often founded or co-funded by

63 | Cf. SA-Today, December 6, 2010, 3.


64 | Cf. Interview with Chris Barron in the Sunday Times, January
16, 2011, 7.
65 | Cf. Ann Bernstein (ed.), “Hidden Assets – South Africa’s low-fee
private schools,” in: CDE in Depth, № 10, August 2010.
86 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

corporations. The actual percentage of these schools in all


provinces is said to be about 30 per cent. The ministry of
education indicated that the number of private schools in
2008 was 3.4 per cent. Parents say that factors in deciding
to send their children to private schools are above all the
better results in school certificates and the better educated
and motivated teacher, who are, in part, paid less than
other teachers. It is questionable whether or not the ANC
government is opening itself up to this possibility of a
mixed school system or if ideological reasons will hinder
it. Alternatively, the national school system would have
to be thoroughly reformed, above all in regard to teacher
training and their motivation. The fact that
Without a better school education, the this is possible is underlined by the example
universities will have to lower their of the Masibambane High School in the
own levels of quality. This would af-
fect the international competitiveness Bloekombos Community in the outskirts of
of South Africa. Cape Town.66

Without a better school education, the universities will


have to lower their own levels of quality. This would not
only affect the employment market and job situations, but
it would affect the international competitiveness of South
Africa, also in comparison with other developing countries.
For corporations, this would have the consequence that
they would no longer be able to fulfil BEE requirements.
Multinational corporations could rethink location decisions
or revise investment decisions.

FURTHER ASPECTS

The NGP is characterized by a general mistrust in the


allocation capability of the market through responsible
decisions by business persons. For this reason the NGP
has the goal “to redirect savings and investment toward
productive and infrastructure projects in support of
employment and sustained growth”.67 Moreover, many
specifications and intention declarations are contained
within the NGP without specific statements concerning
their implementation and their achievability, with the
exception of mentioning that the state and the government
will be responsible. A statement about the partnership
cooperation with the private sector in achieving set targets

66 | Cf. DA-Today, January 24, 2011.


67 | Cf. n. 9, 27.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 87

is not to be found. However, the government is reliant on


the cooperation with social partners in implementing the
NGP.68

In addition, numbers in connection with political-ideological


views of the ANC are partially established that have not
recognizable political or economic basis. “A broad devel-
opment pact on wages”69 that should be implemented by
social partners is suggested. According to this, the monthly
income of 3,000 to 20,000 rand per month should rise in
relation to the inflation rate in addition to a measured rise
in wage. Salaries over 20,000 should also rise in relation
to the rate of inflation, without a rise in wage. Salaries
of “senior managers and executives” over 550,000 Rand
per year should be frozen at this level. This formulation
seems to be an indication that “public servants” are not
affected. Now it is the salaries of the public servants that
are reflected in the budget. Alone the rise in salaries in the
year 2010 burdens the budget with an additional 6.2 billion
rand.70 Lavish bonus and salary payments for
the Parastatals are also no model for what The capping of salaries at the level of
is demanded of the social partners in the approx. 45,000 Rand per month also
has an unpleasant aftertaste when the
NGP. The capping of salaries at the level of minister earns 1.5 million a year.
approx. 45,000 Rand per month also has an
unpleasant aftertaste when the minister earns 1.5 million a
year and Jacob Zuma approved a salary rise for his cabinet
members of 5 per cent. It is equally questionable why the
cabinet meeting of 16-20 of January 2011 took place in a
luxury golf and safari resort in the province of Limpopo and
not in the government buildings in Pretoria. The estimated
costs were up to 15 million rand, which will be charged to
the government treasury.71

According to NGP, the government is obligated, within the


parameters of the “pact”, to secure social welfare payments
to poor members of the communities and disadvantages
employees. How this expensive promise is supposed to be
administered is not said. Already approximately 14 million

68 | Steven Friedman, “New Growth Path success needs ‘new


politics’”, Business Day, January 26, 2011, 9.
69 | Cf. n. 9.
70 | Cf. Annabel Bishop, “Civil servants wages eat into ability to
build crucial capacity,” The Star – Business Report, 25.
71 | Cf. Mandy Rossouw, “Luxury lekgotla irks officials,” Mail &
Guardian, January 21-27, 2011, 2.
88 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

people receive social welfare payments. This number will


rise to approximately 18 million by the year 2013. In
relation to this only 5.5 million carry 95 per cent of income
tax generation. The corporate taxes of approximately
2,000 companies are added to this. This base of taxpayers
is too small to finance the growing number of social welfare
payments in addition to public services. The limits have
already been stretched to such an extent that only a rise in
the number of taxpayers can resolve the dilemma.72

Independently from the nationalization debate in the


Tripartite Alliance the NGP announces the establishment of
an government-owned mining company and a government-
owned bank. However, the NGP does not answer the
question of why these new companies in the hands of the
government are supposed to be better managed than the
existing parastatals. Many of these, such as the electricity
supplier Eskom, the government airline SAA or the
government station SABC, require regular financial injec-
tions from the fiscal policy. Added to this is a fluctuation in
the injection supplied to these government businesses that
are either based on political influence or the incapability of
the company leadership. “It was all about the state”, the
Business Day commented on the speech by Jacob Zuma at
the ANC party convention on January 8, 2011. This does
not apply any less to the NGP.

OUTLOOK

The potential of this country, a first- The economic performance of South Africa
rate tourist destination with access to has, in the two decades since the beginning
significant raw materials and a rela-
tively well-developed infrastructure, of democracy, developed positively though at
is not used adequately. a low level, with the exception of the year
of crisis in 2009. In the nineties, the growth rate was a
moderate two to three per cent. In the context of the positive
world economic development, it rose in the last decade to
four to 5.5 per cent. South Africa however remains signifi-
cantly behind other emerging countries such as Brazil,
India, Indonesia, or Vietnam. The potential of this country,
a first-rate tourist destination with access to significant
raw materials and a relatively well-developed infrastruc-
ture, is not used adequately due to false political directions.

72 | Cf. Annabel Bishop, n. 70; National Treasury and South


African Revenue Service (ed.), Tax-Statistics 2009, 14.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 89

The basic democratic conditions have changed negatively


since the negotiated transition. Being in the position of
dominant governing party, the ANC seems determined
to secure its power permanently or at least long term.
Included in this aim are the exclusive proportional right
to vote with closed party lists, party financing as well as
the increasing centralization of the concentration of power
to national executives through weakening lower political
levels, interventions in justice such as in the setting up
of the Judicial Service Commission, the
dissolution of the special unit for fighting The deciding factor is the mixing of
corruption in the public sector (Scorpions), state and party and, above all, the
Cadre-Deployment-System with fatal
cutting off the National Prosecution Authority consequences for independence and
(NPA) or the purposeful limitation of the the efficiency of governmental admi-
nistration.
media through the Media Tribunal and the
Protection of Information Bill. The deciding
factor however is the mixing of state and party and, above
all, the Cadre-Deployment-System with fatal consequences
for independence and the efficiency of governmental
administration. Accordingly, the quality of democracy in
South Africa has worsened, mostly since 2007, and, as the
Bertelsmann-Transformations-Index (BTI) and the Global
Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forums
(WEF) 2008/2009 compared with 2010/2011 attest, the
competitiveness of the country has worsened as well.73

From 2007 at the latest, the ANC has defined South Africa
as a “developmental state” with a “developmental econo-
my”. Irrespective of whether this is meant to be the classic
development state concept from Asian countries or the
democratic-developmental model practiced in Botswana
and Mauritius, an autonomous and efficient governmental
bureaucracy, which is not present (anymore), is the basic
requirement for this to work. Edigheji defines the Democratic
Developmental State as “one that forges broad-based
alliances with society and ensures popular participation

73 | Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index 2010, Gütersloh


2009, http://bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/fileadmin/
pdf/Anlagen_BTI_2010/BTI_2010__Rankingtabelle_D_web.pdf
(accessed February 2, 2011); World Economic Forum, The
Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, Geneva 2010,
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitiveness
Report_2010-11.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011); World
Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2008-
2009, Geneva 2008, https://members.weforum.org/pdf/
GCR08/GCR08.pdf (accessed February 2, 2011).
90 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

in the governance and transformation process”.74 This


criterion is not fulfilled in South Africa because the ANC
acknowledges its democratic centralism and the internal
debates take place within the party and within the param-
eters of the “Broad Church”. Initiatives by the opposition
and by (independent) civilians are, in contrast, ignored.
The question of whether a developmental state concept
can function in South Africa is therefore justified. The
realities will again and again force the ANC government to
continue interventions in the economy as long as no other
basic directions are taken. This would require a complete
revision of the ANC’s and their alliance partners COSATU
and SACP’s objectives.

The daily policy interventions that, due to the complexity of


economic processes, must be followed by further interven-
tions go beyond the regulatory capacity of the government
and the administration. Conflicting national plans and
ideological influences unsettle the private
The South African economic system economy and scare international investors
desperately needs a clear direction, away. On the other hand, the South African
because the high unemployment base
of 40 percent presents the potential economic system desperately needs a clear
for a great amount of unrest. direction, because the high unemployment
base of 40 per cent presents the potential
for a great amount of unrest. Dissatisfaction about the lack
of social services (service delivery) and the widespread
political machinery already led to violent street protests
in townships that could again gain momentum before the
upcoming communal elections in May 2011. Higher levels
of migration resulted in the xenophobic attacks of May
2008.

In order to achieve a reduction in unemployment, growth


rates of the BIP that are over six per cent are required.
The achievement of this goal must have an economically
friendly climate and trust in the economic system as its
prerequisite. Clear basic conditions and a reliable legal
state of law are absolute necessities. Active middle-ground
policy to diversify the economy must also be the goal. The
processing and refinement of raw materials would lead to
a higher level of value and increased income from exports
and would also create additional manufacturing jobs.

74 | Quoted from Meyns, Charity Musamba, n. 8, 40.


3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 91

Additional jobs in larger corporations and a productive


middle class would be created and, on top of this, young
people would receive training. More people in employment
expands the income basis of the state and lead to higher
national revenues that can be used for the expansion and
modernization of the infrastructure as well as the estab-
lishment of a transparent social service system. In short,
it means that: a move away from a state-interventionist
market economy model and a move towards a regulatory
policy of the social market economy must take place.

It is doubtful whether the ANC is in the position to renew


its programs and to return the (strong) state back to the
establishment of basic conditions in order to give the
economy room to grow. Civil society is ready for a new
direction in the economic and social system. The third
scenario of the Dinokeng Iniative reveals this possibility.

The article was finished on February 1, 2011.


92 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

PAKISTAN AFTER THE FLOOD

Karl Fischer

Six months after the biggest flood disaster in Pakistan’s


Dr. Karl Fischer was
ambassador to Pa- history, approximately seven of 13 million people who lost
kistan (1988-1990), their houses and possessions to the floods around the Indus
Deputy Head of the
and its tributaries1 are still without adequate protection or
UN Special Mission to
Afghanistan (UNSMA food in the face of the cold winter weather which has been
2001) and Chief-of- prevailing since December. The worst affected are those hun-
Staff to the UN Aid
dreds of thousands of people who have already returned
Organisation in
Afghanistan (UNAMA to their ruined villages because they could no longer stand
2002–2004). Since the deplorable conditions in the refugee camps or because
2004 he works as a
they were asked to leave the schools, boarding-schools and
regional consultant
for South Asia. administration buildings that were being used as emergency
shelters. And there are also those tens of thousands of
flood victims who were unable to escape as the flood
waters rose. It took until the beginning of December before
representatives of the World Food Programme, together
with a unit of the Pakistan Army and a non-governmental
organisation (NGO), were able to reach eleven villages in
the Jamshoro District that had been completely cut off by
the floods. There were 1,700 families with around 11,900
people in these villages2, half-starved, living in what was
left of their huts, and who had given up all hope of rescue.

The problem is not only the flooded areas but also the
refugee camps, where around one million people still live,
according to government figures. For weeks now there has
been such an acute lack of the most essential supplies that
well-known NGOs such as ActionAid Pakistan now believe
there is a real danger of hunger riots breaking out. The UN
had warned at the end of October that it did not have the
financial resources to keep the flood victims supplied with

1 | Tahir Ali, “Left in the Lurch,” The News, December 12, 2010.
2 | According to estimates by the World Bank (WB) and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) around 1.7 million people lost their
homes. A Pakistani family comprises eight to ten people on
average.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 93

food and water over the whole winter because they had
only received around a half of the two billion U.S. Dollars
in aid money that had been pledged by donor countries.

In light of the dire predicament of millions of people it is


hard to understand, especially for the victims themselves,
why the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)3
decided at the end of December to declare
that the initial phase of direct disaster relief The visas of all aid workers active in
had in fact come to an end. More specifically Pakistan were cancelled as of January
31. But the reality is that after the
the visas of all aid workers active in Pakistan floods the country still needs the assis-
were cancelled as of January 31. But the tance of international experts.
reality is that after the floods the country still
needs the assistance of international experts to deal with
what has proved to be an unprecedented humanitarian
disaster.

In his official communication to the UN coordinator for


humanitarian aid in Pakistan the NDMA Director General,
General Nadeem Ahmed, claimed that “the situation had
stabilised very quickly”, apart from one or two regions in
the Sindh and Baluchistan provinces “where there is still
flood water and people are not able to return to their
houses.”4 It is clear that the NDMA is basing its estimate of
the level of normalisation on the number of refugees who
have returned home, irrespective of the living conditions
they find where their houses once stood.

The International Crisis Group5 believe that this ignorance


is due to the fact that the NDMA is dominated by senior
officers, and they draw parallels with the way in which
one and a half years earlier, after their military operation
against the Taliban in the Swat Valley of North Pakistan and
surrounding tribal areas, the army forced the people who
had fled the war zone to return quickly to their bombed-out
and destroyed homes, thus enabling them to claim that

3 | National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), the opera-


tions arm of the National Disaster Management Commission
set up by the Pakistan government following the 2005 earth-
quake.
4 | Riaz Khan Daudzai, “Close relief operation by end January:
NDMA”, The News, December 31, 2010, http://thenews.com.pk/
TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=23093&Cat=2 (accessed January
12, 2011).
5 | International non-governmental organization, founded in 1995
with the aim of analysing conflicts and developing solutions.
94 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

the refugee problem had been “successfully resolved”. It


is a tragedy in itself that this flood disaster struck precisely
those war-torn areas in the Khyber-Pakh-
It is a tragedy in itself that this flood tunkhwa province (formerly known as North
disaster struck precisely the war-torn West Frontier Province  – NWFP) and in the
areas, in which the people had just
started to lead a normal life again. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA),
in which the people had just started to lead
a normal life again, despite the ever-present threat from
the Taliban.

