THE CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

FACTS:A petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injuction and/or Restraining Order filed by Patricio
Dumlao a former Governor of Nueva Viscaya, seeking to enjoin Comelec from implementing section 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, for being unconstitutional, discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection
rights. Petitioner Dumlao join the suit filled by petitioner Igot and Salapatan to declare the said
provision as null and void for being violative of the Constitution.

ISSUE:Whether or not the petition filed contains the requisite of actual case or controversy as a
requisite for a review on certiorari?
-Whether or not paragraph 1 Section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 52 is constitutional?

HELD:It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and
controversies. The petitioner assails the constitutionality of the said provision and seeks to prohibit the
respondent COMELEC from implementing such, yet the petitioner has not been adversely affected by
the application of that provision. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter on which
the court is being asked to review on certiorari. Courts are practically unanimous in the
pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear
beyond reasonable doubt. It is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for
one who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.
The constitutionality of paragraph 1 section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 is clear and unequivocal thus
it does not discriminate and violate the equal protection rights of the petitioner. The first paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is declared VALID.

MANILA MOTORS CO. INC. VS. FLORES

M ay 195 4, Man ila Mo to rs Co. Inc . fil ed a compla int bef ore th e mu n. cour t of ma nil a to r eco ver the
amount of P 1,047.98 from MANUEL T. FLORES as chattel mortgage installments w/c is due
i n September 1941.– Flores pleaded for prescription: 1941-1954 and the complaint was dismissed.– On
appeal before the CFI, the court saw the plaintiff’s sustaining contention that the moratorium lawshad
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period & that deducting the time during
which
saidl a w s w e r e i n o p e r a t i o n - 3 y r s . A n d 8 m o n t h s - t h e 1 0 y r . t e r m h a d n o t
y e t e l a p s e d w h e n t h e complainant sued for collection in 1954.
–
CFI ordered the return of the case to the mun. judge for trial on the merits.

ISSUE/S:W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e m o r a t o r i u m l a w s d i d n o t h a v e t h e
e f f e c t o f s u s p e n d i n g t h e p e r i o d d u e t o unconstitutionality as declared in the Rutter vs.
Esteban case.

Ruling:
1.
In Montilla vs. Pacific Commercial3 we held that the moratorium laws suspended
the period of prescription. That was rendered after the Rutter-Esteban decision. It should be stated
however, infairness to appellant, that the Montilla decision came down after he had submitted his
brief. And inanswer to his main contention, the following portion is quoted from a resolution of this
Court4
2.Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil. 68) may be construed to mean that at the of the decision theMoratorium
law could no longer be validly applied because of the prevailing circumstances. At anyrate, although
the general rule is that an unconstitutional statute "confers no right, create no office, affords
no protection and justifies no acts performed under it."(11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.)Judgment affirmed,
without costs.

Lozada vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-59068 January 27, 1983

FACTS:
Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada and Romeo B. Igot filed a representative suit for and in behalf of those who
wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation, to compel the respondent COMELEC
to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies numbering twelve (12) in the Interim Batasan
Pambansa. The petition is based on Section 5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution which reads:

(2) In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa eighteen months or more before a
regularelection, the Commission on Election shall call a special election to be held within sixty (60)
daysafter the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term.
Petitioner Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu City and a transient voter
of Quezon City, Metro Manila, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan Pambansa; while
petitioner Romeo B. Igot alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling
of a special election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution. As reason for their petition, petitioners allege
that they are "... deeply concerned about their duties as citizens and desirous to uphold the
constitutional mandate and rule of law ...; that they have filed the instant petition on their own and in
behalf of all other Filipinos since the subject matters are of profound and general interest. "
The respondent COMELEC, represented by counsel, opposes the petition alleging,
substantially, that 1)petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the proper
parties to institute the action; 2)this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition; and 3) Section
5(2), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitutiondoes not apply to the Interim Batasan Pambansa.

OPOSA vs. FACTORAN

FACTS: The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent,
then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged
that the massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rainforest.

They furthered the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a
balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.

HELD:
Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard.

The SC decided in the affirmative.

Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that:

The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We
find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the
succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to
a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers the
“rhythm and harmony of nature”. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of
common and general interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

POLICE POWER

MAXIMO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., respondents.Maximo

Calalang in his own behalf.

The case of Calalang vs Williams is known for the elegant exposition of the definition of social justice.
In this case, Justice Laurel defined social justice as “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
nor anarchy” but humanization of laws and equalization of social and economic forces by the State so
that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
As I browse through the entire case, I found out that there is more to this case than the definition of
social justice. In fact, another important issue raised here is whether there was a valid delegation of
power by the National Assembly to the Director of Public Works. Let us begin with the facts of the
case.
Facts:
In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote
safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the
Director of Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the
passing of animal drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila.
Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issues:
Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative
powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they
promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy
demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act,
to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of
the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and
interest.”
The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely
the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated.
To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long
a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon
and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly.
It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the
exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.

Agustin vs Edu

Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No
229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to equip them with a
pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this order is
unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are already equipped
with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other motorists. And that the
mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and
would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.

HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car
owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said motor
vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on
front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) . . .
because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters, any motorist from this
country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning device
installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along
the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is
stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a
motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning devices or the petroleum lamps
will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light
is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion
or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of
collision.

The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is conceded
by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the former, however, that
while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was mentioned only in passing. The broad and
expansive scope of the police power which was originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the
American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of government
inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice
Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams,
identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state. Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the
doctrine, such a competence being referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The
concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in
Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent,
and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed out ‘to all the great public
needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were
narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation.
What is critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably
vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and
imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the particular
police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It would be a rare
occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None has
been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu
v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with the same end in
view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national
roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by
the imperative demands of public safety.
BUCK V BELL

Facts of the Case:

Carrie Buck was a feeble minded woman who was committed to a state mental institution. Her
condition had been present in her family for the last three generations. A Virginia law allowed for the
sexual sterilization of inmates of institutions to promote the "health of the patient and the welfare of
society." Before the procedure could be performed, however, a hearing was required to determine
whether or not the operation was a wise thing to do.

Question:
Did the Virginia statute which authorized sterilization deny Buck the right to due process of the law
and the equal protection of the laws as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?