The majority of the flood victims were living in extreme


poverty even before the flood, but now their situation
is completely hopeless. It is the same throughout the
country, where every essential area of everyday life was
already in serious difficulties even before the floods struck.
But now this national disaster has made the economic,
social, political and educational crisis much worse. Foreign
financial aid will not be enough on its own to solve the
problem. The country itself will also have to make a huge
effort, including some serious rethinking of its economic
and political direction.

LOSS AND DAMAGES

The cost of the floods, as calculated by the NDMA, only


really hints at the true human cost of the tragedy for the
loss of homes and possessions were not included in the
figures.

By the middle of October the floods had claimed 1,985


lives and 2,946 people had been injured. By the end of
September the UN World Health Organisation (WHO) had
also recorded 99 cases of cholera. The fear is that during
the winter many more people will fall prey to respiratory
illness, malaria, diarrhoea and skin diseases, especially
undernourished children and the elderly. Medical treatment
in the flooded areas is severely limited as the floods
destroyed or partially destroyed 515 existing medical
facilities.6 And where individual hospitals and infirmaries
are still functioning, collapsed bridges and washed-away

6 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods 2010, Damage and Needs


Assessment,” analysis delivered to the Pakistan Development
Forum (PDF), Islamabad, November 14 and 15, 2010, “Health”
section.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 95

roads make it difficult for people to actually get to them.


On December 9, the United Nations bulletin on the humani­
tarian situation in the flooded areas reported that of the
1,938,207,510 U.S. dollars earmarked for
emergency aid, only 50 per cent had so far In the education sector alone the da-
been made available.7 Education projects are mages are immense: 10,248 schools
have been destroyed or damaged,
worst hit (nine per cent funded), followed by along with 23 higher education facili-
accommodation (20 per cent), water supply ties and 21 technical colleges.
and hygiene (29 per cent) and medical treat-
ment (35 per cent). In the already chronically-underfunded
education sector alone the damages are immense: 10,248
schools have been destroyed or damaged, along with 23
higher education facilities and 21 technical colleges.8 The
fact that hundreds of educational buildings had to be used
as emergency centres well beyond the end of the summer
break and had to be completely cleaned and sanitised once
the refugees had left, means that in the Hyderabad district
alone at least 17,000 school children and students will
have to miss a full academic year.9

DEVASTATED LIVES AND SUPPLY BOTTLENECKS

The catastrophic impact of the flooding on the livelihoods


of people in rural areas and on the supply of agricultural
products to the rest of Pakistan can be seen in the fact
that 19,000 villages with 1,750,000 houses were washed
away, 2,244,644 hectares of agricultural land were lost
and the harvest was destroyed. And nobody knows when
the devastated fields and plantations can be planted or
sown again. In addition, initial estimates from November
1410 suggest that 315,600 camels, water buffalo, cattle,
horses and donkeys, 1,208,300 sheep and goats as well as
10,279,700 poultry birds also drowned in the floods. For
the people returning to their villages, these animals should
have been a source of food or income. The loss of so many
animals also meant that the leather industry, Pakistan’s
second largest export industry after textiles, has lost a
significant part of its raw material supply. Wells everywhere

7 | OCHA, Pakistan Humanitarian Bulletin, Issue 9, Islamabad,


December 9, 2010.
8 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Education”.
9 | “17,000 students may face loss of academic year,” The News,
October 16, 2010.
10 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Agriculture, Livestock and
Fisheries”.
96 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

have been contaminated and 3,999 drinking water facili-


ties and 2,842 sewage treatment plants have been dama-
ged. They urgently need disinfection and repair at an
estimated cost of 93.9 million U.S. dollars,11 in order to
provide people and animals with clean drinking water and
to prevent the spread of disease.

DAMAGED INFRASTRUCTURE

The extensive but outdated Indus Basin Irrigation System


(IBIS)12 is the largest continuous irrigation system in the
world. 90 per cent of the country’s agricultural production
is situated in this area and it is here that 54 per cent of
Pakistan’s workforce produces 23 per cent of the country’s
gross national product. The irrigation system incorporates
three large dams and reservoirs, 50,000 kilometres of canal
systems and 1.6 million kilometres of irrigation channels.13
The damage to this system, which irrigates more than 18
million hectares of agricultural land used mostly for rice,
wheat, maize, sugar, cotton, fruit and vegetable growing,
is estimated at 277.6 million U.S. dollars. Initial estimates
for the cost of rebuilding the system vary between 427
and 982.3 million U.S. dollars. In concrete terms there is
damage to 46 dams and barrages, broken canal walls in
hundreds of places in all provinces and a generally insuf-
ficient and neglected drainage system. As
There will be bottlenecks in the supply repairing these installations will take at least
of food to the country as a whole, a re- two to three years, it has to be assumed that
duction in the supply of raw materials
to industry and therefore a noticeable harvest yields will be significantly down and
loss in export volumes. this means that there will be bottlenecks in
the supply of food to the country as a whole, a reduction
in the supply of raw materials to industry and therefore a
noticeable loss in export volumes, and above all a level of
poverty amongst people living on the land which it is not
yet possible to predict.

Right up until the end of the year people in most of the


flooded areas still had no contact with the outside world.
People in those areas without mobile phone networks lost

11 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Water and Sanitation”.


12 | IBIS: Indus Basin Irrigation System.
13 | Fazlur Rahman Siddiqi, “Indus Basin Irrigation System of
Pakistan,” CSR & Companies, Reports & Surveys, July 10,
2008, 1.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 97

their only means of phoning relatives, friends or organi-


sations or even of calling for help as a result of damage
to 734 kilometres of telephone cables, 594
exchanges and 284 relay stations.14 In many The majority of roads are now non-
places the only telephones available to the existent or so badly damaged that
they cannot be used for transporting
public were in administration buildings, but aid to those in need. This has made it
at least 1,437 of these buildings were badly extremely difficult for refugees to re-
turn home.
damaged or totally destroyed.

The majority of roads are now non-existent or so badly


damaged that they cannot be used for transporting aid
to those in need. This has made it extremely difficult for
refugees to return home. In total the floods destroyed 793
kilometres of main roads, including 33 bridges on eight
of these main traffic arteries. 24,295 kilometres of minor
paved roads in the provinces, districts and communities
are now unusable. A large proportion of the broad network
of unpaved roads has either been flooded or totally washed
away as rivers changed their course during the floods and
hillsides collapsed.

The under-developed and unprofitable rail network is not


even close to being able to provide alternative transport
to the road network. 1,224 kilometres of tracks need to
be re-laid as many rails lay under up to a metre of water
or were washed away. On six important lines operations
had to be totally suspended. Estimated damages at the
beginning of October were almost 60 million euros. On top
of that there was a loss of income from reduced passenger
and goods traffic of eight and a half million euros and
additional expenditure required for train trips for delivering
emergency aid. Four airports also sustained damage which
limited their use for aid flights.15

The impact of the floods on energy supplies, which for


many years have already been insufficient to meet the
needs of industry and private households, have been
particularly bad for Pakistan’s economic development and
for people’s living conditions. 15 production plants in the
oil and gas sector have been damaged along with one

14 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Transport & Communication”.


15 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Transport and Communication”;
NDMA, “Floods 2010, Damages & Losses, Roads”, Prime
Minister’s Office, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad 2010.
98 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

refinery, 274 kilometres of pipelines, 3 fuel depots, 135


petrol stations and 310 gas or liquid gas distribution
stations. If those who have returned to their homes cannot
find wood or brushwood to burn they cannot even make
a warming drink of tea. Energy supplies across the whole
country have suffered, with electricity and gas being cut off
for up to 12 hours per day, and in some areas hit by the
catastrophe there have been periods with no supplies at all
because one transformer station has been totally destroyed
and 31 others substantially damaged. In addition, supplies
along around 3,400 kilometres of high tension and other
supply lines have been interrupted and 91 hydro or fossil
fuel power plants can either no longer function at all, or
can only manage a significantly reduced output as a result
of flood damage.16

The Pakistan government, the ADB and the WB estimate


that the flood damages that can be calculated so far to
around six per cent of Pakistan’s gross national product
for the financial year 2009/10, of which 50 per cent is due
to losses incurred in agriculture.17 There can be no doubt
that the effects of this unprece­dented flooding will have
a negative impact on Pakistan’s economic situation and
increase inflationary pressures. At the same time reduced
exports and the need for substantial imports as well as
credit for reconstruction and compensation payments to
flood victims will drive the negative balance of trade and
payments even further into the red.

REACTION TO THE FLOOD CATASTROPHE

For almost a week after the floods began the central and
regional governments in Pakistan did virtually nothing.
During this period around 1,000 people died or were
seriously injured in the mountainous north, where the
disaster started to unfold. On August 1 the Prime Minister
Yusuf Raza Gilani finally announced the setting up of a flood
emergency fund18, into which all cabinet ministers would
give one month’s salary and all civil servants from level 17
and above (22 is the highest level) one day’s salary as an
initial donation.19

16 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Energy”.


17 | ADB and WB, “Pakistan Floods”, “Economic Assessment”.
18 | Prime Minister Flood Relief Fund.
19 | “PM sets up flood relief fund”, The News, August 2, 2010.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 99

As the sheer size of the floods became apparent, President


Zardari, who was abroad at the time, did not feel it was
necessary to return home, but peacefully carried on with
his stay in England and France with this son and daughter. It
was September 7 before he visited the crisis
regions in Sindh and Belutschistan for the Before the Pakistani government had
first time. Likewise, it was two weeks before even worked out what additional
emergency aid they actually needed,
Prime Minister Gilani visited the crisis region. they were already calling on the inter-
And before the Pakistani government had national community for financial and
material assistance.
even worked out what additional emergency
aid they actually needed, they were already
calling on the international community for financial and
material assistance, as they usually do when there is some
kind of calamity.

While private initiatives and national non-governmental


organisations provided immediate help to the victims,20
politicians and civil servants were somewhat reluctant
to donate funds to help. 150 of a total of 371 assembly
members in Punjab province, for example, declined to
donate to the Chief Minister’s flood relief fund. Apparently
they preferred to spend the money in their own constitu-
encies, so that their good deeds would be remembered at
the next elections.21

The army was also initially reluctant to get involved in


rescue and aid activities and focused instead on protecting
their own military facilities. Eventually they did use their
technical means and expertise to help and so strengthened
their image amongst the people.

Donations from abroad were also very slow in coming,


compared to past international disasters, which is probably
due to Pakistan’s reputation for being notoriously corrupt
and for their somewhat ambivalent attitude towards
terrorists. In the first five weeks after the floods began,
only 82 million of the 777 million U.S. dollars pledged and
60 million dollars worth of relief had been received, while

20 | There were many examples of victims staying with relatives


or even strangers, of communities taking in refugees and
providing them with free food and clothing, including warm
meals, and of doctors providing free medical treatment and
drugs.
21 | “150 Punjab MPA refuse donation to relief fund,” The News,
August 4, 2010.
100 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

in the same period after the 2005 earthquake around 6


billion U.S. dollars had flowed into Pakistan.22

Most embarrassing of all, according to Pakistan’s media,


was the performance of the NDMA, whose responsibilities
included the organisation and coordination
Most embarrassing of all was the per- of national and international relief efforts in
formance of the National Disaster Ma- the event of a catastrophe. So far they have
nagement Authority (NDMA) that has
so far limited its activities mainly to limited their activities mainly to collecting
collecting statistical data. statistical data and maintaining their website.
And their head, former Corps Commander
General Nadeem Ahmed, preferred to pose for press photos
alongside foreign representatives in front of a map of
Pakistan showing the flooded areas. As the NDMA has few
resources of its own and insufficient links to civil organisa-
tions, it has not had much success in managing crises in
the past. However, near to Mianwali (Punjab province) they
were able to manage a photo opportunity with the Prime
Minister against the backdrop of an infirmary.23 The former
member of parliament Shafqat Mahmud wrote that the
authorities in this picture were hiding “the reality of their
incapability behind an illusion of effectiveness” 24
.

The NDMA basically left the organisation and coordination


of the emergency effort to provincial and local authorities.
They concentrated on helping the UN aid organisations,
the WB and the ADB, who produced their first aid plan at
the beginning of August25 and published it in its expanded
form on November 5.26 At its heart this plan is as much as
anything a plea to the international community to donate
the 1.94 billion dollars needed for 471 aid projects. It does,
however, also include recommendations from the WB and
the ADB on how to overcome the crisis in 16 areas of
Pakistan’s economy and society and outlines the political
action that would be required.

22 | Ahmad Noorani, “The real scorecard of aid so far received,”


The News, August 30, 2010.
23 | Ahmad Noorani, “As NDMA is scrutinised its record shows it
has miserably failed,” The News, August 19, 2010.
24 | Shafqat Mahmood, “Where could the Messiah come from,”
The News, August 6, 2010.
25 | “Pakistan Initial Floods Emergency Response Plan”.
26 | “Pakistan Flood Relief and Early Recovery Response Plan”.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 101

Extremist religious organisations such as the Al Rehmat


Trust, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harkatul
Mujahideen and Sipah-e-Sahaba27 were quick to mobilise
tens of thousands of volunteers and to be the first to
provide people with accommodation, drinking water and
food, especially in the inaccessible mountain regions, as
they had done after the 2005 earthquake. In many places
they were entrusted with the distribution
of relief supplies by over-stretched local While official incompetence enraged
authorities. In three of the flooded areas in many flood victims, the Islamists were
able to use the floods to strengthen
north Pakistan they distributed food to the their base of sympathisers and to re-
value of 1,100 Rupees per family (approx. cruit new members.
100 Euro). While official incompetence
enraged many flood victims, the Islamists were able to use
the floods to strengthen their base of sympathisers in the
affected areas and to recruit new members.28 However,
well-known author Ahmad Rashid was probably being too
pessimistic when he suggested that the government would
lose control of the areas cut off by the floods and that
these areas would be taken over by the Taliban. The much
feared “Talibanisation of the flood” did not in fact happen.

The Pakistani government used the international Pakistan


Development Forum (PDF)29 on November 14 and 15 in
Islamabad to present the extent of the damages and
losses, to outline who was responsible for carrying out the
aid programmes and to once more ask the international
community for substantial help. The interior minister
Rehman Malik went so far as to demand the cancellation of
50 billion dollars of Pakistan’s international debt, arguing
that, as the frontline state in the battle against terrorism,
Pakistan was making the biggest sacrifices to ensure
security for the western world.30 However, Finance Minister
Abdul Hafeez Shaikh immediately rejected his colleague’s

27 | These groups are often called “the Taliban” by the media, a


convention which is also used here.
28 | Khaled Ahmed, “Sickness of flood politics,” The Friday Times,
August 20, 2010.
29 | PDF: An international consortium which meets at irregular
intervals (last meeting 2007) to provide Pakistan with deve-
lopment assistance, a forum for the presentation of ideas for
Pakistan’s development.
30 | Khaleeq Kiani, “Pakistan seeks $50bn foreign debt waiver”,
Dawn, November 15, 2010, http://dawn.com/2010/11/15/
pakistan-seeks-50bn-foreign-debt-waiver (accessed January
12, 2011).
102 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

suggestion, as this had not been agreed,31 and such a


move would affect Pakistan’s creditworthiness with all the
attendant potential long-term negative consequences.

DIG DEEPER IN YOUR OWN POCKETS

Over the last few years Pakistan has faced repeated accusa-
tions from its financial backers  – chiefly the USA  – that
whenever there is a crisis the country’s knee-jerk reaction
is always to ask for international financial aid rather than
to look for its own solution to the problem. Parallel to this
there is growing criticism within the country
A lack of transparency and control over that the government has wasted international
the way the funds are used has led to aid money rather than using it to initiate
significant amounts draining away into
the morass of corruption caused by the structural reforms to promote sustainable
elite’s self-serving mentality. social and economic development.32 A lack of
transparency and control over the way the
funds are used has also led to significant amounts draining
away into the morass of corruption caused by the elite’s
self-serving mentality. Two years ago the USA were the
first country to stop issuing the Pakistani government with
billions of dollars in annual blank cheques for development
aid. Instead they stipulated what the money should be used
for and demanded that the funds be clearly accounted for.
Responding to accusations that the U.S. was intruding in
Pakistan’s financial and administrative affairs, U.S. ambas-
sador Cameron Munter said at a scientific conference
in Islamabad on January 7: “We appear to be intrusive
because we care, we are the largest donor. Our aid comes
as outright grant of assistance which is different from
loans”33 In addition, the USA and other donors, including
the EU, linked flood aid to the condition that Pakistan’s
dollar millionaires dig equally deep in their own pockets
to help their compatriots and to the requirement for
donations to be documented in a full and transparent way.
This was clearly stressed by foreign speakers at the PDF

31 | “Debt waiver,” Editorial, Dawn, November 16, 2010.


32 | Sania Nishtar, “The PDF premise,” The News, November 22,
2010; Hadia Majid, “Development aid failure,” Dawn,
November 12, 2010.
33 | Bakir Sajjad Syed, “Munter’s blunt talk: We pay so we intrude,”
Dawn, January 8, 2011, http://dawn.com/2011/01/08/
munter’s-blunt-talk-we-pay-so-we-intrude (accessed January
12, 2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 103

conference.34 On September 21 the late Special Repre-


sentative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke,
who died recently, called on the government of Pakistan to
do more to get over the floods, as the inter-
national community could bear no more than Economic experts criticised the IMF and
25 per cent of the total reconstruction costs.35 WB for past structural programmes and
strategies to alleviate poverty which
Economic experts in Pakistan warned against had led to Pakistan’s increasing financi-
further indebtedness and criticised the al dependence.
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and WB
for past structural programmes and strategies to alleviate
poverty which had led to Pakistan’s increasing financial
dependence. In line with the requirements of the interna-
tional credit institutions, on November 12 the government
presented both houses of the National Assembly with a
draft law to introduce sales tax, the Reformed General
Sales Tax (RGST), along with a temporary flood tax.36 As at
year’s end, this still awaited ratification.37 The government
made its intentions known at the PDF conference and
representatives of the provinces assured the donor
countries and credit institutions that in future agriculture
and the real estate industry would also be taxed.

Following on from previous failed attempts, the RGST is


trying to record all purchases, sales and services to provide
a basis for further taxation. The sales tax has been set at
15 per cent and within six months it should bring 30 billion
rupees38 flooding into state coffers. It is hoped that the
flood tax, set at 10 per cent of income tax, will produce
an additional 42 billion rupees, and it is also planned to
increase import duties. However, the transition from
emergency aid to the reconstruction phase, set to begin
on January 31, 2011, will need another 260 billion rupees
in the current financial year,39 part of which will have to be
diverted from other development projects. Allegedly the
new strategy has already meant that 484 development
projects in the sum of 585 billion rupees have already

34 | Kiani, n. 30.
35 | “Pakistan govt. must do more for flood recovery: Holbrooke,”
The News, September 22, 2010.
36 | “Moving of RGST Bill,” Editorial, The Nation, November 14,
2010.
37 | This delay is reducing planned tax income. It is possible that
a parliamentary recess will be used in order to pass the pro-
posed measures by presidential decree.
38 | One Euro is 110 PKR (Pakistani Rupees), as at January 9, 2011.
39 | July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011.
104 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

been cancelled.40 The need for austerity has also forced the
government to cut its expenditure for the financial year by
300 billion rupees and to reduce subsidies.

It remains doubtful whether Pakistan’s spoilt elite will be


prepared to take the painful steps necessary to stabilise the
economy and rebuild after the floods. In the
It remains doubtful whether Pakistan’s past they have often talked about austerity
spoilt elite will be prepared to take the and transparency without anything actually
painful steps necessary to stabilise the
economy and rebuild after the floods. being done. It seems likely that the expected
fiscal deficit of 4.7 per cent will be more than
6 per cent and that the anticipated 9 per cent inflation
rate will actually exceed 15 per cent due to soaring food
and energy prices. As for the planned increases in income
as a result of the tax reforms, they are in danger of being
illusory due to a deeply-rooted tradition of refusing to pay
taxes.41 The government of the Pakistan People’s Party
will therefore find itself coming up against resistance from
both the opposition and its coalition partners, as cabinet
members and many members of parliament are feudals or
industrialists and find themselves personally affected by the
planned taxation reforms and the reduction in subsidies.

Analysts have criticised the PDF and the flood aid pro-
grammes, saying they do not pay sufficient attention to
the social aspects of the crisis in their political recom-
mendations. Former Secretary to the Government of
Pakistan Roedad Khan has analysed Pakistan’s painful
history of failed attempts to push through radical land
reforms to free the country from the control of feudal
elites and open up the possibility of a healthy democracy
and market economy.42 But instead he sees a movement
in the opposite direction, with the entrenched feudal
classes working together with high-ranking army officers
and government officials who have created a “neo-feudal”
class by acquiring land through fair means or foul, to
expand their political influence and prevent any changes in

40 | “Tough economic Steps,” Dawn, November 21, 2010; Sania


Nishtar, “The PDF premise,” The News, November 22, 2010.
41 | “Are Pakistan’s revised economic targets realistic?”, The News,
November 17, 2010.
42 | Roedad Khan, “Pakistan’s rural Iron Curtain,” The News,
November 20, 2010: “A great divide, a yawning chasm –
some call it a new Iron Curtain – separates the rich from their
less fortunate countrymen, whose lives are hard, violent and
short.”
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 105

rural land ownership. “For something to change, everything


must change” is his resigned prediction.43 Like businessman
and columnist Ardeshir Cowasjee, he cannot perceive any
power in Pakistan which is capable of instigating this kind
of change in Pakistani society in the foreseeable future.44
In contrast, Zahir Kazmi, a scholar at the National Defence
University, Islamabad, expresses cautious optimism when
he says that although the bad state of the economy and
education and political instability are Pakistan’s Achilles’
heel, it is still in the interest of the elite to
bring about long-term economic and social The government’s aid programme for
reforms which, if implemented properly, the reconstruction phase which is just
now beginning also includes financial
could put Pakistan on the road to success compensation for flood victims.
within 40 years.45

The government’s aid programme for the reconstruction


phase which is just now beginning also includes financial
compensation for flood victims. They will be given watan
cards which entitle each family to 100,000 rupees in instal-
ments of 20,000 rupees at a time. This system, whereby
local officials will only be handling cards rather than cash,
is designed to prevent corruption. Yet in November Interior
Minister Rehman Malik was forced to publicly admit that
there were irregularities in the distribution of cards, such as
the forging of false identities and the illegal sale of cards. A
man from Nowshera Kalan on the Kabul river in North West
Pakistan complained to a journalist: “People who have
connections with members of parliament or government
officials get their cards easily, while everyone else either
has to wait or do deals with the card distributors.”46 Those
who have managed to get their first 20,000 rupees are not
necessarily better off, as most of them have had to use it
straight away to pay for their families to return home and
to buy a few mouthfuls of food. And the homeless are now
clamouring all the more for their next instalments, so that
they can at least build some kind of primitive shelters to
protect them from the winter cold.

43 | Ibid.
44 | Ardeshir Cowasjee, “The national stupor,” Dawn, November
21, 2010.
45 | Zahir Kazmi, “Lessons from China,” Dawn, November 22, 2010.
46 | Zulfiqar Ali und Faiz Muhammad, “Lawmakers cashing in on
Watan cards,” Dawn, October 31, 2010.
106 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

OUTLOOK

In many ways the flood catastrophe has served to highlight


the parlous state of Pakistan’s political system, and some
intellectuals see it as a chance for the country
The great majority of the population to progress beyond feudalism.47 The desired
is frozen in a state of deep disillusion- consequences would be economic and social
ment and despair. Their main concern
is how to survive from one day to the resurgence and a robust democracy. But
next. these are utopian ideals. The great majority
of the population is frozen in a state of deep social,
economic and political disillusionment and despair.48 Their
main concern is how to survive from one day to the next,
which was made all the more difficult by the rocketing
prices of basic foodstuffs since the floods. In the Punjab, for
example, an area which was once Pakistan’s bread basket,
flour is now three times more expensive than before the
floods. Pakistan’s young intelligentsia, who could be the
driving force for change, see no future in their own country
and are leaving in droves for the USA, Europe or Dubai. On
top of this, the all-powerful secret service, in alliance with
the army and police, make sure any political resistance is
nipped in the bud. There seems to be no answer to the
despairing question of one committed democrat: “Where
could the Messiah come from?”49

In economic terms, growth of less than three per cent will


not be enough to stabilise the general living conditions of a
population which is growing by around the same rate every
year and to absorb the costs of the flood damage. So, for
example, steel and cement producers face the problem
of not being able to meet demand for reconstruction.
Although cement production has increased almost three-
fold since 2002 due to export markets in Afghanistan, Iraq
and Africa, they are forced to continue exporting around
12 million tonnes annually because of the country’s critical
shortage of foreign exchange.50 Resolving the dilemma
by increasing capacity would necessi­tate uninterrupted
supplies of cheaper raw materials and energy, both of

47 | Najm Sethi, “Dismal outlook for 2011,” The Friday Times,


December 31, 2010.
48 | Ibid.
49 | Shafqat Mahmood, “Where could the Messiah come from,”
The News, August 6, 2010.
50 | Naveed Iqbal, “Heavy resources required in post-flood recon-
struction,” The News, November 15, 2010.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 107

which are far from guaranteed.51 Inflation will be fuelled


by the anticipated steep rises in food, energy and building
material prices. Manufacturers will also
have to cope with power cuts lasting up to The flood has left Pakistan with a
twelve hours a day, which of course will drive massive refugee problem. Millions of
people are flocking to the cities, only
exporters faced with strict supply deadlines to end up swelling the ranks of the
to the brink of ruin. army of day labourers and beggars.

On a social level, the flood has left Pakistan with a massive


refugee problem. Millions of people are flocking to the
cities in the hope of finding work, only to end up swelling
the ranks of the army of day labourers and beggars. This
will inevitably lead to higher crime rates. And the backbone
of Pakistani society, the social structures of its families and
villages, is being destroyed.

This state of social and economic emergency is set against


a security situation which is characterised by constant
terrorist attacks. Between 2003 and 2010 around 31,000
people were killed in Pakistan by Islamist terror attacks,
including 10,000 civilians.52 The terror spilled over from
its heartlands into Pakistan’s cities and in Karachi, the
country’s economic and trading hub, it has taken on a
striking ethnic and political hue. Against Pakistan’s social
and religious background, social uprooting, unemployment
and poverty have come together to form an explosive
mixture which is the perfect breeding ground for terrorist
groups.

In terms of domestic politics, Pakistan is close to a position


which in the past has resulted in the end of civilian
government and a takeover of power by the military. At the
moment this is counterbalanced by domestic and foreign
policy considerations. The murder of Salman Taseer, the
liberal PPP governor of the Punjab province on January 5
and the subsequent low-key official reaction to it clearly
show the freedom which is afforded to extremist groups
and their ideologies.53 In tune with these groups, the
parliamentary opposition is blatantly pressurizing president

51 | Khaleeq Kiani, “Uncertainties in energy development,” The


News, Economic & Business Review, November 22-28, 2010.
52 | “After the deluge,” The Economist, September 16, 2010.
53 | Taseer spoke out in public for a change in the blasphemy laws
and for the pardon of Asia Bibi, who had been sentenced to
death as a result of these laws.
108 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Zardari and his government to stand down, blaming them


for the dire economic situation and the consequences of
the floods. At the same time, the ruling coalition has been
on the verge of collapse since the beginning of the year,
while the strongest opposition party and traditionally the
fiercest opponents of the ruling PPP, the Pakistan Muslim
League (PML) led by Nawaz Sharif, is stridently calling
for new elections. There is little left of the Charta of
Democracy, which was signed by Benazir Bhutto on behalf
of the Pakistan People’s Party and Nawaz Sharif for the
Pakistan Muslim League on May 15, 2006, and hope of any
long-term democratic change is fading fast.

Military domination of Pakistan’s foreign and security policy


means the civilian government’s room for manoeuvre and
strategic options are severely limited. Pressurised by the
military leadership, the government is continuing to pursue
a policy of confrontation with India, adding the potential
of military conflict to the already-strained relationship
between the two hostile nuclear nations. At the same
time, Pakistan has willingly become a pawn of Chinese
interests by allowing itself to be drawn into
In the arms race with India, Pakistan Beijing’s border negoti­ations with India as a
is hoping to obtain funding and mo- third party, hoping that it will thereby gain
dern military technology from the USA
under the guise of fighting terrorism. advantages regarding the Kashmir conflict.
In the arms race with its neighbour, Pakistan
is hoping to obtain funding and modern military technology
from the USA under the guise of fighting terrorism. In this
way it hopes to modernise both its weapons manufac-
turing industry – built up with the help of China – and the
equipping of its armed forces to at least try to balance out
India’s combat strength.