Conclusion:
The Court found that the statute did not violate the Constitution. Justice Holmes made clear that
Buck's challenge was not upon the medical procedure involved but on the process of the substantive
law. Since sterilization could not occur until a proper hearing had occurred (at which the patient and a
guardian could be present) and after the Circuit Court of the County and the Supreme Court of Appeals
had reviewed the case, if so requested by the patient. Only after "months of observation" could the
operation take place. That was enough to satisfy the Court that there was no Constitutional violation.
Citing the best interests of the state, Justice Holmes affirmed the value of a law like Virginia's in order
to prevent the nation from "being swamped with incompetence . . . Three generations of imbeciles are
enough."

JACOBSON VS. MASSACHUSETTS

Facts of the Case:

A Massachusetts law allowed cities to require residents to be vaccinated against smallpox. Cambridge
adopted such an ordinance, with some exceptions. Jacobson refused to comply with the requirement
and was fined five dollars.

Question:
Did the mandatory vaccination law violate Jacobson's Fourteenth Amendment right to liberty?

Conclusion:
The Court held that the law was a legitimate exercise of the state's police power to protect the public
health and safety of its citizens. Local boards of health determined when mandatory vaccinations were
needed, thus making the requirement neither unreasonable nor arbitrarily imposed.

As the 20th century began, epidemics of infectious diseases such as smallpox remained a recurrent
threat. A Massachusetts statute granted city boards of health the authority to require vaccination
“when necessary for public health or safety.”17 In 1902, when smallpox surged in Cambridge, the city’s
board of health issued an order pursuant to this authority that required all adults to be vaccinated to
halt the disease. The statutory penalty for refusing vaccination was a monetary fine of $5 (about $100
today). There was no provision for actually forcing vaccination on any person.
Henning Jacobson refused vaccination, claiming that he and his son had had bad reactions to earlier
vaccinations. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found it unnecessary to worry about any
possible harm from vaccination, because no one could actually be forced to be vaccinated: “If a person
should deem it important that vaccination should not be performed in his case, and the authorities
should think otherwise, it is not in their power to vaccinate him by force, and the worst that could
happen to him under the statute would be the payment of $5.”18 Jacobson was fined, and he appealed
to the US Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court had no difficulty upholding the state’s power to grant the board of health authority
to order a general vaccination program during an epidemic. No one disputed, and the Constitution
confirmed, that states retained all the sovereign authority they had not ceded to the national
government in the Constitution.19–23There had never been any doubt that, subject to constitutional
limitations, states had authority to legislate with respect to all matters within their geographic
boundaries, or to police their internal affairs, which Chief Justice Marshall referred to as the “police
power.”24–26 During the 1800s, the Supreme Court confirmed that this power included the power to
pass laws that promote the “health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people.”27–
29 Most early Supreme Court cases that involved state police powers, however, were disputes over
which level of government—state or federal—had jurisdiction to regulate or tax a commercial
activity.30–37 Jacobsonwas the rare case in which a state’s jurisdiction was not questioned—because no
one claimed that the federal government should control a local smallpox epidemic. Instead, the
question was whether the state had overstepped its own authority and whether the sphere of personal
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment38 included the right to refuse
vaccination.

Justice Harlan stated the question before the Court: “Is this statute . . . inconsistent with the liberty
which the Constitution of the United States secures to every person against deprivation by the
State?”2(p25) Harlan confirmed that the Constitution protects individual liberty and that liberty is not
“an absolute right in each person to be, in all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from
restraint”:

There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will
and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government, especially of any free government
existing under a written constitution. But it is equally true that in every well-ordered society
charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in
respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such
restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may
demand.2(p29)

Thus, the more specific questions were whether the safety of the public justified this particular
restriction and whether it was enforceable by reasonable regulations. The Court answered yes to both
questions. It noted that the vaccination law applied “only when, in the opinion of the Board of Health,
that was necessary for the public health or the public safety.”2(p27) The board of health was qualified to
make that judgment, and, consistent with its own precedents, the Court said that it was the
legislature’s prerogative to determine how to control the epidemic, as long as it did not act in an
unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive manner.2,39,40 Vaccination was a reasonable means of control:
“The state legislature proceeded upon the theory which recognized vaccination as at least an effective
if not the best known way in which to meet and suppress the evils of a smallpox epidemic that
imperiled an entire population.”2(p31)

The Court nonetheless concluded with a note of caution:

The police power of a State, whether exercised by the legislature, or by a local body acting under
its authority, may be exerted in such circumstances or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive
in particular cases as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and
oppression.2(p38)

For example, it noted that the law should not be understood to apply to anyone who could show that
vaccination would impair his health or probably cause his death.

In most respects, Jacobson was an easy case.41 The decision held that a state may require healthy
adults to accept an effective vaccination when an existing epidemic endangers a community’s
population. As with all court decisions, what this “means” is a matter of interpretation. Jacobson may
be what Sunstein called a narrow and shallow decision—narrow because it is not intended to apply to a
broad range of legislation, and shallow because it does not explicitly rely on a general theory of
constitutional interpretation to justify its result.42 People who have quite different world views or
philosophies can accept the decision because it need not require the same result for different laws or
in different circumstances. Not surprisingly, judges and scholars emphasize different language in the
opinion to support different interpretations.43–46.

EMINENT DOMAIN

CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery
for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such
public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are
within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were
available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss
and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that
would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of
land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation.
Thus, the same filed an appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation.

Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the
municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the
conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal
corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature.
But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under
the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire
to.

United States vs. Causby [328 US 256, 27 May 1946]

Douglas (J)

Facts: Causby owns 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro, North Carolina. It has on it a
dwelling house, and also various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising chickens. The end of
the airport’s northwest-southeast runway is 2,220 feet from Causby’s barn and 2,275 feet from their
house. The path of glide to this runway passes directly over the property-which is 100 feet wide and
1,200 feet long. The 30 to 1 safe glide angle approved by the Civil Aeronautics Authority passes over
this property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn and 18 feet above
the highest tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease executed in May
1942, for a term commencing 1 June 1942 and ending 30 June 1942, with a provision for renewals until
30 June 1967, or 6 months after the end of the national emergency, whichever is the earlier. Various
aircraft of the United States, i.e. bombers, transports and fighters, use this airport. Since the United
States began operations in May 1942, its four-motored heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier
type, and its fighter planes have frequently passed over Causby’s land buildings in considerable
numbers and rather close together. They come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops
of the trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off. The noise is
startling. And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the noise,
the Causbys had to give up their chicken business. As many as 6 to 10 of their chickens were killed in
one day by flying into the walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150.
Production also fell off. The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial
chicken farm. The Causbys are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has become nervous
and frightened. Although there have been no airplane accidents on their property, there have been
several accidents near the airport and close to their place. These are the essential facts found by the
Court of Claims. On the basis of these facts, it found that the property had depreciated in value. It
held that the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the
value of the property destroyed and the easement taken was $2,000. The United States contends that
when flights are made within the navigable airspace (Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938) without any physical invasion of the property of the landowners, there
has been no taking of property. It says that at most there was merely incidental damage occurring as a
consequence of authorized air navigation.