On its western border Pakistan has been forced by the


military to pursue the concept of “strategic depth” which
is designed to guarantee its influence in Afghanistan after
the hoped-for regime change in Afghanistan in 2014. It
is also designed to open up the shortest route to the raw
materials and goods markets of Central Asia. It sees the
Taliban as being the next regime and for strategic reasons
will continue to allow them safe heavens in the Pakistan/
Afghanistan border areas.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 109

Pakistan’s strategic geographic position and its crucial role


in resolving the situation in Afghanistan and in maintaining
peaceful conditions in South Asia lend top priority to
strategic, political, economic and social considerations for
providing Pakistan with substantial long-term development
aid.
110 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

THE LONG SHADOW OF


THE BELARUS PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS
PROCEDURES, RESULTS AND POLITICAL FALL-OUT

Stephan Malerius is
Stephan Malerius
Head of the country
office Belarus of the
Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung. The office
is based in Vilnius, Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, Europe has rarely
Lithuania. seen elections as disastrous as the Presidential elections
held in Belarus on December 19, 2010. This is not because
of President Alexander Lukashenko’s landslide victory in
the so-called elections. After his 16 years in office, no-one
seriously believed that the votes would actually be counted
or that the authorities would not rig the elections to suit
Lukashenko. The real disaster lies in the brutality used to
break up the peaceful demonstration on election night and
the repression which followed over the next few weeks –
something which even the worst pessimists had not
foreseen. Indeed, the election campaign itself had been
surprisingly liberal.

The 2010 Presidential elections in Belarus have produced


only losers: the opposition has lost out because it was
unable to come up with a joint manifesto or a joint candidate
and after the elections most of its political leaders ended
up in jail. Europe has lost out because all the hard work
done to build closer ties with Belarus and to strengthen
pro-European parties has been wiped out overnight. Russia
has lost out because it recognized Lukashenko’s dubious
re-election, failed to condemn the repressive measures
and once again has shown that its attitude towards basic
democratic principles is very different to that of the rest
of Europe. And Lukashenko has also lost out because the
demonstrations in front of the government building and
subsequent repression have forced the formerly street-
smart rulers into a blind alley. Perhaps the most astonishing
thing about these elections is the way Lukashenko has, at
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 111

a stroke, dropped the “multi-vector foreign policy” which


he worked so hard on and returned to his self-imposed
political isolation.

So who was calling the shots on election night? And why,


after three months of free campaigning, did it only take
a few hours for violence to escalate? Was Lukashenko
manipulated, and if so, by whom? Or was it Lukashenko
himself who ordered the peaceful protests to be crushed
upon finding out that the actual election results would
mean a second ballot? These are the questions which must
be asked if Europe is now going to build a new strategy
towards Belarus.

THE LOCAL ELECTIONS AS A DRESS REHEARSAL

As political co-determination is practically non-existent in


authoritarian Belarus, the people have very few opportu-
nities in everyday life to feel that they can actually change
things, even if this is somewhat illusory. The
five-yearly Presidential elections present The local elections held nine months
such an opportunity for political momentum, before the Presidential elections were
something of a dress rehearsal. Chan-
and so they are hotly anticipated well before ges to electoral law were seen interna-
election day. The local elections held on April tionally as a step in the right direction.
25, nine months before the main event,
were something of a dress rehearsal. They were the first
elections to be held since the changes to electoral law
which came into force in January 2010 and which had
taken into account the recommendations of the OSCE and
independent local experts. These changes were seen inter-
nationally as a step in the right direction, although they did
not go far enough to really prevent electoral fraud. Still, it
was hoped the April elections would show whether the new
laws would at least make Belarusian elections a little fairer,
freer and more transparent.

These hopes were soon dashed: of the 21,293 local


councillors elected, only nine represented democratic
parties. None of the candidates from the Movement
for Freedom, the United Civic Party or the Belarusian
Popular Front succeeded in winning a seat on any of the
local councils. The elections were no different from all
previous elections over the last fourteen years. Indeed,
112 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

it was amazing how little effort the officials made to hide


their vote-rigging. They used all their usual tricks when
confirming the election results – in almost every case where
a democratic candidate was standing against a government
representative, there were considerable differences
between the results of early voting and the votes cast on
April 25. Around 30 per cent of the voters had voted early.
And before the elections there were once again arrests of
independent candidates, house searches and, on election
day itself, there was rigging and government-organised
voting within companies, closed constituencies (barracks)
and student halls of residence. No pretence was made to
count the votes more transparently than during the 2008
Parliamentary elections.

The fact that 80 per cent of the population believe the


work of local councillors has no effect on their lives throws
doubts on the claimed turnout of 79.5 per cent. The election
organisers also seem to have treated the elections on April
25 as a dress rehearsal. At a Minsk press conference after
the elections, Lidija Yermoshina, head of the Electoral
Commission, declared that “Elections are never sterile”.
It’s true that there were several small-scale aberrations,
but no really serious irregularities.

Lukashenko seemed to want to use the election to make


it clear that he is not prepared to make concessions to
his democratic opponents nor to bow to demands from
Europe to make democratic and constitutional changes
in the country. As a result, all observers assumed that
the Presidential elections would follow the
It was becoming increasingly clear same pattern  – the regime would produce
that not only the EU but Russia was its rigged election results, with the election
losing patience and that Moscow was
perhaps no longer prepared to support itself being staged with greater or lesser
Lukashenko. success to give the illusion of legitimacy. At
the same time Lukashenko was losing his political room
for manoeuvre. It was becoming increasingly clear that
not only the EU but Russia was losing patience and that
Moscow was perhaps no longer prepared to support him in
another term, unlike in 2006. On top of this there was the
unrest in Kyrgyzstan, which Lukashenko also interpreted as
a warning shot across his bows. He publicly drew parallels
with the events in Bishkek: “If something like this were to
happen in my country and if anyone were to dare to try
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 113

leading the people into a storm of violence, our response


would not be weak. A government which does not know
how to defend itself is worthless.” In mid-April, Lukashenko
offered his protection to deposed Kyrgyz President Bakiyev
and granted him political asylum in Belarus.

ECONOMIC DISPUTES, MEDIA WAR: DETERIORATING


RELATIONS BETWEEN MINSK AND MOSCOW

Although the Kremlin has up till now been remarkably


restrained in its remarks on the Belarusian Presidential
elections,1 Russia is still the region’s central player and it
is important to look at the changing relationship between
Minsk and Moscow in order to assess the events on and
around December 19. However, it is difficult to come to any
conclusions beyond mere speculation due to the fact that
most official contacts between the two neighbours take
place behind closed doors. But it is a fact that relations
between Lukashenko and the Medvedev/Putin pairing came
to a head in summer 2010, to the extent that one political
commentator in Minsk wrote that it was no longer possible
to talk about the deteriorating relationship of Belarus and
Russia as there was no longer a relationship. As so often in
recent years, the catalyst for this was an economic dispute.
On January 1, 2010, Russia began levying export duties on
Russian oil supplied to Belarusian refineries
in Novopolatzk and Mozyr. This decision Belarus had for many years been ma-
was another attempt to gradually provide king handsome profits by using cheap
Russian crude oil to sell on oil products
a pragmatic economic basis for its relations to the West at world market prices.
with its western neighbour. Belarus had for
many years been making handsome profits by using cheap
Russian crude oil to sell on oil products to the West at
world market prices. Moscow has long been demanding its
share of the pie, but in January Minsk argued that raising
duties on oil was against the terms of the customs union
agreed at the end of 2009 between Russia, Kazakhstan and
Belarus. The case went before the Economic Court of the
CIS, which in late summer called on both sides to settle the
matter out-of-court. While they were still trying to settle

1 | “We have to respect the choice of the Belarusian people. I am


not prepared to talk about what happened during the elections.
That is something that needs to be looked at in detail”, said
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on December 29, 2010.
Quoted from http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2010/12/29/ic_
news_112_358358 (accessed January 31, 2011).
114 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

the oil duty row by legal means, in June 2010 the tensions
spilled over to the political sphere: Gazprom gave Belarus
an ultimatum to pay its gas debts, which had supposedly
been mounting up for months, and for a few days it reduced
gas supplies to its neighbours by up to 80 per cent. The
conflict seemed to be aimed at putting Lukashenko under
pressure. Lukashenko replied by publicly going on the
offensive for the first time in an open letter to Pravda and
to Russia’s top business leaders. In this letter, he gave his
view of the gas conflict and compared Gazprom’s demands
on Belarus to Nazi Germany’s offensive against the Soviet
Union.

Over the summer things escalated still further. From


early July to mid-August the biggest Russian TV channel,
NTW, showed a prime-time three-part documentary on
Lukashenko, which claimed that he was responsible for
the disappearance of political opponents in 1999/2000
and which described him as the head of a criminal ring
which has been systematically plundering the country.
These programmes were blocked from airing on TV in
Belarus, but they could be viewed on the internet. By the
end of August at least a third of the population had seen
the documentaries. Lukashenko responded by sending a
camera team to Tiflis to interview Russia’s “Public Enemy
No. 1”, the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, and
shortly afterwards he denounced a Molotov
Lukashenko accused high-ranking cocktail attack on the Russian Embassy in
Russian officials of orchestrating a Minsk as the work of Russian provocateurs,
smear campaign against him, called
Russia’s policies towards Belarus “half- a claim which the Russian Foreign Minister
cocked” and “brainless”. Sergey Lavrov immediately rebutted, calling
it “blasphemy”. At the beginning of October Lukashenko
invited a group of journalists from Russia’s regions to Minsk
and gave a four-hour press conference. He accused high-
ranking Russian officials of orchestrating a smear campaign
against him, called Russia’s policies towards Belarus “half-
cocked” and “brainless” and described his relationship with
Medvedev and Putin as “bad, to put it mildly”. Two days
later Medvedev accused Lukashenko in a video blog on his
Kremlin website of wanting to base his election campaign
solely on anti-Russian statements and warned him not to
interfere in Russia’s internal affairs. After a declaration by
Medvedev’s spokeswoman that relations between Belarus
and Russia would never recover to where they were before
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 115

under President Lukashenko, there was public speculation


whether Moscow would use the Presidential elections in
Belarus to get rid of Lukashenko. But there was no clear
evidence of what this “Russian scenario” would be.

So it was all the more surprising when Lukashenko travelled


to Moscow on December 8 to take part in the summit
meetings of the Eurasian Economic Community and the
Collective Security Treaty Organisation. He spent an hour
and a half in private discussions with Medvedev as though
nothing had happened. Russia showed that it was prepared
to withdraw the export duty on oil from the beginning of
2011, and in return Lukashenko signed 17 agreements
designed to advance the planned single market for Russia,
Kazakhstan and Belarus. Not a word was said about the
Presidential elections.

THE CAMPAIGN: UNEXPECTED FREEDOM AND NEW


EXPERIENCES

As soon as the summer break was over, and in the middle


of the escalating conflict between Lukashenko and the
Kremlin, the date for the Belarusian Presidential elections
was set. On September 14 an extraordinary sitting of the
House of Representatives in Minsk announced the elections
would be held on December 19. The electoral procedure
was officially set out: potential candidates had to name
action groups by September 24 who then had a month
from September 30 to collect the signatures of 100,000
supporters. In mid-November the Central Electoral Com-
mission would announce the officially-registered candi-
dates and then campaigning could begin.
In parallel, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry The first surprise for the country’s
made it known that interested parties (OSCE, people was the previously-unknown
freedom granted during the first phase
CIS) were invited to an unrestricted election of campaigning for the primaries.
monitoring.

The first surprise for the country’s people, and also


for international experts, was the previously-unknown
freedom granted during the first phase of campaigning
for the primaries. At the beginning of October, while the
action groups were collecting signatures for their candi-
dates across the country, a 30-year old woman spoke of a
totally new atmosphere: “There was a rally in the centre of
116 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Minsk, the historic white and red flags were being waved
and no one intervened, no police, no arrests. I’ve never
known this before in all my life.” A whole
A whole generation of people had the generation of people had the feeling that
feeling that they could demonstrate they could demonstrate freely, something
freely, something they had never be-
fore experienced in Belarus during 14 they had never before experienced in Belarus
years of repressive authoritarian rule. during 14 years of repressive authoritarian
rule. And there was another mood among
the people, a feeling that after 16 years they were tired of
Lukashenko and were not afraid to express their support
for other candidates. Everywhere people were saying “I will
support anyone, as long as it’s not Lukashenko.”

This atmosphere remained during the critical phase of


campaigning. First of all, anyone who had collected more
than 100,000 signatures was officially registered as a
candidate, meaning that the 2010 elections had more
opposition candidates than ever before. But on closer
inspection this seems to have all been part of an orches-
trated game. A local observer who was present at the local
Electoral Commission’s random checking of the signatures
reported that almost every candidate’s list of signatures
(including Lukaschenko’s) was forged: “The signatures of
a hundred or more supporters had clearly been written by
one person, without even taking the trouble to disguise
the writing. The Electoral Commission’s liberal attitude was
obviously being tested, and in fact all these forged signa-
tures were declared valid.” So it seems that the decision
to register ten candidates was taken from above and was
politically-motivated  – the more candidates who stood
against Lukashenko, the better his chances.

But there was no doubt that change was taking root in the
country. As in most countries, gatherings in public places
were forbidden, but the authorities reacted quite diffe­
rently to violations of this rule compared to 2006. When
two Presidential candidates called on their supporters to
gather for an illegal demonstration on November 24 in
Minsk’s October Square more than 1,000 people turned
up, but the protest was not broken up by the authorities
and there were no arrests. The instigators received a
warning from the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the Central
Electoral Commission, but nothing more.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 117

It was also remarkable that in the next stages of campaigning


the state-controlled electronic media were for the first time
cautiously opened up. All the Presidential candidates were
allowed two 30-minute slots on both TV and radio in order
to present their manifestos or to talk about the country’s
situation. The slots were broadcast live, so they could
not be censored or otherwise manipulated. Nearly every
candidate took advantage of this opportunity, particularly
as a way of settling old scores with Lukashenko, who had
largely denied them all access to a wider public since 1996.
In his broadcast, the Social Democrat Nikolai Statkevich
demanded that Lukashenko give back the stolen elections:
“Fair elections depend on you and you alone, and not on
the clowns in the so-called Parliament or the so-called
Electoral Commission.” But otherwise nothing had changed
in the electronic media: all news programmes were still
dominated by Lukashenko to such an extent that he saw
no need to present his manifesto once again on TV. He also
refused to take part in the first televised debates between
the candidates.

This is why political scientist Yuri Chausov The regime had promised to give the
talked about a kind of “invisible liberalisation”. people free elections and was now
trying to play this out. But liberali-
The regime had promised to give the people sation was not to be confused with
free elections and was now trying to play this democracy.
out. But liberalisation was not to be confused
with democracy. According to Chausov, the Parliamentary
elections of 2008 served as an example. Candidate regis-
tration and campaigning had been relatively free, but the
end result was a totally sterile Parliament without a single
independent representative. Chausov thought the results
of the 2010 Presidential elections were totally predictable:
“President Lukashenko has kept away from the official
announcement of candidates for good reason. He wants to
show that he is not one of the actors in these elections, but
rather the director.”2

Despite the orchestrated election campaign, the people felt


that the new liberal atmosphere within the country was a
positive change. For the first time since 1994 they could
experience plurality, which still did not bring the chance of
fair elections but which at least allowed the public airing

2 | Quoted from http://naviny.by/rubrics/elections/2010/11/18/


ic_articles_623_171295 (accessed January 31, 2011).
118 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

of different opinions. But many observers took a sceptical


view of how long this surprising freedom would last. How
far would Lukashenko go in his attempt to get Western
countries to recognize the election results?

THE CANDIDATES

Campaigning for the Belarusian Presidential elections also


promised to be a strange political event because of its
unusual range of candidates. Closer inspection reveals the
following three different groups.

Lukashenko was faced by two candi- To begin with, Lukashenko was faced by two
dates who either had never stood for candidates who either had never stood for
office before or who acted as kind of
guaranteed opposition candidates in office before (Dmitri Uss) or who acted as
the event that the opposition announ- kind of guaranteed opposition candidates
ced a boycott.
(Vladimir Tereshtshenko) in the event that
the opposition announced a boycott and it was necessary
to give the illusion of an election. Tereshtshenko at least
was expected to follow the instructions of the President’s
administration or its officials.

The second group consisted of five relatively high-profile


candidates belonging to the democratic opposition: Jaroslav
Romanchuk (United Civic Party), a liberal economist; Vitali
Rymasheuski, a Christian Democrat; Grogori Kostusev and
Ales Michalevich, long-time members of the Belarusian
Popular Front, the driving force in the popular movement
which resulted in Belarus leaving the Soviet Union at
the end of the 1980s. They both stood for a patriotic,
pro-European orientation for Belarus, and Michalevich
focused his campaign on the need to modernise the
economy and society. Nicolai Statkievich carried the flag
for the Social Democrats.

The third group of candidates consisted of two governors


who at least on the face of it were Lukaschenko’s main
competition: Vladimir Neklyayev and Andrei Sannikov,
who had unusually large amounts of money to spend
on their campaigns and who were obviously acting on
behalf of unnamed foreign powers. Many people are still
wondering what Neklyayev and Sannikov were trying to
achieve and who was backing them. Few are convinced
that they really believed in their campaign slogans “Tell the
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 119

truth” (Neklyayev) and “European Belarus” (Sannikov).


In 2008 Sannikov had called for a boycott of the Parlia-
mentary elections, criticising them as a farce. Now he
was himself standing as a candidate although nothing
had changed. The democratic opposition was weakened
by this deliberate lack of transparency and
the swirling speculation: are they Russian Lukaschenko’s political strategy see-
candidates? Are they being funded by the med to have paid off – a split opposition
and a large number of candidates would
Russian oligarch Boris Beresowski, currently make it easier for him to make his re-
living in exile in London? Are they part of election appear relatively democratic.
a Lukashenko master plan? During their
campaigns, the two candidates sowed the seeds of yet
more mistrust in an already tangled situation, making it
even more difficult for the democratic parties to make a
united stand. Lukaschenko’s political strategy seemed
to have paid off  – a split opposition and a large number
of candidates would make it easier for him to make his
re-election appear relatively democratic.

On top of this, Alexander Milinkevich, who had stood


against Lukashenko as the democratic opposition’s unity
candidate in 2006, announced in September that he would
not stand for the 2010 elections. After his withdrawal many
people felt they were left with no one to vote for. But the
“Anyone but Lukashenko” attitude was so strong in large
sections of the population that the other candidates found
that people listened to their manifestos and for the first
time came to the conclusion that there were other serious
and much more interesting political offerings than “Batka”
Lukaschenko.

VOTING, ELECTION NIGHT AND INCITEMENT TO RIOT

In the week before the elections the country became more


and more nervous and the idea of a Ploscha (Square) was
brought into play. This alludes to October Square in the
centre of Minsk which, similar to the Maidan in Kiev, has
been a symbol of democratic protest against fraudulent
elections ever since the Presidential elections of 2006.
On December 11 Vladimir Makei, Head of the Presidential
Administration, declared that the opposition just wanted
to use the election night demonstration to stir up trouble:
“It’s quite clear that they do not want a peaceful demon-
stration”, he said on RTR, the Belarusian state television.
120 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

“Fighters” were getting themselves ready, stocking up on


warm clothing, pyrotechnic supplies and explosives. The
opposition’s main aim was to provide western TV viewers
with images showing the cruelty of the ruling powers and
their brutality towards the voters. But Makei also made
it clear that the government had sufficient forces and
means to calmly and appropriately handle the situation.3
The opposition were not slow to respond, with several
candidates dismissing Makei’s comments as an attempt
at intimidation. They urged their supporters to ignore it
and to join a peaceful demonstration on the evening of the
election.

One of the keys to assessing the events of election night


is a meeting held on December 15, where Lukashenko
talked about various scenarios which could play out. The
meeting was attended by commanders of the police and
special forces, and parts of it were broadcast on state
television.4 Makei did not attend. Lukashenko said they
must not allow themselves to be provoked during protests:
“On no account respond to provocation. Because they
[the opposition, author’s note] want pictures so that they
can say ‘Look at this undemocratic regime  – once again
Lukashenko has used bloodshed to hold onto power’”.
The most important thing was that “nothing
“The Presidential elections must not must happen to the people, for God’s sake.
be tarnished by any kind of clashes or We have to protect the people.” He went on
protests. If the fly wants to fly, let it
fly.” (Alexander Lukashenko) to add that he was not expecting protests
because the opposition were not capable of
organising them. There would not be a Ploscha because no
one would show up. At the end of the meeting Lukashenko

3 | The interview can be seen on Youtube at http://youtube.com/


watch?v=HP8qd2rQR0U (accessed January 31, 2011). Makei’s
predictions proved to be unfounded: it was not the opposition
which stirred up trouble, and the security forces certainly did
not react in a calm and appropriate manner. Some commen-
tators thought Makei’s words were meant as a warning and an
indirect challenge to the opposition to be alert and prepared
for trouble from the security forces. Makei was considered to
be a moderate within the regime.
4 | I.a. Leonid Maltsev (Head of the Security Council), Anatoly
Kuleshov (Minister of Internal Affairs), Yurij Zhadobin
(Defence Minister), Alexander Radkov (Head of Lukashenko’s
election team), Vadim Zaicev (Head of the KGB), Viktor
Lukashenko and Viktor Scheiman. Excerpts of the meeting
can be viewed on the internet at http://naviny.by/rubrics/
elections/2010/12/15/ic_articles_623_171684 (accessed
January 31, 2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 121

repeated his instruction: “The Presidential elections must


not be tarnished by any kind of clashes or protests. If the
fly wants to fly, let it fly, no one will stop it. Nowadays the
Government’s solidarity is so strong that we have no need
of extraordinary measures”. The opposition failed to take
this prophecy of doom seriously and also did not expect
any violence on election night. One of the opposition
candidates said on the day before the elections that talk
of trouble on election evening was a joke. The regime
was showing weakness and  – just like during the 2006
elections  – was trying to intimidate the people. But this
would not happen because the population had lost its fear.

Election day itself went off quietly. 23.1 per cent of the
population had already cast their votes over the preceding
five days, 8 per cent less than in 2006. But reports were
coming in from all over the country of how people were
being pressurised to vote early. But this
had been expected. The crucial question The opposition had called on their sup-
was what would happen on election night? porters to gather in October Square
during the evening to wait for the elec-
The opposition had come together to call on tion results and to protest against the
their supporters to gather in October Square anticipated vote-rigging.
during the evening to wait for the election
results and to protest against the anticipated vote-rigging.
Voting on election day itself appeared to go off without a
hitch, and by early evening no verdict could be given on
the vote counting process because the polls did not close
until eight o’clock.

A huge skating rink was erected on October Square with


loudspeakers blaring out Russian pop music, so the candi-
dates’ first statements could not be heard. It was also
turning very cold and it seemed likely that the crowd of
several thousands would start to break up after one or
two hours. It seemed clear that none of the opposition
candidates had a strategic plan for the Ploscha.

Trouble first broke out around 7.30 pm, when Vladimir


Neklyayev was beaten while on his way to the demon-
stration. Pictures of the unconscious opposition candidate
flew around the world.5 Neklyayev was responsible for the
PA system to be used for the candidates’ speeches.

5 | The incident can be viewed on Youtube at: http://youtube.com/


watch?v=trcsJ50jGWk (accessed January 31, 2011).
122 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Around 8.40 pm the crowd unexpectedly started moving


from October Square towards Independence Square.
Presidential candidate Kostusev later reported that they
just wanted to go over to Lukashenko’s Presidential offices.
But the police separated the opposition candidates from
the crowd, which continued onwards along Independence
Street, swelling in numbers as it went. It is not clear
who led the crowd on this route. By 9.30 around 20,000
people had gathered in Independence Square to continue
the demonstration. Loudspeakers were set up, candidates
made speeches, and the crowd continually chanted their
demands for new elections to be held without Lukashenko.
By 10.30 the majority of demonstrators had gone home,
but a group of around 15 protesters began
There were more than 600 arrests, trying to batter down the doors to the
among them eight of nine candidates. government building, which was set back
None of the protesters who had batte-
red down the doors of the government slightly from the Square. Shortly afterwards
building was immediately arrested. the security forces were deployed, using
violence to break up the demonstration.
This ended up with people being chased right across the
centre of Minsk. There were more than 600 arrests, among
them eight of nine candidates. None of the protesters who
had battered down the doors was immediately arrested,
although they were kettled by the riot police at the scene.
Their faces were even clearly shown that evening on state
TV coverage of the riots.

Events on the street threw the election results themselves


into the shade. Around five o’clock the next morning
Yermoshina announced the preliminary results, with
Lukashenko winning 79.67 of the vote, Andrei Sannikov
2.56 per cent and all other candidates less than 2 per
cent. According to this, 6.47 per cent of people had voted
against all candidates.

The OSCE/ODHIR observer mission made a provisional


statement on the Monday in which it declared that the
Belarus elections had not met democratic standards:
“Yesterday’s Presidential elections have shown that Belarus
still ha s a considerable way to go in meeting its OSCE
commitments, although certain specific improvements
have been made.”6 The voting process had generally gone

6 | OSCE/ODHIR, “International election observation, Republic


of Belarus – Presidential Election, 19 December 2010, ▸
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 123

smoothly, but the situation deteriorated significantly


during the vote count. The mission classified the vote
count procedure in almost half of all polling
stations visited as very bad.7 In contrast, the The OSCE/ODHIR observer mission
CIS observer mission described the elections classified the vote count procedure in
almost half of all polling stations visi-
as free, open and transparent.8 The mission’s ted as very bad. In contrast, the CIS
head, Sergey Lebedev, even went so far as observer mission described the elec-
tions as free.
to attack the ODHIR/OSCE mission a few
days later, saying that “their opinion before
the elections was completely different to their view after-
wards”, and pointing out that many OSCE observers had
made positive statements beforehand. “And then on the
day after the elections  – this is true not only of Belarus
but of other CIS countries – for no good reason we hear
that there is a negative assessment and that the general
conclusion is that the elections do not meet democratic
standards and principles.”9

THE CONSEQUENCES: REPRESSION AND SANCTIONS

Election night set in motion a level of repression which


is unprecedented in Belarus, even under Lukashenko’s
regime. In this respect, the KGB are taking the leading
role. The majority of those arrested on election night were
sentenced to 10 to 15 days in prison, and as at the middle
of January 20 people remain imprisoned. Another eleven
people are being investigated under Paragraph 293 of the
Belarus Criminal Code (Organisation of Mass Riots), which
could lead to prison sentences of between 5 and 15 years.

Statement of preliminary findings and conclusions”, in:


http://osce.org/odihr/74638, 1 (accessed January 25, 2011).
7 | “While the overall voting process was assessed as good, the
process deteriorated significantly during the vote count under-
mining the steps taken to improve the election. Observers
assessed the vote count as bad and very bad in almost half
of all observed polling stations. The count was largely conduc-
ted in a non-transparent manner, generally in silence, which
undermined its credibility. In many cases, observers were
restricted and did not have a real opportunity to observe the
counting.”
8 | “We believe that these elections were transparent and met
the requirements of the election legislation and common
democratic norms,” CIS Executive Secretary Sergei Lebedev
told reporters in Minsk.” Quote courtesy of the Russian news
agency RIA Novosti, http://en.rian.ru/world/20101220/
161854376.html (accessed January 31, 2011).
9 | Quoted from http://naviny.by/rubrics/elections/2010/12/25/
ic_news_623_358119 (accessed January 31, 2011).
124 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

The exact condition of Vladimir Neklyayev and Andrei


Sannikov, who were beaten on December 19, remains
unknown. Nikolai Statkievich has gone on hunger strike.
Grogori Kostusev lodged an appeal against the election
reports on behalf of all the opposition candidates, but it was
thrown out as being without cause. After the
Representatives of the democratic arrests, during the holiday period (Catholic
opposition, human rights organisations, Christmas, New Year, Orthodox Christmas)
political parties, independent news-
papers and journalists were subjected representatives of the democratic opposition,
to house and office searches. human rights organisations, political parties,
independent newspapers and journalists were
subjected to house and office searches, right across the
country. Dozens of computers, notebooks and data carriers
were confiscated. At the same time, scores of people were
interrogated by the KGB, charged or imprisoned. The
victims’ lawyers also soon found themselves in the Justice
Ministry’s firing line and were threatened with having
their licenses withdrawn. The whole of January saw the
forces of democracy being subjected to constant terror.10
Belarus abruptly began to isolate itself, not just through its
repressive measures but also on the diplomatic front. On
December 31 a Foreign Ministry spokesperson announced
in Minsk that the OSCE mandate in Belarus which expired
at the end of the year would not be extended, saying there
was no justification for having OSCE representatives in the
country, the OSCE mission was fulfilled and they should no
longer have a presence.