Issue: Whether there was taking of the Causby’s property, even in the light that the United States
allegedly has complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the air space over the country.

Held: The United States conceded that if the flights over Causby’s property rendered it uninhabitable,
there would be a taking compensable under the 5th Amendment. It is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s
gain, which is the measure of the value of the property taken. Market value fairly determined is the
normal measure of the recovery. And that value may reflect the use to which the land could readily be
converted, as well as the existing use. If, by reason of the frequency and altitude of the flights, Causby
could not use this land for any purpose, their loss would be complete. It would be as complete as if the
United States had entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession of it. Herein,
there was a taking. Though it would be only an easement of flight which was taken, that easement, if
permanent and not merely temporary, normally would be the equivalent of a fee interest. It would be
a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land. The fact that the
planes never touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery
of seisin on the transfer of real estate. The owner’s right to possess and exploit the land-that is to say,
his beneficial ownership of it-would be destroyed. It would not be a case of incidental damages arising
from a legalized nuisance such as was involved in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co. (233 U.S. 546).
In that case property owners whose lands adjoined a railroad line were denied recovery for damages
resulting from the noise, vibrations, smoke and the like, incidental to the operations of the trains.
Herein, the line of flight is over the land, and the land is appropriated as directly and completely as if
it were used for the runways themselves. However, since the record in the case is not clear whether
the easement taken is a permanent or a temporary one, it would be premature for the Court to
consider whether the amount of the award made by the Court of Claims was proper, and thus the Court
remanded the cause to the Court of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings in conformity
with the Court’s opinion.

Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi [GR L-20620, 15 August 1974]

En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 7 concur, 4 took no part

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the judicial
administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi, from 1 July 1947, by virtue of a contract of
lease, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year). Before the
expiration of the contract of lease on 30 June 1956, the Republic sought to renew the same but
Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the
contract, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff of the AFP on 11 July 1956, informing the latter that the
heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in question because they had
decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general public, demanding that the property be vacated
within 30 days from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the same
condition as before occupancy. The Chief of Staff refused, saying that it was difficult for the army to
vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property, and that, there being no other
recourse, the acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings would be
recommended to the President. Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Pampanga (Civil Case 1458), to eject the Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment case
was pending, the Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent domain against Castellvi, and
Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun over 3 parcels of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca,
Pampanga. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value of
the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga,
was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the
provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that the court authorizes the Republic to take
immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga; that the court appoints 3 commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court issues thereafter a final
order of condemnation. The Republic was placed in possession of the lands on 10 August 1959.
Meanwhile, on 21 November 1959, the CFI of Pampanga, dismissed Civil Case 1458, upon petition of the
parties. After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the trial court, on 26 May 1961, rendered
its decision, finding that the unanimous recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square
meter for the 3 lots subject of the action is fair and just; and required the Republic to pay interests.
On 21 June 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, against which
motion Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed their respective oppositions, and which the trial court denied
on 12 July 1961. The Republic’s record on appeal was finally submitted on 6 December 1961, after
filing various ex-parte motions for extension of time within which to file its record on appeal. On 27
December 1961 the trial court dismissed both appeals for having been filed out of time, thereby . On
11 January 1962 the Republic filed a “motion to strike out the order of 27 December 1961 and for
reconsideration”, and subsequently an amended record on appeal, against which motion Castellvi and
Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On 26 July 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating that “in
the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined by the
Supreme Court,” and at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal
containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated 19 November 1962, the
trial court approved the Republic’s record on appeal as amended. Castellvi did not insist on her appeal.
Toledo-Gozun did not appeal.

Issue: Whether the taking of Castellvi’s property occurred in 1947 or in 1959.

Held: A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of property for purposes of eminent
domain. First, the expropriator must enter a private property. Second, the entrance into private
property must be for more than a momentary period. Third, the entry into the property should be
under warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property for
public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of
the property. The “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee
thereof. Two essential elements in the “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain,
namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite
period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the property and
deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi
property in 1947. The “taking’ of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947
when the Republic first occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just
compensation to be paid for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value
of the property as of that year. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just
compensation” is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled
that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
Herein, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by
authority of the court, on 10 August 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of
determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26 June 1959 when
the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

TAXATION
LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE [14 SCRA 292; NO.L-19201; 16
JUN 1965]

Facts: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr.
Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the
construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose.

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic
Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest.

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish
priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as
the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid.

Held: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the
Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties
as Property taxescontra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift taxon the property
used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of
gift inter vivos.

The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the
donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.

PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA [95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY
1954]

Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assailOrdinance No. 3398 together with the law
authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes
amunicipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-
payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to
impose amunicipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having
already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the
tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared theordinance invalid
and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.

Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize
what amounts to doubletaxation.

Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its
discretion may tax all, or select classes ofoccupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not
for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes
aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of political
departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the
state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently
terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the sameoccupation by both the
state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to
the ordinanceand affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
DUE PROCESS

Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927]

Taft (CJ):
Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North
College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because
of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the
motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within
Hamilton county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine and
costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of
common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the
ground that the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of Appeals of
the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment of
the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumey’s application to require the Court
of Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as of
right, asking that the judgment of the mayor’s court and of the appellate court be reversed on
constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for
the reason that no debatable constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment was then
brought to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state
Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed.

Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts in
prosecuting violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the case.

Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of
kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely
of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a defendant in a
criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the
judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against
him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that the
person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus
has a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in
the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not have received if the defendant had been
acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation of the law and the
ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the
defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at common law or in
this country, that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so
small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim “de minimis non curat lex.” The Court
cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute, remote,
trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought before the mayor for
the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a prospective
loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the
result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the
defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the country part of
counties in which there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons accused of
violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is offered of dividing
between the state and the village the large fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to
be had before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to
questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court to set
aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly against
the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no
matter what the evidence was against him, the defendant had the right to have an impartial judge. He
seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification of the
judge, which existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his
official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village. There
were thus presented at the outset both features of the disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme
Court of Ohio is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the
present opinion.

Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador

Due Process – impartial and competent court

Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan
in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of ”massive terrorism, intimidation,
duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and
intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just
referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on
Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd
Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to
the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made
by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day
period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of
the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the
Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the
proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the
COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then
moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death.

ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has repeatedly and
consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of
due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.
The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated
they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not
go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of
a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the
parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script.
There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent
law.

Nebbia v. New York

New York State dairy farmers were disproportionately affected by farm prices decline after World War
I, and the Great Depression further exacerbated the problems they faced. To address this problem, the
New York legislature created a joint legislative committee headed by Senator Perley A. Pitcher to
devise a remedy.[1]
Following the hearings, in 1933, the state of New York established a Milk Control Board that was
empowered to set maximum and minimumretail prices. The Board set the price of a quart of milk at
nine cents. This price reflected the then-current market price, and the purpose of this order was to
prevent price-cutting.[2] Nevertheless, the public suspected that the Board’s intent was to benefit the
dairy dealers instead of farmers because the minimum prices for the two sides were not the same.
Tensions ran so high that violent milk strikes took place throughout the state, resulting in two deaths
and a great deal of property damage.[3] Every public hearing of the Milk Control Board resulted in a
"tumultuous, popular assemblage" and its every action was "Statewide news."[4]
A search began for a case that would challenge the constitutional basis of the statute. Leo Nebbia, the
owner of a grocery store, sold two quarts of milk and a 5-cent loaf of bread for 18 cents. Nebbia was
found guilty of violating the price regulations, and was fined five dollars. Nebbia challenged the
conviction, arguing that the statute and order violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process
Clause of theFourteenth Amendment.
The county court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the case was heard by the
Supreme Court.
Majority opinion
Justice Owen J. Roberts delivered the majority opinion.
Roberts began by examining the legislative intent of the statute in question, discoursing briefly on the
effects of the Great Depression on milk prices and the significance of milk production to the agriculture
of the United States. He next noted that although use of property and making of contracts are typically
private matters and thus remain free of government interference, “neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute”[5], adding that occasional regulation of these by the state is requisite for proper
government function, especially in instances where such regulation is used to promote general welfare.
Neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth Amendments prohibit governmental regulation for the public
welfare; instead, they only direct the process by which such regulation occurs. As the Court has held in
the past, such due process “demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought
to be attained.”[6]
Roberts noted also that the New York milk industry had long been the subject of public interest
regulation. He indicated that because the legislative investigation that resulted in the establishment of
the Milk Control Board was well aware of the insufficiency of regular laws of supply and demand to
correct the issues with milk prices, “the order appears not to be unreasonable or arbitrary.”[7]
Addressing the due process challenge further, Roberts wrote that in absence of other constitutional
restrictions, a state may adopt an economic policy that can reasonably be said to promote public
welfare, and enforce such policy by appropriate legislation. Courts, however, have no authority to
create such policy or to strike it down when it has been properly enacted by the legislature, adding
“With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to
forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal.”[8]
He concluded that the majority found no basis in the Due Process Clause to strike down the challenged
provisions of the Agriculture and Markets law.

Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business
opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve
to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the
said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to
him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman
engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no
conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection
of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within
such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute
then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong
can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants
(uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is
resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of
Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on thisreservation providing that
said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts
of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction
be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative
Code.

Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam,
and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within
the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials
of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode.
Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The
Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of
the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancementof the non-Christian people of the
province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live
in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines.

“Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for
the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly
as he pleases.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
therefore, not issue.
EQUAL PROTECTION

People vs. Vera

[GR 45685, 16 November 1937]
First Division, Laurel (J): 4 concur, 2 concur in result

Facts: The People of the Philippine and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), are
respectively the plaintiff and the offended party, and Mariano Cu Unjieng is one of the defendants, in
the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al." (Criminal
case 42649) of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila and GR 41200 of the Suprme Court. Hon. Jose
O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, who
heard the application of Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case. The information in the
said criminal case was filed with the CFI on 15 October 1931, HSBC intervening in the case as private
prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine jurisprudence both in the
length of time spent by the court as well as in the volume in the testimony and the bulk of the exhibits
presented, the CFI, on 8 January 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to
indeterminate penalty ranging from 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years of prision
mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the offended party, HSBC. Upon appeal,
the court, on 26 March 1935, modified the sentence to an indeterminate penalty of from 5 years and 6
months of prision correccional to 7 years, 6 months and 27 days of prision mayor, but affirmed the
judgment in all other respects. Cu Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive
motions for new trial which were denied on 17 December 1935, and final judgment was accordingly
entered on 18 December 1935. Cu Unjieng thereupon sought to have the case elevated on certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November,
1936. The Supreme Court, on 24 November 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by Cu Unjieng
for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial and thereafter remanded
the case to the court of origin for execution of the judgment.

Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation on 27 November 1936, before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. Cu Unjieng states in his petition, inter alia,
that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal record and that he
would observe good conduct in the future. The CFI of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding, referred
the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of the same 18
June 1937. Thereafter, the CFI of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the
petition for hearing on 5 April 1937. On 2 April 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition
to the granting of probation to Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on 5 April
1937, alleging, among other things, that Act 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2
of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the
Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not
uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards
with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their
respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition on April 19, 1937,
elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power
to the provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal concurred in
the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to the questions raised concerning the
constitutionality of Act 4221. On 28 June 1937, Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated a resolution,
concluding that Cu Unjieng "es inocente por duda racional" of the crime of which he stands convicted
by the Supreme court in GR 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation. On 3 July 1937,
counsel for Cu Unjieng filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and a notice of intention
to file a motion for reconsideration. An alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial was filed by
counsel on 13 July 1937. This was supplemented by an additional motion for reconsideration submitted
on 14 July 1937. The aforesaid motions were set for hearing on 31 July 1937, but said hearing was
postponed at the petition of counsel for Cu Unjieng because a motion for leave to intervene in the case
as amici curiae signed by 33 (34) attorneys had just been filed with the trial court. On 6 August 1937,
the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed a motion with the trial court for the issuance of an order of
execution of the judgment of this court in said case and forthwith to commit Cu Unjieng to jail in
obedience to said judgment. On 10 August 1937, Judge Vera issued an order requiring all parties
including the movants for intervention as amici curiae to appear before the court on 14 August 1937.
On the last-mentioned date, the Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for
execution of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae but, upon
objection of counsel for Cu Unjieng, he moved for the postponement of the hearing of both motions.
The judge thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on 21 August 1937, but proceeded to
consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as in order. Evidence as to the
circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted
to court was to have been heard on 19 August 1937. But at this juncture, HSBC and the People came to
the Supreme Court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an
interminable proceeding in the CFI of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano
Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him,
exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the judicial machinery
to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng." The
scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended upon the issuance of a temporary
restraining order by the Supreme Court on 21 August 1937.

Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General and Fiscal of the City of
Manila, is a proper party in present case.

Held: YES. The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the
City of Manila, is a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person
who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without
saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name
the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state
can challenge the validity of its own laws.

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, ET AL. vs. PETE PRADO

Facts; Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35
as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege
of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and othergovernment offices were withdrawn from
them.

In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it
becoming a law.

Issues; WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it
has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of
a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

- Violative of the Equal protection clause

Ruling: The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's
adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an
index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made
by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between
the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Brown v. Board of Education

In 1951, a class action suit was filed against the Board of Education of the City of Topeka, Kansas in
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs were thirteen Topeka parents
on behalf of their twenty children.[6]
The suit called for the school district to reverse its policy of racial segregation. Separate elementary
schools were operated by the Topeka Board of Education under an 1879 Kansas law, which permitted
(but did not require) districts to maintain separate elementary school facilities for black and white
students in twelve communities with populations over 15,000. The plaintiffs had been recruited by the
leadership of the Topeka NAACP. Notable among the Topeka NAACP leaders were the
chairman McKinley Burnett; Charles Scott, one of three serving as legal counsel for the chapter; and
Lucinda Todd.
The named plaintiff, Oliver L. Brown, was a parent, a welder in the shops of the Santa Fe Railroad, an
assistant pastor at his local church, and an African American.[7] He was convinced to join the lawsuit by
Scott, a childhood friend. Brown's daughter Linda, a third grader, had to walk six blocks to her school
bus stop to ride to Monroe Elementary, her segregated black school one mile (1.6 km) away, while
Sumner Elementary, a white school, was seven blocks from her house.[8][9]
As directed by the NAACP leadership, the parents each attempted to enroll their children in the closest
neighborhood school in the fall of 1951. They were each refused enrollment and directed to the
segregated schools. Linda Brown Thompson later recalled the experience in a 2004 PBS documentary:
. . . well. like I say, we lived in an integrated neighborhood and I had all of these playmates of
different nationalities. And so when I found out that day that I might be able to go to their
school, I was just thrilled, you know. And I remember walking over to Sumner school with my
dad that day and going up the steps of the school and the school looked so big to a smaller
child. And I remember going inside and my dad spoke with someone and then he went into the
inner office with the principal and they left me out . . . to sit outside with the secretary. And
while he was in the inner office, I could hear voices and hear his voice raised, you know, as the
conversation went on. And then he immediately came out of the office, took me by the hand
and we walked home from the school. I just couldn't understand what was happening because I
was so sure that I was going to go to school with Mona and Guinevere, Wanda, and all of my
playmates.[10]
The Kansas case, "Oliver Brown et al. v. The Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas," was named
after Oliver Brown as a legal strategy to have a man at the head of the roster. Also, it was felt by
lawyers with the National Chapter of the NAACP, that having Mr. Brown at the head of the roster
would be better received by the U.S. Supreme Court Justices because Mr. Brown had an intact,
complete family, as opposed to someone who was a single parent head of household[citation needed].
The thirteen plaintiffs were: Oliver Brown, Darlene Brown, Lena Carper, Sadie Emmanuel,
Marguerite Emerson, Shirley Fleming, Zelma Henderson, Shirley Hodison, Maude Lawton, Alma
Lewis, Iona Richardson, and Lucinda Todd.[11][12] The last surviving plaintiff, Zelma Henderson, died
in Topeka, on May 20, 2008, at the age of 88.[13][14]
The District Court ruled in favor of the Board of Education, citing the U.S. Supreme Court
precedent set in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which had upheld a state law requiring
"separate but equal" segregated facilities for blacks and whites in railway cars.[15] The three-judge
District Court panel found that segregation in public education has a detrimental effect upon
negro children, but denied relief on the ground that the negro and white schools in Topeka were
substantially equal with respect to buildings, transportation, curricular, and educational
qualifications of teachers.[16]
Holding
The key holding of the Court was that, even if segregated black and white schools were of equal
quality in facilities and teachers, segregation by itself was harmful to black students and
unconstitutional. They found that a significant psychological and social disadvantage was given to black
children from the nature of segregation itself, drawing on research conducted byKenneth Clark assisted
by June Shagaloff. This aspect was vital because the question was not whether the schools were
"equal", which under Plessy they nominally should have been, but whether the doctrine of separate was
constitutional. The justices answered with a strong "no":
Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical
facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities? We believe that it does... Segregation of white and colored children in
public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has
the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental
development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system... We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine
of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore,
we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are,
by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment.

VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG [86 SCRA 270; NO.L-29646; 10 NOV 1978]

Facts: The controverted Ordinance no. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February
22, 1968 and signed by Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful for any person not a citizen
of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employmentor to be engaged in any kind of trade
business or occupation within the city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the
Mayor of Manila and for other purposes.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, who was employed in Manila filed a petition praying for the writ of preliminary
injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said ordinance.

Issue: Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due processand equal protection clauses of the
Constitution.