The international community was quick to comment


on the vote-rigging, the election night protests and the
subsequent repression, along with the closing down
of OSCE representation. In an article in the New York
Times published on December 23, the Foreign Ministers
of Germany, Sweden, Poland and the Czech Republic
stated that Lukashenko had made his choice, a choice
which went against everything the European Union stood
for.11 Many governments in Western and Central Europe

10 | At present it is not possible to predict further domestic deve-


lopments. More detailed information on the election campaign,
the elections themselves and the subsequent repression can
be viewed on the election blog of the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung’s Belarus office under http://kas.de/belaruswahl.
11 | Carl Bildt, Karel Schwarzenberg, Radek Sikorski and Guido
Westerwelle, “Lukashenko the Loser,” in: New York Times,
December 23, 2010, http://nytimes.com/2010/12/24/
opinion/24iht-edbildt24.html (accessed January 31, 2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 125

called for the immediate release of those imprisoned and


punishment for those responsible. In contrast, Russia
congratulated Lukashenko on his re-election, claiming the
circumstances surrounding the vote were Belarus’s own
affair. Other post-Soviet countries such as Georgia and the
Ukraine took a similar line. On January 31, the EU Foreign
Ministers in Brussels agreed to ban a total of 158 people
who were responsible for the vote-rigging and repressions
which followed the elections from entering the EU and to
freeze their bank accounts within the EU. They declared
that the list was open and could be changed at any time.
The Foreign Ministers stressed that the EU was keen to
continue talks with Belarus, but with the basic prerequisite
that the Belarus government would adhere to principles of
democracy and the rule of law and respect basic human
rights. At the donor conference in Warsaw on February 2,
the EU and its member states announced that 87 million
euros would be made available over the next two years
to support civil society in Belarus. Some of Belarus’s
EU neighbours have abolished visa charges for ordinary
Belarusian citizens.

WHO WAS BEHIND THE RIOTS?

Certain commentators have accused Europe of achieving


nothing over the last two years in its attempts to carry
on a dialogue with the regime and convert Belarus’s weak
liberalisation into a sustainable democratic process. These
accusations are unfair, as they suggest that the events of
December 19 could have been foreseen, and
they make no mention of what Europe should Europe now needs a whole new stra-
have done to prevent the riots. However, it tegy for Belarus. Questions need to
be asked in order to understand what
cannot be denied that Europe now needs a really happened on election night.
whole new strategy for Belarus. Questions
need to be asked in order to understand what really
happened on election night: what caused the protests to
escalate? Who staged them? And what was the desired
outcome?

Outlined below are three different propositions which could


explain what happened on December 19. They are not so
much speculations about who was behind the protests as
an attempt to clarify the challenges facing Europe over the
next few months in relation to Belarus.
126 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

First: In Lukashenko, Europe has to deal with an unpre-


dictable and out-of-control autocrat who lacks the mental
and intellectual capacity to accept democratic changes in
his country, let alone implement them, and who is only
concerned with maintaining his grip on power. The decision
to use violence against the protestors on
It became clear how hard it was for December 19 came from Lukashenko. During
Lukashenko to deal with the openness the “liberal election campaign” it repeatedly
of the campaigning and to allow the
opposition to voice criticism without became clear how hard it was for him to deal
shutting them down. with the openness of the campaigning and
to allow the opposition to voice criticism without shutting
them down. These three months did not sit well with the
authoritarian mentality which he had nurtured over the
previous 14 years. At one point Lukashenko was surprised
by his own patience and thought his country was already
so democratic that all its neighbours “would be afraid of so
much democracy”. He had entered into this strategy with
great reluctance in order to gain international legitimacy
for his fourth term. Lukashenko had had to grit his teeth
for three long months in order to stomach this controlled
liberalisation. Then on election day he was faced with two
pieces of information which threw him totally off-balance.
While the official, sham results were being announced by
the Central Electoral Commission on election night, votes
were actually being counted in the local Electoral Commis-
sions. Only a few insiders know the actual result of the
vote, but it was not good for Lukashenko, with his vote
probably being in the region of 44 to just over 50 per cent.
This was the first shock for him on election night. Then
he saw the masses of protestors making their way along
Independence Street – 20,000 to 30,000 people who were
openly and fearlessly demanding new elections without his
participation. Shock turned into blind rage and he gave the
momentous command to his henchmen, who were only too
happy to oblige.

Secondly: Europe has to deal with a Mafia-like economic


clique which uses its enormous criminal energies to restrict
foreign  – particularly European  – political and economic
influence. In this scenario, the riots were designed to make
it impossible for the West to recognize the election results
and to destroy the weak ties that Belarus has with the EU.
Many representatives of Belarus’s present-day elite were
and are not interested in any changes to the status quo.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 127

They have watched with alarm the gradual rapprochement


which has taken place between Belarus and Europe since
2008. Any transformation or modernisation of the country
in line with European standards would not only threaten
their very existence, but privatisation, transparency and
European competition would also rob them of the oppor-
tunity to grab the juiciest morsels of their own economy at
very special prices.12 Privatisations are inevitable over the
next few years; otherwise Belarus will be unable to service
its huge debt, which is due for repayment from 2012.
The question is just whether it will be an
elite-dominated privatisation as happened in There are many indications that the
Russia or the Ukraine or whether the country riots which broke out in front of the
government building had been care-
will follow the path taken by its Central fully planned over several weeks.
European neighbours during the 1990s.

There are many indications that the riots which broke out
in front of the government building had been carefully
planned over several weeks. One of these is the delivery van
which was found packed full of Molotov cocktails in plastic
bottles, stun guns and gas bottles, which had allegedly
been prepared by the Opposition and which was shown on
state television on election day. The deployment of special
forces on election night also bears all the traces of a well-
organised, tried-and-tested action. One thing is sure: the
organisers were members of Lukashenko’s close circle.
They knew exactly how and when they needed to feed
him information in order to provoke the impulsive reaction
which materialised on election night. In her analysis of
the meeting on December 15, Svetlana Kalinkina writes:
“Whoever had Lukashenko wrapped round their little finger,
wrecking the plans to gain international recognition of his
fourth term as President, was at the meeting on December
15. We can only speculate on their motivation, whether it
was due to stupidity, ideology, revenge or fear.”13

12 | In this respect we must ask why Presidential candidate Ales


Mikalevich is still in prison when there is no evidence that he
took part in the election night protests and he avoided making
any attacks on Lukashenko during the election campaign.
Obviously his programme of modernisation (and Europeani-
sation) was considered to be more dangerous than the
Christian fundamentalism of Rymahewski, for example.
13 | Quoted from Swetlana Kalinkina, “Sobstwennoe okruschenie
obwelo Lukaschenko wokrug palca” (Lukashenko’s own people
had him wrapped round their little finger), in: http://udf.by/
news/sobytie/37406-sobstvennoe-okruzhenie-obvelo-
lukashenko-vokrug-palca.html (accessed January 31, 2011).
128 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Thirdly: Europe finds itself faced with a Russia which still


views the territory of Belarus as canonic, which is opposed
to the country moving closer to Europe and which is using
economic ties to promote a creeping integration of Belarus
into the Russian Federation’s sphere. Former economic
adviser to the Russian President, Andrei Illarionov, gave
his own version of the events in Minsk during
Former economic adviser to the Rus- an interview on the Echo Moskwy radio
sian President, Andrei Illarionov, clai- station. He claimed that Russia had insti-
med that Russia had instigated a riot
on December 19 as an “imitation of the gated a riot on December 19 as an “imitation
Orange Revolution”. of the Orange Revolution”, with a second riot
being planned by the Belarusian KGB as an
“imitation of storming the government building”. According
to Illarionov it is to be assumed that both scenarios were
closely coordinated and that the secret services knew what
the other side was planning.

Illarionov thinks the Russian action went ahead. It was


designed to incite a reaction from the Belarusian regime
which would result in the country’s links to Europe being
broken and its return to the Russian influence from
which it had been struggling to free itself over the last
two years. The Belarusian secret service then jumped on
the bandwagon and used the protests for their own ends,
i.e. crushing the country’s democratic opposition and a
complete political clear-out. This also proved successful
and is still ongoing.

For Illarionov, the Minsk protests go far beyond the local


and the domestic: “I think these difficult, tragic, dramatic
events are a bitter lesson for Belarus society, but also for
Russian society and the societies of other authoritarian
states. Just when people are fighting to have a voice, to
create a democratic society, to develop the rule of law in
their own country, then they have to constantly bear in
mind the powers that are ranged against them and the
nature of this authoritarian regime. They have to antic-
ipate how not only their own regime, but also other foreign
regimes, are planning to incite unrest and the methods and
tools they are prepared to use to achieve their goals.”14

14 | Excerpts from the interview at http://belaruspartizan.org/


bp-forte/?page=100&news=73938 (accessed January 31,
2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 129

SOLIDARITY WITH DEMOCRATS IN BELARUS

Since the events of December 19, there has arisen a wave


of solidarity with those being persecuted. Before Christmas
the offices of the Belarus Popular Front were
swamped with aid packages and donations for Lukashenko has no longer the backing
the 600+ prisoners. “The people are queuing of the people. He finally lost them by
his brutality, and it is clear that his
up to help”, said one of the coordinators. victory on December 19 was a Pyrrhic
This desire to help shows how the country’s one.
mood has changed: Lukashenko’s regime no
longer has the backing of the people. Lukaschenko finally
lost them by his brutality, and it is clear that his victory on
December 19 was a Pyrrhic one.

This could also be an opportunity for Europe to work with


the country’s people to bring about real change in Belarus.
Three things are now needed:

1. The ban of a wide-ranging group of people who are


responsible for the vote-rigging, riots and repressive
measures from travelling to EU countries must be
followed by an easing of travel restrictions to the EU for
Belarus citizens. This includes consulate procedures and
visa charges.

2. The EU Commission must massively and sustainably


increase its support for Belarusian civil society. It is
important to not only step-up the programme but also
to make it more flexible. Posts in Brussels and delega-
tions in Kiev and Minsk need to be filled by competent
people who clearly understand the conditions which
govern civil society in Belarus.

3. The EU must make it even clearer to Russia that it


considers Belarus to be an independent, sovereign state
and that it is taking a positive interest in its democratic
development. At the same time Europe must also begin
to understand that Belarus is a country with a long
European history and tradition which in the past has
been unfairly treated as either a blank space or as a
tiresome addendum to its foreign policy agenda.
130 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

THE GERMAN MINORITY


IN POLAND
BASIC DATA, STRUCTURE, POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND
TWO EXCURSUSES, ABOUT THE POLISH DIASPORA IN GERMANY
AND ABOUT THE SILESIAN AUTONOMY MOVEMENT

Stephan Georg Raabe


is Resident Represen-
tative of the Konrad- Stephan Georg Raabe
Adenauer-Stiftung
in Warsaw.

It is not easy to find out about the existence of national or


ethnic minorities in the EU. In the extensive demographic
statistics (edition 2006) of the European Commission, the
minorities, which make up estimably 45 million people in
the 27 EU countries, do not appear. Searching the internet
for minorities in the EU is also not particularly promising.
Where everything possible is being counted and weighed: A
current overview of which minorities exist in the individual
EU countries, of how big they are and what status they
have, is almost not to be found amongst the information
of the EU. This leaves only the laborious path of analysing
the individual states.

According to the census of 2002, Poland has the following


population groups, whereas the data concerning minority
groups show them to be less than the estimates of
observers and the minority organisations say themselves:

Table 1
Population groups in Poland 2002

Number Per cent

Polish 36.98 m 96.75

Upper Silesians 173,200 0.45

Germans 152,900 0.40

Belarusians 48,700 0.13

Ukrainians 31,000 0.08

Romanis 12,900 0.03


3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 131

In addition, there are still several thousand Russians,


Lemkos, Lithuanians, Kashubians, Slovenians and Arme-
nians, who together account for less than 0.1 per cent of
the population, and another two per cent of population
groups respectively “unknown”.

From the German side, the number of Germans in Poland


is estimated to be 300,000, which is approximately the
number of those who identified themselves as Germans
or Upper Silesians in the referendum. The high migration
of Polish-German dual nationals to Germany and other
Western countries, some of which are still reported in
Poland, makes a reliable determination of the Germans
actually living in Poland difficult.

THE BACKGROUND

Before the separations at the end of the 18th century,


Poland was the home of many ethnic groups: Lithuanians,
Latvians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Germans and Jews. The
latter, attracted by the great religious tolerance, settled
in Poland since the High Middle Ages, peculiarly are still
considered, to this day, a national minority and not just a
religious community, as they up and into the 20th century
were not, or only partially, integrated into the polish
majority culture.

During the time of separation, the polish people themselves


experienced what it meant to be a minority in Russia,
Germany or Austria-Hungary. After the rebirth of Poland in
late 1918 the population comprised of nearly 70 per cent
Poles and just over 30 per cent other nationalities: 14 to
15 per cent Ukrainians also known as Ruthenians, about
eight per cent Jews, three to four per cent Belarusians and
two to four per cent Germans, whereas the
nationalist policy against the Germans led The Upper Silesians, meaning the Ger-
to their partial migration. After the Second mans, who stayed in their homeland,
provide the largest group. In commu-
World War, the Holocaust, the displacement of nist Poland, they were exposed to a sys-
Poland to the West, the evictions, relocations tematic polish assimilation pressure.
and subsequent expulsions the proportion of
minorities in Poland decreased to around three per cent
at last count. In that, the Upper Silesians, meaning the
Germans, who stayed in their homeland, provide by far the
largest group. In communist Poland, they were exposed to
132 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

a systematic polish assimilation pressure and quite often


repression. Under the impressions of the National Socialist
criminal regime and the occupation of German land, all
German things, particularly the language
Use of the mother tongue German was and culture, had to disappear from public,
subject to punishment, which is why but also private life. For a long time, use of
some members and representatives of
German minority still only have a poor the mother tongue German was subject to
knowledge of German. punishment, which is why some members
and representatives of the German minority still only have
a poor knowledge of German. For a long time, the presence
of Germans in Poland, their history and their culture
was largely denied. 1970, when the “Fundamentals of a
Normalisation” of German-Polish relations was negotiated,
the Polish regime assumed there were only “a few tens of
thousands” of Polish citizens of German origin.1

After 1989, the Germans in Poland could once again


acknowledge their heritage and organise freely. When on
November 12, 1989 some several thousand members of
the German minority  – with the support of the German
Foreign Ministry  – took part in the reconciliation service
with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Prime Minister Tadeusz
Mazowiecki in the Lower Silesian Kreisau, the surprise was
great on the Polish side. Irritation spread as they then
even began to unfurl banners saying, “Helmut, you are our
chancellor, too”.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE AND INTEGRATION

After in 1990 many organisations of the German minority


had already been formed, on September 15, 1990 at a
meeting of representatives of German companies in
Breslau it was decided to form a Central Council, based
in Groß Strehlitz (Strzelce Opolskie) near Opole. One year
later, on August 27, 1991, it was registered as “Association
of the German Social-Cultural Societies in Poland” (VdG)
with its seat in Opole. By its own account, VdG had
about 250,000 members in 2008 (2007: 290,000). As
an umbrella association, it has nine regional associations
as permanent members, six associate members and five

1 | Cf. Gregor Schöllgen, “Wenn die Worte versagen. Bundes-


kanzler Willy Brandt und die schwierige Verständigung mit
Polen: Die Vorgeschichte des 7. Dezember 1970,” Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, December 7, 2010, 8.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 133

independent agencies, including each one youth, women


and farmers’ organisation as well as education, business
and charitable societies.

There are also a dozen German- or dual language media


editors for newspapers, radio and television. By far the
largest Association has its seat in the Voivodship Opole,
with around 130,000 members (2007: 180,000) and about
300 local associations, the so-called German Friendship
Circles (DFC), the second largest Association in the
Voivodship Silesia has approximately 70,000 members.
The office of the VdG has six employees.2

The Organisations of the Germans in Poland are charitably


involved and are significantly supported through funds out
of the federal budget. These range from economic devel-
opment such as the Foundation for the Development of
Silesia up to youth and adult education like
the house of the German-Polish Collaboration The financial support through Germany
in Gliwice, Opole. In addition, the support occasionally evokes resentment, espe-
cially since “the Germans”, for many
through “rich” Germany occasionally evokes years, have had the advantage of free
envy and resentment, especially since “the access to the western job markets.
Germans”, for many years, have had the
advantage of free access to the western job markets and
its associated earning potential, which the “Poles” were
only granted a little at a time. Not until May 1, 2011, the
complete opening of Germany’s job market comes into
force.

Thus the life of the German minority in Poland remains a


constant balancing act between the necessary integration
into the Polish majority and the preservation of their own
identity, while the emphasis is increasingly being put on
the merits of a “multi-cultural identity of the region”.

Partially forgotten or neglected by the old homeland


Germany and regarded with distrust or even rejected by
their new home Poland, many of German origin living in
Poland feel that neither Berlin nor Warsaw, neither the
German refugee organisations nor the German minority
organisations, represent them. So on one hand, the Upper

2 | Next to the Chairperson, Maria Neumann, there are also desk


officers for Culture, School, Media and External Relations,
Bookkeeping and Administration. Cf. http://vdg.pl.
134 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Silesian Autonomy Movement was able to grow strong.


On the other hand, the importance of ethnic affiliation
and thus the integration into the organisations of the
Germans decreases, which is furthered by
German is teached to native speakers the estrangement of the German language
since 1992 in Polish public schools. and culture. Admittedly, Polish public schools
In 2004, the number of schools rose
from ten to 332, which were visited have been teaching German to native
by around 35.000 students. speakers since 1992, the number of these
schools even rose from ten to 332 in 2004,
which were visited by around 35.000 students. Still, there
is no separate schooling system for the German minority,
such as a bilingual lyceum (secondary school).

NEW BEGINNINGS IN TERMS OF PERSONNEL

The last two years have seen a new generation in both the
leadership of the VdG as well as the Opole Association.
Norbert Rasch, a scholar of German studies born 1971,
is the Chairman of the Social-Cultural Society of the
Germans in Opole Silesia since April 26, 2008. Before that,
the long-time Chairman Henryk Kroll, born 1949, who
represented the minority from 1991 to 2007 in the Sejm,
the Polish Parliament, without interruption, had resigned.
Rasch, who since 2005 is a member of the Parliament of
the Voivodship Opole, stands for the trend towards a shift
in focus, away from economic and infrastructure policies
towards culture and language policies, in order to ensure
the survival of the minority. Since May 11, 2009, he also
belongs to the new board of the VdG, whose Chairman
since has been the trading entrepreneur Bernard Gaida
Vintage, born 1958, from the Upper Silesian Dobrodzień
(Guttentag). Similar to Rasch, Gaida also sees the creation
of schools through comprehensive German lessons as a
priority. He especially wants to take care of the “identity of
the minority” and a maximised utilisation of minority policy
opportunities of Polish legislation.3

3 | Cf. Martin Schmidt, “Bernhard Gaida – Mann der Hoffnung,”


Berliner Schlesische Nachrichten (ed. Landsmannschaft
Schlesien – Nieder- und Oberschlesien Landesgruppe Berlin/
Mark Brandenburg e.V.), 02/2009, 4 et seq.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 135

THE MINORITIES ACT IN POLAND

On January 6, 2005, after more than ten years of debate,


with the votes of the then ruling Left and the Civic Platform
PO, the Sejm passed the “Law on National and Ethnic
Minorities and Regional Languages”. It thereby fulfilled a
task of the Polish Constitution and thus created a good
basis for the co-existence. The law was hailed as a major
progress by the German minorities. Representatives of
the national party “League of Polish Families” (LPR) on
the other hand saw this as the first step “of a broader
campaign to Germanisation” of the region.4

Controversial was previously mainly the If the members of a minority make up


quota for the use of a minority language as more than 20 percent of a community,
then, since 2005, they have the right
official language next to Polish in the commu- to use their native language when in
nities. If the members of a minority make contact with the local authorities.
up more than 20 per cent of a community,
then, since 2005, they have the right to use their native
language when in contact with the local authorities. At the
same time, these communities have the opportunity to
put up bilingual city and street signs, which after a few
years was used more and more, especially in Opole Silesia
where the vast majority of the German population group
lives, but partially led to resistance and resentment among
the Polish population. A total of 30 municipalities could
probably introduce bilingualism, 28 in the Opole Voivodship
and 2 in Silesia. As of now, 24 communities have already
implemented this. Likewise seven of twelve Pomeranian
communities that meet the minority quorum have intro-
duced Kashubian as a second language. The municipality
Punsk, populated by many Lithuanians, and the munici-
pality Gorlice, inhabited by Lemkos in Lesser Poland, are
also bilingual. Twelve communities in north-eastern Poland
could also introduce Belarusian as a supplement.

4 | The contents of the minority law is available in German:


http://www.bilingual.com.pl/pdf/Polnisches%20Minderheiten
gesetz.pdf (accessed February 3, 2011); Cf. Renata Mróz,
“Polen verabschiedet neues Minderheitengesetz,” in:
http://polen-news.de/puw/puw73-15 (accessed February 3,
2011); Markus Waschinski, “Die deutsche Minderheit in Polen,”
Polen-Analysen Nr. 26, 2008, 6.
136 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Table 2
Communities with a German population over 20 per
cent and/or German mayors

Per cent Number German mayors

Voivodship Opolskie / Opole

District Kędzierzyń-Kożle / Kandrzin-Cosel

Bierawa / Birawa 24.6 2,010

Cisek / Czissek ◪ 42.4 2,978 Alojzy Parys

Pawłowiczki / Pawlowitzke 20.7 1,802

Polska Cerekiew / Groß Neukirch 21.9 1,082 Krystyna Helbin

Reńska Wieś / Reinschdorf 34.5 3,042 Marian Wojciechowski

District Kluczbork / Kreuzburg

Lasowice Wielkie / Gross Lassowitz ◪ 37.6 2,735

District Krapkowice / Krappitz

Gogolin ◪ n/a n/a Joachim Wojtala

Krapkowice / Krappitz n/a n/a Andrzej Kasiura

Strzeleczki / Klein Strehlitz ◪ 41.6 3,418 Bronisław Kurpiela

Walce / Walzen ◪ 31.7 1,970 Bernhard Kubata

Zdzieszowice / Deschowitz n/a n/a Dieter Przewdzing

District Olesno / Rosenberg

Dobrodzień / Guttentag ◪ 25.0 2,762 Róża Kożlik

Gorzów Śląski / Landsberg n/a n/a Artur Tomala

Olesno / Rosenberg 23.8 4,608

Radłów / Radlau ◪ 27.9 1,295 Włodzimierz Kierat

Zębowice / Zembowitz ◪ 42.1 1,782 Waldemar Czaja

District Opole / Oppeln

Dobrzeń Wielki / Groß Döbern ◪ 20.3 2,885 Henryk Wróbel

Chrząstowice / Chronstau ◪ 25.7 1,705 Helena Rogacka

Komprachcice / Comprachtschütz ◪ 29.5 3,260 Paweł Smolarek

Łubniany / Lugnian ◪ 27.4 2,486 Krystian Baldy

Murów / Murow ◪ 31.0 1,955

Prószków / Prosaku ◪ 30.2 3,046 Róża Malik

Ozimek / Malapane n/a n/a Marek Korniak

Tarnów Opolski / Tarnau ◪ 23.8 2,447

Turawa 20.6 1,983 Waldemar Kampa

Percentage = Proportion of German, ◪ = bilingual municipalities


3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 137

Per cent Number German mayors

District Prudnik / Neustadt

Biała / Zülz ◪ 42.0 5,103 Arnold Hindera

Głogówek / Oberglogau ◪ 24.3 3,680

District Strzelce / Groß Strehlitz

Izbicko / Stubendorf ◪ 28.1 1,563 Brygida Pytel

Jemielnica / Himmelwitz ◪ 23.7 1,822 Joachim Jelito

Kolonowski / Colonnowska ◪ 41.1 2,703 Norbert Koston

Leśnica / Leschnitz ◪ 26.9 2,409 Łukasz Jastrzębski

Ujazd / Ujest ◪ 25.2 1,607

Voivodship Śląskie / Silesia

District Racibórz / Ratibor

Krzanowice / Kranowitz ◪ 20.5 1,285

Rudnik / Rudnick ◪ n/a n/a

Percentage = Proportion of German, ◪ = bilingual municipalities

The law also provides for financial support of the State


for the cultural activities of minorities. Beyond that, it
contains nothing new. Most sections were in previous laws
and regulations, such as the right to their own language,
tradition, culture, its own educational and cultural institu-
tions, native tongue education as well as their own first
and last name. However, this new law determines for the
first time which groups count as an ethnical minority.
The law therefore refers to the national minorities of
Armenians, Germans, Lithuanians, Russians, Slovaks,
Czechs, Ukrainians, White Russians, to Jews and four eth-
nic minorities, which are the Karaites, Lemkos, Romani
and Tatars, but not to the, in the recent years constituent,
ethnic group of Silesia. It also regulates the use of the
language of the Kashubians, located in the area southwest
of Gdansk. The current Prime Minister Donald Tusk comes
from Kashubia.5

5 | Additional literature: Peter Oliver Loew, “Nationale und ethni-


sche Minderheiten,” in: Dieter Bingen, Krzysztof Ruchniewich
(eds.), Länderbericht Polen, (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, 2009), 360-372; Markus Waschinski, “Die
deutsche Minderheit in Polen,” Polen-Analysen Nr. 26, 2008;
Stephan Georg Raabe, “Zur Lage der deutschen Volksgruppe
in Polen,” KAS-Länderbericht, 2005.
138 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Table 3
Communities with Auxiliary Languages

Kashubian Voivodship

Sierakowice Pomorskie / Pomerania

Bytów Pomorskie / Pomerania

Stężyca Pomorskie / Pomerania

Chmielno Pomorskie / Pomerania

Szemud Pomorskie / Pomerania

Linia Pomorskie / Pomerania

Kartuzy Pomorskie / Pomerania

Lithuanian

Puńsk / Punskas Podlaskie

Lemko

Gorlice Małopolskie / Lesser Poland

THE POLISH DIASPORA IN GERMANY

For the Polish Politics a good treatment of the national


minorities in their own country is important insofar as there
are autochthonous Polish minorities living in Lithuania,
Belarus and the Ukraine and there is a large Polish-speaking
group in Germany. There are often disputes
For the Polish speaking population in over the treatment of the Polish minority in
Germany, Poland wants similar rights Lithuania. For the Polish speaking population
as the German minority has in Poland,
referring to the German-Polish Treaty in Germany, Poland wants similar rights as
of 1991. the German minority has in Poland, referring
to the German-Polish Neighbourhood- and Friendship
Treaty of 1991, which celebrates its twentieth anniversary
on June 17 of this year. In round-table discussions at the
invitation of the two interior ministries in February 2010
and with the participation of representatives of the German
minority in Poland and the Polish Diaspora in Germany,
the support of these population groups was discussed.
Articles 20/21 of the German-Polish Neighbourhood Treaty
grant the Polish Diaspora in Germany the same rights as
the German Minority in Poland, although both the status
of the population  – established population on one hand
and immigrants on the other  – as well as the settlement
patterns and the population structures in the two countries
are different. In the Weimar Republic, the Polish were
recognised as a national minority. Immediately before
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 139

the Second World War, however, the leadership of this


Minority was arrested and interned in concentration camps
in Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald. Shortly thereafter, the
recognition as a minority was revoked by decree through
the National Socialist dictatorship, the Polish minority
organisations were prohibited and their property was
confiscated. With the westward shift of the German-Polish
border to the Oder-Neiße line in 1945, the territories in
which an autochthonous Polish minority was established,
(especially the border regions of the Prussian provinces of
Upper Silesia, Grenzmark Posen, West and East Prussia),
were now part of the Communist-ruled Poland. This is
why today the Polish population in Germany is no longer
recognised as a national minority, although the legal
liquidation of the Polish minority before the
war was lifted, with the coming into force of The majority of the Poles now living
the Constitution of the Federal Republic in in Germany are German-Polish emi­
grants, who together with the Polish-
1949. The majority of the Poles now living born population make up approx. 1.3
in Germany are German-Polish emigrants, per cent of the population.
who together with the Polish-born population
make up approximately 1.3 per cent of the population (just
over one million people according to the census of 2005).
Between 1950 and 1989 alone, about 1.2 million German
emigrants and their families came to the Federal Republic
of Germany.

Nevertheless, from Warsaw’s point of view, the treatment


of the Polish Diaspora is by far not the same as the
privileges that the Germans have in Poland, which is
why a greater promotion of language and culture, of
organisational structure and the granting of participation
opportunities is pushed for. Representatives of the Polish
community also demand that the Poles in Germany are
recognised as a national minority and the granting of the
resulting rights. They also demand the elimination of what
is in their opinion an asymmetry in the implementation
of the German-Polish Neighbourhood Treaty. This carries
political dynamite. As there are parliamentary elections
due in the coming up fall, national-conservative forces will
probably pick up this topic.

The Polish Diaspora is organised in the Union of Poles and


in the Polish Congress in Germany, albeit with a relatively
low number of members. Typically enough, the Chairman
140 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

of the Union of Poles, Marek Wójcicki, came to Germany on


the “German minority ticket” in the 1980s, which illustrates
the peculiar conflict situation. A special role belongs to the
Polish Catholic Mission in Germany, which, in addition to its
pastoral work, offers education for children in Polish.