Held: It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to enable aliens
generally to be employed in the city of Manila is not only for the purpose of regulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure anemployment permit from the
Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in processing and approval or disapproval of
application is regulatory in character, the second part which requires the payment of a sum of 50.00
pesos is not a regulatory but a revenue measure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the basic human right
of the people in the Philippines toengaged in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines
as a state is not obliged to admit aliens within it's territory, once an alien is admitted he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it
does not lay down any standard to guide the City Mayor in the issuance or denial of an
alien employment permit fee.

People of the Philippines vs Cayat

“Equal Protection” – Requisites of a Valid Classification – Bar from Drinking Gin

In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native non-Christians from drinking gin or any other
liquor outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the Cordillera, was caught with an
A-1-1 gin in violation of this Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be
imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the
said Act. He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal protection afforded by the
constitution. He said this an attempt to treat them with discrimination or “mark them as inferior or
less capable race and less entitled” will meet with their instant challenge. The law sought to
distinguish and classify native non-Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC
emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a group have the characteristics that distinguish
them from others. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The
requisites to be complied with are;

(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merely
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon “accident of birth or parentage.” The law,
then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as “an inferior or less capable race.” On the
contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a
recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by
their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no
equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture
and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of
placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality.

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886).
Facts
Yick Wo was imprisoned for operating a laundry in a wooden building in violation of a San Francisco
statute. That statute vested in the board of supervisors the discretion to grant or withhold licenses to
operate laundries in wooden buildings. Yick Wo had operated the laundry in the same building for 22
years and fire wardens and safety inspectors had inspected the premises and found them safe. The
board denied licenses to all Chinese-American applicants but denied only one of 80 non-Chinese
Americans.

Yick Wo was fined ten dollars and was imprisoned for failing to pay. Yick Wo sued the Supreme Court of
California for a writ of habeas corpus and the Court found that the board of supervisors had acted
within the scope of its authority and denied the petition. The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari.

Issues
1) May a city enforce an ordinance in a racially discriminatory manner? 2) Does a law or ordinance
granting a person or entity absolute discretion to grant or deny permission to carry on a lawful business
violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?

Holding and Rule (Matthews)

1) No. A city may not enforce ordinances in a racially discriminatory manner. 2) Yes. A law or
ordinance granting a person or entity absolute discretion to grant or deny permission to carry on a
lawful business violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
If the statute were discriminatory on its face the court would have applied strict scrutiny. In this case
however the statute was not discriminatory on its face and the court looked to rational basis. The
statute was ostensibly intended to reduce the risk of fire; however the court also noted that only
Chinese laundries were affected by the statute. The court concluded that the statute was intended to
reduce Chinese laundries rather than the risk of fire and ruled that the statute was invalid under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Valmonte vs. de Villa [GR 83988, 24 May 1990]

En Banc, Padilla (J): 10 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission
of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose
of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an
atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the National Capital
Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various
parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Ricardo C. Valmonte and the Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People’s Right (ULAP) filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order witht the Supreme Court, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila or elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the
alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints,
for the protection of the people. They aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their
cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at
dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety
increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning
the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit
himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was
stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search warrant. They
further contend that the said checkpoints give Gen. Renato de Villa and the National Capital Region
District Command a blanket authority to make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or
court order in violation of the Constitution. In the Supreme Court’s decision dated 29 September 1989,
Valmonte’s and ULAP’s petition for prohibition, seeking the declaration of the checkpoints as
unconstitutional and their dismantling and/or banning, was dismissed. Valmonte and ULAP filed the
motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of said decision.

Issue: Whether checkpoints serve as a blanket authority for government officials for warrantless search
and seizure and, thus, are violative of the Constitution.

Held: Nowhere in the Supreme Court’s decision of 24 May 1990 did the Court legalize all checkpoints,
i.e. at all times and under all circumstances. What the Court declared is, that checkpoints are not
illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is
on the balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be
allowed and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that when the situation clears
and such grave perils are removed, checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. Recent and
on-going events have pointed to the continuing validity and need for checkpoints manned by either
military or police forces. Although no one can be compelled, under our libertarian system, to share
with the present government its ideological beliefs and practices, or commend its political, social and
economic policies or performance; one must concede to it the basic right to defend itself from its
enemies and, while in power, to pursue its program of government intended for public welfare; and in
the pursuit of those objectives, the government has the equal right, under its police power, to select
the reasonable means and methods for best achieving them. The checkpoint is evidently one of such
means it has selected. Admittedly, the routine checkpoint stop does intrude, to a certain extent, on
motorist’s right to “free passage without interruption”, but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it
involves only a brief detention of travellers during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine
checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable search. These
routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. Further, vehicles are generally
allowed to pass these checkpoints after a routine inspection and a few questions. If vehicles are
stopped and extensively searched, it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable
belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the
vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. By the same token, a warrantless search of
incoming and outgoing passengers, at the arrival and departure areas of an international airport, is a
practice not constitutionally objectionable because it is founded on public interest, safety, and
necessity. Lastly, the Court’s decision on checkpoints does not, in any way, validate nor condone
abuses committed by the military manning the checkpoints. The Court’s decision was concerned with
power, i.e. whether the government employing the military has the power to install said checkpoints.
Once that power is acknowledged, the Court’s inquiry ceases. True, power implies the possibility of its
abuse. But whether there is abuse in a particular situation is a different “ball game” to be resolved in
the constitutional arena. In any situation, where abuse marks the operation of a checkpoint, the
citizen is not helpless. For the military is not above but subject to the law. And the courts exist to see
that the law is supreme. Soldiers, including those who man checkpoints, who abuse their authority act
beyond the scope of their authority and are, therefore, liable criminally and civilly for their abusive
acts.

BLAS F. OPLE, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES et al

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998]

FACTS OF THE CASE:

• President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order (A.O.) 308 on December 12, 1996 entiltled
“Adoption of NationalComputerized Identification Reference System” or commonly known as
“Natioanal ID System”.

• Senator Blas F. Ople filed a petition before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of
the said executive issuance on two important grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers
against further erosion.