REPRESENTATION OF THE GERMAN MINORITY


IN THE SEJM AND SELF-GOVERNMENT

Since 1991, the German minority submitted their own


lists to the Sejm elections, whereby it is exempt from the
five-per cent hurdle, which was introduced in 1993. In
the first completely free elections in 1991, approximately
132,000 (1.19 per cent) people across the country voted
for the lists of the German minority (DMi), 74,000 of which
from Opole Silesia. This led to seven Member of Parliament
mandates; in 1993, the DMi won four seats, 1997, 2001
and 2005 only two mandates in each year. In
In the Sejm, the DMi is now only repre- the 2007 elections only 32,462 (0.2 per cent)
sented by one Member of Parliament, voted for the DMi. Thus, the support steadily
Ryszard Galla, who is also the Presi-
dent of the House of German-Polish decreased in the parliamentary elections. In
cooperation in Gliwice. the Sejm, the DMi is now only represented
by one Member of Parliament, Ryszard Galla, who is also
the President of the House of German-Polish cooperation in
Gliwice. The reasons for the weak performance in the 2007
elections on one hand was the increased voter turnout in
the province of Opole (2005: 33.5 per cent; 2007: 45.5
per cent), which was connected to the fact that the election
was characterised as a national referendum against the
national-conservative party “Law and Justice” (PiS)6 and
on the other, lay in the decreasing commitment, especially
of younger people towards the political representation of
the DMi, the lack of mobilisation as well as the over-ageing.

Added to this is the hidden labour migration from the


region, which particularly applies to dual citizens. According
to a study by the Voivodship Opole in 2007, approximately
330,000 autochthonous people are registered in the
region, roughly a third of the total population. Among
them are about 80.000 people, nearly a quarter, who live

6 | With a low turnout, the DMi so far had, in relation, better


results because of its good network for mobilising of voters.
From the rise in turnout by 12 per cent, however the major
parties benefited disproportionately, particularly the Civic
Platform PO, but also the PiS.
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 141

abroad, either partially or the whole time. Therefore, a part


of the potential voters for the DMi is simply not present,
as can also be seen in a regional comparison of the voter’s
turnout, where the Voivodship Opole generally has the
lowest, in particular in the districts with a strong German
population. In 2007, the voter turnout there was six to
seven per cent below the already low average of 45.53
per cent.

REGIONAL ELECTIONS 2010

The DMi is still strongly represented on the local govern-


ment level of the Opole region, for example in the regional
Parliament and in the district and municipal councils.
Here, through its extensive network, it has a good tool for
voter mobilisation, which, at such a low voter turnout, is a
strategic advantage.

In the regional Parliament, the DMi, which evades a clear


political classification, has been part of the government in
various coalitions since 1998, since 2006 with the liberal-
conservative Civic Platform (PO) and before that with the
post-communist “Alliance of the Left Democrats” (SLD). The
deterioration of the German-Polish relations
during 2005 to 2007, when the national- The current situation is also not with­
conservative PiS was in office, according to out tension, as the governmental for-
mation after the regional elections on
representatives of the minority was felt even November 21, 2010 made clear.
in the local government, particularly when
the regional government faced a President of Government
from the PiS. However, the current situation is also not
without tension, as the governmental formation after the
regional elections on November 21, 2010 made clear.

In these regional and local elections, the DMi achieved


good results in the Opole region. In the Voivodship Opole,
the regional Parliament received 17.77 per cent of the
votes (+0.47 per cent over 2006), which is the second
best result after the Civic Platform PO who received 31.93
per cent. In total, the minority received 53,670 votes,
an increase of 4,539 votes compared to 2006. Thus, the
negative trend of recent elections was stopped: In 2006,
the minority received 49,131 votes, however in 2002 the
received 54,385 votes (18.61 per cent).
142 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

In the last two legislatures, the minority had seven repre-


sentatives in the Sejmik, the Voivodship Parliament, before
that even 13 mandates. Now there are six, which is due
to the strong election results of the Civic Platform (PO, 12
mandates, +4) and of the “Alliance of the Left Democrats”
(SLD, five MP’s). Law and Justice (PiS) also received five
seats, and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) two.7

Table 4
Results of the regional elections
in the Voivodship Opole

Election Committee Votes Per cent

PO 96,449 31.93

PiS 52,664 17.43

German Minority (DMi) 53,670 17.77

SLD 50,479 16.71

PSL 36,655 12.13

PPP 6,528 2.16

Others 5,631 1.87

Source: Official results according to the electoral commission


(Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza), http://wybory2010.pkw.gov.pl/
Komunikaty_PKW,2; Wyniki glosowania do sejmików województw
wedlug komitetów wyborczych i województw (accessed February
3, 2011).

The German Minority (DMi) members of the Sejmik are:

1. Hubert Jerzy Kolodziej – Teacher, School Director,


Education Officer of the Association of German
companies VDG;
2. Norbert Rasch – Chairman of the Social-Cultural
Society of the Germans in Opole Silesia (SKGD);
3. Herbert Czaja – Chairman of the Chamber of
Agriculture Opole;
4. Krystian Adamik – Doctor of medicine;
5. Józef Kotys – Vice Prime Minister the Voivodship Opole;
6. Andrzej Kasiura – previously a board member of the

7 | In the Voivodship Warmia and Mazury Urszula Pasławska, on


the list of the Polish People’s Party PSL was voted for by the
German minority and elected to the Sejmik. Cf. Krzysztof
Świerc, Agnieszka Szotka, “Erfolg der Deutschen Minderheit
bei der Kommunalwahl,” Schlesisches Wochenblatt, E-Paper,
http://www.wochenblatt.pl/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=237 (accessed February 3, 2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 143

Voivodship Opole (regional government) was able to


assert himself with 1,549 votes (52.53%) in the runoff
elections for mayor of the district town Krapkowice
(Krappitz) on December 5, against the PO candidate
Maciej Sonik (1,400 votes, 47.47%). The current Vice
Chairman of the Parliament, Ryszard Donitza, will
succeed him.

TUSK AVERTS SCANDAL

The PO, PSL and DMi entered the elections, expressing


their will to continue their previous coalition. However, only
24 hours after the elections, the PO formed a coalition with
the PSL and the “Alliance of the Left Democrats” (SLD),
which the DMi was informed of through the press. The
regional head of the PO, Leszek Korzeniowski, justified
this by stating that the cooperation had not been as
expected, that agreements were not upheld and that the
DMi had acted too selfish. “They kept the money in their
own pockets”, he claimed.8 Furthermore, the new coalition
was perceived more positively in Poland. For allegations
were constantly made by the party headquarters that the
minority enjoyed too many privileges and was exagger-
ating in the exercise of their rights, such as bilingual town
signs. This scandal regionally hit like a bomb. Quickly, the
public talk was of an “anti-German coalition”. After all, the
DMi had emerged from the elections as the second largest
party in the Sejmik. Nevertheless, there were also counter
votes in the PO. The European MP Danuta Jazłowiecka
from Opole criticised the exclusion of Germans openly as a
“mistake” of fellow party members. The Opole Voivodship
is under particular scrutiny and support from Germany, it
was said. Besides, the German tourism in the region is an
important economic factor. The cold disempowerment of
DMi immediately caused the head of PO and Prime Minister
Donald Tusk to call for action. As a result, the PO Opole
included the DMi in the government.9 The Voivodship is

8 | “Korzeniowski: w centrali były zarzuty, że MN ma za dużo


przywilejów” (allegations were constantly made by the party
headquarters, that the minority enjoyed too many privileges),
in: Gazeta Wyborcza (Opole), November 21, 2010.
9 | Website of the German-Polish Association Local Political Part-
nership (AKP), “Tusk wendet Skandalkoalition ab. Deutsche
Minderheit bleibt in Oppelner Regierung,” December 3, 2010,
in: http://akp-dialog.de/index.php?view=article&catid=35%3
Aaktuelles&id=76%3A2010-12-03 (accessed February 3, 2011).
144 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

now governed by a grand four-way coalition, whereas the


DMi however, has to accept disadvantages. The PO as
the strongest parliamentary group provides the Marshall.
However, neither of the two Vice-Prime Minister positions
were awarded, as it would correspond to the proportional
representation, to the Germans. The former German Vice
Marshall Józef Kotys, who by far had the most votes in the
elections, has to remain on the sidelines. As a successful
politician and string-puller, his outstanding
Concerning the results of the German election result speaks for him. His profile was
minority in local elections: 28 candi- probably too dominant for the PO. The PiS
dates from the DMi ran for mayor or
community leaders, 24 of which were alone, now with five of 30 seats in the Sejmik
elected. now form an opposition.

Concerning the results of the German minority in local


elections: 28 candidates from the DMi ran for mayor or
community leaders, 24 of which were elected, 19 in the
first round on November 21, 2010, and five in the runoff
elections on December 5, 2010. The DMi provides 49
Council members to the district assemblies (2006:54).
There, the distribution of seats is as follows:

Table 5
Seats won by DMi in regional elections 2010 and 2006

Community Seats won Seats won Mandates


in 2010 in 2006 total

Strzelce Opolskie
9 10 19
(Groß Strehlitz)

Krapkowice (Krappitz) 7 7 19

Kędzierzyn-Koźle
5 8 21
(Kandrzin-Cosel)

Olesno (Rosenberg) 9 8 19

Prudnik (Neustadt) 5 3 17

Opole (Oppeln) 12 16 25

Kluczburg (Kreuzburg) 2 2 19

Source: Written statement of Joanna Mróz, spokesperson of the


Social-Cultural Society of the Germans in Opole Silesia, November
26, 2010.

In the districts Namysłów (Namslau), Brzeg (Brieg),


Nysa (Neisse) and Głubczyce (Leobschütz), the DMi did
not provide their own candidates. In the municipalities,
the DMi won 278 council mandates (2006:304). The DMi
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 145

therefore received a total of 357 mandates (2006: 365) in


regional and local elections.

IRRITATION ABOUT THE SUCCESS OF


THE SILESIAN AUTONOMY MOVEMENT

In regional elections, the movement Autonomous Silesia


(Ruch Autonomii Śląska, RAŚ) won 122,781 votes (8.49
per cent) in the Voivodship Silesia and three seats in
the Sejmik. Through this, they became the
fourth-largest party after the PO (22 MP’s) The Germans in the Voivodship Silesia
the PiS (11) and the SLD (10). The PSL won did not provide their own list. Its can-
didates were members of various elec-
two seats. 2006, the RAŚ received 58,919 tion committees, but supported in par-
votes (4.35 per cent) and a mandate. The ticular was the RAŚ.
Germans in the Voivodship did not provide
their own list. Its candidates were members of various
election committees, but supported in particular was the
RAŚ.10

Rudolf Kołodziejczyk founded the movement in 1990.


Since 2003, the historian Jerzy Gorzelik chairs it. It links
in particular to the Autonomous Voivodship Silesia in the
Second Polish Republic between the wars and wants to
achieve more autonomy for the region, which is why it
is sometimes accused of anti-Polish tendencies. Today’s
Voivodship, after the territorial reform in 1999, makes
itself up from the Voivodships Katowice, Częstochowa
and Bielsko-Biala and includes mostly the territory of the
former Autonomous Voivodship Silesia. Formed in 1922
out of the part of Upper Silesia, it was separated from the
German Reich and Austria-Hungary after World War I, as
a result of a referendum and rebellions. Then as now, the
region with the industrial agglomeration area between
Gliwice and Katowice is the most densely populated
Voivodship in Poland. The German parties  – the Catholic
People’s Party, the German Party, and the German Social
Democratic Party – in the 1920s elections achieved 21-30
per cent, and provided a representative to the six-strong
government, the Voivodship Council.

In the now newly elected Sejmik, the RAŚ is part of a


coalition with the PO and PSL, which amongst other things,
was openly criticised by the Polish President Bronisław

10 | Cf. Świerc, „Erfolg der Deutschen Minderheit…‟, n. 7.


146 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 3|2011

Komorowski and President of the EU Parliament Jerzy


Buzek, who had his constituency in Katowice. Not until his
second attempt on December 10, the Chairman of the RAŚ
Jerzy Gorzel was voted into the board of the Voivodship,
the regional government, where he is responsible for
education, culture and external relations. During the first
election a week earlier, there had been a stalemate, as
some PO representatives refused to vote for their coalition
partner. This, as well as the national reports in the major
Polish newspapers, showed the irritation that the relatively
strong performance of the Autonomy Movement evoked.

Overall, the RAŚ received 40 mandates in regional and


municipal elections: three in the regional parliament, six
in the district assemblies, seven in the larger city councils
and 24 in municipalities:

In Godów (District Wodzisław) through Mariusz Adamczyk


(re-elected with 90.3 per cent) and in the rural community
Lyski (District Rybnik) through Grzegorz Gryt (64.67 per
cent) it provides the directly elected mayors and the
majority in the municipal council. In the regional assembly
of Rybnik with a 25.61 percentage of votes, it has five
mandates, in the regional assembly of Wodzisław with
a 7.91 percentage of votes, it is represented with one
mandate. In the cities, the RAŚ in Czerwionka-Leszczyny
(ger. Czerwionka-Leschczin, District Rybnik, ca. 29,000
inhabitants) – centre of the polish rebellion under Wojciech
Korfanty between 1919 and 1921 – is represented with four
mandates (20.48 per cent) in Mysłowice (ger. Myslowitz,
75,000 inhabitants) with two (9.29 per cent) and in Ruda
Śląska (143,000 inhabitants) with one mandate (8.18 per
cent).11

PROSPECTIVE

As the major parties do not play a dominant role on the


local level, but are often surpassed by the local citizen’s
committees, the DMi will probably continue to play a larger
role here. It also has a good chance, to continue to form
a central force, regionally in the Opole Voivodship, insofar

11 | Cf. Ruch Autonomii Śląska, http://www.autonomia.pl/index.


php?option=com_content&task=view&id=631 (accessed
February 3, 2011).
3|2011 KAS INTERNATIONAL REPORTS 147

as it maintains its own cultural identity and prevents


the ongoing exodus of Germans. This calls for increased
efforts with regard to the linguistic and cultural promotion
and a perspective on life in the Upper Silesian region. At
national level, however, involvement in the major political
parties promises more success in contributing towards the
integration of the German minority in Poland.

While the DMi fits into the given political context because
of the minority law, the RAŚ, due to their aspirations for
greater autonomy of Silesia (eastern Upper Silesia) evokes
irritation in Poland. It will probably continue to play the role
of a specifically cultural and political force in the region,
whereas locally it is not anchored as strongly, which should
give reason for the Polish majority society to handle the
autonomy movement with more composure.

The author thanks Luke Skwiercz for the assistance in researching


the local election results of the German minority.

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