ISSUE: DOES A.0 308 VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY? SUPREME COURT:
Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass
constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy.
A.O. 308 is so vague. The vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put
our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger. There are no vital safeguards. A.O. No. 308
should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of
data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General
claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of
population data for development planning." 54 This is an admission that the Population Reference
Number (PRN) will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with
remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308
can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other
than the identification of the individual through his PRN. The potential for misuse of the data to be
gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said
administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency
to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be
recorded -- whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's
file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and
liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN,
the better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic
linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. We can even grant, arguendo,
that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other basic personal information
about the individual. Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional
infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information
gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what
circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty
the integrity of the information. Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies
access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the
access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without
fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the
data stored within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that
personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes. The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the
individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also
enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against
selfincrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,
biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks
control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data
encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent. Excerpts from the
concurring opinion of the Supreme Court justices:

RIGHT TO PRIVACY RECOGNIZED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

Hereunder are the provisions in the 1987 Constitution which recognize our

Right to Privacy :
Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:

"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law." Other
facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: 34

"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

xxx xxx xxx.

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Sec. 17. No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Personal Analysis: A.O. 308 was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court en banc for

reasons above stated. It bears stressing that the bulk of discussion in the case focused more on the
issue of infringement of the right to privacy. As can be gleaned from A.O. 308, the provisions were so
general that there were no clear and vital guidelines to safeguard the information stored in the
Identification Card. Had President Fidel V. Ramos issued a more complete and detailed guidelines
providing for the metes and bounds of the ID System, the decision could have been otherwise. Even the
argument of the respondents that rules and regulations would be issued by the committee later, the
court still reject the same. The court said.: The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot
remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its
face, A.O. No. 308 gives the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) virtually unfettered
discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the ID System. In one press conference last month,
Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio Bunye said that there is really no need to pass a law to push through
with the plan of the National ID System. An executive issuance by the President would suffice provided
this time the said order will now be detailed, comprehensive and contains all the vital safeguards.
From his statement, it can be deduced therefrom that the reservation and backlash by the supreme
court on the on the Ople case (A.O 308) have been taken into consideration by Malacanang.

In RE: Umil, Umil vs. Ramos

[GR 81567, 9 July 1990]; also Roque vs. de Villa [GR 84581-82], In RE: Anonuevo. Anonuevo vs. Ramos
[GR 84583-84], In RE: Ocaya. Ocaya vs. Aguirre [GR 83162], In RE: Espiritu. Espiritu vs. Lim [GR 85727],
and In RE: Nazareno. Nazareno vs. Station Commander of Muntinlupa Police Station [GR 86332]
En Banc, Per Curiam: 11 concur
Facts: [GR 81567] On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital
Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit
(liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital
records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining
Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988,
Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the
CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as
T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a consequence of this positive identification, Dural
was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with
the crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.” (Criminal Case C-
30112; no bail recommended). On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as
defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on
behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus on 9 February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano,
and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the
parties were heard on 15 February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted
bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act
had been filed against them, and they were accordingly released.

Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion.

Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOM
soldiers nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day
after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified. However, Dural
was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can
be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of
continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow
the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail
if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or any
other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government
and duly constituted authorities.

Alih vs Castro
GL. 69401
Facts; Zona was conducted by the men of Maj. Gen Castro in a compoud where petioners reside and
conducted illegal search and thereafter seized guns from them. The order was carried on by his Castro's
men with the contention that the petitioners are involved in the latest killing of the town's mayor
Cesar Climaco.

Issue; Is the warrantless search and seizure legal?

Held; The Supreme Court declared those seized in custodia legis and declared that the operation
conducted by Maj. Gen. Castro was ILLEGAL. The respondents have all the time to obtain a search
warrant granted that they have about 10 trial courts. The SC also held the protection of the petitioner's
human rights as stated in Art IV Sec 3 and 4 of the 1973 Constitution regarding illegal search and
seizure. The presumption of innocence of the petitioners should be observed and that they cannot be
subjected to self-incriminating instances like paraffin tests, photographing and finger printing.

As penned by J. Cruz in this case, "The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in
peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government."

Stonehill vs Diokno (20 SCRA 383)

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally,
and/or corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal
properties “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective
residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners
then were subjected to deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the
searches and seizures as well as the admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June
29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held:

a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being
general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the
things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims,
caprice or passion of peace officers.
 b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a
poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the
circumstances.
c. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from
the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different
from that of the corporation.

Camara vs. Municipal Court of the City and Country of San Francisco [387 US 523, 5
June 1967]
White (J)

Facts: On 6 November 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco
Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for
possible violations of the city’s Housing Code. The building’s manager informed the inspector that
Camara, lessee of the ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence.
Claiming that the building’s occupancy permit did not allow residential use of the ground floor, the
inspector confronted Camara and demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises. Camara
refused to allow the inspection because the inspector lacked a search warrant. The inspector returned
on November 8, again without a warrant, and Camara again refused to allow an inspection. A citation
was then mailed ordering Camara to appear at the district attorney’s office. When Camara failed to
appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22. They informed Camara that he was
required by law to permit an inspection under 503 of the Housing Code. Camara nevertheless refused
the inspectors access to his apartment without a search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint was filed
charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of 507 of the Code. Camara was
arrested on December 2nd released on bail. When his demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied,
Camara filed the petition for a writ of prohibition in a California Superior Court alleging that he was
awaiting trial on a criminal charge of violating the San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit a
warrantless inspection of his residence, and that a writ of prohibition should issue to the criminal court
because the ordinance authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on its face. The Superior Court
denied the writ, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme Court of California denied a
petition for hearing.

Issue: Whether Camara can validly refuse the inspection of his dwelling by the Division of Housing
Inspection.

Held: The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless
code-enforcement inspection of his personal residence. The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment,
which is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of
“unreasonable” searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. With certain carefully defined exceptions, an
unconsented warrantless search of private property is “unreasonable.” Administrative searches of the
kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment,
that such searches when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional
safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in
Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify
so substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Contrary to the assumption of
Frank v. Maryland, Fourth Amendment interests are not merely “peripheral” where municipal fire,
health, and housing inspection programs are involved whose purpose is to determine the existence of
physical conditions not complying with local ordinances. Those programs, moreover, are enforceable by
criminal process, as is refusal to allow an inspection. Warrantless administrative searches cannot be
justified on the grounds that they make minimal demands on occupants; that warrants in such cases
are unfeasible; or that area inspection programs could not function under reasonable search-warrant
requirements. Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area code-
enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector’s belief that a particular dwelling violates
the code but on the reasonableness of the enforcement agency’s appraisal of conditions in the area as
a whole. The standards to guide the magistrate in the issuance of such search warrants will necessarily
vary with the municipal program being enforced. Nothing here is intended to foreclose prompt
inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. On
the other hand, in the case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling urgency to inspect
at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most citizens allow inspections of their property
without a warrant. Thus, as a practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement
that a warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally be
sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen complaint or there is other
satisfactory reason for securing immediate entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure
does not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations, of
authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect. Herein, Camara has been charged with a crime
for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was no
emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building in an
attempt to obtain Camara’s consent to search. Yet no warrant was obtained and thus appellant was
unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, the
inspectors entered the public portion of the building with the consent of the landlord, through the
building’s manager, but the City/County does not contend that such consent was sufficient to authorize
inspection of Camara’s premises. Assuming the facts to be as the parties have alleged, camara had a
constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may not
constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It appears from the opinion of
the District Court of Appeal that under these circumstances a writ of prohibition will issue to the
criminal court under California law.

Terry vs. Ohio [392 US 1, 10 June 1968]

Warren (J)

Facts: Martin McFadden, a Cleveland police detective, on a downtown beat which he had been
patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (Terry and Richard Chilton) on a street corner. He
saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, strolling down Huron Road,
pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each
completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which
they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of “casing a job, a
stick-up,” the officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in
front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their
names. The men “mumbled something,” whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his
outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The officer
ordered the three into the store. He removed Terry’s overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the
three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz
and seized a revolver from Chilton’s outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer
garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or
under Terry’s or Chilton’s outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police
station. Terry and Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons. The defense moved to
suppress the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been
seized during a search incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and
admitted the weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that Terry and
Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the officer for his
own protection had the right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that
they might be armed. The court distinguished between an investigatory “stop” and an arrest, and
between a “frisk” of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime.
Terry and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that “no substantial constitutional question” was involved.

Issue: Whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person and subject him to a limited
search for weapons unless there is probable cause for an arrest.

Held: The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment, “protects people, not places,” and therefore applies as much to
the citizen on the streets as well as at home or elsewhere. The issue in this case is not the abstract
propriety of the police conduct but the admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by
the search and seizure. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of
legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques; and this Court’s approval of such techniques
should not discourage remedies other than the exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which that
is not an effective sanction. The Fourth Amendment applies to “stop and frisk” procedures such as
those followed here. Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has “seized” that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A careful exploration
of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing in an attempt to find weapons is a “search” under that
Amendment. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in
believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons
of the person believed by him to be armed and dangerous regardless of whether he has probable cause
to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the individual is armed. Though the
police must whenever practicable secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, that procedure
cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat
is required. The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in light of the
particular circumstances against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in
believing that the action taken was appropriate. The officer here was performing a legitimate function
of investigating suspicious conduct when he decided to approach Terry and his companions. An officer
justified in believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is
armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take necessary measures to determine whether
that person is carrying a weapon. A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must
be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. An officer may make an intrusion short of
arrest where he has reasonable apprehension of danger before being possessed of information
justifying arrest. The officer’s protective seizure of Terry and his companions and the limited search
which he made were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. The actions of Terry and his
companions were consistent with the officer’s hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight
robbery and were armed. The officer’s search was confined to what was minimally necessary to
determine whether the men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of
protecting himself and others nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of weapons. Herein,
Officer McFadden patted down the outer clothing of Terry and his two companions. He did not place
his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until he had felt weapons, and
then he merely reached for and removed the guns. He did not conduct a general exploratory search for
whatever evidence of criminal activity he might find. Thus, the revolver seized from Terry was
properly admitted in evidence against him. At the time McFadden seized Terry and searched him for
weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that Terry was armed and dangerous,
and it was necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to discover the
true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized. The policeman carefully restricted his
search to what was appropriate to the discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each case of
this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts. Where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from
whom they were taken.

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas [GR 45358, 29 January 1937]
First Division, Imperial (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of
Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house
in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a moneylender, charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the
law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to
the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a
reliable person. Upon the affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject
matter of the petition, ordering the search of the Alvarez’s house at any time of the day or night, the
seizure of the books and documents and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in
accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered Alvarez’s
store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized and took possession of the following
articles: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order
books, 4 notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4 stubs, 48 stubs of
purchases of copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles of bills of lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of
stubs of purchases of copra, 2 packages of correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez,
14 bundles of invoices and other papers, many documents and loan contracts with security and
promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC). The search for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition
of Alvarez who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the agents seized even the
originals of the documents. As the articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who issued
the search warrant, Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a motion on 8 June 1936, praying that the
agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit all the seized articles
in the office of the clerk of court and that said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having
disobeyed the order of the court. On said date the court issued an order directing Siongco to deposit all
the articles seized within 24 hours from the receipt of notice thereof and giving him a period of 5 days
within which to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court. On 10 June, Attorney
Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order of the 8th
of said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain the articles seized for
a period of 30 days for the necessary investigation. On June 25, the court issued an order requiring
agent Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the
proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory duly verified by oath of all the articles seized.
On July 2, the attorney for the petitioner filed a petition alleging that the search warrant issued was
illegal and that it had not yet been returned to date together with the proceedings taken in connection
therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled, that an order be issued directing the return of
all the articles seized to Alvarez, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of
court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On September 10, the court issued
an order holding: that the search warrant was obtained and issued in accordance with the law, that it
had been duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled, and that agent Siongco did
not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief of the
Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show cause, if any, within the unextendible period of 2 days from the
date of notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory should not be
returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a
motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained for the
purpose of conducting an investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by Alvarez. On
October 10, said official again filed another motion alleging that he needed 60 days to examine the
documents and papers seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16,
23, 25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said period of 60 days. In an order
of October 16, the court granted him the period of 60 days to investigate said 19 documents. Alvarez,
herein, asks that the search warrant as well as the order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board
to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the articles in
question be returned to him.

Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the
affidavit of agent Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts
which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof
through mere information secured from a person whom he considered reliable, and that it is illegal as
it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant.

Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58
require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the
search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a
party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is
sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is
made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth
of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose
thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking
the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an
affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that
perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which
served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of
the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure
of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to
attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the
judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent
Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. Neither the
Constitution nor General Orders 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the depositions of
the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter.
The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant
or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the
affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely
hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the
applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was
based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.